
THE CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
SEVENTH EDITION, 1930

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

(ACT V OF 1898)

As amended up to date

1930

WITH THE ORDINANCES OF 1930.


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PREFACE TO THE SEVENTH EDITION

As I have observed in a previous edition of this work, the sweeping Amendments of 1921 have not been able to cope with the tremendous task of removing the divergences of opinion among the High Courts which exist under almost every important section of the Code. Perhaps the Committee which sat on the Bills of 1914 and 1921 had decided to direct their attention more towards defining the policy of the law than attempting to reconcile the conflicts of opinion which they accepted as a matter of course. The result is, that Bills are being introduced in almost every Session of the Assembly to patch up the differences, but unfortunately very few of them have met with the approval of the Legislature, which has remained silent during the last three years so far any amendment of this Code is concerned. The labours of the commentator are considerably hampered by these conflicts of rulings, and any attempt to reconcile them is a hopeless task for him, and will remain so, unless the Legislature decides to undertake a general revision and consolidation of the whole Code with this object in view.

In preparing this edition I have corrected the case law down to June 1930, and while adding and incorporating the new rulings which number about 1,000, I have not failed to make a careful scrutiny into the older rulings in the light of the various Amendment Acts; nor have I omitted to consult the several Commentaries published on this subject in recent years. In compliance with the request of mofassil lawyers, I have given parallel references, as far as possible, to non-official provincial Reports, as well as to the Criminal Law Journal and the newly-started Criminal Cases.

Lastly, I have added the various ORDINANCES promulgated by the Viceroy in 1930, together with His Excellency's statements thereon.

15th August, 1930.

B. B. MITRA.

PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION.

In bringing out the fourth edition of this book, the author begs to convey his heartfelt thanks to the legal profession for their kind appreciation of this humble work, which is passing

ABBREVIATIONS.

A. I. R.	All India Reporter.
All.	.	..	Indian Law Reports, Allahabad Series.
A. L. J.	.	.	Allahabad Law Journal
A. W. N.	.	.	Allahabad Weekly Notes
B. L. R.	.	.	Bengal Law Reports
Bom.	.	..	Indian Law Reports, Bombay Series.
B. H. C. R.*	Bombay High Court Reports
Bom. L. R.	.	.	Bombay Law Reporter
Bur L. J.	..	.	Burma Law Journal.
Bur L. R.	Burma Law Reports.
Bur. L. T.	.	.	Burma Law Times.
Bur S. R.	.	.	Burma Sessions Reports
Cal.	.	.	Indian Law Reports, Calcutta Series.
C. L. J.	.	.	Calcutta Law Journal
C. L. R.	.	.	Calcutta Law Reports
C. W. N.	..	.	Calcutta Weekly Notes
C. P. L. R.*	.	.	Central Provinces Law Reports
Cr. C.	..	.	Criminal Cases
Cr. L. J.	Criminal Law Journal of India.
I. C.	Indian Cases
Ind. Jur.	Indian Jurist
L. B. R.	..	.	Lower Burma Rulings
L. W.	Law Weekly (Madras)
Lah.	Indian Law Reports, Lahore Series.
Lah. L. J.	Lahore Law Journal.
Lock.	..	.	Indian Law Reports, Lucknow Series.
Mad.	.	.	Indian Law Reports, Madras Series.
Mad. Jur.	Madras Jurist.
M. H. C. R.	Madras High Court Reports
M. L. J.	Madras Law Journal.
M. L. T.	Madras Law Times.
M. W. N.	Madras Weekly Notes
N. L. J.	Nagpur Law Journal
N. L. R.	Nagpur Law Reports.
N. W. P.	North West Provinces High Court Reports.
O. C.	Oudh Cases
O. L. J.	Oudh Law Journal.
O. S. C.	Oudh Sessions Cases
O. W. N.	Oudh Weekly Notes
Pat.	Indian Law Reports, Patna Series.
P. L. J.	Patna Law Journal
P. L. T.	Patna Law Times
P. L. W.	Patna Law Weekly.
P. L. R.	Punjab Law Reporter.
†P. R.*	Punjab Record.
†P. W. R.*	Punjab Weekly Reporter.
Ratanlal	.	..	Ratanlal's Unreported Criminal Cases (Bombay).
S. L. R.	Sind Law Reporter.
U. B. R.	Upper Burma Rulings
Weir	Weir's Criminal Rulings (Madras).
W. R.*	Weekly Reporter (Calcutta).

* The Civil and Criminal portions of these Reports have different paginations. The pages of these Reports referred to in this book should be read as pages of their Criminal portions.

† In the Punjab Record and Punjab Weekly Reporter the cases are known by their numbers and not by the pages on which they are printed.

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26 All	1		1254	"	575		135
"	144		447	30 All	41	387,	407
"	177	697, 699, 718,	1003	"	52		1184
"	183		812	"	58		620
"	189		302	"	60		206
"	190		231	"	66	27,	968
"	195		747	"	109		631
"	197		564	"	116		1168
"	202		1336	"	331		428
				"	334		1083

			NOTE No				NOTE No
30 All	364 .	339, 351, 359	882	36 All.	168 . .		1087
"	540 . .		447	"	209 ...		325
31 All.	150 .		656	"	222 ...		13
"	317 ...		346	"	233 ...		447
"	453 ...		997	"	262 ...	241, 279, 526	
"	606 ...		754	"	315 ...	708, 1012, 1018	
32 All	57 . .		629, 634	"	378 .		1171
"	74 .		652	"	382 . .	241, 806	
"	78 ...		998, 1211	"	403 ...	1205, 1208	
"	153 .		754	"	468 ..	52	
"	219 ...		557, 565	"	481 .	888	
"	397 ...		232, 233	"	485 ...	1148	
"	571 ...	1428, 1431		"	495 ...	74, 310	
"	635 ..	1370, 1373		"	496 ...	1051	
"	642 ..		728	"	513 ...	1390	
33 All	36 . .		227	37 All	20 ...	237, 1384	
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"	163 . .		1243	"	30 ...	286, 294	
"	385 .		1114	"	31 . .	1439	
"	396 ...		581, 734	"	33 ...	290	
"	510 ...		4, 552	"	107 ...	1090	
"	514 ..		312, 313	"	127 ...	998	
"	578 .		221	"	230 ...	223	
"	624 . .		1145	"	286 ...	610	
"	771 ...		4, 552	"	331 ...	963	
34 All.	115 ...		631, 633	"	344 . .	1252	
"	118 ...		44	"	353 ...	215	
"	197 . .		1245, 1246	"	355 ..	703	
"	203 ...		810, 811	"	419 .	997	
"	267 .		1239	"	471 ...	1109	
"	354 ...		234	"	628 ...	660	
"	393 . .		552	"	654 ...	426, 1355	
"	449 . .		557	38 All	14 . .	521	
"	451 ...		620	"	29 .	1331	
"	487 ..		389, 1370	"	32 ...	1244	
"	522 ..		628	"	42 ...	726, 745	
"	533 .		1372	"	134 ...	1055	
"	654 ...		614	"	169 ...	626, 628	
35 All.	5 .		557	"	276 ...	654	
"	8 ...		1012	"	284 ...	1262	
"	29 . .		1184	"	311 ...	780	
"	63 . .		313, 1101	"	393 ...	1051, 1132	
"	78 . .		85, 1108	"	395 ...	1115	
"	103 . .		858, 860, 862	"	457 ...	755	
"	154 ...		896, 1042, 1403	"	458 ...	755	
"	173 ...		1351	"	468 ...	236	
"	260 .		126	"	695 . .	1248, 1252, 1254	
"	374 ...		890	39 All.	91 ...	1254	
"	407 ...		1095	"	139 ...	258	
"	570 ...		115, 116	"	293 . .	1090, 1096	
36 All	4 ...		1409	"	305 ...	961, 963	
"	6 ...		681, 1177	"	348 ...	1050	
"	13 ...		681, 1177	"	399 ...	1040, 1262	
"	53 ...		811	"	466 . .	313	
"	129 ...		234, 406	"	549 .	1213	
"	132 ..		295, 1180, 1184	"	612 ...	447	
"	143 . .		599, 1394	"	623 ...	757	
"	147 .			"	657 ...	631	
"	166 ...						

		NOTE No.			NOTE No.
40 All.	32 ...	1259	44 All.	759 ..	1129
"	39 ...	307	45 All.	11 ...	1170, 1218
"	79 ...	812	"	17 ...	998, 1211
"	116 ...	1237, 1259	"	25 ...	1356
"	138 ...	1184	"	58 ...	798, 1089
"	140 ..	313	"	109 .	270, 271, 272,
"	144 .	623			274, 290
"	307	1018	"	124 ...	977, 1406
"	364 ...	447	45 All	128 ..	1204
"	372 ..	289	"	135 ...	615
"	416 .	1184	"	140 ...	634
"	577 ..	144	"	143 ...	1055, 1207
"	610 ...	809	"	145 ..	992, 996, 997, 1000
"	615 ..	704, 807	"	162 ...	442
"	641 .	13	"	166 ..	519, 1037
41 All	60 ..	1331	"	223 ...	778, 780, 783
"	116 ...	1019, 1020	"	226 ..	951
"	217 ..	1150	"	272 ...	1262
"	231 ...	289	"	363 ..	241, 806
"	322 ...	806	"	404 .	435
"	452 .	575, 581	"	474 ..	811
"	454 ..	829	"	485 .	746, 1092
"	483 .	122	"	526 ..	381, 1168
"	503 .	241	"	553 ..	1361
"	587	1168, 1171, 1210	"	594 ..	1138, 1148
"	651 .	313	"	633 ..	507
42 All	67	202, 215	"	656 .	335, 357, 358, 1168
"	89	581	"	700	19, 1370, 1381
"	128 .	1179	"	749 .	257, 276
"	130 .	622	46 All	109 ...	236
"	137 ...	1228	"	167 ...	34, 1370
"	214 ...	427	"	235 ..	295, 1180
"	314 ..	96	"	236 .	952
"	345 .	221, 228	"	265 .	938, 939
"	474 .	998	"	446 .	857, 859, 1400
"	522 ..	727, 974	"	537 ..	703
"	563 ...	310	"	611 ...	1238
"	646	257, 279, 280	"	623 ..	1352
"	649 ...	35	"	828	1105, 1439
43 All	25	942	"	851 .	1171, 1198, 1238,
"	125 ..	872			1252
"	186 ...	114, 272	"	877 .	1284, 1290
"	281	859	"	879 ...	458
"	372 .	227	"	906 ..	620
"	402	241	47 All	59 .	84
"	497 ...	1168	"	114 ..	614
44 All	57	703, 715	"	147 ..	967, 1413
"	157 ...	38	"	205 ..	478B
"	276 ...	780	"	268 .	638
"	332	1219	"	276 .	898
"	401 ..	1149, 1150, 1214	"	280 .	480
"	538	76	"	284 ..	1048, 1094
"	540 ...	754	"	288	1371, 1389
"	550	666	"	298 ..	202A
"	575 .	361	"	341	344
"	614 .	313	"	353 ..	1438, 1439
"	642	1239	"	409	1199, 1219, 1244
"	657 .	1336	"	411 .	1377
"	691	1181			

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"	461	...	271, 272	"	678	...	271, 276
"	745	...	1044	23 A. L. J.	18	...	251
12 A. L. J.	262	...	286	"	21	...	1208, 1433A
"	336	...	257	"	35	...	611, 614A, 1408
"	937	...	272	"	41	...	406
13 A. L. J.	1046	...	272, 294	"	43	...	324
"	1055	...	272, 294	"	187	...	357A
14 A. L. J.	215	...	294	"	300	...	235
"	268	...	290	"	719	...	516, 517
"	279	...	273	"	1037	...	521
"	430	...	231	"	1053	...	221
"	769	...	230, 236	24 A. L. J.	80	...	1009
"	794	...	234	"	112	...	320, 356
15 A. L. J.	237	...	49	"	122	...	1237, 1248
"	848	...	302, 303	"	133	...	701, 702, 703, 715
16 A. L. J.	263	...	302	"	148	...	560A
"	279	...	232, 233	"	151	...	1109
"	280	...	225	"	155	...	651
"	503	...	293	"	165	...	361
"	567	...	280	"	167	...	818
"	776	...	263	"	168	...	736
17 A. L. J.	335	...	292	"	170	...	811
"	432	...	250	"	173	...	215
"	867	...	1089	"	180	...	1096
18 A. L. J.	50	...	14	"	217	...	1254
"	85	...	1092	"	221	...	812, 815
"	157	...	233	"	224	...	1171, 1198
"	321	...	240	"	228	...	1439
"	324	...	301	"	239	...	751
"	1135	...	1181, 1184	"	317	...	271
"	1140	...	398	"	318	...	881
"	1149	...	182, 183	"	327	...	296, 1333
19 A. L. J.	39	...	272	"	329	...	981
"	77	...	42	"	361	...	357A, 358
"	310	...	84	"	368	...	1257
"	355	...	42	"	383	...	455
"	374	...	1000	"	414	...	1219
"	382	...	1204	"	506	...	1142, 1143
"	610	...	76	"	512	...	828
"	668	...	276	25 A. L. J.	191	...	702
"	947	...	1156, 1160	"	346	...	1024
"	951	...	275	"	393	...	272, 276
20 A. L. J.	49	...	258	"	493	...	806
"	520	...	280	"	555	...	628
"	523	...	237	"	559	...	625
"	624	...	241	"	749	...	288
"	760	...	301	"	818	...	807
21 A. L. J.	137	...	1044	"	846	...	821
"	513	...	257	"	1010	...	1224
"	621	...	563	26 A. L. J.	46	...	1246, 1248
"	791	...	113, 116	"	76	...	1200
"	825	...	14	"	86	...	325, 326, 331
"	839	...	224	"	107	...	144
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"	847	...	247	"	160	...	1092, 1093, 1094
"	912	...	564				

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26 A L J.	196	...	977	6 Bom.	14	...	968, 1127
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"	331	...	143	"	288	...	519
"	363	...	1310	"	402	...	238
"	398	...	288	"	479	...	1271
"	405	...	336	"	622	...	578
"	519	...	271, 272, 273, 291	"	670	...	334
"	623	...	784	7 Bom.	42	...	316, 317
"	703	...	525A	"	180	...	1186
27 A L J	227	...	953, 964	"	303	...	76
"	397	...	1216	8 Bom.	197	...	1099, 1208
"	509	...	938	"	200	...	731, 735, 736, 1166
"	512	...	1181	"	216	...	499
"	514	...	1168	"	307	...	1090, 1400
"	520	...	1299	"	312	...	549
"	616	...	1376	"	338	...	1365
"	927	...	1310, 1315	"	575	...	1353
"	981	...	251	9 Bom.	40	...	24, 42, 1288
"	1056	...	785, 1094	"	400	...	50, 1016, 1171, 1191
"	1208	...	1284	"	131	...	1365, 1368
I. L. R. Bombay Series.				"	172	...	586, 1376
1 Bom.	10	...	938	"	173	...	586
"	50	...	554, 558, 561	"	244	...	4
"	64	...	826, 1224	"	288	...	647, 1402
"	175	...	812	"	333	...	1383
"	214	...	761	10 Bom.	124	...	730, 747
"	219	...	519, 1036	"	131	...	854, 1183
"	223	...	1113	"	174	...	251, 271, 275, 291
"	311	...	719	"	176	...	1055, 1167
"	339	...	1270	"	181	...	8, 1092
"	340	...	573	"	185	...	1268
"	462	...	886	"	186	...	4, 559, 561, 577
"	475	...	956	"	190	...	950, 955, 983
"	610	...	955, 983	"	196	...	1010
"	630	...	1342	"	197	...	1342
"	639	...	1060	"	199	...	794, 809
2 Bom.	61	...	1124, 1142	"	258	...	4
"	481	...	632, 644	"	274	...	36, 1369, 1383
"	525	...	935	"	319	...	705, 956, 1406
"	534	...	1097	"	340	...	652
"	564	...	1163, 1203	"	497	...	938
"	643	...	512	"	512	...	1085
"	653	...	803	11 Bom.	372	...	701, 702
3 Bom.	12	...	506	"	375	...	344
"	150	...	1116	"	438	...	632
4 Bom.	15	...	1040	"	584	...	464
"	101	...	1053, 1162	"	657	...	502
"	204	...	1010	"	659	...	22, 499, 622
"	287	...	1258	12 Bom.	36	...	625
"	357	...	643	"	63	...	1262
"	479	...	622	"	161	...	586, 668
5 Bom.	85	...	1112	"	377	...	117A, 1203
"	262	...	970	"	561	...	18
"	338	...	558, 1319	13 Bom.	109	...	14, 614
"	405	...	1088	"	147	...	579
				"	168	...	109, 158
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14 Bom.	25	...	466, 474	21 Bom.	495	...	9, 484A, 509, 516, 1038
"	115	...	956, 1210	"	536	...	13
"	165	...	379	22 Bom.	112	...	635, 637, 1402
"	227	...	4, 580	"	235	...	509
"	331	...	1168, 1210	"	549	...	604, 1314, 1393
"	381	...	21	"	596	...	502
"	436	...	908	"	711	...	803, 1090
"	555	...	1299	"	714	...	329
"	572	...	791, 1429	"	717	...	1416
15 Bom.	66	...	882, 982	"	759	...	1112
"	152	...	418	"	760	...	1148
"	349	...	1116, 1204	"	844	...	1342, 1345
"	369	...	915	"	934	...	805
"	452	...	930, 938, 939	"	936	...	22, 622
"	488	...	1126, 1315	"	949	13, 187, 193, 392, 1053	325, 357
"	491	...	725, 743	"	988	...	237, 258, 529, 986, 991
"	514	...	872, 883, 890	23 Bom	32	...	1053, 1162
16 Bom	159	...	53, 545	"	50	...	904, 983
"	165	...	915	"	213	...	516
"	200	...	1402	"	221	...	515, 881, 913, 915
"	269	...	1274, 1283	"	316	...	1148
"	274	...	1383	"	439	...	1290
"	307	...	1299	"	484	...	1433
"	368	...	859	"	490	...	718, 958, 962
"	372	...	225, 293	"	493	...	1357, 1359
"	414	...	732, 735, 902, 1119	"	494	...	933
"	580	...	3, 695, 829	"	696	...	78A, 761
"	661	...	3, 295, 241, 904, 984	"	706	...	559, 581
"	729	...	989, 1242	"	527	...	438, 447
17 Bom.	260	...	761	24 Bom.	287	...	241, 806
"	369	...	734, 769	"	527	...	639
"	485	...	510	25 Bom.	48	...	652, 997
"	731	...	21, 858	"	90	...	517
"	748	...	1342, 1363, 1365	"	151	...	1288
18 Bom	97	...	869	"	168	...	389, 410, 447
"	364	...	901, 909	"	176	...	1304
"	380	...	1271	"	179	...	518
"	442	...	1431	"	422	...	553
"	468	...	15, 1292	"	543	...	961, 962
"	581	...	719, 1237, 1259	"	636	...	1123
"	636	...	148, 149	"	675	...	883, 890
"	751	...	1148	"	680	...	1345
19 Bom	51	...	585, 1119, 1141	"	694	...	1012
"	105	...	559	"	702	...	16, 485, 582, 805
"	195	...	882	26 Bom	50	...	956
"	612	...	7, 11	"	150	...	428
"	668	...	1368	"	193	...	843
"	714	...	1163	"	353	...	20, 1307
"	728	...	515	"	418	...	665, 1365
"	732	...	1054, 1162	"	533	...	14, 1251, 1254
"	735	...	918, 928, 931	"	552	...	701, 707, 1208
"	749	...	1124, 1152, 1319	"	785	...	615
20 Bom.	145	...	1111	27 Bom	130	...	756, 757
"	215	...	928, 930, 935, 938	"	135	...	
"	502	...	1429				

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26 A. L. J.	196	977	6 Bom	14	968, 1127
"	328	808	"	285	1319
"	331	143	"	288	519
"	363	1310	"	402	238
"	398	288	"	479	1271
"	405	336	"	622	578
"	519	271, 272, 273, 291	"	670	334
"	623	784	7 Bom	42	316, 317
"	703	525A	"	180	1186
27 A. L. J.	227	953, 964	"	303	76
"	397	1216	8 Bom	197	1099, 1208
"	509	938	"	200	731, 735, 736, 1166
"	512	1181	"	216	499
"	514	1168	"	307	1090, 1400
"	520	1299	"	312	549
"	616	1376	"	338	1365
"	927	1310, 1315	"	575	1353
"	981	251	9 Bom	40	24, 42, 1288
"	1056	785, 1094	"	400	50, 1016, 1171, 1191
"	1208	1284	"	131	1365, 1368
I. L. R. Bombay Series.			"	172	586, 1376
1 Bom.	10	938	"	173	586
"	50	554, 558, 561	"	244	4
"	64	826, 1224	"	288	647, 1402
"	175	812	"	333	1383
"	214	761	10 Bom.	124	730, 747
"	219	519, 1036	"	131	854, 1183
"	223	1113	"	174	251, 271, 275, 291
"	311	719	"	176	1055, 1167
"	339	1270	"	181	8, 1092
"	340	573	"	185	1268
"	462	886	"	186	4, 559, 561, 577
"	475	956	"	190	950, 955, 983
"	610	955, 983	"	196	1010
"	630	1342	"	197	1342
"	639	1060	"	199	794, 809
2 Bom.	61	1124, 1142	"	258	4
"	481	632, 644	"	274	36, 1369, 1383
"	525	935	"	319	705, 956, 1406
"	534	1097	"	340	652
"	564	1163, 1203	"	497	938
"	643	512	"	512	1085
"	653	803	11 Bom.	372	701, 702
3 Bom	12	506	"	375	344
"	150	1116	"	438	632
4 Bom	15	1040	"	584	464
"	101	1053, 1162	"	657	502
"	204	1010	"	659	22, 499, 622
"	287	1258	12 Bom.	36	625
"	357	643	"	63	1262
"	479	622	"	161	586, 668
5 Bom	85	1112	"	377	117A, 1203
"	262	970	"	561	18
"	338	558, 1319	13 Bom.	109	14, 614
"	405	1088	"	147	579
			"	168	109, 158
			"	376	1181
			"	502	62, 702, 1001

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"	160	...	1285	"	360	...	1054
"	195	...	503	"	599	...	935
"	254	...	857	"	663	...	231
"	257	...	1090	"	862	...	231
"	262	...	1206	"	1098	...	306
"	277	...	78A	7 Bom. L. R.	463	...	118
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			1141	"	723	...	712
"	448	...	671, 675	"	833	...	54, 58
"	456	...	1009	"	969	...	956
"	686	...	1156	8 Bom. L. R.	589	...	21
"	699	...	973, 1157	"	849	...	971
"	763	...	1276, 1283, 1293	9 Bom. L. R.	156	...	1204
"	768	...	973, 984	"	212	...	1259
"	898	...	642	"	225	...	709
53 Bom.	69	...	565, 1090, 1096	"	244	...	258
"	149	...	17, 1173	"	366	...	502
"	184	...	101	"	895	...	502
"	339	...	658	"	1057	...	875
"	344	...	778	"	1385	...	286
"	479	...	775, 980	10 Bom. L. R.	1056	...	1000
"	564	...	1219	11 Bom. L. R.	18	...	709, 714
"	578	...	837, 1155	"	740	...	285
"	604	...	1094	"	743	...	218, 243
"	611	...	1004	12 Bom. L. R.	226	...	1094
"	693	...	797, 798	"	383	...	629
"	716	...	1428, 1429	"	521	...	711, 1054
"	781	...	1288	"	1029	...	1172
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"	160	...	1045	"	163	...	163, 168
"	347	...	57	"	236	...	1023
"	357	...	517	"	889	...	163, 258, 284
"	520	...	280	"	972	...	775
"	783	...	344	15 Bom. L. R.	57	...	357
2 Bom. L. R.	57	...	273	"	175	...	178, 179
"	536	...	95	"	998	...	695, 710
"	818	...	344, 357A	16 Bom. L. R.	138	...	280, 302
"	918	...	2A	"	684	...	379
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"	371	...	970	17 Bom. L. R.	382	...	413
"	584	...	2, 1204	"	389	...	556
4 Bom. L. R.	53	...	775	"	678	...	656
"	438	...	406	"	1085	...	1051
"	575	...	1095	18 Bom. L. R.	266	...	984
"	582	...	371	19 Bom. L. R.	61	...	616
"	687	...	357	"	211	...	243
"	785	...	1038	20 Bom. L. R.	121	...	283, 1308
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"	826	...	962	21 Bom. L. R.	1065	...	511
"	876	...	89	22 Bom. L. R.	157	...	381
"	878	...	991	"	368	...	1261
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"	873	...	4	"	844	...	340
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"	281	...	1121	"	308	...	558, 561
"	282	...	1097	"	440	...	1242, 1252
"	450	...	1241	"	491	...	623
2 Cal	23	...	48, 1428	"	496	...	1380
"	110	...	225, 251, 293, 294, 1203	"	579	...	1247
"	117	...	856	"	581	...	869
"	273	...	1119	"	582	...	809
"	290	...	1369	"	584	...	719
"	356	...	1232	"	714	...	717
"	384	...	225, 293, 306	"	718	...	720, 845
"	405	...	1097, 1429	"	762	...	761
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"	320	...	404	"	835	...	393, 438
"	366	...	858	7 Cal.	28	...	838
"	379	...	1345, 1352	"	42	...	886A, 917
"	389	...	823	"	46	...	398, 410
"	495	...	850, 1004	"	87	...	1247
"	540	...	751	"	96	...	831, 832, 880
"	573	...	720, 1205	"	208	...	1247
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"	742	...	22, 546	"	322	...	1429
"	754	...	19	"	385	...	394
"	757	...	1338	"	447	...	1117
"	758	...	642	"	662	...	1033
"	765	...	874, 1123	8 Cal	63	...	1386
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"	18	...	89, 857, 1001, 1400	"	154	...	915
"	20	...	1023, 1222	"	166	...	538
"	339	...	426	"	211	...	1423
"	378	...	404	"	393	...	505, 1325
"	417	...	419	"	450	...	604, 1393
"	483	...	882	"	481	...	733, 745
"	603	...	101	"	580	...	759
"	623	...	100	"	616	...	380, 381
"	650	...	394, 407	"	618 (Note)	...	516, 1037
"	865	...	299, 1335	"	634	...	1037
"	869	...	620	"	644	...	745
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"	132	...	364	"	736	...	280
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"	558	...	1275	"	875	...	1390
"	614	...	894, 1413	"	883	...	1198
"	768	...	915, 945	"	895	...	332
"	826	...	831, 832, 878, 1026, 1038	"	896	...	1204
"	871	...	926, 928	"	985	...	1321
"	875	...	325, 339, 349, 354	9 Cal	53	...	4, 1401
"	954	...	519, 1041	"	96	...	930, 938
"	958	...	225, 271, 275	"	103	...	1103
6 Cal.	14	...	1369	"	371	...	372, 382
"	30	...	1398	"	397	...	755
"	83	...		"	455	...	884
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"	878	158	"	305	1010
0 Cal	18	826, 851	"	334	586, 659
"	67	390	14 Cal	42	1055, 1207
"	78	66, 702	"	60	346
"	85	8, 31, 1261	"	128	746
"	109	904, 907, 930, 974	"	141	663, 668, 671, 675, 679
"	140	1429, 1431	"	164	914, 1151
"	194	1177	"	169	410, 439, 449
"	207	497	"	174	1057
"	256	1097, 1223	"	245	823, 893, 894, 908
"	268	499, 775	"	276	1290
"	405	996	"	358	774
"	551	553	"	361	417, 449, 453, 1210
"	643	506, 507, 517	"	395	748, 779
"	775	843	"	539	516, 519, 1037
"	931	1030	"	556	27
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"	970	908	"	707	591, 620
"	1024	1326	"	834	1342, 1345
"	1026	1122, 1141	"	887	1168
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"	1030	1210	"	109	189, 190, 191, 193,
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"	77	1000	"	595	9, 484A, 509, 1038
"	79	350, 354	"	608	19, 827, 854
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"	527	1216	"	610	497
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"	566	100, 105	"	715	857
"	619	237	"	730	1208, 1241
"	737	409, 436, 712	"	766	1271
"	762	237	"	781	15, 969, 1276
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"	473	761	17 Cal	485	1121
"	495	418	"	562	358
"	521	1279, 1295	"	642	1167
"	535	3, 6, 1162	"	862	1038
"	536	406, 418	"	872	622
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19 Cal.	52	...	189,	190	"	391	...	723,	1408
"	113	...	1319,	1324	"	467	...		632
"	127	...	369,	370, 382	"	573	...		1176
"	345	...		1245	"	586	...	816,	817
"	380	...		1165	"	638	...		762
20 Cal	316	...		100	"	761	...	1365,	1367A
"	349	...		1245	"	805	...	941,	944
"	351	...	859,	1024	"	817	...		1038
"	353	...	1047,	1051	"	898	...	19, 256, 396, 425,	598
"	469	...	836,	844	"	935	...		1071
"	474	...		1245	"	998	...		1210
"	478	...	1069,	1072	"	1004	...	628,	1237
"	481	...		812	"	1006	...	768,	769, 939
"	483	...		654	23 Cal	37	...		478A
"	513	...		390, 391	"	44	...	1428,	1431
"	520	...	390, 392, 398,	407	"	55	...	466,	467, 471
"	537	...		779	"	80	...	395,	405
"	633	...	705,	1179	"	174	...		762
"	642	...	497,	540	"	194	...	1012,	1019
"	676	...	24,	75	"	248	...		805
"	687	...	1113,	1421	"	249	...	307,	1198
"	719	...		22	"	250	...		1171
"	724	...		22	"	252	...		903
"	729	...	13, 25, 445,	1180	"	300	...		7
"	857	...		1373	"	328	...	670,	1406, 1428
"	867	...		444	"	347	...		1138
"	870	...	1011, 1012,	1019	"	350	...		1144
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"	92	...	1051,	1132	"	420	...		1051
"	97	...		884	"	442	...		1406
"	103	...	802, 992, 993,	995	"	493	...	241, 286, 308,	966
"	121	...		1043	"	495	...		1371
"	401	...	846,	905	"	499	...	349,	357
"	404	...		435	"	502	...		1045
"	588	...		689	"	532	...		1241
"	609	...		478A	"	557	...	394, 465, 466,	469
"	622	...	224,	1009	"	604	...		1085
"	642	...	698, 836, 896,	1038	"	610	...		989
"	727	...		470	"	621	...	272,	307
"	782	...		4	"	731	...		433
"	827	...	730,	1408	"	896	...	149, 157,	158
"	915	...		399	"	975	...	1091, 1142, 1145,	
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"	920	...	1391,	1429				681,	1406
"	955	...	762, 930, 1143,	1151,					
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22 Cal	50	...	609,	962	"	155	...		308
"	131	...		1215	"	167	...	670,	1411
"	139	...	805,	1066	"	193	...		726
"	164	...	1116,	1204	"	286	...		681
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..	551	954	..	451	1057
..	638	1342	..	501	1161
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25 Cal	20	12 525	..	656	..	241,	308
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..	434	357,	..	798	..	662,	664
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"	387	...	745, 846, 1413	"	710	...	1143
"	389	...	43	"	715	...	1387
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"	412	...	1090, 1400	"	990	...	373
"	415	...	654, 734	"	1007	...	782, 1094
"	417	...	169	"	1050	...	908
"	455	...	301, 312	"	1053	...	779
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"	481	...	741, 788, 829	"	80	...	239, 240, 241, 282
"	483	...	46, 510, 520	"	154	...	367, 372, 373
"	724	...	1150, 1362	"	178	...	1132
"	726	...	854, 1043	"	180	...	615
"	779	...	259, 289	"	287	...	399, 404
"	782	...	956, 1151, 1152	"	367	...	21
"	885	...	396	"	379	...	16
"	887	...	628	"	425	...	652
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"	110	...	406, 455	"	759	...	930, 1330
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"	123	...	810, 817	"	796	...	439, 451
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"	443	...	397, 407	"	1093	...	1184
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"	822	...	1143	"	33	...	389, 407, 447
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"	916	...	631	"	292	...	752, 777, 778
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"	718	...	1047
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"	370	...	1399
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"	415	...	681
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"	236	...	836, 838
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"	578	...	395, 406, 466
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"	387	...	395, 406, 466, 469
"	453	...	776, 778
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"	774	...	631	"	365	...	796
"	781	...	729, 845, 1018	"	374	...	1138
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"	931	...	864	"	422	...	893, 1300
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"	393	...	1029	"	305	...	649
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42 C.L.J.	111	...	898, 922	"	364	...	424
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"	496	...	915	"	115	...	1015
"	528	...	1124	"	144	...	897
"	551	...	1134	"	359	...	32, 207, 778
"	554	...	1134	"	401	...	444
"	585	...	1029	"	431	...	951
43 C.L.J.	100	...	830, 1011	"	443	...	1371
"	184	...	525A	4 Lah	38	...	1363, 1367
"	214	...	803	"	49	...	1352, 1353
"	231	...	32	"	55	...	974
"	586	...	390	"	58	...	1239
44 C.L.J.	134	...	137	"	61	...	977
"	170	...	1335	"	66	...	397, 448
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"	216	...	771	"	130	...	615
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46 C.L.J.	40	...	1257	"	373	...	766, 770, 1093, 1145
"	121	...	1302	"	376	...	1023, 1406
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47 C.L.J.	449	...	912	"			1406
48 C.L.J.	541	...	938	"	460	...	1344
49 C.L.J.	62	...	565	"	462	...	1332
"	205	...	1400	5 Lah	11	...	1198
"	374	...	1257	"	16	...	1197
"	422	...	1184	"	36	...	1437
50 C.L.J.	181	...	247	"	239	...	802, 1000
"	284	...	1181	"	301	...	652
"	291	...	323, 357A	"	324	...	898
"	472	...	771	"	379	...	960, 965
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40 C.L.J.	283	...	1215	"	310	...	297
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"	172	...	1208	"	237	...	1012, 1019
"	320	...	934, 935	"	279	...	221, 221A, 222
"	393	...	1029	"	305	...	649
"	474	...	512, 1404	"	308	...	1051, 1261
"	563	...	78	"	325	...	517
42 C.L.J.	111	...	898, 922	"	364	...	424
"	114	...	717	"	372	...	405
"	131	...	1410	3 Lah	23	...	1171
"	139	...	993	"	46	...	981, 983, 1386
"	496	...	915	"	115	...	1015
"	528	...	1124	"	144	...	897
"	551	...	1134	"	359	...	32, 207, 778
"	554	...	1134	"	401	...	444
"	585	...	1029	"	431	...	951
43 C.L.J.	100	...	830, 1011	"	443	...	1371
"	184	...	525A	4 Lah	38	...	1363, 1367
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44 C.L.J.	134	...	137	"	61	...	977
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"	214	...	473	"	69	...	701, 703
"	216	...	771	"	130	...	615
"	233	...	915	"	224	...	337, 339, 349, 358,
"	541	...	886	"	271	...	359
"	593	...	419	"	359	...	842
45 C.L.J.	1	...	754	"	373	...	614, 661
46 C.L.J.	40	...	1257	"	376	...	766, 770, 1093, 1145
"	121	...	1302	"	382	...	1023, 1406
"	368	...	1031	"	460	...	893, 911, 930, 931
47 C.L.J.	449	...	912	"	462	...	1406
48 C.L.J.	541	...	938	5 Lah	11	...	1344
49 C.L.J.	62	...	565	"	16	...	1337
"	205	...	1400	"	36	...	1198
"	374	...	1257	"	1197	...	1197
"	422	...	1184	"	36	...	1437
50 C.L.J.	181	...	247	"	239	...	802, 1000
"	284	...	1181	"	301	...	652
"	291	...	323, 357A	"	324	...	898
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"	485	...	1208, 1215	"	230	...	1297
11 Lah. L. J.	113	...	1145	"	234	...	25, 806, 859
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1888 P. R	4	651	"	14	896
"	5	857	"	15	22

		NOTE No			NOTE No
1894 P. R.	18 ...	1276	1901 P. R.	1 ..	554, 561, 829
"	19 ..	668	"	2 ...	1181
"	21 ...	1275, 1297	"	3 ..	1095A
"	22 ...	1336	"	4 ...	787
"	24 ...	587	"	8 ...	588
"	25 ...	101	"	11 ...	1078
"	26 ...	1337	"	12 ...	252
"	29 ..	596	"	13 ...	972, 1374, 1434
"	33 ...	681	"	14 ...	1287
1895 P. R.	1 ...	290	"	18 ..	817
"	14 ...	306, 1083	"	22 ...	224, 225, 227
"	15 ...	961	"	24 ...	42, 558
"	16 ..	1144	"	25 ...	88, 1105
"	17 ...	1184	"	28 ..	221
"	20 ...	75	"	30 ..	631
"	23 ...	654	"	33 ...	1078
1896 P. R.	4 ...	241, 806	1902 P. R.	2 ..	557
"	5 ..	1431	"	3 ..	225
"	7 ...	498, 499	"	4 ..	581
"	9 ...	993	"	7 ...	631
"	10 ...	659, 1319	"	9 ..	681, 1176
"	13 ...	816	"	12 ...	983
1897 P. R.	1 ...	41	"	14 ..	816, 826
"	2 ...	272	"	15 ...	232
"	3 ..	19, 1189	"	18 ..	1254
"	4 ..	347	"	21 ..	1216
"	5 ...	404, 419	"	23 ...	405, 413, 448
1897 P. R.	10 ...	1120	"	24 ..	530
"	12 ...	1237	"	26 ...	807
"	14 ...	680, 809	"	28 ...	1393
1898 P. R.	2 ..	272	"	33 ..	241, 806
"	3 ...	68, 957	"	34 ..	961, 965
"	4 ..	252, 257, 271,	"	36 ...	1286
"	6 ..	273	1903 P. R.	2 ..	358
"	7 ..	1035	"	3 ..	1015
"	11 ...	720, 793, 848	"	11 ..	1120
"	13 ..	161	"	14 ...	1014, 1015
"	14 ...	594	"	16 ..	515
"	15 ..	987	"	18 ...	810, 816
"	16 ...	1120	"	19 ...	1287
"	17 ..	631	"	24 ...	295, 1180
1899 P. R.	2 ...	1216, 1419	"	26 ...	1273
"	6 ..	448	"	27 ...	257, 271
"	7 ...	551, 822	"	29 ...	819, 1422
"	10 ..	1038, 1042	"	32 ..	275, 1339
"	11 ...	21, 271, 286	1904 P. II	3 ...	876
"	13 ...	581	"	7 ..	1120, 1121
"	14 ..	1391	"	8 ...	1215
1900 P. R.	2 ...	74, 1078	"	9 ...	327
"	7 ...	327, 337, 341	"	10 ...	964
"	12 ...	556	"	12 ..	1151, 1219
"	14 ...	68, 1109	"	15 ..	69, 1171
"	15 ..	1010	"	16 ..	149
"	17 ..	241, 966	"	20 ...	990
"	19 ...	225, 293, 306	"	21 ..	954
"	22 ...	794	"	24 ..	1105, 1439
"	24 ..	587	"	26 ...	1336
"	25 ..	293	"	31 ..	960, 961
		631	"	32 ..	586

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"	6	1306	"	9	1173, 1213
"	8	590, 594	"	10	701
"	11	1137	"	11	1172
"	12	620, 1210	"	12	470, 472
"	13	1219	"	15	1121
"	14	728, 751	1910 P. R.	1	21
"	15	1341	"	3	1393
"	16	301	"	6	615
"	19	1208, 1216	"	7	1400
"	21	227, 1148	"	11	487
"	25	1017	"	20	762
"	29	15, 662, 1278	"	28	298
"	30	14	"	29	308
"	33	241	"	30	809
"	36	367, 594	"	32	654
"	38	744, 779	"	33	1206, 1208, 1215
"	41	954	"	34	1084
"	42	13, 241, 295	1911 P. R.	1	551, 562
"	43	1216	"	6	241, 295, 1180
"	44	21, 622, 1238	"	8	171
"	48	942	"	10	681, 1179
"	51	745	"	11	586, 646, 659, 661
"	54	1229	"	13	972, 1235
"	57	811	"	15	882
1906 P. R.	2	828, 829	"	16	1439
"	3	680, 809	"	19	1278
"	4	1290	1912 P. R.	2	618, 631, 660, 668, 669, 680
"	5	779, 1205	"	5	859
"	6	297, 990	"	6	891, 1398
"	9	983	"	7	1096
"	10	779	1912 P. R.	8	1262
"	12	1356	"	10	1175
"	18	280, 301, 303	1913 P. R.	1	1370
1907 P. R.	6	227	"	2	1153
"	7	407, 448	"	6	931
"	8	509	"	8	1060
"	11	993	"	9	804, 1097, 1170
"	12	840	"	11	762
"	17	1440	"	13	1336
"	20	1220	"	15	300
1908 P. R.	1	1398	"	18	1419
"	2	1420	"	20	478A
"	4	1173, 1203	"	21	84
"	5	1254	"	22	1311, 1317
"	8	638	1914 P. R.	3	622
"	9	175	"	5	241, 389, 1370
"	10	652	"	6	302, 303, 307
"	14	701, 702	"	11	837
"	15	1315	"	12	1284
"	21	227	"	15	1359
"	24	819, 1163, 1203	"	21	261
"	25	1171	"	22	297
"	27	500, 542	"	29	735, 996, 1000
1909 P. R.	1	1055, 1167, 1207	"	30	515
"	2	509, 1038, 1041	"	35	778
"	3	1207	"	36	188, 195, 198
"	4	1171, 1207, 1226			
"	6	1239			

		NOTE No			NOTE No.
1915 P R	6	300	1918 P R.	17	1084
"	7	1148	"	19	1107
"	10	293 300	"	22	623
"	12	479, 488	"	24	96
"	17	950, 1403	"	25	1120
"	18	622	"	26	298
"	22	563	"	29	63
"	24	236, 291	"	35	998, 1211
"	30	1115	"	36	501A
1916 P R	1	268, 835	1919 P. R	1	807
"	4	413	"	4	646
"	5	1108	"	6	778
"	10	1105	"	7	1216
"	11	1434	"	11	1163
"	12	893	"	12	1281
"	16	1115	"	14	1361
"	19	1434, 1435	"	15	807, 815
"	22	397, 413, 448	"	16	30, 1356
"	24	1291	"	17	898
"	25	1054	"	20	956
"	28	554	"	23	435
"	29	1239, 1252	"	27	1216
"	31	1148	"	29	990
"	33	735, 740, 741	"	30	957, 1076
"	34	21, 203	"	31	739
1917 P R	6	165, 177, 178	"	32	166, 168, 176, 177
"	10	629, 1237			
"	11	631			
"	12	1029			
"	13	695			
"	14	1278			
"	15	1336			
"	17	752			
"	19	624			
"	20	1105			
"	21	1140			
"	22	1276, 1283			
"	24	570			
"	27	236, 291			
"	29	724			
"	30	597			
"	31	811			
"	32	346			
"	34	628, 1251			
"	36	689, 1044, 1331			
"	37	898			
"	38	63			
"	39	165, 176, 177			
"	43	1120			
"	44	784			
1918 P. R.	1	975			
"	2	654			
"	5	227			
"	7	45, 1106			
"	8	1219			
"	11	511, 518			
"	14	1262			
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"	36	...	628				
"	42	...	1004				
"	48	...	1237, 1239				
"	55	...	960, 1402				
"	68	...	770, 1142, 1145				
"	93	...	816, 1030				
"	95	...	640				
"	139	...	977, 1406				
"	150	...	1290				
"	156	...	1440				
"	169	...	407				
"	224	...	964				
"	303	...	616, 1240				
"	538	...	1310				
"	577	...	480				
"	612	...	1029				
"	656	...	501				
4 Rang	72	...	494, 500A, 501A,				
"	106	...	501				
"	128	...	1374, 1411				
"	131	...	642, 644				
"	140	...	639				
"	355	...	1219				
"	356	...	762, 766				
"	361	...	502A				
"	471	...	975				
"	488	...	701, 704, 707,				
"	506	...	1204, 1205				
5 Rang	26	...	914, 930				
"	53	...	976				
"	129	...	502				
"	136	...	586, 1029, 1031,				
"	274	...	1100				
"	276	...	398				
"	291	...	802, 826, 851				
"	523	...	1131				
"	553	...	1310, 1315				
"	697	...	208				
6 Rang	710	...	1257				
"	6	...	1346, 1353, 1433A				
"	137	...	1291				
"	259	...	1112				
"	380	...	723				
"	386	...	500A				
"	529	...	1342, 1352				
"	531	...	563				
"	664	...	1093, 1094				
"	672	...	1257				
7 Rang	95	...	697				
"	319	...	851, 853				
"	345	...	502				
"	370	...	762				
"	470	...	1148				
			1352				
			1045				
			977				

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"	4	...	1164
"	5	...	1320
"	6	...	717
"	14	...	302, 723
"	25	...	422
"	30	...	1215
"	40	...	1171, 1198
"	46	...	280, 302
"	50	...	234, 394, 447
"	69	...	151, 687
"	72	...	656
"	73	...	750, 756, 759,
"	84	...	778, 783
"	91	...	1250
"	98	...	938
"	103	...	594, 1102, 1428
"	119	...	703
"	124	...	600
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"	16	...	301
"	20	...	993
"	23	...	1203
"	25	...	84, 1082
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"	102	...	881
"	114	...	913
"	167	...	1083
"	200	...	691
4 S L R	38	...	893
"	174	...	489
"	195	...	1088
"	207	...	968
"	209	...	27
"	255	...	506
"	258	...	1349
"	474	...	589
5 S L R	1	...	762
"	10	...	582, 587
"	16	...	293
"	31	...	762
"	54	...	510
"	87	...	1172
"	105	...	303, 308, 315
"	123	...	6
"	129	...	770
			775

			NOTE No				NOTE No
5 S. L. R.	131	..	1045	10 S. L. R.	62		1181
"	137		1428	"	154		876
"	174	.. 21, 512, 951,	954	"	156		1115
"	220	..	1288	"	162	817,	1248
"	263	..	84	"	181		1371
"	266	..	561, 575	"	185		855
6 S. L. R.	82		16, 582	"	192	751, 753,	758
"	83		664	"	207		1216
"	101	.. 859, 860,	1204	"	208	310,	1315
"	120	.. 860,	1204	11 S. L. R.	52		1036
"	165		859	"	55	810,	812
"	206	691, 832,	976,	"	79		695
"			1044	12 S. L. R.	76		812
"	208		1274	"	87		809
"	254	13, 25,	806	"	90		1285
"	260		579	13 S. L. R.	166	812,	1019
"	277		500	14 S. L. R.	69	613,	616
"	284	996,	1000	"	85	719,	1004
7 S. L. R.	10		817	"	168		810
"	17	554, 561	575	"	173		1220
"	40	687,	690	15 S. L. R.	1	702,	703
"	75		662	"	103		1039
"	77	13, 586,	593	"	126		1172
"	94	301,	303	"	171	6,	1204
"	98		27	"	200		660
"	123		811	"	205		1083
"	161		690	16 S. L. R.	205		807
"	187		1252	"	285		763
"	194		1172	17 S. L. R.	150	541,	587
"	200	997	1000	"	188	717, 718,	1003
"	203		1033	"	245	1204,	1210
8 S. L. R.	1	522	524	"	268	1198,	1216
"	23	694,	714	18 S. L. R.	30		1306
"	25		814	"	61		1434
"	41	660,	661	"	185		762
"	66		13	"	199		756
"	173	280, 301,	302	"	216	1010,	1017
"	179	769,	1248	"	218		1343
"	196	681,	854	"	262		1220
"	203		896	"	278		394
"	207	420,	447	19 S. L. R.	6		501A
"	213		789	"	64		1216
"	215		389	"	66		818
"	229	250,	1220	"	71	898,	899
"	238		1215	"	95	254,	1316
"	267	824,	847	"	96		290
"	322		280	"	101		286
"	343		1443	"	117		1373
"	341		1387	"	121		973
9 S. L. R.	17		1120	"	122		581
"	37	731,	734	"	136	860,	864
"	43	950,	959	"	142		501A
"	82		1216	"	176	280,	290
"	87		869	"	183		950
"	95		1216	"	309	8710,	1122
"	153		283	"	332		289
"	176		1242	"	353	705,	1199

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"	41 ...		818	"	107 ...	756, 1210,	1221
"	43 .		671	"	111 ...		1120
"	50		1014	"	154 ..		1092
"	54 .	1369,	1387	"	331 ...	975,	977
"	74	501A,	756, 757				
"	88 .		126, 129	22 S. L. R.	20 ..		296
"	90 .		1220, 1239	"	41 ..		841
"	122	279, 966,	1308,	"	79 ...		1215
			1387	"	151 ...		406
"	128 ..		1298	"	201 ..	1164, 1197,	1199
"	134 .		1020	"	349 ..		933
"	136 .	1310,	1379	"	386 ..		406
"	145 .		1290	"	404 ...		557
"	163		296				
"	178		1226B	23 S. L. R.	1 ..		977
"	189	1133, 1137,	1140	"	37 .		1256
"	261 ..		1153	"	43 ..		681
"	291 .	588,	597	"	216 ..		1210
"	352		1219	"	285 ..	620, 621,	658
21 S. L. R.	1	612,	1090	"	397 .		940
"	43	1242,	1248	"	432 ..		1433A

			Note No.				Note No.
5 S. L. R.	131		1045	10 S. L. R.	62		1181
"	137		1428	"	154		876
"	174	21, 512, 951,	954	"	156		1115
"	220		1288	"	162	817,	1248
"	263		84	"	183		1371
"	266	561, 575		"	185		855
6 S. L. R.	82	16, 582		"	192	751, 753,	758
"	83	664		"	207		1216
"	101	859, 860, 1204		"	208	310,	1315
"	120	860, 1204		11 S. L. R.	52		1036
"	165	859		"	55	810,	812
"	206	691, 832, 976,		"	79		695
"		1044		12 S. L. R.	76		812
"	208	1274		"	87		809
"	254	13, 25, 806		"	90		1285
"	260	579		13 S. L. R.	166	812,	1019
"	277	500		14 S. L. R.	69	613, 616	
"	284	996, 1000		"	85	719,	1004
7 S. L. R.	10	817		"	168		810
"	17	554, 561, 575		"	173		1220
"	40	687, 690		15 S. L. R.	1	702,	703
"	75	662		"	103		1059
"	77	13, 586, 593		"	126		1172
"	94	301, 303		"	171	6,	1204
"	98	27		"	200		660
"	123	811		"	205		1083
"	161	690		16 S. L. R.	205		807
"	187	1252		"	285		763
"	194	1172		17 S. L. R.	150	541, 587	
"	200	997, 1000		"	188	717, 718,	1003
"	203	1083		"	245	1204,	1210
8 S. L. R.	1	522, 524		"	268	1198,	1216
"	23	694, 714		18 S. L. R.	30		1306
"	25	814		"	61		1434
"	41	660, 661		"	185		762
"	66	13		"	199		756
"	173	280, 301, 302		"	216	1010,	1017
"	179	769, 1248		"	218		1343
"	196	681, 854		"	262		1220
"	203	896		"	278		394
"	207	420, 447		19 S. L. R.	6		501A
"	213	789		"	64		1216
"	215	389		"	66		818
"	229	280, 1220		"	71	898, 899	
"	238	1215		"	95	254, 1336	
"	267	824, 847		"	96		290
"	322	280		"	101		286
"	340	1440		"	117		1373
"	341	1387		"	121		973
9 S. L. R.	17	1120		"	122		581
"	37	731, 734		"	136	860, 864	
"	43	950, 959		"	142	501A	
"	82	1216		"	176	280, 290	
"	89	869		"	183	950	
"	95	1216		"	309	871B, 1122	
"	158	283		"	332	280	
"	176	1242		"	353	705, 1190	

THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1898

ACT NO. V OF 1898.

[As amended up to date]

RECEIVED THE G. G.'s ASSENT ON THE
22ND MARCH, 1898.

*An Act to consolidate and amend the Law relating to
Criminal Procedure.*

WHEREAS it is expedient to consolidate and amend the law relating to criminal procedure; It is hereby enacted as follows:—

1. The 1923 Amendments and their history:—

The Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 has undergone drastic amendments in the hands of the Legislature in 1923 by two Acts, viz., the Criminal Law Amendment Act, XII of 1923 (popularly known as the Racial Distinctions Act) and the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. Of these the latter Act is the more important and is the outcome of a general revision of the whole Code, whereas the former Act is limited to the amendment of certain sections relating to the trial of European British Subjects. These Amendment Acts have come into force from 1st September 1923.

The genesis of Act XVIII of 1923 dates as far back as 1914. In that year a Bill (no. 3 of 1914) was introduced in the Imperial Legislative Council on the 21st March, and was thereafter referred to the Local Governments and Administrations. Their opinions were received and partially examined, but further progress with the Bill was suspended until the conclusion of the war. Meanwhile the Government by a resolution dated the 18th September 1916 referred this Bill and the opinions received to a small Committee (known as the Lowndes Committee). This Committee sat for 21 days and its work was finished on the 23rd December 1916. The Bill as revised by this Committee was again introduced in the Imperial

Legislative Council on the 26th September 1917, but further consideration of the Bill was postponed until after the war. Meanwhile some further suggestions for the amendment of the Code were considered by the Government, and after the termination of the war, a new Bill was prepared in 1921 which was substantially the Bill as revised by the above Committee, supplemented by the amendments regarded as advisable as a result of the consideration above referred to.

This Bill (no. 3 of 1921) was introduced in the Council of State on the 21st February 1921 by Sir William Vincent, and in September 1921 it was referred to a Joint Committee, composed of representative members of the Legislative Assembly and the Council of State. This Committee sat for 14 days and submitted its report after a year (in September 1922); and the Bill as revised by this Committee, with certain alterations made during the discussions in the Council of State in September 1922 and in the Legislative Assembly in January and February 1923 ultimately passed into law, and has been enacted as Act XVIII of 1923.

(For Bill 3 of 1914, see Gazette of India, Part V, 28th March 1914; for the Report of the Select Committee of 1916, see Gazette of India, Part V, September, 1917, reprinted in the Gazette of India, February 26, 1921, at p. 39; for Bill 3 of 1921, see Gazette of India, Part V, February 26, 1921; for the Report of the Joint Committee, see Gazette of India, Part V, September 9, 1922).

— The changes made from time to time by other minor Amendment Acts up to date have been noticed in this book in their proper places.

2. Pending cases are not affected by changes in the law :—The general rule as to new laws of procedure is that they take effect from their coming into operation, so that the procedure from that date would be governed by such laws. It is also a general rule that such laws are not to affect vested rights. Therefore, where a person was being tried under an old Act, and before the conclusion of the trial, the new Act came into force, the trial ought to be continued in accordance with the procedure laid down in the earlier Act, which was in force at the commencement of the trial—*Srinivasachari v. Queen*, 6 Mad. 336; *Mukund v. Ladu*, 3 Bom. L.R. 584.

2A. Construction :—A penal statute must be construed strictly; that is, nothing is to be regarded as within the meaning of the statute which is not within the letter—which is not clearly and intelligibly described in the very words of the statute itself—*Emp. v. Kola*, 11 Cal. 214; *Lakshmi Chand v. Emp.*, 1901 P.R. 24; *Bisumbhar v. Q. E.*, 5 C.W.N. 108. Penal provisions have to be strictly construed, nor can the liability to punishment for the neglect of a statutory obligation be extended by inferential reasoning—*Kazi v. Q. E.*, 28 Cal. 504. In interpreting statutes of a penal character, it is important to see that the powers conferred upon the Magistrates are duly exercised with reference to the rendering unlawful of acts which would otherwise be lawful—*Q. E. v. Sheodin*, 10 All. 115. A penal statute must be construed strictly, and Magistrates ought to be very careful before they proceed to inflict imprisonment in a

summary manner. They must avoid all appearance of oppression—*In re Ganesh Narayan*, 13 Bom. 600. Words importing a doubtful or ambiguous meaning must be construed strictly, and in favour of the subject; that is to say, unless the meaning of the Legislature is perfectly clear, no penalties are to be imposed upon the subjects of the Crown, nor are their liberties to be restricted—*Q. E. v. Imam*, 10 All 150 (F. B.). See also *Q. E. v. Balakrishna*, 17 Bom. 573; *Patandin v. K. E.*, 2 A.L.J. 26, *Reg v. Bista*, 1 Bom. 308.

The same rules of interpretation apply to notifications issued under penal statutes—*Lakhmi Chand v. Emp.*, 1901 P.R. 24.

The marginal notes to a section do not form part of an enactment, and cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the section. They should not be allowed to vary the clear grammatical meaning of the rule embodied in the section—*Punardeo v. Ram Sarup*, 25 Cal 858; *Bijoyendra v. Emp.*, 7 C.W.N. 883; *Q. E. v. Mahomed*, 2 Bom L R 918; *Dukhi v. Halway*, 23 Cal. 55; *Swayambu v. Municipal Council*, 1 M L J. 37. In construing a section, it is not competent to refer to the proceedings in the Legislative Council as legitimate aids to the construction of a law—*Q. E. v. Srichurn*, 22 Cal. 1017 F B.; *Q. E. v. Tilak*, 22 Bom 112 (128); nor is it proper to refer to the previous history of the law—*Sarat v. Emp.*, 7 C.W.N. 301.

It is not regular for a Magistrate to allow his decision to be guided by anything that appears in some proposed Bill that has not become law—*Raunak v Harban*, 3 All. 283

Code exhaustive :—So far as it deals with any point specifically the Code of Criminal Procedure must be deemed to be exhaustive, and the law must be ascertained by reference to its provisions, but where a case arises which obviously demands interference, and it is not within those for which the Code specifically provides, it would not be reasonable to say that the Court had not the power to make such order as the ends of justice require—*Rahim Sheikh v. Emp.*, 50 Cal 872 (875), 24 Cr L.J. 677. But it is not open to a Court to travel outside the Code for finding powers either for the Police or for private persons to interfere with the liberty of the subject—*Gopal Naidu v. Emp.*, 46 Mad 605, 625 (F B)

PART I.

PRELIMINARY

CHAPTER I.

1. (1) This Act may be called the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898; and it shall come into force on the first day of July, 1898.

Short title.
Commencement.

(2) It extends to the whole of British India; but in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing herein contained shall affect any special or local law now in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being in force, or shall apply to—

Extent.

(a) the Commissioners of Police in the towns of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, or the Police in the towns of Calcutta and Bombay;

(b) heads of villages in the Presidency of Fort St. George; or

(c) village Police Officers in the Presidency of Bombay;

Provided that the Local Government may, if it thinks fit, * * * by notification in the official Gazette, extend any of the provisions of this Code, with any necessary modifications, to such excepted persons.

The words "with the sanction of the Governor-General in Council" which occurred in the proviso have been omitted by the Devolution Act XXXVIII of 1920

N.B.—The Amendments made by Acts XII and XVIII of 1923 have come into force from 1st September 1923

3. **Object of the Code** :—The object of the Criminal Procedure Code is to provide a machinery for the punishment of offences against the substantive law—*In re Ganesh Narain*, 13 Bom. 590, Q. E. v. *Abdul Rahaman*, 16 Bom 580, *Dular v. Niyabat*, 12 Cal 536; Q. E. v. *Rama*

chandra, Ratanlal 776 (778); *Q. E. v. Mona Puna*, 16 Bom. 661 (669); *Q. E. v. Abdul*, Ratanlal 577 (579); *In re Ramasami*, 43 M L.J. 710, 23 Cr. L.J. 691 (692)

4. Extent :—*British India* :—The term “British India” shall mean all territories and places within Her Majesty’s dominions which are for the time being governed by Her (His) Majesty through the Governor-General of India or through any Governor or other officer subordinate to the Governor-General of India (Sec. 3, General Clauses Act, X of 1897).

The following are within British India :—Aden, Laccadive Islands (*Q. E. v. Cheria Koya*, 13 Mad. 353); Andaman and Nicobar Islands (*Triccam v. B. B. & C. I. Ry. Co.*, 9 Bom 244); Ajmer and Merwara (9 Bom. 244); Island of Perim (*Q. E. v. Mangal Tekchand*, 10 Bom. 258.)

Native States :—The Native States and Tributary Mahals are not within British India; therefore this Code does not apply to Rajkot (*Q. E. v. Abdul Latif*, 10 Bom 186), Civil Station of Wadhwan (*Emp. v. Chuman Lal*, 37 Bom 152; but see 9 Bom 244), Moyurbhanj (*Emp. v. Keshub*, 8 Cal. 985), Keonjhar (*Bichitranand v. Bhugbut*, 16 Cal. 667); the lands occupied by the Hyderabad State Railway (*Muhammad Yusufuddin v. Q. E.*, 25 Cal. 20 P C); Railway Station in a Native State (*Emp. v. Raghunathrao*, 5 Bom L^R 873)

But although the Code as such does not apply to the Native States, many of those States have in fact adopted it, *e.g.* the Civil and Military Station of Bangalore (*In re Hayes*, 12 Mad. 39), Mysore, Kashmir, the Native States in the Rajputana Agency, etc

Transfer of territory from British India to Native State :—The British Court has jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of an offence committed in a territory which formed part of British India at the date of the offence and at the date of commitment to the Sessions, but was transferred to a Native State before the case came on for trial—*King Emp. v. Ram Naresh*, 34 All. 118. Similarly, the British Appellate Court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal if the transfer took place after a conviction but before the appeal therefrom was heard—*Mahabir v. King Emp.*, 33 All. 578.

Other places where the Code does not apply :—The Code does not apply to the North Cachar Hills (*Soonderjee v. Maylon*, 26 Cal 874) or to the Chittagong Hill Tracts (*Q. E. v. Sonai Mugh*, 27 Cal 654). It also does not apply to the Garo Hills, the Khasia and Jaintia Hills, the Naga Hills, the North Cachar Subdivision of the Cachar District, the Mihir Hill Tracts in the Nowgong District, the Dibrugarh Frontier Tracts in the Lakhimpur District, and the Lushai Hills; see Assam Gazette, 1893, Part II, page 788

Places to which the Code has been extended :—The Code has been extended to the following places —

(1) The District of Angul (with effect from 1st August, 1898); see Calcutta Gazette, 1898, Part I, p. 779.

(2) *Upper Burma* (excluding the Shan States); see Burma Laws Act

(3) the *Shan States* (by the *Shan States Laws and Criminal Justice Order 1895* as amended by Notification no 29 dated 19-12-1898, *Burma Code*);

(4) the *Scheduled Districts in Ganjam and Vizagapatam* see *Fort St. George Gazette, 1898, Part I, page 306*, see also *Public Prosecutor v Sadananda*, 23 M L J. 670, 13 Cr. L J 856,

(5) *Sonthal Parganas* see *Calcutta Gazette, 1898, Part I, page 665*;

(6) *Districts of Hazaribagh, Lohardaga, Manbhum, Palamau, Pargana Dhalbhum and the Kothan in the Singhbhum District* see *Calcutta Gazette, 1898, Part I, page 714*, and *Gazette of India 1899, Part I, page 779*,

(7) *Pargana of Manpur* see *Gazette of India, 1899, Part I, page 419*;

(8) *British Baluchistan* see *Gazette of India, 1898, Part I, page 221*;

(9) *Chittagong Hill Tracts* see section 4 of the *Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation I of 1900*, but see *Q. E. v Sonai Mugh*, 27 Cal. 654

The Code has also been extended to the *British Protectorates* on the *East Coast of Africa* (*Order of Council, 1897*); *Somaliland* (*Order, 1899*); the *Persian Coast and Islands* (*Order, 1897*); and *Zanzibar* (*Order, 1884*, under which Zanzibar is to be treated as a District in the *Bombay Presidency*).

As regards *Muscat*, it has been held that the *Bombay High Court* is invested with original criminal jurisdiction over it, but not appellate or revisional jurisdiction—*In re Rattansce*, 24 Bom 471.

High Seas :—The trial of a British seaman for an offence committed on the high seas on a British ship must be conducted under the Code of Criminal Procedure, though the offence charged was an offence under the English Law—*Q. E. v. Gunning*, 21 Cal. 782; *Q E v Barton*, 16 Cal. 238; *Q v Thompson*, 1 B.L.R O. Cr 1; *Reg. v Elmstone*, 7 B. H. C. R. 89

5. Special law :—The expression 'special law' in this section has reference to statutory enactments and not to local family law (e. g. *Marumakkattayan law*)—*Thillu Amma v. Sankunni*, 37 M L J 361, 20 Cr. L.J. 733. The *Coroner's Act* is an instance of special law.

6. Local Law :—This Code will not affect any local law, as for instance, *Act XXXVII of 1885* which is still in force in *Sonthal Perganas*. So, an order under that Act sentencing an accused to imprisonment is not open to revision under this Code—*Dular v. Nijabat*, 12 Cal 536. So also, the *Criminal Procedure Code* will not apply to proceedings held under the *Sind Frontier Regulations (V of 1872 and III of 1892)*—*Emp v Ghulam Kadir*, 11 S.L.R. 105, 12 Cr. L J. 568

7. Special jurisdiction :—The following are instances of special jurisdiction :—The jurisdiction conferred by *Sec 3 of Madras Act XXIV of 1839 (Vizagapatam Agency Act)* regarding the administration of criminal justice in the *Vizagapatam Agency Tract*—*Q E v. Budara Janni*, 14 Mad. 121; the jurisdiction conferred by secs. 20-23, *Cattle Trespass Act*—*Shama v. Lachu*, 23 Cal. 300; *Badhan v. Issur*, 34 Cal. 926; the jurisdiction conferred by *Bombay Village Police Act VIII of 1867*—*Q E. v. Ragho Mahadu*, 10 Bom. 612.

8. Special powers :—Instances :—Powers conferred on second-class Magistrates by Secs 3 (5) and 56 of the Bombay Abkari Act V of 1878—*Q. E. v. Gaudapu*, 10 Bom 181. powers possessed by the High Courts to punish for contempts—*Surendra Nath Banerjee v. Chief Justice*, 10 Cal 100 (P.C.), powers possessed by the High Courts under Sec. 29 of the Letters Patent to transfer criminal cases before itself—*Sitapathi v. Queen*, 11 Mad 32; power of superintendence under Sec. 15 of the Charter Act—*Lakhraj v. Deh Pershad* 12 C.W.N 678.

9. Police of Calcutta, Bombay :—This Code does not apply to the Police in the city of Calcutta, unless expressly made applicable to them—*Emp. v. Madho Dhobi*, 31 Cal 557. Section 155, however, applies to the Police of Calcutta and Bombay—*Q. E. v. Nilmadhub*, 15 Cal. 595; *Q. v. Visram Babaji*, 21 Bom 495. Also, Secs. 42, 44, 54, 55, 56, 68, 83, 84, 85, 86, 127, 164, 202, and Col. 3 of Schedule II have been specially extended to the Police in the town of Calcutta. Sections 386 and 387 have been, by notification under the proviso, extended to the Commissioner of Police for the town of Calcutta (see *Calcutta Gazette*, 23rd March, 1904). Secs. 42, 44, 68, 84, 85, 86, 127, 164, 202 and Col 3 of Sch. II apply to the Police of Bombay. But Secs 54, 55, 56 and 83 are no longer applicable to the Police of Bombay under Sec. 2 (1) of the City of Bombay Police Act IV of 1902.

This Code applies to the Police but not to the Commissioner of Police, Madras. See Madras Act III of 1888.

10. Madras Village Headmen :—No part of this Code applies to Village Headmen who are empowered by Madras Regs. XI of 1816 and IV of 1821 to try petty cases—*In re Vīramutha Pillai*, 2 Weir 1. But sec 528 now applies to Madras Village Headmen. Sections 480 and 482 do not apply to Village Munsiffs—*Q. E. v. Venkatasami*, 15 Mad. 131.

This section should not be read to mean that village Magistrates cannot complain or be tried under this Code; but it only means that in his official capacity as a village Magistrate, that is, in the proceedings he takes as a village Magistrate, he is not governed by the Cr. P. Code. There is nothing in this Code to prevent him from instituting a complaint himself before a Magistrate—*Pub. Pros. v. Mari Mudali*, 19 L. W. 30, 25 Cr. L. J. 221, A. I. R. 1924 Mad. 730.

11. Bombay Village Police-officers :—The ancient village system of Police regulated formerly by Reg. IV of 1818 and Reg. XII of 1827 and now by Bombay Village Police Act VIII of 1867 remains unaffected by the Criminal Procedure Code—*Q. E. v. Ragho Mahadu*, 19 Bom. 612.

2. [Repealed by the Repealing and Amending Act X of 1914].

3. (1) In every enactment passed before this Code comes into force, in which reference is made to, or to any chapter or section of, the Code of Criminal Procedure, Act XXV of 1861, or

References to Code of Criminal Procedure and other repealed enactments.

Act X of 1872, or Act X of 1882, or to any other enactment hereby repealed, such reference shall, so far as may be practicable, be taken to be made to this Code, or to its corresponding chapter or section.

(2) In every enactment passed before this Code comes into force, the expressions "Officer exercising (or 'having') the powers (or 'the full powers') of a Magistrate," "Subordinate Magistrate, first class" and "Subordinate Magistrate, second class," shall respectively be deemed to mean "Magistrate of the first class," "Magistrate of the second class," and "Magistrate of the third class"; the expression "Magistrate of a division of a district" shall be deemed to mean "Sub-divisional Magistrate"; the expression "Magistrate of the district" shall be deemed to mean "District Magistrate"; the expression "Magistrate of Police" shall be deemed to mean "Presidency Magistrate"; and the expression "Joint Sessions Judge" shall mean "Additional Sessions Judge."

4. (1) In this Code the following words and expressions have the following meanings unless a different intention appears from the subject or context :

Section 4 is an interpretation-clause Its legitimate function is to declare that certain words and expressions used in the Code shall, wherever permissible, not only have the meaning which is generally attached to such words and expressions, but such meaning as is assigned to such words and expressions by the interpretation clause But by no means it is intended to annex to such words or expressions every incident which may seem to be attached to them by any other Act of the Legislature—
Brooks v Barwick, A. I R 1926 Sind 58 (61), 91 I. C. 99

(a) "Advocate-General" includes also a Government Advocate, or, where there is no Advocate-General or Government Advocate, such officer as the Local Government may, from time to time, appoint in this behalf :

(b) "bailable offence" means an offence shown as bailable in the second schedule, or which is made bailable by any other law for the

time being in force; and "non-bailable offence" means any other offence:

(c) "charge" includes any head of charge when the charge contains more heads than one:

(d) * * * * *

(e) "Clerk of the Crown" includes any officer specially appointed by the Chief Justice to discharge the functions given by this Code to the Clerk of the Crown:

(f) "cognizable offence" means an offence for, and "cognizable case" means a case in, which a police-officer, within or without the Presidency-towns, may, in accordance with the second schedule, or under any law for the time being in force, arrest without warrant:

12. Cognizable offence.—The words "a Police-officer" in this clause do not mean "any and every Police-officer". That is, an offence is regarded as a cognizable offence, if the offender can be arrested without warrant by *certain* Police-officers, though not by *any and every* Police-officer. If the power of arrest without warrant is limited to any *particular* class of Police-officers, that does not prevent the offence being regarded as a cognizable one—*Q. E. v Deodhar*, 27 Cal. 144. Thus, under the Gambling Act it is not every Police-officer who can arrest without a warrant. It is only the District Superintendent of Police who can so arrest; but still the offence under that Act will be treated as a cognizable offence—*Ibid.*

But the power of arrest referred to in this clause must be an unqualified power, and not a conditional power like the one conferred upon the Police by sec 24, Opium Act I of 1878 which authorises a Police-officer to arrest without warrant if the accused does not furnish the security required by that section. An offence under sec 9 Opium Act is not therefore a cognizable offence—*Bahabal v Tarak Nath*, 24 Cal 691.

(g) "Commissioner of Police" includes a Deputy Commissioner of Police.

(h) "complaint" means the allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but it does not include the report of a police-officer:

13. Complaint :—*Who can make a complaint :—*A complaint need not necessarily be made by the person injured but may be made by any person aware of the offence. The rule is that if a general law is broken, any person has a right to complain, whether he himself has suffered any particular injury or not—*In re Ganesh Narayan*, 13 Bom 600; *Imp v. Keshav Lal*, 21 Bom. 536; *Dedar Bux v. Shyamapada*, 41 Cal. 1013, 18 C.W.N. 921; *Farzand Ali v. Hanuman*, 18 All. 465; *Basirulla v. Asadulla*, 33 C.W.N 576 (577). This general rule is, however, subject to the exceptions mentioned in secs. 198 and 199, where certain offences are stated to be complainable only by specified persons

It is not necessary under this clause or under section 190 (a) that the person lodging the complaint must have personal knowledge of the facts constituting the offence—*Sukumar v. Mofizuddin*, 25 C.W.N 357, 22 Cr. L.J. 455; *Suresh Chandra v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 531, 21 Cr. L.J. 346; *Imp. v Shewak Ram*, 7 S.L.R 77, 15 Cr L.J 369 (370); *In re Ganesh*, 13 Bom 600. Therefore, the Public Prosecutor is competent to make a complaint, although he has no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the offence—*Imp. v Shewak (supra)*

Essentials of a complaint :—The complaint must allege that an offence has been committed; the use of a house as a brothel is not an offence, and a statement to a Magistrate that a certain person has so used his house is not therefore a complaint—*Imp. v. Khairi*, 6 S.L.R. 254, 14 Cr. L.J 320. An application for taking action under sec 107 is not a complaint—*Shamsuddin*, 25 Cr. L.J 89; *Ram Lal*, 1 O.W.N 359, 25 Cr. L.J 1149. But if the application for action under sec. 107 alleges facts which amount to a substantive offence, the application would amount to a complaint—*Khacho Mal v Emp.*, 27 Cr. L.J. 405 (406), A.I.R 1926 All. 358. So also, a petition to institute proceedings under sec. 110 (*Q. E. v. Imami Mandal*, 27 Cal 662; *Imam Mandal v. Emp.* 11 C.W.N. 163; *Queen v. Ahmad Khan*, 1900 A.W.N. 206; *Muhammad Khan v K E.*, 1905 P.R 42) or under sec. 145 (*Chathu v. Niranjan*, 20 Cal 729) is not a complaint, because the allegations in support of proceedings under those sections do not amount to an offence. As to what are and what are not offences, see notes under Clause (o) *infra*.

A report was made by the Circle Inspector of Police to the Superintendent of Police alleging that the accused had committed an offence, and the Superintendent made an endorsement thus - "I submit the above report for favour of personal and necessary action," and sent it to the Magistrate. *Held* that the endorsement did not amount to a complaint, because it contained no allegation that an offence had been committed. The Superintendent was merely forwarding to the Magistrate a report of his subordinate, just as he might forward a hundred other reports of various kinds—*Baldeo Singh v. Emp.*, 27 Cr. L. J. 899 (900), A.I.R 1926 All. 566

The complaint must be made to a Magistrate. A Police-officer is not a Magistrate; therefore a petition or information sent to such officer is not a complaint—*Ishri v Bakshi*, 6 All. 96; *Queen v. Palanvarapa*, 7 Mad

563; *Kailash v. Emp.*, 30 Cal 265; *Surendra v. Rai Mohan*, 30 Cal 620 (F.B.); *In re Harilal*, 22 Bom 819; *Emp. v. Mathura Singh*, 1894 A.W.N. 266. So also, an Agent of the Court of Wards is not a Magistrate—*Jagobundhu v. Emp.*, 30 Cal 415; a Mamladar in his executive capacity is not a Magistrate—*Queen v. Shivrao*, Rajmalal 554. But a Deputy Commissioner is an *ex-officio* District Magistrate and a petition addressed to him would amount to a complaint—*Shanker v. Manni* 13 N.L.R. 13, 18 Cr. L.J. 459 (460).

The complaint must be made to a Magistrate with a view to his taking action under this Code. A petition alleging that an offence has been committed, but that the petitioner does not desire to prosecute the wrong-doer is not a complaint—*Bhaman Singh v. Haluman* 6 C.W.N. 920, a mere statement to a Magistrate by way of information without any intention of asking him to take action is not a complaint—*Haider Raja v. King Emp* 36 All. 222; *Ahmed Husain v. Emp.*, 17 C.W.N. 950, 14 Cr. L.J. 462, *Bansi Lal v. Emp.*, 12 C.W.N. 438; *Rayan Kuli v. Emp* 28 Mad 610; so also, a petition sent by a husband to a Magistrate not with a view to his taking action thereon, but to recover the jewels alleged to have been stolen by his wife, is not a complaint—*In re Rukmani*, 16 Cr. L.J. 466 (Mad.), a petition making charges against a person and asking for an order of the Police to warn that person in the first instance is not a complaint—*Purno v. Hurish*, 15 C.W.N. 1051, 12 Cr. L.J. 535, a letter written by the Assistant Collector to the District Magistrate in which the former did not ask that any action should be taken by the Magistrate nor intended that the Magistrate should proceed according to law against the person complained against, but merely 'solicited for orders' (*i.e.*, asked for directions as to how he should proceed) did not amount to a complaint—*Sheosampal v. Emp.*, 40 All. 641, 19 Cr. L.J. 903, a statement made to a Magistrate with the object of inducing him to take action not under this Code, but under Sec 6 of the Bombay Gambling Act IV of 1897 is not a complaint within the meaning of this section—*Holu v. Crown*, 8 S.L.R. 66, 15 Cr. L.J. 657.

A complaint need not set out all the facts on which the accused is to be charged—*Chidambaram v. Emp.*, 32 Mad 3 (11), but it must contain a statement of the facts relied on as constituting the offence in ordinary and concise language with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit. A complaint in which no facts are set out but only the words of the section of the Statute are literally copied, is a colourable compliance with the requirements of the law—*Pulin Behari Das v. Emp* 16 C.W.N. 1105, 13 Cr. L.J. 609; *Sukumar v. Mofazzuddin*, 25 C.W.N. 357, 22 Cr. L.J. 455.

It is not necessary that the complaint should specifically, and in terms, accuse any particular person of an offence. It is sufficient if it contains a statement of facts which would constitute an offence—*Jagat Chandra v. Q. E.*, 26 Cal 786 (789). The mention of the name of the accused is not imperatively required under the definition given in this clause—*Shukhadeva v. Hamid*, 7 Pat. 561, 29 Cr. L.J. 942 (944).

the words "report in writing made by a Police Officer," remarking that the term 'police report' in section 190 was not intended to be a technical expression, but was used to cover any report made by a police officer. But the Legislature has not made any amendment in section 4 (h), and hence the words "report of a police officer" in clause 4 (h) should be interpreted to mean only the report of a Police officer in a cognizable case; and any information of a non-cognizable offence which a Police-officer may report to a Magistrate would fall within the definition of a complaint. Thus, the Bombay High Court holds that the 'report of a police officer' in sec 4 (h) means a report which a police-officer is authorised to make under sec 173, and does not include the report of a police-officer in a non-cognizable case. A report of the latter kind amounts to a complaint—*Emp. v. Shivaswami*, 51 Bom. 498, 29 Bom. L.R. 742, A.I.R. 1927 Bom. 440 (442), 28 Cr. L.J. 939. See also *Radhika v. Hamid Ali*, 54 Cal. 371, 28 Cr. L.J. 316, A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 405. But a contrary opinion has been expressed by Sir J. G. Woodroffe, who observes: "A police report in a non-cognizable case was treated either as a complaint under sec 4 cl (h) or as a police report under sec. 190 (1) (b). But now section 190 clause (b) has been amended so as to include any report whether in cognizable or non-cognizable cases and therefore the term 'complaint' will exclude both"—Woodroffe's Criminal Procedure, p. 12.

If, however, a report is made by a Police officer investigating a non-cognizable case, under the orders of a Magistrate having power to try the case, the report falls within the duty of the Police officer, and it is a report, not a complaint—*Sarfaraz v. K. E.*, 11 A.L.J. 332. This question presents no difficulty.

The report of an Excise officer (e.g. sub-inspector of Excise and Salt) under sec. 74 (4) of the Excise Act is not a report of a Police officer for the purpose of sec 4 (h), but is a complaint under that section, in as much as it is an allegation, made to a Magistrate in writing with a view to his taking action under the Code, that some person has committed an offence. The report of the Excise officer is deemed to be a report of a police officer only for the purpose of sec 190 (1) (b), according to the express words of sec. 74 (4) of the Excise Act—*Radhika Mohan v. Hamid Ali*, 54 Cal. 371, 28 Cr. L.J. 316.

(i) 'European British subject' means—

(i) any subject of His Majesty of European descent in the male line born, naturalized or domiciled in the British Islands or any colony, or

(ii) any subject of His Majesty who is the child or grand-child of any such person by legitimate descent :

17. Change :—This clause has been amended by sec 2 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, XII of 1923 (popularly known as the

'Racial Distinctions Act'). Prior to the present amendment, the definition stood as follows :—"European British subject means (i) any subject of Her Majesty born, naturalised or domiciled in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland or in any of the European, American or Australian Colonies or possessions of Her Majesty or in the Colony of New Zealand or in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope or Natal; (ii) any child or grandchild of such person by legitimate descent."

Under the old definition the *place of birth* was the determining factor. "European" meant "born" in Europe. Should a Madras Ayah be taken to London and there give birth to an illegitimate son conceived of a pariah, that son would have been an European British subject. Now, however, this is not so, for the subject must be of *European descent*—Woodroffe, p. 12

"The present amendment has narrowed the definition, so that the number of persons who will be entitled to the privileges conferred by this Code on European British subjects will now be reduced by reason of the fact that they will only be claimable by persons of *European descent in the male line*"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons*, para. 9, of the Criminal Law Amendment Bill

In order to sustain the plea of a British-born subject under clauses (i) and (ii), not only the legitimate descent of the accused, but also the nationality of his father or grandfather, as the case may be, must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court—*Thomas Nash Turnbull*, 6 M.H. C R. 7.

The words "born, naturalized or domiciled" should not be interpreted as "born, naturalized and domiciled"; in other words, it is not necessary that the applicant, in order to come under the definition of an European British subject, should, besides being an European British subject by birth, also be domiciled at the time in the British Islands or any colony. Therefore, an European British woman who marries a native British Indian husband or an Indian subject of a Native state does not cease to be an European British subject either by reason of her marriage or because of her domicile in the Native State—*In re Bai Asha*, 53 Bom. 149, A.I R. 1929 Bom 81 (85)

(j) "High Court" means, in reference to proceedings against European British subjects, or persons jointly charged with European British subjects, the High Courts of Judicature at Fort William, Madras, Bombay, Allahabad, Patna, Lahore and Rangoon, the Chief Courts of Oudh and Sind, and the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of the Central Provinces; in other cases "High Court" means the highest Court of criminal appeal or revision for any local area, or,

where no such Court is established under any law for the time being in force, such officer as the Governor-General in Council may appoint in this behalf:

18. Change—The words “and the Court of the Provinces” in this clause have been added by Sec 2 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act (XII of 1923), and the words “the Chief Courts of Oudh and Sind” have been added by the Oudh Courts Act (XXXII of 1925), and the Sind Courts Act, 1926. Before this Amendment, it was held that a Judicial Commissioner’s Court could exercise its revisional powers over an European British subject only when the latter waived his privileges under Chapter XXXIII (old) of the Code (*Queen v. Grant*, 12 Bom 561), otherwise he was under the revisional jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court. See also *Jeremiah v. Johnson*, 45 M L J 800, A.I.R. 1924 Mad 373 (following 12 Bom 561). These cases are no longer of any authority. Under the present law a Judicial Commissioner’s Court (at Nagpur) will exercise its revisional jurisdiction over an European British subject under all circumstances in the same way as it will over an Indian accused.

Under the Sonthal Perganas Justice Regulation, 1893, the ‘High Court’ for the purpose of hearing an appeal against an acquittal under sec. 417 would be the High Court of Patna, but for the purpose of hearing an application for revision under sec. 439 against an order of acquittal, the Commissioner of the Bhagalpur Division would be deemed a ‘High Court’—*Anwar Ali v. Chairman, Deoghar Municipality*, 6 Pat. 83, 28 Cr L.J. 80, A.I.R. 1926 Pat 449.

High Court, Original side :—A single Judge sitting on the original side of the High Court is not a High Court within the meaning of this Code—*Kalikinkar v. Dinabandhu*, 32 Cal 379.

(h) “inquiry” includes every inquiry other than a trial conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court:

19. Clause (k)—Inquiry :—The word ‘inquiry’ is meant to include every thing done in a case by a Magistrate, whether the case has been challanned or not—*Bhallun Singh v. Q. E.*, 1897 P.R. 3. A proceeding under Chapter XII is an inquiry—*Lalit Mohun v. Suryakanta*, 28 Cal. 709, 5 C.W.N. 749; *Safish v. Rajendra*, 22 Cal. 898; *Ali Mohamed v. Tarak Chandra*, 13 C.W.N. 420. An inquiry under the Workman’s Breach of Contract Act is an inquiry contemplated by the Code—*Bansi v. Lakshmi Das*, 45 All. 700, 21 A.L.J. 619. A “register case” or a preliminary inquiry into an accusation of an offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session is an inquiry and not a trial—*Palaniandy v. Emp.*, 32 Mad 218. A proceeding under sec. 176 is an inquiry—*In re Laxminarayan*, 30 Bom L.R. 1050, 29 Cr L.J. 1063 (1066).

The word “inquiry” relates to proceedings of Magistrates prior to trial, whereas “investigation” is a word confined to proceedings of police or persons other than Magistrates—*Pedda v. K. E.*, 45 Mad. 230 (233).

Trial :—The word 'trial' is not defined in the Code. It means, according to Wharton's Law Lexicon, "the examination of a case, civil or criminal before a Judge who has jurisdiction over it, according to the laws of the land"—*In re Ramasawmi*, 27 Mad. 510. It means the proceeding which commences when the case is called on with the Magistrate on the Bench and the accused on the dock, and the representatives for the prosecution and the accused are present in Court for the hearing of the case—*Gomer Sirda v. Q. E.*, 25 Cal. 863. It refers only to trials for offences, and not to miscellaneous matters such as those coming within sec. 145 of this Code—*Sufferuddin v. Ibrahim*, 3 Cal. 754. The word 'trial' as used in sec. 497 includes appeal—*Madhub Chunder v. Novodceep*, 16 Cal. 121. A proceeding under section 107 is a trial—*In re Ramasawmi*, 27 Mad. 510; *Venkatachinnaya*, 43 Mad. 511 (F.B.), 21 Cr. L.J. 402.

Trial, when begins :—In a case triable exclusively by a Court of Session, the trial begins only after the charge is framed—*Palaniandy v. Emp.*, 32 Mad. 218. So also, in a warrant case, the trial commences when the accused is called upon to plead to a charge, and till a charge has been framed, there is no trial but only an inquiry—*Manna v. Emp.*, 9 N.L.R. 42; *Sreeramulu v. Veerasalingam*, 38 Mad. 585, 15 Cr. L.J. 673; *Narayanaswami v. Emp.*, 32 Mad. 220 F.B. (at pp. 224 and 234); *Haridass v. Saritulla*, 15 Cal. 608 (F.B.). In a summons case, however, it is not necessary to frame a formal charge, the trial may be said to commence when the accused is brought or appears before the Magistrate.

(l) "investigation" includes all the proceedings under the Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorized by a Magistrate in this behalf :

20. Clause (l)—Investigation :—A police Inspector who got information that certain persons were carrying on a wagering business, and having satisfied himself, obtained a warrant and effected the arrest of the accused and the seizure of books, articles of gaming etc., was held to have taken part in the 'investigation' of the case—*Emp. v. Tribhovan Das*, 26 Bom. 533.

(m) "judicial proceeding" includes any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath :

21. Clause (m)—Judicial Proceedings, what are:—

(1) Investigation proceedings under Sec. 202 by a Subordinate Magistrate on a complaint which was taken cognizance of by another Magistrate and sent to him for inquiry and report—*Kanchan v. Ram Kishun*, 36 Cal. 72;

(2) proceedings of a Court holding a preliminary inquiry under Sec. 476 of this Code—*Abdulla v. Emp.*, 37 Cal. 52;

(3) proceedings under Sec. 514 of this Code—*Q. E. v. Har Chandra*, 25 Cal. 440,

(4) proceedings in execution of a decree—*Bahadur v. Eradatulla*, 37 Cal. 642 F. B. (overruling *Hara Charan v. King Emp.*, 32 Cal. 367, *Kanto Ram v. Gobardhan*, 35 Cal. 133 and *Jadu Nath v. Jagadish*, 7 C.W.N. 423), *Dakhineswar v. Harish Chandra*, 10 C.L.J. 450, *Bhola Nath v. Emp.*, 10 C.W.N. 55, *Emp. v. Sheoshankarpari*, 10 N.L.R. 177, *Charan v. Crown*, 1910 P.R. 1,

(5) an inquiry by a Registrar of the Presidency Small Cause Court as to the proper service of summons—*Balchand v. Tarak Nath Sadhu*, 18 C.W.N. 1323, 16 Cr. L.J. 151,

(6) proceedings in which a Magistrate decides as to the fitness of sureties under Chapter VIII—*Imp. v. Mahro*, 2 S.L.R. 11,

(7) proceedings in which the statement of a witness is recorded under Sec. 164 of this Code—*Crown v. Andal*, 5 S.L.R. 174, *Emp. v. Vishwanath*, 8 Bom. L.R. 589,

(8) an inquiry by a Collector under the Income Tax Act hearing objections to assessment—*King Emp. v. Rup Singh*, 1905 P.R. 44,

(9) an inquiry by a Magistrate before issuing an order under Sec. 144 of this Code—*Q. E. v. Tirunarasinha*, 19 Mad. 18,

(10) a proceeding under Sec. 195, whether of the original or Appellate Court, and whether granting or refusing or revoking a sanction (now abolished)—*Q. E. v. Seshadri*, 20 Mad. 383, *Pampapathi v. Subba Sashtri*, 23 Mad. 210; *Q. E. v. Sheikh Beari*, 10 Mad. 232,

(10a) proceedings under sec. 176 of this Code—*In re Laxminarayan*, 30 Bom. L.R. 1050, 29 Cr. L.J. 1063 (1066),

(11) an investigation by a Magistrate under Chapter XIV—*Suppa Tevan v. Emp.*, 29 Mad. 89;

(12) an inquiry under the Legal Practitioner's Act—*Nallasivam v. Ramalingam*, 32 M.L.J. 402, 18 Cr. L.J. 785; *Subba Chelli v. Queen*, 6 Mad. 252; *Gouri Shankar v. King Emp.*, 9 A.L.J. 156;

(13) a proceeding before a Magistrate for recovery of Municipal cesses and taxes under Sec. 84 of the Bombay Municipal Act (VI of 1873)—*Municipality of Amedabad v. Jumna*, 17 Bom. 731;

(14) an inquiry as to the character of the accused under Sec. 117 of this Code—*Sher Zeman v. Q. E.*, 1899 P.R. 10;

(15) maintenance proceeding under Chapter XXXVI—*Laraiti v. Ram Dial*, 5 All. 224;

(16) an inquiry by a Magistrate into the truth of allegations against a subordinate official, contained in a petition presented to a Deputy Commissioner—*Emp. v. Kuna Sah*, 28 All. 89;

(17) proceedings under Sec. 8 of the Reformatory Schools Act—*Q. E. v. Manaji*, 14 Bom. 381;

(18) proceedings under Sec. 42 of Act IV of 1872 (Track Law)—*Dul Singh v. Crown*, 1873 P.R. 28;

(19) an inquiry on an application under Sec. 100 to issue a search warrant is a judicial inquiry, and proceedings preliminary to the issue

(3) proceedings under Sec 514 of this Code—*Q. E. v Har Chandra*, 25 Cal. 440;

(4) proceedings in execution of a decree—*Bahadur v. Eradatulla*, 37 Cal. 642 F B (overruling *Hara Charan v King Emp*, 32 Cal. 367, *Kanto Ram v Gobardhan*, 35 Cal 133 and *Jadu Nath v. Jagadish*, 7 C.W.N 423); *Dakhineswar v Harish Chandra*, 10 C L J 450, *Bhola Nath v. Emp*, 10 C W N 55, *Emp v Sheoshankarpuri*, 10 N L ■ 177; *Charan v Crown*, 1910 P R 1,

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of a search warrant are judicial proceedings—*Abdul Aziz v. Crown*, 1916 P.R. 34, 17 Cr. L.J. 491 (495)

22. Judicial Proceedings, what are not :—(1) It was held that the proceedings of a Magistrate under Sec. 88 investigating claims of third parties to attached property were not judicial proceedings, because the Magistrate had no authority to hold such proceedings—*Q. E. v. Sheodihal*, ■ All. 487. But this decision can no longer stand as correct, because Section 88 as now amended in 1923 provides for an inquiry into the claims of third parties to the attached property, and such an inquiry is a judicial proceeding.

(2) A departmental inquiry by a Magistrate into a complaint made against a Sub-Magistrate—*Suria Narayana v. Emp.*, 29 Mad 100.

(3) A departmental inquiry by a District Registrar into a complaint made against a Sub-Registrar—*Muljat Ali v. K. E.*, 2 C.L.J. 619.

(4) An order of Government authorising or sanctioning a prosecution under Sec. 196 or 197 of this Code—*In re Kalagana Bapiiah*, 27 Mad. 54.

(5) An inquiry by a Magistrate with a view to ascertain whether a sanction to prosecute (now abolished) should be given or not—*Q. E v Venkataramana*, 23 Mad 223

(6) A departmental inquiry under Sec 197 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code (Act V of 1879)—*In re Chotalal*, 22 Bom. 936.

(7) An inquiry by a Deputy Magistrate in pursuance of an order of the District Magistrate calling for inquiry on the report by the Police stating that a complaint lodged with them was false—*Maibat Khan v. Emp.*, 33 Cal. 30.

(8) An examination by a Police officer under Sec. 161 of this Code—*Q. E. v. Ismail*, 11 Bom 659

(9) Proceedings of a District Magistrate under Sec. 125 for cancelling a bond for keeping the peace or for good behaviour—*Daya Nath v. Emp.*, 37 Cal. 72.

(10) An inquiry by a Magistrate on the strength of an information from the secretariat that a seditious pamphlet was published—*Fatteh Ali v. Emp*, 1894 P.R. 15

(11) A report of an inquiry under Sec. 176 into the cause of death of a person under suspicious circumstances—*In re Troilokha Nath*, 3 Cal. 742.

(12) Calling for records under Sec 435 of this Code—*In re Subraya*, 15 M L J. 489.

(13) An inquiry held by a Magistrate not in his magisterial, but in his executive, capacity—*In re Ahadju*, 1886 P R. 21

(14) Proceedings conducted by a person not legally authorised or having no jurisdiction—*Radhika Mohan v Lal Mohan*, 20 Cal 719, *Abdul Majid v. Krishna Lal*, 20 Cal 724; *e g.* an inquiry into the unprofessional conduct of a second grade pleader, conducted not by the presiding officer of the Court in which the pleader practises but by the District Judge—*Nallasivam v Ramalingam*, 32 M L J 402, 18 Cr L J 785

(15) Where on the death of an employee in the Telegraph Department his heir sent a letter to the Telegraph Authorities demanding payment of

of a search warrant are judicial proceedings—*Abdul Aziz v. Crown*, 1916 P.R. 34, 17 Cr. L.J. 491 (495).

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(7) An inquiry by a Deputy Magistrate in pursuance of an order of the District Magistrate calling for inquiry on the report by the Police stating that a complaint lodged with them was false—*Masbat Khan v. Emp.*, 33 Cal. 30.

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(9) Proceedings of a District Magistrate under Sec. 125 for cancelling a bond for keeping the peace or for good behaviour—*Daya Nath v. Emp.*, 37 Cal. 72.

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(15) Where on the death of an employee in the Telegraph Department his heir sent a letter to the Telegraph Authorities demanding payment of

money due to the deceased in the hands of the "Telegraph Authorities, and they sent the letter to the District Judge for verification and orders, whereupon the District Judge inquired into the claim, held that the reference to the Judge for verification and the subsequent action in regard thereto did not constitute a judicial proceeding—*Emp v Chattram*, 6 All. 103.

(n) "non-cognizable offence" means an offence for, and "non-cognizable case" means a case in, which a police officer, within or without a presidency-town, may not arrest without warrant :

(o) "offence" means any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force; it also includes any act in respect of which a complaint may be made under section 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act, 1871 :

23. Clause (o)—Offence.—This definition is the same as that given in Sec 3 (37) of the General Clauses Act. The definition in Sec. 40 I. P. Code is wider and includes acts committed outside British India. In the Extradition Act the word has a still wider meaning and is not restricted to offences as defined in Sec 40 I P C. or in this Code—*Adams v. Emp*, 26 Mad 607

Civil wrong —Where an act may be a criminal offence or a mere civil wrong according to the intention of the person doing the Act, the aggrieved party should not be encouraged to go into a Criminal Court unless he is fully prepared to prove that the act is criminal and not a mere civil wrong—*Gulzar v Emp.*, 1887 P M. 50

24. Offences, what are:—(1) Breach of a husband's duty (to maintain his wife) declared by the Magistrate's order, or a disobedience of such order—*In re Sheikh Fakruddin*, 9 Bom. 40.

(2) Failure to prepare and retain counterfoils of rent receipts as specified in Sec 58 of the Bengal Tenancy Act—*Emp. v. Mohant Ramdas*, 11 C.W.N. 816.

(3) Omission to stamp a share-warrant under Sec 35 of the Indian Companies Act—*Q. E. v. Moore*, 20 Cal. 676

(4) Illegal seizure of cattle mentioned in Sec. 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act—*Buddhan Mahto v Issur Singh*, 34 Cal. 926.

(5) Omission by a workman to comply with an order made under clause (1) of Sec 2 of the Workmen's Breach of Contract Act—*King Emp. v. Takasi Nukayya*, 24 Mad. 660; *Emp. v. Dhondur*, 33 Bom. 22 (24).

25. Offences, what are not :—(1) Neglect to maintain wife or children—*Q. v. Golam Hossain*, 7 W.R. 10; *In re Ponnammal*, 16 Mad. 234; *Hildephonsus v. Malone*, 1885 P.R. 13.

(2) A mere breach of the contract under clause (1) of Sec. 2 of the

Workmen's Breach of Contract Act—*K. E. v. Takasi Nukayya*, 24 Mad. 600; *In re Ram Sarup*, 4 C.W.N. 253; *Averam v. Abdul Rahim*, 27 Cal. 131; *Pollard v. Mothilal*, 4 Mad. 234; *Emp. v. Dhondu*, 33 Bom. 22 (24). The breach of the contract does not of itself constitute any offence, but upon such breach the Magistrate passes an order for payment of the advance or for performance of the contract, and it is only when the order is disobeyed that there is an 'offence' within the meaning of the Cr. P Code—33 Bom. 22 (24).

(3) Inability to give a satisfactory account of oneself, or want of ostensible means of livelihood (sec. 109)—*Emp. v. Buddha*, 3 N L R, 51.

(4) The mere travelling in a train without pass or ticket is not an offence under the Railways Act unless there is a dishonest intention to defraud the Railway Company—*Q. E. v. Rampal*, 20 All. 95; *Kuloda v. Emp.*, 11 C.W.N. 100.

(5) The mere use of a house as a brothel—*Emp. v. Khairi*, 6 S L.R. 254, 14 Cr. L.J. 320.

(6) Keeping a disorderly house is not an offence under the Eastern Bengal Disorderly Houses Act—*Rajani Khemtawali v. Pramatha*, 37 Cal. 287.

(7) An application to take proceedings under sec. 107 is not an accusation for an offence—*Hazarimal v. Memanmal*, 1893 P R 16; *Q. E. v. Imam Mandal*, 27 Cal. 662; *Chalhu v. Niranjan*, 20 Cal. 729. See notes under sec. 107.

(8) Gambling in a boat hired by the accused or in a compartment in a train is not an offence under Bombay Act IV of 1887—*Emp. v. Walla*, 29 Bom. 226; *Emp. v. Budhoobai*, 30 Bom. 126.

(9) The erection of an unauthorised structure is not an offence under the Calcutta Municipal Act; it is only when an order of demolition of the structure passed by the Municipal Magistrate is disobeyed that the owner of the structure commits an 'offence'—*Krishna Doyal v. Corporation of Calcutta*, 54 Cal. 532, 31 C.W.N. 506 (508), 28 Cr. L.J. 407.

Offence under the Cattle Trespass Act:—Since an offence as defined in this clause includes an "act in respect of which a complaint may be made under sec. 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act," a Magistrate who is generally empowered under the Cr. Pro. Code to receive complaints of offences is competent to receive complaints under sec. 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act, and he need not be specially authorised by the District Magistrate to receive complaints under that section—*Deenadayalu v. Ratna*, 52 M L J 251, 28 Cr. L.J. 301.

(p) "officer in charge of a police station" includes, when the officer in charge of the police-station is absent from the station-house or unable from illness or other cause to perform his duties, the police officer present at the station-house who is next in rank to such officer and is above the rank

of constable or, when the Local Government so directs, any other police officer so present :

26. Clause (p) :—This clause is not applicable to the Police of Calcutta—*Emp. v Madho Dhobi*, 31 Cal. 557.

The words 'present at the station-house' do not mean physically present at the station-house, therefore, if a person is deputed to be in charge of a police station, the fact that he was doing duty within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Police Station but *outside the station-house*, does not deprive him of his capacity as Station-House officer—*Assan Alliar v. Masilamani*, 42 Mad 446, 36 M L J 252, 20 Cr L J. 422.

If the Sub-Inspector in charge of the thana is ill, the writer Head Constable who is the officer next in seniority to him can act in his place. Thus, where the Magistrate sent a cognizable case to the Police for investigation and report, and the Sub-Inspector was ill that day, it was the duty of the writer Head Constable who was in charge of the Police-station on that day to investigate the case, although he was not generally empowered to make investigation into cognizable cases—*K E v Bhola Bhagat*, 3 Pat. 379 (384), 4 P.L.T. 521, 24 Cr L J 375.

Constable—By a judicial notification no 3, dated 31-1-1883, the senior constable present at any police station shall be deemed to be the officer in charge for the time being, during the absence of the officer in charge—*Kuppa Kavundan*, 9 M L T 414, 12 Cr L J 190, 10 I.C. 667.

(q) "place" includes also a house, building, tent, and vessel :

(r) "pleader," used with reference to any proceeding in any Court, means a pleader or a *mukhtar* authorized under any law for the time being in force to practise in such Court, and includes (1) an advocate, a *vakil*, and an attorney of a High Court so authorized, and (2) any other person appointed with the permission of the Court to act in such proceeding :

27. Clause (r) :—Change in the law.—The definition of 'pleader' has been amended by the Criminal Procedure Code Further Amendment Act (XXXV of 1923). The old definition ran as follows :—

"Pleader used with reference to any proceeding in any Court means a pleader authorised under any law for the time being in force to practise in such Court, and includes (1) an advocate, a *vakil* and an attorney of a High Court, so authorised, and (2) any *mukhtar* or other person appointed with the permission of the Court to act in such proceeding."

Thus, under the old law, a *mukhtar* fell under the second part of the definition of the word 'pleader'; that is, a *mukhtar* was not entitled as of

right to practise in Criminal Courts, but it was necessary for him to obtain *permission of the Court* in each case before he was authorised to practise before Magistrates and Sessions Judges (*In re Anant Ram*, 30 All 66; *Ishan Chandra v Emp.*, 38 Cal. 488), though such permission was usually and naturally granted. The mukhtars were placed in the same category as "other person" i.e., ordinary persons without any training or license. For this reason the mukhtars had a sentimental grievance and it was desirable that it should be removed (see the Report of the Select Committee on Bill 6 of 1922, in the *Gazette of India*, 1923, Part V, pages 129—131). Accordingly the definition has been amended by the Amendment Act (XXXV of 1923). This amendment has done away with the necessity of obtaining the permission of the Court, and gives a legal status to mukhtars.

'Practise'.—The word 'practise' does not connote the doing of acts habitually or often, but signifies the performance of even a single act by a person as a professional man, which as a private individual he could not do—*Emp. v. Beni Bahadur*, 26 All 380.

A petition-writer who attends Court all day cannot be said to practise—*Shib Churn v. Isham Chunder*, 18 W R 27. Only persons entitled to appear, plead or act in Court can be said to practise—*Tassaduq v. Girhar*, 14 Cal. 556 (565).

Mukhtar—The word refers to such Mukhtars as have obtained a certificate of qualification from the High Court—*In re Anant Ram*, 30 All. 66.

License for one district—A pleader who holds a license to practise in a particular district is not entitled as a matter of right to practise in a Criminal Court of another district, unless he is permitted to practise in the latter Court—*Kimatrai v. Crown*, 4 S L R 207. It is the duty of a pleader who appears in a Criminal Court of a district to which his *sanad* does not apply, to inform the Magistrate that he cannot appear as of right, and to apply for a permission under this clause—*Re Clements*, 7 S L R 98, 15 Cr. L J. 382.

Other person—The words 'other person' embrace pure outsiders as well as duly qualified and enrolled mukhtars who have failed to take out their certificates—*Tassaduq v. Girhar*, 14 Cal 556.

The Code entitles a prisoner to authorise any person to be his agent in any Criminal Court—*Reg v. Ramchandra*, Ratanlal 1, see also *Q E v. Chandrabhaga*, Ratanlal 206. It is open to the accused to appoint any person (e.g. the manager of his estate) to appear in his stead and plead and do other acts on his behalf; but there must be clearly on record something to show that the person who represents the accused has been duly appointed by him (just as an ordinary pleader has to file a vakalat-nama), and that the Court has given the requisite permission for his appearance in place of the accused—*Dorabshah v. Emp.*, 50 Bom 250, 28 Bom. L R. 102, 27 Cr L.J. 440 (444), A I R 1926 Bom 218.

The authority which can grant permission to an ordinary person to appear in any case is the Court in which he appears, and the District Magistrate cannot debar such persons, by a general order, from appearing

High Court can deal with by virtue of its superior powers—*Surendra Nath Banerjee v. Chief Justice*, 10 Cal. 109 (P.C.).

"Otherwise dealt with"—To 'otherwise deal with' a case includes the act of transferring a case from one Court to another under sec. 526—*Basdeo v. Badai*, 49 All 188, 28 Cr. L.J. 94

32. Clause (2) :—Where a special law (e.g., the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act IV of 1887) has provided a special procedure for the manner or place of investigating or inquiring into any offence under it, its provisions must prevail, and no provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code can apply. Where, however, the special Act is silent, the Cr. P. C. would be applicable—*Emp. v. Kattan*, 31 Bom 439

Thus, the Gambling Act III of 1867, sec. 5, prescribes a special procedure for searches under that Act, and the provisions of Chapter VII of this Code shall not apply thereto—*Khilinda Ram v. Emp.*, 3 Lah 359, 23 Cr. L.J. 621. So also, under the Madras Abkari Act (I of 1886), an accused person has the right to a special procedure regulating the course of investigation and providing for a much more elaborate inquiry than is provided for in the Cr. P. Code, and if a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence under the Madras Abkari Act under the provisions of this Code, the proceedings are not properly instituted—*In re Kuppuswamy*, 44 M.L.J. 231, 24 Cr. L.J. 335

Where the special law prescribes no special procedure, the procedure of the Cr. P. Code must be followed. So, an offence under sec. 20 of the Calcutta Rent Act must be summarily inquired into under the provisions of Chapter XXII of this Code—*Ishan Chandra v. Manmatha*, 37 C.L.J. 298, A.I.R. 1923 Cal. 339. The Cr. P. Code is applicable to trials before a Magistrate of offences under the Bengal Excise Act—*Upendra v. Emp.*, 41 Cal 694 (702), 18 C.W.N. 486.

The Cr. P. Code is applicable to a prosecution under the Calcutta Municipal Act—See *Sisir Kumar v. Corporation of Calcutta*, 30 C.W.N. 598; *Umesh Chandra v. Corporation of Calcutta*, 43 C.L.J. 231, *Sew Prosad v. Corporation of Calcutta*, 9 C.W.N. 18; *Krishen Doyal v. Corporation of Calcutta*, 54 Cal 532, 31 C.W.N. 506

A simultaneous conviction under the Indian Penal Code as well as under a special law for the same offence is illegal—*Quern v. Hussan Ali*, 5 N.W.P. 49.

33. "Enactment" :—A rule framed under any act (e.g., Calcutta Rent Act) is not an 'enactment' within the meaning of clause (2) of this section—*Gobardhan v. Doolie Chand*, 25 C.W.N. 661, 22 Cr. L.J. 354.

PART II.

CONSTITUTION AND POWERS OF CRIMINAL COURTS AND OFFICES.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE CONSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL COURTS AND OFFICES.

A.—Classes of Criminal Courts.

6. Besides the High Courts and the Courts constituted under any law other than this Code for the time being in force, there shall be five classes of Criminal Courts in British India, namely :—

I.—Courts of Session :

II.—Presidency Magistrates :

III.—Magistrates of the first class :

IV.—Magistrates of the second class :

V.—Magistrates of the third class.

34. **Magistrate—Court** .—A Magistrate as such is not a Court unless he is acting in a judicial capacity—*Clarke v Brojendra Kishore*, 36 Cal. 433.

The Court of a Police Patel is not a Criminal Court within the enumeration contained in this section—*Q E v Ramia, Ratanlal*, 317.

A village Panchayet constituted under U P Act VI of 1920 is a Criminal Court within the meaning of Chap II of the Cr P. Code—*Basdeo v. Badal*, 49 All 188, 28 Cr L J 94; *Kamlapati v Emp*, 48 All. 23, 27 Cr L J 19 Contra—*Sat Narain v Sarju*, 46 All 167, 25 Cr. L.J. 1390

35. **Presidency Magistrate** .—The term "Presidency Magistrate" would not be ordinarily included in the words "District Magistrate" or "Magistrate of the first class" because secs 10 and 12 of the Code show that the District Magistrates and Magistrates of the first class are appointed only in districts outside the Presidency towns—*Emp v. Chota Singh*, 32 Mad 303 But the term "Magistrate of the first class" used in sec 111 of the Emigration Act (XX of 1883) means a Magistrate appointed to exercise the highest magisterial powers, and includes a Presidency Magistrate—*Emp v Jeevanji*, 31 Bom 611, *Emp v Haji Shaik Mahomed*, 32 Bom 10

a class of Courts different from the High Courts—*Emp v. Harendra*, 51 Cal. 980 (1982), 29 C.W.N. 384.

The Additional Sessions Judge will try such cases as would be made over to him by the Sessions Judge. But that does not oust the jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge over those cases, therefore if a Sessions Judge makes over a particular appeal to the Additional Sessions Judge to be tried by the latter, he can afterwards withdraw the case from the latter, and take it on his own file and decide it—*Birju Marwari v Emp*, 44 All. 157, 19 A.L.J. 952, 23 Cr. L.J. 107.

The appointment of an Additional Sessions Judge does not constitute an additional Sessions Court. There can be only one Sessions Court for each Sessions Division, but there can be more than one Judge of such Sessions Court. If an Additional Sessions Judge is appointed, he can try only such cases as the Local Government directs or as the Sessions Judge makes over to him—*Q. E. v Kunjan*, 1 M.L.J. 397 (400) (F.B.).

Under Sec. 20 of the Aden Courts Act (Bom. Act II of 1864), the *Resident of Aden* is not a Court of Session, but is a *persona designata* invested with the powers of a Court of Session except as in that Act otherwise provided. The powers of the Court of Session conferred on the Resident are not wholly such as are defined in the Cr. P. Code, but only such as are specially provided in Act II of 1864—*Emp. v. Robert Comley*, 29 Bom. 575.

10. (1) In every district outside the presidency-towns, the Local Government shall appoint a Magistrate of the first class who shall be called the District Magistrate.

(2) The Local Government may appoint any Magistrate of the first class to be an Additional District Magistrate * * * and such Additional District Magistrate shall have all or any of the powers of a District Magistrate under this Code or under any other law for the time being in force as the Local Government may direct.

(3) For the purposes of sections 192 sub-section (1), 407 sub-section (2), and 528 sub-sections (2) and (3), such Additional District Magistrate shall be deemed to be subordinate to the District Magistrate.

39. Change :—In sub-section (2), the italicised words have been added, and the words "for a period not exceeding six months" occurring after the words "an Additional District Magistrate" have been omitted, by Sec. 2 of the Cr. P. Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923).

Sub-section (3) has also been newly added by the same Amendment Act. Prior to this amendment, the Code did not define the relation between a District Magistrate and an Additional District Magistrate. Section 12 also did not make an Additional District Magistrate subordinate

to a District Magistrate, and therefore the latter had no power under section 528 to transfer a case from a Sub-divisional Magistrate to the Additional District Magistrate—*Prakas Chunder v. Emp.*, 34 Cal. 918. This case is no longer good law, because under sub-section (3), newly enacted, the District Magistrate has been expressly empowered to transfer cases under sec. 528 to the Additional District Magistrate.

40. District Magistrate.—A District Magistrate is appointed in a district outside the Presidency towns. Therefore a Presidency Magistrate is not included in the term 'District Magistrate'—*Emp. v. Chota Singh*, 32 Mad 303.

The term 'Zillah Magistrate' used in the Bombay Regulations means a District Magistrate—*Reg. v. Prabhakar*, 3 B H.C.R. 11; *Reg. v. Hira*, 7 B H.C.R. 59. A Deputy Commissioner in a non-Regulation Province is a District Magistrate—*In re Boron*, 16 W R 1.

A District Magistrate is subordinate to the Sessions Judge and cannot disregard the order of the latter—*K. E. v. Tun Lin*, 5 L B R. 49, 2 I.C. 541, 10 Cr. L.J. 77.

District Magistrate and 1st class Magistrate—Where a trial was commenced by an officiating District Magistrate, and before its close, the officer reverted to his original position as First class Magistrate of the district, in which capacity also he had jurisdiction over the offence, it was held that he had jurisdiction to continue the trial. This Code does not recognise any particular Court as that of the District Magistrate but only Courts of First, Second and Third Class Magistrates—*Emp. v. Syed Sajjad Husain*, 3 A.L.J. 825.

11. Whenever, in consequence of the office of a District Magistrate becoming vacant,

Officers temporarily
succeeding to vacancies
in office of District
Magistrate.

any officer succeeds temporarily to the chief executive administration of the district, such officer shall, pending the orders of the Local Government, exercise all the powers and perform all the duties respectively conferred and imposed by this Code on the District Magistrate.

40A. An officer absent on casual leave is not treated as absent from duty. While such officer is on casual leave, the next senior officer remains in charge of the current duties. There is no vacancy and no temporary succession within the meaning of this section, when a Sub-divisional Magistrate is temporarily looking after the current duties of a District Magistrate absent on casual leave on account of illness, and when there is no order appointing him to officiate as District Magistrate—*K E v. Achhaibar*, 24 O.C. 255, 22 Cr. L.J. 713.

12. (1) The Local Government may appoint as many persons as it thinks fit, besides the District Magistrate, to be Magistrates of the first, second or

Subordinate Magis-
trates.

third class in any district outside the presidency towns; and the Local Government, or the District Magistrate subject to the control of the Local Government may, from time to time, define local areas within which such persons may exercise all or any of the powers with which they may respectively be invested under this Code.

(2) *Except as otherwise provided by such definition, the jurisdiction and powers of such persons shall extend throughout such district.*

41. Magistrate :—A cantonment Magistrate is a Magistrate appointed under this section—*Q. E v Maula Baksh*, 1897 P.R. 1.

42. Local area :—Although the expression "local area" includes a sessions division, district or subdivision (*Punardeo v. Ram Sarup*, 25 Cal. 858), still it appears sufficiently clear that the Legislature did not contemplate the exercise of jurisdiction by any Magistrate outside the limits of an area called a 'District' in which he might be appointed by the Local Government—*In re Shaik Fakruddin*, 9 Bom. 40. A Sub-divisional Magistrate who has had his jurisdiction defined within a sub-division or local area in the district by order of the District Magistrate cannot take cognizance of a matter outside such local area—*Kunj Behari v. Lanua*, 19 A.L.J. 77, 22 Cr. L.J. 122. But where a notification, appointing a Magistrate, did not specify any local area within which he was to exercise jurisdiction, but conferred on him power to try "all such cases as might be instituted in his Court," it was held that the notification by necessary implication conferred jurisdiction throughout the province—*Lakhmi Chand v. Emp.*, 1901 P.R. 24.

But a Magistrate having jurisdiction within a district cannot record a confession in a place *outside British India* (e.g., in a Native State) although the offence in respect of which the confession is made has been committed within that district—*Nahar Singh v. Emp.*, 19 A.L.J. 355, 22 Cr. L.J. 567.

43. Jurisdiction extends throughout district :—Unless the powers of a Magistrate have been restricted to a certain local area, he has jurisdiction over the entire district—*Sarat Chandra v. Bipin*, 29 Cal. 389; *Hiranand v. K. E.*, 10 C.W.N. 1095 (1098); *Emp. v. Achhabar Singh*, 24 O.C. 255, 22 Cr. L.J. 713; therefore a Magistrate appointed for a whole district, but put in charge of a particular taluk or sub-division only, is not without jurisdiction, if he enquires into or tries a case in another taluk or sub-division of the same district—*Q. E v. Jamshedji, Ratanlal* 177; *Rameshwar v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 632, 21 Cr. L.J. 321; *Q. E v. Laban*, U.B.R. (1892—96) 16.

A Magistrate in the division whose powers have not been formally limited to any particular portion of the division has jurisdiction to try an

offence committed within the division although beyond the local limits of what was regarded as his jurisdiction—*Anon*, 2 Weir 13.

44. Effect of transfer:—Since the jurisdiction of a Magistrate extends throughout the district, it follows that the transfer of a Magistrate from one local area to another local area in the same district does not oust his jurisdiction over the former area—*Karuppana v. Ahobalamani*, 22 Mad. 47. Cases on the file of one Magistrate in a district do not automatically pass to his successor in the local area, merely because the former has been transferred to another local area in the same district. The former Magistrate can retain the case on his file even after he is transferred to another local area in the district, and can pass order in the case—*Mithani v. K. E.*, 34 All. 203, 9 A L.J. 448, 13 Cr. L.J. 203.

But when a Magistrate is transferred to another district, his jurisdiction over the district in which he was originally appointed ceases as soon as he is relieved by his successor, and therefore a judgment passed after, though on the same day as, he was relieved by his successor, was held to be without jurisdiction—*Emp. v. Anand Sarup*, 3 All. 563, *Baiwant v. Krishen*, 19 All. 114; *Emp. v. Dhonda*, 15 C. P. L. R. 15, *Baishnab Charan v. Amin Ali*, 50 Cal. 664, 38 C.L.J. 202, 24 Cr. L.J. 489.

13. (1) The Local Government may place any Magistrate of the first or second class in charge of a sub-division, and relieve him of the charge as occasion requires.

Power to put Magistrate in charge of sub-division.

(2) Such Magistrates shall be called Sub-divisional Magistrates.

(3) The Local Government may delegate its powers under this section to the District Magistrate.

Delegation of powers to District Magistrate.

14. (1) The Local Government may confer upon any person all or any of the powers conferred or conferrable by or under this Code on a Magistrate of the first, second, or third class in respect to particular cases or to a particular class or particular classes of cases, or in regard to cases generally, in any local area outside the presidency towns.

(2) Such Magistrates shall be called Special Magistrates, and shall be appointed for such term as the Local Government may by general or special order direct.

(3) * * * The Local Government may delegate, with such limitations as it thinks fit, to any officer under its control, the power conferred by sub-section (1).

(4) No powers shall be conferred under this section on any police officer below the grade of Assistant District Superintendent, and no powers shall be conferred on a police officer except so far as may be necessary for preserving the peace, preventing crime, and detecting, apprehending, and detaining offenders in order to their being brought before a Magistrate, and for the performance by the officer of any other duties imposed upon him by any law for the time being in force.

The words "with the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council" which occurred at the beginning of sub-section (3) have been omitted by the Devolution Act XXXVIII of 1920

45. "Any local area":—The words 'any local area' can be extended to cover, if necessary, a whole province, therefore, where the Local Government, by a Notification, appointed a special Magistrate under this section with all the powers of a first class Magistrate in regard to cases generally 'throughout the Punjab,' it was held that the appointment was not *ultra vires*—*Hiralal v Crown*, 1918 P R 7, 19 Cr L J 310, *Lakhmi Chand v Emp*, 1901 P R 24

It is essential that a Special Magistrate should be appointed for a local area. The connotation of a Special Magistrate under this Code is that he should have (1) specified powers conferrable on a Magistrate by the Local Government, (2) a local area within which to exercise those powers, and (3) jurisdiction to try particular cases or classes of cases generally. Each of the above ingredient enters into the conception of a Special Magistrate as defined in this section, but the last is a variable element and does not necessarily require specific mention. If nothing is said about the cases to be tried, it will be understood that all cases triable by law by a Magistrate invested with the powers of a Special Magistrate may be tried by him. But the powers and the local area must be defined—*Lakhmi Chand v. Emp.*, 1901 P.R. 24

Case:—If a special Magistrate is appointed under sec. 14 to try a particular 'case', against a certain person, the 'case' would cover all the charges which may arise against that person—*Emp v Jehangir*, 29 Bom. L R, 996, A.I.R. 1927 Bom. 501, 28 Cr L.J. 1012.

Appeal:—Appeals from the orders of a Special Magistrate would lie to the Sessions Judge within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the Magistrate was in any particular case holding his Court—*Hiralal*, 1918 P.R 7, 19 Cr. L J 310

15. (1) The Local Government may direct any two

or more Magistrates in any place outside the presidency-towns to sit together as a Bench, and may by order invest such Bench with any of the powers con-

Benches of Magistrates.

ferred or conferrable by or under this Code on a Magistrate of the first, second, or third class, and direct it to exercise such powers in such cases, or such classes of cases only, and within such local limits, as the Local Government thinks fit.

(2) Except as otherwise provided by any order under this section, every such Bench shall have the powers conferred by this Code on a Magistrate of the highest class to which any one of its members, who is present taking part in the proceedings as a member of the Bench, belongs, and, as far as practicable, shall, for the purposes of this Code, be deemed to be a Magistrate of such class.

Powers exercisable by Bench in absence of special direction.

See notes under sec 350A

46. Powers of a Bench —Where a case triable by a first class Magistrate was at first tried by a Bench of Magistrates which could exercise first class powers when sitting together, but neither of whom was individually invested with first class powers, and at the adjourned hearing only one member of the Bench was present, it was held that he was not competent to try the case alone—*In re Baroda*, 2 C.L.R. 348. An Honorary Magistrate who is a member of a Bench, which exercises powers of third class collectively cannot act independently (that is, when not sitting on the Bench), unless he is authorised to act independently—*Emp v. Nuri Sheikh*, 29 Cal 483.

Where there was a rule framed under this section, that only such cases as could be tried summarily should be transferred to the Bench, and in spite of this rule, a case not triable summarily but within the competency of the Bench was transferred to it, and the Bench tried the case in the regular way, it was held that this contravention of the rule in transferring a case which the Bench could not try summarily was cured by the provisions of sec. 529 (f), and the trial by the Bench was valid—*Nga San v. K E*, 1910 U.B.R. (Cr. P.C.) 70, 11 I.C. 247, 12 Cr. L.J. 383.

16. The Local Government may, or subject to the control of the Local Government,

Power to frame rules for guidance of Benches.

the District Magistrate may, from time to time, make rules consistent with this Code, for the guidance of Magistrates' Benches in any district respecting the following subjects:—

- (a) the classes of cases to be tried;
- (b) the times and places of sitting;

- (c) the constitution of the Bench for conducting trials;
- (d) the mode of settling differences of opinion which may arise between the Magistrates in session.

47. Consistent with this Code.—The rules framed under this section must be consistent with this Code. "The judges have recently had occasion to call for and examine the rules made in each district, and they noticed that in several districts, District Magistrates have exceeded the powers conferred upon them by sec 16, either by making rules inconsistent with the Code itself, or by adding rules on the subject not mentioned in the section in question, and so not within the powers conferred by it. Care should, therefore, be taken to limit action under the section to the powers conferred by it"—*Punj. Cir.*, No 13-2612 G, of 1890.

48. Classes of cases to be tried—Magistrates should ordinarily not make over cases to Benches which are likely to be of a protracted character—*Q. v. Bholanath*, 2 Cal 23. So also, cases involving difficult questions of fact or law should not be directed to be tried by a Bench of Honorary Magistrates—*Pub. Pro v. Varadarajulu*, 47 Mad. 716 (722), 47 M L J 470, 25 Cr L J 1070.

Constitution of Bench—Quorum.—See notes under sec. 350A.

49. Differences of Opinion.—According to the new rule framed in Bengal (see rule 6 of the Bengal Rules, cited below), in case of difference of opinion as to the finding between an even number of Magistrates the case shall be referred back to the District Magistrate or the Sub-divisional Officer; and the provisions of section 350 shall then apply—*Chand v. Shamsher*, 19 Cr L.J. 312 (Cal). But in Eastern Bengal and Assam, the old Notification under which the difference of opinion between two Honorary Magistrates forming a Bench is to be settled by the casting vote of one of them, viz., the Chairman, is still in force. See *Ufal v. K E.*, 18 C.W.N. 394, 14 Cr. L.J. 684.

According to the U. P. rules, if there is an irreconcilable difference of opinion among the members of a Bench as to the guilt of the accused, he should be given the benefit of doubt. The Bench cannot refer the case to a District Magistrate; such a reference is irregular and is not justified by any provisions of the Code—*Kashinath v. Shanker*, 16 Cr. L.J. 113 (All.); *Abdul Aziz v. Emp.*, 15 A.L.J. 237, 18 Cr. L.J. 506.

In a case where the President of the Bench is in a minority as to conviction or acquittal, the judgment should be written by some member of the majority. "Otherwise, as in the present case, we have a conviction based on an acquitting judgment, and we are left without any reasons for the conviction which under the provisions of the Cr. P. Code the Bench is bound to set out. The judgment does not conform to the

law and the conviction cannot be upheld"—*Lalamma v. Emp.*, 51 Mad 338, 29 Cr. L.J. 207, A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 197.

RULES FOR GUIDANCE OF BENCHES.

Bengal Rules.

1. The Bench shall try such cases as its powers enable it to try, and it is authorised to try, arising within the local limits following :—

[Here enter local limits].

or such particular cases as are made over to it by the Magistrate of the district, or any Magistrate empowered to make over cases. It can only entertain of its own motion complaints made in respect of the following classes of offences :—

[Here enter classes of cases].

2. The Bench shall sit at the place and on the date mentioned below. The Honorary Magistrates will sit in the rotation arranged by the Magistrate of the district or division; but any Magistrate not named may sit, provided he is not personally interested in the case before the Bench.

[Here enter place and ordinary dates of sitting].

3. The Bench may hold one or more adjourned sittings if this be found necessary for the disposal of business or of part-heard cases; but it shall be open to the Bench at the close of its regular sitting either to apply to the District or Subordinate Magistrate to transfer from their file any unheard cases, or to postpone them to next Bench-day as may seem most convenient.

4. The Chairman of the Bench for the time being shall be the Magistrate of highest powers, present at a sitting. Where two or more are of equal powers, the Bench may elect its own Chairman, provided always that it shall be in the discretion of the Magistrate of the district to appoint the Chairman for each time of sitting or generally.

5. The Chairman shall maintain order, conduct the proceedings of the Court, and exercise all the functions in that behalf usually exercised by a Magistrate when sitting alone. It shall be open to any member of the Bench to put any question to the witnesses, either direct or through the Chairman, as to the latter may deem advisable, and to suggest any matter for the Chairman's consideration.

6. Each member of the Bench shall have a voice in deciding as to the admissibility of evidence and in the finding and sentence. In a Bench of three or other uneven number of members the opinion of the majority shall prevail. When the numbers are even, the Chairman shall have a casting vote.

This rule has been modified by the Bengal Government owing to the strong disapproval expressed by the Full Bench in *Kailash v. Kali Prasad* 10 C W N 642 (F B) and the rule now reads thus —

'Each member of the Bench shall have a voice in deciding as to the admissibility of evidence and in the finding and sentence. In a Bench of three or other uneven number of members the opinion of the majority shall prevail. When the numbers are even the opinion of the Chairman shall prevail in all points except the finding. In the event of disagreement as to the finding the case shall be referred back to the District Magistrate or to the Sub-divisional Officer as the case may be.'—*Calcutta Gazette*, 2nd May, 1906, Pt. I, p. 980

7. In the trial of ordinary cases, the Chairman shall generally record the evidence and judgment, but such duty may, with his consent, be performed by any one of his colleagues.

In the trial of summary cases, where the Bench has been invested with summary powers, the necessary record shall be prepared by the Chairman or one of his colleagues, or by means of the Clerk of the Court, but in every case the record must be signed by each member of the Bench who is present.

8. [This rule as to the hearing of any part-heard case has been cancelled by Government Notification, June 6th, 1893—*Calcutta Gazette*, 1893, Pt. I, p. 523] See *Hardwar v. Khaga*, 30 Cal. 870 which declared this rule to be *ultra vires*.

9. The Bench may refer any point of law for the opinion of the Magistrate of the District or Sub-division, or of any first class Magistrate appointed by the Magistrate of the district for that purpose, and the Magistrate may certify his opinion thereon.

10. Magistrates should ordinarily not make over cases to Benches which are likely to be of a protracted character. *Calcutta Gazette* 1889, Pt. I, p. 1071.

Madras Rules.

1. One or more Special Magistrates appointed for any local area may sit as a Bench, together with any salaried Magistrate whom the District Magistrate shall from time to time nominate for that purpose. The salaried Magistrate shall be the Chairman of the Bench so constituted, and the Bench is hereby invested with the powers of a Magistrate of the third class or such higher powers as are exercisable under the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of s. 15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure—

(1) to try summarily offences against the I. P. C., ss. 277, 278, 279, 285, 286, 289, 290, 323, 334, 336, 341, 352, 426 and 447;

(2) to try summarily offences against Municipal Acts and the Conservancy clauses of Police Acts, punishable only with fine or with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month;

- (3) to try summarily abetments of any of the foregoing offences;
- (4) to try summarily attempts to commit any of the foregoing offences when such attempts are offences;
- (5) to try, in accordance with Chapter XX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, offences punishable under—
 - (a) sub-sections (2) and (3) of s. 112 of the Madras Local Boards Act, 1884,
 - (b) s. 18 of the Madras Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1899,
 - (c) ss. 5, 6 and 7 of the Madras Towns' Nuisances Act, 1889,
 - (d) the Madras Hackney Carriage Act, 1911

Provided that no Bench of Magistrates shall try offences under ss. 426 and 447, I P C, including abetment of and attempts to commit, such offences, except with the special sanction of Government

Provided also that with the approval of the District Magistrate, any three or more Special Magistrates, of whom one is specially designated by the District Magistrate, may sit together as a Bench and shall exercise the powers of a Magistrate of the third class in respect of the offences specified above other than those referred to in the first proviso

2 The Magistrate specially designated by the District Magistrate shall, if no salaried Magistrate is present, be Chairman of such Bench.

3 All existing rules made by District Magistrates for the guidance of Benches in their several districts as to the times and places of sitting shall continue in force until modified or withdrawn

4. Differences of opinion shall be settled by the votes of the majority of the Magistrates present, the Chairman having the casting vote.

5 If any person charged with any of the offences specified above is arrested without warrant, and has not been released on bail, he shall be produced for trial before the salaried Magistrate having jurisdiction. If such person has been released on bail, or if process to compel his appearance is issued by the salaried Magistrate having jurisdiction, the bail bond or the process shall require him to appear in accordance with its terms before the Bench of Magistrates having jurisdiction. The District Magistrate or the Sub-divisional Magistrate shall exercise the same powers in regard to withdrawal or reference of cases from Benches as he possesses in the case of Magistrates under s. 528 of the Cr P C

6 Under s. 265, Cr P C, every Bench of Magistrates is authorised to prepare the record or judgment of the Bench by means of any officer appointed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate

7. Under s. 260 of the said Code, every Bench of Magistrates exercising first class powers is hereby invested with power to try summarily any or all of the offences specified in that section, and every Bench of Magistrates exercising powers of the first or second class is hereby empowered to try summarily all or any of the offences specified in clauses (1) and (2) of Rule 1 *supra* Government Order No 1628, Notification,

Judicial, 8th October, 1912 See also *Fort St George Gazette*, 1891, Part I, pp. 879, 923 and 1095

8 The Governor in Council is pleased to direct that the term of office of Honorary Magistrates shall be five years

Bombay Rules.

Rules made by Government of Bombay for the guidance of Benches of Magistrates, "A" and "B" established by Government Notification No 5848 for the area within the limits of the Poona City and Suburban Municipalities —

1. *Class of cases to be tried* —Except in respect of offences under the Indian Penal Code Chapters VI, VII, VIII, IX, XV, XXI, XXII and offences designated in Col 8, Sch II, of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, as triable exclusively by the Court of Session, any such *quorum* of either of the said Benches as shall be constituted as hereinafter provided may exercise the ordinary powers of a Magistrate of the first class in all cases transferred to the said Bench by or under the order of the Magistrate of the district or by the Sub-divisional Magistrate to whom the said Benches are immediately subordinate

2. *Each Bench to be divided into two sections*.—Each of the said Benches shall be divided into two sections containing four Honorary Magistrates in each.

3. *District Magistrate to determine composition of each section* —The Magistrate of the district shall from time to time determine which of the Honorary Magistrates in each Bench shall belong to each section of such Bench The constitution of each section should be frequently changed.

4. *Each section to sit separately* —Each such section shall sit separately, but any stipendiary Magistrate who is a member of the Bench may sit at any time on either section

5. *Times of sitting*.—Except on Sundays and close holidays, at least one section of each Bench shall hold a sitting every day between the hours of 10 A.M. and 3 P.M

6. *Order and days of sitting*.—Not less than ten days before the end of each month, each Bench shall meet and arrange the order in which and the days on which each of its sections shall sit during the following month. The arrangement so made shall be forthwith submitted to the Magistrate of the District for his approval.

Unless the Magistrate of the District communicates his disapproval before the beginning of the month for which it is made, the said arrangement shall hold good for that month. If either Bench fails to make such arrangement, or makes one which the Magistrate of the district disapproves, the Magistrate of the district may himself make an arrangement as aforesaid, which shall be communicated by him to the Bench and shall hold good for the month for which it is made

7. *Places of sitting* —Each section of each Bench shall hold its sitting at such places as may be from time to time appointed for this purpose by the Magistrates of the district.

8. *Quorum* —In order to form a *quorum*, at least three members shall be present from the beginning to the end of a trial or inquiry as members of the Bench.

Provided that if a stipendiary first class Magistrate be present throughout a trial or enquiry as President, the case may be proceeded with to its conclusion, notwithstanding that a *quorum* may not have been present throughout the proceedings.

9. *Stipendiary Magistrate may take part in any proceedings at any time*:—Any stipendiary Magistrate who is a member of the Bench and is present during any part of any proceedings may take part therein as a member :

but not given final vote unless present throughout —Provided that no member of a Bench shall preside or give such vote as is referred to in Rule 15 in any case, who has been absent during any part of the proceedings therein

10. *What members entitled to preside* —Except as provided in Rule 9, the stipendiary Magistrate of highest official rank present, if he be a first class Magistrate and if his official rank is not inferior to that of a Deputy Collector, shall preside. If there be no such stipendiary Magistrate present, the Honorary Magistrate whose name stands highest of those present, in a list of the Honorary Magistrates prepared from time to time by the District Magistrate, subject to the orders of Government, for this purpose, shall be President.

11. *Member not to preside if unable to attend throughout*:—The claim of a member to preside at the trial of or enquiry into any case shall pass to the person next entitled thereto, if the former shall state that he has reason to doubt whether he will be able to be present throughout the proceedings.

12. *Substitution of President*:—If any President be unable to be present or fail to be present throughout the proceedings, such one of the members who have been present throughout such proceedings as is next entitled to preside shall take the place of the President.

13. *Each quorum to proceed with its partly-heard adjourned cases notwithstanding Rule 6*:—Notwithstanding any arrangement made as provided in Rule 6, any *quorum* that may have heard part of a case which stands adjourned at the rising of the Court shall proceed with such case till the conclusion of the trial or enquiry, as the case may be, at sittings held either from day to day or, if the case stand adjourned for more than one day, then on the days to which it stands adjourned. In such case the District Magistrate or Sub-divisional Magistrate may, for as long as shall be necessary, set aside or vary any arrangement made under Rule 11

Judicial, 8th October, 1912. See also *Fort St. George Gazette*, 1891, Part I, pp 879, 923 and 1095

8. The Governor in Council is pleased to direct that the term of office of Honorary Magistrates shall be five years

Bombay Rules.

Rules made by Government of Bombay for the guidance of Benches of Magistrates, "A" and "B" established by Government Notification No. 5848 for the area within the limits of the Poona City and Suburban Municipalities.—

1. *Class of cases to be tried*—Except in respect of offences under the Indian Penal Code Chapters VI, VII, VIII, IX, XV, XXI, XXII and offences designated in Col 8, Sch. II, of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, as triable exclusively by the Court of Session, any such *quorum* of either of the said Benches as shall be constituted as hereinafter provided may exercise the ordinary powers of a Magistrate of the first class in all cases transferred to the said Bench by or under the order of the Magistrate of the district or by the Sub-divisional Magistrate to whom the said Benches are immediately subordinate.

2. *Each Bench to be divided into two sections*—Each of the said Benches shall be divided into two sections containing four Honorary Magistrates in each

3. *District Magistrate to determine composition of each section*:—The Magistrate of the district shall from time to time determine which of the Honorary Magistrates in each Bench shall belong to each section of such Bench. The constitution of each section should be frequently changed.

4. *Each section to sit separately*.—Each such section shall sit separately, but any stipendiary Magistrate who is a member of the Bench may sit at any time on either section

5. *Times of sitting*:—Except on Sundays and close holidays, at least one section of each Bench shall hold a sitting every day between the hours of 10 A M and 5 P M

6. *Order and days of sitting*.—Not less than ten days before the end of each month, each Bench shall meet and arrange the order in which and the days on which each of its sections shall sit during the following month. The arrangement so made shall be forthwith submitted to the Magistrate of the District for his approval.

Unless the Magistrate of the District communicates his disapproval before the beginning of the month for which it is made, the said arrangement shall hold good for that month. If either Bench fails to make such arrangement, or makes one which the Magistrate of the district disapproves, the Magistrate of the district may himself make an arrangement as aforesaid, which shall be communicated by him to the Bench and shall hold good for the month for which it is made

(2) Every Magistrate (other than a Sub-divisional Magistrate) and every Bench exercising powers in a sub-division shall also be subordinate to the Sub-divisional Magistrate, subject, however, to the general control of the District Magistrate.

(3) All Assistant Sessions Judges shall be subordinate to the Sessions Judge in whose Court they exercise jurisdiction, and he may, from time to time, make rules consistent with this Code as to the distribution of business among such Assistant Sessions Judges.

(4) The Sessions Judge may also, when he himself is unavoidably absent or incapable of acting, make provision for the disposal of any urgent application by an Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge or, if there be no Additional or Assistant Judge, by the District Magistrate, and such Judge or Magistrate shall have jurisdiction to deal with any such application.

(5) Neither the District Magistrate nor the Magistrates or Benches appointed or constituted under sections 12, 13, 14 and 15 shall be subordinate to the Sessions Judge except to the extent and in the manner hereinafter expressly provided.

50. Subordinate :—'Subordinate' means inferior in rank within the meaning of sec. 435—*Q. E. v. Pitya Gopal*, 9 Bom. 100; *In re Padmanabha*, 8 Mad. 18; *Opendra v. Dukhina*, 12 Cal. 473. All Magistrates and Courts made subordinate to the District Magistrate are 'inferior Criminal Courts' in respect of him within the meaning of sec. 435—*Shamsuddin v. Pir Ala*, 1885 P.R. 39. A Magistrate who is subordinate to a Sub-divisional Magistrate is also subordinate to the District Magistrate—*Thaman Chetti v. Alagiri*, 14 Mad. 399. A covenanted Magistrate of the third class to whom a case is made over by the Sub-divisional Magistrate is subordinate to the Sub-divisional Magistrate—*Emp. v. Kallu*, 4 All. 366.

The Court of a subordinate Magistrate in the district is subordinate to that of the District Magistrate both in its judicial as well as executive capacity—*In re Gur Dayal*, 2 All. 205 (F.B.); and the District Magistrate has power to call for and examine the record of a proceeding before a Sub-divisional Magistrate of the first class—*Q. E. v. Laskari*, 7 All. 853 (F.B.).

51. Clause (5)—Magistrates not subordinate to the Sessions Judge:—A Sub-divisional Magistrate is subordinate to the District Magistrate and not to the Sessions Judge—*Maini v. K. E.*, 6 Pat. 39, 28 Cr. L.J. 353, A.I.R. 1927 Pat. 111. Neither the District Magistrate nor the other Magistrates are subordinate to the Sessions Judge except in so far as is expressly provided in the Code (see secs. 123, 103, 105, 408, 431, 436, 437); therefore an order of the District and Sessions Judge declaring certain persons to be touts and prohibiting them to appear within the precincts of the Courts is limited only to his own Court and the Civil Courts subordinate to him, but does not extend to the Courts of Magistrates—*Bavu Sahib v. Dt. Judge*, 26 Mad 500. So also, where a Sub-divisional Magistrate (acting as an executive officer and not as a Court) revoked a sanction granted by a Sub-Magistrate, the Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to set aside the order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate—*Anon.*, 2 Weir 19, *Sankaram v Sakkarappa*, 2 Weir 155.

'Except . hereinafter provided'—See for instance sec 435, Explanation, which provides that all Magistrates shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purpose of sec 435 (1) and sec 437.

"District Magistrates should comply with all requisitions for records, returns and informations made by Sessions Judges with regard to any case appealable to them or referable by them to the High Court whether decided by the District Magistrate or other magisterial officers of the district, or made by Sessions Judges under orders of the High Court in the exercise of their duty of superintendence over the Subordinate Courts. They should also render any explanation which Sessions Judges may require from them and obtain and submit any which they may require from Subordinate Magistrates in order to assist the Appellate Courts in respect of the classes of cases above referred to"—*G I.*, No 1753, dated 3rd November, 1876.

52. Delegation of power by District Magistrate:—Clause (1) of sec. 17 empowers only a District Magistrate to make rules or pass orders as to the distribution of work. Such power cannot be delegated by a District Magistrate to a Sub-divisional Magistrate or to a senior Honorary Magistrate—*Balkishen v. Sipahital*, 36 All 468, 15 Cr. L.J. 584, 12 A.L.J. 803.

D.—Courts of Presidency Magistrates.

18. (1) The Local Government shall, from time to time appoint a sufficient number of

Appointment of Presidency Magistrates.

persons (hereinafter called Presidency Magistrates) to be Magistrates for each of the presidency-towns, and shall appoint one of such persons to be Chief Presidency Magistrate for each such town.

from time to time, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, make rules consistent with this Code to regulate—

- (a) the conduct and distribution of business and the practice in the Courts of the Magistrates of the town;
- (b) the times and places at which Benches of Magistrates shall sit;
- (c) the constitution of such Benches;
- (d) the mode of settling differences of opinion which may arise between Magistrates in session; and
- (e) any other matter which could be dealt with by a District Magistrate under his general powers of control over the Magistrates subordinate to him.

(2) The Local Government may, for the purposes of this Code, declare what Presidency Magistrates *including Additional Chief Presidency Magistrates* are subordinate to the Chief Presidency Magistrate, and may define the extent of their subordination.

The italicised words have been added by section 4 of the Cr. P. Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923). This is consequential to the amendment made in section 18 (4).

57. Subordination :—In Bombay (and Calcutta) all Presidency Magistrates and Benches are subordinate to the Chief Presidency Magistrate, and the Chief Presidency Magistrate has power to transfer a case from one Presidency Magistrate to another under sec. 528 of this Code—*In re Nageshwar*, 1 Bom. L.R. 347. But in Madras the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate and the Courts of the other Presidency Magistrates are of equal jurisdiction—*Venkateswara v. Emp.*, 10 M.L.T. 518, 12 Cr. L.J. 451.

By a Notification No. 6787 J. dated 23-10-1923, the Bengal Government has declared the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate of Calcutta to be subordinate to the Chief Presidency Magistrate. The latter has therefore power under sec. 528 to withdraw a case from the file of a Presidency Magistrate to whom that case was transferred by the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate for disposal—*Mohini v. Punam Chand*, 51 Cal. 820 (826), 28 C.W.N. 903.

58. Benches :—Section 18 has conferred on Benches of Magistrates all the powers of a Presidency Magistrate; and the Chief Presidency

Magistrate has no power either to confer, restrict or enlarge those powers—*J. Hassan v. Yaskubar*, 7 Bom. L.R. 833 Therefore, where a Chief Presidency Magistrate revived a case that had been dismissed by him, and transferred it for trial to a Bench of Magistrates, it was held that the latter had jurisdiction to entertain a preliminary objection as to the jurisdiction of the Chief Presidency Magistrate so to revive and transfer—*Walters v. Ibrahim*, 7 C W N 527

According to the Rules (rr. 9 and 10) framed by the Bombay Government, if the Bench of Presidency Magistrates is equally divided in opinion, the Chairman shall have a second or casting vote. This holds good even though the Bench consists of only two members. But in such case the dissentient judgment also should form part of the record—*Emp. v Fardunji*, 29 Bom. L.J. 1470, 28 Cr L.J 1025, A I.R 1927 Bom 630

RULES.

Calcutta :—The following revised rules have been sanctioned by the Lieutenant-Governor for the guidance of Benches of Magistrates in the town of Calcutta —

1 The Presidency Magistrates other than the Chief Presidency Magistrate or salaried Presidency Magistrate shall sit in the rotation arranged by the Chief Presidency Magistrate.

2 The Presidency Magistrates other than the Chief Presidency Magistrate or salaried Presidency Magistrate shall take only such business as is made over to them by the general or special order of the Chief Presidency Magistrate

3 The Presidency Magistrates other than the Chief Presidency Magistrate or salaried Presidency Magistrate shall ordinarily sit from noon to 5 P.M., on the days on which they have been invited to attend by the Chief Presidency Magistrate

4. A Bench of Presidency Magistrates shall ordinarily be composed of three Presidency Magistrates other than the Chief Presidency Magistrate or salaried Presidency Magistrate sitting together, or of two so sitting when, in the opinion of the Chief Presidency Magistrate this is necessary.

5 A Bench of Presidency Magistrates may, however, be composed of the Chief Presidency Magistrate or the salaried Presidency Magistrate and two Presidency Magistrates other than the Chief Presidency Magistrate or salaried Presidency Magistrate, or of the Chief Presidency Magistrate or the salaried Presidency Magistrate and one Presidency Magistrate other than the Chief Presidency Magistrate or salaried Presidency Magistrate

6 Should any Presidency Magistrate other than the Chief Presidency Magistrate or salaried Presidency Magistrate appointed to sit in Bench be unable or fail to be present on the appointed day, the Chief Presidency Magistrate may in his discretion, at any time before the actual sitting

of the Court, reform or reconstitute such Bench in such manner as to him seems most convenient for the disposal of business

7. The Chief Presidency Magistrate and the salaried Presidency Magistrate shall be *ex-officio* members of Benches; the Chief Presidency Magistrate shall, if present, officiate as Chairman of the Bench, the salaried Presidency Magistrate, if sitting, shall, in the absence of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, officiate as Chairman, and in the absence of the Chief Presidency Magistrate or the salaried Presidency Magistrate, the Chief Presidency Magistrate shall nominate the Chairman

8. Every member of a Bench shall have a voice in the determination of all points arising in cases before them and in the finding and sentence. In a Bench composed of three members, the decision of the majority shall prevail, and in a Bench composed of two members, the decision of the Chairman shall prevail

[This Rule, in so far as it directs that in a Bench composed of two members, the decision of the Chairman shall prevail, has been held to be inconsistent with the provisions of this Code, as well as arbitrary and not consonant with natural justice—*Wakefield v. Haran*, 8 C.W.N. 862. An analogous rule, viz., Rule 6 under s. 16 *supra*, was strongly disapproved of by the majority of the Full Bench in 10 C.W.N. 642, and has since been modified by the Bengal Government.]

9. The Chairman shall ordinarily record the evidence and judgment in cases where a record of evidence and judgment is necessary; but such duty may, with his consent, be performed by any of his colleagues, or the evidence and judgment may be taken down by the Registrar, or the Clerk of the Court, at the dictation of the Chairman

10. A Bench or a Presidency Magistrate sitting singly may hold one or more adjourned sittings, should it be necessary to do so for the disposal of business or part-heard cases, but such adjournment shall be, as far as possible, *de die in diem*

11. Any part-heard case may be sent back to the Chief Presidency Magistrate for disposal, should it, in the opinion of the Court, be thought to be a case which should be committed to the Sessions Court for trial

12. Any case transferred to a Bench or to a Presidency Magistrate other than the Chief Presidency Magistrate or salaried Presidency Magistrate sitting singly remaining unheard at the close of the day may be either adjourned or, on necessity arising, may be sent back for disposal to the Chief Presidency Magistrate.

13. No private business shall be carried on in the Chambers set apart for the Presidency Magistrates other than the Chief Presidency Magistrate or salaried Presidency Magistrate, and no outsiders shall be admitted therein. It will be the duty of the Presidency Magistrates other than the Chief Presidency Magistrate or salaried Presidency Magistrate to report to the Chief Presidency Magistrate any infraction of this rule which may come to their knowledge.

14. It shall be the duty of the Registrar to inform the Chief Presidency Magistrate of any stress of business in the Courts.

15 The Chief Presidency Magistrate may at any time delegate any or all powers conferred on him under these rules to the salaried Presidency Magistrate.—*Notification No. 1256 J*, dated 5th March, 1900, *Calcutta Gazette*, 1900, Pt. I., p. 714.

Madras.—(i) The Chief Presidency Magistrate may of his own motion or on the application of any Presidency Magistrate refer any case, or class of cases, triable by a Presidency Magistrate, for trial by a Bench of two or more Magistrates, and may, by his order, appoint the time and place in which such Bench shall sit

(ii) The Chief Magistrate shall, if present, officiate as Chairman. In his absence the senior Magistrate present shall officiate as Chairman

(iii) The Chairman shall conduct the proceedings of the Court and exercise all the functions in that behalf usually exercised by a Presidency Magistrate when sitting alone; but he shall be competent to any member of the Bench to put any question to a witness either direct or through the Chairman as the latter may deem advisable, and to suggest any matter for the Chairman's consideration.

(iv) Each member of the Bench shall have a voice in the finding and sentence. In a Bench of three or other uneven number, the opinion of the majority shall prevail. When the numbers are even, the Chairman shall have a casting vote

(v) In regard to the recording of evidence and the judgment, the proceeding shall be conducted in a manner similar to proceedings before a single Magistrate and subject to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code

(vi) The Bench may hold one or more sittings for the disposal of such cases as may be referred to it, or of part-heard cases. Any part-heard case postponed to a further sitting of the Bench may be proceeded with if any member of the Bench has been present at the previous hearings in the case but subject to the provisions of s. 350 of the Criminal Procedure Code.—*Fort St. George Gazette*, 1901, Pt. I., p. 1414

Rules for the guidance of Honorary Presidency Magistrates in Madras—

(1) *Power of trial.*—The Honorary Presidency Magistrates shall sit as Benches to try such cases or classes of cases and to undertake such business as may be made over to them by the general or special order of the Chief Presidency Magistrate

(2) *Number and Sitting hours.*—Each Bench will ordinarily consist of three Magistrates selected by the Chief Presidency Magistrate from the list of those appointed by Government. A Bench will sit in the Magistrates' Court at Egmore and another in the Court at Georgetown from 7-30 to 9-30 A.M. or till the work of the day is over, if earlier, on all days except Sundays and close holidays

(3) *Sitting to be arranged by Chief Presidency Magistrate. Inability to attend to be notified.*—Not less than ten days before the end of each month the Chief Presidency Magistrate will arrange the order in which and the days on which the Honorary Presidency Magistrates shall sit dur-

ing the following month and communicate the same to the Honorary Presidency Magistrates concerned. If any Honorary Presidency Magistrate is unable to attend on a day for which he has been named, he shall give timely notice to the Chief Presidency Magistrate, mentioning, where possible, a substitute who is willing to take his place. The Chief Presidency Magistrate may depute such substitute in his place or make such other arrangements as he thinks fit. If occasion arises, the Chief Presidency Magistrate may alter any arrangement he has made under this rule.

(4) *Salaried Magistrates may sit*—The Chief Presidency Magistrate or any salaried Presidency Magistrate may, with the permission of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, sit as a member of a Bench of Honorary Presidency Magistrates.

(5) *Quorum*—In order to form a quorum, at least two Magistrates shall be present from the beginning to the end of a trial or inquiry as members of the Bench, provided that if a salaried Magistrate be present throughout the inquiry or trial a case may be proceeded with to a decision notwithstanding that a quorum was not present throughout the proceedings. If a Bench is unable to sit for any particular day, the cases set down for hearing before it on that day may be put up before a Stipendiary Magistrate or adjourned to the Bench's next working day, as the Chief Presidency Magistrate may direct.

(6) *Adjournment*—Any case before a Bench remaining unheard at the close of a sitting may be either adjourned to the next working day or sent back to be disposed of as the Chief Presidency Magistrate directs.

(7) *Chairman*—The Chief Presidency Magistrate shall, if present, officiate as Chairman of the Bench. In his absence the Stipendiary Presidency Magistrate (if any) present shall officiate as Chairman of the Bench. In the absence of any Stipendiary Presidency Magistrate, the Bench shall, as often as may be necessary, elect a Chairman from among the Magistrates present. If the votes should be equal, the Chief Presidency Magistrate shall decide which Honorary Magistrate shall preside.

(8) *Powers of Chairman*.—The Chairman shall conduct the proceedings of the Court and exercise all the functions in that behalf, usually exercised by a Stipendiary Magistrate when sitting alone. He shall decide upon the admissibility of evidence and maintain order in the Court, but it shall be open to any member of the Bench to put any question to the witnesses, either direct or through the Chairman, as the latter may deem advisable and to suggest any matter for the Chairman's consideration.

(9) *Taking down evidence*—The Chairman shall generally record the evidence and judgment in cases in which a record of evidence and judgment are necessary; but such duty may, with his consent, be performed by any one of his colleagues.

(10) *Opinion of majority of members to prevail*—Each member of the Bench who has been present throughout the proceedings shall have a voice in the finding and sentence. In a Bench of three or other uneven number the opinion of the majority shall prevail; when the numbers are even the Chairman shall have a casting vote.

(11) *Same Bench to hear a case till conclusion*—Notwithstanding any arrangement made as provided in Rule 3, any quorum that may have heard part of a case which stands adjourned at the rising of the Court shall proceed with such case till the conclusion of the trial or inquiry, as the case may be, at sittings held, either from day to day, or, if the case stands adjourned for more than one day, then on the days to which it stands adjourned. In such case the Chief Presidency Magistrate may, for as long as shall be necessary, set aside or vary any arrangement made under Rule 3.

(12) *Signing Calendars*—Every Honorary Presidency Magistrate will sign the daily calendar of the day's proceedings at which he is present.

(13) *Transfer of cases*—The Chief Presidency Magistrate may at any time transfer for disposal any case whether part-heard or not from the file of any Bench to his own file or to the file of any salaried Magistrate or Bench of Honorary Magistrates.

(14) *Delegation of powers*.—The Chief Presidency Magistrate may at any time delegate any of his powers under these rules to any salaried Magistrate subordinate to him.

(15) *Additional Benches*—These rules shall also apply to any additional Bench of Honorary Presidency Magistrates which the Governor in Council may be pleased to appoint. See Notification No 18, Fort St. George Gazette, Part I, 3rd January, 1911, pp. 7 and 8.

Bombay.—The following revised rules to regulate the conduct and distribution of business and the practice in the Courts of the Magistrates of the town and Island of Bombay, which have been made by the Chief Presidency Magistrate with the previous sanction of His Excellency the Governor in Council, are hereby published in supersession of the rules published in Government Notification No 287, dated the 16th January, 1894—

1. The Magistrates will ordinarily sit in Court for the disposal of business at 11 A.M. Complaints and cases arising in the A, C, H and I Divisions shall ordinarily be heard at the Esplanade Police Court. Complaints and cases arising in the B, D, E, F and G Divisions shall ordinarily be heard at the Mazagon Police Court.

2. The Chief Presidency Magistrate and Third Presidency Magistrate will ordinarily sit at the Esplanade Police Court, and the Second Presidency Magistrate and the Fourth Presidency Magistrate will ordinarily sit at the Mazagon Police Court. In case of emergency any Presidency Magistrate may hold his Court at such place and hour as he may consider best suited to meet the requirements of the public service.

3. In the event of any pressure of work occurring in any Court, or during the casual or other absence of any Magistrate, the Chief Presidency Magistrate shall arrange for the distribution of business among the Magistrates.

4. All applications for process, copies, certificates or otherwise shall ordinarily be made to the Magistrates on their first taking their seats.

on the Bench in the morning. Applications which are shown to involve urgency may be made at any time during the sitting of the Court. The Magistrates will not undertake to entertain any application of any sort at their private residences.

5. Complaints and applications should, as a general rule, be made in writing, with proper stamp affixed. In each complaint the names of the complainant and of the accused parties, and also of the witnesses, and the section of the law alleged to have been infringed should be legibly written, with such particulars of the facts as may be necessary to support the complaint.

6. All applications must be presented in person or by pleader. The Magistrates will not undertake to reply to written communications.

7. The following fees shall be levied.—

(a) Copying fees at 3 annas per folio of 90 words or fraction thereof. Prisoners will be charged 2 annas per folio for copies or proceedings, but will be furnished with a copy of the judgment in cases other than summons cases free of charge.

(b) Inspection fee Re 1 on each application per day.

(c) Translation fee Re 1 per folio of 90 words or fraction thereof. Parties not supplying their own paper for copies will be charged $\frac{1}{2}$ anna per sheet of foolscap supplied.

8. The Magistrates at each Court will divide the work between themselves, and any difference of opinion will be decided by the Chief Presidency Magistrate. As a general rule, petty Police cases will be disposed of before others.

9. The Magistrates shall submit such forms, records, reports and returns as may be called for by the Chief Presidency Magistrate.

10. The office hours shall be from 10 A.M. to 5 P.M. The Courts and offices shall be closed on the gazetted Government holidays; but the Chief Presidency Magistrate will arrange for the despatch of urgent business.

11. If in any case there exist special circumstances which in the opinion of any party concerned or interested in such case require a departure from the ordinary procedure prescribed by these rules, such party may bring such special circumstances to the notice of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, who shall thereupon make such order in the matter as he shall think fit.

Note.—An authorized petition-writer is attached to each Court for the purpose of writing at a moderate charge applications and petitions for persons requiring his services. *Bombay Notification No. 2536, dated 19th May, 1904.*

For Rules for the guidance of *Honorary Presidency Magistrates* in Bombay, see G. R. J. D. no. 2536 of May 19, 1904, subsequently modified by G. R. J. D. no. 3801 of July 29, 1905, and G. R. J. D. no. 1653 of March 28. *Vide Manual for the use of Honorary Presidency Magistrates of Bombay.*

E.—Justices of the Peace.

22. * * * Every Local Government, so far as regards the territories subject to its administration, * * *

Justices of the Peace for the mufassal.

may, by notification in the official Gazette, appoint such persons resident within British India and not being the subject of any foreign State as it thinks fit, to be Justices of the Peace within and for the territories mentioned in such notification.

Change :—The words "The Governor-General in Council, so far as regards the whole or any part of British India outside the Presidency Towns and" which occurred at the beginning of this section have been omitted by the Devolution Act XXXVIII of 1920. Moreover, in the same para the words "(other than the towns aforesaid)" have also been omitted, and in para 2 the italicised words have been substituted for the words "European British subjects" by sec 3 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act (XII of 1923)

"By omitting section 23, and by assimilating the provisions of sections 22 and 23, this clause has removed the qualification of being an European British subject for being appointed as a Justice of the Peace"—*Notes on Clauses* (Criminal Law Amendment Bill)

59. Powers .—The powers conferred on the Justices of the Peace are the ordinary powers conferred on 1st class Magistrates under sec 36. The power to entertain complaints is not one of such powers—*Loghan v Romer*, 34 Mad. 343, 12 Cr. L.J. 535.

23. [Repealed by section 4 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act XII of 1923].

24. [Repealed by ditto.]

"Section 24 is incidentally repealed as being spent"—*Notes on Clauses* (Criminal Law Amendment Bill)

25. In virtue of their respective offices, the Governor-General, Governors, Ex-officio Justices of the Peace, Lieutenant-Governors and Chief Commissioners, the Ordinary Members of the Council of the Governor-General, and the Judges of the High Courts are Justices of the Peace within and for the whole of British India; Sessions Judges and District Magistrates are Justices of the Peace within

and for the whole of the territories administered by the Local Government under which they are serving; and the Presidency Magistrates are Justices of the Peace within and for the towns of which they are respectively Magistrates.

F.—Suspension and Removal.

26. All Judges of criminal Courts other than the High Courts established by Royal Charter and all Magistrates may be suspended or removed from office by the Local Government :

Suspension and removal of Judges and Magistrates.

Provided that such Judges and Magistrates as now are liable to be suspended or removed from office by the Governor-General in Council only shall not be suspended or removed from office by any other authority.

60. The power of appointment of a Magistrate (even a subordinate Magistrate of the second class) is vested in the Local Government under sec 12; and under sec 26, such Magistrate may be suspended or removed from office by the Local Government only. The District Magistrate and Collector has no power to suspend such Magistrate. Where a person who is a Mahalkari has been appointed as a second class Magistrate by name under sec. 12, the mere suspension of such a person as a Mahalkari by the Collector would not put an end to his powers as a second class Magistrate. He can be suspended or removed from his office as a Magistrate only by the Local Government—*In re Laxminarayan*, 30 Bom. L R. 1050, 29 Cr. L.J. 1063 (1072, 1073)

27. The Local Government may suspend or remove from office any Justice of the Peace appointed by it.

Suspension and removal of Justices of the Peace.

CHAPTER III.

POWERS OF COURTS.

A.—Description of Offences cognizable by each Court.

28. Subject to the other provisions of this Code,
Offences under Penal Code. any offence under the Indian Penal Code may be tried—

- (a) by the High Court, or
- (b) by the Court of Session, or
- (c) by any other Court by which such offence is shown in the eighth column of the second schedule to be triable.

Illustration.

A is committed to the Sessions Court on a charge of culpable homicide. He may be convicted of voluntarily causing hurt, an offence triable by a Magistrate.

61. Power of Court of Session.—The provisions as to the other Courts indicated in clause (c) do not cut down or restrict the jurisdiction of the High Court or the Sessions Court. This section gives powers to the High Court and the Court of Session to try any offence under the Penal Code—*Q E v. Kharga*, 8 All. 665. Therefore, the fact that in a case committed to the Sessions, the Sessions Judge adds a charge of an offence triable exclusively by a Magistrate, does not affect the jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge to try it—*Q E v Kharga*, 8 All 665. There is nothing illegal in a Magistrate committing a person charged with an offence under section 147 I.P.C to the Sessions Court if in his opinion it cannot be adequately punished by him, though the second Schedule of this Code says that the offence is triable by a Magistrate only—*Q E v Kayemulla*, 24 Cal 429

But if the offence falls under some other law and that law specifies a particular Court, the *forum* cannot be changed (see sec 29). Thus, an offence under sec. 9 of the Opium Act must be tried by a Magistrate; a Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction over the offence and the Magistrate has no power to commit the case to the Sessions—*Q E v Schade*, 19 All 465 (466)

The illustration shows that in a case committed to the Sessions Court for a more heinous offence, the accused can be convicted of a minor offence triable by a Magistrate

62. Offences within and beyond jurisdiction.—When an offence is triable by an inferior tribunal but it also contains an element

of aggravation which puts the offence beyond the jurisdiction of that tribunal, the jurisdiction of that tribunal is not necessarily ousted thereby—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 20 (21). In other words, where the facts disclose an offence within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, it is a complete fallacy to say that he is not empowered to try the offence merely because the same facts disclose a more serious offence beyond his jurisdiction—*K. E. v. Ayyan*, 24 Mad. 675. Where the facts disclose a major offence (e.g. offence under section 330 I. P. C.) triable exclusively by a Court of Session, the Magistrate can convict the accused for a minor offence (e.g. under section 323, 342 or 348 I. P. C.) triable by him which constitutes a component of the major offence—*Dawson v. K. E.* 2 Rang. 455. But no tribunal can properly clutch jurisdiction by intentionally ignoring facts of aggravation which make the offence really cognisable only by a higher tribunal—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 21, *In re Maduri*, 12 Mad. 54, *Emp. v. Bapu Rao*, 4 N. L. R. 18, *Q. E. v. Gundya*, 13 Bom. 502, *Lakhraj v. Crown*, 1910 P. R. 31, 11 Cr. L. J. 639.

Where two or more persons are jointly indicted, and the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is ousted in the case of one of them, the proper course is to commit all the accused for trial before the Court of Session—*Anonymous*, 1 Weir 448 (449).

A Magistrate is not entitled to decline jurisdiction on the ground that the offence is a petty one ordinarily triable by heads of villages, and to direct the complainant to seek redress from the head of the village—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 237, 7 M. H. C. II App. 31. So also, a Magistrate is not entitled to decline to exercise jurisdiction in a case on the ground that it falls under the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical authority, when the act of that authority plainly amounts to an offence. Thus, where the ecclesiastical authority threatened a Roman Catholic that unless he abstained from certain acts (which he was legally entitled to do) he would be excommunicated, the action of the ecclesiastical authority was illegal and amounted to criminal intimidation, and the Criminal Courts had therefore jurisdiction over the offence—*In re Paul De Cruz*, 8 Mad. 140.

29. (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Code,
any offence under any other law shall, when any Court is mentioned in this behalf in such law, be tried by such Court.

(2) When no Court is so mentioned, it may be tried by the High Court or subject as aforesaid by any Court constituted under this Code by which such offence is shown in the eighth column of the second schedule to be triable.

Change :—In sub-section (1), the italicised words have been substituted for the words "subject to the provisions of sec. 447," by sec. 5 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act (XII of 1923).

In sub-section (2), the italicised words have been added by section 5 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923).

63. "Shall be tried by such Court."—An offence under a special law triable only by a Magistrate invested with special powers cannot be transferred to an ordinary Magistrate or be tried by any other Magistrate—*Emp v Deokinandan*, 1886, A W N 289. An offence under sec 11 of the Opium Act must be tried by a Magistrate, and not by a Court of Session—*Q. E. v. Schade*, 19 All. 465 (466). An offence under Madras Act 1 of 1868 (e.g. supplying liquor without a license) is triable only by a Magistrate, and not by the Sessions Court or the High Court—*Reg. v. Donoghue*, 5 M II C R 277. An offence under sec 16 of the Bombay Village Police Act (VIII of 1867) is triable by Police Patels duly empowered, and not by Taluk Magistrates—*Q. E. v. Hanmanta, Ratanlal* 196. An offence under sec 52 of the Prisons Act is not triable by a Presidency Magistrate, since he is not a District Magistrate or a First Class Magistrate mentioned therein—*Emp v Chota Singh*, 32 Mad 303. An order under sec. 3 (1) of the Defence of India Act (IV of 1915) whereby the Local Government had directed that all persons accused of the offence of committing dacoity on 27th February 1915 at Basti Naurang should be tried by the Commissioners appointed under the provisions of the said Act, ousted the jurisdiction of the regular Courts in respect of the persons accused of the offence specified—*Samaria v Crown*, 1917 P R. 38. Under section 83 of the Registration Act, an offence under sec. 82 of that Act is triable by a Magistrate not inferior to a Magistrate of the second class—*Q. E. v. Krishna*, 7 Mad. 347. A third Class Magistrate has jurisdiction to try an offence under sec. 68 of the Bombay District Municipal Act (VI of 1873)—*Q. E. v. Naran Narsing, Ratanlal* 763. An offence under sec 20 of the Calcutta Rent Act must be tried by the President of the Calcutta Improvement Tribunal, which is the Court mentioned in sec 20 of that Act—*Ishan v Manmatha*, 37 C.L.J. 298, A I.R. 1923 Cal 339.

64. When no Court is mentioned.—A Magistrate can try a landlord for an offence under sec 58 (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act (failure to prepare and retain counterfoils of rent receipts) in the same way as he would try a summons case, the Act not having specified any particular Magistrate to try such an offence—*Emp v Mohunt Ramdas* 9 C.W N. 816 (817), 2 Cr L J 532.

29A. No Magistrate of the second or third class

**Trial of European
British Subjects by
second and third class
Magistrates.**

shall inquire into or try any offence which is punishable otherwise than with fine not exceeding fifty rupees, where the accused is an European

British subject who claims to be tried as such.

This section has been added by sec 6 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923).

which a person who may try an European British subject must be a Justice of the Peace. Except in cases punishable with sentences of fine only not exceeding rupees fifty, the Bill provides that European British subjects shall not be triable by second or third class Magistrates, but all first class Magistrates are given power to try European British subjects no matter what their nationality may be"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons*, Para. 8 (i)

29B. Any offence other than one punishable with death or transportation for life, committed by any person who at the date when he appears or is brought before the Court is under the age of fifteen years, may be tried by a District Magistrate or a Chief Presidency Magistrate, or by any Magistrate specially empowered by the Local Government to exercise the powers conferred by section 8, sub-section (1), of the Reformatory Schools Act, 1897, or, in any area in which the said Act has been wholly or in part repealed by any other law providing for the custody, trial or punishment of youthful offenders, by any Magistrate empowered by or under such law to exercise all or any of the powers conferred thereby.

This section has been added by section 6 of the Cr P Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923). This amendment was for the first time introduced by Bill 3 of 1921 and did not exist in the Bill of 1914.

The reasons for the amendment have been thus stated: "The existing procedure of committal to a Court of Session is lengthy and often involves the prolonged detention of juvenile offenders as undertrial prisoners, although the offences generally committed by them seldom require to be so severely punished as to necessitate the intervention of a Sessions Court, the sentence or order eventually passed being often incommensurate with the time and energy expended upon a committal and sessions trial. It is therefore proposed that offences of children, unless so serious as to be punishable with death or transportation for life, should be triable by a District Magistrate, a Chief Presidency Magistrate, or by any Magistrate specially empowered to exercise the powers conferred by sec. 8, sub-section (i), of the Reformatory Schools Act, 1897"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1921)

30. In the territories respectively administered by the Lieutenant-Governors of the Punjab and Burma and the Chief Commissioners of Oudh, the Central Provinces, Coorg and Assam, in Sind, and in

Offences not punishable with death.

those parts of the other provinces in which there are Deputy Commissioners or Assistant Commissioners, the Local Government may, notwithstanding anything contained in section 29, invest the District Magistrate or any Magistrate of the first class, with power to try as a Magistrate all offences not punishable with death.

65. Object of Section—The object of conferring special powers on District Magistrates is to accelerate proceedings at the trial by avoiding the delay consequent on commitment to the Sessions Court which sits only at considerable intervals. It is also intended to afford relief to those who have to attend as witnesses in the Court—*Amir Khan v. K E*, 7 C W N 457 (460)

Magistrate must purport to act under this section—A first class Magistrate who is simply described on the heading of his judgment as invested with the powers under this section, but not purporting to act under such powers, cannot exercise those powers in passing the sentence—*Mah v Crown*, 1908 P.W.R 17

66. Powers of District Magistrate—As a general rule, the cases which a District Magistrate should refrain from trying under his higher powers, are those in which a sentence more severe than a District Magistrate can inflict under sec 34 appears to be called for if the offence be established, and secondly those cases in which the issues are so complex or the difficulty of ascertaining the true facts or of correctly applying the law to them so considerable as to make a trial before a Sessions Judge more appropriate than a trial before a District Magistrate—*Saw Kahu v.Q. E.*, L B R. (1893-1900) 219

In the exercise of special powers under this section, a District Magistrate has no power to try cases summarily—*Fazlu v Emp*, 1879 P.R 25

A District Magistrate empowered under this section cannot try an offence punishable with death (e.g. murder) and find the accused guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder on the ground that the case falls within one of the exceptions mentioned in sec. 300 I.P.C.—*Q E v. Gurdit Singh*, 1891 P.R 3, *Emp v Shamra*, 27 Cr L.J 846, A.I.R 1926 Lah 575. He cannot legally try the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under the first part of sec 304 I P C, an offence not punishable with death. The reason is, that where there is credible evidence both of murder and of qualified murder, the accused should be committed for trial before a Court which is competent to try both offences once for all and to pronounce a judgment which shall be an effectual bar to a second trial on the same facts—*Mangal Singh v Emp*, 1893 P.R 1. So, where there is sufficient evidence to constitute an offence of murder, a Magistrate exercising special powers under this section should not try the case as on a minor charge—*Emp v Paramananda*, 10 Cal 85. Similarly, the offence of attempting to wage war against the Queen should not be tried as a dacoity case by a District Magistrate—1 Bur S.R 158

year's imprisonment, is improper—*Abdul v Emp.*, 46 Bom 429, 23 Cr L J 93, 23 Bom. L R 1199

The powers of the Magistrate to pass sentence are limited by this section. Even a request by the accused to pass a greater sentence will not empower a Magistrate to pass a sentence which he is not authorised by law to pass—*In re Krishnanand*, 3 B L R App 50

72. Nature of sentence must be defined —A Magistrate who pronounces a sentence must define precisely the nature of the sentence intended, as well as the period of detention. Generally the sentence ought to be self-contained, like a decree of a Civil Court, so that the functionary who has to execute it should have nothing to do but to obey the direction given, without making an inquiry on his own account—*Q E v Rama*, 24 Mad 13

73. Sec. 75 I. P. C. —A Magistrate in passing an enhanced sentence under section 75 I P C (for previous conviction) cannot exceed the powers limited by sec 32 of the Cr P Code. Thus, where a person who was convicted of theft was sentenced by a second class Magistrate to undergo six months' rigorous imprisonment, and to further imprisonment for six months under sec 75 I P C on account of his previous conviction, *held* that the second class Magistrate had no power to so sentence under sec. 75 as to make the total sentence exceed six months—*Q E v Gulab, Ratanlal* 683

74. Solitary confinement —The punishment of solitary confinement can be awarded only for offences under the Penal Code—*Crown v Gholam Hoosain*, 1866 P R 120, *Hurnarain v Crown*, 1870 P R 20, *Crown v Manawar*, 1875 P R. 4. Thus, a person convicted of an offence under section 35 of the Excise Act (*Emp v. Gurdit Singh*, 1889 P.R. 17) or under section 48 of the Post Offices Act (*Emp. v Mukh Ram*, 1879 P R 24) is not liable to a sentence of solitary imprisonment.

Again, solitary confinement can be awarded only as part of a substantive sentence of imprisonment—*Crown v Umar Sing*, 1869 P.R. 20; and not when such imprisonment is awarded in default of payment of fine—*Crown v. Jita*, 1873 P.R. 26; *Emp. v Jamdad*, 1887 P.R. 53; or in default of furnishing security—*Kundan v. King Emp.*, 36 All 195. Solitary confinement cannot be awarded in default of payment of fine—*Bunsi v. Emp.*, 1882 P.R. 9.

But it is not illegal to award solitary confinement as part of an imprisonment awarded in lieu of whipping under sec. 395 of this Code—*Q. E. v. Gaman*, 1899 P.R. 14; nor is it illegal to impose solitary confinement as part of a sentence in a summary trial under Chapter XXII—*Emp v. Annu*, 5 All 83.

A Magistrate has no power to direct that a sentence of solitary confinement should be undergone in the first week of every month, because the mode of such punishment is regulated by the Penal Code—*Emp v. Jiman*, 5 C P L R 17.

75. Fine :—In imposing fine, regard is to be had to the nature of the offence and the means of the accused—*Q. E. v. Vengalaswamy*, U B. 11 (1897-1901) 1, 244; *Crown v. Subhan*, 1878 P.R. 18. Where a fine is not suited to the nature of the offence and is beyond the means of the offender to pay it, it ought not to be inflicted merely in order that a further period of imprisonment in default should be suffered. If the substantive sentence awardable by the Magistrate is insufficient for the offence, the case should be sent for trial to a Court which can award adequate sentence—*Mohana v. Emp.*, 1895 P.R. 20.

An order for payment of daily fine is illegal, in as much as it is an adjudication prospectively in respect of an offence which has not been committed when the order is passed—*Ram Krishna v. Mahendra*, 27 Cal. 565. There must be proof of a continuing offence before the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to make such an order arises—*Emp. v. Wazir Ahmad*, 24 All. 309. Thus, under section 580 of the Calcutta Municipal Act (III of 1899) the failure to comply with an order of the Municipality on each subsequent day is a continuing offence, for which a daily fine can be imposed, and no fresh order is necessary to authorise the imposition of the daily fine—*Noni Lal v Corporation of Calcutta*, 7 C.W.N 853

Fine under other laws—Under this Code and the Penal Code a Magistrate has power only to inflict fine up to Rs. 1000—*In re Abdoor Rahaman*, 7 W R. 37. But if an offence under any other law, e.g. under sec 35 of the Companies Act, is proved, the Magistrate is bound to impose a fine of Rs. 500 in respect of each offence of issuing an unstamped share-certificate; and the fact that section 32 of this Code gives the Magistrate power to inflict only a fine of Rs. 1000 will not curtail the Magistrate's jurisdiction to impose a fine of more than Rs. 1000 in a case where more than two unstamped share-certificates have been issued—*Q. E. v. Moore*, 20 Cal. 676. So also, under section 12 of the Opium Act, the Magistrate can impose any amount of fine in lieu of confiscation, and his power is not limited by section 32 of this Code—*Maghan v Rahim*, 23 Cr. L.J. 747 (Pat.)

76. Whipping :—A second class Magistrate cannot pass a sentence of whipping under this Code, although he was empowered to do so under the old Code of 1872—*Emp v. Bhagvanta*, 7 Bom 303.

A sentence of whipping is not appropriate in the case of a person holding a respectable position in life—*Bhagel v. Crown*, 1907 P.W.R. 9.

Whipping cannot be awarded in default of payment of fine—*Budhu v Bahu*, 1866 P.R. 5, nor can fine be awarded in addition to whipping—*Emp. v. Thusku*, 6 C P L R 34

A sentence of whipping should be imposed when there is an aggravation in the commission of the offence. Whipping should not be added to imprisonment where the hurt caused (in a case of robbery) was very slight and negligible and the accused was a young man and a first offender—*Badri Prasad v. Emp.*, 44 All 538, 20 A.L.J. 388, 23 Cr. L.J. 274. Where dacoity is attended with acts of great cruelty, a sentence of

whipping may be properly inflicted in addition to a substantive sentence of transportation—*Ram Sahai v Emp.*, 19 A.L.J. 610, 22 Cr. L.J. 397.

Rules for whipping :—"The Governor-General in Council observes that the extent to which the punishment of whipping is inflicted in the several provinces is a matter which should, even during ordinary times when the circumstances of the country are normal, be carefully watched by Local Governments and Administrations, in order that any tendency towards an indiscriminate or ill-judged resort to this form of punishment may be promptly checked. This is especially necessary during times of scarcity, when, from causes more or less beyond their own control, the poorer classes of the population are driven to the commission of petty crimes. The policy of largely resorting, during times of agricultural distress, to whipping as a punishment for petty thefts and other offences of a similar nature, may, no doubt, be defended by the argument that it would be impossible at such times to provide accommodation for all offenders in the jails. But if due and timely provision is made for employment of the industrious poor, there need be no excessive resort to punitive measures of this kind, and the Governor-General in Council trusts that if such times should unfortunately recur, the matter will be watched with especial care by the Local Governments and Administrations concerned, and that it may be found possible to distinguish between those members of the criminal classes who take advantage of seasons of public trouble to prey upon their neighbours, and the honest labouring poor who are driven by sheer necessity to grain-pilfering or similar offences. For the former, the punishment should be sharp and effective, and whipping may often be most appropriate. The latter should be considerably dealt with, and put in the way of relief after such punishment of fine or moderate imprisonment as may seem to be appropriate in each case."—*Proceedings of the Government of India, Home Department (Judicial)*, 11th January, 1882

"The Judges of the Punjab Chief Court have invited the attention of the Criminal Courts to the following points;—(1) that persons in respectable position of life should not ordinarily be whipped; (2) that the punishment should be inflicted only in case of false evidence, extortion and forgery under any exceptional circumstances; (3) that whipping, as an additional punishment, should only be ordered when a further deterrent appears to be really called for in the interests of justice; (4) that special care and judgment should be exercised in times of agricultural scarcity and distress"—*Punjab Cir.*, LXII, ■ 280

"Whipping being a punishment which, to certain classes of the community, carries great disgrace with it, shall not be inflicted when there are special circumstances which render it undesirable or make it in reality a greater punishment than the law intends. More especially should this be borne in mind in cases where it is proposed to inflict whipping as the sole punishment, and where consequently either no appeal lies in law or there is often no practical appeal. No man who up to the time of his conviction has occupied a position of some respectability should

be subjected to this punishment, which is meant rather for persons of the lowest classes who commit such petty thefts, etc., as are properly visited with whipping. Neither adults nor juveniles may be punished with whipping for an offence under a special Act, unless the Act contains a special provision to that end"—C. P. Cr., Part III, No. 3

33. (1) The Court of any Magistrate may award such term of imprisonment in default of payment of fine as is authorized by law in case of such default:

Power of Magistrates to sentence to imprisonment in default of fine.

Provided that—

Proviso as to certain cases.

(a) the term is not in excess of the Magistrate's powers under this Code:

(b) in any case decided by a Magistrate where imprisonment has been awarded as part of the substantive sentence, the period of imprisonment awarded in default of payment of the fine shall not exceed one-fourth of the period of imprisonment which such Magistrate is competent to inflict as punishment for the offence otherwise than as imprisonment in default of payment of the fine.

(2) The imprisonment awarded under this section may be in addition to a substantive sentence of imprisonment for the maximum term awardable by the Magistrate under section 32.

77. Imprisonment in default of fine.—The imprisonment in default of payment of fine need not always be proportionate to the amount of the fine imposed—*Nga Chun*, 1 Bur S H 483.

Where the sentence is one of imprisonment and fine, this section should be read with section 65 I P. Code; and where the sentence is one of fine only, it should be read with section 67 I P. Code

Clause (a) of the proviso applies where the sentence is one of fine only, and in such a case the Magistrate may award imprisonment, in default of fine, up to the limit of his powers

Clause (b) applies where the accused is sentenced to imprisonment as well as fine, and in such cases, this section does not authorise the Magistrate to pass a sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of fine in excess of the term prescribed by Sec 65 I P. C. (i.e., one-

fourth of the maximum term of imprisonment fixed for the offence)—*Q. E. v. Venkatesagadu*, 10 Mad. 165, F.B. (overruling 1 Mad. 277), 10 Mad. 166 (Note); See also *Emp v. Darba*, 1 All. 461.

Sub-section (2) of this section does not apply to cases where the substantive sentence is one of fine only—*Nga Sen*, 1 Bur. S R. 486

34. The Court of a Magistrate, specially empowered under section 30, may pass any

Higher powers of certain District Magistrates. sentence authorised by law, except a sentence of death or of trans-

portation for a term exceeding seven years or of imprisonment for a term exceeding seven years.

78. Under sec 34 read with sec. 33, a District Magistrate specially empowered under sec. 30, in trying a case under sec. 471 I. P. C., can pass a sentence of imprisonment for one year and nine months (i.e., one-fourth of 7 years) in default of payment of fine—*Karam Chand v Emp.*, 1885 P.R. 35. A Magistrate exercising powers under this section is competent, under sec. 59 I. P. C., to pass a sentence of transportation for seven years instead of awarding a sentence of imprisonment—*In re Boodhooa*, 9 W.R. 6.

Sentences which Courts and Magistrates may pass upon European British Subjects.

34A. Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 31, 32 and 34—

(a) no Court of Session shall pass on any European British subject any sentence other than a sentence of death, penal servitude, or imprisonment with or without fine, or of fine; and

(b) no District Magistrate or other Magistrate of the first class shall pass on any European British subject any sentence other than imprisonment which may extend to two years or fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or both.

This section has been added by section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act XII of 1923. Under the old law, the sentences that could be awarded by Magistrates of the first class, District Magistrates and Courts of Session in the case of European British subjects were limited to three months imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000; six months' imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2,000; and one year's imprisonment and unlimited fine, respectively. These restrictions are now removed. "The Bill proposes that so far as sentences of death, penal servitude, or imprisonment with or without fine, or of fine only are concerned, the powers of those officers shall be identical in the case of European British subjects and Indian British subjects, except as regards Magistrates who have been specially

empowered under section 30 of the Code. Such Magistrates will only be able to pass those sentences on European British subjects which could be passed by ordinary first class Magistrates. Such Magistrates will, however, have power to try European British subjects for the same additional offences as they are able to try Indian subjects under their special powers."—*Statement of Objects and Reasons, Para. 8 (iii).*

This section further shows that an European British subject shall not be punished with whipping.

35. (1) When a person is convicted at one trial of two or more * * * offences, the Court may, subject to the provisions of section 71 of the Indian Penal Code, sentence him, for such offences, to the several punishments prescribed therefor which such Court is competent to inflict; such punishments, when consisting of imprisonment or transportation, to commence the one after the expiration of the other in such order as the Court may direct, unless the Court directs that such punishments shall run concurrently.

(2) In the case of consecutive sentences, it shall not be necessary for the Court, by reason only of the aggregate punishment for the several offences being in excess of the punishment which it is competent to inflict on conviction of a single offence, to send the offender for trial before a higher Court :

Provided as follows :—

(a) in no case shall such person be sentenced to Maximum term of punishment. imprisonment for a longer period than fourteen years ;

(b) if the case is tried by a Magistrate (other than a Magistrate acting under section 34) the aggregate punishment shall not exceed twice the amount of punishment which he is, in the exercise of his ordinary jurisdiction, competent to inflict.

(3) For the purpose of appeal, the aggregate of consecutive sentences passed under this section in case of convictions for several offences at one trial shall be deemed to be a single sentence.

Explanation—Separable offences which come within the provisions of section 71 of the Indian Penal Code are not distinct offences within the meaning of this section.

(Omitted)

Illustration.

A breaks into a house with intent to commit theft and steals property therein. A has not committed distinct offences.

(Omitted)

78A. Change .—This section has been amended by section 7 of the Cr. P. Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. In sub-section (1) the word 'distinct' has been omitted and the italicised words have been added, in sub-section (3), the words "aggregate of consecutive" have been substituted for the word "aggregate", and the *Explanation* and *Illustration* have been omitted

"The existing *Explanation* and *Illustration* to section 35 have occasioned considerable misunderstanding. It is therefore proposed to omit them and state definitely that section 35 must be read subject to section 71 I. P. C. It is also declared that aggregate sentences passed under section 35 in case of conviction for several offences at one trial shall be deemed to be a single sentence for the purpose of appeal, if they run consecutively"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (Bill 3 of 1914).

Section 71, I. P. C.—Section 71 of the Indian Penal Code provides as follows :—

"Where anything which is an offence is made up of parts any of which parts is itself an offence, the offender shall not be punished with the punishment of more than one of such offences, unless it be so expressly provided.

"Where anything is an offence falling within two or more separate definitions of any law in force for the time being by which offences are defined or punished, or

where several acts, of which one or more than one would by itself or themselves constitute an offence, constitute, when combined, a different offence,

the offender shall not be punished with a more severe punishment than the Court which tries him could award for any one of such offences."

In all other cases (e.g. where the offences are independent of each

other), the Court can pass separate sentence for each of the offences, under section 35 of the Cr. P. Code.

"Section 35 has been materially altered by the recent amendment of the Code. Under the present Code no reference is made to *distinct* or *separable* offences, and it is not necessary to consider whether the two offences are distinct offences. For the application of sec. 35 we have now only to consider whether the offences are of the nature described in sec. 71 I. P. Code so that the punishment for more than one of the offences is forbidden by that section"—*Kanchan v. Emp*, 41 C.L.J. 563, 26 Cr. L.J. 1253, *Emp v. Hanma Timma*, 30 Bom. L.R. 383, 29 Cr. L.J. 544

Cases under sec. 71 I. P. C.—In awarding punishment under sec. 71, I. P. C., in case of convictions for several separable offences, falling within the purview of the section, it is illegal to impose a sentence for each offence—*Nilmony v. Q. E.*, 16 Cal. 442, *Keamuddi v. Emp.*, 51 Cal. 79, *Mithoo Singh v. Gopal Lal*, 3 C.W.N. 761, *Bhagwan v. Emp.*, 1901 P.R. 4. Thus, the offence of being members of an unlawful assembly with the common object of committing an offence, and the actual commission of that offence, may be considered as separate and distinct offences, but having regard to the provisions of sec. 71 I. P. Code, a person convicted of such offences would not be liable to separate punishment for each offence—*Sarat Chandra v. Emp*, 37 C.L.J. 171, 24 Cr. L.J. 851, A.I.R. 1923 Cal. 408, following *Bhup Singh v. Emp*, 8 C.W.N. 305 (rioting and criminal trespass), and *Alim Sheikh v. Shahazada*, 8 C.W.N. 483 (wrongful confinement and rioting). So also, it is improper to pass separate sentences upon the accused both for rioting and theft, when the former offence is but an element of the latter—*Mithoo v. Gopal*, 3 C.W.N. 761. If a person abducts a woman with intent to commit rape, and then actually commits rape, he cannot be awarded separate sentences under secs. 366 and 376 I. P. C. The sentence under sec. 366 I. P. C. will be set aside—*Imam v. Emp.*, A.I.R. 1926 Lah. 212, 27 Cr. L.J. 338. Separate sentences under sections 148 and 324/149 I. P. C. are illegal—*Nilmony v. Q. E.*, 16 Cal. 442. The infliction of separate punishments under sections 147 and 325/149 of the Penal Code is illegal, even though the sentences are made to run concurrently—*Keamuddi v. Emp.*, 51 Cal. 79, 28 C.W.N. 347, 25 Cr. L.J. 947. Where an accused is charged under sections 121 and 124A of the I. P. Code in respect of a single speech, he will be liable to one punishment only, even if he is convicted of both the offences charged—*Emp. v. Hasrat Mohani*, 24 Bom. L.R. 885, A.I.R. 1922 Bom. 284. The Bombay High Court holds in some other cases that though a Court in awarding punishment under the provisions of sec. 71, I. P. C. should pass one sentence for either of the offences and not a separate one for each offence, still if two sentences are passed and the aggregate of them does not exceed the punishment provided by law for any one of the offences, or the jurisdiction of the Court, it would be an irregularity only and not an illegality—*Q. E. v. Malu* 23 Bom. 706 (F.B.); *Emp. v. Piru Rama* 49 Bom. 916, 27 Cr. L.J. 113, A.I.R. 1926 Bom. 64;

Q. E. v. Bana, 17 Bom. 260 (F.B.). The Allahabad High Court likewise holds that it is not illegal to pass separate sentences for all the offences, but the amount of punishment should not be heavier than that which the Court can inflict for any one of the offences—*Q. E. v. Wazir*, 10 All. 58.

Where the offences are independent of each other, e.g., the offence of house breaking at night with intent to commit theft (sec. 457 I. P. C.) and the offence of theft of ornaments in a dwelling house (sec. 380 I. P. C.), the case does not fall under sec. 71 I. P. Code, and separate sentences can be passed for the two offences, the one sentence to commence after the expiration of the other—*Kanchan v. K. E.*, 41 C.L.J. 563, 26 Cr. L.J. 1253, A.I.R. 1925 Cal. 1015. (In this case the change in the law has been very fully explained). So also, the offence of possessing illicit liquor and the offence of possessing apparatus for manufacturing such liquor, are quite distinct offences for which separate sentences can be passed—*Emp. v. Pandu*, 52 Bom. 277, 30 Bom. L.R. 378, 29 Cr. L.J. 412 (following *Q. E. v. Shivdia*, Ratanlal 523). In this case Fawcett J. has used the word 'distinct' obviously to mean that the case does not fall under sec. 71 I. P. Code. So again, consecutive sentences can be imposed where a person is convicted of receiving stolen property under sec. 411 I. P. C. and of concealing other stolen property under sec. 414 I. P. Code, sec. 71 I. P. C. does not apply to the case—*Emp. v. Hanma Timma*, 30 Bom. L.R. 383, 29 Cr. L.J. 344. The offence of forgery and the offence of using a forged document as genuine are separate offences, and separate sentences may be passed on an accused person who has been convicted at one trial for both—*Sriramulu v. Emp.*, 52 Mad. 532, 56 M.L.J. 554, A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 450. Under this section separate sentences for rioting and hurt are legal, but in practice it is undoubtedly better to give a single sentence for all the offences or order the sentences to run concurrently—*Ali Akbar v. Emp.*, 30 Cr. L.J. 575 (following *Piru Rama*, 49 Bom. 916).

79. Scope of Section :—'Convicted':—This section applies only to convictions for offences. It does not apply to imprisonments under sec. 123 of the Code—*Emp. v. Kanji*, 5 Bom. L.R. 26; *Emp. v. Tukaram*, 4 Bom. L.R. 876.

Therefore, it is illegal for a Magistrate to direct under this section that a sentence of imprisonment for an offence should take effect after the expiry of the sentence which the accused may be undergoing for default of furnishing security for good behaviour—*In re Pichari Anthu*, 16 Cr. L.J. 622 (Mad.). The order is also illegal under sec. 120.

This section is not restricted to cases where the several punishments are all of the same kind i.e., all are sentences of imprisonment or all are sentences of transportation. It covers cases of the description where one of the punishments is imprisonment while the other is transportation—*Khohua v. K. E.*, 21 C.W.N. 608, 17 Cr. L.J. 238.

80. One trial :—This section has reference only to the conviction of an accused person of two or more offences at one trial. It does not apply to sentences passed at different trials—*Q. v. Padan*, 7 W.R. 1;

In *Daulatai*, 3 All. 305; *Emp. v. Thakur*, 1881 A.W.N. 23; *Kamal v. K. E.*, 20 C.W.N. 1300. Thus, it does not include the case of separate trials held on the same day for separate offences committed by the same accused—*Q. E. v. Venkatesadu*, 11 Weir 30. This section has no application whatever when a person is convicted in two or more separate trials, even though in all of them the complainant is the same and the offences are similar and they are concluded on the same date—*Sheo Narain v. Crown*, 1910 P.L.R. 105, 11 Cr. L.J. 679.

81. Distinct offences—By reason of the omission of the word 'distinct' the present section applies to all cases (except those which are covered by sec 71 I P C) whether the offences are distinct or not. In all cases, the Court will be competent to inflict an aggregate punishment in excess of the punishment which it is ordinarily competent to inflict in respect of a single offence

Owing to this change in the law the rulings in *Emp. v. Dhondi*, 8 Bom. L.R. 850, 4 Cr. L.J. 445, and *Emp. v. Rameswardas*, 13 C.P.L.R. 124 are overruled. In these cases it was held that if the offences were not distinct, the trying Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass enhanced sentence under the provisions of sub-section (2) and proviso (b)

82. "May sentence"—The words 'may sentence' do not mean that the Court must necessarily pass distinct sentences—*Q. E. v. Mahomed*, Ratanlal 597 (*per* Jardine J.) The use of the word *may* shows that this section only permits and does not make it obligatory on Courts to pass separate sentences in one trial—*Q. E. v. Nga Kyin*, L.B.R. (1872-1892) 271; *Ngakyn v. Emp.*, 1 Bur. S.R. 271.

But though it is not illegal to pass one sentence for all the offences, still it is generally the proper course to pass a separate sentence for each offence—*Mahomed*, Ratanlal 597; *Anonymous*, 4 M.H.C.R. App. 27; because such a course will enable the Appellate Court to know the punishment to be remitted, in case the conviction for one of the offences is set aside—4 M.H.C.R. App. 27. If one aggregate sentence is imposed for all the offences, it is impossible to apportion it to the different offences for which the accused is convicted—*Bahadur v. Emp.*, 1886 P.R. 14. But the passing of one aggregate sentence for the several offences is not an illegality but a mere irregularity; it is not an error or defect in consequence of which the High Court would reverse or alter the sentence—*Reg. v. Vinayak*, 2 B.H.C.R. 391

On the other hand, if the offences are not separate (*e.g.* offences under secs 392 and 75 I. P. C.) the awarding of two separate sentences is illegal—*In re Muthurakka*, 18 M.L.T. 121, 18 Cr. L.J. 611

83. Consecutive sentences—If separate sentences are passed for each offence of which an accused stands convicted, the sentences must commence one after the expiry of the other—*Q. E. v. Maung Kala*, L.B.R. (1872-1892) 526. Where a man is imprisoned under two warrants, ordering consecutive sentences, the first should be completely executed both in regard to the substantive term of imprisonment as well as the

imprisonment in default of fine, before any effect is given to the second warrant—*Anonymous*, Ratanlal 132

84. Concurrent sentences :—The Court must expressly direct whether the sentences are to run concurrently or consecutively. Omission to determine whether the sentences of imprisonment and transportation (in a case where both sentences have been passed) are to run concurrently or consecutively makes the sentence defective in form—*Khohua v. King Emp*, 21 C.W.N. 608, 23 C.L.J. 596, 17 Cr. L.J. 238

It is not illegal to direct a sentence of imprisonment to run concurrently with a sentence of transportation—*Bogi v. Crown*, 1913 P.R. 21, 15 Cr. L.J. 68

The imprisonment referred to in this section is a substantive sentence of imprisonment; an order directing that the terms of imprisonment awarded in default of payment of fine shall run concurrently is illegal—*Imp. v. Akidullah*, 5 S.L.R. 263, 13 Cr. L.J. 536, *Emp. v. Subrao*, 27 Bom. L.R. 1351, A.J.R. 1926 Bom. 62, 27 Cr. L.J. 111.

85. Appeal .—An accused who has been sentenced to concurrent sentences of imprisonment, no one of which is individually appealable, has no right to aggregate them and appeal against them collectively—*Aziz Shaikh v. Emp.*, 40 Cal. 631, 17 C.W.N. 825; *Abdul Jabbar v. Emp.*, 25 C.W.N. 613, 23 Cr. L.J. 225, *Suknandan v. Emp.*, 17 C.L.J. 392, 13 Cr. L.J. 787; *Gur Sahay v. Emp.*, 3 P.L.J. 138, 19 Cr. L.J. 90; *Tulsi Ram v. Emp.*, 35 All. 154. Contra—*Abdul Khalik v. K. E.*, 17 C.W.N. 72, 13 Cr. L.J. 877, *Joy Chandra*, 38 Cal. 214, and *Bepin Behari v. Emp.*, 15 C.W.N. 734, where it was held that concurrent sentences must be aggregated for purposes of appeal, as otherwise there would be no distinction between a concurrent sentence and a single sentence in which no sentence was passed under the second charge. But these three rulings can no longer stand as good law in view of the recent amendment made in sub-section (3) under which only consecutive sentences can be aggregated for the purpose of appeal.

86. Proviso (a) :—According to proviso (a), fourteen years is the maximum term of imprisonment which can be awarded as an aggregate sentence. A sentence of transportation in lieu of imprisonment awarded under section 59 I. P. C. is therefore subject to the limitation which has been provided by sec. 35 Cr. P. Code in the case of sentences of imprisonment—*Emp. v. Gumaní*, 7 C.P.L.R. 29. An aggregate sentence of 20 years' rigorous imprisonment is contrary to proviso (a) of this section—*Sheo Narain v. Crown*, 1910 P.L.R. 105, 11 Cr. L.J. 679

The fact that the Magistrate passes the maximum term of imprisonment under this section is no bar to his awarding further punishment on the same accused for a distinct offence tried separately. Thus, where a person was charged with two charges of dacoity and one charge of kidnapping, and was tried separately for the dacoity and for the kidnapping, and the Magistrate inflicted a sentence of 14 years for the charges of dacoity, held that this would not disqualify him from passing further sentence for

the offence of kidnapping although the trial for that offence was contemporaneous with the trial on the dacoity charges and terminated on the same day—*Bahadur v. Emp.*, 1886 P.R. 14.

87. Proviso (b) :—Where there are separate trials, the Magistrate's power of punishment is not limited to twice the amount which he is competent to pass—*In re Daulatai*, 3 All. 305; *Nga Kyin v. Emp.*, 1 Bur. S. R. 271.

88. Sub-section (3) .—For the purpose of appeal :—It is only for the purposes of appeal (and for no other purpose, e.g. for the purpose of commutation into transportation) that the consecutive sentences can be treated as one sentence; therefore, two or more sentences cannot be added up so that the aggregate period may be commuted into transportation—*Queen v. Ootum Mal*, 2 W R 1.

For the purposes of appeal, only consecutive sentences are allowed to be taken in the aggregate as one sentence. This sub-section does not apply to concurrent sentences—*Saw Hlaing v. Emp.*, U B R. (1897-1901) 13; *Nga Shwe v. Emp.*, L B R. (1900-1902) 57, *Sher Muhammad v. Emp.*, 1901 P.R. 25; *Jagadish v. K E*, 10 N L J 135, 28 Cr. L J 672. See notes under "Appeal" above.

Only substantive sentences can be aggregated under this section; a sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of fine must not be included for the purposes of calculation—1892 P.R. page 22.

This sub-section, which provides that the aggregate of consecutive sentences should for the purpose of appeal be deemed to be a single sentence, refers only to sentences of imprisonment, and not to sentences of fine—*Shidingappa v. Emp.*, 28 Bom. L.R. 668, 27 Cr. L.J. 926, A.I R. 1926 Bom. 416.

89. Splitting up of offences .—No Magistrate is entitled to split up an offence (over the whole of which he had no jurisdiction) into its component parts for the purpose of giving himself jurisdiction over a part, thereby depriving the prisoner of the right of appeal—*Emp v Abdool Karim*, 4 Cal. 18.

C.—Ordinary and Additional Powers.

36. All District Magistrates, Sub-divisional Magistrates and Magistrates of the first, second and third classes, have the powers hereinafter respectively conferred upon them and specified in the third schedule. Such powers are called their "ordinary powers."

90. Secs. 36 and 107 .—Where a person is not sent before the District Magistrate by any other Magistrate under Sec 107 (3), the District Magistrate has no jurisdiction to commit him to custody under sec 107 (4). Nor can the District Magistrate commit the accused to custody under sec. 36

because this section does not override the provisions of sec. 107—*Chithambaran v. Emp.*, 31 Mad. 315.

91. Ordinary powers.—Power to entertain complaints is not one of the ordinary powers of a first class Magistrate—*Loghan v. Romer*, 34 Mad. 343, 12 Cr. L.J. 535

37. In addition to his ordinary powers, any Sub-divisional Magistrate or any Magistrate of the first, second and third class may be invested by the Local Government or the District Magistrate, as the case may be, with any powers specified in the fourth schedule as powers with which he may be invested by the Local Government or the District Magistrate.

Additional powers
conferable on Magis-
trates.

38. The power conferred on the District Magistrate by section 37 shall be exercised subject to the control of the Local Government.

Control of District
Magistrate's investing
power.

D.—Conferment, Continuance and Cancellation of Powers.

39. (1) In conferring powers under this Code the Local Government may, by order, empower persons specially, by name or in virtue of their office, or classes of officials generally by their official titles.

Mode of conferring
powers.

(2) Every such order shall take effect from the date on which it is communicated to the person so empowered.

92. Where a Magistrate of the second class begins a trial in that capacity and, previous to his passing the sentence, is empowered as a first class Magistrate, he can inflict a sentence in the latter capacity—*Q. E. v. Pershad*, 7 All. 414 (F.B.)

“Generally” or “specially” :—When by a notification of the Government a class of officials is invested with powers to try certain offences, such officials are only “generally” empowered and not specially empowered—*Mahomed Kasim v. K. E.*, 17 M.L.T. 191, 16 Cr. L.J. 268. The term “specially” refers to the empowering of a particular official by name or by virtue of his office. Thus, a notification of the Government which empowers second class Magistrates of certain places to try cases under the Opium Act is a special empowering of the persons holding those offices in virtue of their office—*Alaga v. Emp.* 24 Cr. L.J. 846 (Mad.).

40. Whenever any person holding an office in the service of Government who has been invested with any powers under this Code throughout any local area is appointed to an equal or higher office of the same nature, within a like local area under the same Local Government, he shall, unless the Local Government otherwise directs, or has otherwise directed, exercise the same powers in the local area in which he is so appointed.

Continuance of powers of officers appointed.

Change.—The word "appointed" has been substituted for 'transferred' by section 8 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act XVIII of 1923. The object of this amendment is to cover cases of officers going on leave and returning to the same district, and to obviate the necessity of investing them again with their old powers and re-gazetting the same—*Statement of Objects and Reasons*, (1914). The amendment will save a great deal of routine work in the Secretariat and in the Government printing press—*Leg Ass Debates*, 15-1-23, page 1047.

93. **Continuance of powers.**—When a Tahsilidar is invested with the powers of a Magistrate of the first class, while acting as a Deputy Collector, his powers continue so long as he is a Magistrate, until they are withdrawn by a fresh notification, though he is posted in a less responsible post—*In re Hanumanta*, 2 Weir 36. A Sub-Registrar invested with third class powers for trial of certain offences in a certain place is competent to exercise, on his transfer to another place, the powers conferred upon him as Sub-Registrar of the place from which he was transferred, unless the Local Government directed him not to exercise them—*Q. E. v. Veeranna*, 15 Mad. 132. A Mamlatdar invested by name with second class powers in a district, retains them, though he ceases to be a Mamlatdar and becomes an Awalkarkun, his revenue title being a matter of description only—*Q. E. v. Rama*, Ratanlal 322.

94. **Continuance of trials.**—Where a Head Assistant Magistrate having almost completed the trial of a case was appointed to the office of a Deputy Magistrate in another place in the same district, and the case was by order of the District Magistrate brought on to his file to the latter place, it was held that the Magistrate could proceed with the case from the point at which he had arrived as Head Assistant Magistrate, and the trial need not be commenced *de novo*—*Karuppana v. Ahobalamatam*, 22 Mad. 47.

But where during a trial the Magistrate is transferred to another district, he cannot continue the trial. See notes under sec 12.

95. **Going on leave.**—The Magisterial powers conferred on an officer are kept alive under this section, even though he is absent on leave (This is now made clear by the present amendment). But the case is

because this section does not override the provisions of sec. 107—*Chithambaran v. Emp.*, 31 Mad. 315.

91. Ordinary powers.—Power to entertain complaints is not one of the ordinary powers of a first class Magistrate—*Loghan v. Romer*, 34 Mad. 343, 12 Cr. L.J. 535

37. In addition to his ordinary powers, any Sub-divisional Magistrate or any Magistrate of the first, second and third class may be invested by the Local Government or the District Magistrate, as the case may be, with any powers specified in the fourth schedule as powers with which he may be invested by the Local Government or the District Magistrate.

38. The power conferred on the District Magistrate by section 37 shall be exercised subject to the control of the Local Government.

D.—Conferment, Continuance and Cancellation of Powers.

39. (1) In conferring powers under this Code the Local Government may, by order, empower persons specially, by name or in virtue of their office, or classes of officials generally by their official titles.

(2) Every such order shall take effect from the date on which it is communicated to the person so empowered.

92. Where a Magistrate of the second class begins a trial in that capacity and, previous to his passing the sentence, is empowered as a first class Magistrate, he can inflict a sentence in the latter capacity—*Q. E v. Pershad*, 7 All. 414 (F.B.).

“Generally” or “specially” :—When by a notification of the Government a class of officials is invested with powers to try certain offences, such officials are only “generally” empowered and not specially empowered—*Mahomed Kasim v. K. E.*, 17 M.L.T. 191, 16 Cr. L.J. 268. The term “specially” refers to the empowering of a particular official by name or by virtue of his office. Thus, a notification of the Government which empowers second class Magistrates of certain places to try cases under the Opium Act is a special empowering of the persons holding those offices in virtue of their office—*Alaga v. Emp.* 24 Cr. L.J. 846 (Mad.).

PART III.

GENERAL PROVISIONS.

CHAPTER IV.

OF AID AND INFORMATION TO THE MAGISTRATES, THE POLICE AND PERSONS MAKING ARRESTS.

42. Every person is bound to assist a Magistrate or police officer reasonably demanding his aid, whether within or without the presidency towns,—

Public when to assist Magistrates and police.

- (a) in the taking or preventing the escape of any other person whom such Magistrate or police-officer is authorized to arrest;
- (b) in the prevention or suppression of a breach of the peace, or in the prevention of any injury attempted to be committed to any railway, canal, telegraph or public property.

95A. 'Every person' :—A police officer charged with the duty of arresting an accused can ask a *chowkidar* to assist him in arresting the accused or preventing his escape—*Manik v. Kenaram*, 6 C W N 337

96. 'Reasonably' :—No person is bound to obey an unreasonable order of a Magistrate or Police officer. Thus, where a Magistrate ordered a landholder to find a clue to a theft within 15 days, it was held that such an order was unreasonable and unwarranted by this section, and the landlord was not bound to perform an act for which the police are appointed and paid. Disobedience by the landlord to such an order is no offence—*Emp v Bakshi Ram*, 3 All. 201. Members of the public are bound to assist a police officer reasonably demanding their aid in the taking of any dacoits or suspected dacoits whom that officer is authorised by law to arrest. The law however does not intend that the police officers should have a general power of calling upon the members of the public to join them in arresting a number of unknown persons whose whereabouts are not known. Refusal to assist the police officer in such a quest is not an offence—*Joti Prosad v. Emp.*, 42 All. 314, 18 A.L.J. 169, 21 Cr. L.J. 801.

97. Aid :—The aid that can be demanded under this section is the personal assistance of the person of whom it is demanded, and not the supply of a contingent of men to assist—*In re Ramia*, 2 Weir 37

Punishment .—Omission to assist under this section is punishable under sec. 187 I. P. C.

43. When a warrant is directed to a person other than a police-officer, any other person may aid in the execution of such warrant, if the person to whom the warrant is directed be near at hand and acting in the execution of the warrant.

Aid to person, other than police-officer, executing warrant.

44. (1) Every person, whether within or without the presidency-towns, aware of the commission of, or of the intention of any other person to commit, any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code (namely), 121, 121A, 122, 123, 124, 124A, 125, 126, 130, 143, 144, 145, 147, 148, 302, 303, 304, 382, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 402, 435, 436, 449, 450, 456, 457, 458, 459 and 460, shall, in the absence of reasonable excuse, the burden of proving which shall lie upon the person so aware, forthwith give information to the nearest Magistrate or police-officer of such commission or intention.

(2) For the purposes of this section, the term "offence" includes any act committed at any place out of British India which would constitute an offence if committed in British India.

98. Information sent through chowkidar :—Where one of several lambardars, to the knowledge of others, directs the chowkidar to report a burglary at the thana, the requirements of this section have been complied with, and the lambardar cannot be said to have failed to give information if the chowkidar omits to report it at the thana—*Sher Singh v. Emp.*, 1889 P.R. 5.

99. No duty after information :—Where once the information of a crime reaches the police, the object of this section is fulfilled, and no further duty is imposed upon the persons mentioned in this section to give information—*Q. E. v. Sada, Ratanlal* 674 (675).

Punishment :—Omission to give information under this section is punishable under Secs. 118, 176 and 202 I. P. C. For false information, see Sec. 177 I. P. C.

Omission to report a plot of waging war against the Crown does not amount to abetment of waging war, unless the accused's intention in omitting to report the plot was with a view to aiding the waging of war—*Goman v. Emp*, 6 Bur L T. 153, 14 Cr. L.J. 610.

45. (1) Every village headman, village-accountant, village-watchman, village police-officer, owner or occupier of land, and the agent of any such owner or occupier *in charge of the management of that land* and every officer

Village-headmen, accountants, land-holders and others bound to report certain matters.

employed in the collection of revenue or rent of land on the part of Government or the Court of Wards, shall forthwith communicate to the nearest Magistrate or to the officer in charge of the nearest police-station, whichever is the nearer, any information which he may possess respecting—

- (a) the permanent or temporary residence of any notorious receiver or vendor of stolen property in any village of which he is headman, accountant, watchman or police-officer, or in which he owns or occupies land, or is agent, or collects revenue or rent;
- (b) the resort to any place within, or the passage through, such village of any person whom he knows, or reasonably suspects, to be a thug, robber, escaped convict or proclaimed offender;
- (c) the commission of, or intention to commit, in or near such village, any non-bailable offence or any offence punishable under section 143, 144, 145, 147 or 148 of the Indian Penal Code;
- (d) the occurrence in or near such village of any sudden or unnatural death or of any death under suspicious circumstances; or *the discovery in or near such village of any corpse or part of a corpse in circumstances*

which lead to a reasonable suspicion that such a death has occurred, or the disappearance from such village of any person in circumstances which lead to a reasonable suspicion that a non-bailable offence has been committed in respect of such person;

(e) the commission of, or intention to commit, at any place out of British India near such village, any act which, if committed in British India, would be an offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code, namely, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 302, 304, 382, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 402, 435, 436, 449, 450, 457, 458, 459, 460, 489A, 489B, 489C and 489D;

(f) any matter likely to affect the maintenance of order or the prevention of crimes or the safety of person or property respecting which the District Magistrate, by general or special order made with the previous sanction of the Local Government, has directed him to communicate information.

(2) In this section—

- (i) "village" includes village-lands; and
- (ii) the expression "proclaimed offender" includes any person proclaimed as an offender by any Court or authority established or continued by the Governor-General in Council in any part of India, in respect of any act which, if committed in British India, would be punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code, namely, 302, 304, 382, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 402, 435, 436, 449, 450, 457, 458, 459 and 460.

(3) Subject to rules in this behalf to be made by the Local Government, the District Magistrate or Sub-divisional Magistrate may from time to time appoint one or more persons, with his or their consent, to perform the duties of a village-headman under this section, whether a village-headman has or has not been appointed for that village under any other law.

Change :—The italicised words have been added by section 9 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. The reasons are stated below.

100. Object of Section :—The object of the law is clearly that the earliest information shall be communicated by those who are in the best position to obtain the same, or who from their connection with the land are in some authority and should accordingly be made responsible for this duty in order that an inquest may be held—*Matuku v Queen*, 11 Cal. 619 (624).

The provisions of this section are not to be worked solely for the purpose of vexation, but for the purpose of ensuring that information be not intentionally withheld by persons whose position renders them liable to give it. Therefore, when information is given to the nearest Magistrate or Police by one of the persons bound to give such information, it is not reasonable that every other person bound to give the information should be prosecuted for not having done so—*Emp v. Sashi Bhushan*, 4 Cal. 623; *In re Pandya*, 7 Mad. 436; *Q. E. v. Gopal*, 20 Cal. 316, *Q. E. v. Hari Gopal*, Ratnial 778 (779). Where the police are already informed of a fact by the Chowkidar, there is no further obligation upon the village headman to report the same information again to the police—*Rampal v Emp.*, 8 O.L.J. 590, 23 Cr. L.J. 162.

101. Persons bound :—Village headman in Madras means a Village Munsiff or Village Magistrate—*In re Sivan Chetti*, 32 Mad. 258. A Zailder is not a village headman within the meaning of this Section—*Q. E. v. Hari Singh*, 1894 P.R. 25, *Shah Ahahammad v Emp.* 1886 P.R. 19.

Every *mukkaddam* and *Kotwar* in C. P. is bound to give information under this section because they have to perform the duties of a village headman—*Local Govt. v Maniharsingh*, 7 N.L.R. 101, 12 Cr. L.J. 441.

A Village Accountant was not bound under the corresponding section of the Code of 1872 or 1882—*In re Raminshi Nayar*, 1 Mad. 266, but now he is expressly mentioned.

The owner or occupier of a house in a village is not the 'owner or occupier of land'. The duty of giving information under this section is cast upon the owner or occupier of land, and not of a house. Where there are houses, it is expected that the place would be populous, and

the Police would somehow get the information. But in cases of land in the mofussil there are not always enough policemen available in the locality. Hence it is necessary that the owner or occupier of the land should give such information to them—*Emp. v. Hiru Satua*, 53 Bom 184, 30 Bom. L.R. 1570, 30 Cr. L.J. 172, A.I.R. 1929 Bom 12; *Q. E. v. Achutha*, 12 Mad. 92. Residence in a dwelling house belonging to another is not occupation of land—*In re Mudhoo Soodun*, 23 W.R. 60

Owner and agent—The liability of the resident agent arises when the owner is not resident and has no personal knowledge of the fact to be reported. Where the owner has such knowledge, the liability certainly attaches to the owner (and not to the agent)—*In re Mudhoo Soodun*, 23 W.R. 60. Under the present law the agent is liable only if he is 'in charge of the management of the land'

These words have been added on the motion of Mr. Agnihotri who observed:—"The word 'agent' should be qualified and made definite in such a way that only such agents be made liable to give information under sec. 45 as may be connected with the land or be in charge of the management of the land the occurrence on which is to be reported. The word 'agent' is very comprehensive and vague, for instance there may be agents for various purposes, they may be for the collection of land revenue, they may be for looking after the cultivation of the land, they may be for the construction of buildings on the land or for conducting and defending suits for title of such land and so on, the word may apply even to servants. And to make such agents liable would be to make the term very wide and troublesome, so it is necessary to restrict it only to such persons as are in charge of the management of the land, and who may be in a better position to know about the occurrences on that land"—*Legislative Assembly Debates*, January 16, 1923, page 1114

A Khazanchi of a Zemindar of a village is not an agent. A dewan may be an agent during the absence of his master, but not a dewan who acts only under the orders of his resident master—*Emp. v. Achiraj*, 4 Cal. 603.

"Forthwith"—It means "within a reasonable time" (Wharton). The word 'forthwith' must be construed with reference to the object of the enactment. Where a Kulkarni gave information of a suspicious death some 7 or 8 hours after he was aware of the same, held that the information was not given forthwith—*Q. E. v. Waman*, Ratanlal 784 (785).

102. Information—The persons enumerated in this section are bound to report an information and not a mere rumour—*Lachmi v. Emp.*, 5 P.L.T. 505, 25 Cr. L.J. 972. Where the Zemindar heard of the disappearance of a man from the village and a rumour that he had been murdered, the omission to report such rumour to the police was not an offence—*In re Bhup Singh*, 1900 A.W.N. 207. But under clause (d) as now amended, the disappearance of a man under suspicious circumstances must be reported.

"Possess"—This word has been substituted for the word 'obtain.' In 1904 the Madras Government found that the word 'obtain' did not

cover information obtained by personal observation, because the word undoubtedly meant 'obtain by making inquiries.' There was therefore some difficulty in making certain that information obtained by personal observation, such as for example the discovery of a corpse on the ground, came within the scope of the law. Moreover the deletion of the word was absolutely necessary, because it implied an obligation to seek the information. The Magistrates were likely to be misled by the word 'obtain,' they might come to the conclusion that it was obligatory on the persons concerned to obtain information. It was therefore necessary to make an amendment by substituting the word 'possess' for the word 'obtain.' In moving the amendment Mr Pantulu observed "The offending portion of the section is that the landholder would be called upon to give information which he may possibly obtain but which he may not have in his possession. Now if we take away the word 'obtain' and substitute the word 'possess,' it comes to this that the landlord is bound to give only the information which he possesses and not information which he may possibly obtain by making inquiries. If my amendment is carried, it will be incumbent upon the prosecution to show that the accused had that information in his possession, and not merely that he might have obtained it. Therefore, I think that if this amendment is carried, the sting will be taken out of the section"—*Legislative Assembly Debates*, January 16, 1923, page 1116. See also *Lachmi v Emp.* (ubi supra)

103. Clause (b)—*Resort to or passage through*—The bringing of a suspected robber under arrest to the village and releasing him there does not amount to the resorting to or the passage through the village of such robber—*Emp v Malik Daud*, 1887 P R. 30

Proclaimed offender.—These words include persons over and above those to whom the words in their ordinary sense apply—*Q. E. v. Narpal*, 1901 A W N. 10. The fact that the offender's property has been attached and sold under the provisions of sec 88 of this Code does not raise any presumption that he is a proclaimed offender. It is on the prosecution to prove that the proclamation was made in the manner prescribed by sec 87 of this Code—*In re Pandya Nayak*, 7 Mad 436

104. Clause (c)—The information to be given to the police under clause (c) is the information of the commission of an offence. An information that a certain jewel is missing is not an information that an offence has been committed, and need not be communicated to the police—*In re Venu Reddi*, 11 M L T 257, 11 Cr L J 224. This clause speaks of non-bailable offences, if the offence is a bailable one, the persons enumerated in this section are not bound to give information of it—*Emp v Malik Daud*, 1887 P R. 30, *In re Sivan Chetti*, 32 Mad 258.

105. Clause (d)—*Occurrence of death*—The duty imposed by this section on a village headman etc of giving information as to the occurrence of any sudden or unnatural death is intended to apply only when the death takes place at or near the village of which he is the headman, owner, occupier, etc—*In re Mudhoosoodun*, 23 W.R. 60

If a body is found on one's land, the presumption is that the death

took place there, and the owner is under an obligation to give information regarding the matter—*Mataki v. Queen*, 11 Cal. 619. In this case, Mitter J. (dissenting) was of opinion that there could be no such presumption; it could be equally presumed that the death took place in another village, and the dead body was thence removed to this village. Under clause (d) as now amended, the finding of a corpse must be reported, without reference to the question of presumption as to whether the death took place in the same village or in another village.

If a dead body is found in a stream, it is enough to give rise to a presumption that the death took place under suspicious circumstances, and the person finding it is bound to report it under this section—*Sher Muhammad v Emp*, 1887 P R 20

When a man fell from a tree and died two days afterwards, held that although the death was 'unnatural' in the ordinary sense of the word, still it would not come within the meaning of the word 'unnatural' as used in sec 45 (d), so as to require to be reported immediately, unless it occurred fairly soon after the cause—*Domarsing v Emp*, 23 Cr. L.J. 345 (Nag).

106. Punishment :—For omission to give information under this section, see sec. 176 I P C. But omission to give information by persons not enumerated in this section is not an offence—*Bahadur v. Emp.*, 1882 P.R 34

False information —A person giving a false information of an offence to a village Magistrate who is bound to pass the information on to the higher authorities under this section, will be guilty of an offence under sec. 211 I P C—*In re Sivan Chetti*, 32 Mad. 258. It would be otherwise if the offence complained of is one in regard to which the information need not under this section be passed to the higher authorities—*Ibid*.

Proof —To support a conviction for omitting to give information under this section, it should be proved that the accused bears the character which raises the obligation under this section—1 Mad 266; it must be proved that a specified offence has been committed by some one, that the accused knew of its having been committed, and that he wilfully omitted to give the information—*Queen v. Ahmed Ali*, 22 W.R. 42.

107. Sub-section—Appointment of village headmen.—An order of a District Magistrate dismissing a person from the office of a headman of a village under the rules framed under this sub-section, is an executive order and is not subject to revision by the High Court—*In re Damma* 29 All 563

'With his or their consent' .—These words were added during the Debate in the Assembly on the motion of Mr. Rangachariar. "My amendment would remove any misconception there may be as to the power of the District Magistrate to appoint persons against their will, and it is for this reason that I have inserted this clause that when they are so appointed it should be with their consent ..I know that in the case of enlisting special police, people without their consent are enlisted This ought not to

degenerate into such a provision. It must be a voluntary duty to be performed by people who are given a certain status"—*Legislative Assembly Debates*, January 16, 1923, page 1117.

Bengal rules for the appointment of headmen :—

(1) In all villages in which Bengal Act VI of 1870 has been introduced, the Magistrate of the District may appoint the principal member of the Chowkidari Panchayat or the collecting member, where there is one, to be village headman.

(2) In villages where Bengal Act VI of 1870 has not been introduced, the Magistrate of the District may appoint the principal resident agent of land-owner, or rent-receiver, or his representative, or the principal resident cultivator, to be village headman.

(3) In the case of a principal or collecting member of a Chowkidari Panchayat, a clause shall be added to the appointment under sec. 3 of the Chowkidari Act to the effect that he has also been appointed to be village headman under sec. 45 of the Criminal Procedure Code. When a person other than a member of a Chowkidari Panchayat is appointed, he shall receive a special *sanad* from the Magistrate.

(4) The Magistrate shall keep a register of all persons who have been appointed village headmen, showing their names and father's names and the village for which they are responsible, and shall take measures to effect mutations in that register from time to time when one headman dies and is succeeded by another—*Calcutta Gazette*, 26-12-1894.

(N.B.—These rules are in force in the Patna, Dacca and Orissa Divisions, excepting the Khurda sub-division in the Puri District.)

CHAPTER V.

OF ARREST, ESCAPE AND RETAKING.

A.—Arrest Generally.

46. (1) In making an arrest the police-officer or other person making the same shall actually touch or confine the body of the person to be arrested, unless there be a submission to the custody by word or action.

(2) If such person forcibly resists the endeavour to arrest him, or attempts to evade the arrest, such police officer or other person may use all means necessary to effect the arrest.

Resisting
to arrest. endeavour

took place there, and the owner is under an obligation to give information regarding the matter—*Matuk v. Queen*, 11 Cal. 619. In this case, Mitter J (dissenting) was of opinion that there could be no such presumption; it could be equally presumed that the death took place in another village, and the dead body was thence removed to this village. Under clause (d) as now amended, the finding of a corpse must be reported, without reference to the question of presumption as to whether the death took place in the same village or in another village.

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Resisting to arrest. endeavour

(3) Nothing in this section gives a right to cause the death of a person who is not accused of an offence punishable with death or with transportation for life.

108. Warrant :—When a warrant of arrest has been issued, the officer making the arrest must have the warrant in his possession; otherwise the arrest is illegal—*Emp. v Amar Nath*, 5 All. 318.

109. Arrest —An arrest is a restraint of the liberty of the person. Unless there is submission, actual contact is necessary to effect it. Where a bailiff met the accused in the street, showed his staff, told him he was under arrest but did not touch him, and the accused instead of going with him walked away and entered a shop, *held* that the accused was not arrested at all, and could not be convicted of escape from custody—*Aludomal v Crown*, 9 S L R 141, 17 Cr L J. 87. See also *Harmohanlal v. Emp.*, 30 Cr.L J 128 (Nag).

110. "All means" —*Justifiable violence*. —The means employed to stop the fugitive should be such as an ordinary prudent man would make use of, who had no intention of doing any serious injury. The wounding of a fugitive thief by a Chowkidar in order to effect his arrest, where there was no other means of capturing the thief, was held to be justifiable under the circumstances—*Q v. Protab Chowkidar*, 2 W.R 9. Under clause (3) of this section, an Excise officer pursuing an opium smuggler has no right to fire at him, where he so fired, and the accused cut the Excise officer on his thigh with a sword, but did not cause a severe wound, *held* that the act of the officer in firing at the accused was illegal, and the latter exercised his right of private defence in wounding the officer with his sword—*Nga Nan v K. E.*, 21 Cr L J. 97 (Bur.)

Punishment for resistance to arrest—see secs. 224, 225, 225B, 1 P. C.

47. If any person acting under a warrant of arrest, or any police-officer having authority to arrest, has reason to believe that the person to be arrested has entered into, or is within, any place, the person residing in, or being in charge of, such place, shall, on demand of such person acting as aforesaid or such police-officer, allow him free ingress thereto, and afford all reasonable facilities for a search therein.

Search of place entered by person sought to be arrested.

111. Scope :—This section is not intended to restrict the powers of the Police to enter the place to be searched. On the contrary, it is a provision compelling householders to afford the police facilities in carrying out their duties; and the next section provides that if difficulties are placed in the way of a Police officer, he may use force to obtain ingress—*Romesh Chandra v. Emp.*, 41 Cal 350 (376), 18 C W.N. 496, 15 Cr L J. 385.

Demand :—No precise words are needed; it is enough to give notice that entry is sought under proper authority. *Russell on Crimes*, p. 745

48. If ingress to such place cannot be obtained under section 47, it shall be lawful, in any case for a person acting under a warrant and in any case in

Procedure where ingress not obtainable.

which a warrant may issue but cannot be obtained without affording the person to be arrested an opportunity of escape, for a police-officer to enter such place and search therein, and in order to effect an entrance into such place, to break open any outer or inner door or window of any house or place, whether that of the person to be arrested or of any other person, if after notification of his authority and purpose, and demand of admittance duly made, he cannot otherwise obtain admittance :

Provided that, if any such place is an apartment in the actual occupancy of a woman (not being the person to be arrested) who, according to custom, does

Breaking open
zanana.

not appear in public, such person or police-officer shall, before entering such apartment, give notice to such woman that she is at liberty to withdraw and shall afford her every reasonable facility for withdrawing and may then break open the apartment and enter it.

112. A Police-officer entering into a building for the purpose of arresting suspected persons will not be liable for trespass—*Clarke v. Brojendra Kishore*, 36 Cal. 433

49. Any police-officer or other person authorised to make an arrest may break open any outer and inner door or window of any house or place in order to liberate himself or any other person who, having lawfully entered for the purpose of making an arrest, is detained therein.

Power to break open doors and windows for purposes of liberation.

50. The person arrested shall not be subjected to more restraint than is necessary to prevent his escape.

No unnecessary restraint.

For punishment for unnecessary restraint, see sec 220, I. P. C.

51. Whenever a person is arrested by a police-officer under a warrant which does not provide for the taking of bail, or under a warrant which provides for the taking of bail but the person arrested cannot furnish bail, and

Search of arrested persons.
 whenever a person is arrested without warrant, or by a private person under a warrant, and cannot legally be admitted to bail, or is unable to furnish bail,

the officer making the arrest or, when the arrest is made by a private person, the police officer to whom he makes over the person arrested, may search such person, and place in safe custody all articles, other than necessary wearing-apparel, found upon him.

52. Whenever it is necessary to cause a woman to be searched, the search shall be made by another woman, with strict regard to decency.

Mode of searching women.

53. The officer or other person making any arrest under this Code may take from the person arrested any offensive weapons which he has about his person, and shall deliver all weapons so taken to the Court or officer before which or whom the officer or person making the arrest is required by this Code to produce the person arrested.

Power to seize offensive weapons.

B.—Arrest without Warrant.

When police may arrest without warrant.

54. (1) Any police-officer may, without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest—

first, any person who has been concerned in any cognizable offence or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists of his having been so concerned;

- secondly*, any person having in his possession without lawful excuse, the burden of proving which excuse shall lie on such person, any implement of house-breaking;
- thirdly*, any person who has been proclaimed as an offender either under this Code or by order of the Local Government;
- fourthly*, any person in whose possession anything is found which may reasonably be suspected to be stolen property, and who may reasonably be suspected of having committed an offence with reference to such thing;
- fifthly*, any person who obstructs a police-officer while in the execution of his duty, or who has escaped, or attempts to escape, from lawful custody;
- sixthly*, any person reasonably suspected of being a deserter from Her Majesty's Army, Navy or Air Force or of belonging to Her Majesty's Indian Marine Service and being illegally absent from that service;
- seventhly*, any person who has been concerned in, or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made or credible information has been received or a reasonable suspicion exists of his having been concerned in, any act committed at any place out of British India, which, if committed in British India, would have been punishable as an offence, and for which he is, under any law relating to extradition or under the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, or otherwise, liable to be apprehended or detained in custody in British India;
- eighthly*, any released convict committing a breach of any rule made under section 565, sub-section (3); and
- ninthly*, any person for whose arrest a requisition has been received from another police-officer, pro-

vided that the requisition specifies the person to be arrested and the offence or other cause for which the arrest is to be made and it appears therefrom that the person might lawfully be arrested without a warrant by the officer who issued the requisition.

(2) This section applies also to the police in the town of Calcutta.

Change —In the fourth clause the word 'and' has been substituted for the word 'or' and the ninth clause has been newly added, by section 10 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. For reasons, see below.

In the sixth clause the words "or Air Force" have been added by the Repealing and Amending Act, 1927 (X of 1927)

113. Any Police-Officer —Village Chowkidars are not Police-officers within the meaning of this section—*Kalai v. Kalu Chowkidar*, 27 Cal 366, *Emp v. Kallu*, 3 All 60, *Bolai v. Emp*, 35 Cal 361, *Purna Chandra v. Hachanah*, 41 Cal 17 (19)

The words 'any police-officer' show that where a warrant has been issued for the arrest of certain culprits on a charge of a cognizable offence, any police-officer, even though he is not entrusted with the execution of such warrant and has not got the warrant with him, will be justified under this section in making the arrest—*Raina Mudali v. Emp.*, 40 Mad. 1028, 18 Cr. L.J. 709

Where a complaint has been made against any person in respect of a cognizable offence, any police-officer may arrest him without warrant even though the Police-officer be not in his uniform—*Mahadeo v. Emp.*, 21 A L.J. 791, 25 Cr.L.J. 652.

114. Power of arrest :—The words "may arrest" show that the power of arrest is discretionary. A Police-officer is not always bound to arrest for cognizable offences. If an information of such an offence is brought to him, he ought, if there be circumstances in the case which lead him to suspect the information, to refrain from arresting persons of respectable position and to leave the complainant to go to a Magistrate and convince him that the information justifies the serious step of the issue of a warrant of arrest—*Q. E. v. Irappa, Ratanlal* 795 (797).

The powers under this section must be cautiously used. This section gives wide powers to a Police-officer to make an arrest without an order from the Magistrate and without warrant only in certain circumstances limited by the provisions contained in this section, and it is necessary in exercising such large powers to be cautious and circumspect—*In re Charu Chandra*, 44 Cal. 76, 20 C.W.N. 1233.

Power to detain :—Authority given to arrest under this section implies authority to detain—*Q. E. v. Ramchandra, Ratanlal* 220. But when

certain persons were arrested under section 54 Cr. P. Code on suspicion of having been concerned in a dacoity, and afterwards the investigating police-officer reported to the Magistrate that there was no sufficient evidence upon which to charge those persons with participation in the dacoity, the Magistrate ought to discharge those persons and ought not to detain them in order that the police might institute proceedings under sec 110. If the police believe that those persons were habitual thieves or robbers, they ought to re-arrest them under section 55—*Emp v. Rahu*, 43 All. 186, 18 A.L.J. 1114

115. Punishment.—A police-officer arresting a person unjustifiably or otherwise than on a reasonable ground is guilty of an offence under sec 220, I. P. Code.

A person causing obstruction to a Police-officer making an arrest under this section, is guilty of an offence under section 225 I P. C.—*Ratna Mudali v. Emp.*, 40 Mad. 1028; *Gopal Singh v K. E*, 36 All 6

116. Clause (1)—Reasonable complaint or suspicion, credible information.—What is a reasonable complaint or suspicion must depend on the circumstances of each particular case, but it must be at least founded on some definite fact tending to throw suspicion on the persons arrested, and not a mere vague surmise or information. Still less have the police any power to arrest persons, as they sometimes appear to do, merely on the chance of something being hereafter proved against them—*Q v. Behary*, 7 W R. 3 (5)

A general definition of what constitutes *reasonableness* in a complaint or suspicion and *credibility* of information cannot be given. Both must depend upon the existence of tangible legal evidence within the cognizance of the Police-officer, and he must judge whether the evidence is sufficient to establish the reasonableness and credibility of the charge, information or suspicion—*Reg. and Ord. N W. P. Sec 10*, para 366 (8) The words 'credible' and 'reasonable' must have reference to the mind of the person receiving the information, and such information must afford sufficient materials for the exercise of an independent judgment at the time of making the arrest—*Subodh v K. E*, 52 Cal. 319, 29 C.W.N. 98, 26 Cr L.J. 625

If a Magistrate after taking the statement of the complainant respecting an offence under section 406 I P. Code, issues a warrant for the arrest of the accused, there is a 'reasonable complaint' of the accused being concerned in a cognizable offence; consequently a constable who arrests the accused without a warrant is justified in doing so under this section—*Alay Muhammad v Emp.*, 22 Cr L J 758, A.L.R 1922 All. 457 If a warrant of arrest is issued against the accused on a charge of cognizable offence by the Police of any other province, it amounts to a credible information that the accused has committed a cognizable offence—*Gopal Singh v Emp.* 36 All. 6, 11 A L J 957.

Where a complaint of a cognizable offence was made to the Magistrate who recorded it under section 200 and directed the police to make

an investigation and send a report, and the police after making the investigation arrested three persons, it was held that the complaint recorded under sec. 200 was a credible information upon which the police were entitled to arrest under this section, even though the Magistrate had not issued process against the accused—*Emp v Bhola Bhagat*, 2 Pat. 379, 4 P L T 521, 24 Cr L J 375. The police can make an arrest under this section on a complaint of a cognizable offence made before them—*Mahadeo v Emp*, 21 A.L.J 791, 25 Cr L J 652.

117. Clause (4) —A formal complaint need not be made, in order to authorise a police-officer to arrest under this clause any person found with stolen property—*Queen v Gowree Singh*, 11 W.R. 28.

The possession of stolen property must be recent and exclusive—*Ibid*.

The word 'and' has been substituted for 'or'. Under the old law as it stood before 1923, a police-officer could arrest any person in whose possession anything was found which might reasonably be suspected to be stolen property even though he might come in possession of that property innocently. The effect of the amendment is that the mere possession of stolen property will not empower a police-officer to arrest the person in possession of it but the person must also be reasonably suspected of having committed an offence in respect of the thing. See the *Legislative Assembly Debates*, 16th January, 1923, page 1154.

117A. Clause (5)—Obstruction to police-officer :—Where a police constable, after questioning a person carrying bundles of cloth under his arms (suspecting the cloth to be stolen) and receiving unsatisfactory replies, took hold of the pieces of cloth in order to inspect them, but the latter refused to allow the officer to inspect the cloth and scuffled with him, after which the police-officer arrested him, *held* that the person was legally arrested under the fifth clause of this section, for obstructing a police officer while acting in the execution of his duty—*Bhawoo v. Mulji*, 12 Bom. 377.

118. Clause (7) :—Offence committed out of British India :—By virtue of this clause the ruling in 19 Bom 72 is no longer good law. This clause authorises the police in British India to arrest without warrant a British subject committing outside British India any of the offences enumerated in the first Schedule of the Extradition Act—*Emp. v. Husein-ally*, 7 Bom. L.R. 463, 2 Cr.L J 439.

An arrest in British India by a police of the Native State of a person suspected to have committed an offence in the Native State is illegal—*Emperor v. Debi*, 29 All. 377.

The wording of this clause indicates that the arresting Police-officer has to exercise his own judgment and form his own opinion as to whether he should or should not act, and to enable him to do so he must have the necessary facts before him. A bare assertion of the commission of an offence does not amount to a reasonable suspicion or a credible information, on the basis of which an arrest can be made under this clause. If there is a credible information of the issue of a warrant by the Foreign

State, that would justify an action under this section—*Subodh v. Emp.*, 52 Cal. 319, 29 C.W.N. 98, 40 C.L.J. 489, 26 Cr.L.J. 625.

The expression "liable to be apprehended" etc. contemplates cases in which there is a *present* liability to apprehension or detention in custody in British India under the laws of extradition or the Fugitive Offenders Act, or any other law, and not cases in which there may be liability *in future* for apprehension or detention. The issue of some sort of process under the law would create such a liability though the process may not have arrived and is not available for execution—*Ibid.*

119. Clause (9) :—The first two lines of this clause have been added on the recommendation of the Select Committee in 1916, and the latter portion on the recommendation of the Joint Committee in 1922. As regards the first two lines the Select Committee of 1916 observed: "The Committee are of opinion that an amendment is required in section 54 to meet the case of a requisition from a police-officer to arrest a man at a distance. We think it is clear that there should be power for an investigating officer to require by telegram the arrest of a person who may, perhaps, have absconded from the place where the investigation was taking place. We, therefore, propose to add a clause at the end of section 54." As regards the rest of the clause the Joint Committee (1922) added: "We agree with those critics who desire that some safeguard should be provided and we have therefore proposed to lay down that the requisition should reveal the offence or other cause for which the arrest is to be made, so that the arresting officer can satisfy himself that the arrest could lawfully have been made without warrant by the officer issuing the requisition."

Before the ninth clause was added, it was held that the 'reasonable suspicion' and 'credible information' in this section must be based upon definite facts which the Police-officer must consider *for himself* before he could act under this section. He could not delegate his discretion or take shelter under *another person's belief or judgment*. Thus, where a Police-officer arrested the accused on receipt of a letter written by an Inspector of Police in which it was stated that the accused committed offences under secs 409 and 420 I. P. C., and it appeared that the officer effecting the arrest relied solely on the aforesaid letter and had no personal knowledge of the facts of the case, it was held that the arrest of the accused was not proper—*In re Charu Chandra*, 44 Cal 76. This ruling is no longer correct in view of this new clause.

120. Arrest without warrant under Special Acts:—See Sec. 21, Madras Act VII of 1864, Sec. 4 of Madras Act I of 1887, Sec. 12, Arms Act, XI of 1878; Sec. 13 of the Indian Gambling Act, III of 1867; Sec. 132, Railways Act (IX of 1890), Sec. 250 Cantonments Act (Act II of 1924), Criminal Tribes Act (Act VI of 1924), secs 21, 22, 25, Emigration Act (XXI of 1883), sec. 12, Indian Explosives Act (IV of 1884), sec. 13; Forest Act (Act VII of 1878), sec. 63; European Vagrancy Act (Act IX of 1871) Sec. 19, Assam Labour and Emigration Act (VI of 1901) Sec. 195, Bengal Excise Act (VII of 1878) secs 40 and 41;

Cruelty to Animals Act (Bengal Act III of 1869) section 1; Punjab Municipal Act (XX of 1891) secs. 18, 83; Bombay Gambling Act (IV of 1867) sec 12A; Rangoon Tramways Act (XXII of 1883) sec 19

Arrest of vagabonds,
habitual robbers, etc.

55. (1) Any officer in charge of a police-station may, in like manner, arrest or cause to be arrested—

- (a) any person found taking precautions to conceal his presence within the limits of such station under circumstances which afford reason to believe that he is taking such precautions with a view to committing a cognizable offence; or
- (b) any person within the limits of such station who has no ostensible means of subsistence, or who cannot give a satisfactory account of himself; or
- (c) any person who is by repute an habitual robber, house-breaker or thief, or an habitual receiver of stolen property knowing it to be stolen, or who by repute habitually commits extortion or in order to the committing of extortion habitually puts or attempts to put persons in fear of injury.

(2) This section applies also to the police in the town of Calcutta.

121. Object of section :—The powers with which officers in charge of police stations have been armed under the Code for the purpose of restraining bad characters are exceptional powers. They provide very strong remedies and should never be put in force without the greatest deliberation, and except upon convincing evidence. This section was intended for the suppression of habitual bad characters whom an officer in charge of a Police station suddenly finds within his jurisdiction or about whom he has good cause to fear that they will commit serious harm, before there is time to apply to the nearest Magistrate empowered to deal with the case under sec. 112—*In re Dzulat Sing*, 14 All. 45.

122. Illegal arrest :—A person against whom proceedings under Chapter VIII were held by the High Court to be illegal, was re-arrested under this section within the Court-precincts after giving him ostensible release, and proceedings against him under Chapter VIII were renewed. It was held that the re-arrest was illegal and an unlawful exercise of authority, as it was an attempt in another way to do what had

been declared by the High Court to be illegal—*Emp. v. Amir Khan*, 1883 A.W.N. 223. Similarly, where the Sessions Judge has passed orders for the immediate release of an accused person who had been prosecuted for dacoity, the action of a Police officer or a Magistrate in re-arresting him under this section and subsequently taking proceedings against him is a grave irregularity and wholly without jurisdiction—*Emp. v. Maiku*, 41 All. 483, 17 A.L.J. 458, 20 Cr. L.J. 381.

In order to justify an arrest under clause (c) of this section the prosecution will have to prove that the man was reputed to be a habitual robber or house-breaker etc., it is illegal to arrest a person merely on the ground that the police had reason to suspect that he was concerned in several offences—*Appasami v. King-Emp.*, 47 Mad. 442 (445), 46 M L.J. 447, 25 Cr. L.J. 563.

123. Section applies to Calcutta Police :—This section is expressly made applicable to the Police of Calcutta. Therefore, an officer in charge of a Police-station in Calcutta may arrest a person, although there is no declaration by Government declaring a thana or police-station in Calcutta to be a police-station within the meaning of this Code—*Emp. v. Madho Dhobi*, 31 Cal. 557

124. Bail .—When the Police arrest under this section, they are bound to give the person arrested the option of bail, and the bond should not be excessive, but in accordance with the position in life occupied by the person arrested—*In re Daulat Singh*, 14 All. 45.

125. Clause (a) :—Habitual gambler .—Only the persons enumerated here can be arrested under this section. Persons who are suspected of earning their livelihood by unlawful gambling are not liable to arrest by the Police. The proper course is to proceed under sec 112 of the Code—*King Emp. v. Kyaw Dun*, 3 L.B.R. 94, 3 Cr. L.J. 20.

126. Sections 55 and 110 .—This section is independent of Chapter VIII of this Code, although proceedings under that Chapter might follow on arrest under this section as a natural sequence. A police-officer can therefore arrest or cause to be arrested without a warrant or an order of a Magistrate under Ch. VIII, any person who comes under this section, although proceedings under sec 110 are contemplated against him—*Nepal v. Emperor*, 35 All 407, 14 Cr L.J. 618, 11 A L J. 596

A person who can be dealt with under clauses (d) and (e) of sec 110 is in most cases a person who would fall within one of the categories given in sec 55. A Police officer who intends to proceed against a man under sec 110 can cause him to be arrested under sec 55 without a warrant. It is not necessary that all the formalities of Chap. VIII are to be observed before he can be arrested, because it would in many cases render proceedings under Ch VIII useless. If the Police or the Magistrates who are contemplating taking proceedings under that chapter against desperate and dangerous characters or vagabonds and vagrants, are to allow the suspects to remain free until all the formalities of Ch. VIII have been fulfilled and a regular committal order passed against such

persons, it would oftentime happen that the offenders would abscond and the proceedings would be wholly infructuous. The police can therefore arrest a suspected criminal under sec. 55 and then proceed against him either for a substantive offence or under Ch. VIII—*Haradaya v. Emp.*, 20 S.L.R. 85, 27 Cr. L.J. 628 (630).

56. (1) When any officer in charge of a police-station or any police-officer making an investigation under Chapter XIV requires any officer subordinate to him to arrest without a warrant (otherwise than in his presence) any person who may lawfully be arrested without a warrant, he shall deliver to the officer required to make the arrest an order in writing specifying the person to be arrested and the offence or other cause for which the arrest is to be made.

The officer so required shall before making the arrest notify to the person to be arrested the substance of the order and, if so required by such person, shall show him the order.

(2) This section applies also to the police in the town of Calcutta.

Change —The italicised words have been added by sec. 11 of the Cr. P. Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923).

"We consider that a Police-officer making an investigation should, no less than an officer-in-charge of a police-station, have power to depute a subordinate to effect an arrest under the provisions of section 56 (1) and we propose an amendment in this subsection accordingly"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*

The second para of subsection (1) was added on the motion of Mr. Rangachariar during the debate in the Assembly. See *Legislative Assembly Debates*, January 17, 1923, page 1186.

127. "Officer subordinate":—These words are not limited to a police-officer as in sec. 54 or 57. A *chowkidar* is an officer subordinate to an officer-in-charge of a police-station—*Bahubal v. Emp.*, 10 C.W.N. 287; *Umrao v. Emp.*, 26 Cr. L.J. 795.

128. In his presence:—If the arrest is made in the presence of the officer-in-charge of the Police-station, the arrest is virtually made by him, and no order in writing is necessary; a verbal order is sufficient—*Queen v. Shaikh Emoo*, 11 W R. 20

129. Order in writing:—The order in writing is an authority to a subordinate officer to make an arrest which the superior Police-officer, if present, could himself make on his own responsibility—*Q. E. v. Basant*

Lal, 27 Cal 320. The mere writing of the name of the subordinate on the back of the warrant and the signing of that endorsement by the officer in charge of the station does not constitute the warrant an order in writing. But adding the words "arrest the person within named and for the offence within stated" would make it a valid order in writing—*Q. E. v. Dalip*, 18 All. 246.

A Sub-Inspector may arrest persons who fall under certain categories given in sec. 55. If he wishes any other police-constable to arrest such person, he must specify the cause for which the arrest is to be made, i.e., he must state within which category as given in sec. 55 the supposed offender falls. If it is intended that the police officer should arrest a man with the view of taking proceedings under sec. 110, it is strictly and specially necessary that he should specify one of the clauses given in sec. 55—*Hardayal v. Emp.*, 20 S.L.R. 85, 27 Cr. L.J. 628 (629).

Section 80 of the Code applies only to warrants and not to orders in writing mentioned in this section; therefore it was held that a subordinate officer making an arrest under an order in writing was not bound to notify to the person arrested the authority for and the cause of his arrest—*Q. E. v. Basant Lal*, 27 Cal. 320 (323). This is no longer good law, because the new second para of subsection (1) of this section expressly makes it obligatory on the subordinate officer to notify to the person arrested the substance of the order in writing, and to show him the order if called upon to do so.

But the provisions of section 56 (requiring a constable to notify the substance of the order to the person to be arrested) do not deprive the constable of his statutory power under sec. 54 to arrest without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant any person who has been concerned in any cognizable offence or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made or credible information has been received or a reasonable suspicion exists of his having been so concerned. If the person to be arrested falls under this category, the mere fact that a command certificate (order in writing) has been given to the constable under sec. 56 is immaterial, as the constable independently of any such command certificate is entitled to make the arrest. The failure of the constable in such a case to notify the substance of the command certificate to the person to be arrested does not take away from him the protection which attaches to him while acting in the discharge of his duty in a manner authorised by law—*Kishun Mandar v. Emp.*, 5 Pat. 533, 27 Cr. L.J. 1310 (1311), 11 P.L.T. 237.

The subordinate officer making the arrest is not bound on his own initiative to show the accused the order given by the officer-in-charge of the police station, unless he is asked to produce the order—*Umrao v. Emp.*, 26 Cr. L.J. 795 (796).

130. Warrant by a Magistrate :—The Issuing of a warrant by a Magistrate for the arrest of a person does not exclude the jurisdiction of the officer in charge of the Police-station and prevent him from issuing the order under this section. It might be different if the Magistrate has

decided that no warrant should issue and that summons only should issue—*Q. E. v. Dalip*, 18 All 246 (248).

57. (1) When any person, who in the presence of a police-officer has committed or has been accused of committing a non-cognizable offence, refuses, on demand of such officer, to give his name and residence or gives a name or residence which such officer has reason to believe to be false, he may be arrested by such officer in order that his name or residence may be ascertained.

(2) When the true name and residence of such person have been ascertained, he shall be released on his executing a bond, with or without sureties, to appear before a Magistrate if so required :

Provided that, if such person is not resident in British India, the bond shall be secured by a surety or sureties resident in British India.

(3) Should the true name and residence of such person not be ascertained within twenty-four hours from the time of arrest or should he fail to execute the bond, or, if so required, to furnish sufficient sureties, he shall forthwith be forwarded to the nearest Magistrate having jurisdiction.

131. Refusal to give name and address:—A police constable asked a man not to create any disturbance on the public road. Upon the man's declining to do so, the constable demanded his name and address which were not given. Then the constable arrested and dragged him to the police chowky and detained him there till his name and address were ascertained. It was held that the constable had lawfully exercised the powers conferred by this section—*Emp. v. Goolab Rasul*, 5 Bom. L R. 597.

Where two police-officers arrested without warrant a person who was drunk and creating disturbance in a public street, and confined him in the police station, though one of them knew his name and address, held that the police officers' action was not justified under this section—*Gopal Naidu*, 46 Mad. 605, 625 (F.B.), 44 M.L.J. 655, 24 Cr. L.J. 599.

58. A police-officer may, for the purpose of arresting without warrant any person whom he is authorized to arrest under this Chapter, pursue such person into any place in British India.

Pursuit of offenders into other jurisdictions.

132. Pursuit in foreign territory :—The Police may in *hot pursuit* follow an offender into an independent Native State; if they arrest him there, they must take him at once to the nearest Police authority of that State; if not in *hot pursuit*, they should ordinarily apply to the nearest Police authorities of the State and request them to effect the arrest of the fugitive—C. P. Pol Man., p 170.

59. (1) Any private person may arrest any person who, in his view, commits a non-bailable and cognizable offence, or who has been proclaimed as an offender; and shall, without unnecessary delay, make over any person so arrested to a police-officer, or in the absence of a police-officer, take such person to the nearest police station.

Arrest by private persons.

Procedure on such arrest.

59. (1) Any private person may arrest any person who, in his view, commits a non-bailable and cognizable offence or any proclaimed offender, and without unnecessary delay, shall make over any person so arrested to a police-officer, or, in the absence of a police-officer, take such person or *cause him to be taken in custody* to the nearest police-station.

Arrest by private persons.

Procedure on such arrest.

(2) If there is reason to believe that such person comes under the provisions of section 54, a police-officer shall re-arrest him.

(3) If there is reason to believe that he has committed a non-cognizable offence, and he refuses on the demand of a police-officer to give his name and residence, or gives a name or residence which such officer has reason to believe to be false, he shall be dealt with under the provisions of section 57. If there is no sufficient reason to believe that he has committed any offence, he shall be at once released.

Change :—Subsection (1) has been re-drafted by sec 12 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923), but the actual amendment made in the subsection is the addition of the words "or cause him to be taken in custody" This amendment gives effect to the ruling in 29 All 575 cited below.

133. Principle :—The principle of this section is that "for the sake of preservation of the peace, any individual who sees it broken may

decided that no warrant should issue and that summons only should issue—*Q. E. v. Dalip*, 18 All. 246 (248).

57. (1) When any person, who in the presence of a police-officer has committed or has been accused of committing a non-cognizable offence, refuses, on demand of such officer, to give his name and residence or gives a name or residence which such officer has reason to believe to be false, he may be arrested by such officer in order that his name or residence may be ascertained.

(2) When the true name and residence of such person have been ascertained, he shall be released on his executing a bond, with or without sureties, to appear before a Magistrate if so required :

Provided that, if such person is not resident in British India, the bond shall be secured by a surety or sureties resident in British India.

(3) Should the true name and residence of such person not be ascertained within twenty-four hours from the time of arrest or should he fail to execute the bond, or, if so required, to furnish sufficient sureties, he shall forthwith be forwarded to the nearest Magistrate having jurisdiction.

131. Refusal to give name and address :—A police constable asked a man not to create any disturbance on the public road. Upon the man's declining to do so, the constable demanded his name and address which were not given. Then the constable arrested and dragged him to the police chowky and detained him there till his name and address were ascertained. It was held that the constable had lawfully exercised the powers conferred by this section—*Emp. v. Goolab Rasul*, 5 Bom L.R. 597.

Where two police-officers arrested without warrant a person who was drunk and creating disturbance in a public street, and confined him in the police station, though one of them knew his name and address, held that the police officers' action was not justified under this section—*Gopal Naidu*, 46 Mad. 605, 625 (F.B.), 44 M L.J. 655, 24 Cr. L.J. 599.

58. A police-officer may, for the purpose of arresting without warrant any person whom he is authorized to arrest under this Chapter, pursue such person into any place in British India.

'Take such person to the police-station':—It is not the intention of the Legislature that the person making the arrest should be bound himself to take the arrested person to the police-station—*Emp. v. Parsiddhan Sing*, 29 All. 575; *Q. E. v. Potadu*, 11 Mad. 480. See also *King Emp. v. Johri*, 23 All. 266. The directions are sufficiently complied with if the person arresting the accused forwards him in charge of a servant or a village servant—*Ibid.* This is now made clear by the addition of the words "or cause him to be taken."

A private person making an arrest must either make over the arrested person to a police-officer or take him to the nearest police-station. If he keeps the arrested person in his own custody, he will be guilty of an offence under sec 342 I P C (wrongful confinement)—*Anant Prasad v. Emp.*, 8 P L T 204, 27 Cr. L J. 1378 (1381)

60 A police-officer making an arrest without warrant shall, without unnecessary delay and subject to the provisions herein contained as to bail, take or send the person arrested before a

Persons arrested to be taken before Magistrate or officer in charge of police-station.

Magistrate having jurisdiction in the case, or before the officer in charge of a police-station.

136. "Send the person"—On a police-officer arresting a person, the prisoner should not be kept in confinement in any place which the officer might select, but should be sent immediately to the police-station and be placed in the custody of the officer in charge of the station, 'who is the person entrusted by the Act with the conduct of the enquiry—*Q. v. Tarinee*, 7 W.R. 3.

Report to the Magistrate.—Where a policeman arrested a thief, but being himself unable to send or take the accused to a Magistrate, made a report, upon which the Magistrate issued a warrant, it was held under the circumstances that the accused was legally brought before the Magistrate—*Reg. v. Mahipya*, 5 B H C R 99.

"When a person is arrested in a district in which the trial cannot be made, and the offence is non-bailable, or where such person cannot give bail, the police should be guided by sec 60 Cr. P. Code"—*C. P. Pol. Manual*, p. 187.

61. No police-officer shall detain in custody a per-

son arrested without warrant for a longer period than under all the circumstances of the case is reasonable, and such period shall not, in the absence of a special order of a Magistrate under section 167, exceed twenty-four hours exclusive of the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate's Court.

Person arrested not to be detained more than twenty-four hours.

137. Object of section :—The intention of the Legislature, having regard to this section and section 167, is that an accused person should be brought before a Magistrate competent to try or commit, with as little delay as possible—*Q E v. Engadu*, 11 Mad. 98; *Ponnusami v. Queen*, 11 Mad 69, *Narendra v Emp*, 36 Cal. 166; *In re Nagendra Nath*, 51 Cal 402 (412), 38 C L J 388. The precautions laid down in sections 60 and 61 seem to be designed to secure that within not more than 24 hours some Magistrate shall have seisin of what is going on and some knowledge of the nature of the charge against the accused, however incomplete the information may be—*Dwarkadas v Ambalal*, 28 C.W.N. 850, 25 Cr L J 1203.

Section 61 does not apply to the Calcutta Police, but the detention of an offender by the Deputy Commissioner of Police in Calcutta for an unlimited period is improper—*Emp v Panchkari*, 52 Cal 67, 29 C.W.N. 300, 26 Cr L J 782 (792), and an improper exercise of such power may be corrected by the High Court under the suitable provisions of law such as sec 491 Cr P Code—*Sri Lal v Emp*, 44 C L J 134, 27 Cr L J 1185 (1186).

138. Detention in custody :—Where the accused were not allowed to leave the thana or to go to their homes, held that they were detained in custody within the meaning of this section, and the mere fact of there not being a special guard over them would not alter the nature of their position—*Queen v Basooram*, 19 W R 36.

139. Period of detention :—Although this section gives power to a police-officer to detain an accused person for a period of 24 hours, still in no case is a Police-officer justified in detaining a person for a single hour without bringing him before a Magistrate, except upon some reasonable ground justified by all the circumstances of the case, and it is for the police-officer to show that he had reasonable grounds. He is not entitled to detain the accused if he can send the accused to a Magistrate at once—*Q v. Suprosunno*, 6 W.R 88 (89). Even if a person be rightly arrested, it does not rest with the police-officer to keep the prisoner in custody where and as long as he pleases. Under no circumstances can he be detained, without the special order of a Magistrate under sec 167, for more than 24 hours. Unless the special order has been obtained, the prisoner must either be discharged or sent on to the Magistrate, and any longer detention is absolutely unlawful—*Q v. Tarinee*, 7 W.R 3.

The provisions of this section are imperative, and where a police officer is charged with having detained prisoners for more than 24 hours without the special order of a Magistrate, it is not necessary for the Crown to prove that the police-officer detained them with a guilty knowledge—*Queen v. Basooram*, 19 W.R 36.

The detention mentioned in this section means *continuous* detention. This section does not apply to cases where there has not been a continuous detention for more than 24 hours. The law does not mean that the number of hours during which an accused person is detained at a thana is to be added up irrespective of circumstances. Thus, where the accused person

was brought to the thana at 3 o'clock in the afternoon and was allowed to go (to get bail) at noon the next day, and was not a prisoner in the thana till his return on the morning of the next day and then he was sent up to the sudder station by the evening, held that although the period of detention exceeded 24 hours, there was no continuous detention for more than 24 hours, and that the detention was not illegal—*In re Indrobeer*, 1 W.R. 5.

Time occupied in journey—The 24 hours of detention are to be counted up to the time when the accused person leaves the police station on the way to the Magistrate. The time occupied in journey to the Magistrate is not to be counted in the 24 hours, but it is the duty of the Magistrate to see that the time so occupied is reasonable, with reference to the distance to be travelled and other local considerations—*Circular*, Ratanlal 22.

Handcuffs.—In all heinous cases, where a single prisoner is sent in, he should be handcuffed. Where two or more prisoners are sent, they should be handcuffed to each other, two and two. In cases not of a heinous nature, the prisoner should not be handcuffed unless violent, and then only by order of the Officer-in-charge of the station not below the rank of Sub-Inspector—*Bengal Pol Man*, p. 398.

62. Officers in charge of police-stations shall report to the District Magistrate, or, if he so directs, to the Sub-divisional Magistrate, the cases of all persons arrested without warrant, within the limits of their respective stations, whether such persons have been admitted to bail or otherwise.

Police to report apprehensions. The object of sections 62 and 63 is that the Magistrate should promptly exercise authority, if necessary, with regard to all arrests by the Police, and they seem to have been framed with this view that, as no person can be released without the order of a Magistrate except on bail or recognizance, the Magistrate should be responsible as well as the Police, if a person illegally arrested remains unnecessarily in custody—*Punjab Cir.*, p. 174.

63. No person who has been arrested by a police-officer shall be discharged except on his own bond, or on bail, or under the special order of a Magistrate.

64. When any offence is committed in the presence of a Magistrate within the local limits of his jurisdiction, he may himself arrest or order any person to arrest the offender,

and may thereupon, subject to the provisions herein contained as to bail, commit the offender to custody.

140. Secs. 64 and 556.—Although this section gives to a Magistrate authority to arrest a person committing an offence in his presence, yet it is clearly not intended to trench upon the general principle embodied in Sec. 556 of this Code, that no Judge or Magistrate shall try a case in which he is personally interested. Therefore, where a Magistrate, while travelling in a railway carriage, requested the accused who were his fellow passengers to desist from smoking and on their contemptuously refusing to do so, arrested and subsequently tried and convicted them, it was held that the Magistrate was legally and morally disqualified from exercising his judicial functions in relation to the offence imputed—*Q. E. v Venkara, Ratanlal* 339 (340)

65. Any Magistrate may at any time arrest or direct the arrest, in his presence, within the local limits of his jurisdiction, of any person for whose arrest he is competent at the time and in the circumstances to issue a warrant.

141. Arrest under Bombay Gambling Act:—Under the provisions of sec 6 of the Bombay Gambling Act IV of 1887, a first class Magistrate has power to give authority, under a special warrant, to a Police-officer to make an arrest and search, those provisions must be read subject to the provisions of secs 65 and 105 of this Code, that is, the Legislature must be presumed to have intended that the Magistrate should have authority to make the arrest and search himself if necessary—*Emp. v. Fernand*, 31 Bom 438, 9 Bom. L.R. 695, 6 Cr. L.J. 60.

66. If a person in lawful custody escapes or is rescued, the person from whose custody he escaped or was rescued may immediately pursue and arrest him in any place in British India.

67. The provisions of sections 47, 48, and 49 shall apply to arrests under section 66, although the person making any such arrest is not acting under a warrant and is not a police-officer having authority to arrest.

CHAPTER VI.

OF PROCESSES TO COMPEL APPEARANCE.

A.—*Summons.*

68. (1) Every summons issued by a Court under

Form of summons.

this Code shall be in writing in duplicate, signed and sealed by the presiding officer of such Court, or by such other officer as the High Court may, from time to time, by rule, direct.

(2) Such summons shall be served by a police-officer, or, subject to such rules as the Local

Summons by whom served.

Government may prescribe in this behalf, by an officer of the Court issuing it or other public servant.

(3) This section applies to the police in the towns of Calcutta and Bombay.

Scope.—The corresponding sections in the Code of 1872 (secs. 152 and 153) were limited to service of summons against an accused person only. The scope has now been enlarged. This is the only section which provides for the issue of a summons under this Code, and a summons to an assessor must comply with the terms of this section—*In re Sarat Chandra*, 1 C.W.N. cxvi.

142. Application for summons.—Duty of Court.—When an application is made for a process to compel the appearance of witnesses, it is the duty of the Court to pass an order either granting the prayer or refusing it. To make a mere order directing the petition to be filed is to leave the matter open and is improper—*Bhomar v. Digambar*, 11 C.W.N. 548.

143. Form and Contents.—A summons should be clear and specific in its terms as to the title of the Court, the place at which and the day and the time of the day when the attendance of the person summoned is required; and it should go on to say that such person is not to leave the Court without permission, and if the case in which he has been summoned is adjourned, without ascertaining the date of the adjournment. If these formalities are not duly observed, a conviction for non-attendance in obedience to the summons cannot be sustained—*Ram Saran*, 5 All. 7. Thus, where the summons did not specify where the accused or the witnesses were to attend, non-attendance in obedience to such summons was not an offence under sec. 143—*Narasimha*, 1 Weir 100, *Narayana*, 1 Weir 100; *Anon.*, App. 14, 1 Weir 81, *Anon.*, 1 Weir 81.

Where a defendant was summoned to appear before a Magistrate on a certain date but the summons did not specify the place at which he was to appear, it was held that the Magistrate was not competent to dispose of the case *ex parte* on failure of the person to appear before the Magistrate—*Anon.*, 7 M.H.C.R. App 43, 2 Weir 38 (39).

A summons should contain the name of the father of the person summoned, his caste or tribe and his residence, so as to place his identity beyond all doubt—See *Punj. Cir.* Vol II, p 151. In a process issued against a person residing in a large town, the description should contain not merely the name and father's name of the person to whom the process is addressed, and the name only of the town in which such person resides, but should give such further particulars regarding the section or street of the town in which such person resides as can be ascertained and will facilitate his identification—*Cal G R & C O*, Ch. I, Rule 19.

The summons should also state the particulars of the offence charged. Form I of Sch V says "state shortly the offence charged." This statutory requirement cannot be satisfied by a reference to a general omnibus charge, which may include a variety of charges; the Form should state the place where and the date when the accused is supposed to have committed the offence, as well as the precise nature of the offence—*Emp v. Ranajit*, 26 A.L.J. 331, 29 Cr.L.J. 357 (359).

Signing—Every summons should be signed in full by the officer by whom it is issued with the name of his office or the capacity in which he acts—*Punj Cir.*, Vol II, p. 151. In Bombay a summons may be signed by the clerk of the Court, or where there is no clerk of the Court, by the sheristadar, subject to the order of the presiding Officer of the Court—*Bom H. C. Cr. Cir.*, p 10. In Madras, the summons may be signed by the Chief Ministerial Officer—*Mad H. C. Cr. Cir.*, No 1302, dated 29-4-1891.

Signing not by full name but by initials is only an irregularity, and does not affect the validity of the proceedings—Sec. 537, *Illustration* (under the old law). The illustration to Sec. 537 has now been omitted by the 1923 Amendment Act, but the law does not seem to have been changed. See also *Q. E. v. Janki Prasad*, 11 All. 293 and *Banke Behari v. Emp.*, 3 P.L.J. 493, 19 Cr.L.J. 747.

'Sealed':—A summons which is not sealed is not valid in law, and therefore disobedience to a summons not sealed is not an offence—*Narasaiya*, 1 Weir 100; *Abdul Rahim*, 37 M.L.J. 588, 21 Cr.L.J. 800.

"By whom served":—Under clause (2) of section 68 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal has declared that the processes issued under that Act shall be served by peons appointed under the rules framed by the High Court under Sec. 22 of the Court Fees Act VII of 1870. *Vide Notification*, Government of Bengal, the 11th May 1883; *Calcutta Gazette*, 23rd May 1883, page 426. Similar orders were passed by the Chief Commissioner of Assam; see *Assam Gazette*, 23rd June 1883, page 290.

69. (1) The summons shall, if practicable, be served personally on the person summoned, by delivering or tendering to him one of the duplicates of the summons.

Summons how served.

(2) Every person on whom a summons is so served shall, if so required by the serving officer, sign a receipt therefor on the back of the other duplicate.

Signature of receipt for summons.

(3) Service of a summons on an incorporated company or other body corporate may be effected by serving it on the secretary, local manager or other principal officer of the corporation, or by registered post letter addressed to the chief officer of the corporation in British India. In such case the service shall be deemed to have been effected when the letter would arrive in ordinary course of post.

This is the only section which provides for the procedure of service of summons, and every summons (e.g. summons to attend as assessor) under this Code must be served in accordance with the provisions of this section. Any other mode (e.g. sending summons by post or under registered cover) is illegal and not justifiable—*Sarat Chandra*, 1 C.W.N cxvi.

144. Service how effected—The mere showing of a summons to the person summoned is not sufficient service. Either the original should be left with the party meant to be served, or should be exhibited to him and a copy of it delivered or tendered to him—*Reg. v. Karsanlal*, 5 B.H.C.R. 20

Tender—Refusal to take or sign.—If however the person refuses to take the summons, the mere tendering is sufficient service—*Sittu Padayachi*, 1 Weir 81; *Punamalai*, 5 Mad. 99; *Sahadeo v. Emp.*, 40 All 577, 10 A.L.J. 453, 10 Cr.L.J. 746. What is necessary to the service of summons is that the summons should be delivered or tendered; and if the summons is delivered or tendered, then it is served, whether the person signs a receipt for it or not—*Reg. v. Kalya*, 5 B.H.C.R. 34, *Emp. v. Ganga Ram*, 1886 A.W.N. 93.

Under this section, personal service may be made either by delivering or by tendering; but the tender must be a real tender of a document which is understood by the person to be served, and he must have voluntarily waived actual delivery and indicated in some way that a tender was sufficient. But if the person to be served runs away and shuts himself in his house, the summons cannot be served on him either by delivery or by tender—*Budhua v. Emp.*, 26 A.L.J. 107, 29 Cr.L.J. 263 (264).

70. Where the person summoned cannot by the exercise of due diligence be found,

Service when person summoned cannot be found.

the summons may be served by leaving one of the duplicates for him with some adult male member of his family or, in a presidency town, with his servant residing with him, and the person with whom the summons is so left shall, if so required by the serving officer, sign a receipt therefor on the back of the other duplicate.

145. "Cannot be found".—It must be shown by affidavit of the person entrusted with the service of summons that he made his best endeavours to effect personal service on the accused, and that the accused evaded service or that he could not be found by the exercise of due diligence—*Emp. v Sundar*, 1882 A.W.N. 170.

Where sufficient steps have not been taken to serve the accused personally and there has been want of reasonable diligence in that behalf, a substituted service of summons should not be ordered—*Jadho v. Manik*, 6 N.L.J. 63, 23 Cr.L.J. 739.

If the person summoned cannot be found, the summons may be served on an adult male member of his family, the service of summons on the mother of the accused is not warranted by this section—*Sawan Singh v. Emp*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1370, A.I.E. 1926 Lah. 50.

Service on servant.—Outside the Presidency Towns, a service of summons on a juror cannot be effected on his servant—*In re Behari Lal*, 1899 A.W.N. 13.

71. If service in the manner mentioned in sections 69 and 70 cannot by the exercise

Procedure when service cannot be effected as before provided.

of due diligence be effected, the serving officer shall affix one of the duplicates of the summons to some conspicuous part of the house or home-stead in which the person summoned ordinarily resides; and thereupon the summons shall be deemed to have been duly served.

145A. The procedure which is provided by section 71 cannot be made use of unless service in the manner mentioned in sections 69 and 70 cannot be effected by the exercise of due diligence. If it is not enough to show that service could not be effected in the manner provided by section 69; it must also be shown that the service could not be effected in the manner provided by section 70—*Beni Madhab v. Jadu Nath*, 31 C.W.N. 148, 43 C.L.J. 113, 27 Cr.L.J. 715 (716).

72. (1) Where the person summoned is in the active service of the Government or of a Railway Company, the Court issuing the summons shall ordinarily send it in duplicate to the head of the office in which such person is employed; and such head shall thereupon cause the summons to be served in manner provided by section 69, and shall return it to the Court under his signature with the endorsement required by that section.

Service on servant of Government or of Railway Company.

(2) Such signature shall be evidence of due service.

Mode of service on Government employees—See Cal. G. R. & C. O., Ch. I, Rules 14-18; All R. & O., pages 7-8; Punj. Cir., Vol. II, pp 152-153 Madras Rule No 8 (G O., 9th April 1875, No. 823).

146. **Scope** :—This section requiring service of summonses to Government servants to be effected through the heads of their departments, is intended to apply only to summonses issued by a Court of Justice and not to summonses or orders of police-officers investigating a crime under Chap XIV of this Code. A summons or notice issued by the police may be served directly on the Government servant, and need not be sent through his departmental superior. Therefore, refusal by an amin (a Government servant) to attend at a police investigation in obedience to a summons directly served on him by the police is an offence punishable under sec. 174 I. P. Code—*In re Gumparthi Venkataramia*, 18 Cr.L.J. 733,734 (Mad.)

Summons to a Sub-Inspector of the Railway Police should be served through the superintendent of the Railway Police of that district—*Gouri Shankar v Collector*, 6 P.L.T. 215, 26 Cr.L.J. 965 (968)

73. When a Court desires that a summons issued by it shall be served at any place outside the local limits of its jurisdiction, it shall ordinarily send such summons in duplicate to a Magistrate within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the person summoned resides or is, to be there served.

Service of summons outside local limits.

74. (1) When a summons issued by a Court is served outside the local limits of its jurisdiction, and in any case where the officer who has served a summons is not present at the hearing of the case, an affidavit, purporting to be made before

Proof of service in such cases, and when serving officer not present.

■ Magistrate, that such summons has been served, and a duplicate of the summons purporting to be endorsed (in manner provided by section 69 or section 70) by the person to whom it was delivered or tendered or with whom it was left, shall be admissible in evidence, and the statements made therein shall be deemed to be correct unless and until the contrary is proved.

(2) The affidavit mentioned in this section may be attached to the duplicate of the summons and returned to the Court.

B.—Warrant of Arrest.

75. (1) Every warrant of arrest issued by a Court under this Code shall be in writing signed by the presiding officer, or in the case of a Bench of Magistrates, by any member of such Bench; and shall bear the seal of the Court.

(2) Every such warrant shall remain in force until it is cancelled by the Court which issued it, or until it is executed.

147. Grounds for issuing warrants :—A Magistrate should issue a warrant on good and legal grounds. It is essential that he should have a knowledge of the offence having been committed, and that knowledge must be either personal or derived from testimony legally given before him. The report of the Police or any statement which is not on oath and which falls short of actual formal complaint is not sufficient to give the Magistrate jurisdiction to issue a warrant—*Q. v. Surendra*, 13 W.R. 27 (31).

148. Warrant :—Form :—When any Act does not provide a form of warrant, the form to be used is the ordinary one prescribed by this Code—*Alter Kaufman v. Govt. of Bombay*, 18 Bom. 636.

Pardanashin lady :—Until and unless a Magistrate is convinced that there is strong likelihood of the charge being proved, a pardanashin lady of good position should not be ordinarily compelled to appear in person in the first instance—*Prem Kuer v. Mai Sham Nath*, 1908 P.W.R. 20

General warrants :—The issuing of a general warrant, which means a warrant to apprehend all persons committing a particular offence or offences, is illegal—*In re James Hastings*, ■ B.H.C.R. 154. No general warrant for arrest should ever be issued by a Court of Justice. Every warrant should state as shortly as possible the special matter on which it proceeds. A strict adherence to the forms of warrants of arrest prescribed

by the Code will tend to prevent their being granted irregularly and without inquiry as to whether the circumstances justify their issue—*Punj. Cir.*, p. 144

Conditional warrants :—A warrant which directs that *in the event of* a certain named person not leaving British India forthwith all officers to whom the warrant is directed are to arrest that person, is invalid—*Alter Kaufman v. Govt. of Bombay*, 18 Bom. 636. The proper procedure in this case would be, first to issue an order directing the person to leave British India forthwith, which should be duly served upon him, and then, in case of his refusal or neglect to comply with its terms, there should be a further order by the Governor in Council authorising his arrest and detention in jail—*Ibid.*

149. Requisites of a valid warrant :—

(a) It must be in writing,

(b) It must be signed, signing not by full name but by initials is a mere irregularity and does not affect the validity of the warrant or vitiate the arrest—*Bankey Behary v. Emp.*, 3 P.L.J. 493, 19 Cr.L.J. 747; *Q. E. v. Janki Prosad*, 8 All 293 [In *Abdul Gafur v. Q. E.*, 23 Cal. 896, it was held that the signing must be by full name. But this does not seem to be correct. See Note 143 under sec 68.] The signing must be by pen and ink and not by stamp—*Subramania Ayyar v. Queen*, 6 Mad. 396. The warrant must be signed by the presiding officer of the Court and not by any other Magistrate. A warrant signed not by the Magistrate who took cognizance of the case but by an Honorary Magistrate who lived in the same town, is invalid, and a person resisting or escaping from an arrest made in pursuance of such warrant does not commit an offence under Sec. 353 I P. C.—*Jagpat Koeri v. Emp.*, 2 P.L.J. 487, 18 Cr.L.J. 526.

(c) It must be sealed. An unsealed warrant is void—*In re James Hastings*, 11 B.H.C.R. 154; *Mahajan v. Emp.*, 42 Cal. 708, 19 C.W.N. 224; *Alter Kaufman v. Government of Bombay*, 18 Bom. 636.

(d) The person named in the warrant must be described with sufficient certainty and particularity—*Alter Kaufman*, 18 Bom. 636. The warrant must give particulars of the person to be arrested so as to identify him clearly. A warrant which directs the committal of 'James Hastings,' without giving any further description of him is invalid, since it may lead to the arrest of any person bearing that name—*In re James Hastings*, 9 B.H.C.R. 154. So also, a warrant containing a wrong description of the accused (e.g. giving a wrong name of his father) is invalid—*Debi Sing v. Q. E.*, 11 Cal. 399.

(e) The warrant must specify the offence. Where a warrant was issued for the arrest of a person on a charge of abduction, it was held that since the act with which the accused was charged did not amount to an offence without a specific intention, the warrant must state the intent with which the offence was committed; otherwise it would be invalid—*Bidhoomookhi v. Sreenath*, 11 W.R. 4

(f) And lastly, the warrant must contain the name and designation of the police-officer or other person who is to execute it. If the name is left blank, the warrant is invalid—*Emp. v. Gaman*, 1913 P.R. 16, 14 Cr.L.J. 142. A warrant not addressed to a bailiff as required by Form 154 of Schedule V of this Code, or to any other person, is not valid—*Mahammad Baksh v. King Emp.*, 1904 P.R. 16.

Language of warrant:—A warrant should be written in the language of the District from which it is issued. If sent to another District or Province where a different language is in ordinary use, it should be invariably accompanied by a translation—*Cal. G. R. and C. O.*, p. 3; *Bom. H. C. Cr. Cir.*, p. 10.

Warrant by telegram—A Court should not issue a judicial order or communicate the purport of a warrant or process by telegram—*N. W. P. Reg. and Ord.*, p. 71.

150. 'Shall remain in force'.—When the law has not fixed any period limiting the duration of a warrant, the presumption is that it remains valid until it is executed—*Emp. v. Alloomia*, 28 Bom. 129.

A warrant on which there is an endorsement for bail to be taken for the appearance of the accused on a particular date, does not lapse on the expiry of that date; after that date, only the direction to take bail lapses, but the warrant continues in force until it is cancelled by the Court which issued it, or until it is executed—*Raushan Singh v. K. E.*, 13 C.W.N. 1091, 10 Cr.L.J. 479.

A warrant of arrest does not become invalid on the expiry of the date fixed for return of the warrant, but remains in force until it is cancelled by the Court or is executed. Therefore, an arrest made after expiry of the date fixed is not illegal—*Emp. v. Binda Ahir*, 7 Pat 478, 29 Cr.L.J. 1007 (1008).

151. Cancellation of warrant:—A Magistrate has discretion, on sufficient cause shown, to cancel a warrant and issue summons instead—*Imp. v. Janat*, 1 S.L.R. 69, 8 Cr.L.J. 187; *Prem Koer v. Mai Sham Nath*, 1908 P.W.R. 20.

When a warrant is cancelled, it is at an end and cannot be re-issued. Even where a subordinate Magistrate issued warrants for the apprehension of some accused persons for trial and afterwards cancelled the warrants, the District Magistrate had no authority to direct the re-issue of the warrants against the accused—*In re Guru Charan*, 1 C.W.N. 650.

76. (1) Any Court issuing a warrant for the arrest of any person may in its discretion

Court may direct security to be taken.

direct by endorsement on the warrant that, if such person executes a bond with sufficient sureties for his attendance before the Court at a specified time and thereafter until otherwise directed by the Court, the officer to whom the

warrant is directed shall take such security and shall release such person from custody.

(2) The endorsement shall state—

(a) the number of sureties;

(b) the amount in which they and the person for whose arrest the warrant is issued, are to be respectively bound; and

(c) the time at which he is to attend before the Court.

(3) Whenever security is taken under this section, the officer to whom the warrant is directed shall forward the bond to the Court.

Recognizance to be forwarded.

152. Scope of section :—This section now applies to witnesses as well as to accused persons. In the 1872 Code, there were, instead of the words "for his attendance before a Court" the words "to answer the complaint" which applies only to accused persons—*Anon*, 2 Weir 39.

152A. Bond —Under sec. 513, the Court or officer may allow a sum of money or G. P. Notes to be deposited in Court in lieu of executing a bond.

A Magistrate should issue a bailable warrant even in non-bailable cases, when the offence charged borders on the technical (*e.g.* when the head of a mutt is alleged to have committed robbery in respect of property which he admittedly claims to be his) and the accused is a man of position and respectability—*Sivamulu v Emp.*, (1911) 1 M.W.N. 452, 12 Cr.L.J. 430.

Bail bonds in criminal cases are exempt from Court-fees under sec. 19, Cl. 15 of the Court Fees Act, but the bonds given by sureties are not—*Ahmedabad Magistrate's Endorsement*, Ratanlal 126.

153. Attendance before a Court :—The Magistrate may issue a warrant of arrest for attendance before himself or some other Court; but he has no power to issue a warrant for the arrest and production of a person, in order that he may give evidence before the Police in an investigation under Chap. XIV—*Q. E. v. Jogendra*, 24 Cal. 320.

77. (1) A warrant of arrest shall ordinarily be directed to one or more police-officers, and, when issued by a Presidency Magistrate, shall always be so directed; but any other Court issuing such a warrant may, if its immediate execution is necessary and no police-officer is immediately available, direct it to any other

Warrant to whom directed.

person or persons; and such person or persons shall execute the same.

(2) When a warrant is directed to more officers or persons than one, it may be executed by all, or by any one or more, of them.

Warrants to several persons.

154. This section merely directs that a warrant shall be ordinarily directed to one or more Police-officers, but it does not say that the name of that Police-officer should be inserted in the warrant as well as his designation—*Bankey Behary v Emp*, 3 P L J. 493, 19 Cr.L.J. 747. The reasons have been thus stated: "It would be extremely difficult to carry on the Police administration of the country if every warrant had to be directed by name to a Police-officer and upon his transfer it were to become incapable of execution till the name of some other officer had been substituted in his place"—*Ibid* In *K E. v Shankar Dayal*, 25 O C 111, 24 Cr L J 14, it has been held, however, that a warrant which does not contain the name of the police-officer to whom it was issued and to whom authority to make the arrest was given, is irregular; but it has been conceded that the evidence of the Magistrate who signed the warrant or of the Sub-Inspector who executed it may supply the omission. The Rangoon High Court also holds that if a warrant is directed to a police thana without specifying the name of any officer in the station, it is at most a clerical error and does not invalidate the arrest if the accused has not suffered any prejudice—*Ma Kin v Emp*, 3 Bur L.J. 182, 26 Cr.L.J. 845, A I.R. 1924 Rang 383.

Warrant by Presidency Magistrate—A warrant issued by a Presidency Magistrate shall always be directed to Police-officers. Where such a warrant was directed to a person other than a Police-Officer, though such officer was immediately available, the High Court severely condemned the procedure—*Queen v. Syud Hossain*, 8 W.R. 74.

Any other person:—A Magistrate may, under this section, direct a warrant to an unofficial person only when its immediate execution is necessary, and when he cannot immediately obtain the assistance of the Police—*Queen v. Surendra Nath Roy*, 13 W R. 27. In the absence of these conditions, a Court is not justified in entrusting a warrant to a private person (e.g. a Forest Officer) for execution—*Pasuvathi v. Emp.*, 51 Mad 873, 29 Cr.L.J. 541 (542).

78. (1) A District Magistrate or Sub-divisional Magistrate may direct a warrant to any landholder, farmer or manager of land within his district or sub-division for the arrest of any escaped convict, proclaimed offender or person who has been accused of a non-bailable offence, and who has eluded pursuit.

Warrant may be directed to landholders etc.

(2) Such landholder, farmer or manager shall acknowledge in writing the receipt of the warrant, and shall execute it if the person for whose arrest it was issued is in, or enters on, his land or farm, or the land under his charge.

(3) When the person against whom such warrant is issued is arrested, he shall be made over with the warrant to the nearest police-officer, who shall cause him to be taken before a Magistrate having jurisdiction in the case, unless security is taken under section 76.

79. A warrant directed to any police-officer may also be executed by any other police-officer whose name is endorsed upon the warrant by the officer to whom it is directed or endorsed.

155. Scope—This section speaks of a warrant "directed to a police-officer," and has no application to a warrant directed to a private person (e.g. a Forest Officer) under the latter part of sec 77. Such person cannot endorse the warrant to anybody—*Pasuvathi v. Emp.*, 51 Mad 873, 29 Cr L J 541

Endorsement :—If a warrant directed to a police-officer is executed by another officer without endorsement (e.g. if a warrant addressed to the bailiff of the Court is executed by a naib-nazir and process-server without any endorsement by the bailiff), the execution is illegal—*Ghasita v. Emp.*, 22 Cr L J. 145, 3 Lah L J 346. The endorsement should be regularly made by name to a certain person, in order to authorise him to make the arrest—*Durga Tewari v. Rahman*, 4 C.W.N 85.

Moreover, the endorsement must be made by the Police-officer to whom the warrant is directed. Where a warrant was directed to a Court Sub-Inspector and the endorsement was made by the Court Head Constable, it was held to be invalid—*Durga Charan v Q E*, 27 Cal 457

'Any other Police Officer'—A process-serving peon is not included in the term 'any other police-officer' in the section—*Durga Charan v Q. E*, 27 Cal. 457

156. Warrant under special Acts—A special warrant issued under sec 6 of the Bombay Gambling Act IV of 1887 cannot be executed by any other officer except the officer therein named—*Crown v. Mithu*, 3 S.L.R 56, 10 Cr L J 3. Similarly a warrant under sec 45 of the Bengal Chowkidari Act (VI of 1870, B C) can be executed only by the person named therein—*Sheikh Nasir v Emp.*, 37 Cal 122. The Burma Gambling Act does not contain any provision for endorsement of the warrant issued under section 6 of that Act by the Officer to whom it is

issued, to another officer—*Po Thwai v. Emp.*, 12 Bur. L.T. 165, 21 Cr.L.J. 9.

80. The police-officer or other person executing a warrant of arrest shall notify the substance thereof to the person to be arrested, and if so required, shall show him the warrant.

Notification of substance of warrant.

157. Notify the substance :—Where a Police-officer simply shows the warrant to the accused but does not give him an opportunity of reading it, and does not notify its substance to him, the arrest so made is unlawful—*Satis Chandra v. Jadunandan*, 26 Cal. 748; *Abdul Gafur v. Q. E.*, 23 Cal. 896. But if the Police-officer shows the warrant to the accused and gives him sufficient opportunity of reading the warrant itself, the omission on the part of the officer to explain the particulars of the warrant does not invalidate the arrest; because, all that this section requires is that the accused should have reasonable opportunity of knowing on what charge he is being arrested and before what Court he is to appear, so that he may take steps for arranging for his defence—*Bankey Behary v. Emp.*, 3 P.L.J. 493, 19 Cr. L.J. 747. Where a warrant provided for bail, but the constable making the arrest did not give the slightest intimation to the arrested person that bail had been allowed, nor did he ask the prisoner whether he could give the required bail, held that the arrest was illegal—*Shyama Charan v. Emp.*, 16 C.W.N. 549, 13 Cr. L.J. 590 (591).

158. Show the warrant—This implies that the arresting officer must have the warrant of arrest in his possession at the time of making the arrest; otherwise it is illegal—*Emp. v. Amar Nath*, 5 All 318; see also *Emp. v. Ganesh Lal*, 27 All 258.

Mere showing is not sufficient. An opportunity should be given to the person to be arrested by showing him the warrant so that he might read it (26 Cal. 748) and see that the person arresting has authority—*Abdul Gafur v. Q. E.*, 23 Cal. 896; *Satish Chandra v. Jadunandan*, 26 Cal. 748; *Anand Lal v. Empress*, 10 Cal. 18; *Q. E. v. Tulsiram*, 13 Bom. 168; *Sheikh Nasur v. Emp.*, 37 Cal. 122.

The arresting officer is to show the warrant, if so required. It is not necessary that the officer executing the warrant should in the first instance show the warrant. It is sufficient if he should apprise the person to be arrested of the contents of the warrant and show it if desired—*Baroda Kanta*, 25 C.W.N. 815, 23 Cr. L.J. 347.

A recent Calcutta case has laid down that even though the provisions of sec. 80 are not complied with (i.e. substance of warrant is not notified nor warrant shown), still the arrest is legal in this sense that the police-officer may, under sec. 46 (2), use all means necessary to effect the arrest, if the person to be arrested forcibly resists the endeavour to arrest—*Darbesh Ali*, 33 C.W.N. 284 (285).

81. The police-officer or other person executing a warrant of arrest shall (subject to the provisions of section 76 as to security) without unnecessary delay bring the person arrested before the Court before which he is required by law to produce such person.

Person arrested to be brought before Court without delay.

159. Further detention :—When the arrested person is brought before the Magistrate, the Magistrate cannot lawfully commit him to prison or remand him without sufficient grounds, and in the complete absence of evidence there can be no grounds—*Queen v. Surendra Nath*, 13 W R 27

The warrant is exhausted as soon as the person arrested is brought before the Court. If the accused is to be further detained, it must be under some fresh warrant or order, such as an order of remand under Sec. 344. The warrant for further detention would be one of commitment directed to some jailor or other person having authority to receive and keep the prisoner—*In re W Bourke*, 13 W R 1

Arrest of women after childbirth —Women arrested soon after childbirth should not ordinarily be removed until they are in a proper condition to travel. They should be allowed to remain under proper charge in the care of their relations or to be sent to the nearest dispensary and suffered to remain in the dispensary until the officer-in-charge certifies that they are sufficiently recovered—*Bom. H. C. Cr. Cir.*, p. 3

82. A warrant of arrest may be executed at any place in British India.

Where warrant may be executed.

160. Arrest outside British India :—Where the accused was arrested by a constable of the Jeypur State, and was afterwards arrested by a British Constable in the Residency of Jeypur, the arrest was held to be made outside British India—*Emp. v Sheu Bun*, 7 Bur. L R 83.

The arrest of a person at a Railway Station in a Native State (e.g. the Gwalior State) on a charge of an offence committed in British India is illegal. The Gwalior State has ceded to the British Government jurisdiction over the Railway lands for the administration of civil and criminal justice in connection with the Railway, and not in respect of offences not committed on those lands and having no connection with the Railway administration—*Radha Kishen v Crown*, 1 Lah 406, 21 Cr. L J 303. So also, the grant by the Nizam to the British Government of civil and criminal jurisdiction along the line of Hyderabad State Railway, does not justify the arrest of a person on the lands of the State Railway under the warrant of a Magistrate in British India for an offence committed in a British territory and not committed in the Railway nor in any way con-

nected with the administration of the Railway—*Mahammad Yusufuddin v. Q. E.*, 25 Cal 20 (P.C.).

83. (1) When a warrant is to be executed outside the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court issuing the same, such Court may, instead of directing such warrant to a police-officer, forward the same by post or otherwise to any Magistrate or District Superintendent of Police or the Commissioner of Police in a presidency-town within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it is to be executed.

(2) The Magistrate or District Superintendent or Commissioner to whom such warrant is so forwarded shall endorse his name thereon and, if practicable, cause it to be executed in manner hereinbefore provided within the local limits of his jurisdiction.

161. **Warrant under Act XIII of 1859** :—The provisions of this section read with Sec 5 apply to a warrant issued under the Workmen's Breach of Contract Act. Therefore a Magistrate cannot refuse to execute within his district a warrant issued by a Magistrate of another district under that Act—*Q E v Chalu*, 1898 P R. 11; *Q E. v Kattayan*, 20 Mad 235, *Q E v Muthya*, 20 Mad 457; *Gauri Shankar v Mata Prosad*, 20 All 124

84. (1) When a warrant directed to a police-officer is to be executed beyond the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court issuing the same, he shall ordinarily take it for endorsement either to a Magistrate or to a police-officer not below the rank of an officer in charge of a station, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the warrant is to be executed.

(2) Such Magistrate or police-officer shall endorse his name thereon and such endorsement shall be sufficient authority to the police-officer to whom the warrant is directed to execute the same within such limits, and the local police shall, if so required, assist such officer in executing such warrant.

(3) Whenever there is reason to believe that the delay occasioned by obtaining the endorsement of the

Magistrate or police-officer within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the warrant is to be executed, will prevent such execution, the police-officer to whom it is directed may execute the same without such endorsement in any place beyond the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court which issued it.

(4) This section applies also to the police in the town of Calcutta.

85. When a warrant of arrest is executed outside the district in which it was issued, the person arrested shall, unless the Court which issued the warrant is within twenty miles of the place of arrest or is nearer than the Magistrate or District Superintendent of Police or the Commissioner of Police in a presidency-town within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the arrest was made, or unless security is taken under section 76, be taken before such Magistrate or Commissioner or District Superintendent.

Procedure on arrest of person against whom warrant issued.

86. (1) Such Magistrate or District Superintendent or Commissioner shall, if the person arrested appears to be the person intended by the Court which issued the warrant, direct his removal in custody to such Court :

Procedure by Magistrate before whom person arrested is brought.

Provided that, if the offence is bailable, and such person is ready and willing to give bail to the satisfaction of such Magistrate, District Superintendent or Commissioner, or a direction has been endorsed under section 76 on the warrant and such person is ready and willing to give the security required by such direction, the Magistrate, District Superintendent or Commissioner shall take such bail or security, as the case may be, and forward the bond to the Court which issued the warrant.

(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent a police-officer from taking security under section 76.

C—Proclamation and Attachment.

87. (1) If any Court has reason to believe (whether after taking evidence or not) that any person against whom a warrant has been issued by it has absconded or is concealing himself so that such warrant cannot be executed, such Court may publish a written proclamation requiring him to appear at a specified place and at a specified time not less than thirty days from the date of publishing such proclamation.

Proclamation for person absconding.

(2) The proclamation shall be published as follows :—

- (a) it shall be publicly read in some conspicuous place of the town or village in which such person ordinarily resides;
- (b) it shall be affixed to some conspicuous part of the house or homestead in which such person ordinarily resides or to some conspicuous place of such town or village; and
- (c) a copy thereof shall be affixed to some conspicuous part of the Court house.

(3) A statement in writing by the Court issuing the proclamation to the effect that the proclamation was duly published on a specified day shall be conclusive evidence that the requirements of this section have been complied with, and that the proclamation was published on such day.

162. **Summons cases.**—This section read with section 88 shows that even in summons cases and as against witnesses, a proclamation may be issued. But to lay a foundation for the issue of a proclamation under this section with an accompanying order for attachment under Sec. 88, it is necessary strictly to comply with the provisions of law relating to the issue of a warrant, in a case where a summons is the ordinary mode of enforcing attendance—*Yasin Khan*, 5 N.L.R 125, 10 Cr. L.J. 306.

163. **Conditions precedent to proclamation.**—The processes of attachment and proclamation are not to issue whenever a warrant falls of its effect. Before issuing a proclamation, the officer sent to serve the warrant must be examined as to the measures adopted by him to serve it. If, on his evidence or in any other manner, the Magistrate is satisfied that the accused is absconding or concealing, then and then only the processes of proclamation and attachment may be issued—*Bishonath*,

3 W.R. 63; *Shewdyal v. Griban*, 6 W.R. 73; *K. E. v. Po Ni*, 3 L.B.R. 116; *In re Ramkishore*, 19 W.R. 12; *Yasin Khan v. Emp.*, 5 N.L.R. 125.

The previous issue of a warrant against the person whose attendance is required before the Court is a necessary condition. Therefore, if the Court has no authority or jurisdiction to issue a warrant, an order for the issue of proclamation and a subsequent order for attachment are illegal—*Kanwar Singh*, 1893 P.R. 15; *In re Ramjitbai*, 14 Bom. L.R. 889.

164. Absconding—The Magistrate must be satisfied that the accused was *absconding or concealing himself* for the purpose of avoiding the service of the warrant. The mere fact that the Sub-Inspector *could not find* the accused is not enough under this section—*Shewdyal v. Griban*, 6 W.R. 73 (74); *Ram Kishore*, 19 W.R. 12 (13).

The term "abscond" does not necessarily imply change of place. Its etymological and ordinary sense is "to hide oneself," and it matters not if a person departs from his place or remains in it, if he conceals himself. In either case he is said to 'abscond.' Moreover, the term does not apply to the commencement of concealment. If a person having concealed himself before process issues, continues to do so after it is issued, he is said to abscond—*Srinivasa Aiyengar v. Queen*, 4 Mad. 393.

To be deemed an absconder, one need not be *proclaimed* as such under this section. But an absent person should not be too readily assumed to be an absconder without due inquiry and notice—*H. C. Proceedings*, 2 Weir 40.

A man who files a petition against an order issuing the warrant and takes steps to procure the order of a superior Court that he should be allowed to remain on bail after such warrant has been issued, cannot be said to be absconding or concealing himself, and a Magistrate is not justified in proceeding under this section—*Qamardin v. Emp.*, 1922 P.L.R. 66, 23 Cr. L.J. 454.

165. Mode of publication—The procedure laid down in this section for the publication of the proclamation seems to indicate that it was the intention of the legislature that the accused person should have the means of deriving information through his friends or family, or in some other indirect way, when the warrant or the direct order ~~is~~ attend cannot be served upon him; and that the Legislature has distinctly determined a sufficient time (30 days) ~~to~~ allow such indirect notice ~~to~~ reach him and for him to attend the Court in consequence of that notice—*In re Ramkishore*, 19 W.R. 12 (14, 15).

The provisions of subsection (2) as to the mode of publishing a proclamation are perfectly clear and explicit in their terms, and failure to comply with the rules will vitiate the subsequent attachment and sale—*Mian Jan v. Abdul*, 27 All 572. Where the provisions of clause (a) were not complied with at all, and although the provisions of clauses (b) and (c) were complied with, the proclamation did not specify a place and a time for the appearance of the absconder, *held* that the proclamation was not made according to law—*Abdullah v. Jitu*, 22 All 216 (218); *Abdul v. Kazim*, 1904 A.W.N. 159 (cited in 27 All 572 at p. 573).

But where the proclamation was made and was read and published in the places where the absconders were most likely to hear of them, but a copy was not affixed to the Court-house, the flaw would in no way prejudice the proceedings, and would be cured by section 537—*Mallu v. Crown*, 1917 P.R. 39, 18 Cr. L.J. 979.

The most important part of the publication is the publishing of the proclamation in the accused's place of residence, and it is from the date of such publication that the 30 days should be counted—*Mala Singh v. Emp.*, 1917 P.R. 6, 17 Cr. L.J. 414 (416); *Q. E. v. Subbarayar*, 19 Mad. 3.

Burden of proof—It is on the prosecution to prove that the proclamation was made in the manner prescribed by this section—*In re Pandya Nayak*, 7 Mad. 436.

166. Thirty days' time —The period of thirty days is to be counted not from the date of issuing the proclamation, but from the 'date of publishing such proclamation' i.e. from the date of the complete publication by doing all that is required under subsection (2) of this section—*In re Ram Kishore*, 19 W.R. 12 (14).

The rules prescribed by this section with regard to time and place are imperative, and if the date fixed for the appearance of the accused is less than 30 days from the date of publishing the proclamation, it is illegal and all subsequent proceedings (attachment and sale) will also be invalid and must be quashed—*Emp. v. Multan Singh*, 1919 P.R. 32, 21 Cr. L.J. 210, *Q. E. v. Subbarayar*, 19 Mad. 3, *In re Subba Naicken*, 17 M.L.J. 438.

167. Disobedience to proclamation —An accused person against whom a proclamation has been issued must, until he has surrendered, be regarded as in contempt, and the Court will not entertain any application on his behalf. He must appear before the Magistrate and apply to him to be discharged on the ground that the warrant is informal or offer some explanation by way of purging his contempt, and at the same time application may be made for the release of his property. It will then be the duty of the Magistrate to determine judicially whether the warrant was valid, and when he has done so, the person against whom and whose property the warrant was respectively issued may, if he be so advised, apply for the revision of the proceedings—*Q. v. Bisheshur*, 2 N.W.P.H.C.R. 441; *Q. v. Womesh Chandra*, 5 W.R. 71.

168. Statement in writing :—When there is no endorsement or statement in writing made by the Court validating the proclamation, the proclamation is not made according to law, and the subsequent attachment and sale are invalid—*Mian Jan v. Abdul*, 27 All. 572; *Abdulla v. Jitu*, 22 All. 216. The Magistrate ought to take particular care to preserve the proclamation, and there must be records in the Court to show that the formalities were strictly observed. Where such records were lost (e.g. where neither the proclamation nor its copy was forthcoming) the High Court set aside the proclamation and attachment, and restored

the property to the owner—*Emp. v. Jina Badhar*, 14 Bom. L.R. 163, 13 Cr. L.J. 293 (294) See also *Shewdyal v. Griban*, 6 W.R. 73.

The statement in writing should state clearly that the proclamation was duly published, and should also mention the date of publishing the proclamation. Where the validating order merely stated that the proclamation was duly published, but omitted to specify the date of the publication, held that it could not be considered as a conclusive evidence that the requirements of Sec. 87 had been complied with—*Emp v Multan Singh*, 1919 P.R. 32, 21 Cr L.J. 210.

Some vague materials on the record merely to show that a proclamation was perhaps issued, are insufficient; so also, a vague admission by one of the accused persons that a proclamation of some undescribed sort was at some unspecified time issued, has no value—*Jina Badhar*, supra

88. (1) The Court issuing a proclamation under section 87 may at any time order the attachment of any property, moveable or immovable, or both, belonging to the proclaimed person.

Attachment of property of person absconding.

(2) Such order shall authorize the attachment of any property belonging to such person within the district in which it is made; and it shall authorize the attachment of any property belonging to such person without such district when endorsed by the District Magistrate or Chief Presidency Magistrate within whose district such property is situate.

(3) If the property ordered to be attached is a debt or other moveable property, the attachment under this section shall be made—

- (a) by seizure; or
- (b) by the appointment of a receiver; or
- (c) by an order in writing prohibiting the delivery of such property to the proclaimed person or to any one on his behalf; or
- (d) by all or any two of such methods, as the Court thinks fit.

(4) If the property ordered to be attached is immovable, the attachment under this section shall, in the case of land paying revenue to Government, be made through

the Collector of the district in which the land is situate, and in all other cases—

(e) by taking possession; or

(f) by the appointment of a receiver; or

(g) by an order in writing prohibiting the payment of rent or delivery of property to the proclaimed person or to any one on his behalf; or

(h) by all or any two of such methods, as the Court thinks fit.

(5) If the property ordered to be attached consists of livestock or is of a perishable nature, the Court may, if it thinks it expedient, order immediate sale thereof, and in such case the proceeds of the sale shall abide the order of the Court.

(6) The powers, duties and liabilities of a receiver appointed under this section shall be the same as those of a receiver appointed under Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882.

(6A) If any claim is preferred to, or objection made to the attachment of, any property attached under this section within six months from the date of such attachment, by any person other than the proclaimed person, on the ground that the claimant or objector has an interest in such property, and that such interest is not liable to attachment under this section, the claim or objection shall be inquired into, and may be allowed or disallowed in whole or in part:

Provided that any claim preferred or objection made within the period allowed by this sub-section may, in the event of the death of the claimant or objector, be continued by his legal representative.

(6B) Claims or objections under sub-section (6A) may be preferred or made in the Court by which the order of attachment is issued or, if the claim or objection is in respect of property attached under an order endorsed by a District Magistrate or Chief Presidency Magistrate in

accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2), in the Court of such Magistrate.

(6C) Every such claim or objection shall be inquired into by the Court in which it is preferred or made :

Provided that, if it is preferred or made in the Court of a District Magistrate or Chief Presidency Magistrate, such Magistrate may make it over for disposal to any Magistrate of the first or second class or to any Presidency Magistrate, as the case may be, subordinate to him.

(6D) Any person whose claim or objection has been disallowed in whole or in part by an order under sub-section (6A) may, within a period of one year from the date of such order, institute a suit to establish the right which he claims in respect of the property in dispute; but subject to the result of such suit, if any, the order shall be conclusive.

(6E) If the proclaimed person appears within the time specified in the proclamation, the Court shall make an order releasing the property from the attachment.

(7) If the proclaimed person does not appear within the time specified in the proclamation, the property under attachment shall be at the disposal of Government; but it shall not be sold until the expiration of six months from the date of the attachment and until any claim preferred or objection made under sub-section (6A) has been disposed of under that sub-section, unless it is subject to speedy and natural decay, or the Court considers that the sale would be for the benefit of the owner, in either of which cases the Court may cause it to be sold whenever it thinks fit.

Change .—Sub-sections 6A to 6E, and the italicised words in sub-section (7) have been added by Sec. 13 of the Cr P C Amendment Act XVIII of 1923. The reasons are stated below in their proper places.

169. Proclamation and attachment —Having regard to the words 'at any time,' a Magistrate may issue a simultaneous order of proclamation (under Sec 87) and attachment (under this section)—*Bhai Lal v. Emperor*, 29 Cal 417. Since the object of attachment is to enforce the appearance of the absconder, the attachment must immediately follow the proclamation, and it is unnecessary or even illegal to wait till the time specified in the proclamation has run out and then to order attach-

ment because the proclamation has not been obeyed—*Empress v. Mulchand Pemraj*, 6 C P L R 38

170. Property—The words of the section “order the attachment of any property moveable or immovable” are enabling and not restrictive, so that the Court may attach both kinds of property—*H. C. Proceedings*, 4 M.H.C.R. App 48

But the Magistrate has no power to order the attachment of any property that does not belong to the absconder. He should be most careful not to interfere with or disturb the rights of third persons—*Queen v. Kissoree Pater*, 7 W R 35

According to the Madras High Court the undivided interest of a coparcener of a joint Hindu family, or any portion thereof can be attached under this section—*Secretary of State v. Rangasamy*, 39 Mad. 831 (834) F II (overruling *In re Chinnian*, 2 Weir 43), *re Umayan*, 2 Weir 43 (Footnote). The Lahore High Court holds that with regard to ancestral lands all that can be attached is the interest of the absconder, but on his death the lands must be released in favour of his heirs—*Shah Muhammad v Crown*, 7 Lah L.J. 40, 26 Cr. L.J. 1148, 26 P L.R. 395; *Sadhu Singh v Secretary of State*, 1908 P R 18, *Niamat Ali v Secretary of State*, 1915 P R 52, 30 I C 71

The unascertained share of a partner in the assets of the partnership which were then in the hands of a Receiver under a winding-up order was not attachable, such share not being “property belonging to the defendant”—*Abbot v Abbot*, 5 B L R 382. But the share of a judgment-debtor in partnership with another person who alone was in possession of the property at the time of attachment was liable to attachment, but the attachment must be by prohibitory order and not by actual seizure—*Thama Singh v Kalidas*, 5 B.L.R. 386

171. Sub-section (6A)—Claims of third parties—Before the addition of this subsection by the Amendment Act of 1923, it was held in a number of cases that Secs. 88 and 89 did not provide for the investigation by a Magistrate of the claims of third parties whose property had been attached as the property of the accused; the remedy of the claimant was by way of a civil suit, as the question was one more for the Civil Court than for the Magistrate—*Q. E. v. Sheodihal*, 6 All 487; *Queen v. Kissoree Pater*, 7 W.R. 35; *Su We v. K. E.*, 4 L.B.R. 109; *Q. E. v. Kandappa Goundan*, 20 Mad. 88; *Emp v Gaman*, 1911 P.R. 8. These rulings are now rendered obsolete by the new subsection 6A which provides for the investigation by the Magistrate of claims and objections preferred by third parties

The proviso to the subsection provides for the continuance of proceedings by the legal representative of a claimant or objector who may die pending the inquiry into his claim or objection

Sub-section (6B) :—“We have provided for the case of claims to property in another district from that in which the order of attachment was made”—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916.*

Sub-section (6C) :—"The subsections which the Bill adds to section 88 imply that the Court which issues an order of attachment or endorses the same under subsection (2) is to investigate and determine a claim or objection. We think that a limited power to transfer claims and objections for disposal to subordinate Magistrates would be useful, and we have therefore provided that the District Magistrates may transfer such cases to Magistrates not below the rank of second class Magistrates, and that Chief Presidency Magistrates may likewise transfer cases to Presidency Magistrates subordinate to them"—*Report of the Joint Committee* (1922).

172. Sub-section (6D) .—"We have provided a period of limitation within which proceedings in a Civil Court to establish a claim which has been disallowed by a Magistrate, must be instituted"—*Report of the Select Committee* of 1916. The language of this subsection may be compared with that of O. XXI, rule 63, C. P. Code

A civil suit is maintainable by the real owner against the Government and the person at whose instance the criminal proceedings were instituted, to recover possession of the property attached, with mesne profits and damages done to the property while it was at the disposal of the Government—*Secretary of State v Jagat Mohini*, 28 Cal 540

173. No revision of order passed on a claim :—It was held in *Q E v Sheodihal*, 6 All. 487, *Queen v. Kissoree Pater*, 7 W.R. 35, *Abdulla v Jitu*, 22 All. 216, and *Q E v Kandappa Goundan*, 20 Mad. 88 that since the Code did not contain any provisions for the investigation of claims of third parties to the attached property, the orders of Magistrates passed on claims of third parties were not 'judicial proceedings' and therefore they were not open to revision under Secs 435-439 of the Code.

Under the present law also, though the claim-proceeding held by the Magistrate would be a judicial proceeding, still the Magistrate's order in such a proceeding is not liable to revision, because the words "subject to the result of such suit, if any, the order shall be conclusive" show that the order is not liable to be contested in appeal or revision.

Sub-section (6E) :—Release of property .—This subsection was added (on the motion of Mr Rangachariar) during the debate in the Legislative Assembly

The reasons have been thus stated by the mover of the amendment :—"The object of the proclamation and attachment is a compulsory process to compel the party to appear in obedience to the summons or warrant of the Court, and there is no provision here ordering the release of property from attachment in case he complies with the condition contained in the proclamation. This is a slip, I take it. Whereas section 89 provides that if within two years from the date of attachment any person whose property is in the disposal of Government appears and shows that he had sufficient cause for not appearing, then the property shall be restored to him; but if he appears within the time limited in the proclamation, there is no provision ordering the release of attachment. An

attachment has got some legal effects as Honourable members are aware. It prohibits the party from alienating the property. It prohibits the Civil Court from attaching the same property over again, and various other complications do arise. Therefore it is necessary that once the condition on which the attachment has been made is fulfilled, the attachment should cease *ipso facto*—*Legislative Assembly Debates*, January 17, 1923, page 1199

The High Court can interfere in revision with an order passed by a Magistrate refusing to release the property from attachment—*Santa Singh v. Emp.*, 25 Cr. L.J. 82 (Lah.)

174. Sub-section (7) —Property shall be at the disposal of Government—The attached property shall be declared to be at the disposal of the Government, if the accused does not appear within the time fixed in the proclamation, and it is for the accused, if he appears at any time within two years of the attachment, to satisfy the Magistrate that he had not been avoiding the process of the Court—*In re Bishonath*, 3 W.R. 63

The mere seizure of property of an absconder by the police does not confer any right on the Government unless and until proceedings are taken under secs. 87 and 88 of this Code. Therefore where the Police seized certain property of an absconder in August 1911 but no proceedings were taken under secs. 87 and 88 until December, an attachment of the property in October 1911 made by a creditor of the absconder in a civil suit would prevail, and the refusal of the Magistrate to hand over the property in obedience to the order of the Civil Court was held to be wrong—*Subramanyam v. K. E.*, 6 L.B.R. 57, 13 Cr. L.J. 568. The words "shall be at the disposal of Government" do not mean that from the moment the absconder fails to appear on the date ordered, all his right, title and interest in the property immediately pass over to the Government. It has that effect only from the date of attachment. This is evident from the very words of the section, "property under attachment." In other words, while the right and power of Government to attach begin from the time for appearance specified in the proclamation, the exercise of the power must begin with the attachment. Therefore where the property was attached by the Civil Court prior to the attachment by the Magistrate, the attachment of the Civil Court prevailed—*Narayan v. Govind*, 31 Bom. L.R. 345, A.I.R. 1929 Bom. 200. But when proceedings have been taken under these sections, and the property has been at the disposal of the Government, no title can be conferred by an attachment and sale subsequently made in execution of a money decree by the Civil Court—*Golam Abed v. Toolseeram*, 9 Cal. 661.

When the property has been declared to be at the disposal of the Government, the title of the accused to the property is put an end to; the Government can regrant the property (which consists of vatan lands) to some other person; such grant does not confer on the accused any

right to institute a suit to recover the property from such person—*Dattaji v. Narayan*, 25 Bom. L R 228, A.I.R. 1923 Bom. 198.

Time.—The law does not lay down any express time when the order of forfeiture should be made; if by mistake it has not been passed before the accused appears, it may be passed after he has appeared, if he does not satisfy the Court that he has not been evading justice—*Bishonath Sircar*, 3 W.R. 63. But it has been held in *In re Ramkishore*, 19 W.R. 12 (14) that if an order of forfeiture has not been made before the person has come in or has been brought in, it ought not to be made at all after he has appeared, because by that time its purpose has been effected though even possibly by other means than that of the process that was evaded.

Irregularity.—An order of forfeiture under this section, if in substance quite legal, cannot be disturbed on the ground of an irregularity in procedure—*Baiju Baul v Gajun*, 8 W.R. 61.

Power to restore property.—Property which has been declared to be at the disposal of the Government can be restored to its owner only by the Government and not by the Court—*Government of Bengal v Mir Sarwarjan*, 18 W.R 33; even the High Court has no power to make any order with respect to that property—*Government of Bengal, Petitioner*, 9 B L.R. 342.

175. Sale.—Where the land was subject to a lease, the sale should be subject to the right of the lessees to remain in possession until the expiry of the lease—*Ilam Din v King Emperor*, 1908 P R. 9.

Sale of revenue paying land should be done by the Collector and the procedure laid down in the C. P Code for execution sale should be strictly followed. See *Cal. G. R. and C. O.*, p. 6.

176. Setting aside of sale.—Where the publication of the proclamation was not in accordance with law, and the accused applied in revision to have the sale set aside and to have the purchase-money refunded to the purchasers, held that whatever irregularities there might have been in the publication of the proclamation, when a sale has taken place and the purchasers have acquired some sort of title, it is not open to the High Court in exercising its revisional power to pass an order affecting the title of persons (purchasers) who are strangers to the legal proceedings in which the order is made—*Abdulla v Jitu*, 22 All 216. But the Punjab Chief Court holds that it is within the revisional powers of that Court to set aside an attachment on the ground of illegality of the proclamation or defect in its publication—*Mallu v Emp.*, 1917 P R 39, 18 Cr L J 979, *Emp. v. Multan Singh*, 1919 P R 32.

Suit to set aside sale.—The accused can institute a suit in a Civil Court for setting aside the sale and for recovery of his property from the purchaser, if it turns out that the proclamation was illegal—*Abdul v. Kazim*, 1904 A W N 159 (cited in 27 All 572 at p 574). *Mia Jan v Abdul*, 27 All 572. In *Secy of State v Lown Karan* 5 P L J 321 (327), *Mullick J* has expressed an opinion (obiter) that secs 89 and 90 debar an absconder from suing for the recovery of his property. The Lahore High Court is of opinion that the proclaimed person has no right to bring

a civil suit for the restoration of the property sold on the ground of irregularity in the proclamation, attachment or sale. But he can get his remedy by invoking the revisional powers of the High Court under sec. 439, or its inherent powers to secure the ends of justice now expressly recognized by sec. 561A—*Dewa Singh v Fazal Dad*, 10 Lah 338, A.I.R. 1928 Lah 562

89. If, within two years from the date of the attachment, any person whose property is or has been at the disposal of Government under sub-section (7) of section 88, appears voluntarily or is apprehended and brought before the Court by whose order the property was attached or the Court to which such Court is subordinate, and proves to the satisfaction of such Court that he did not abscond or conceal himself for the purpose of avoiding execution of the warrant, and that he had not such notice of the proclamation as to enable him to attend within the time specified therein, such property, or, if the same has been sold, the nett proceeds of the sale, or, if part only thereof has been sold, the nett proceeds of the sale and the residue of the property, shall, after satisfying thereout all costs incurred in consequence of the attachment, be delivered to him.

177. Scope —This section does not apply where the proclamation and attachment are invalid. It prescribes a remedy where there has been a good and legal publication of proclamation under sec. 87, but offers no facility for the contesting of the legality of the proclamation. In the latter case the person aggrieved has his remedy by a civil suit.—*Abdulla v Jitu*, 22 All 216 (218); *Abdul v. Karim*, 1904 A.W.N. 159; *Mala Singh v. Emp.*, 1917 P.R. 6, 17 Cr.L.J. 414 (417).

But in two other cases the Punjab Chief Court has held that it cannot be said that the person aggrieved by an illegal attachment has no remedy except by a civil suit, for the Chief Court has revisional powers which it would employ to annul such an attachment—*Malli v. Emp.*, 1917 P.R. 39, 18 Cr.L.J. 979 (disapproving *Mala Singh v. Emp.*, supra); *Emp. v Multan Singh*, 1919 P.R. 32, 21 Cr.L.J. 210

178. "Two years" :—An application under sec. 89 not made within two years from the date of attachment is not entertainable—*Mala Singh v. Emp.*, 1917 P.R. 6, 17 Cr.L.J. 414.

"And proves" etc. —The phrase "within two years" qualifies not only the word 'appears' but also the word 'proves'; therefore it is not enough that the accused person appears within two years; it is also necessary that the proof that the accused has not been absconding should be offered

within two years—*In re Nilkanth*, 15 Bom. L.R. 175, 14 Cr.L.J. 237; *Buta Singh v. Emp.*, 27 P.L.R. 825, 27 Cr.L.J. 1025 (1026).

In order that the applicant may have the property restored to him, it is necessary for him to show that he had not absconded and that he had not proper notice; it is not sufficient to show merely that he did not abscond—*Buta Singh v. Emp.*, 27 Cr L J. 1025 (1026), 27 P.L.R. 825.

Forfeiture of property.—Forfeiture of property of an absconding offender who appears within two years from the attachment of his property should not be carried into effect without a regular inquiry into the cause of the offender's absence—*In re Bishonath*, 3 W.R. 63.

179. Restoration of property :—For the purpose of this section it is not necessary that the absconding accused should himself personally apply for the restoration of the property; the application can be made by any one on his behalf. But it is essential that the absconding accused should appear and prove the facts required, viz., that he did not abscond or conceal himself for the purpose of avoiding the arrest and that he had not notice of the proclamation—*In re Nilkanth*, 15 Bom L.R 175, 14 Cr.L.J. 237.

A Magistrate's direction to his subordinate to write to the Collector and authorise the taking off of a certain attachment will amount to an order releasing the property from attachment—*Jhundoo Singh*, 5 W R. 8.

After the sale of the property of an absconding accused, if an application by him for restoration is allowed, all that he can get is the nett sale-proceeds and not the property itself—*Fazaldad*, 24 Cr L.J. 573 (Lah).

Where land is attached regarding which no warrant has been issued, the High Court may, in the exercise of its inherent powers to rectify a grave irregularity under the provisions of section 530 (a) read with sec 439, release the property from attachment, where it cannot do so under the strict provisions of section 89—*Buta Singh v Emp.*, 27 P L.R. 825, 27 Cr L.J 1025 (1026)

180. No Civil suit —Where the accused did not appear within two years of the attachment and the property was ordered to be sold, no civil action could lie to set aside the sale—*Mirza Zowad Ali v. Hussein Bibee*, 8 W' R 207 (civil)

Appeal —An order refusing restoration of property is appealable; see sec. 405

D.—Other Rules regarding Processes.

90. A Court may, in any case in which it is empowered by this Code to issue a

Issue of warrant in lieu of, or in addition to, summons.

summons for the appearance of any person other than a juror or assessor, issue, after recording its

reasons in writing, a warrant for his arrest—

(a) if, either before the issue of such summons, or

after the issue of the same but before the time fixed for his appearance, the Court sees reason to believe that he had absconded or will not obey the summons ; or

- (b) if at such time he fails to appear and the summons is proved to have been duly served in time to admit of his appearing in accordance therewith, and no reasonable excuse is offered for such failure.

181. Scope —This section applies to witnesses as well as to the accused. But witnesses brought up under arrest should be dealt with not as criminals but simply as persons arrested on civil process. *Cal G. R. & C. O.*, p. 7.

This section empowers the Court to issue a warrant only in cases in which it is empowered to issue summons, and not in a case in which it has no power to issue the latter. Therefore, where no case is found against the accused and he is discharged by a Magistrate under sec. 253, it is not in the power of the District Magistrate to issue a warrant for his arrest for a retrial, until the order of discharge is set aside and the case is taken to his own file—*Kanwar Singh v. Q. E.*, 1893 P.R. 15.

182. Recording of reasons .—A Magistrate ought not to issue a warrant, either in lieu of or in addition to summons, in a summons case, unless he has previously recorded his reasons for so doing—*Yasin Khan v. Emp.*, 5 N.L.R. 125, 10 Cr.L.J. 306, *Q. E. v. Anant Pershad*, O.S.C. 99; *Bela Singh v. Emperor*, 1918 P.L.R. 50, 10 Cr.L.J. 443. Where an accused person has been let out on his own bond, a warrant issued under this section without recording reasons is illegal. The recording of reasons is a necessary preliminary to the issue of a warrant; and omission to do so vitiates the warrant; such omission cannot be overlooked, and cannot be cured by sec. 537—*Re Karuthan Ambalam*, 38 Mad. 1088, 17 Cr.L.J. 132. In *Mahar Singh v. Emp.*, 18 A.L.J. 1149, 22 Cr.L.J. 111, the omission by the Magistrate to record reasons for the issue of a warrant in the first instance was held by the Allahabad High Court to be a mere irregularity and not an illegality.

The Calcutta High Court also holds that the provisions as regards the recording of reasons are merely directory and not mandatory. Therefore in a case in which the Magistrate had materials before him sufficient to justify the issue of a warrant and to which the Magistrate did apply his judicial discretion, and the warrant was good and valid on the face of it, and the Magistrate stated in the warrant the reasons upon which he relied, the warrant was not invalid by reason of the fact that the Magistrate omitted to record separately in his order-sheet the reasons which actuated him in issuing the warrant—*Govt. of Assam v. Sahabulla*, 51 Cal. 1 (F.B.), 27 C.W.N. 857, 24 Cr.L.J. 881 (overruling *Sukheshwar Phukan v. Emp.*, 38 Cal. 789). Magistrates should record their reasons specifically in

writing in the warrant (though not necessarily in the order-sheet) before issuing the warrant, and should not be satisfied with merely signing their names to warrants in the form given in the schedule—51 Cal. 1 (at p. 21).

183. Issue of warrant in the first instance—Grounds :—In the absence of special grounds mentioned in this section, the Court ought to issue a summons—*Yasin v Emp.*, 5 N L 125; *K E v Po Ni*, 3 L B R. 116 Great care should be taken that a warrant which implies personal arrest and restraint never goes forth when a summons to attend would be sufficient for the ends of justice, and any attempt to coerce or restrain a party who has been summoned only should be checked and punished—*Punj Cir Chap XLI*, p 144

A warrant cannot be issued to enforce the attendance of a witness unless the Magistrate is first satisfied that the witness will disobey or has disobeyed the summons served on him—*Sutherland*, 14 W.R. 20; or unless he believes that the witness will not give evidence voluntarily—*In re Bourke*, 13 W.R. 1; or unless it is proved that summons has been duly served, and in spite of it the witness did not appear—*In re Abdour Rahman*, 7 W R. 37; *King Emp v. Po Ni*, 3 L B R. 116.

Where in proceedings under section 498 I. P. C. the complainant stated on oath that a warrant should be issued for the attendance of the abducted woman, or else the accused would remove the woman from their house, held that the Magistrate was justified in issuing a warrant for the arrest of the woman—*Mahar Singh v. Emp.*, 18 A.L.J 1149. 22 Cr.L.J. 111.

184. Clause (b) —Proof of service of summons :—A warrant ought not to issue unless due service of summons is proved. But a report by the station-writer that he served the summons is no evidence of service of summons under clause (b) of this section—*K. E. v. Po Ni*, 3 L B R. 116

Bail :—A Magistrate is competent to admit to bail a recalcitrant witness arrested under this section—*H. C. Proceedings*, 2 Weir 39

91. When any person, for whose appearance or arrest the officer presiding in any Court is empowered to issue a summons or warrant, is present in such Court, such officer may require such person to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for his appearance in such Court.

185. Bond by Mukhtar :—A bond by a mukhtar by which he undertook to produce a witness when called upon was held to be sufficient, although no security for appearance had been taken from the witness herself—*Q. E. v. Kazim Husain*, 1901 A.W.N. 35.

Power to lock up :—Even though a Magistrate may suspect that the witness who is present may in future be kept out of the way by the accused, still it will not justify the Magistrate in arresting the witness and placing her in the lock-up—*Ibid*

92. When any person who is bound by an taken under this Code to ap

Arrest on breach of
bond for appearance.

fore a Court, does not so :
the officer presiding in such
may issue a warrant directing that such person be a
and produced before him.

186. Scope --Sec. 92 has reference to the case of a pers
bound by a bond to appear in Court. It provides for a warran
case the person does not appear at the time when he is bound by
to appear, but it does not apply to a case where prior to the
appearance, arrest by warrant is sought to be effected. Such a
under sec 90—*Re Karuthan Ambalam*, 38 Mad. 1088, 17 Cr.L.

93. The provisions contained in this C

Provisions of this
Chapter generally ap-
plicable to summonses
and warrants of arrest.

relating to a summons and w
and their issue, service and
tion, shall, so far as may be,
to every summons and ever
rant of arrest issued under this Code.

CHAPTER VII.

OF PROCESSES TO COMPEL THE PRODUCTION OF DOCU- MENT AND OTHER MOVEABLE PROPERTY AND FOR THE DISCOVERY OF PERSONS WRONGFULLY CONFINED.

A.—*Summons to produce.*

94. (1) Whenever any Court, or in any place

Summons to produce
document or other
thing.

beyond the limits of the towns of
Calcutta and Bombay, any officer
in charge of a police-station, con-
siders that the production of any document or other thing
is necessary or desirable for the purposes of any investiga-
tion, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code
by or before such Court or officer, such Court may issue
a summons, or such officer a written order, to the person
in whose possession or power such document or thing is
believed to be, requiring him to attend and produce it, or

to produce it, at the time and place stated in the summons or order.

(2) Any person required under this section merely to produce a document or other thing shall be deemed to have complied with the requisition if he causes such document or thing to be produced instead of attending personally to produce the same.

(3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, sections 123 and 124, or to apply to a letter, postcard, telegram or other document or any parcel or thing in the custody of the Postal or Telegraph authorities.

187. Court :—It was held in *Brojendra Kishore v Clarke*, 12 C.W.N. 973, *Clarke v. Brojendra Kishore*, 36 Cal 433, and *In re Hanilal*, 22 Bom. 949 that if there were no proceedings pending before a Magistrate, he was not a 'Court' within the meaning of this section, and could not issue an order under sec. 94 or 96. But the Privy Council in the case of *Clarke v. Brojendra Kishore*, 39 Cal 953 (at p 966) has laid down that the words "Court" and "Magistrate" are convertible terms, and that Sch. V, Form VIII contemplates the issue of a search warrant before any proceedings are initiated, and in view of an inquiry to be made.

188. Document .—This section deals with documents forming the subject of a criminal offence—as also with documents which are or can be used only as evidence in support of a prosecution—*In re Lakshmidas*, 5 Bom L.R. 980. The words 'document or thing' are general and seem to cover any document, the production and inspection of which are necessary or desirable or will serve the ends of justice. When the premises to be searched are those of the accused person, the warrant issued under sec. 96 need not be only for the document or thing in respect of which an alleged offence has been committed—*Municipal Committee, Jhang v. Md. Hayat*, 1914 P.R. 36, 16 Cr L.J. 225.

The document or thing must be clearly specified, see *Prankhan v. King Emp*, 16 C W N .1078.

189. Necessary or desirable :—Before the Magistrate can order for the production of any document, he must judicially consider whether the production of the document is necessary or relevant for the purpose of the trial—*In re Lakshmi Das*, 5 Bom. L.R. 980. The Magistrate cannot call for anything and everything from anybody and everybody. The document or thing called for must have some relation to or connection with the subject matter of the investigation or the inquiry, or throw some light on the proceeding, or supply some link in the chain of evidence—*Nizam of Hyderabad v Jacob*, 19 Cal. 52. Before a person can be punished for the non-production of a document, it is necessary to show that its production was material for the decision of the case in which the

document was called for—*Damri Ram v. Emp.*, 4 P.L.W. 65, 19 Cr.L.J. 217. A document is a necessary document even though it is necessary as a mere piece of evidence only—*In re Lakshmi Das*, 5 Bom L.R. 980. It may be that the thing called for may turn out to be wholly irrelevant to the inquiry; but so long as it is considered to be necessary or desirable for the purpose of the inquiry, the power is there—*Nizam of Hyderabad v. Jacob*, 19 Cal. 52.

Whether the documents are necessary for the inquiry is a matter to be decided by the Magistrate at the time of issuing a summons under this section or a search warrant under sec. 96—*Mahomed Jackariah v. Ahmed Mahomed*, 15 Cal. 109. In a murder case, the accused has a right to a copy of the statements made by the witnesses at the inquest inquiry, and if the record of the inquest proceeding is in the Court, the Magistrate has power under this section to call for it to be produced by the Police—*In re Chanlet*, 20 L.W. 745, 26 Cr L.J. 426.

190. Person in possession.—The person called upon to produce need not be a party to the proceedings. The Magistrate can order the production of things in the possession of the solicitor—*Nizam v. Jacob*, 19 Cal. 52.

Person whether includes 'accused'—The provisions of this section apply to an accused, and it is competent for the Magistrate to issue summons to an accused to produce a document or other thing (e.g. a stolen article) the production of which might incriminate him—*Konda Reddi v. Emperor*, 37 Mad 112, 13 Cr L.J. 493, *Mahomed Jackariah v. Ahmed*, 15 Cal 109, *Nizam v. Jacob*, 19 Cal. 52. The Magistrate has the power of issuing a search warrant under sec. 96 to obtain documents in possession of the accused (*Bisser Missar v. Emp.*, 41 Cal 261) and the issue of summons is a milder means of attaining the same end—*Konda Reddi v. Emp.*, 37 Mad 112. Contra—*Ishwar Chandra v. Emp.*, 12 C.W.N. 1016, 8 Cr L.J. 224 and *Bayrang Gope v. Emp.*, 38 Cal 304, 15 C.W.N. 343, where it is held that this section does not refer to stolen articles or to any incriminating document or things in the possession of an accused person.

191. Order for production.—The order for production must be made on sufficient materials. Where a complaint was made against a certain person before the Chief Presidency Magistrate who examined the complainant and directed a local investigation, and an application was made thereafter by the complainant for summons under this section, and was granted by the Court after his further examination thereon, held that there were sufficient materials on which an order under this section could properly be made and that it was properly made—*T. R. Pratt v. King Emp.*, 47 Cal 647, 24 C.W.N. 410, 21 Cr L.J. 577.

Seizure of account books by police—A Magistrate, on taking cognizance of a complaint under sec. 477 I P. Code, may issue a summons under this section for the production of account books, or a search warrant under sec. 96, but is not competent to pass an order directing

the police to take possession of account books forming the subject of the charge—*Hari Charan v. Girish* 38 Cal 69 (72)

Inspection:—The jurisdiction of the Magistrate to order the production of a document or thing carries with it the jurisdiction to allow the prosecution the right of inspection. But the Magistrate can order for production in Court; he cannot allow the prosecution to inspect the entries in the account book kept by the accused, in his solicitor's office. They must be first produced in Court where they can be inspected—*In re Lakshmidas*, 5 Bom L.R. 978, 980

Putting it in evidence—On production of a document, the accused has no right to insist upon the prosecution putting it in evidence. The prosecution is entitled to determine whether it is to be put in evidence or not—*Mahomed Jackariah v Ahmed*, 15 Cal. 109. *In re Lakshmi Das*, 5 Bom. L.R. 980.

Security for production.—Where a Magistrate thinks that there are articles in a person's possession, the production of which is necessary, he can issue a summons under this section or a search-warrant under sec 96; there is no section to enable him to demand security from the person for the production of the articles when required, instead of issuing a summons under sec. 94 or a warrant under sec 96—*Purna Chandra v. Sashi Bhusan*, 7 C.W.N 522. But after a warrant has been issued against a person for search of certain articles in his premises, if such person offers an undertaking to produce the articles before the Court whenever required, the Magistrate may stay execution of the warrant conditionally on the execution of the bond by such person for production of the articles in Court whenever called upon—*Kishori Mohan v. Hari Das*, 47 Cal 164, 21 Cr.L.J. 391.

Lien:—The mere fact that the person in possession of the articles has a lien over them does not affect the power of the Magistrate to order their production—*Nizam of Hyderabad v. Jacob*, 19 Cal 52.

Punishment—Omission to produce the document or thing is punishable under sec. 175 I P. C

95. (1) If any document, parcel or thing in such custody is, in the opinion of any District Magistrate, Chief Presidency Magistrate, High Court or

Procedure as to letters and telegrams.

Court of Session, wanted for the purpose of any investigation, inquiry, trial, or other proceeding under this Code, such Magistrate or Court may require the Postal or Telegraph authorities, as the case may be, to deliver such document, parcel or thing to such person as such Magistrate or Court directs.

(2) If any such document, parcel or thing is, in the opinion of any other Magistrate or of any Commissioner

of Police or District Superintendent of Police, wanted for any such purpose, he may require the Postal or Telegraph Department, as the case may be, to cause search to be made for and to detain such document, parcel or thing pending the orders of any such District Magistrate, Chief Presidency Magistrate or Court.

192. Production of Post office records before Courts.—The attention of all Civil and Criminal Courts in the Provinces of Bengal and Eastern Bengal and Assam is invited to the following departmental instructions which the Director-General of Post Office, with the approval of the Government of India, has issued for the guidance of Postmasters on the subject of the production of Post Office Records before Court:—

“A summons from a Court of Civil or Criminal jurisdiction to produce any of the records of a Post Office or a certified extract from or copy of any such records must be complied with. The receipt of such a summons and such particulars as are known to the Post Master regarding the case, should be at once reported to the Post Master General in case he should see fit to raise any objection in Court under secs. 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act (I of 1872) to the production of any of the records. When any journal or other record of a Post Office is produced in Court and admitted in evidence, the Officer producing it shall ask the Court to direct that only such portions of the record as may be required by the Court shall be disclosed”—*Cal. G. R. and C. O.*, p. 7

B.—Search-warrants.

96. (1) Where any Court has reason to believe that

■ person to whom ■ summons or
 When search warrant may be issued. order under section 94 or a requisition under section 95, sub-section (1), has been or might be addressed will not or would not produce the document or thing as required by such summons or requisition,

or where such document or thing is not known to the Court to be in the possession of any person,

or where the Court considers that the purposes of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code will be served by a general search or inspection,

it may issue a search-warrant; and the person to whom such warrant is directed may search or inspect in accordance therewith and the provisions hereinafter contained.

(2) Nothing herein contained shall authorize any Magistrate other than a District Magistrate or Chief Presidency Magistrate to grant a warrant to search for a document, parcel or other thing in the custody of the Postal or Telegraph authorities.

193. Conditions precedent—Duty of Magistrate :—

(a) Before issuing the search warrant the Magistrate must have before him some information or evidence that the document is necessary or desirable for the purpose of the inquiry before him—*Moidcen Brothers v Eng Thaung*, 9 L.B.R. 45, 10 Bur LT 216

(b) The Court issuing the search warrant must have reason to believe that the person against whom the search warrant is issued is not likely to produce the document or thing in his possession in pursuance of a mere summons or order under section 94 or a requisition under section 95 (1) of this Code—*In re Manekji Sorabji*, 5 Bom LR 1032 The issue of a search-warrant is a judicial act, and it is the duty of the Magistrate before issuing such warrant to satisfy himself by inquiry that summons may not have the desired effect. Where without such inquiry, the Magistrate issued a search warrant on the mere application of the complainant, the order was *ultra vires*—*Iyavoo Chetty v Jehangir*, 1917 M.W.N. 494, 18 Cr L.J. 837; *Piyare Lal v Thakur Dat*, 1916 P.W.R. 12, 17 Cr L.J. 60 (61).

(c) A search warrant ought to be issued only after judicial inquiry and on proper materials—*Mahomed Jackariah v Ahmed*, 15 Cal 109; *Queen v Syud Hossain Ali*, 8 W.R. 74; *In re Harial*, 22 Bom 949; *Rash Behary v Emperor*, 35 Cal. 1076. The application on which the search warrant is issued should disclose the offences committed by the accused, but it is not necessary that definite particulars of the offences should be given or that the sections of the Penal Code under which the said offences would come should be mentioned—*Ajoy Krishna v S G Bose*, 33 C.W.N. 369 (370), 30 Cr. L.J. 705 Before ordering a search, the Magistrate would have to take cognizance of the offence by examining the complainant—*Ibid*. Of course, it is not obligatory on a Magistrate to wait until a preliminary inquiry is held and all the witnesses for the prosecution are examined and cross-examined, the Magistrate is entitled to act upon information which he considers credible, provided that there is a complaint before him and the complainant is examined by him on oath or solemn affirmation—*Q E v Mahant of Tirupati*, 13 Mad 18; *In re Sinagurunatha Pillai*, 1910 M.W.N. 818, 8 M.L.T. 416 If a complaint is laid before a Magistrate, a search-warrant issued on the complaint without examining the complainant is irregular. If the Magistrate is about to issue a search warrant on the strength of information as distinguished from a complaint, the Court should, if feasible, examine the informant on oath, and if evidence cannot be taken on oath, the Court should act with a due appreciation of the fact that it is taking upon itself the responsibility of issuing, upon the basis of that informa-

an inspection thereof. They stand, when they are brought to the Court, precisely in the same position as documents or things found upon the person of a prisoner at the time of his arrest—*Mahomed Jackaria v. Ahmed*, 15 Cal. 109, *Ajoy Krishna v. S. G. Bose*, 33 C.W.N. 369 (370), 30 Cr. L.J. 705, *In re Lakshmi Das*, 5 Bom. L.R. 980; but he is not entitled to examine it all, e.g. in case of account books, the Court should restrict the examination to the particular book or portions of the book relating to the subject matter under inquiry or trial—*Mahomed Jackaria v. Ahmed*, 15 Cal. 109.

Seizure without search warrant—An order of the Magistrate to seize certain account books without issuing a summons under Sec. 94 or warrant under this section is illegal—*Hari Charan v. Girish*, 38 Cal. 68.

Search warrant when to be executed—A search warrant should be executed between sunrise and sunset. If for special reasons it is executed between sunset and sunrise, such reasons must be reported to the D. S. P. for the information of the Magistrate—*Bengal Police Manual*, 2nd Ed., p. 402.

Issue of search warrant must be prompt—Where in a case of criminal trespass and theft, the complainant at the time of applying for process prayed for the issue of a search warrant, but the Magistrate after repeated applications made an order for the issue of warrant more than three weeks after, it was held that although the procedure was not contrary to the actual letter of sections 96 and 98, still it was so dilatory that it could only tend to defeat the very object for which such a warrant was issued—*Bilas v. Ram Gopal*, 22 C.W.N. 719, 19 Cr. L.J. 707.

200. Stay of execution of warrant on security—Where the person against whom a search warrant was issued prays for the stay thereof and offers an undertaking not to sell copies of the infringing book but to produce them before the Court whenever required, the Magistrate has jurisdiction to stay execution of the warrant conditionally on the execution of a bond to produce the copies in Court—*Kishori Mohan v. Hari Das*, 47 Cal. 164 (See this case cited in Note 191 under section 94).

97. The Court may, if it thinks fit, specify in the warrant the particular place or part thereof to which only the search or inspection shall extend; and the person charged with the execution of such warrant shall then search or inspect only the place or part so specified.

Power to restrict warrant.

98. (1) If a District Magistrate, Subdivisional Magistrate, Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class, upon information and after such inquiry as he thinks necessary, has reason

Search of house suspected to contain stolen property, forged documents, etc.

to believe that any place is used for the deposit or sale of stolen property,

or for the deposit or sale or manufacture of forged documents, false seals or counterfeit stamps or coin, or instruments or materials for counterfeiting coin or stamps or for forging,

or that any forged documents, false seals or counterfeit stamps or coin, or instruments or materials used for counterfeiting coin or stamps or for forging are kept or deposited in any place,

or, if a *District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate or a Presidency Magistrate*, upon information and after such inquiry as he thinks necessary, has reason to believe that any place is used for the deposit, sale, manufacture or production of any obscene object such as is referred to in section 292 of the Indian Penal Code or that any such obscene objects are kept or deposited in any place,

he may by his warrant authorize any police-officer above the rank of a constable—

- (a) to enter, with such assistance as may be required, such place, and
- (b) to search the same in manner specified in the warrant, and
- (c) to take possession of any property, documents, seals, stamps or coins therein found which he reasonably suspects to be stolen, unlawfully obtained, forged, false or counterfeit, and also of any such instruments and materials or of any such obscene objects as aforesaid, and
- (d) to convey such property, documents, seals, stamps, coins, instruments or materials or such obscene objects before a Magistrate, or to guard the same on the spot until the offender is taken before a Magistrate, or otherwise to dispose thereof in some place of safety, and

- (e) to take into custody and carry before a Magistrate every person found in such place who appears to have been privy to the deposit, sale or manufacture or keeping of any such property, documents, seals, stamps, coins, instruments or materials or *such obscene objects*, knowing or having reasonable cause to suspect the said property to have been stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained, or the said documents, seals, stamps, coins, instruments or materials to have been forged, falsified or counterfeited, or the said instruments or materials to have been or to be intended to be used for counterfeiting coin or stamps or for forging, *or the said obscene objects to have been or to be intended to be sold, let to hire, distributed, publicly exhibited, circulated, imported or exported.*

(2) The provisions of this section with respect to—

- (a) counterfeit coin,
- (b) coin suspected to be counterfeit, and
- (c) instruments or materials for counterfeiting coin,

shall, so far as they can be made applicable, apply respectively to—

- (a) pieces of metal made in contravention of the Metal Tokens Act, 1889 [I of 1889] or brought into British India in contravention of any notification for the time being in force under section 19 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 [VIII of 1878],
- (b) pieces of metal suspected to have been so made or to have been so brought into British India or to be intended to be issued in contravention of the former of those Acts, and
- (c) instruments or materials for making pieces of metal in contravention of that Act.

Change :—The italicised words have been added by the Obscene Publications Act (VIII of 1925).

201. Secs. 98 and 96 :—The Calcutta High Court has made a distinction between secs. 96 and 98, and laid down that Section 96 contemplates the existence of a judicial proceeding in the course of which alone the Magistrate can issue a search warrant, but that section 98 does not require a criminal proceeding as a condition precedent to the issue of a search warrant—*Rash Behary v. Emp.*, 35 Cal. 1076. But see *Clarke v. Brojendra Kishore*, 39 Cal. 953 (P.C.) which lays down that it is not necessary that there should be any proceeding before the issue of any search warrant. See Note 194.

202. Search without warrant :—If there is no search-warrant under this section, the search is illegal and the occupiers of the house have a legal right of private defence in resisting it—*Bajrang Gope v. Emp.*, 38 Cal. 304 (306), 15 C.W.N. 343. But a police-officer investigating a charge of theft is entitled to search, without a warrant, a house which he suspects to contain stolen property; in such a case his right to search is incidental to his right to investigate—*Emp v Nirmal Singh*, 42 All. 67 (68), 17 A.L.J. 1047, 20 Cr L.J. 695.

99. When, in the execution of a search-warrant at any place beyond the local limits found in search beyond jurisdiction. of the jurisdiction of the Court which issued the same, any of the things for which search is made, are found, such things, together with the list of the same prepared under the provisions hereinafter contained, shall be immediately taken before the Court issuing the warrant, unless such place is nearer to the Magistrate having jurisdiction therein than to such Court, in which case the list and things shall be immediately taken before such Magistrate; and, unless there be good cause to the contrary, such Magistrate shall make an order authorizing them to be taken to such Court.

Power to declare certain publications forfeited, and to issue search warrants for the same.

99A. (1) Where—

(a) any newspaper, or book as defined in the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, or

(b) any document,

wherever printed, appears to the Local Government to contain any seditious matter or any matter which promotes or is intended to promote feelings of enmity or hatred

between different classes of His Majesty's subjects or which is deliberately and maliciously intended to outrage the religious feelings of any such class by insulting the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, that is to say, any matter the publication of which is punishable under section 124A or section 153A or section 295A of the Indian Penal Code, the Local Government may, by notification in the local Official Gazette, stating the grounds of its opinion, declare every copy of the issue of the newspaper containing such matter, and every copy of such book or other document, to be forfeited to His Majesty, and thereupon any police-officer may seize the same, wherever found in British India, and any Magistrate may by warrant authorize any Police-officer not below the rank of Sub Inspector to enter upon and search for the same in any premises where any copy of such issue or any such book or other document may be or may be reasonably suspected to be.

(2) In sub-section (1) "document" includes also any painting, drawing or photograph, or other representation.

Sections 99A to 99G have been added by Act XIV of 1922 (Indian Press Law Repeal and Amendment Act)

Amendments—The words "or . . . Majesty's subjects" have been added by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Third Amendment) Act, 1926 (Act XXXVI of 1926). "Section 99A of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the Local Government to search for and confiscate all copies of newspapers, books or documents which appear to contain seditious matter. There is no provision which enables similar action to be taken against publications calculated to promote feelings of hatred or enmity between different classes of His Majesty's subjects. The publication and circulation of such documents have the effect of spreading and intensifying feelings of communal bitterness and hatred, and as the law now stands, even if a prosecution is launched under section 153A of the Indian Penal Code, there is no effective power to check circulation. The experience of the last few months has emphasised the importance of amending the law so as to provide this power. The Bill is accordingly intended to bring all documents which offend against sec. 153A, I. P. Code, within the scope of the power of forfeiture conferred in respect of seditious documents by sec. 99A of the Code of Criminal Procedure"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons*, (Gazette of India, 1926, Part V, p. 139).

Consequential amendments have been made in sections 99B, 99D and 99E below. Further, the words "or which is deliberately . . . that class" have been recently added by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1927 (XXV of 1927).

Sec.153A.—In order to justify the forfeiture of a book under sec. 99A on the ground that it contains matter punishable under sec. 153A, I. P. Code, it is necessary for the Government Advocate to satisfy the Court that on the evidence produced by the prosecution a conviction could have been had under sec. 153A, I.P.C.—*Lalpat Rai v. Emp.*, 29 P.L.R. 335, 29 Cr.L.J. 899, 9 Lah. 663 (S II).

99B. Any person having any interest in any newspaper, book or other document, in respect of which an order of forfeiture has been made under section 99A, may, within two months from the date of such order, apply to the High Court to set aside such order on the ground that the issue of the newspaper, or the book or other document, in respect of which the order was made, did not contain any seditious or other matter of such a nature as is referred to in sub-section (1) of section 99A.

202A. When an application is made to the High Court under this section, the High Court is precluded by section 99D from considering any other point than the question whether in fact the matters contained in the book were seditious or not. The High Court cannot enter into the question as to whether the Government Notification declaring all copies of the book to be forfeited complied with the requirements of section 99A—*Bajinath v. K. E.*, 47 All. 298, 23 A.L.J. 1, 26 Cr.L.J. 679.

When an application is made under section 99B to have an order of forfeiture set aside on the ground that the matter published does not fall within the mischief of sec. 153A of the I P Code, it is for the applicant to convince the Court that for the reasons he gives the order is a wrong order. It does not lie on the Government to establish that the order complained of was justified by law—*Emp v Kalicharan*, 49 All. 856 (F.B.), A.I.R. 1927 All 649.

99C. Every such application shall be heard and determined by a Special Bench of the High Court composed of three Judges.

Hearing by Special Bench.

99D. (1) On receipt of the application, the Special Bench shall, if it is not satisfied that the issue of the newspaper, or the book or other document, in respect of which the application has been made, contained seditious or other matter of such a nature as is referred to in sub-section (1) of section 99A, set aside the order of forfeiture.

Order of Special Bench setting aside forfeiture.

(2) Where there is a difference of opinion among the Judges forming the Special Bench, the decision shall be in accordance with the opinion of the majority of those Judges.

202B. Where the applicant is alleged to have published a series of seditious books, the whole series must be looked to, in order to determine whether the passages contained therein are seditious—*Bajinath v. K. E.*, 47 All. 298, 26 Cr L J. 479.

The meaning of section 99D is that if the High Court is left in doubt, after hearing the application, it should set aside the order (although it is contrary to the ordinary practice in an appeal in a civil suit)—*Kali Charan*, 49 All. 856 (F.B.), A I.R. 1927 All. 649.

99E. On the hearing of any such application with reference to any newspaper, any Evidence to prove nature or tendency of newspapers. copy of such newspaper may be given in evidence in aid of the proof of the nature or tendency of the words, signs or visible representations contained in such newspaper in respect of which the order of forfeiture was made.

99F. Every High Court shall, as soon as conveniently may be, frame rules to regulate the procedure in the case of such application, the amount of the costs thereof and the execution of orders passed thereon, and until such rules are framed, the practice of such Courts in proceedings other than suits and appeals shall apply, so far as may be practicable, to such applications.

99G. No order passed or action taken under section 99A shall be called in question in Jurisdiction barred. any Court otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of section 99B.

C.—Discovery of Persons wrongfully confined.

100. If any Presidency Magistrate, Magistrate of the first class or Sub-divisional Magistrate has reason to believe that Search for persons wrongfully confined. any person is confined under such circumstances that the confinement amounts to an offence, he may issue a search-warrant, and the person to whom such warrant is directed may search for the person so

confined; and such search shall be made in accordance therewith, and the person, if found, shall be immediately taken before a Magistrate, who shall make such order as in the circumstances of the case seems proper.

203. Duty of Magistrate :—When a Magistrate has an application before him containing the allegations mentioned in this section, and asking him to issue a search-warrant, it is incumbent on such Magistrate to satisfy himself by holding an inquiry that there is foundation for the application. He cannot act merely upon the allegation of the petitioner—*Abdul Aziz v. Crown*, 1916 P.R. 34, 17 Cr L.J. 491 (495). But the Patna High Court holds that the Magistrate may issue a warrant under this section merely on the application of the complainant, otherwise it would necessitate almost in every case that the Magistrate would have to try out the case before he could determine the question whether it was a *bona fide* application that was made before him. The only question is whether the Magistrate was of the belief that a person had been detained, and he may be of that belief by reason of the petition itself or for any other reason that may be brought before him—*Chepa Mehton v. Emp.*, A.I.R. 1928 Pat. 550, 30 Cr L.J. 175.

Search-warrant—This section applies where a search-warrant has been issued. Where no such warrant was issued, and the person was brought before the Court by the other party of his own accord, this section could not apply—*Chagan v. Hera Lal*, 24 C.W.N. 104 (105).

Arrest of ward :—The powers conferred on a first-class Magistrate under this section may be exercised by a District Judge in arresting a ward removed from the custody of the guardian. See section 25 (3) of the Guardians and Wards Act.

• On an application for the recovery of a boy by his adoptive mother from the natural father, the health or safety of the boy in his being allowed to live with his natural parents should be a paramount consideration for the Court—*Chagan v. Hera Lal*, 24 C.W.N. 104 (105), 20 Cr L.J. 729.

Power of Police-officer—Where a warrant issued under this section directs the police officer to find out the detained person from a particular house, the police officer when endorsing the warrant to another officer cannot authorise the officer to execute the warrant in some other place. Such a direction on the part of the police-officer would amount to altering the warrant itself—*Chepa Mahton*, A.I.R. 1928 Pat. 550 (551), 30 Cr.L.J. 175.

204. Wrongful confinement :—The Magistrate is not bound to issue a search warrant under this section unless he has reason to believe that the confinement is wrongful, i.e., amounts to an offence. The jurisdiction conferred by this section is not as wide as that conferred by sec. 491—*Q. E. v. Muktabai, Ratanlal* 839. Where a boy was taken away by the natural father from the house of the alleged adoptive father alleging that no adoption has really taken place, and the alleged adoptive

father applied for recovery of the boy, held that this section did not apply as it was doubtful whether the confinement of the boy by the natural father amounted to an offence—*Chagan v. Hera Lal*, 24 C.W.N. 104 (105).

Complaint against husband—In the case of a complaint being made against the husband that he was keeping his wife in confinement, a Magistrate cannot make a summary order, but before disposing of the proceedings, he is bound to hear both sides, and after making such inquiry as may seem necessary, he should pass such order as may seem right. If he finds that the confinement amounts to an offence, he should let the wife go and warn the husband against interfering with her except through a Civil Court. If, on the other hand, he arrives at the conclusion that such is not the case, he should advise the wife to go home with her husband, warning the husband at the same time against using any coercion in taking the wife with him—*Sher Sha v. Sakina Begum*, 1910 P.W.R. 29, 11 Cr.L.J. 450, 7 I.C. 354.

205. Form of warrant—There being no prescribed form of warrant under this section, a Magistrate who has to issue one under this section, may adapt a form under Sec. 96 to the provisions of this section by altering the figures, and by drawing up the warrant in terms required by this section—*Legal Remembrancer v. Mozam Molla*, 45 Cal. 905, 20 Cr.L.J. 47 (dissenting from *Bisu Halder v. Emp.*, 11 C.W.N. 836 where it was held that if a warrant was issued purporting to be under sec. 96, while it ought to be under sec. 100, the warrant was illegal).

A form under sec. 98 also may be lawfully used for a warrant under this section with necessary alterations—*Gora Mian v. Abdul Majid* 39 Cal. 403, 16 C.W.N. 336, 13 Cr.L.J. 186.

D.—General Provisions relating to Searches.

101. The provisions of sections 43, 75, 77, 79, 82
83 and 84 shall, so far as may be,

Direction etc., of
search-warrants. apply to all search-warrants issued
under section 96, section 98,
section 99A or section 100.

The words "section 99A" in this section have been added by Act XIV of 1922 (Indian Press Law Repeal and Amendment Act).

206. Sec. 79—Endorsement—A search warrant issued under the Gambling Act (III of 1867) is governed by the provisions of this Code, and consequently the search warrant may be endorsed by the Police officer, in whom it is originally directed, to another of equal rank—*Emp. v. Kashi Nath*, 30 All. 60. A search warrant issued under sec. 93 can be endorsed over to any other Police officer of similar rank for execution—*Crown v. Mithu*, 3 S.L.R. 56, 10 Cr.L.J. 3.

102. (1) Whenever any place liable to search or inspection under this Chapter is closed, any person residing in, or being in charge of, such place shall, on demand of the officer or other person executing the warrant, and on production of the warrant, allow him free ingress thereto, and afford all reasonable facilities for a search therein.

(2) If ingress into such place cannot be so obtained, the officer or other person executing the warrant may proceed in manner provided by section 48.

(3) Where any person in or about such place is reasonably suspected of concealing about his person any article for which search should be made, such person may be searched. If such person is a woman, the directions of section 52 shall be observed.

103. (1) Before making a search under this Chapter, the officer or other person about to make it shall call upon two or more respectable inhabitants of the locality in which the place to be searched is situate to attend and witness the search *and may issue an order in writing to them or any of them so to do.*

(2) The search shall be made in their presence, and a list of all things seized in the course of such search and of the places in which they are respectively found shall be prepared by such officer or other person and signed by such witnesses; but no person witnessing a search under this section shall be required to attend the Court as a witness of the search unless specially summoned by it.

(3) The occupant of the place searched, or some person in his behalf, shall, in every instance, be permitted to attend during the search, and a copy of the list prepared under this section, signed by the said witnesses, shall be delivered to such occupant or person at his request.

(4) When any person is searched under section 102, sub-section (3), a list of all things taken possession of shall be prepared, and a copy thereof shall be delivered to such person at his request.

(5) *Any person who without reasonable cause refuses or neglects to attend and witness a search under this section when called upon to do so by an order in writing delivered or tendered to him, shall be deemed to have committed an offence under section 187 of the Indian Penal Code.*

The italicised words have been added by sec 14 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923). For reasons, see below.

207. Searches under other Acts :—According to Sec. II of the Burma Gambling Act (1 of 1899), all searches made under that Act must be made in accordance with the terms of sections 102 (3) and 103 of this Code—*Ah Shwee*, 3 L B R. 229, *Ana Dewa Sing*, 4 L B.R. 134. Section 16 of the Opium Act lays down that searches under secs 14 and 15 of that Act shall be made in accordance with the provisions of this Code—*Mi Hauk v Emp.*, 4 L B R 121. But if a search is made in an open place under section 15 of the Opium Act, compliance with the provisions of section 103 of this Code is not obligatory—*Kali Kumar v. Emp.*, 11 Bur L J. 11, 28 Cr L J. 372 (373). A search under the Madras Abkari Act (1 of 1886) must, by virtue of sec 36 of that Act, be conducted in the manner laid down in the Criminal Procedure Code

But the Gambling Act (111 of 1867, sec. 5) prescribes a special procedure for searches under that Act, and the provisions of Chapter VII of this Code will not apply thereto—*Khilinda Ram v. Crown*, 3 Lah. 359, 23 Cr L J 621. So also, the provisions of sections 102 and 103 of this Code do not apply a search made under the Bengal Excise Act which contains a special provision relating to search. Such a search is not invalid by reason of the fact that it was not made in the presence of two witnesses—*Harbhanjan v K E* 54 Cal. 601, 31 C W N 667 (669), 28 Cr L J. 579.

208. Witnesses —It is obligatory on the officer about to execute a search warrant to call on and get two or more respectable inhabitants of the locality to witness the search, before he enters the place to be searched—*K E v Kwe Haw*, 4 L B R 213, 7 Cr.L J. 479. The witnesses are to be selected by the officer conducting the search and not by any other person—*Q. E v Raman*, 21 Mad. 83.

The regularity and proper conduct of the search is to be secured by two or more witnesses; the intention of the enactment is to ensure that searches are conducted with decency and in order, and that no wrong doing such as 'planting' of articles by the Police in the house searched should take place—*King-Emp. v Kwe Haw*, 4 L.B R 213; *Emp. v Wan Va*, 5 Rang. 291, 28 Cr.L J. 701 (702), *Ah Shwee v. K. E.*, 3 L.B.R.

229; *Abdullah v. Emp.*, 27 Cr.L.J. 73 (Lah.); and that no false evidence may be fabricated—*Ti Ya v. Emp.*, 7 Bur. L.T. 143, 15 Cr.L.J. 441.

Persons unconnected in any way with the Government and officialdom should be called to witness the search—*Ah Shwee v. K. E.*, 3 L.B.R. 229. Therefore, the Headmen of Wards in Rangoon being appointed by the Commissioner of Police and having to do many Police duties, it is not advisable that witnesses should be chosen from that class, as being Police officials they are not likely to have the confidence of men—*King-Emp. v. Kwe Haw*, 4 L.B.R. 213, 7 Cr.L.J. 479, *Ah Shwee v. K. E.*, 3 L.B.R. 229; *Emp. v. Khan Haw*, 4 Bur. L.T. 91 (F.B.) In *Ti Ya v. Emp.*, 7 Bur. L.T. 143 (F.B.), 15 Cr.L.J. 441, it is held that Ward-Headmen of towns other than Rangoon are competent witnesses to a search.

It is objectionable to be constantly calling the same person to witness the search, because such a practice is likely to prejudice the mind of the trying Magistrate against the prosecution—*Ma Hauk*, 4 L.B.R. 121.

The witnesses are called not only to attend and witness the search, but they can even assist the search, and by rendering assistance to the search they do not cease to be witnesses of the search—*Emp. v. Wun Nu*, 5 Rang. 291, 28 Cr.L.J. 701 (703), dissenting from *Ti Ya v. Emp.*, 7 Bur. L.T. 143, 15 Cr.L.J. 441.

209. Respectable inhabitants—Only those persons should be chosen as witnesses who can be reasonably relied on to secure the desired result (viz., prevention of fabrication of evidence, and decent and orderly conduct on the part of the officers conducting the search) and in whose trustworthiness and ability towards the carrying out of the particular duty required of them confidence can be felt—*Emp. v. Kwe Haw*, 4 L.B.R. 213; *Ti Ya v. Emp.*, 7 Bur. L.T. 143 (F.B.)

A respectable person is a person who would be impartial and on whom the owner or occupier of the premises searched can *prima facie* rely—*Ti Ya v. Emp.*, 7 Bur. L.T. 143 (F.B.), 15 Cr.L.J. 441. The word 'respectable' means 'respectable and independent'—*Emp. v. Khan Haw*, 4 Bur. L.T. 91 F.B. (following *Rex v. Hall*, 1 B. & C. 123), *Sher Ali v. Emp.*, 23 Cr.L.J. 609 (Lah.) Where one of the witnesses was a friend of the Sub Inspector and lived two miles away, and the other witness lived a mile away, held that the search was illegal—*Ma Htway v. Emp.*, 4 Bur. L.J. 2, 26 Cr.L.J. 827.

210. 'Of the locality' :—For the purposes of this section a person living in a quarter within a part of the place to be searched may reasonably be regarded as an inhabitant 'of the locality,' even if a river flows between—*Ti Ya v. Emp.*, 7 Bur. L.T. 143, 15 Cr.L.J. 441. The word 'locality' does not mean the same quarter of the town as the place which is to be searched—*Ah Sein v. Emp.*, 4 Bur. L.T. 222, 12 Cr.L.J. 479. Where the witnesses lived in a quarter exactly half a mile west of the house searched in Rangoon, held that the witnesses lived within easy reach and in the same locality within the meaning of this section—*Ah Pok v. Emp.*, 18 Cr.L.J. 1009. But witnesses who lived a mile or more

miles away, were not inhabitants of the locality—*Ma Htway v. Emp.*, 4 Bur. L.J. 2, 26 Cr.L.J. 827.

It has been held in some cases that the fact that the witnesses are not men 'of the locality' is immaterial if they are "respectable" men; the important point is that the men called in as witnesses should be persons of some standing whose word can be believed, not that they should be persons living within a stone's throw of the house which is to be searched. The stress is on the word 'respectable' and not on the word 'locality'—*Ti Ya v. Emp.*, 7 Bur. L.T. 143; *Ah Pok*, 18 Cr.L.J. 1009; and failure to call inhabitants of the locality as witnesses does not make a search illegal—*Q. E. v. Raman* 21 Mad 83, *Satagopachariu v. Satrugna*, 23 M.L.J. 445. The failure to call persons of the locality as witnesses to the search does not render the search illegal, especially where the search is conducted and witnessed by responsible and respectable officers in the presence of a Magistrate, and a satisfactory explanation for not inviting the neighbours to witness the search has been furnished—*Abdullah*, 27 Cr.L.J. 73 (Lah.).

But the intention of the Legislature is to lay equal stress on the words 'respectable' and 'locality' or rather to lay more stress on the word 'locality'; for the *Report of the Select Committee* of 1916 runs as follows—"We think that the power thus given to the police, practically to compel the attendance of respectable witnesses from as near as possible to the place where the search is to be effected, should go far to put an end to the objectionable practice of bringing semi-professional search witnesses from a greater distance, and will also prevent the frustration of searches by the unreasonable refusal of witnesses to attend, which, we understand, is by no means uncommon. If executive instructions are issued to the police that, with the new sub-section (5) to back them, they are, whenever possible, to require the attendance of respectable witnesses from the immediate vicinity, we think that a considerable improvement will be effected."

211. Right of occupant to be present :—The language of sub-section (3) is that the occupant of the place shall be permitted to attend during the search, and it means that he is to be given the option of being present, and not that he is to be allowed to be present only if he demands it. This section permits the occupants of the search to be present at the search, and this rule is not one merely of technicality but of substance, in that it is enacted to guarantee the reality of the search and the discoveries made thereat. Therefore when the occupants of the house, who were inside the room searched by the Police, were, after the discovery in their presence of a gun and after search of their persons, arrested and sent out of the room, and the search was continued, it was held that the exclusion of the occupants during the search was not a technical but a substantial violation of the law enunciated in this sub-section—*Pomesh Chandra v. Emperor*, 41 Cal. 350 (370, 377), 18 C.W.N. 496, 15 Cr.L.J., 385. But this case has been dissented from in the very recent case of *Harinarayan v. Emp.*, 46 C.L.J. 368, 29 Cr.L.J. 49 (57),

where Cammiade J. holds that the word "permitted" in this clause cannot be taken to mean that the 'occupant shall be present and must be given the option of being present.'

The word "occupant" is not intended to cover every person who may happen to be in the place at the time; but it refers back to the person mentioned in sec. 102, i.e., a person residing in or being in charge of the place—*Ramesh Chandra v. Emperor*, 41 Cal 350 (377).

212. Search-list :—A search-list prepared under this section is a proper evidence as to the matter contained therein, viz., the articles, found and the place where they were found—*Anon*, 2 Weir 47.

After a search-list has been prepared and signed, it is not proper to make additions thereto subsequently; but such additions however will not invalidate the whole search, nor is the omission of unimportant articles a circumstance invalidating the search—*Htaung v. Emp*, 7 Bur. L T. 163, 15 Cr.L J 523.

But it is competent for the Court to receive evidence other than the search-list regarding the things seized in course of the search and the places in which they were found. The provisions of section 91 of the Evidence Act do not apply to the case of a search-list prepared under this section—*Solai Naik v Emp*, 34 Mad 349 (F B), 21 M L J. 281, 11 Cr L J. 576, overruling 2 Weir 515

Non-signing of search-list.—Refusal by a witness to sign the search-list is not punishable under section 187 L P. Code (intentional omission to assist a public servant in the execution of his duty) because the 'assistance' referred to in sec. 187 L. P. C must have some direct personal relation to the execution of the duty by the Police-officer. The signing of the list is an independent duty cast upon the witness, whereas the word 'assistance' in sec. 187 L. P. C. implies that the party who assists is doing something which in ordinary circumstances the party assisted could do for himself—*In re Ramaya Naika*, 26 Mad 419 (F B)

In *Ana Dewa Sing v. Emp*, 4 L B.R 134 it has been laid down that unless the search-list is signed by witnesses, the search would not be legal. But a more reasonable view has been taken in *Solai Naik v. Emp.*, 34 Mad 349 cited above.

In the Bill of 1914, it was proposed to add another sub-section (6) to this section as follows :—"The fact that any person so attending neglects or refuses to sign the list of the articles seized shall not affect the legality of the search." But this was thought unnecessary and omitted by the Select Committee of 1916 who observed as follows—"We doubt if it would be wise to enact the new sub-section (6) proposed by the Bill, and we recommend that it should be omitted. We think that it will be sufficient to rely upon the law as expounded recently by the Full Bench in Madras (1 L R. 34 Mad. 349) which shows that the facts with reference to a search may be proved otherwise than by the production of the search list."

miles away, were not inhabitants of the locality—*Ma Htway v. Emp.*, 4 Bur. L.J. 2, 26 Cr.L.J. 827.

It has been held in some cases that the fact that the witnesses are not men 'of the locality' is immaterial if they are "respectable" men; the important point is that the men called in as witnesses should be persons of some standing whose word can be believed, not that they should be persons living within a stone's throw of the house which is to be searched. The stress is on the word 'respectable' and not on the word 'locality'—*Ti Ya v. Emp.*, 7 Bur. L.T. 143; *Ah Pok*, 18 Cr.L.J. 1009; and failure to call inhabitants of the locality as witnesses does not make a search illegal—*Q. E. v. Raman* 21 Mad 83, *Satagopacharlu v. Satruguna*, 23 M.L.J. 445. The failure to call persons of the locality as witnesses to the search does not render the search illegal, especially where the search is conducted and witnessed by responsible and respectable officers in the presence of a Magistrate, and a satisfactory explanation for not inviting the neighbours to witness the search has been furnished—*Abdullah*, 27 Cr.L.J. 73 (Lah.).

But the intention of the Legislature is to lay equal stress on the words 'respectable' and 'locality' or rather to lay more stress on the word 'locality', for the *Report of the Select Committee of 1916* runs as follows.—"We think that the power thus given to the police, practically to compel the attendance of respectable witnesses from as near as possible in the place where the search is to be effected, should go far to put an end to the objectionable practice of bringing semi-professional search witnesses from a greater distance, and will also prevent the frustration of searches by the unreasonable refusal of witnesses to attend, which, we understand, is by no means uncommon. If executive instructions are issued to the police that, with the new sub-section (5) to back them, they are, whenever possible, to require the attendance of respectable witnesses from the immediate vicinity, we think that a considerable improvement will be effected."

211. Right of occupant to be present :—The language of sub-section (3) is that the occupant of the place shall be permitted to attend during the search, and it means that he is to be given the option of being present, and not that he is to be allowed to be present *only if he demands it*. This section permits the occupants of the search to be present at the search, and this rule is not one merely of technicality but of substance, in that it is enacted to guarantee the reality of the search and the discoveries made thereat. Therefore when the occupants of the house, who were inside the room searched by the Police, were, after the discovery in their presence of a gun and after search of their persons, arrested and sent out of the room, and the search was continued, it was held that the exclusion of the occupants during the search was not a technical but a substantial violation of the law enunciated in this sub-section—*Romesh Chandra v. Emperor*, 41 Cal. 350 (370, 377), 18 C.W.N. 496, 15 Cr.L.J., 385. But this case has been dissented from in the very recent case of *Harinarayan v. Emp.*, 46 C.L.J. 368, 29 Cr.L.J. 49 (57),

to make at the time a note of the articles found and where found, the permitting of unauthorised persons to go in and out of the place searched, the omission to send up the articles found as soon as possible to the Magistrate, or the exclusion of the occupant of the place during the search. But the effect of such irregularities is only to necessitate a careful scrutiny of the evidence of search, and in spite of such irregularities it is found that no advantage was taken of them by the police, they have no further effect (i.e., the search does not become illegal)—*Romesh Chandra v. Emp.*, 41 Cal. 350 (368-371), 18 C.W.N. 496. A search made without the presence of any witness is irregular, but such irregularity does not entitle the occupants of the place to exercise their right of private defence by assaulting the police-officer, when it was not shown that that officer was acting maliciously and otherwise than in good faith—*Queen Emp. v. Pukot Kotu*, 19 Mad. 349. Where the police-officer made a search without a warrant and in the presence of only one witness, and a constable entered the house to be searched by scaling a wall, held that the search was grossly irregular, but the occupants had no right of private defence, and any assault committed by them on the police was punishable under section 323 (though not under sec. 332) I. P. C.—*Emp. v. Mukhtar Ahmed*, 37 All 353, 13 A.L.J. 439. In a later Allahabad case, however, it has been held that a search without witness is absolutely illegal, and the occupant of the house is entitled to exercise his right of private defence by assaulting the police-officer so as to prevent him from entering the house—*Emp. v. Nirmal Singh*, 42 All 67, 17 A.L.J. 1047, 20 Cr.L.J. 695.

11 for any reason the officer making the search is unable to get two or more respectable inhabitants of the locality, and a search is effected in the presence of one or more men available at the time, leading to the discovery of an excisable article, the accused who is found in possession of that article can all the same be convicted under the Excise Act, if the Court is satisfied from the evidence that an offence has been committed. The irregularity in the search would not mitigate the offence or operate as a bar to the conviction of the accused—*Abdul Hafiz v. Emp.*, 24 A.L.J. 173, A.I.R. 1926 All. 188, 27 Cr.L.J. 265.

E.—Miscellaneous.

Power to impound document, etc., produced.

104. Any Court may, if it thinks fit, impound any document or thing produced before it under this Code.

216. 'Before it'.—A Magistrate can impound a document produced in a case pending before him, and not before any other Magistrate subordinate to him—*Byas Hardeo Das v. K. E.*, 1 A.L.J. 607.

Jurisdiction.—Where a Magistrate had no jurisdiction to summon a person to produce his account books, this section does not apply so as to justify his sending the books out of his jurisdiction—*In re Permanand Kessonji*, Ratnaji 880.

Procedure :—A note upon the document or thing impounded or attached to it should be made and signed by the presiding officer and it should not be allowed to pass out of the custody of the Court except by his written order—*All. H. C. Bk Cir.* ¶ 6.

105. Any Magistrate may direct a search to be made in his presence of any place for the search of which he is competent to issue a search-warrant.

Magistrate may direct search in his presence,

217. When the Magistrate is competent to issue a search warrant, then instead of issuing such a warrant he can direct the search to be made in his presence—*Clarke v Brojendra Kishore*, 36 Cal. 433, *Empress v. Ganeshi*, 1884 A.W N 213.

PART IV.

PREVENTION OF OFFENCES.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF SECURITY FOR KEEPING THE PEACE AND FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.

A.—Security for keeping the Peace on Conviction.

106. (1) Whenever any

Security for
keeping the
peace on con-
viction.

person accus-
ed of rioting,
assault or
other offence

involving a breach of the peace, or of abetting the same, or of assembling armed men or of taking other unlawful measures with the evident intention of committing the same, or any person accused of committing criminal intimidation, is convicted of such offence before a High Court, a Court of Session or the Court of a Presidency Magistrate, a District Magistrate, a Sub-divisional Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class,

and such Court is of opinion that it is necessary to require such person to execute a bond for keeping the peace,

106. (1) Whenever any

Security for
keeping the
peace on
conviction

person accus-
ed of any off-
ence punish-
able under

*Chapter VIII of the Indian Penal Code, other than an offence punishable under section 143, section 149, section 153A or section 154 thereof, or of assault or other offence involving a breach of the peace, or of abetting the same, * * or any person accused of committing criminal intimidation, is convicted of such offence before a High Court, a Court of Session or the Court of a Presidency Magistrate, a District Magistrate, a Sub-divisional Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class.*

and such Court is of opinion that it is necessary to require such person to execute a bond for keeping the peace,

such Court may, at the time of passing sentence on such person, order him to execute a bond for a sum proportionate to his means, with or without sureties, for keeping the peace during such period, not exceeding three years, as it thinks fit to fix.

(2) If the conviction is set aside on appeal or otherwise, the bond so executed shall become void.

(3) An order under this section may also be made by an Appellate Court *including a Court hearing appeals under section 407* or by the High Court when exercising its powers of revision.

Change .—The words “or of assembling. . . committing the same” in the old sub-section (1) have been omitted, and the italicised words have been added, by sec 15 of the Cr. P. C Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923) The reasons are stated below in their proper places.

218. Object of this Chapter :—The object of this Chapter is the *prevention* and not the *punishment* of offences, and its provisions are aimed at persons who are a danger to the public by reason of the commission by them of certain offences—*Emp v. Vaman Sakharam*, 11 Bom. L.R. 743, *Emp. v. Murli*, 1885 P.R. 43, *Hari Telang v. Q. E.*, 27 Cal. 781 (784). This Chapter gives a certain amount of discretion to the Magistrates, and the High Court must always be slow to interfere with that discretion unless there is an error of law—*Emp v. Raoji*, 6 Bom. L.R. 34; *In re Umbica Prosad* 1 C.L.R. 268. But the Magistrate should exercise this preventive jurisdiction under this Chapter with cautious discrimination and watchful care, and see that the administration of this branch of criminal law does not become harsh and oppressive—*Q. E. v. Nga On*, L.B.R. (1893—1900) 223.

219. Offences under Ch. VIII, I. P. C. .—In the Bill of 1914 it was proposed to include in this section the “offences which are likely to lead to a breach of the peace”. But the *Select Committee* of 1916 changed those words into “offences punishable under Chapter VIII of the I. P. Code” and observed “We think it is better to enlarge the scope of this section by including all offences under Chapter VIII of the Penal Code than to involve the Court in an inquiry whether the offence of which the accused has been convicted, though not involving a breach of the peace, was nevertheless likely to have occasioned a breach.”

A security can be demanded on a conviction for an offence under sec 147 I. P. C.—*Maharaj Singh v. Emp*, 20 Cr.L.J. 760 (Nag); or on a conviction for rioting—*Marimuthu*, 32 M.L.T. 315, 17 L.W. 577.

The words “or of assembling armed men or of taking other unlawful measures with the evident intention of committing the same” which occurred in the old section have now been omitted, because these offences are covered by Chapter VIII of the Indian Penal Code, and specific men-

tion of them is unnecessary. The offence of assembling armed men is an offence under Chapter VIII of the I. P. Code; therefore this section applies where armed men were assembled with the intention of committing a breach of the peace and an order for beating men was given, although no breach of the peace actually took place because the assembly did not go so far—*Srihari v. Lalkhan*, 5 C.W.N. 250. So also, the offence of being an armed member of an assembly (sec. 144 I. P. C.) or joining such assembly after it has been commanded to disperse (sec. 145 I. P. C.) is an offence under Chapter VIII of the I. P. Code and brings an accused under this section. The case of *Yar Mahammed v. Empress*, 1890 P.R. 3 in which the contrary view was held is no longer good law.

An offence under sec. 149 I. P. C. is excluded from this section, for that section alone does not make any substantive offence—*Chhed Singh v. Emp*, 3 Pat. 870, 11 P.L.T. 330, 26 Cr.L.J. 426.

220. Assault :—The word "assault" as used in this section refers to the offence of assault as defined in section 351 I. P. C. An offence of causing grievous hurt under sec. 325 I. P. C., though it involves the use of criminal force and is in that sense an assault, does not strictly fall under the category of "assault" as contemplated by this section, and cannot form the basis of an order for security. Moreover, such offence does not always involve a breach of the peace—*Dubri v. Emp*, 8 O.L.J. 318, 24 Cr.L.J. 227. But where the offence of hurt was committed under such circumstances that it clearly implies the use of violence and a breach of the peace, e.g. assaulting a prosecution witness in a public place, the order for security was not improper—*In re Ramaswami Thevan*, 44 M.L.J. 485, 24 Cr.L.J. 455.

221. "Other offence involving breach of the peace" :—These words refer to offences in which a breach of the peace is an essential or necessary ingredient, and not to offences which merely provoke or are likely to lead to a breach of the peace—*Arun Samanta v. Emp*, 30 Cal. 366; *Muthia Chetty v. Emp*, 29 Mad. 190, *Kannookaran v. Emp.*, 26 Mad. 469, *Abdulla v. Crown*, 2 Lah. 279, 22 Cr.L.J. 709; *Raj Narain v. Bhagabat*, 35 Cal. 315, *Kuppa Reddiar v. K. E.*, 47 Mad. 846 (848), 25 Cr.L.J. 1096, 47 M.L.J. 232.

But according to the Bombay High Court the words "involving a breach of the peace" include offences in which a breach of the peace is likely to occur. And therefore when an accused person being convicted of an offence punishable under sec. 504 I. P. C. (insult with intent to provoke a breach of the peace) was ordered to furnish security to keep the peace, it was held that the order was lawful in as much as a breach of the peace or a probability of a breach of the peace was an ingredient of the offence under sec. 504 I. P. C.—*Emp. v. Sayad Yacoob*, 43 Bom. 554, 21 Bom. L.R. 270 (dissenting from 30 Cal. 366 and 26 Mad. 469). The Allahabad High Court likewise holds that the word "involving" connotes inclusion not only of a necessary but also of a probable feature, circumstance, antecedent condition or consequence. That is, an offence "involving a breach of the peace" mentioned in sec. 106 does not mean only

an offence which necessarily involves a breach of the peace or of which a breach of the peace forms an ingredient, but includes an offence such as the removal of a landmark (punishable under sec. 448 I. P. C.) which, as a matter of common experience, is often followed by serious riots and loss of life. Therefore, where the evidence shows that the accused were prepared to commit the act of removal of landmark by a breach of peace, and were only prevented from doing so by the other side running away, *held* that the offence came within the terms "involving a breach of the peace"—*Emp. v. Manik Lal*, 33 All 771 (dissenting from 30 Cal 93, 30 Cal. 366, 35 Cal 315 and 29 Mad 190); *Nanha v Kanharyalal*, 25 Cr L J. 71 (Nag.)

Upon a conviction of criminal trespass, where the intention of the trespass is to commit a breach of the peace, an order under sec 106 may lawfully be passed. Thus, where the accused came armed with lathis to assault the complainant and aimed a blow at him which missed, whereupon the complainant took refuge in his house, but the accused pushed the door open and assaulted the complainant inside the house, *held* that a breach of the peace was a necessary ingredient of the offence (criminal trespass with intent to cause hurt, sec 452 I. P. C.) of which the accused was convicted, and an order for security was proper in this case—*Emp. v. Dharam Raj*, 42 All 345, 18 A L J. 300, 21 Cr L J. 388; *Dullah v. Emp.*, 26 Cr L J 1462 (Lah.).

Sec. 323 I P Code—Where the accused is convicted under sec. 323, I. P. C., he cannot be bound down to keep the peace merely on the ground that the parties were on bad terms. There must be a further finding that a breach of the peace was involved in the occurrence—*Md Rahim v Emp.*, 23 A L J 1053, 26 Cr L J 1457, *Atma Ram v. Emp.*, 49 All 131, 28 Cr L J 88. But in all ordinary cases of conviction under sec 323 I. P. C there is a conviction for an offence involving a breach of the peace, and the desirability of taking security must depend upon how far the circumstances indicate that such a breach of the peace is likely to occur—*Mewa Lal v Emp.*, 51 All 540, 30 Cr L J. 686 (687). The Oudh Chief Court holds that the words "assault or other offence involving a breach of the peace" clearly include the offence of causing hurt under sec 323 I P Code—*Emp v Ramanuj*, 3 O.W.N 311 (Supp.), 28 Cr L J 144, dissenting from *Dubri v Emp.*, 30 O L J. 318, 24 Cr L J. 227.

221A. Offences involving no breach of the peace:—(a) Merely being a member of an unlawful assembly (Sec 143 I. P. C.)—*Abdulla v. Crown*, 2 Lah. 279, *Jib Lal v. Jagmohan*, 26 Cal. 576; *Raj Narain v Bhagabut*, 35 Cal 315; *Kannookaran v. Emp.*, 26 Mad 469; *Sheo Bhajan v. Mosawi*, 27 Cal 983, *Abdul Ali v Emp.*, 43 Cal. 671, 20 C.W N 197; an offence under sec 143 I. P. C. is now expressly excluded from this section by the present amendment;

(b) Criminal trespass—*Jib Lal v. Jagmohan*, 26 Cal. 576; *Badaruddin v. Emp.*, 1901 P L R 127; *Reg v. Bhaskar*, 3 B.H C R. 1;

(c) criminal trespass with intent to have illicit intercourse with the complainant's wife—*Subal v. Ramkanai*, 25 Cal. 628;

(d) merely causing disturbance to religious worship—2 Weir 47;

(e) theft or mischief—*Kannookaran v. Emp.*, 26 Mad. 469; *Ram Charan v. Umesh*, 1 C.W.N. 186; *Q. E. v. Muniram*, Ratanlal 622;

(f) breaking open a locked shop and criminal trespass—*Emp. v. Kundan*, 1885 A.W.N. 303,

(g) house trespass with intent to commit theft—*Morali v. K. E.*, 4 L.B.R. 277; house-trespass after preparation to commit hurt, assault etc. (sec 452 I. P. C.)—*Santosh v. Emp.*, 27 Cr.L.J. 571 (Lah.),

(h) grievous hurt—*Q. v. Kunhiya*, 4 N.W.P.H.C.R. 154,

(i) robbery—*In re Muthurakka*, 18 M.L.T. 131, 16 Cr.L.J. 611;

(j) offence under sec 297 I. P. C.—*Abdulla v. Crown*, 2 Lah. 279;

(k) wrongful confinement—*Md. Afzal v. Emp.*, 24 C.L.J. 271 (Lah.), but if the accused is found to have violently seized another person, tied his hands and wrongfully confined him in an open garden, then it amounts to an offence involving a breach of the peace—*Kuppa Reddiar v. K. E.*, 47 Mad. 846 (849), 47 M.L.J. 232, 25 Cr.L.J. 1096,

(l) defamation (even though the person defamed was provoked to commit a breach of the peace)—*Emp. v. Syad Yacoob*, 43 Bom. 554 (557), 21 Bom. L.R. 270;

(m) attempt to seduce married women and behaving indecently and immodestly towards them—*Arun v. Emp.*, 30 Cal. 366.

When a person is convicted of offences which do not, in themselves and apart from any other incidents, come within the terms of this section, it is incumbent on the Magistrate to record a clear finding with respect to the facts which in his opinion make this section applicable to the case—*Baidya Nath v. Nibaran*, 30 Cal. 93, *Sheo Bhajan v. Mosawi*, 27 Cal. 983; *Jib Lal v. Jagmohan*, 26 Cal. 576, *Kinoo Sheikh v. Darastulla*, 29 Cal. 393

222. "Convicted of such offences" —This section refers only to parties convicted of rioting, assault, etc., and cannot be applied to cases where there is only a possible apprehension of a future breach of the peace. It is only when there has been a conviction, and not until then, of the accused of the offence charged, that a Magistrate can resort to this section—*Q. v. Hur Kumari*, 24 W.R. 10. Therefore where a person was acquitted on a charge of unlawful assembly and trespass etc., the Magistrate would be in error in demanding security from him on the same evidence—*Dulloo Singh v. Ootim Singh*, 22 W.R. ■ So also, where the Magistrate only found that the accused threatened to beat the complainant, but did not convict the accused for assault or criminal intimidation, an order under this section was illegal—*Subal v. Ramkanai*, 25 Cal. 628. The conviction must be for an offence specified in this section. Therefore, where the accused was charged with criminal intimidation, but was

convicted of theft or unlawful assembly (sec. 143 I P. C.) an order under this section was not legal—*Kishore Sarkar v. K. E.*, 8 C.W.N. 517; *Raj Narain v. Bhagabat*, 35 Cal. 315; *Abdulla v. Crown*, 2 Lah 279 (280), 22 Cr.L.J. 709.

Annulment of conviction.—If the conviction is annulled on appeal, the order directing security abates *ipso facto* by virtue of sub-section (2) and it is not competent to the Appellate Court to order the security to be continued—*Emp. v. Chajju Mal*, 1895 A.W.N. 141.

Summary trial.—An order under this section may be made even if the conviction takes place in a summary trial, provided the Magistrate has jurisdiction—*Meghu v. K. E.*, 7 O.C. 338; *Emp. v. Lachman*, 1886 A.W.N. 181.

223. Magistrates empowered :—Since Section 18 confers full powers of a Presidency Magistrate on an Honorary Presidency Magistrate, the latter can take action under this section—*Hassan v. Yas Kubar*, 7 Bom L.R. 833, 2 Cr.L.J. 770. If any Bench of Magistrates has first class powers, the Bench is competent to pass an order under this section—See sec. 15 (2). The ruling in *Q. v. Bebhakti*, 21 W.R. 12 is no longer good law. A Sub-Divisional Magistrate, even though he is a Magistrate of the second class, can pass an order under this section binding over a person to keep the peace for a period exceeding six months. The fact that the order carries with it an alternative sentence of imprisonment in case the security is not furnished, which will be beyond his ordinary powers under sec. 32, cannot have the effect of limiting the powers conferred on the Court of the Subdivisional Magistrate under this section. So long as the order was passed by a Court which had authority to do so under this section, and the period for which security was required did not exceed the limits he was authorised by this section to impose, the liability of the accused to be detained in prison unless he furnished security is something independent of the powers of the Magistrate in the matter of passing substantive sentences of imprisonment—*Raja Singh v. Emp.*, 37 All 230, 13 A.L.J. 268, 16 Cr.L.J. 350.

224. "At the time of passing sentence" :—The order for security is to be made at the time of passing the sentence. Where a second class Magistrate convicted a person for assault and sentenced him to a fine, but ordered the sentence to be in abeyance pending the order of the District Magistrate for binding over the person, and the District Magistrate ordered the accused to furnish security, *held* that the order of the District Magistrate was bad in law—*Crown v. Nura*, 1901 P.R. 22. If a Magistrate of the 2nd or 3rd class is of opinion that the accused should be bound down under this section, he must refer the whole case to a superior Magistrate under section 349, without passing any sentence himself—*Rohumuddi v. Emp.*, 35 Cal. 1093. The second or third class Magistrate when referring a case under sec. 349 cannot even *convict* the accused. Section 106 contemplates that before an order requiring security can be passed under it, the accused shall have been convicted by the Court or Magistrate specified, who is not inferior to a Magistrate of the first class.

Reading sections 106 and 349 together, it follows that the conviction and order under section 106 must be passed by one and the same officer, and when a second or third class Magistrate refers a case to a superior Magistrate for an order under section 106, the conviction and sentence must be passed by the superior Magistrate and not by the Magistrate of the 2nd or 3rd class. Therefore, where a third class Magistrate convicted the accused and then submitted the case to the District Magistrate with a recommendation that the accused should be bound over to keep the peace, and the District Magistrate ordered security under this section, the order was *ultra vires* and illegal—*Mahmudi v Ali Sheikh*, 21 Cal 622

A second-class Magistrate ought not to pass any sentence at all, if he refers the case to a superior Magistrate for an order under section 106. Where a second class Magistrate convicted the accused under sections 147 and 325 I. P. C., and sentenced the accused under section 147 I. P. C. but passed no sentence under sec 325 I P C, and forwarded the proceedings to the Subdivisional Magistrate in order that the accused should be bound down under sec 106 of this Code, held that the action of the 2nd class Magistrate was wrong. If he thought that the binding down was necessary, he should have forwarded the whole case to the Subdivisional Magistrate, without passing any part of the sentences (viz., the sentence under sec. 147 I P. C.) himself—*Rohimuddi*, 35 Cal. 1093

An order for recognizance or for security under this section must be passed at the time of deciding the original case. If no such order is then made, the only procedure open to the Magistrate is to take subsequent proceedings under section 107—*Ram Adin v. Emp.*, 21 A.L.J. 839, 25 Cr.L.J. 965; *In re Gobind*, 15 W.R. 56. If a Magistrate omits to order the accused to furnish security under this section at the time of passing the sentence, he cannot afterwards, upon receiving some further information (other than that which he derived from the previous trial) that the parties are likely to commit a breach of the peace, pass an order under this section—*Q. v. Powell*, 3 N.W.P. 96

An appellate Court can pass an order for security on confirmation of the sentence passed by the original Court. If the Appellate Court sets aside the sentence passed by the original Court, but passes no sentence itself, and makes an order for security, the order is illegal—*Crown v Nura*, 1901 P.R. 22; *Reg v Bhaskar*, 3 B.H.C.R. 1.

225. Order for security.—An order under this section can only be made in the presence of the accused. An order made at the instance of the prosecutor, behind the back of the accused, is bad in law—*Reg. v Bhaskar*, 3 B.H.C.R. 1.

The security ordered under this section must be for *keeping the peace*. An order for furnishing security for *good behaviour* under this section is bad in law—*Mahabir v. Emp.*, 16 A.L.J. 280, 19 Cr.L.J. 439.

The security must be *in addition to an award of punishment*; therefore a Magistrate cannot order security *in lieu of other punishment*—*Crown v Nura*, 1901 P.R. 22

Who can be bound down :—Only the accused person can be asked to give security. Under this section a Magistrate is not authorised to demand security from the complainant (in a case under sec. 323 I. P. C.) If he considers it necessary to demand security from the complainant, he must record a separate proceeding and give the complainant an opportunity to be heard under secs 117 and 118—*Crown v. Kallu*, 1902 P.R. 3. The Magistrate is not competent to take security from a witness for the defence on the ground that his evidence in the trial proved that he was one of the rioters—*Q v. Kadar Khan*, 5 Mad. 380.

'Proportionate to his means' :—The provision for taking security being a preventive measure intended to preserve future good conduct, it should not be made an instrument of punishment by demanding excessive security disproportionate to the means of the person and thus making him undergo further imprisonment—*Q E v Rama*, 16 Bom 372; *Emp v. Dedar*, 2 Cal. 384, *In re Juggut*, 2 Cal 110, *Emp v Kala Chand* 6 Cal 14; *Wasya v Emp.* 1901 P R 28, *Ali v Emp.* 1900 P.R. 17; *Ram Singh v. Emp.* 1883 P R 1, *Jayawa v Emp.* 1890 P R. 30 See Note 293 under sec 118

226. Cases when order should not be made :—An order for security should not be made when a sentence of transportation or imprisonment for a long time is passed—*Kyaw Wa v. K E.*, 8 L B R. 34, 10 Cr.L.J. 69, or when such an order would prevent the party bound down from exercising his lawful rights—*Nanda Kumar v. Emp.*, 11 C.W.N 1128 (1132). Thus, where upon the complainant trying to take possession of the land in the possession of the accused, the latter used more force than was necessary to prevent the complainant from taking possession, and the accused was punished for rioting, it was held that he should not be bound down under this section as such order would have the effect of preventing him from resisting any further attempt by the complainant to take possession of his land—*Nahar v. Emp.*, 11 C.W.N 840 (841), 6 Cr.L.J. 40. In *Bepin v. Pranakul*, 11 C.W.N 176 (177), it has been held that if it is necessary, in order to prevent a breach of the peace, to bind down the party entitled to possession, and if the effect of such order is to prevent him from taking possession of the property, it is desirable that the other party should also be bound down under sec. 107

227. Sub-section (3)—Power of Appellate Court to direct security :—The words "including a Court hearing appeals under sec. 407" recently added in this sub-section by the Amendment Act of 1923 have removed the conflict of opinion which existed between the several High Courts as to whether an Appellate Court could direct security where the original Court (e.g. a 2nd or 3rd class Magistrate) was not empowered to pass the order. "It has been held in some cases that an Appellate Court cannot pass an order under sub-section (3) unless the person convicted has been sentenced by a Court not inferior to that of a first class Magistrate. This result does not appear to have been intended,

and it is proposed to remove the restriction"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914).

Thus, it has been held by the Madras, Bombay, Allahabad and Patna High Courts, as well as in Oudh, C P and Burma, that an Appellate Court can pass an order under this section, although the original Court was not competent (being a 2nd or 3rd class Magistrate) to pass the order—*In re Solai Gounden*, 37 Mad. 153, 14 Cr L J 574 (over-ruling 29 Mad 190 and 30 Mad 48), *Doraisami v Emp.*, 30 Mad 182, *Dharam Das v. K. E.*, 33 All 48, 11 Cr.L.J. 480, *Emp v Bhansing* 33 Bom. 33, 10 Bom.L.R. 759; *Tilak Rao v Emp.*, 43 All 372, 22 Cr.L.J 310; *Bachan Singh v Emp.*, 2 P L J 21, 18 Cr L J 118, *Hasanbagh v Emp.*, 19 N.L.R. 154; *Lachmi Narain v. Emp.*, 23 O.C 380, 22 Cr.L.J 276, *Bharat Singh v Emp.*, 16 O C 281, 14 Cr L J 592 (overruling 10 O C. 287) The word 'also' in sub-section (3) plainly implies that the order may be independently made by an Appellate Court or by a Court of Revision in addition to those mentioned in sub-section (1), and it is not implied that the power of the original Court should in any way control or limit those of the Appellate or Revisional authority—*Emp v Bhansingh*, 33 Bom 33

The Calcutta and Punjab Courts, however, were of opinion that where the original Court was not competent to order security under this section the Appellate Court could not exercise such powers—*Emp. v. Momin Malita*, 35 Cal 434, 12 C.W.N. 752, *Karim Baksh v. Emp.*, 19 Cr L.J. 220 (Cal), *Eusafali v Emp.*, 24 Cr.L.J 208 (Cal); *Gopal Singh v K. E.*, 1908 P.R 21; *Radha Singh v K. E.*, 1907 P.R 6; *Lalkhan v. Crown*, 1918 P.R. 5; *Karam Singh v. Emp.*, 23 Cr.L.J 457 (Lsh.).

In view of the present Amendment, the above Calcutta and Punjab decisions are rendered obsolete

There is nothing in sub-section (3) to limit the time when the order can be made by the Appellate Court. That Court has power to order a bond, even after disposal of the appeal and confirmation of the sentence passed by the trial Court—*Hussein Gulam*, 30 Bom.L.R 373, 29 Cr L J 502 (503) An Appellate Court can require the accused to furnish security, even after the working out of the substantive punishment passed by the original Court, and such an order would not amount to an enhancement of punishment under sec 423 (1) (b)—*Miran v. K E.*, 1905 P R 21, *Maharaj Singh v. Emp.*, 20 Cr L J 760 (Nag)

An Appellate Court can cancel an order of security passed by the original Court, while upholding the sentence—*Abdul v Amiran*, 30 Cal 101 But if the conviction and sentence are cancelled by the Appellate Court, the order of security is also cancelled *ipso facto* under sub-section (2), and it is not competent to the Appellate Court to order the security to be continued—*Emp. v. Chajju Mal*, 1895 A W N 141

228. Revision.—This section gives a discretion to the Magistrate to pass an order for security, and the High Court is reluctant to interfere upon a mere question of discretion, unless the order is on the face of it such an improper exercise of discretion as to require interference—*Emp.*

v. *Dharam Raj*, 42 All. 345 (346), 18 A.L.J. 300, 21 Cr.L.J. 288 The High Court in revision set aside an order under sec. 106, where the findings did not sufficiently and clearly show that the acts for which the accused were convicted necessarily involved a breach of the peace—*Abdul Ali v. Emp.*, 43 Cal. 671, 20 C.W.N. 197, 17 Cr.L.J. 241.

B.—Security for keeping the Peace in other Cases and Security for Good Behaviour.

107. (1) Whenever a Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate, Sub-divisional Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class is informed that any person is likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity, or to do any wrongful act that may probably occasion a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity, the Magistrate, *if in his opinion there is sufficient ground for proceeding*, may, in manner hereinafter provided, require such person to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for keeping the peace for such period not exceeding one year as the Magistrate thinks fit to fix.

(2) Proceedings shall not be taken under this section unless either the person informed against or the place where the breach of the peace or disturbance is apprehended, is within the local limits of such Magistrate's jurisdiction, and no proceedings shall be taken before any Magistrate, other than a Chief Presidency or District Magistrate, unless both the person informed against and the place where the breach of the peace or disturbance is apprehended, are within the local limits of the Magistrate's jurisdiction.

(3) When any Magistrate not empowered to proceed under sub-section (1) has reason to believe that any person is likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity or to do any wrongful act that may probably occasion a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity, and that such breach of the peace or disturbance cannot be pre-

Security for keeping the peace in other cases.

Procedure of Magistrate not empowered to act under sub-section (1).

vented otherwise than by detaining such person in custody, such Magistrate may, after recording his reasons, issue a warrant for his arrest (if he is not already in custody or before the Court), and may send him before a Magistrate empowered to deal with the case, together with a copy of his reasons.

(4) A Magistrate before whom a person is sent under this section, may in his discretion detain such person in custody until the completion of the inquiry hereinafter prescribed.

(4) A Magistrate before whom a person is sent under sub-section (3) may in his discretion detain such person in custody pending further action by himself under this Chapter.

Change :—This section has been amended by sec 16 of the Cr. P. Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923)

The words "*if in his opinion there is sufficient ground for proceeding*" have been added during the debate in the Assembly adopting the phraseology of sec. 204, and the object of this amendment is to prevent the Magistrate from proceeding upon any and every information. The words "is informed" in this section are too wide and the amendment therefore makes it incumbent on Magistrates to be satisfied, by some sort of inquiry whether private or public, or by taking evidence whether in camera or in open Court, about the correctness and veracity of that information before they take any action. See the *Legislative Assembly Debates*, January 18, 1923, pp 1246-1254.

"We also recommend an amendment of section 107 (4), as we think that the powers conferred by the sub-section as it stands are unnecessarily wide. We think that it will be sufficient that the Magistrate should have power to detain the accused in custody 'pending further action by himself under this Chapter,' and we have made this change."—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*

229. Object of section :—The object of this section is the prevention and not the punishment of offences. It is intended, not to punish persons for anything that they have done in the past, but to prevent them from doing in the future something that may probably occasion a breach of the peace. Therefore where offences have been committed, the proper procedure is to institute regular trials for those offences, and not to take proceedings under this section—*Srikanta v Emp*, 9 C.W.N. 898; *Emp. v. Manu*, 25 Cr L J 1226

230. Information :—There should be reliable information as to the probability of a breach of the peace—*Malik Sultan v. Bano*, 1903 P.L.R. 115. The information must be of a clear and definite kind, directly affecting the person against whom process is issued, and should disclose tangible facts and details, so that it may afford notice to such

person of what he is to come forward to meet—*In re Jai Prakash*, 11 All. 26; *Prankrishna v. Emp.*, 8 C.W.N. 180; *Ainuddin v. Emp.*, 24 Cr.L.J. 230 (Cal) When a Magistrate received verbal communication from certain persons, it is proper that he should order the institution of some inquiry into the truth of the matter before he proceeds to take action thereupon. It is not open to a Magistrate to draw up proceedings under this section upon vague and general statements which do not amount to any direct accusation or allegation—*Grant v Emp.*, 2 P.L.T. 669, 22 Cr.L.J. 745; *Nitianund v Crown*, 3 Lah L.J. 480

The Oudh Chief Court, however holds that there is nothing in this section which specifies what the nature of the information should be. Undoubtedly a prudent Magistrate might not consider information sufficient to cause him to take action under the preventive sections, unless it gave sufficient details against the person in question; but there is nothing in this section laying down any quantum of information as a necessary condition for the Magistrate to take action. If a Magistrate empowered receives information of the barest kind to the effect that a certain person is a habitual thief, and is within the local limits of his jurisdiction, it is within his powers to take action under this chapter, and the legality of his action cannot be questioned—*Emp v. Ram Ghulam*, 2 Luck. 157, 28 Cr.L.J. 744

A Magistrate ought not to act under this section upon a statement by a private person not upon oath or solemn affirmation—*Reg v Jivanji*, 6 B.H.C.R. 1, *Chamaro v Kashi*, 8 W.R. 85; or upon hearsay evidence—*Mohan*, 21 Cr.L.J. 560 (Nag), or upon conversation out of Court with persons however respectable—*Emp. v Babua*, 6 All. 132, or upon personal knowledge of certain facts which he obtains from sources outside the record—*Mathura*, 14 A.L.J. 769, 17 Cr.L.J. 484

A police report is in itself a sufficient information on which a Magistrate may issue a summons, but it is in no sense evidence upon which he can determine under section 118 whether it is necessary to take a bond to keep the peace or for good behaviour—*Behari v Mahomed*, 12 W.R. 60, *In re Brindaban*, 10 W.R. 41. When it appears that any person is likely to commit a breach of the peace etc., it is the duty of the police to lay information before the Magistrate having jurisdiction. In laying such information the police should set out carefully the evidence on which they rely or the circumstances leading to the information—*C. P. Pol Man*, I, page 55

A statement of the complainant, in the absence of the persons charged, may be accepted by the Magistrate as credible information and may enable him to act upon it by issuing summons to show cause, but it is not competent for the Magistrate, on the appearance of the persons so charged, to act upon his previous information and to pass final order without taking further evidence—*Q. v. Naseerooddeen*, 2 N.W.P. 461; *Q. v. Kristendra*, 7 W.R. 30. Similarly, a report of a subordinate Magistrate is credible information to authorise a Magistrate to pass a preliminary order under this section—*Jai Prakash*, 6 All. 26 (F.B.); but if unsupported by other

evidence, it cannot form a sufficient ground for final adjudication under section 118—*Jivanji*, 6 B H C R 1, *Dalpatram*, 5 B H C R 105

But the Magistrate is not entitled to initiate proceedings upon facts and information which had already been the subject of inquiry under Sec. 107, or in connection with charges under the Penal Code brought against the same persons, and which had ended in favour of the accused. Thus, where there have been a number of cases and proceedings going on for a long time between the parties, and in all these cases the persons accused of the offences were either discharged or acquitted and the proceedings under section 107 fell through, the Magistrate cannot initiate fresh proceedings under sec 107 upon the same facts and information, when there are no fresh materials of any importance available in which fresh apprehension can arise of a breach of the peace. The same facts cannot form the subject of repeated proceedings either under the Penal Code or under the Cr P Code—*Konda Reddy v K E*, 41 Mad 246, 18 Cr L J 878

231. "Likely to commit breach of the peace":—The information must contain evidence of some specific conduct on the part of the accused from which a reasonable and immediate inference can be drawn that the accused is likely to commit a breach of the peace, and it is only on information of this character that the Magistrate should initiate proceedings under this section—*Run Bahadur v. Tilassee*, 22 W R 79; *Q v Har Kumari*, 24 W R. 10; *Huree Mohan v Kali Nath*, 25 W R 15; *Q. v Abdul Haq*, 20 W R. 57; *Emp., v Shimbhu*, 1888 P R 21. The mere finding that the accused is a bad character and that it is not right in any way to leave him without a guarantee is wholly insufficient to justify an order under this section—*Emp v Shimbhu*, 1888 P.R. 21. Where the evidence on the record disclosed reliable statements that persons who were ordered to furnish security to keep the peace were men who had shown by their acts and general behaviour that their object was to disturb the public tranquillity (e.g. by wounding the religious feelings of the Muhammadans of a certain locality) it was held that the Magistrate was justified in making such order—*Chunni Lal v Emp*, 14 A L J 430, 17 Cr L J 301

The information must shew that there is a strong and reasonable probability of a breach of the peace and not merely a bare possibility—*Q. v. Abdul Haq*, 20 W.R. 57; *Malik Sultan v Bano*, 1903 P L R 115; *Emp. v. Chanbasawa*, 6 Bom L R 862. The act likely to cause a breach of the peace must be an impending one and not one likely to happen at some future time; it must be shewn to be in contemplation at the time of the information given; and the fact that a person has done a wrongful act in the past should not give rise to the inference that he is likely to do the same again—*In re Shivaram*, 11 Bom L R 663, *In re Basdeo*, 26 All 190; *Q v Kedarnath*, 7 N W P 233. Thus, the mere fact that certain persons had made preparations for disturbing the public tranquillity on the occasion of the last Muharram festival would afford no ground, after the festival had passed without the public tranquillity having

been disturbed, for inferring that they would be likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity at the next *Muharram*, and would not be a sufficient ground for binding them over—*In re Basdeo*, 26 All 190; *Zulfakar v Emp.*, 8 P.L.T. 370, 28 Cr L.J. 719. But security should be taken in a case where, though the occasion on which the ill-feeling between the parties (Hindus and Mussalmans) first came to a head had passed without any actual disturbances, there still remained the probability of a recurrence of it in the near future, in fact at any moment—*Ayodhya Prasad v. K. E.*, 8 A.L.J. 1080, 12 Cr L.J. 493

232. "Wrongful acts that may occasion breach of the peace" :—A person is liable to be dealt with under sec. 107 not only when he himself is likely to commit a breach of the peace, but also where for any wrongful act on his part other persons may do things which would probably occasion a breach of the peace—*Satindra Nath Sen v. Emp.*, 32 C.W.N. 477, 29 Cr L.J. 844

There are two distinct sets of circumstances in which a Magistrate may take action under Sec. 107, *first*, where it appears that a person is likely himself to commit a breach of the peace or to disturb the public tranquillity, that is to say, by a direct act, *e.g.*, by committing an assault; and *secondly*, where a person may be the indirect cause of a breach of the peace or the disturbance of the public tranquillity by doing a certain act; but in the latter case the Magistrate may only take action where the acts anticipated is a *wrongful act*. This section does not authorise action against a person who is expected to do an act which may cause a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity unless that act is *wrongful*, and the mere fact that the doing of a lawful act by certain persons may lead to the commission of a breach of the peace by other persons does not authorise the Magistrate to take action against the persons intending to do the lawful act, unless they are themselves likely to commit a breach of the peace or to disturb the public tranquillity—*Nga Ti v. Maung Kyaw*, 11 Bur.L.T. 59, 18 Cr.L.J. 512; *Emp. v. Mahammad Yakub*, 32 All 571 (575), 7 A.L.J. 649.

Threats of violence are sufficient to indicate an intention to commit a breach of the peace and justify an order under this section—*Surya Kanta v. Emp.*, 31 Cal. 350, *Emp. v. Kallu*, 27 All. 92. Illegal collection of tolls accompanied with acts of violence and threats of violence in case of non-payment of tolls is a wrongful act likely to cause a breach of the peace—*Bepin Behari v. Emp.*, 21 Cr L.J. 651 (Cal.). An abetment by instigation of the offence of voluntarily causing hurt in a public place is a wrongful act justifying an order under this section—*Barnes v Emp.*, 23 Cr L.J. 394 (Nag.)

The words 'wrongful act' mean an act forbidden or declared to be penal or wrongful by the criminal law, and not a mere improper act. The killing of a dedicated bull for the sake of its meat is not a 'wrongful' act—*Pir Ali v Emp.*, 21 Cr.L.J. 453 (Pat.)

The following are not 'wrongful acts' under this section :—

(a) Singing of ballads in open streets, although leading to an obstruc-

tion in the street by crowds collecting to hear the same is not a wrongful act—*Ghulam Nabi v. Emp.*, 1889 P.R. 13;

(b) the grant of leases to tenants by the owner who is entitled to possession but is wrongfully kept out of possession, and the taking of possession by the lessee peacefully and without using violence, are not wrongful acts—*Driver v. Q. E.*, 25 Cal. 708.

(c) use of the word 'Amin' in a loud voice in prayers in a mosque—*Khuda Baksh v. Emp.*, 1902 P.R. 15, *Q. E. v. Kamran*, 7 All. 461; *Ataula v. Azimulla*, 12 All. 491, *Jangu v. Amanulla*, 13 All. 410, *Abdur Rahman v. Emp.*, 8 O.L.J. 282, 22 Cr.L.J. 590.

(d) stopping the services of village barber and washerman being rendered to the complainant—*Sk. Jinaut v. Sk. Rhusen*, 7 C.W.N. 32;

(e) the opening of a cattle market by persons on their own land not far from an already existing cattle market—*Mahu v. Emp.*, 10 A.L.J. 270, 19 Cr.L.J. 437.

(f) mere use of idle threats and bombast—*In re Chinnathambi*, II M.L.T. 271, 12 Cr.L.J. 104.

The Magistrate should have tangible evidence that some definite wrongful act is contemplated, which act if committed is likely to occasion a breach of the peace; therefore the fact that the accused had attempted to get up false cases and that he would probably continue to do so is not a ground of action under this section—*Emp. v. Badhawa*, 1887 P.R. 64. So also, merely being on bad terms with others (*Emp. v. Balajee*, 7 C.P. L.R. 9) or being a quarrelsome, head-strong and contumacious person (*Emp. v. Shimbhu*, 1888 P.R. 21) is neither a definite wrongful act, nor an act likely to cause a breach of the peace. So also, the mere fact that enmity exists between two parties does not entitle the Magistrate to bind down either party—*Sher Khan v. Emp.*, 12 Cr.L.J. 186, 1911 P.L.R. 126, *Narendra v. Emp.*, 1 A.L.J. 418, *Parman v. Crown*, 29 P.L.R. 434, 29 Cr.L.J. 417.

233. Acts which amount to an exercise of lawful rights are not to be treated as wrongful acts necessitating an order under this section—*Din Dayal v. Emp.*, 34 Cal. 935, *In re Kashichandra*, 19 W.R. 47, *Bepin v. Emp.*, 21 Cr.L.J. 651 (Cal). The preventive jurisdiction of a Magistrate under this section must be exercised with caution. Where its exercise may undoubtedly lead to the infringement of an undoubted civil right, where an obligation which the law of the country imposes becomes incapable of being enforced owing to the exercise of such a jurisdiction, and where the breach of the peace apprehended by the Magistrate is a likely result of the enforcement of his legal right by a party in a legal way and the illegal denial of the corresponding obligation by the other party, the Magistrate ought not to bind down the party who has the legal right in him—*Din Dayal v. Emp.*, 34 Cal. 935 (938); *Nga Ti v. Maung Kyaw*, 11 Bur. L.T. 59, 18 Cr.L.J. 512, *Thaker Singh v. Emp.*, 8 Lah. 98, 27 P.L.R. 599, 27 Cr.L.J. 1094.

Where the act which a person intends to commit is lawful in itself, there is no reason for demanding security from him, under sec. 107, even

though his act is likely to induce his opponents to commit a breach of the peace. In such a case, it would be more reasonable to take proceedings against those who are expected to commit the breach of the peace and offer violence to law-abiding citizens—*Khazan Chand v. Emp.*, 7 Lah. 482, 27 P.L.R. 810, 27 Cr.L.J. 1063. Thus, it is not unlawful for a *chamar* to draw water from a public well, and he cannot be called upon to give security simply because his act of drawing water from the well is objected to by certain persons and is likely to lead to a breach of the peace—*Khazan Chand v. Emp.*, (supra). The fact that a Muhammadan in the exercise of his legal right to kill cows may perhaps give offence to his Hindu neighbours and induce them to commit a breach of the peace is no ground for binding over the Muhammadan—*Emp. v. Muhammad Yakub*, 32 All 571, 11 Cr.L.J. 355. The right of protection of lawful possession is a lawful right which may properly be exercised not only to resist any unlawful attempt to interfere with the possession but also to defend oneself if it becomes necessary in the process. Where, therefore, the lawful possession of the accused had more than once been threatened by a show of armed force, and he had collected a body of men armed with *lathis* and posted them on the property to resist any violence or interference with his possession, it was held that as the intention was to maintain an existing right, the accused was justified in adopting measures for the defence of his possession, and that as there was no likelihood of a breach of the peace from his side, there was no reason either for punishing him or binding him over in security—*Janki Prasad v. Emp.*, 18 A.L.J. 157, 21 Cr.L.J. 337. Since a joint owner is entitled to improve the joint property, no security can be demanded from him on the ground that his persistence in improving the joint property is likely to lead to a breach of the peace, it being probable that such breach will be committed by his brothers—*Thaker Singh v. Emp.*, 8 Lah. 98, 27 P.L.R. 599, 27 Cr.L.J. 1094 (1095). Where a party has the right to take a procession along a particular road, he cannot be bound down under this section because other persons object to his doing so and he insists on taking the procession along that road. The proper course is to bind down the other persons—*Feroze Ali v. Emp.*, 12 C.W.N. 703. Where one of several co-sharer landlords sought to make a measurement of lands contrary to the provisions of Secs. 90 and 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the other co-sharer landlords would be justified in objecting to the survey, and where no force was used by them they ought not to be bound down to keep the peace—*Bhabataran v. Barkutesh*, 9 C.W.N. 618. Where a Zemindari village was in the possession of the Mokhassadar and the tenants had been paying rents to him, and the Zemindar came to the village with the express purpose of ousting him and incited the tenants not to pay rents to the Mokhassadar, whereupon the Mokhassadar protested and asked the Zemindar in a threatening manner to leave the village, it was held that in as much as the Zemindar was acting illegally, the Mokhassadar protesting against such illegal act was acting within his rights and could not be bound down under this section—*Chandrasekhara v. Emp.*, 14 M.L.J. 491. Where a Magistrate found that persons who attempted to

do *bastu puja* on a waste land were not entitled to perform it, it was held that if the persons opposing it acted properly and within their rights, there was no reason to suppose that any breach of the peace was likely to be committed—*Bijoy Singha v. Emp.*, 3 C.W.N. 463. Where there was already a cattle-market and certain persons intended to open another cattle-market on their own land, not far from the old market, and the Magistrate apprehending that there would be a breach of the peace consequent thereon bound over those persons to keep the peace, the order of the Magistrate was illegal—*Mahu v. Emp.*, 16 A.L.J. 279, 19 Cr.L.J. 437.

But where there are doubts as to the existence of the respective rights and obligations of the parties (*i.e.* as to who is acting legally in the exercise of his rights and who is not) the proper procedure is to bind down both parties (until their rights and obligations have been determined by a proper tribunal), so that the order of the Magistrate may not be detrimental to either—*Dindayal v. Emp.*, 34 Cal. 935 (938); *Ghasi Ram v. Emp.*, 20 Cr.L.J. 194 (Pat.); *Musaheb Soudagar v. Nidhi Ram*, 8 P.L.T. 645, 28 Cr.L.J. 605. Where, however, no doubt exists, the party in the wrong should be bound down and prevented from illegally exercising an alleged claim. An attempt to ascertain legal rights of parties should always be made by the Magistrate before he binds down one or the other party under this section—*Din Dayal v. Emp.*, 34 Cal. 935 (938).

234. Disputes relating to immoveable property :—Proceedings under this section are only intended for the security of the public peace and not for the purpose of enabling one of two contending parties to help themselves in obtaining or retaining possession of immoveable property and having their adversaries' hands tied down by an order under this section. The proper procedure in such cases is to take proceedings under sec. 145—*Driver v. Q. E.*, 25 Cal. 798. Where the apprehension of a breach of the peace arises out of a dispute regarding possession of immoveable property, the Magistrate can undoubtedly proceed under Sec. 145; but this fact will not preclude the Magistrate from taking proceedings under this section. In such cases the Magistrate is not bound to act only under Secs. 144 and 145, but has a discretion to proceed either under those sections or under section 107—*Sheo Raj v. Chatter*, 32 Cal. 966; *In re Muthia*, 36 Mad. 315, *Thakur Panday v. K. E.*, 34 All. 449; *Emp. v. Abbas*, 39 Cal. 150, 16 C.W.N. 83 (F.B.); *Dhuma v. Emp.*, 23 Cr.L.J. 567 (Nag.); *K. E. v. Basiruddin*, 7 C.W.N. 746; *Amulya v. Amrita Lal*, 24 C.W.N. 1075, 22 Cr.L.J. 224; *Abbas Sayeed*, 23 Cr.L.J. 123 (Cal.); *Ramacharia*, 26 Mad. 471, *Sindama v. Zemindar*, 2 Weir 50; *Balmukand*, 1 S.L.R. 50, 8 Cr.L.J. 170.

Where parties are clearly in the wrong, they can be bound down under Section 107 to prevent a breach of the peace; or a party threatening to usurp the rights of another can be restrained by a temporary order under Section 144; but where the dispute relates to lands and there is an apprehension of a breach of the peace as both the contending parties urge their claim to possession, the proceedings should be under Section 145—*Gaurinath v. Gobind Singh*, 1 P.L.T. 44, 20 Cr.L.J. 829.

Sections 107, 144 and 145 all give summary jurisdiction to Magistrates to take action in order to prevent a breach of the peace when such a breach is imminent. There is a very thin line of demarcation between these sections. When there is a *bona fide* dispute as to the right of possession between two rival parties, the proper procedure is to take action under S. 145 and not under S. 107, because the former section (145) is not only effective to prevent a breach of the peace but also is the one which causes the least prejudice to the contending parties—*Himmat v Emp*, 19 Cr.L.J. 712 (Pat), *Balaqt v. Bhoju*, 35 Cal 117, *Mahadeo v Bishu*, 25 All 537, *Baishnab Das v Emp*, 12 C.W.N. 606; *Emp. v. Debendra*, 1 C.L.J. 632; *Kali Pershad v. Dhodhar*, 22 Cr.L.J. 574 (Pat), *Abdus Sayeed v Emp*, 23 Cr.L.J. 123 (Cal); whereas the effect of an order under this section would be to bind down only one of the parties, leaving the other party free, without any adjudication of the question as to which of the parties is in possession—*Dolegobind v. Dahnu*, 25 Cal. 559; *Bidhubhusan v Annoda*, 6 C.W.N. 883, *Baishnab Das v. Emp.*, 12 C.W.N. 606, *Driver v Q. E.*, 25 Cal. 798; *Shama Churn v Emp.*, 6 P.L.T. 766, 26 Cr.L.J. 1562. It should be noted that while section 107 leaves it to the Magistrate to demand security or not in the exercise of his discretion, section 145 makes it obligatory upon him to institute proceedings if he is satisfied as to the existence of a dispute relating to immoveable property—*Balaqt v Bhoju*, 35 Cal. 117. Proceedings under section 107 are intended only for the security of the public peace and not for the purpose of enabling one of the two contending parties to help himself in recovering possession of immoveable property after having his adversary's hands tied down by an order under this section. In such a case the necessary action must be taken under Section 145 of the Code—*Jalal v Crown*, 1917 P.L.R. 144, 19 Cr.L.J. 446. Even if the Magistrate proceeds at all under section 107, the proper order is to bind down both the parties—*Baishnab Das v Emp*, 12 C.W.N. 606; *Amanat Ali v. Emp*, 10 P.L.T. 639, 30 Cr.L.J. 492.

But if the dispute is not *bona fide*, i.e. if one party is clearly in possession of property and another party wrongfully and without any claim to possession seeks to eject him by force from the possession of the land and a breach of the peace is imminent, there cannot be said to be a *bona fide* dispute about possession within the meaning of Sec. 145, and the Magistrate is justified in taking action under section 107—*Emp. v. Rambaran*, 28 All. 406; *Lachmi v. Emp*, 1 P.L.T. 681, 22 Cr.L.J. 86; *Shama Churn v. Emp*, 6 P.L.T. 766, 26 Cr.L.J. 1562. If one of the parties threatens to use violence to the other party if the latter should go upon the land of which the latter is in possession, an order under section 107 binding down the former would be proper—*Jafar v. Jaribulla*, 9 C.W.N. 551. It is probable that the parties to a land-dispute will break the King's peace before the decision of the Civil Court can be given, that danger can be guarded against by an order under sec. 107 in an appropriate case—*In re Mallappa*, 28 Bom. L.R. 488, 27 Cr.L.J. 734 (735).

Where the dispute between the parties is not one concerning land and does not involve any question of actual possession but concerns the

rights of the respective parties to carry on boring operations for coal over a specified area, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to enter into the intricate questions of title and possession which arise between the parties. If in such a case there is any likelihood of a breach of the peace, proceedings which are simpler in nature and which summarily and expediently dispose of the matter should be adopted. That is, proceedings under sec. 107 would be more appropriate in such a case than proceedings under sec. 145—*Indian Iron and Steel Co. v. Bansa Gopal*, 32 C.L.J. 54, 22 Cr.L.J. 99.

An order under sec. 107 is no bar to a subsequent proceeding under Chapter XII—*Baisnab v. Gatinath*, 39 Cal 469, 16 C.W.N. 384; *Ram Lochun v. K. E.*, 36 All 143, 12 A.L.J. 162; *Nasiruddin v. Gofuruddin*, 21 C.W.N. 160. Similarly an order under Sec. 145 is no bar to the passing of an order under Sec. 107, on the same facts, if the Magistrate is satisfied that notwithstanding the order under Sec. 145, one of the parties is likely to take the law into his own hands—*In re Muthia*, 36 Mad 315; *K. E. v. Bandi*, 24 O.C. 21, 22 Cr L.J. 384.

But it is illegal to institute proceedings under one section and to pass an order under another. Thus, where the Magistrate instituted proceedings under Sec. 145, and apprehending a disturbance of the peace, ordered a party to furnish security under Sec. 107, it was held that the order was illegal and without jurisdiction—*Emp v. Sat Deo*, 14 A.L.J. 794, 17 Cr L.J. 527. Similarly, where a Magistrate proceeded under section 107 and concluded the proceedings thereunder but subsequently passed an order under Section 145, held that the order of the Magistrate was *ultra vires*, as he failed to take written statements from the parties and receive evidence under the latter section—*Sahdeb v. Jumon*, 19 Cr L.J. 320 (Pat.).

If, owing to a dispute relating to immoveable property, proceedings are taken under sec. 107, instead of under sec. 145, the Magistrate cannot pass an order of *attachment of property* (which order can be passed only under sec. 146)—*Ram Sarup*, A.I.R. 1924 Oudh 345, 25 Cr L.J. 350.

235. Who can be bound down:—Only the person who is himself likely to cause a breach of the peace (and no other) can be bound down under this section; it is illegal and contrary to the provisions of this section to take recognisance from one person in order to prevent another from committing a breach of the peace—*Ram Coomar v. Rajagopal*, 17 W.R. 54, *Kashi Chandra v. Hur Kishore*, 19 W.R. 47. Thus, the mere fact that a dispute exists between two rival Zemindars would not justify proceedings being taken against all their officers and servants, unless there are materials to show that they are all likely to commit a breach of the peace. It may be that they are all interested in the dispute between their masters—and in one sense all the members of the Zemindar's family are interested in a dispute relating to a property comprised in the Zemindary—but that by itself would be no ground for taking proceedings against them all—*Ainuddin v. Emp.* 24 Cr.L.J. 230 (Cal). Where there were old standing feuds between the parties, but the Magistrate finding no

evidence against them, discharged them but bound down their servants, held that the order was illegal and without jurisdiction—*Din Dayal v. Emp.*, 23 A.L.J. 300, 26 Cr.L.J. 981.

A non-resident Zemindar cannot be bound over to keep the peace merely because his local agents are committing acts likely to cause a breach of the peace—*In re Charoo Chundra*, 10 C.L.R. 430. The mere fact that the patwari threatened to use violence does not justify the Magistrate in starting proceedings against the proprietor and manager on the presumption that the latter must have acquiesced in the action of the patwari—*Grant v. Emp.*, 2 P.L.T. 669, 22 Cr.L.J. 745. But the master would be liable if he actually acquiesced in the servant's acts. Thus, where the master, a *panda* of Gaya, used to send his servant, always armed with a lathi, to the Railway station for procuring pilgrims, and this led to a contest with a rival *panda* resulting in disturbance of the public peace, it was held that this was sufficient to make the master liable under this section. The fact that the master himself did not go to the Railway station but always remained in his house was no bar to the application of this section—*Batalal v. K. E.*, 1 P.L.J. 361, 18 Cr.L.J. 374.

So also, where it was found that the petitioner was not himself likely to commit a breach of the peace, he should not be ordered under this section merely because his act of attaching the crops of his raiyats would lead to a riot, resulting from the resistance of the cultivators to the attachment—*In re Sheo Surn*, 3 C.L.R. 280.

Joint trial of several persons:—See Note 290 under sec. 117.

236. Evidence—A Magistrate dealing with proceedings under this section must base his judgment upon evidence relevant to the case. He should not rely upon his knowledge of certain facts which he obtains from sources outside the record—*Mathura v. Emp.*, 14 A.L.J. 769, 17 Cr.L.J. 484. Where the order is passed against more persons than one, there must be definite evidence in the case of any and every person that there is a danger of a breach of the peace by him. The mere fact that a collective body of persons are indulging in feelings of hostility against another body of persons is insufficient—*Shambhu v. Emp.*, 38 All. 468, 14 A.L.J. 656, 17 Cr.L.J. 400.

Consent of accused to be bound down—The fact of likelihood of a breach of the peace must be established by independent evidence. In the absence of evidence to prove that the accused was likely to commit a breach of the peace, the accused's own statement before the Magistrate that he is willing to give security would not justify an order being passed under this section—*Jagdat v. Emp.*, 11 Cr.L.J. 176 (All); *Crown v. Sheodan*, 1915 P.R. 24, 16 Cr.L.J. 784; *Prem Singh v. Crown*, 1917 P.R. 27, 18 Cr.L.J. 847; *Ujagar v. Emp.*, 10 Lah. 155, 30 Cr.L.J. 839; *Joti v. Emp.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 710 (Lah.), 20 Cr.L.J. 105; *Prabhudas v. Emp.*, 21 Cr.L.J. 656 (Nag.); *Karam v. Emp.*, 23 Cr.L.J. 175 (Lah.); *Ram Chandra v. Emp.*, 35 Cal. 674; *Chandra Sekhar v. Emp.*, 21 Cr.L.J. 59 (All). In recent Allahabad cases it has been held (dissenting from the above rulings) that where the persons called upon to furnish security

appeared in Court and expressed their willingness to be bound over, whereupon the trial Court took no evidence and passed an order against them, the consent of the accused must be taken to be a plea of guilty and the order for security was rightly passed—*Ghariba v. K. E.*, 46 All. 109, 21 A.L.J. 882, 25 Cr.L.J. 750; *Nasir Ahmad v. Emp.*, 50 All. 120, 25 A.L.J. 819, 28 Cr.L.J. 609; *Emp. v. Kishan Narain*, 50 All. 599, 30 Cr.L.J. □ (9).

Reference to Sub-Magistrate or to Police:—The power of taking action under sec. 107 is a discretionary power, and there is nothing irregular in a Magistrate calling for a report from a subordinate Magistrate before issuing notice under sec. 112, especially if he doubts whether the information before him is reliable—*Egambara v. Murugappa*, 2 Weir 51. It is open to a Magistrate to refer a petition under sec. 107 to a police-officer for investigation—*Sanjiv v. Koneri*, 49 Mad. 315, 50 M.L.J. 460, A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 521.

237. Subsection (2)—Local jurisdiction.—In order to give the Magistrate jurisdiction over a person, it is not necessary that such person should permanently or habitually live within his jurisdiction. It is sufficient if at the time when the Magistrate receives information and takes proceedings under this section, the person temporarily resides within his jurisdiction—*Shama Churn v. Katu Mandal*, 24 Cal. 344, *Ullah Khan v. Emp.*, 22 Cr.L.J. 109 (All.). The terms of this sub-section do not authorise a Magistrate to bind over a person residing outside the limits of his district, concerning whom he has received information that such person is likely to commit a breach of the peace within his district—*In re Jai-prakash*, 6 All. 26 (F.B.); *In re Abdul Aziz*, 14 All. 49, *In re Rajendra*, 11 Cal. 737; *Dinonath v. Giriya*, 12 Cal. 133, *In re Krishnaji*, 23 Bom. 32. The proper course in such a case is to cause information to be given to the Magistrate within whose district that person resides, in order that proceedings might be taken by that Magistrate—*In re Rajendra*, 11 Cal. 737.

If, however, a Magistrate proceeds under this section against a person not residing within the local limits of his jurisdiction, and no objection is taken in the trial Court to his jurisdiction and no prejudice is caused, the irregularity is cured by sec. 531—*Ram Deo v. Emp.*, 27 Cr.L.J. 1132 (All.).

Special powers of Chief Presidency and District Magistrates.—Sub-section (2) gives special powers to Chief Presidency and District Magistrates to proceed against persons outside jurisdiction. Therefore, where a District Magistrate is satisfied that a breach of the peace is apprehended within the local limits of his district, the fact that the accused is living outside such limits in a Native State does not take away his jurisdiction to pass an order under this section—*Sheo Baran v. Emp.*, 20 A.L.J. 523, 23 Cr.L.J. 396. But the District Magistrate cannot delegate this special power to a subordinate Magistrate. Thus a Sub-divisional Magistrate cannot, on the direction of a District Magistrate, draw up proceedings under this section against a person residing in another jurisdiction, in such

a case the proceedings must take place and be brought to a conclusion before the District Magistrate himself—*Nirbeekar v. Emp.*, 13 C.W.N. 580. A District Magistrate is not competent to make over the initiation of proceedings under this section to a first class Magistrate who has no local jurisdiction over the matter—*Konda Reddy v. K. E.*, 41 Mad. 246. But after proceedings have been initiated by a District Magistrate against persons residing outside jurisdiction, he can transfer the proceedings to a subordinate Magistrate otherwise competent to deal with the matter. This section only restricts the initiation of the proceedings against persons living outside the jurisdiction of the District Magistrate, but does not prevent him from transferring such proceedings, after initiation, to a subordinate Magistrate, though such Magistrate had no local jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings—*Surja Kanta v. Emp.*, 31 Cal. 350; *K. E. v. Munna*, 24 All 151, *Rakhal Mandal*, 27 C.L.J. 314. But the District Magistrate cannot make over the case to a Magistrate incompetent to try the case, *g* a 2nd class Magistrate—*Gobind*, 37 All 20, 12 A.L.J. 1136.

238. Sub-section (3).—‘*Has reason to believe*’ :—The use of this expression, as compared with ‘*is informed*’ in sub-section (1), shows that the Magistrate’s discretion under this sub-section is very limited. The Magistrate should act when he has reason to believe, *i.e.*, when he has reasonable grounds to believe and not merely to suspect. See *Emp. v. Rango*, 6 Bom. 402.

239. Sub-section (4).—*Power to detain in custody* :—Only in the special circumstances referred to in clauses (3) and (4) does the law empower the Magistrate to detain a person against whom proceedings have been instituted under this section—*Raghunandan v. Emp.*, 32 Cal. 80. Therefore, where an accused was not sent before a District Magistrate by another Magistrate acting under clause (3) so as to bring the case under clause (4), such District Magistrate’s order detaining the accused in custody was illegal—*Chidambara v. Emp.*, 31 Mad 315 (F B).

240. Bail —Even when the person has been arrested under clause (3), unless there are special circumstances, he should be admitted to bail. When a Magistrate on the report of the D. S. P. directed the re-arrest of persons (whom he had previously admitted to bail on their appearance) and remanded them to custody, it was held that the re-arrest and remand were illegal, as none of the special circumstances mentioned in clause (3) existed in the case, and the Magistrate was bound under sec. 496 to release them on bail—*Raghunandan v. Emp.*, 32 Cal 80. But the Madras High Court holds that the Magistrate may in his discretion detain such persons in custody, according to the clear words of sub-section (4); these words cannot be qualified by sec. 496; that section does not give an absolute right of bail but must be read along with any other provision giving to the Court a special power of detention, and sub-section (4) of this section gives such power—*Narayanaswami v. Emp.*, 36 Mad. 474.

Further inquiry :—See notes under sec. 119.

240A. Revision :—See note 294 under sec. 118.

An order of a Magistrate *refusing* to take action under sec. 107 cannot be set aside by the superior Court in revision. The object of this section is rather administrative than judicial. If the Magistrate who is responsible for the administration of a subdivision is not satisfied that there is any need to take proceedings under this chapter, a superior judicial tribunal cannot interfere with the exercise of his discretion—*Ram Lal v. Bankateshar*, 28 O.C. 44, 1 O.W.N. 359, 25 Cr.L.J. 1149; *Phani Bhusan v. Kunja*, 25 Cr.L.J. 679, A I R. 1925 Cal. 262.

Persons who come to the High Court in revision against an order under sec. 107 should do so with the utmost promptitude, and at any rate within 30 days of the order against which they complain—*Ram Deo v. Emp.*, 27 Cr.L.J. 1132 (All.).

241. Nature of proceedings under this chapter.—There is no unanimity of opinion among the various Courts as to whether proceedings under this Chapter are of a criminal nature, or as to whether the persons proceeded against under this Chapter are 'accused' persons. In *Wajid Ali v. K. E.*, 41 Cal. 719, *In re Ramasami*, 27 Mad 510, *Desikachari v. Emp.*, 39 Mad. 539, *Lalit Mohan v. Suryakanta*, 28 Cal. 709, *Mathura Prasad v. Q. E.*, 3 O.C. 247, and *Md. Niaz v. Jai Ram*, 41 All. 503 it is held that proceedings under this chapter are of a criminal nature, therefore, a person who brings a proceeding under sec. 107 from malicious motives is liable to an action for malicious prosecution if the proceeding terminates in favour of the person against whom the allegation is made—*Md. Niaz Khan v. Jai Ram*, 41 All. 503; *Chiranji v. Dharam Singh*, 43 All. 402, whereas in *Ahmed v. K. E.*, 1914 P.R. 5, 15 Cr.L.J. 363, and *Rehmani v. Crown*, 1916 P.L.R. 78, it has been held that proceedings under sec. 110 are not criminal proceedings, and 'the Chief Court has no power to direct the transfer of such proceedings under sec. 526 from one Magistrate's Court to another'; (But the word 'criminal' has now been omitted from sec. 526)

In the following cases it has been held that persons proceeded against under this chapter are in the position of 'accused' persons—*Hopcroft v. Emp.*, 36 Cal 163, *Q. E. v. Mutsaddi*, 21 All 107; *Gokha Singh v. Chetu*, 1905 P.R. 33; *Crown v. Ida*, 1900 P.R. 15, *Nakhi Lal v. Q. E.*, 27 Cal 656, *Jhosh Singh v. Q. E.*, 23 Cal 493, *Q. E. v. Mona Puna*, 16 Bom 661; *Venkatachinnaya*, 43 Mad 511 (F.B.), and further inquiry can be ordered in case of such persons under sec. 437 (now 436)—*Q. E. v. Mutsaddi*, 21 All 107; *K. E. v. Fyazuddin*, 24 All 148, *Gokha v. Chetu*, 1905 P.R. 33 (But see sec. 436 as now amended in 1923)

But in *K. E. v. Rameshwar*, 36 All 262, *Emp. v. Basya*, 5 Bom L.R. 27, *Raghunandan v. Emp.*, 32 Cal. 80, it has been held that such persons are not accused persons within the meaning of sec. 167, nor are they accused persons within the meaning of sec. 437 (now 436)—*Md. Khan v. Emp.*, 1905 P.R. 42, *Q. E. v. Iman Mandal*, 27 Cal 662; *Dayanath v. Emp.*, 33 Cal. 8; *Velu v. Chidambara*, 33 Mad 85, *Narain v. Durga*, 1911 P.R. 6. An application to take proceedings under this chapter is not an accusation of an offence—*Md. Khan v. Emp.*, 1905 P.R. 42, 2

Cr.L.J. 697; *Natha Singh v. Pala Singh*, 1896 P.R. 4; and therefore compensation cannot be awarded under sec. 250 to the person against whom proceedings under this chapter have been dropped, such proceedings not being proceedings in a case in which a person is 'accused of an offence'—*In re Govind*, 25 Bom. 48; *Hazari v. Meman Mal*, 1893 P.R. 16; *Crown v. Kaura*, 1902 P.R. 33; *Q. E. v. Lakhpat*, 15 All. 365; *Mannu Khan v. Chand*, 20 A.L.J. 624, 23 Cr.L.J. 474; *Ram Badan v. Janki*, 45 All. 363, 21 A.L.J. 207, 24 Cr.L.J. 228; *Ram Sukh v. Mahadeo*, 7 A.L.J. 743; *Bindachal v. Lal Behari*, 36 All. 382; *Natha Singh v. Pala Singh*, 1896 P.R. 4, *Jay Singh v. Kanhya*, 1884 P.R. 37. A person called upon to give security is not an accused within the meaning of sec. 342 nor is he guilty of any offence, therefore omission to examine him under that section is not an illegality—*Benode Behari v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 985.

There are certain indications to show that it is not the intention of the Legislature to treat the persons proceeded against under this chapter as accused persons or as persons guilty of an offence:—First, the Legislature has studiously avoided the use of the word 'accused' in sections 107-126, and has deliberately used such expressions as "the person," "such person," "the person informed against" (see 107), "the person called upon to show cause" (sec. 116) etc.; whereas in the chapters relating to inquiries and trials (chapters XVIII, XX—XXIII) the word "accused" has been used throughout. And during the debate in the Assembly, the Law Member stated that the word 'accused' was really a misnomer in security cases (*Leg. Ass. Debates*, 18-1-23, p. 1253). Secondly, in the similar case of a proceeding under chapter XXXVI, the word 'accused' has now been replaced by the words 'any person'. This is significant. Thirdly, in Sec. 340, the words "against whom proceedings are instituted under this Code" have now been added in order to make it clear that the words "a person accused of an offence" occurring in that section do not include a person proceeded against under Chapter VIII. Fourthly, in section 436 the words 'person accused of an offence' have been substituted for the words 'accused person'; this shows that the person proceeded against under the present chapter is not a person accused of an offence, and that sec. 436 does not apply to such person.

108. Whenever a Chief Presidency or District Magistrate, or a Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class specially empowered by the Local Government in this behalf, has information that there is within the limits of his jurisdiction any person who, within or without such limits, either orally or in writing or in any other manner, intentionally disseminates or attempts to disseminate, or in anywise abets the dissemination of,—

Security for good behaviour from persons disseminating seditious matter.

Magistrate, or a Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class specially empowered by the Local Government in this behalf, has information that there is within the limits of his jurisdiction any person who, within or without such limits, either orally or in writing or in any other manner, intentionally disseminates or attempts to disseminate, or in anywise abets the dissemination of,—

any person who, within or without such limits, either orally or in writing or in any other manner, intentionally disseminates or attempts to disseminate, or in anywise abets the dissemination of,—

- (a) any seditious matter, that is to say, any matter the publication of which is punishable under section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, or
- (b) any matter the publication of which is punishable under section 153A of the Indian Penal Code, or
- (c) any matter concerning a Judge which amounts to criminal intimidation or defamation under the Indian Penal Code,

such Magistrate, *if in his opinion there is sufficient ground for proceeding*, may (in manner hereinafter provided) require such person to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for his good behaviour for such period, not exceeding one year, as the Magistrate thinks fit to fix.

No proceedings shall be taken under this section against the editor, proprietor, printer or publisher of any publication registered under, *and edited, printed and published* in conformity with, the rules laid down in the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 [XXV of 1867] *with reference to any matter contained in such publication*, except by the order or under the authority of the Governor-General in Council or the Local Government or some officer empowered by the Governor-General in Council in this behalf.

Change :—The italicised words have been added by sec. 17 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923).

'Or in any other manner' —“This amendment is to provide for the contingency where the matters covered by section 108 have been disseminated by other means than either orally or in writing, e.g., by gramophone records”—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914).

'Intentionally' :—This word has been added during the debate in the Assembly on the motion of Mr Rangachariar “so that innocent agents may not be proceeded against; for instance, boys who handle newspapers without knowing the contents and such other persons who are merely ignorant tools in the hands of other persons should not be proceeded against”—*Legislative Assembly Debates*, January 18, 1923, page 1279

"If proceeding" —For reason of the addition of these see notes to sec. 107, under heading “Change”

'And edited':—"In view of the recent amendments made in the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, regulating the editing of newspapers, we have made a consequential amendment here. We also think that the protection given by the last clause of section 108 should only extend to newspapers which are edited, printed and published in conformity with that Act"—*Report of the Joint Committee* (1922).

"With reference . . . publication":—"This amendment is merely designed to make the intention of the Legislature clearer as regards the proceedings which require sanction prior to their institution"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914)

242. Essentials of the section :—In a proceeding under this section it must be shown that the accused was connected with the dissemination of the seditious matter. Thus, the mere writing of a seditious matter is not a sufficient ground for proceeding against the author under this section unless it is shown that he was connected with the publication or the subsequent dissemination thereof. So also, in the case of a printer, although it must be assumed that by printing the seditious matter he abets the dissemination thereof, still in order to make him liable under this section it must be shown that he had a knowledge of the contents of the matter printed, especially in case of a big press which is managed by an independent staff such as manager, clerks and others, where it is not possible for the owner of the press to scrutinize personally every detail of the concern. As regards the publisher, he is liable under this section because as publisher he must be presumed to have knowledge of the contents of the matter and he therefore 'disseminated' or at least 'abetted the dissemination of' the matter within the meaning of this section—*Emp. v. Pate*, 47 Bom. 438, 25 Bom. L.R. 97, 25 Cr.L.J. 150.

It is illegal to initiate proceedings under this section against a person where all that is proved against him is the commission of only one particular offence under sec. 153A, I. P. Code at one particular time, and there is no evidence of his having done so before or of his having an intention of doing so in the immediate future—*Chiranj Lal*, 50 All. 854, 30 Cr.L.J. 216 (217).

Proceedings under this section are unjustifiable, where the object of such proceedings is to avoid the trouble and possible refusal of Government to prosecute under sec. 153A, I. P. Code—*Chiranj Lal*, *supra*.

243. Seditious matter .—The test under this section is whether the person proceeded against has been disseminating seditious matter, and whether there is a fear of the repetition of such offence. In every case it is a question of fact which will have to be determined with reference to the antecedents of the person and other surrounding circumstances—*Emp. v. Vaman*, 11 Bom. L.R. 743, 10 Cr.L.J. 379. The preaching of *swaraj*, which means nothing more than Home-rule under the present Government by constitutional means, does not amount to dissemination of seditious matter and does not therefore justify an order under this section—*Veni Bhushan v. Emp.*, 34 Cal. 991; *Emp. v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak*, 19 Bom. L.R. 211, 18 Cr.L.J. 567. It is essential under clause (a) of

this section that the matter disseminated must be *seditious*—19 Bom. L R. 211.

244. Promoting enmity between classes :—To sustain an order under sec. 108, it is not sufficient that the language used was highly offensive to one community; it must also be shown that the accused intended to provoke feelings of hatred or enmity between communities. But it is not necessary that he should have succeeded in provoking such feelings, if deliberate intention to do so can be inferred—*Dharmaloka v. Emp.*, 4 Bur.L.T. 84 In *Sital Prosad v. Emperor*, 43 Cal. 591, 20 C.W N. 199, on the other hand, it has been held that to justify an order under sec. 108, one has only got to find that the words used in the leaflet or the matters complained of are likely to promote feelings of hatred or enmity, and there is no necessity under this section of finding *intention*, such as would be necessary if the person were placed on his trial under sec. 153A, I P. C. This decision seems to be no longer correct because the word "intentionally" has been newly added. See *P K Chakravarty v. Emp.*, 54 Cal 59, 30 C W N 953, 27 Cr L J 1154 ('Forward' Case)

109. Whenever a Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate, Sub-divisional Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class receives information—

Security for good behaviour from vagrants and suspected persons.

- (a) that any person is taking precautions to conceal his presence within the local limits of such Magistrate's jurisdiction, and that there is reason to believe that such person is taking such precautions with a view to committing any offence, or
- (b) that there is within such limits a person who has no ostensible means of subsistence, or who cannot give a satisfactory account of himself,

such Magistrate may, in manner hereinafter provided, require such person to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond, with sureties, for his good behaviour for such period, not exceeding one year, as the Magistrate thinks fit to fix

245. Scope and object —This section provides for taking security, not from persons suspected of a *particular offence*, but from persons lurking within the Magistrate's jurisdiction, who have no ostensible means of subsistence, or cannot give a satisfactory account of themselves—*Reg. v. Bhuja, Ratanlal* 63

This section aims at summarily disposing of cases of vagabondism, where sturdy rogues are found to be lurking about—1 O S C. No. 73.

Magistrates are empowered to put in force the provisions of this section whenever they have credible information that the accused has no ostensible means of livelihood or is unable to give a satisfactory account of himself, and is within the local limits of his jurisdiction—*Emp. v. Madho Dhobi*, 31 Cal. 557; *Mahadeo v. K. E.*, 6 A.L.J. 253. Honorary Magistrates can act under this section—*Emp. v. Madho Dhobi*, 31 Cal. 557.

246. Within the Magistrate's jurisdiction :—It is not necessary that the accused person should have a residence within the local limits of the Magistrate's jurisdiction—*In re Narsimhappa*, 2 Weir 53.

The expression "within the local limits of the Magistrate's jurisdiction" is an adverbial clause modifying the word "conceal" and not an adjectival clause qualifying the noun "presence", and on a correct interpretation of the section, if a man is taking precautions anywhere in order to conceal his presence, and that concealing is to be effected within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, the Magistrate has power to demand security even though the residence of the person within the jurisdiction is well known—*Emp. v. Phuchai*, 50 All. 909 (F.B.), 30 Cr.L.J. 145, 26 A.L.J. 1257, overruling *Emp. v. Bhairon*, 49 All. 240, 25 A.L.J. 94, 27 Cr.L.J. 1116. In the latter case it was held that the passage 'within the local limits of the Magistrate's jurisdiction' in clause (a) is part of the predicate "to conceal" his presence and the offence contemplated is that of a person probably, although not necessarily, coming from outside the jurisdiction into the Magistrate's jurisdiction for some nefarious purpose and taking precautions to conceal the fact that he is present in that jurisdiction, and that Clause (a) is not intended to apply to a habitual resident or a person well known in the neighbourhood, trying to conceal himself. This case has been followed in *Emp. v. Himayatullah*, 49 All. 844, 25 A.L.J. 679, 28 Cr.L.J. 567 (568), which also must be treated as overruled by the above Full Bench decision.

The fact that the accused was arrested from a place outside the Magistrate's jurisdiction and that the arrest was illegal would not oust the Magistrate's jurisdiction to proceed under this section—*Madho Dhobi*, 31 Cal. 557 (following *Emp. v. Ravalu*, 26 Mad 124).

When a person gives a satisfactory account of his presence within the limits of the Magistrate's jurisdiction, he cannot be called upon by such Magistrate to give an account of his presence in any other jurisdiction—*Satis Chandra*, 39 Cal. 456, 16 C.W.N. 499, 13 Cr.L.J. 161.

247. Concealing presence with a view to commit offence :—Where a person's presence or residence within the Magistrate's jurisdiction was well known and there was no attempt to conceal the same, his mere attempt to conceal his presence at a particular spot at a particular time or his inability to give a satisfactory explanation of what he was doing at a particular place at a particular time does not bring his case within sec. 109, and he cannot be ordered to give security

for good behaviour. This section refers to a *continuous* act and does not apply to a case where there is a momentary effort at concealment to avoid detection or arrest—*Reshu Kabiraj v. Emp.*, 22 C.W.N. 163, 18 Cr L.J. 825; *Gobra v. Emp.*, 50 C.L.J. 181, 1929 Cr.C. 365 (366); *Sheikh Piru v. Emp.*, 41 C.L.J. 142, 26 Cr.L.J. 842. See also *Laltu v. Emp.*, 17 A.L.J. 891, 20 Cr.L.J. 572. The Patna High Court, however, is of opinion that in order to bring a case under this section it need not be proved that the accused has followed a *continuous* course of conduct in taking precautions to conceal his presence—*Rambirich v. Emp.*, 6 Pat. 177, 8 P.L.T. 95, 27 Cr.L.J. 1128 (1129).

The concealment referred to must be with a view to committing some offence. Therefore a person cannot be called upon to furnish security under this section in respect of an alleged temporary concealment in his father's house merely to avoid observation of police (owing to a warrant being issued against him) unconnected with any intent to commit an offence or with any previous concealment outside the Magistrate's jurisdiction—*Satis Chandra v. Emp.*, 39 Cal. 456. An old offender attempting, on seeing a constable, to conceal himself to avoid observation does not bring himself within the mischief of sec. 109—*Sheikh Piru v. Emp.*, 41 C.L.J. 142, 26 Cr.L.J. 842, *Rambirich v. Emp.*, 6 Pat. 177, 8 P.L.T. 95, 27 Cr.L.J. 1128. This clause is one which must be used with discretion; and the mere fact that a person was found talking at night with some persons of bad character is no evidence that he was taking precautions to conceal his presence. There must be some definite attempt at concealment by taking precautions with that object in view, whether it be by disguise or otherwise indicating a desire to hide the fact that the person is present within the local limits of the Magistrate's jurisdiction—*Rambirich v. Emp.*, 6 Pat. 177, 8 P.L.T. 95, 27 Cr.L.J. 1128.

A person who gives a false name and delivers letters secretly containing incitement to commit crimes or demanding money for the means of committing crimes comes within the provisions of clause (a)—*Preo Nath*, 15 Cr.L.J. 255 (Cal.) But where a person on being asked by the police gives a false name and then corrects it, and there is nothing else to show that he was taking precautions to conceal his presence, an action under this section is not justified—*Sheo Prosad v. Emp.*, 21 A.L.J. 847.

248. Want of ostensible means of subsistence:—Mere proof of want of ostensible means of subsistence is not of itself a sufficient reason for passing an order for furnishing security. A Magistrate is bound to consider whether the order is really necessary in order to secure good behaviour, which is a matter for the Magistrate's judicial discretion, and he ought not to send people to jail simply because the opinions of Police witnesses are unfavourable to them—*Q. II v. Kala, Ratanlal* 723 (724).

A young man, out of employment, staying in the house of his father who is a man of substance and able if necessary to support him, cannot be held to be without ostensible means of subsistence within the meaning

of this section. Clause (b) is directed only against suspicious strangers lurking within the Magistrate's jurisdiction—*Satis Chandra v. Emp.*, 39 Cal. 456; *Abdur Rashid v. Emp.*, 22 Cr.L.J. 749 (Lah.). Merely to be penniless or out of work is not an offence. Many an honest man may find himself in either predicament, and in a country where there are workless people but no workhouses, persons ought not to be exposed to proceedings under sec. 109 (b) merely because they cannot give a satisfactory account of the manner in which they are eking out a precarious existence—*Victor v. K. E.*, 53 Cal. 345, 30 C.W.N. 380, 27 Cr.L.J. 497. If a person is unable to prove the source of his livelihood, he ought not to be ordered to execute a bond under sec. 109 unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that he is sustaining himself by some dishonest means, for such an order can be made where 'it is necessary for keeping the peace or maintaining good behaviour'—*Ibid.* The accused's explanation that he came to Calcutta 2 months ago and that he worked as a cooly but had no fixed abode, is a satisfactory account of himself. If a cooly could not show any immediate work, it does not mean that he has no ostensible means of livelihood—*Sheikh Piru v. Emp.*, 41 C.L.J. 142, 26 Cr.L.J. 842. So also, the mere fact that a man is doing no work at present and was previously convicted for bad livelihood (*Q. E. v. Pooran*, 5 C.W.N. 28, *Sheikh Piru*, 41 C.L.J. 142, 26 Cr.L.J. 842) or the mere fact that he belongs to a wandering tribe (*In re Yerukala*, 2 Weir 53) or to a gang which frequented *melas* and carries on illegal games (*Mahadeo v. K. E.*, 6 A.L.J. 253); or the mere fact that he is a gambler or opium-smoker (1 Bur S ■ 246) or has no other means of subsistence except through play of ring game which is a game of skill and not an offence under the Gaming Act (*Bangoli*, 40 Cal. 702, 14 Cr.L.J. 452) is not a sufficient ground for requiring him to give security.

249. 'Cannot give a satisfactory account of himself' :
—Cl. (b) of this section applies not only to vagrants or vagabonds, but also covers suspected persons of any class who cannot give a satisfactory account of themselves—*Narendra*, 13 Cr.L.J. 239 (Cal.). A person who gives a false name or address (*Abdur Rashid*, 22 Cr.L.J. 749) or gives a false account or cannot give a satisfactory account of his association with persons who are dangerous political conspirators (*Narendra*, 13 Cr.L.J. 239) is included in this section.

The words "cannot give a satisfactory account of himself" do not mean failure to satisfy the Magistrate that he spends his time or at least his leisure hours in a satisfactory manner; and therefore the fact that a person (a Municipal peon), whose residence and occupation were well known, was said to prowl about at night in the company of scoundrels and was armed with a lathi and used the lathi, was not a sufficient ground for calling upon him to furnish security—*Sharif Ahmad v. K. E.*, 8 A.L.J. 1097, 12 Cr.L.J. 536.

The expression "cannot give a satisfactory account of himself" does not include mere inability to account for one's presence at a particular place at a particular time. If a man proves that he is a resident of the

neighbourhood, and is a man of substance, he must be said to be able to give a satisfactory account of himself, although he is not able to or does not give any convincing explanation as to why on a particular dark night he was found prowling about in a lonely place—*Emp. v. Phuchai*, 50 All. 909 (F.B.), 30 Cr L J. 145 (149).

Where it was proved that the accused were residents of another district where they had their houses, that they had money with them, that they were dealers in cattle and that they had money in deposit with bankers, it could not be said that they had not been able to give a satisfactory account of themselves. And the mere fact that they were camping in an open ground in a city while on their way home, would not justify the Magistrate in passing an order under this section—*Nanka v Emp.*, 18 A L.J. 321, 21 Cr L.J. 366

The word 'satisfactory' means satisfactory in accordance with the known facts that are consistent with the surrounding circumstances. Where an accused was a man known to the police, the mere fact that on him were found a jemmy, a bunch of keys, a box of matches and a stick of lac or that he was scantily dressed, did not show that he failed to give a satisfactory account of his presence at a particular locality at a precise time—*Emp v Himayatullah*, 49 All 844, 25 A L J. 679, 28 Cr L.J. 567 (568). The prosecution must satisfy the Magistrate that the accused is suspected to be living dishonestly because of his failure to give a satisfactory explanation when called upon to account for his presence in the place where he is found, e.g., if he fails to account for being discovered in the company of persons living a dishonest or criminal life, or detected in some place where he has no legal right to be. But the poor and the outcast and the old offender must somewhere move and live and have their being, and a person who was passing the time to all outward appearances innocently and in a manner void of suspicion could not be brought within the ambit of sec. 109 merely because he was unable to prove that he was working for his living—*Victor v K E.*, 53 Cal. 345, 30 C W.N. 380, 27 Cr L J. 497

'With sureties' :—Compare this expression with the words "with or without sureties" in the preceding sections. The requirement of surety in this section is obligatory and not optional

250. Evidence.—Mere proof of want of ostensible means of livelihood is not a sufficient reason for passing an order under this section—*Kala, Ratanlal* 723 (724). The Magistrate should take evidence as to the general character of the person charged with bad livelihood, and not convict him on the mere report of Police officers—*Q v. Alam Sheikh*, 5 W.R. 2; *Kala*, supra

The fact that the accused had previously been connected with a criminal conspiracy or might still be in correspondence with criminals, is not relevant under this section, though it might form the basis of a substantive proceeding under sec. 110—*Satish Chandra*, 39 Cal 456

An order under this section passed more on suspicion than on any good basis of fact must be set aside. Where three respectable residents of Delhi came to Meerut by a night train, and were found on the road between the station and the city near in a place where a burglar's jemmy was found, an order calling upon them to furnish security for good behaviour was illegal—*Ghulam Julani*, 17 A.L.J. 432, 20 Cr.L.J. 401.

110. Whenever a Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate, Sub-divisional Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class specially empowered in this behalf by the Local Government receives information that any person within the local limits of his jurisdiction—

Security for good
behaviour from habi-
tual offenders.

- (a) is by habit a robber, house-breaker, thief or forger ; or
- (b) is by habit a receiver of stolen property knowing the same to have been stolen ; or
- (c) habitually protects or harbours thieves or aids in the concealment or disposal of stolen property ; or
- (d) habitually commits or attempts to commit, or abets the commission of, the offence of kidnapping, abduction, extortion or cheating or mischief, or any offence punishable under Chapter XII of the Indian Penal Code or under Section 489A, Section 489B, Section 489C, or Section 489D of that Code ; or
- (e) habitually commits, or attempts to commit, or abets the commission of, offences involving a breach of the peace ; or
- (f) is so desperate and dangerous as to render his being at large without security hazardous to the community,

such Magistrate may, in manner hereinafter provided, require such person to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond, with sureties, for his good behaviour for such period, not exceeding three years, as the Magistrate thinks fit to fix.

Change :—This section, has been amended by sec. II of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923).

"We agree that habitual kidnappers should be brought under this section, but doubt the necessity of any reference to abduction. We think that it is desirable to include all offences under Chapter XII of the Indian Penal Code, and also habitual forgers. We have included "forger" in section 110 (a) and have re-arranged clause (d) in accordance with this note"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916.*

251. Object and Scope of Section :—The object of this section is to afford protection to the public against a repetition of crimes in which the safety of property is menaced as well as the security of persons is jeopardised—*Emp. v. Nawab*, 2 All. 835, *Manindra v. Emp.*, 46 Cal. 215, *Rajendra v. K. E.*, 17 C.W.N. 238, 14 Cr.L.J. 5.

Again, the object of this section is the prevention and not the punishment of offences, and with that object it authorises the Magistrate to take security for good behaviour. But it is solely for the purpose of securing future good behaviour that the section can be used. Any attempt to use it for the purpose of punishing past offences is wrong and not sanctioned by law—*In re Umbica*, 1 C.L.R. 268; *In re Juggat*, 2 Cal. 110; *In re Raja Valad*, 10 Bom 174; *Q. E. v. Kandhaiya*, 7 All. 67; *Jagat Singh v. Crown*, 2 Lah L.J. 237. Therefore where the accused have committed definite acts of extortion for which they are liable to be prosecuted under the I. P. Code, an order for furnishing security under this section should not be passed, because such order would seriously prejudice them in their trial for those offences—*Anookool v. Q. E.*, 27 Cal. 781. So also, where a man is alleged to have habitually committed robbery with 4 or more others, it means that he is a member of a gang of dacoits, and thereby commits a definite and specific offence for which he ought to be punished under sec. 400 of the I. P. Code; and no action should be taken under the preventive section of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is for this reason that section 110 deliberately omits dacoity out of its purview—*Ram Prasad v. Emp.*, 23 A.L.J. 18, 26 Cr.L.J. 746, A.I.R. 1925 All 250. See also *Ram Rup v. Emp.*, 27 A.L.J. 931, 1929 Cr.C. 449. But evidence going to show that a substantive offence has been committed or evidence which might possibly form the basis of a charge of substantive offence is not necessarily to be excluded from proceedings under sec. 110, and can form the basis of an order for security—*Budan v. Emp.*, 23 A.L.J. 507, 47 All. 733, 26 Cr.L.J. 1130 (distinguishing 23 A.L.J. 18).

Moreover, this section is not intended to afford the police a means of keeping a suspected person under detention until they are able to work out a case against him—*K. E. v. Paimal*, 10 A.L.J. 351, 13 Cr.L.J. 837.

252. Application of Section :—This section arms the Magistrate with a powerful means of securing the interest of the community from injury at the hands of hardened offenders of the most dangerous classes. Therefore the power given by this section should be exercised sparingly

An order under this section passed more on suspicion than on any good basis of fact must be set aside. Where three respectable residents of Delhi came to Meerut by a night train, and were found on the road between the station and the city near to a place where a burglar's jemmy was found, an order calling upon them to furnish security for good behaviour was illegal—*Ghulam Jilani*, 17 A.L.J. 432, 20 Cr.L.J. 401.

110. Whenever a Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate, Sub-divisional Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class specially empowered in this behalf by the Local Government receives information that any person within the local limits of his jurisdiction—

Security for good
behaviour from habi-
tual offenders.

- (a) is by habit a robber, house-breaker, thief or forger ; or
- (b) is by habit a receiver of stolen property knowing the same to have been stolen ; or
- (c) habitually protects or harbours thieves or aids in the concealment or disposal of stolen property ; or
- (d) habitually commits or attempts to commit, or abets the commission of, the offence of kidnapping, abduction, extortion or cheating or mischief, or any offence punishable under Chapter XII of the Indian Penal Code or under Section 489A, Section 489B, Section 489C, or Section 489D of that Code ; or
- (e) habitually commits, or attempts to commit, or abets the commission of, offences involving a breach of the peace ; or
- (f) is so desperate and dangerous as to render his being at large without security hazardous to the community,

such Magistrate may, in manner hereinafter provided, require such person to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond, with sureties, for his good behaviour for such period, not exceeding three years, as the Magistrate thinks fit to fix.

Change :—This section, has been amended by sec. 18 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923).

"We agree that habitual kidnappers should be brought under this section, but doubt the necessity of any reference to abduction. We think that it is desirable to include all offences under Chapter XII of the Indian Penal Code, and also habitual forgers. We have included "forger" in section 110 (a) and have re-arranged clause (d) in accordance with this note"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*

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Again, the object of this section is the prevention and not the punishment of offences, and with that object it authorises the Magistrate to take security for good behaviour. But it is solely for the purpose of securing future good behaviour that the section can be used. Any attempt to use it for the purpose of punishing past offences is wrong and not sanctioned by law—*In re Umbica*, 1 C.L.R. 268, *In re Juggat*, 2 Cal. 110; *In re Raja Valad*, 10 Bom 174, *Q. E. v Kandhaiya* 7 All 67, *Jagat Singh v. Crown*, 2 Lah L.J. 237. Therefore where the accused have committed definite acts of extortion for which they are liable to be prosecuted under the I. P. Code, an order for furnishing security under this section should not be passed, because such order would seriously prejudice them in their trial for those offences—*Anookool v Q. E.*, 27 Cal. 781. So also, where a man is alleged to have habitually committed robbery with 4 or more others, it means that he is a member of a gang of dacoits, and thereby commits a definite and specific offence for which he ought to be punished under sec. 400 of the I. P. Code, and no action should be taken under the preventive section of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is for this reason that section 110 deliberately omits dacoity out of its purview—*Ram Prasad v Emp.*, 23 A L J 18, 26 Cr L.J. 746, A I R. 1925 All. 250. See also *Ram Rup v. Emp.*, 27 A L J 981, 1929 Cr.C 449. But evidence going to show that a substantive offence has been committed or evidence which might possibly form the basis of a charge of substantive offence is not necessarily to be excluded from proceedings under sec. 110, and can form the basis of an order for security—*Budan v Emp.*, 23 A L J 507, 47 All 733, 26 Cr L J 1130 (distinguishing 23 A.L.J. 18).

Moreover, this section is not intended to afford the police a means of keeping a suspected person under detention until they are able to work out a case against him—*K. E. v Paimal*, 10 A L J 351, 13 Cr L.J. 827.

252. Application of Section—This section arms the Magistrate with a powerful means of securing the interest of the community from injury at the hands of hardened offenders of the most dangerous classes. Therefore the power given by this section should be exercised sparingly

and with much discretion by the Magistrate and only in those cases where the evidence is very clear and precise—*Rajendra v. K. E.*, 17 C.W.N. 238, *Jagat Singh v Crown*, 2 Lah.L.J. 237; *Yaghi v. Emp.*, 1892 P.R. 5, 3 Mad 238; nor, on the other hand, should its exercise be confined only to cases in which positive evidence is forthcoming of the commission of offences—*In re Peddasiva Reddi*, 3 Mad. 238.

This section is preventive and not punitive. Its objects is to protect society against persons who are so likely to commit offences that it is not advisable to leave them at large unchecked. It is very undesirable to proceed under this section against a person who is trying to reform himself and to live an honest life—*In re Billa Appayya*, 10 M L T. 333, 12 Cr.L.J. 328.

Moreover, Magistrates should be cautious in making sure that the provisions intended for securing the peace of the community are not utilized for taking private vengeance under the aegis of a Crown prosecution—*Kali Prasanna v Emp.*, 38 Cal. 156, 15 C.W.N. 366, 12 Cr. L.J. 164. It is to be feared that this section is often resorted to by the Magistrates for the purpose of ensuring the punishment of the persons suspected but not proved to have committed offences such as theft, etc., and it is notorious that accusations of bad livelihood are constantly made with the object of blackening an enemy's character, and satisfying feelings of spite and hatred. So it is incumbent on the Magistrates to see that this section is not resorted to unnecessarily and to annoy individuals—*Sukha v. Emp.*, 1898 P.R. 4. The Courts must not make use of this section in order to secure a punishment of persons against whom a substantive charge has broken down—*Raja Ram v. Emp.*, 23 O.C. 371, 22 Cr. L.J. 273, *Bhagwat v K. E.*, 24 O.C. 317, *Shiam Lal v. K. E.*, 6 A.L.J. 487. An order under section 110 should not be made against a person immediately after he has been acquitted of an offence, unless a very strong case is made out against him—*Abdulla v Emp.*, 26 P.L.R. 789, 27 Cr. L.J. 190. When proceedings have been taken under this section against a man soon after a discharge or acquittal from a charge of an offence of which he was suspected, it is always necessary to make it clear that the proceedings have not been taken as a means of punishing in an indirect way a man whom the police suspected to be guilty—*Shiam Lal v. K. E.*, 6 A.L.J. 487, 9 Cr.L.J. 528.

This section has been made applicable to Burma Habitual Offenders Restriction Act by section 4 of that Act, and section 3 of that Act permits an order of restriction to be passed in any case in which security can be required under sec. 110 of this Code—*San Daa v. K. E.*, 2 Rang. 641 (642), A.I.R. 1925 Rang. 112.

253. Secs. 108 and 110 :—The mere fact that Sec. 108 may have been applicable does not necessarily make sec. 110 inapplicable—*Manindra v. Emperor*, 46 Cal. 215 (234).

254. Secs. 109 and 110 :—The two sections overlap each other. They must be carefully worked and great care should be taken not to abuse them. The proceedings taken must clearly specify whether the

accusation which the accused is to meet in one under section 109 or under sec. 110—*Mad. Pol. Man.*, p. 89. Therefore where the preliminary order passed by the Magistrate under sec. 112 was not clear in that the accused did not know whether the accusation he had to meet was under section 109 or 110, the order was set aside,—*Q. E. v. Iswar Chandra*, 11 Cal. 13. An order under sec. 110 is not valid during the continuance of an order under sec. 109, the two sections having the same object and the evidence required to secure an order under either section being of the same nature—*Gholam Ali v. Emp.*, 8 C.W.N. 543. A person cannot be bound down under both the sections (109 and 110)—*In re Rangaswami*, 38 Mad. 555, 16 Cr.L.J. 631; *In re Kosakumaran*, 38 Mad. 556, 16 Cr.L.J. 626. (Contra—*Jeomal v. Emp.*, 19 S.L.R. 95, 27 Cr.L.J. 326).

255. Secs. 107 and 110.—When the information set forth in the order of the Magistrate refers to an apprehended breach of the peace, sec. 110 is not applicable, but proceedings should be instituted under sec. 107. A Magistrate has no authority whatever under the law, upon information that suggests the likelihood of an assault being committed and the peace endangered, to resort to sec. 110, and it is altogether *ultra vires* for him to proceed thereunder—*Emp. v. Babua*, 6 All. 132; *Emp. v. Kallu*, 27 All. 92. When a Magistrate at first issued notice with reference to sec. 110, but subsequently found that the case was under sec. 107, he ought not to deal with the case as one under sec. 107, without issuing a fresh notice with reference to the altered view of the circumstances. The notice issued with reference to sec. 110 cannot be held sufficient to comply with the requirements of law, because the facts necessary to be proved to make the accused liable under sec. 110 are different from those under sec. 107, and the accused should have notice of the facts on which the Magistrate proposes to proceed against him—*Krishnaswami v. Vanamamalai*, 30 Mad. 282.

Similarly, where notice was issued to show cause why the accused should not be bound down to keep the peace under sec. 107, he cannot be directed in the final order to execute a bond for good behaviour under sec. 110—*Driver v. Q. E.*, 25 Cal. 798. But in a case where the evidence was recorded at length and the parties had opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and were not prejudiced, it was held that the irregularity was cured by sec. 537—*Sangamma*, 14 Cr.L.J. 65 (Mad.).

256. Magistrates empowered :—This section only permits the particular Magistrates mentioned herein to deal with the cases falling under it. Orders in such cases made by other Magistrates are invalid and without jurisdiction—*Puran v. Emp.*, 17 Cr.L.J. 141 (All.) In the Punjab, all first class Magistrates have been empowered to act under this section—*Punjab Gazette*, 3-2-1882, Part 1, p. 32. In Madras, according to Madras Act III of 1888, sec. 7, the Commissioner of Police can act as a Magistrate under this section.

The special power must be conferred by the Local Government only, it cannot be conferred by the District Magistrate. Therefore a first class Magistrate not specially empowered under this section cannot exercise

jurisdiction in a case arising under it upon a transfer thereof to him by the District Magistrate—*Q. E. v. Khandu, Ratanlal* 838.

257. Information :—No information should be acted upon unless it comes from a trustworthy source and is such that, if substantiated and not rebutted, it will justify a finding that the person charged answers to one or more specified descriptions given in this section.—*Punj. Cir.*, p. 165. A Magistrate cannot proceed under this section unless he has the information upon which he can make the order required by sec. 112. And there must be some information to work upon before a person can be arrested. This section is not intended to empower the Police to arrest a person without any information and then to work out a case against him and give information to the Magistrate—*K. E. v. Paimal*, 10 A L J. 351, 13 Cr.L J. 827. A Magistrate has no jurisdiction to act under this section until he has such information before him as will suffice for his making an order in writing setting forth its substance and the further particulars required by sec. 112—*K. E. v. Ganesh*, 12 A.L.J. 336, 15 Cr L J 696, *Rajbansi v Emp*, 18 A L J. 673, 42 All 646 (647), 22 Cr.L J 228.

Source of information.—The language of this section does not place any limit as to the nature of the information or as to the source from which it may be derived—*In re Mithu*, 27 All. 172 (173).

The Magistrate is not bound to reveal the source of the information to the person concerned, for the information is not any evidence against the accused, moreover, if a Magistrate is to set out before the accused the names of the persons from whom he receives information and the nature of the information given, very few self-respecting persons would dream of placing any information at the disposal of the Magistrate—*In re Mithu Khan*, 27 All 172 (173).

The words "receives information" in this section include information however obtained. The law does not limit the method in which the Magistrate who is empowered by the Local Government is to receive the information. He may receive the information through some other Magistrate. Therefore where the police made a report to the senior Deputy Magistrate that certain persons were in the habit of committing mischief, extortion, and other offences, and that Magistrate forwarded the report to another Magistrate of the first class, held that the latter had jurisdiction to institute a proceeding under this section on that report—*Hiranand v. Emp*, 1 Pat. 621, A.I R. 1922 Pat 586, 24 Cr. L J. 31.

As to what is or is not credible information, see notes under sec. 107.

The information to be required by a Magistrate may be to some extent of a hearsay and general description, but when the party to whom the order is directed appears in Court in obedience to such order, the inquiry must be conducted on the lines laid down in section 117—*Emp. v. Babua*, 11 All. 132.

Conversations out of Court with persons however respectable are not legal or proper materials upon which to adopt proceedings under this section—*Babua*, 6 All. 132. It is incumbent on Magistrates to exercise

the greatest caution and impartiality, and to be careful not to be influenced by outside gossip and vague rumours—*Sukha v. Emp.*, 1898 P.R. 4.

Magistrates are not competent to base their orders on their local and personal knowledge of the accused and witnesses—*Alimuddin v. Emp.*, 29 Cal. 392, *Run Bahadur v. Tileasuree*, 22 W.R. 79; *Wali Md. v. Emp.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 808, A.I.R. 1925 Lah. 166. No doubt a Magistrate is compelled in the performance of his duties to make private inquiries as to the character of his neighbourhood and as to the persons reputed to be of bad character and likely to cause trouble. These inquiries are necessary to an executive officer having to inform himself of the nature of the population committed to his charge, but where it is shown that the Magistrate has allowed the actual information obtained in such inquiries against certain individuals to influence his judgment in a judicial decision against those individuals brought before him by process of law, his order would be quashed as being vitiated by the admission of such information—*Ashiq Ali v. Emp.*, 21 A.L.J. 513, 24 Cr.L.J. 593, A.I.R. 1923 All 596. The proper procedure, where it is important to utilize the personal knowledge of a Magistrate, is for the case to be tried by another Magistrate, and for the former Magistrate to give evidence as a witness—*Alimuddin v. Emp.*, 29 Cal. 392, *Nurdin v. Emp.*, 1903 P.R. 27, 1 Cr.L.J. 99.

A local inquiry is most appropriate before instituting proceedings under sec 110, but once the accused are before the Court, the case must be decided on the evidence alone, and not on the basis of the local inquiry. But it is not illegal for a Magistrate to use his inquiries to confirm the result at which he has arrived on a consideration of the evidence—*Ram Pargat v. Emp.*, 12 O.L.J. 341, 2 O.W.N. 350, 26 Cr.L.J. 1149.

But although the private information possessed by a Magistrate concerning the accused person cannot be used as if it was evidence in the case, yet such information is a form of check which the trial Court may legitimately use in order to test the nature of the evidence with which it has to deal, and negative, for example, a suggestion that the police investigation has been unfair—*Emp. v. Darbari Singh*, 45 All 749 (751).

258. "Within the Magistrate's jurisdiction":—A Magistrate can take action under this section only when the accused resides within the local limits of his jurisdiction—*Sona Ram v. K. E.*, 3 C.L.J. 105; *Kripasindhu v. Emp.*, 1918 M.W.N. 751, 19 Cr.L.J. 905, *Crown v. Kalu*, 1901 P.R. 12, and it is not contemplated by this section that he can issue a warrant, so as to pursue the person concerned into another jurisdiction—*Ketaboi v. Q. E.*, 27 Cal. 993 (995), nor is it contemplated that the Police should be at liberty to bring persons from distant places (e.g. from a different district or a different province) outside the Magistrate's jurisdiction to a place within the local limits of his jurisdiction, and then to ask the Magistrate to exercise his jurisdiction in respect of offences committed elsewhere. The jurisdiction given by this section is confined to persons within the limits of the Magistrate's jurisdiction, and certainly cannot have been meant to extend to persons who

within those limits merely because they have been brought there in police custody—*Emp v. Murlu*, 1885 P.R. 43. But if a person has been arrested outside the jurisdiction for an offence committed within the jurisdiction, and the charge of substantive offence fails, the person can be proceeded against under this section—*Manindra v Emp.*, 46 Cal. 215 (235).

But the residence need not be permanent residence within the local limits of the Magistrate's jurisdiction. Therefore, persons who ordinarily did not reside within the Magistrate's jurisdiction, but resided within his jurisdiction at the time of taking action, could be proceeded against by the Magistrate under this section—*In re Kora Rangan*, 36 Mad 96, *Lakhi Narain v K E.*, 23 C.W.N. 100, *Sona Ram v. K. E.*, 3 C.L.J. 195; *Bhola v Emp.*, 23 Cr.L.J. 86, 20 A.L.J. 49, *Emp v. Bapoo*, 9 Bom. L.R. 244, *In re Ramjibhai*, 14 Bom. L.R. 889, 13 Cr.L.J. 706; *Ghulam Kadir v Emperor*, 20 S.L.R. 310, 27 Cr.L.J. 1261. Having regard to the plain language of this section, it is clear that a Magistrate is given power to deal with persons who have a general reputation as bad characters and who happen to be within his jurisdiction, no matter whether they are residents of a place within his jurisdiction or not—*Emp v. Munna*, 39 All 139, 17 Cr.L.J. 390. The reason is, that the most dangerous criminals have no well-known residence anywhere and wander from place to place, and it should be left in the power of the Magistrate to deal with them where the police or the Magistrate could be sure, at any time, of finding them—*Emperor v Bapoo*, 9 Bom.L.R. 244. In *Emp. v. Durga Halwai*, 43 Cal 153, it has been pointed out that in none of the sections 107-110 does the word 'residing' occur, and therefore no residence within the local limits of the Magistrate's jurisdiction is necessary to bring the case under this section, it is sufficient to give the Magistrate jurisdiction if the evil habits were practised and the evil reputation acquired within the local limits of his jurisdiction, i.e. if the various acts of house-breaking and theft were committed at a place within the Magistrate's jurisdiction.

Where the accused had a residential house within the Magistrate's jurisdiction, to which he occasionally, if not often, went for the purpose of his business, the Magistrate had jurisdiction over him, provided the accused committed the acts of oppression while he so resided—*Kasi Sundar v. Emp.*, 31 Cal. 419.

Residence always implies voluntary residence. Therefore a person undergoing imprisonment within the Magistrate's jurisdiction cannot be said to be voluntarily residing—*Ketaboi v. Q. E.*, 27 Cal. 993; *In re Krishnaji*, 23 Bom 32. So also, persons arrested from outside, and brought and detained within the Magistrate's jurisdiction cannot be said to reside within the Magistrate's jurisdiction—*Emp v. Murlu*, 1885 P.R. 43. But in *Manindra v. Emp.*, 46 Cal. 215 (235) and *Emp v. Nga Singh*, 8 L.B.R. 353, 17 Cr.L.J. 88 (overruling 4 L.B.R. 148) it has been held that an order under this section may be made against a person who is in custody in a jail within the local limits of the Magistrate's jurisdiction at the time of the proceeding. This is also evident from the words 'when such person is in custody' occurring in sec. 114.

259. Clause (a)—Habitual thief etc.:—The evidence must be of such a nature as would lead to a reasonable and definite ground for coming to the conclusion that the accused was a *habitual thief*—*Gholam Ali v Emp.* 8 C.W.N 543 There should be proof of specific acts showing that he to the knowledge of some particular individual is by habit a thief or a dacoit—*Kalai v. Emp.* 29 Cal. 779. Where the evidence merely showed that the accused had been suspected of a *single* act of theft, and kept bad company, it did not amount to his being a robber by *habit*, and an order under this section was not proper—*Ishar Singh v Emp.* 1880 P.R. 32.

Where a person stated that he was a bad character and that he had been once in jail, but there was no evidence to show that he was a habitual thief, an order under this section was not justified—*K. E. v. Kaka*, 3 Bom. L R 269

Mere association with men of bad character is not sufficient to bring a man under this section as being by habit a thief etc., unless the association is to commit theft etc. So, the fact that a Zemindar had tenants of bad character and he used to lend money and paddy to them does not bring him under this section—*Nilkamal v Emp.*, 6 C.L.J. 711, 6 Cr.L.J. 403 When the charge against the accused is that of being a habitual robber, the fact that the accused gathered bad characters at his house does not go far enough to be in itself relevant. It is necessary to show that these bad characters were robbers, or were gathered there for the purpose of robbery or theft—*Budhan v. Emp.*, 47 All. 733, 23 A.L.J. 507, 26 Cr.L.J. 1130

Forger:—By reason of the addition of this word in clause (a), the ruling in *Mahian Mal v. Emp.*, 1900 P R 28 (where it was held that a habitual forger did not come under this section) is no longer good law.

260. Clause (c) :—Aid in concealment of stolen property:—This clause is designed to meet only the case of professional receivers of stolen property who assist the thief by protecting him from discovery and arrest and by helping him to dispose of such property—*Nga Pu v. K. E.*, (1910) U.B.R Cr P. C 4, 11 Cr.L J 790, 7 I C. 462 (464).

Harbouring thief.—The harbouring must be to screen the offender from punishment. A person giving food or shelter or medical assistance to a starving or invalid criminal, from mere motives of humanity and not with the intention of enabling him to escape justice, does not come within the purview of this section—*Nga Pu, supra*.

This clause speaks of harbouring a *thief* but not of harbouring a *dacoit*. Harbouring a *dacoit* is a more serious offence and should be dealt with under the substantive provisions of sec 216A I. P. Code, and not under the provisions of sec. 110 Cr. P. Code—*Manni Lal v. Emp.*, 51 All 459, 30 Cr.L J. 694 (695).

261. Clause (d) :—Habitually committing extortion:—Sec. 110 is not applicable to the case of persons who commit acts of extortion not in their individual capacity but as agents of others; e.g. the *burkundazes*

in a Zemindary who commit acts of extortion on tenants in the performance of their duties. Sec. 110 is not applicable to them, as it cannot be said that they are in the habit of committing extortion as individual members of the community, because, if it so happens that they cease to be in the employ of the Zemindars, they would no longer commit those acts of extortion in their private capacities. The proper course of dealing with the case is to prosecute them, or their masters under whose orders they act, for specific acts of oppression—*Hari Telang v. Q. E.*, 27 Cal 781 (784).

It was formerly held that persons in the habit of bringing false claims by forged entries (*Ganesh v. Emp.*, 1894 P.R. 25) or obtaining decrees by means of forged documents (*Crown v. Chuni*, 1914 P.R. 21) did not come under this section as they could not be said to be habitually committing extortion. But these rulings are no longer good law in view of the word 'forger' added to clause (a) by the Amendment Act of 1923.

A person who brings a claim in the Civil Court which he knows to be false commits an offence under sec-209 I. P. C., but he does not by so doing commit an offence of extortion, if he succeeds in the claim, or an offence of attempting to commit extortion, if he fails in his claim; and he cannot be bound down under this section—*Khushal v. K. E.*, 20 O.C 129, 18 Cr L J 651; *Bappu v. Emp.*, 19 Cr.L.J. 885 (Nag.).

Committing mischief —This clause applies to persons who habitually commit mischief, where the evidence shows the man to be of an excellent character, one weak and unsupported charge of mischief by fire does not bring him within the purview of this clause—*Hamidooddeen*, 24 W.R. 37.

262. Clause (e):—Offences involving breach of the peace—See Note 221 under sec 106

Where the accused, who was found by the Magistrate to be addicted to acts of immorality in attempting to seduce married women and behaving indecently and immodestly to them, was bound over to give security for good behaviour under clause (e) of section 110, held that although the actions of the accused were certainly offences under the law and it might be desirable to control them, still the offences were not such as "involved a breach of the peace" within the meaning of this section and of section 106, and the order for security was illegal—*Arun Samanto v. Emp.*, 30 Cal 366. The words "offences peace" in this clause are to bear the same interpretation as in section 106—*Ibid* (at p 368).

263. Clause (f) —Desperate and dangerous character.—A man of desperate and dangerous character in clause (f) means a man who has a reckless disregard of the safety of the person and of the property of his neighbours—*Manindra v. K. E.*, 46 Cal. 215, *Wahed Ali v. Emp.*, 11 C W N 789. Evidence of acts of extortion committed by a person, unless those acts were accompanied by acts causing danger to life and property, is not sufficient to bring the case under this clause—*Wahid Ali v. Emp.*, (supra).

But where it was found that the accused persons were associated for the purpose of spreading disloyal doctrines among school boys and, besides

being engaged in preparing the young for the future revolution, were connected with an organisation for the collection of money by dacoity, it was held that these facts were sufficient to bring the case within this clause—*Manindra v. K. E.*, 46 Cal. 215, 23 C.W.N. 193, 19 Cr.L.J. 696.

The following persons, though they are undoubtedly persons of bad character, do not come under this clause, as they cannot be called men of 'desperate and dangerous' character :—

A person who had been arrested on suspicion of the commission of a dacoity and released—*Kismet v. Emp.*, 11 C W N. 129; *Gulab Chand v Emp.*, 17 Cr.L.J. 184 (Oudh), a person who is known to be a bad character and is earning his living by prostituting one of his wives—*Yaghi Emp.*, 1892 P R 5, a person who had been annoying the neighbours in various ways by knocking at their doors at night or throwing brickbats over their roofs, or who had been annoying respectable women—*Akhoy Kumar v. Q. E.*, 5 C W.N. 249, a person who attempts to seduce married women and behaves indecently and immodestly to them—*Arun Samanta v. Emp.*, 30 Cal. 366, a person who is a nuisance to his neighbours, declines to pay debts, abuses his neighbours, and makes indecent overtures to school-boys who pass by his shop—*Md Asghar v Emp.*, 16 Cr.L.J. 582 (All); a person of a violent or turbulent character—*In re Naran*, 6 W R 6, a person who promotes litigation and is said to have had considerable influence with *patwaris*—*Ishwar Dutt v Emp.*, 16 A.L.J. 776, 19 Cr.L.J. 781.

Where the evidence shows that there is an apprehension of the accused committing a breach of the peace by using violence towards a particular person or persons, he ought not to be bound over under this section. He may be hazardous to the particular person or persons, but cannot be said to be hazardous to the community. He may be proceeded against under section 107 but not under sec. 110—*Emp. v. Kallu*, 27 All. 92; *Emp. v. Babua*, 6 All. 132.

Evidence, which was regarded as unreliable and insufficient to convict a person of the charge of dacoity, should not be treated as reliable evidence to show that such person is a dangerous and desperate character who ought to be called upon to furnish security for good behaviour—*Gulab Chand v. Emp.*, 3 O L.J. 43, 17 Cr L.J. 184.

'At large' —Persons who have been convicted and whose sentences have not expired are not 'at large' within the meaning of clause (f), and therefore there is no necessity of taking action against them—*Bhubaneswar v. Emp.*, 6 Pat. 1, 28 Cr L.J. 359, 8 P L.T. 335.

270. Joint trial of several persons :—See Note 290 under sec 117 (5)

The provisions of sec. 117 (5) as to joint trial cannot properly be applied to proceedings under sec. 110, when the matter under inquiry is whether a person is a habitual offender. But there can be a joint trial of persons called on to show cause under sec 110, when there is evidence in the nature of a conspiracy or of acting in concert—*Jogendra v. K. E.*

25 C.W.N. 334 (335), 22 Cr.L.J. 377; see also *Kalu Mirza v Emp.*, 37 Cal 91, *Godhan v. K. E.*, 4 P.L.J. 7. The provisions about joint trial are applicable to cases coming under clause (f) as well as cases under clauses (a) to (e)—*Jogendra v K E.*, (supra). But it is not advisable to take proceedings under this section against several persons jointly, unless such persons are confederates or partners, as against whom all the evidence is equally applicable—*Emp. v. Angnu Singh*, 45 All. 109, 20 A.L.J. 881. Ordinarily, under this section, every person has to be tried separately for the offences enumerated herein. A joint trial is only permissible when two or more persons have been associated for the purpose of committing the offences mentioned in clauses (a) to (f) of this section. Unless this circumstance is established, a joint trial is illegal and the conviction would be set aside—*Jai Rao v Emp.*, 3 P.L.T. 538, 23 Cr.L.J. 100. But if in a joint trial the evidence against each is separated and considered distinctly, there is no prejudice and the order will not be upset—*Shams-uddin v Emp.*, 26 Cr L.J. 1114 (Nag).

The joint trial of several persons who were habitually associating together for committing the offences mentioned in this section, is not illegal merely because they did not belong to the same village—*Rahim Bux v Emp.*, 23 Cr L.J. 58 (Cal).

271. Evidence under this section :—In a case under sec. 110, it is the duty of the Magistrate to hold an independent inquiry of the offence, and not to bind down the accused person merely because he agrees to furnish security—*Ram Charan v Emp.*, 24 A.L.J. 317, 27 Cr L.J. 370 (371).

The evidence that is required to justify an order under this section is not necessarily evidence that the accused has committed definite criminal offences, but it must be proved by evidence of general repute or otherwise that he comes within the category of one of the clauses (a) to (f)—*Sher Zaman v Emp.*, 1899 P R 10. The mere fact that a man has a bad character does not necessarily make him liable to be called upon to furnish security for good behaviour. There must be satisfactory evidence that he answers to one of the descriptions mentioned in the section—*Emp. v Babua*, 6 All 132, *Emp. v Kala Chand*, 11 Cal. 14, *In re Daulat Singh*, 14 All 45; *In re Karuppanan*, 8 M L T 246, 11 Cr L.J. 638; *Haku v. Emp.*, 1881 P R 12, *Sohan v. Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1377. The mere fact that a person has a record of several previous convictions does not satisfy the requirements of this section, and he cannot be ordered to give security on that fact alone—*In re Raja*, 10 Bom. 174 (175); *Emp. v. Nepal*, 13 C.W.N. 318. The evidence must be of such a character that it will reasonably support the inference that it is necessary in the interests of public security to send the man to prison or to bind him down—*Alimuddi v. Emp.*, 22 A.L.J. 678, 25 Cr.L.J. 1172. The evidence that a certain person is of bad character is not sufficient to put him on security under this section. There should be clear evidence on the record to show what exactly he had been doing and how he had been living. Where there is strong evidence of apparently respectable men on the record to show that

a person has not in recent times lived a disreputable life, and such evidence has not been rebutted, security under this section ought not to be demanded—*Md. Hussain v. Crown*, 1916 P.L.R. 30, 17 Cr.L.J. 142; *Shiam Lal v. K. E.*, 6 A.L.J. 487, 11 Cr.L.J. 528. The mere fact that sixteen years ago the accused had on three occasions been bound over is no ground for considering that he is still a bad character and has not reformed himself, and is not a ground of action under this section against him—*Jagat Sing v. Emp.*, 23 Cr.L.J. 507. A Magistrate should not pass an order under this section where the witnesses for the prosecution are mostly enemies of the accused—*Shakur v. Emp.*, 26 O.C. 242, 24 Cr.L.J. 565; *Wali Md. v. Emp.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 808 (Lah.), *Gur Dayal v. Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 11 (Oudh).

In a trial under this section the Magistrate must act on evidence duly recorded in the presence of the accused, and it is not open to him to take into consideration any information obtained otherwise than from such evidence. He must not act on anything extraneous to the evidence on the record, e.g., an information obtained from local inquiries—*San Dun v. K. E.*, 2 Rang. 641 (642).

Inquiries under Chapter VIII of the Criminal Procedure Code are governed by the ordinary rules of evidence, and evidence which is not admissible under the Evidence Act cannot be admitted in proceedings under sec. 110 of this Code—*Bechari v. Emp.*, 12 A.L.J. 937, 15 Cr.L.J. 705; *Raj Narayan v. Emp.*, 25 A.L.J. 393, 28 Cr.L.J. 502.

Police evidence:—In proceedings under this section, the evidence of official and Police witnesses should as far as possible be eschewed. Though there is no rule of law which prohibits a Magistrate from admitting Police evidence, it should, if not wholly discarded, influence his judgment as little as possible. Where the evidence of the police witnesses consists only of rumours and hearsay which they have recorded in their note-books and diaries, it is wholly admissible—*In re Ranga Reddi*, 38 M.L.J. 97, 43 Mad. 450. Entries in the Thana Village Crime Note-Book are in themselves no evidence to support an order under this section—*Pochai v. K. E.*, 22 Cr.L.J. 486 (Cal.). A Magistrate should not act on information not given in evidence but obtained from a perusal of the police-diary—*Jhanda v. K. E.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 45 (All.).

The history sheets kept by the Police of persons proceeded against under this section cannot be taken into consideration by the Court. A Magistrate should not delegate his judicial functions to the Police—*Jogendra v. Emp.*, 21 Cr.L.J. 700 (Cal.); *Jabinuddin v. Emp.*, 20 Cr.L.J. 689 (All.). A list of cases in which the accused was suspected of having been concerned is inadmissible in evidence—*Chandi*, 21 O.C. 132, 111 Cr.L.J. 825; *Raghubir*, 10 O.C. 168, 6 Cr.L.J. 256.

Mere suspicion is not evidence—The powers under this section are to be exercised very sparingly and only in those cases where the evidence is very clear and precise. Where, beyond the mere suspicion that the accused are habitual thieves, nothing substantial has been established, an action under this section is not justified—*Jagat Singh v. Emp.*, 23 Cr.L.J. 11 (Oudh).

507; *Emp. v. Karwa*, 26 A.L.J. 519, 30 Cr.L.J. 122; *Amjad Ali v. Emp.*, 5 P.L.T. 129. Where the only evidence against the accused was that he was a man of bad character and was suspected on many occasions by the Police, an order under this section could not be sustained—*Emp. v. Husain Ahmed*, 1905 A.W.N. 34; *Sohna v. Emp.*, 27 Cr.L.J. 1067 (Lah.). A person ought not to be bound down on the mere statement of witnesses that they suspect the accused to be a thief or a dacoit—*Alep Pramanik v. K. E.* 11 C.W.N. 413, *Kismat v. Emp.*, 11 C.W.N. 129; *Sohna v. Emp.*, (supra). The fact that he was once convicted of theft, and his house was searched on several occasions (but no stolen property was found) and he was said to have associated with two or three persons of bad character, does not justify an order under this section—*Kashim*, 1907 P.L.R. 23, 5 Cr.L.J. 24.

Where the only thing appearing against the accused was that he was on a previous occasion arrested in connection with a dacoity, but the police considered the evidence against him of so little value that he was released under sec 169 without even being placed before the Court, held that this fact was insufficient for binding over the accused under this section—*Jhandoo v. K. E.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 45, A.I.R. 1924 All. 124, *Sital Din v. Emp.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 366, A.I.R. 1925 Oudh 49. But if the evidence in support of the charge under section 110 is antecedent to the charge for the substantive offence (dacoity), and is wholly independent of it, the proceedings under section 110 are not illegal—*Sital Din v. Emp.* (supra).

When the evidence is good and equally balanced on both sides, no order for security shall be made—*Raham Ali v. K. E.*, 11 A.L.J. 461; *Ganga Singh v. K. E.*, 10 A.L.J. 393, 13 Cr.L.J. 772; *Angnu Singh v. Emp.*, 45 All. 109 (113), 20 A.L.J. 881; *Manni v. Emp.*, 20 Cr.L.J. 716 (All.), *Krishna v. Crown*, 4 Lah. L.J. 531. Thus, where there is a large volume of evidence in favour of the accused which is as good as, if not better than, that of the prosecution, there is no ground for making an order under this section—*Krishna v. Crown*, 4 Lah. L.J. 531; *Bahadur v. Emp.*, 27 O.C. 327, 26 Cr.L.J. 530, *Gur Dayal v. Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 99 (Oudh).

The burden of proving the bad character of an accused is on the prosecution, and therefore when the evidence on both sides is of an indifferent and interested character, the prosecution must fail—*Nardin v. Emp.*, 1903 P.R. 27, 1 Cr.L.J. 99, *Sukha v. Empress*, 1898 P.R. 4.

Evidence of habit:—The persons mentioned in this section are those who are habitual criminals, and the habit is to be proved by an aggregate of acts—*Sriram Venkatasami*, 6 M.H.C.R. 120, 1 Weir 452. The word "habitually" must be taken to mean repeatedly or persistently. The word "habit" means persistence in doing an act, a fact which is capable of proof by adducing evidence of the commission of a number of similar acts—*Government v. Hanmantrao*, 25 Cr.L.J. 60 (Nag.). The words 'by habit' and 'habitually' imply frequent practice or use, and are used in this section in the sense of depravity of character, as evidenced by the frequent repetition or commission of offences mentioned in the

section—*Bhubaneswar v. Emp.*, 6 Pat. 1, 8 P.L.T. 335, 28 Cr.L.J. 359. The fact that a person was on only one occasion suspected of theft is no evidence that he is a *habitual* thief—*Ishar Singh v. Emp.*, 1880 P.R. 32. Where certain tenants formed into a party to compel the Zemindar to settle certain lands with them, and many loots, assaults and murders were committed by them against the Zemindar, but apart from this land dispute, there was nothing on the record to show that the tenants bore any despicable character, or that they were implicated in theft, extortion etc. or that they ever provoked a breach of the peace, held that the tenants could not be said to be *habitual* offenders within the purview of clauses (a) to (e), but that they were desperate and dangerous characters and proceedings could be taken against them under clause (f)—*Bhubaneswar v. Emp.*, (*supra*). The fact that a person has been convicted on a former occasion is not sufficient to justify the finding that he is an *habitual* offender, unless there is some additional evidence to show that he has again done some acts that indicate an intention on his part to return to his former course of life—*Emp. v. Nawab*, 2 All. 835. Evidence of acts of misconduct committed by a person years ago is admissible as indicating formation of habit. But such evidence, unless supplemented by evidence of misconduct committed by such person within a year or so, cannot justify the making of an order under sec. 118—*Wahid Ali v. Emp.*, 11 C.W.N. 789, 6 Cr.L.J. 1. The existence of previous convictions is not by itself sufficient to justify an order for furnishing security. Weight must be given to a consideration of the period that has elapsed subsequent to the last of the convictions in order to see whether during that period the accused has apparently shown a disposition to conduct himself properly or has during that period continued his previous course—*Emp. v. Ram Lal*, 51 All. 663, 30 Cr.L.J. 562 (564).

Proof of previous convictions.—Whenever it is required to prove previous convictions against a man in a proceeding under this chapter, such previous convictions must be proved strictly and in accordance with law; otherwise no Court can properly take them into consideration—*K. E. v. Sheikh Abdul*, 43 Cal. 1128, 20 C.W.N. 725, 17 Cr.L.J. 185. See sec. 511.

272. Evidence of general repute.—Under sec. 117 (4) the fact that a person is a habitual offender or a desperate and dangerous character may be proved by evidence of general repute.

A man's general reputation is the reputation which he bears in the place in which he lives amongst all the townsmen, and if it is proved that a man who lives in a particular place is looked upon by his fellow townsmen, whether they happen to know him or not, as a man of good repute, that is strong evidence that he is a man of good character. On the other hand, if the state of things is that the body of his fellow townsmen who know him look upon him as a dangerous man and a man of bad habits, that is strong evidence that he is a man of bad character—*Rai Isri Prasad v. K. E.*, 23 Cal. 621; *Jogendra v. K. E.*, 25 C.W.N. 334, 22 Cr.L.J. 337. *Crown v. Nga Nyen*, 1 L.B.R. 90. *Raghbir v. K. E.*, 10 O.C.

168, *Dunia v. K. E.*, 5 O.C. 203; *Gokul v. K. E.*, 10 O.C. 132, 6 Cr.L.J. 97, *Emp. v. Jagannath*, 1903 A.W.N. 181; *Kewal Kishore v. Emp.*, 29 O.C. 44, 12 O.L.J. 413, 26 Cr.L.J. 1283.

Where in a proceeding under this section, the accused person is able to produce witnesses on his behalf to speak of his good character, the Court ought to pay particular attention to such evidence and to give substantial reason for not believing such evidence, before it makes an order under section 118—*Ramlagan v. Emp.*, 5 P.L.T. 166, 25 Cr.L.J. 985; *Amjad Ali v. Emp.*, 5 P.L.T. 129, 25 Cr.L.J. 35, *Hakim Singh v. Emp.*, 13 A.L.J. 1055. Where the accused who was a Zemindar and money-lender produced a large number of witnesses consisting of his own caste-fellows and tenants to depose to his good character, but the Magistrate disbelieved the evidence simply on the ground that the accused by virtue of his position could produce a large number of witnesses, and assigned no other legitimate reason, held that the case had not been approached from a proper point of view, and the High Court could interfere in revision—*Miharban v. Emp.*, 13 A.L.J. 1046, 16 Cr.L.J. 805.

Nature of the evidence—Evidence of general repute may be either evidence as to the general opinion of the community or the neighbourhood, or the personal opinion of the witnesses who are examined. But the opinion need not necessarily be the opinion of the entire community, but at least the opinion of a considerable number of persons—*Bechau v. K. E.*, 12 A.L.J. 937, 15 Cr.L.J. 705, *In re Ranga Reddi*, 43 Mad. 450; *Kewal Kishore v. Emp.*, 29 O.C. 44, 12 O.L.J. 413, 26 Cr.L.J. 1283; *Duma Singh v. K. E.*, 5 O.C. 203.

The persons who testify to the character of the accused must be respectable persons who are acquainted with the accused (43 Mad. 450) and should not ordinarily be officials—*Nga Hein v. K. E.*, 8 Bur. L.T. 53, 16 Cr.L.J. 553. Thus, when a large body of respectable persons testified to the character of the accused against the evidence of Police-officers, the opinion of the former should be accepted, and an order under this section should not be made—*Soman v. Crown*, 1910 P.W.R. 37, 11 Cr.L.J. 603, *Kundan v. Emp.*, 9 Lah. 133, 28 Cr.L.J. 813.

Evidence of accused's own caste fellows and neighbours is certainly the best sort of evidence available—*Gur Baksh v. Emp.*, 12 Cr.L.J. 542 (Oudh). The reputation which the accused is found to have must necessarily mean the reputation of that person in the neighbourhood, and the persons residing in that locality would be best able to speak to his character—*Ketaboi v. Q. E.*, 27 Cal. 993 (995). Where witnesses voluntarily come forward as friends or associates or caste-fellows of the accused to give evidence about the good character of the accused, they must not be brushed aside unless they are discredited ■■ regards their good faith and honesty—*Emp. v. Angnu Singh*, 45 All. 109 (113), 24 Cr.L.J. 257, *Emp. v. Bahu*, 43 All. 186 (190), 18 A.L.J. 1114; *Kewal Kishore v. K. E.*, 29 O.C. 44, 12 O.L.J. 413, 26 Cr.L.J. 1283. In fact, when the caste-fellows of the accused voluntarily come forward and say that they regard the accused as the head of their brotherhood and they

consider it a slur upon their community that the accused should be treated as a habitual robber or dacoit, it shows the good faith of the witnesses and their honest and emphatic belief that the accused is a respectable person enjoying the confidence of his community. The Magistrate ought not to discredit the evidence of these witnesses—*Emp. v. Rahu*, 43 All. 186 (190), 18 A.L.J. 1114, 22 Cr.L.J. 115. The mere fact that some of the witnesses are persons who have had commercial dealings with the accused and that others are persons of the same class and position as the accused, is not a sufficient ground for excluding their evidence—*Sohna v. Emp.*, 27 Cr.L.J. 1067 (Lah.).

But it is not always necessary that the persons who testify to the character of the accused should live in the immediate neighbourhood of the accused—*Iyad Ali v. Emp.*, 11 C.W.N. 789, 6 Cr.L.J. 1. Thus, a series of dacoities having taken place in a certain village, the evidence of general reputation of the accused coming from the people of the village where the dacoities took place is certainly to be treated as evidence of general repute, although the accused did not live among those people—*Chintamon v. Emp.*, 35 Cal 243. It is not right to discard the evidence of witnesses who speak to the reputation of the accused merely because they are not his immediate neighbours. A man's general reputation in the place in which he lives among the inhabitants of that place is not always conclusive, because it is quite possible for a cunning rogue to conceal his real character from his immediate neighbours. What the Court has to do is to satisfy itself that the evidence of the witnesses is true, and if it is satisfied on this point, then it is entitled to accept the evidence. Where a witness lives at a considerable distance from the person of whose reputation he speaks, the Court should of course inquire how he came by that knowledge and should take his answer into consideration in framing its estimate of the value of the evidence—*K. E. v. Po Yin*, 2 Rang. 686, 4 Bur.L.J. 6, 26 Cr.L.J. 528.

Moreover, the persons testifying to the character of the accused must speak from their *personal knowledge*. A vague and general statement that a man is a habitual offender is not sufficient. Evidence of repute in respect of an accused person must be evidence of persons who are speaking to matters within their own personal knowledge and not from mere *hearsay*—*Rup Singh v. K. E.*, 1 A.L.J. 616, *Kallu v. Emp.*, 19 A.L.J. 39, 22 Cr.L.J. 314, *Emp. v. Angnu Singh*, 45 All. 109 (113); *San Dun*, 2 Rang. 641 (643); *Deodhari*, 6 P.L.T. 810, 26 Cr.L.J. 738. But evidence of repute must necessarily consist largely of hearsay evidence, in this sense that it consists of statements of what persons other than the witness say or believe about the character of the accused—*Emp. v. Kumera*, 51 All. 275, 1929 Cr. C. 346 (349).

Mere *rumour* is not repute, evidence of rumour is mere hearsay evidence of a particular fact; evidence of repute is a totally different thing. Rumours in a particular place that a man had done particular acts or has characteristics of a certain kind are not evidence of general repute—*Isri Prasad v. K. E.*, 23 Cal. 621, *Rajendra v. K. E.*, 1 A.L.J. 611;

Kripasinduh v. Emp., 1918 M.W.N. 751, 19 Cr.L.J. 905; *Ramlagan v. Emp.*, 5 P.L.T. 166, 25 Cr.L.J. 985.

The witnesses must give their own opinion, and their statements must not be mere repetitions of what other persons said to them about the accused, and when they give their own opinion they may be asked to give the grounds of their opinion and to give names of the persons whom they have heard to speak against the character of the accused—*Bechai v. K. E.*, 12 A.L.J. 937, 15 Cr.L.J. 705; *Kewal Kishore v. Emp.*, 29 O.C. 44, 12 O.L.J. 413, 26 Cr.L.J. 1283. Mere repetitions unaccompanied by direct evidence personally affecting each accused is insufficient in a case under this section—*Emp. v. Angnu Singh*, 45 All. 109, 24 Cr.L.J. 257. The evidence must relate to particular instances which have come to the knowledge of the witness and must be specific. Evidence relating to mere beliefs and opinions without reference to acts or instances which have induced the witnesses to form an opinion cannot be regarded as evidence of repute. The test of the admissibility of the evidence of general opinion is whether it shows the general reputation of the accused and it should at least be the opinion of a considerable number of persons. It must not be the repetition of what certain persons have said to the witnesses. It should be the evidence of respectable persons acquainted with the accused who live in the neighbourhood and are aware of his reputation—*In re Ranga Reddi*, 43 Mad. 450, *Ramlagan v. Emp.*, 5 P.L.T. 166.

The repute must be universal and there should be no doubt about it—*Jhandu Ram v. Crown*, 1915 P.L.R. 215, 16 Cr.L.J. 106; *Masit Khan v. Emp.*, 1897 P.R. 2, *Ajmal v. Emp.*, 1898 P.R. 2; *Wali Muhammad v. Emp.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 808 (Lah.), i.e., the evidence must be so general and overwhelming as to leave no doubt that the accused has been in the habit of committing the offences imputed—*Q. E. v. Sher Khan*, Ratanlal 639. Where as many good witnesses come forward to state that the man's reputation is good as those who state the contrary, it can hardly be held safely that the man's general reputation is bad, unless there is something to corroborate the evidence of witnesses against him—*Ajmal Shah v. Emp.*, 1898 P.R. 2, *Rajendra Prosad v. K. E.*, 1 A.L.J. 611; *Kundan v. Emp.*, 9 Lah. 133, 28 Cr.L.J. 813.

Mere suspicion against the accused is not evidence of general repute. Statements of witnesses each of whom says that he suspected the accused to be implicated in this or that isolated offence, do not amount to evidence of general repute—*Bechai v. K. E.*, 12 A.L.J. 937, 15 Cr.L.J. 705; *Ajmal Ali v. Emp.*, 5 P.L.T. 129, *Raj Narain v. Emp.*, 25 A.L.J. 393, 28 Cr.L.J. 502; *Kehr Singh*, 9 Lah. 586, 29 Cr.L.J. 479; *Kundan v. Emp.*, 9 Lah. 133, 28 Cr.L.J. 813. So also, evidence of cases in which the accused was suspected is not evidence of general repute—*Raham Ali*, 11 A.L.J. 461, 14 Cr.L.J. 407, *Bechai*, 12 A.L.J. 937, 15 Cr.L.J. 705; *Jabinuddin*, 20 Cr.L.J. 689 (All.). Where the prosecution witnesses say that they suspect the accused to be a thief or dacoit because his house was searched and he was arrested on several occasions, such a suspicion is not sufficient evidence against the accused. Where there is positive

evidence for the defence that the accused is a good man, it is not a sufficient reason for casting it aside to say that proof of malice against the accused on the part of the prosecution is wanting—*Surendra*, 21 Cr.L.J. 170 (Cal)

But an evidence that a person had been suspected and named in a large number of cases extending over a considerable interval may be very useful corroboration of general evidence against him. Conversely, in a doubtful case, the fact that a person has never been suspected of any offence may weaken the general evidence of reputation that is given against him—*Raja Ram v. Emp*, 23 O C 371, 22 Cr.L.J. 273

The fact that an accused person has been acquitted of a particular charge may diminish, and will diminish in many cases, and many even destroy wholly, the value of the evidence, but does not render it inadmissible—*Budhan v. Emp.*, 23 A.L.J. 507, 47 All 733, 26 Cr.L.J. 1130

In order to establish general repute for the purposes of section 117, the evidence of the investigating police-officer is inadmissible and irrelevant—*Rameshwar v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 632, 21 Cr.L.J. 321

A witness should be allowed to depose, if he can in fact give that evidence, that the accused has a general reputation as a habitual thief (or robber, etc as the case may be), but he should not be allowed to depose that the accused is a bad character or has the reputation of being a bad character—*Emp v. Kurwa*, 26 A.L.J. 519, 30 Cr.L.J. 122 (124). A witness should not be allowed to state merely that the accused is a "bad character", because that expression is too vague and susceptible of many different meanings. But when a witness starts by saying that the accused is a "bad character" and immediately explains what he means by that expression by saying that the person habitually commits theft, then there is no ambiguity about his meaning and his deposition is admissible as evidence of general repute—*Emp v. Kumera*, 51 All. 275, 1929 Cr. C 346 (348).

273. Duty of Court to test the evidence :—Evidence of general repute is obviously a type of evidence which requires to be weighed very carefully; and the Court should be careful that no improper laxity is permitted—*Emp. v. Kurwa*, 26 A.L.J. 519, 30 Cr.L.J. 122 (124) Where the evidence for the prosecution is of a vague character, and when a case has to be established merely upon evidence of bad repute, the Court should take into consideration the value and weight of evidence tendered on behalf of the prosecution as compared with that for the defence—*Gur Baksh v. Emp.*, 12 Cr.L.J. 542 (Oudh)

The Court (whether original or appellate) must show by its judgment that it has duly weighed and examined the evidence for and against the accused in the case. Where therefore in a proceeding started under sec 110 Criminal Procedure Code the judgment ran: "It is obvious that if one quarter of the evidence for the prosecution is true—and I see no reason to doubt that it is—the appellant is a most proper person to be bound over under sec 110, Criminal Procedure Code," held that the judgment was bad and must be set aside and the case sent back for retrial

—*Bhansi Dhar v. Emp.*, 4 O L J. 141, 18 Cr.L.J. 649. Where the Appellate Court in a case under this section wrote a judgment of four lines without giving even an indication of the fact that he had weighed the evidence for and against the accused, *held* that there had not been a proper trial of the case, and that it should be retried—*Sarwan v. Emp.*, 14 A L J. 279, 17 Cr L J. 167.

Evidence should be tested by its quality rather than by its quantity. When the evidence on the side of the prosecution and the defence is found to be of an indifferent character, the prosecution must fail. If the quality of evidence is good on both sides the case must also fail, if the evidence for the defence over-balances that for the prosecution—*Sukha v. Emp.*, 1898 P R 4, *Haru Telang v. Q. E.*, 27 Cal. 781; *Raham Ali*, 11 A L J. 461, 14 Cr L J. 407. Where as many as 10 reliable persons come forward and testify to the good character of the accused, the Magistrate should not reject their evidence and pass an order under this section merely because the prosecution produces a larger number of witnesses—*Bahadur v. Emp.*, 27 O C 327, 28 Cr L J. 530; *Gur Dajal v. Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 99 (Oudh). On the other hand the accused is not entitled to be acquitted merely because the defence witnesses are as numerous as or more numerous than the prosecution witnesses, but it is the weight of the evidence and not the number of the witnesses which the Court has to consider—*Kewal Kishore v. Emp.*, 12 O L J. 413, 26 Cr.L.J. 1283; *Gur Din v. K. E.*, 24 O C 225, 22 Cr L J. 647.

274. Examination of witnesses:—In a proceeding under this section the Magistrate is bound to examine all the witnesses produced by the accused. Where the trying Magistrate declined to examine on behalf of the defence more than the same number of witnesses as were examined for the prosecution, *held* that it was not open to the trying Magistrate to put such an arbitrary limit on the witnesses whose evidence the defence desired to adduce—*Amirulla v. King Emp.*, 22 C W N 408, 20 Cr L.J. 201. Where witnesses are cited for the defence in proceedings under this section, time and opportunity should be given to have them produced, and then only should order be passed—*Ponithram v. Emp.*, 38 C L J. 285, 25 Cr L J. 293.

Magistrates should be careful not to allow an unnecessarily large number of witnesses to be examined, which would amount to a scandalous waste of public time and Magisterial energy—*Emp. v. Angnu Singh*, 45 All 109 (112), 20 A L J. 881. In this case the Police produced as many as 76 witnesses to prove the bad character of the accused (which took more than two months to examine them), and the total number of witnesses produced in the case was 402, the examination of which occupied 6 months. The High Court severely condemned the procedure as "monstrous and amounting to something like persecution."

Further Inquiry:—See Note 295 under sec 119. Section 436 as now amended does not apply in cases under this chapter, and therefore further inquiry cannot be directed in a case of discharge under sec 110.

275. Order for security :—The provision of law which requires sureties for the bond is made not with a view to obtain money for the Crown by the forfeiture of recognizances, but to ensure that the particular accused person shall be of good behaviour for the time mentioned in the order—*Q. E. v. Rahim Baksh*, 20 All. 206, *In re Raja*, 10 Bom. 174. Therefore, an order under this section requiring persons to deposit cash in lieu of entering into a bond for their future good behaviour is bad in law—*Emp. v. Kala Chand*, 6 Cal 14.

Under this section, the Magistrate can pass an order directing the person to give security. But an order directing that the person "must leave the town at once or he will be prosecuted as a bad character" is illegal and *ultra vires*—*Ram Prasad*, III A L J. 951, 23 Cr. L J. 122.

An order should not be made under this section, where a previous proceeding against the same accused had resulted in his discharge and only a short interval had elapsed between the previous proceeding and the institution of the present proceedings—*Shakur v. Emp.*, 26 O C. 242.

It is illegal for a Magistrate to call upon a person to furnish security soon after the expiry of the term of imprisonment to which he was sentenced for past offences. Before passing such an order, the accused should be questioned as to his means and intention of earning an honest livelihood, and he should not be subjected to penalties unless it is shown that there is no reasonable prospect of his future good behaviour—*In re Raja*, 10 Bom 174 (175).

Fresh security after expiry of term of bond —Where a bond for good behaviour expired on the 13th of June 1905, and on the 20th June fresh proceedings were started against him, it was held that the order was illegal in as much as the accused was not given a sufficient opportunity of showing that he was willing to adopt an honest livelihood, and the interval was not long enough to see whether the accused has reformed his course of life or not—*Emp. v. Ranjit*, 28 All 306, 3 A L J 29.

A person who was previously bound over to be of good behaviour under this section cannot, soon after his release, be handed up again on vague evidence of suspicion without any tangible evidence to show that he has been leading a life of crime. A convict should be given sufficient opportunity to reform himself before he is handed up again—*Akbara v. Emp.*, 18 Cr. L J. 710 (Oudh). Where the accused was imprisoned for one year for failure to furnish security, and several months afterwards fresh proceedings were instituted against him as a result of which he was ordered to execute a bond for good behaviour, it was held that the order was bad, that the accused has not had a sufficient *locus penitentiae*, and that the evil reputation which he had before his imprisonment still followed him and permeated the evidence of many of the witnesses—*Junab Ali v. Emp.*, 31 Cal 783; *K. E. v. Sheikh Abdul*, 20 C W N 725, 43 Cal 1128, *Nga Po v. K. E.*, 1915 U B II 3rd Qr 86, 17 Cr L J 85.

Error in form of bond —Where a bond required under section 110 was, under a mistake, executed in the form of bonds required to be entered into under section 107, it was held that the bond was void and

the error could not be rectified under section 537—*Wadhawa v. Emp.*, 1903 P R. 32.

Order should state on which clause it is based:—On the conclusion of the inquiry, if the Magistrate considers that the accused is a person falling within any of the descriptions stated in this section, he should record a distinct finding of the specific description which he considers proved. If the finding be insufficient, the final order based upon it will be open to reversal. The same will be the case, if the finding be that he is a habitual thief (or dacoit) but the finding is not supported by evidence that the misconduct is habitual—*Panj Circ.*, p 167. When a person is sought to be proceeded against under this section, it must be made clear to him as to which subsection he is charged with coming under. Mere assertion that he is a man of criminal tendency or is suspected of having committed crimes is insufficient—*Sohan v. Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1377 (Lah.).

Remand to custody—Where proceedings are instituted under this section the Magistrate can remand the accused person to custody. See Note 526 under section 167

276. Revision—In questions arising under sec. 110 and sec. 107, the moment it is shown *prima facie* that there is something which the Courts below have done either in excess of their powers, or by a too summary exercise of their powers, or by misapplying the rules of evidence, or by not giving due effect to the evidence for the defence, an application for revision should be admitted. But the High Court will not generally interfere on the merits except in very exceptional cases, because it is idle to suggest that the High Court, sitting with only the paper evidence before it, should presume to differ on questions which are purely questions of fact and questions depending on the demeanour of witnesses—*Gayani v Emp.*, 17 Cr L.J. 461 (All). The High Court is not a Court of appeal in cases under sec 110, and the responsibility of administering that section does not rest upon it. It is only when something appears unsatisfactory and unusual in the proceedings of the lower Court that the High Court will look into the record to examine whether the order under sec 110 has been properly passed—*Raj Narayan v. Emp.*, 25 A L J 393, 28 Cr L J 502. The High Court is not a Court of Appeal in cases under section 110, and the duty of the High Court is not to weigh the evidence given on behalf of one side or the other, but only to see whether the Court below has approached the consideration of the case in a fair way, having regard to the interest not only of the prosecution but also of the accused—*Miharban v. Emp.*, 13 A.L.J 1046, 16 Cr L.J. 805; *Kenal Kishore v. Emp.*, 29 O.C. 44, 12 O L.J. 413, 26 Cr. L J. 1283, A.I R 1925 Oudh 473. The High Court will not interfere on the merits with proceedings under this section, provided that the Lower Court or the Appellate Court shows in its judgment that it has really and not merely nominally considered the evidence on the record—*Shiam Lal v. K. E.*, 6 A.L J. 487, 9 Cr.L.J. 528. The High Court is not disposed to encourage revision applications in respect of proceedings under this Chapter, because so long as the cases proceed fairly and regularly, the,

Magistrate is the best tribunal, in fact the only tribunal who can satisfactorily decide them—*Emp. v. Darbari Singh*, 45 All. 749 (751). But at the same time the administration of this section has to be very carefully watched; and where evidence has been misunderstood or ignored, difficulties have not been seen or the rules of evidence have not been followed, and the Judge has reviewed the case in a very perfunctory way without noticing the palpable defects in the evidence, the grounds upon which a man has been bound down require to be carefully scrutinized—*Bisheswar v. Emp.*, 19 A.L.J. 668. If it is established to the satisfaction of the High Court that the proceedings under sec. 110 are not *bona fide*, and that in substance their continuation would mean an abuse of the statutory provisions on the subject, it is not only competent to the High Court but it is its obvious duty to interfere—*Rajendra v. K. E.*, 17 C.W.N. 238. Though the High Court finds it difficult to interfere with orders under section 110, still it has to be satisfied that the evidence is of a character which will reasonably support the inference that it is necessary in the interests of public security to bind down the accused—*Almuddin v. Emp.*, 22 A.L.J. 678, 25 Cr.L.J. 1172.

277. Order under Special Acts.—An order restricting movements under the provisions of sec 7 of the Punjab Act V of 1918 (Restriction of Habitual Offenders Act) cannot be passed against any person from whom a security has already been taken under section 110 of the Cr P Code—*Kabir Baksh v Emp.*, 1 Lah. 100; *Bhana v Crown*, 1919 P.L.R. 34.

A double order both under sec. 110 of this Code and under section 7 of the Burma Habitual Offenders Restriction Act is illegal, and the order of restriction must be set aside—*Pan Zyaw v. Emp.*, 1 Bur. L.J. 257, 24 Cr.L.J. 735. Where proceedings have been taken under section 110 of this Code by the Subdivisional Magistrate, and a final order has been passed under sec. 118, the District Magistrate (and he alone) can convert the order into an order of restriction under the Burma Habitual Offenders Restriction Act (II of 1919), where there has been a proper preliminary order under sec. 112 and the District Magistrate has good reasons for the change—*Parsodan v. K. E.*, 2 Rang. 524.

Proceedings under this section against persons who have been registered under sec. 4 of the Criminal Tribes Act (III of 1911) are not illegal. But such proceedings though not illegal are inexpedient, and the fact that the persons proceeded against are already registered under the Criminal Tribes Act may be a factor and an important factor which the Magistrate should take into consideration before he makes any order against them under section 110 of this Code—*Ghulam Rasul v Emp.*, 20 Cr L J. 30 (Cal.). A person who has been registered under the Criminal Tribes Act may be proceeded against under sec 110 of this Code, if he pursues a career of crime bringing him within some one of the clauses of this section. Each case has to be scrutinized on its merits. If such proceedings appear to be necessary in view of the exigencies of any particular case, evidence of general repute, which is bound to be affected in a large measure by the very fact of the person proceeded against being a

member of a criminal tribe, should be, if at all, acted upon with great caution and scrutiny—*Badu Mur v. Emp.*, 54 Cal. 279, 31 C.W.N. 165 (166), 28 Cr.L.J. 106.

111. [Repealed].

This section has been repealed by section 8 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act (XII of 1923). It ran as follows:—

“111 The provisions of sections 109 and 110 do not apply to European British subjects in cases where they may be dealt with under the European Vagrancy Act, 1874.”

“We consider that section 111 should be repealed and that sections 109 and 110 should apply equally to Europeans and Indians”—*Report of the Racial Distinctions Committee*, para. 16

112. When a Magistrate acting under section 107,

section 108, section 109 or section 110 deems it necessary to require any person to show cause under such section, he shall make an order in writing, setting forth the substance of the information received, the amount of the bond to be executed, the term for which it is to be in force, and the number, character and class of sureties (if any) required.

278. Scope.—The provisions of this section must be complied with by a Magistrate passing a preliminary order under the Burma Habitual Offenders Restriction Act (II of 1919), and if that order does not set forth the substance of the information received and the term during which the order of restriction shall be in force, the entire proceeding is irregular and orders passed therein must be set aside—*Pursodan v. K. E.*, 2 Rang 524

279. Order in writing—A Magistrate acting under this Chapter has no power to act until he has recorded an order in writing under this section—*Rameshwari v. K. E.* 36 All 262, 12 A.L.J. 365. The issue of a warrant under sec. 115 without recording an order under this section is illegal—*Jatoi v. Emp.* 20 S.L.R. 122, 27 Cr.L.J. 935. So also, where the accused persons were arrested as suspected habitual thieves and the Magistrate fixed a date for the production of evidence with the object of issuing a notice under section 112, but on the date fixed, after hearing the prosecution evidence, he at once called upon the accused to enter upon his defence to a charge under section 110, held that the procedure was illegal and the proceeding must be set aside. It is only after the Magistrate has recorded an order under sec. 112, that the actual hearing can by law take place at all—*Emp. v. Rajbansi*, 42 All. 646 (648), 22 Cr.L.J. 228. In *Pragi v. K. E.*, 10 O.C. 365, 7 Cr.L.J. 94, however, it has been held that the provisions of this section are purely directory, and a failure to record the order is a mere irregularity. In *In re Kavatham*, 26 M.L.T. 385, 20 Cr.L.J. 763, it was held that the

omission to draw up a proceeding under this section or to serve a copy of the order on the accused under section 115 did not vitiate the proceedings, if the order was drawn up later and read out and explained to the accused who appeared in Court in pursuance of a summons.

Where a Magistrate, instead of making an order in writing, wrote the order on the back of the police report which gave the information, held that it was a mere irregularity cured by sec 537—*Ram Deo v. Emp.*, 27 Cr L.J. 1132 (All.)

Joint order :—Where there are several persons, and the charges against them are not the same, a joint notice to them is undesirable. Each man is entitled to a separate notice and not to have the charges which are going to be made against him confused with the charges that are being made against somebody else—*Emp. v. Ram Lal*, 51 All 663, 30 Cr.L.J. 562 (564).

280. Contents of the order —The Magistrate should be very careful in drawing up the preliminary order, bearing in mind the provisions of sec. 118, which lays down that the final order shall not be at variance with the preliminary order passed under section 112

(a) *Substance of the information* —This should be stated with sufficient fulness for the accused person to have a clear understanding of the matter that he has to meet in his defence—*Punj Cir*, Chap XLIV, p. 166. An order which does not set forth the substance of the information received is illegal and must be set aside—*Ujagar v Emp.*, 10 Lah 155, 1929 Cr C. 61; *Maung Tun v. Emp.*, 4 Bur L.J. 172, 27 Cr.L.J. 318 (319). Magistrates should by no means be contented with allowing the office to fill up a vague lithographed or typed form, but ought to do their best to see that the first order does actually contain the substance of the information, no less and no more. If this is not done, the accused cannot know till he comes to court precisely what he is charged with, and as no charge is drawn up, he may not know till the final order is passed what his alleged delinquency is—*Sultan v Emp.*, 19 S L R 332, 26 Cr L J 767. Under this section, the substance of the report made to the Magistrate should be clearly disclosed to the accused so that he may be informed of the charges or of the nature of the evidence which he is to rebut. Thus, a notice under section 110 must contain something more than a mere reproduction of the clauses of the section. There should be sufficient indication of the time and place of the acts charged and sufficient details which enable the accused to know what facts he is to meet—*Ranga Reddi v K. E.*, 43 Mad 450, *Kripasindhu v Emp.*, 19 Cr L J. 905, 1918 M.W. 751, *Tannor v Emp.*, 19 S L R 176, 26 Cr L J 1398. A mere assertion in writing by the Magistrate that he has been informed that an offence (e.g. a breach of the peace) is likely to be committed, is not sufficient, the persons proceeded against are entitled to know the nature of the accusation they have to meet and to a reasonable opportunity within which to prepare themselves to meet the accusation and to cite witnesses—*Iswar Chandra* 11 Cal 13; *Nathu*, 6 All 214; *Ranga Reddi*, 43 Mad. 450. The accused is entitled to be

told the nature and extent of the information. Therefore, if the substance of the report made to the Magistrate is not clearly disclosed, and the accused is not informed of the charges and of the nature of the evidence that he is to rebut, the proceedings cannot be regarded as legal—*Ranga Reddi v. K. E.*, 43 Mad. 450, 38 M.L.J. 97, 21 Cr.L.J. 354. Where a notice under sec. 107 did not at all state when the threats complained of were uttered, who were the persons who were threatened and when the apprehension of a breach of the peace arose, held that the notice was vague and bad in law—*Konda Reddi v. K. E.*, 41 Mad. 246, 18 Cr.L.J. 878. A notice which is very meagre and does not contain sufficient details regarding the charges brought against the persons must be held not to comply with the provisions of the Code, and this defect cannot be remedied by any explanation given by the Prosecuting Inspector at the commencement of the trial—*In re Kutti Goundan*, 47 M.L.J. 689, A I R. 1925 Mad. 189, 26 Cr.L.J. 673.

Merely informing an accused person that he is suspected to be a habitual thief is not a sufficient notice. There must be something in the nature of an indictment or charge containing substantial particulars indicating the grounds upon which the police have given information to the Magistrate—*Rajbansi*, 18 A.L.J. 678, 42 All. 646 (648), 22 Cr.L.J. 228; *Nihal v. Emp.*, 49 All. 5, 24 A.L.J. 908, 23 Cr.L.J. 9. The failure of the Magistrate to record the substance of the information which he has received is not a mere irregularity which would be covered by sec. 537, but an illegality which vitiates the trial—*Nihal v. Emp.*, (supra). The Oudh Chief Court however dissents from these two rulings and is of opinion that the 'substance of the information' does not mean anything more than the gist of the information. It is not necessary to state anything more than the particular section or subsection on which it is proposed to proceed against the accused. In any view, the failure to give the accused the information of the nature of the case against him is a mere irregularity cured by sec. 537—*Emp. v. Ram Ghulam*, 2 Luck. 157, 28 Cr.L.J. 744 (746). The Calcutta High Court likewise holds that the substance of the information means such or so much of the information as would enable the parties to know under what clause of sec. 110 he is charged or to what particular class of offenders he is said to belong. Where possible, the repetition of the words of the section should be avoided, but the notice is not rendered invalid because of failure to mention the details of the case—*Bhut Nath*, 33 C.W.N. 852, 1929 Cr. C. 387.

The omission to set forth the substance of the information will not of itself be sufficient to render the proceeding and the final order null and void, unless the accused has been prejudiced by the omission and a failure of justice has been occasioned—*Emp. v. Md. Jafar*, 3 All. 545; *Abbasu v. Umda*, 11 Cal. 724; *Emp. v. Bhagwan*, 1891 A.W.N. 40; *Tanwar v. Emp.*, 19 S.L.R. 176, 26 Cr.L.J. 1398; the omission in the notice to give detailed information as to the nature of the evidence for the prosecution is not an irregularity sufficient to vitiate the proceedings, especially if the accused had cross-examined at great length the witnesses for the prosecu-

tion—*Dohra v. Emp.*, 20 Cr.L.J. 436 (Pat.); or if as a matter of fact the accused had clear notice of the case made against them and had ample time and opportunity to let in evidence—*Jai Singh v. Emp.*, 23 Cr.L.J. 42 (Pat.).

In a proceeding under section 107 the Magistrate may give only the substance of the information received, and it is not necessary to specify the definite acts which the accused intends to commit—*Jaguji v. Emp.*, 16 A.L.J. 567, 19 Cr.L.J. 876 In proceedings under section 110, an order by the Magistrate stating that he has received some reliable information (though not definite) that the accused is a habitual cattle-thief and a receiver of stolen goods is a sufficient compliance with the provisions of this section—*In re Kala*, 1896 A.W.N. 73.

But a Magistrate is not bound to give the source of the information—*In re Mithu*, 27 All. 172; *Alimuddin v. Emp.*, 29 Cal. 392. It is also not necessary to give a list of the prosecution witnesses in the order—*Chintamon v. Emp.*, 35 Cal. 243, 12 C.W.N. 299

(b) *The amount of bond.*—Omission to specify the amount of the recognizance and the surety is a mere irregularity which does not vitiate further proceedings—*Abasu v. Umda*, 8 Cal 724

(c) *The term of the bond.*—The order should set forth a definite period for which security is to be demanded—*In re Pedda Siva*, 3 Mad. 238. But this term should not be unnecessarily lengthy. Thus, where a disturbance of the peace was apprehended in a fair which was to last for a fortnight, an order demanding security for a period of one year is unnecessary and excessive—*Q. E. v. Nathu*, 6 All. 214.

(d) *Number, character and class of sureties.*—The Magistrate in setting forth the number, character and class of sureties, should not place undue and unnecessary difficulties in the way of finding them—*Rahmatulla v. Emp.*, 22 Cr.L.J. 395 (All). The Magistrate should not impose impossible restrictions, as the provisions of this chapter are preventive and not penal—*Imp v. Md. Pahor*, 1 S.L.R. 46, 8 Cr.L.J. 166 The Magistrate is not competent to impose arbitrary conditions not essential to the object in view (*viz.*, to restrain a party from the infringement of the law), still less impossible conditions. The object of the law is that the person charged should furnish, if possible, good and sufficient security—*In re Narain Soobodhee*, 22 W.R. 37.

Therefore, a Magistrate has no right to impose a condition requiring the accused to find sureties residing within certain geographical limits (*e.g.* within one mile or five miles) or residing in a certain locality—*Narain Soobodhee*, 22 W.R. 37, *Tara Sing v. Emp.*, 1880 P.R. 38; *Bhagwan v. K. E.*, 7 A.L.J. 993, 11 Cr.L.J. 536; *Hasimuddin v. K. E.* 10 A.L.J. 354, 13 Cr.L.J. 831; *Raghunandan v. Emp.*, 20 A.L.J. 520, 23 Cr.L.J. 400; *K. E. v. Mangal*, 6 O.C. 199; or to impose a condition that the sureties must be inhabitants of one village—*Nga Po v. K. E.*, 1915 U. B. R. 3rd Qr. 86, 17 Cr.L.J. 85. In *Emp. v. Nabba*, 24 All. 471 it has been held that the Magistrate is entitled to prescribe certain geographical limits for the residence of sureties, but it must not be too

narrow, and therefore where an order was passed by a Magistrate requiring the sureties to be "residing within the Municipality of Mirzapore" the High Court added the words "or in the immediate neighbourhood"

But of course it is reasonable to expect and require that the sureties must not live at such a distance as would make it unlikely for them to exercise any control over the accused—*Q. E. v. Rahim Baksh*, 20 All. 206, and so where the sureties lived at a distance of 13 miles, they were rejected—*Emp. v. Babu*, 1898 A.W.N. 199, *Emp. v. Toni*, 1895 A.W.N. 143. A condition requiring that the sureties should be neighbours of the accused is reasonable—*Md. Ibrahim v. Crown*, 8 S.L.R. 322, 16 Cr.L.J. 479, *Allahdad v. Emp.*, 17 S.L.R. 160. See Note 302 under sec. 122

Lastly, as regards the class of sureties. Since section 112 gives the Magistrate power to define the character and class of sureties, it is open to him to require that they must be landholders or persons having a certain pecuniary status—*Q. E. v. Rahim*, 20 All. 206, *Emp. v. Jiva Natha*, 16 Bom L.R. 138, 15 Cr.L.J. 268, *Allahdad v. Emp.*, 17 S.L.R. 160, *Jumo v. Crown*, 16 Cr.L.J. 252, 8 S.L.R. 229, (but see *Wasya v. Emp.*, 1901 P.R. 28), or that they should be of respectable character and should not be of inferior standing to suspects—*Md. Ibrahim v. Crown*, 8 S.L.R. 173, 16 Cr.L.J. 100. But a condition that the sureties must not be *lambardars*, *inamdars* and *Chowkidars* (*K. E. v. Kaim Khan*, 1906 P.R. 18) or that they must not be related to the accused (*Narain*, 22 W.R. 37) or that they must not come from *Kaharati* and must not be *Kunbi* by caste (*Q. E. v. Yesu*, 1 Bom L.R. 520) is too restrictive and illegal

As regards inquiry into the fitness of sureties and the grounds for their rejection, see section 122

113. If the person in respect of whom such order is made is present in Court, it shall be read over to him or, if he so desires, the substance thereof shall be explained to him.

Procedure in respect of person present in Court.

'Is present in Court'—Even if persons are illegally arrested and brought into Court, the Magistrate is justified in treating the persons as present in Court and may proceed to initiate proceedings—*Emp. v. Ghulam Husain*, 12 Cr.L.J. 533 (Bom)

114 If such person is not present in Court, the Magistrate shall issue a summons requiring him to appear, or, when such person is in custody, a warrant directing the officer in whose custody he is, to bring him before the Court:

Summons or warrant in case of person not so present.

Provided that, whenever it appears to such Magistrate, upon the report of a police-officer or upon other information (the substance of which report or information

shall be recorded by the Magistrate), that there is reason to fear the commission of a breach of the peace, and that such breach of the peace cannot be prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest of such person, the Magistrate may at any time issue a warrant for his arrest.

281. Issue of summons .—Where a charge of criminal trespass and mischief was dismissed, and thereupon the Magistrate recorded an order in the presence of both parties calling on them to show cause on a day fixed why they should not furnish security for keeping the peace, it was held that it was not necessary to issue a summons to them—*Q v. Chowdhury*, 2 B L.R. App. 28

Where a Magistrate issued a notice with reference to section, 110, but at the time of inquiry passed an order demanding security under section 107, it was held that the Magistrate ought to have issued a fresh notice with reference to section 107, to enable the party to know the facts on which the Magistrate intended to proceed against him—*Krishnaswami v. Vanamamalai*, 30 Mad 282

The notice issued to the accused to appear and show cause must give him sufficient time to produce his evidence. So, where notice was served on the 7th, requiring the accused to appear on the 9th, it was held that sufficient time was not given, and the order for security was set aside—*Q v. Cheyt Singh*, 22 W R. 70

282. Issue of Warrant .—Section 114 contains two stringent elements obviously directed against ill-considered precipitancy on the part of the Magistrate in making an order for immediate arrest. He must be of opinion that the only way of preventing a breach of the peace is to commit the person to custody, and he must put on record the substance of the Police report or other information by which he is influenced—*Maniruddin v. Emp*, 5 B L.T. 95, 24 Cr L J 829.

To justify an arrest under this section, the Magistrate must act upon information that has been recorded. It is not enough for him to merely express a belief that such a course is necessary. Not only must he have reason to fear the commission of a breach of the peace, but it must also be shown that such breach of the peace cannot be prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest of such person—*Emp v. Babua*, 6 All 132.

As for arrest without warrant, see 20 B L.R. 85 cited in Note 126 under sec. 55.

Re-arrest .—The proviso to this section is a provision relating to the circumstances set out in the section and is not a substantive provision by itself. It does not give power to Magistrates to re-arrest a person who has already been discharged after executing surety bonds—*Nathan Gope*, 10 P.L.T. 801, 30 Cr.L.J. 809.

It may be doubted whether this proviso empowers a Magistrate to re-arrest a person who has already appeared and been admitted to bail—*Raghunandan v. Emp*, 32 Cal 80 (83)

283. Bail :—A Magistrate has no jurisdiction to refuse bail to an accused person arrested under a warrant issued under this section—*Faiz Mahomed v. Crown*, 9 S.L.R. 158, 17 Cr.L.J. 77. When a man who is arrested is not accused of a non-bailable offence, no needless impediments should be placed in the way of his being admitted to bail. The intention of the law undoubtedly is that in such cases the man is ordinarily to be at liberty, and it is only if he is unable to furnish such moderate security, if any is required of him, as is suitable for the purpose of securing his appearance before a Court pending inquiry, that he should remain in detention—*Emp. v. Mir Hashamali*, 20 Bom.L.R. 121, 19 Cr.L.J. 329.

284. Person outside jurisdiction :—A Magistrate cannot legally issue a warrant under this section for the arrest of a person who has already left the local limits of his jurisdiction. The person proceeded against must be actually and physically present in the district in which the Magistrate exercises jurisdiction—*In re Ramjiban*, 14 Bom.L.R. 889, 13 Cr.L.J. 796. But see *Alanindra v. Emp.*, 46 Cal. 215 (236) where it is held that section 114 is not limited to arrest within the local limits of the Magistrate's jurisdiction but applies to an accused arrested outside the jurisdiction and brought in custody within the jurisdiction for the purpose of proceeding under this chapter. See Note 258 under section 110.

115. Every summons or warrant issued under Section 114 shall be accompanied by a copy of the order made under Section 112 and such copy shall be delivered by the officer serving or executing such summons or warrant to the person served with, or arrested under, the same.

Copy of order under Sec. 112 to accompany summons or warrant.

285. Omission to send copy of order :—When the summons was not accompanied by a copy of the order passed under section 112, the whole proceedings were invalid, and the order for security must be set aside—*In re Subba Naicken* 11 Cr.L.J. 332, 17 M.L.J. 438, *In re Abdul Rahman*, 2 Weir 55; *Nga Po Kin v. Q. E.*, U. B. II (1897—1901) 16. *Contra*—*Suleman v. Emp.*, 11 Bom.L.R. 740, 10 Bom.L.R. 375, and *Narain v. Emp.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 682 (Nag.) where such omission was held to be a mere irregularity, cured by Sec. 537. So also, in a recent Allahabad case, where the Magistrate instead of sending a copy of his order with the summons, gave the substance of the information in the summons itself, and the accused were therefore informed of what they had to meet, held that the irregularity was cured by sec. 537—*Ram Deo v. Emp.*, 27 Cr.L.J. 1132 (All.). See also *In re Kavatham*, 26 M.L.T. 385, 20 Cr.L.J. 763, *Rameshwar v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 632, 21 Cr.L.J. 321, and *Bejirao v. Emp.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 132 (Nag.), where it has been held that an order for security is not liable to be set aside merely because no preliminary order was drawn up and served on the accused, provided that the preliminary order was drawn up later and read and explained to the accused when they were brought into Court in pursuance of summonses.

116. The Magistrate may, if he sees sufficient cause, dispense with the personal attendance of any person called upon to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond for keeping the peace, and may permit him to appear by a pleader.

Power to dispense with personal attendance.

Where the person against whom proceedings were taken lived at a distance and there was no special circumstance making his personal attendance necessary, it would be a very unwise exercise of jurisdiction to require him to appear personally, since the Magistrate could under this section allow him to appear by a pleader—*Dinonath v Giryā*, 12 Cal. 133

The words "bond for keeping the peace" imply that this section applies only to a case under Sec 107

117. (1) When the order under Section 112 has been read or explained under Section 113 to a person present in Court or when any person appears or is brought before a Magistrate in compliance with, or in execution of, a summons or warrant issued under section 114, the Magistrate shall proceed to inquire into the truth of the information upon which action has been taken, and to take such further evidence as may appear necessary.

Inquiry as to truth of information.

(2) Such inquiry shall be made, as nearly as may be practicable, where the order requires security for keeping the peace, in the manner hereinafter prescribed for conducting trials and recording evidence in summons-cases; and where the order requires security for good behaviour, in the manner hereinafter prescribed for conducting trials and recording evidence in warrant-cases, except that no charge need be framed.

(3) Pending the completion of the inquiry under subsection (1), the Magistrate, if he considers that immediate measures are necessary for the prevention of a breach of the peace or disturbance of the public tranquillity or the commission of any offence, or for the public safety, may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct the person, in respect of whom the order under Section 112 has been made, to execute a bond, with or without

sureties, for keeping the peace or maintaining good behaviour until the conclusion of the inquiry, and may detain him in custody until such bond is executed, or, in default of execution, until the inquiry is concluded.

Provided that—

(a) *no person against whom proceedings are not being taken under Section 108, Section 109 or Section 110 shall be directed to execute a bond for maintaining good behaviour, and*

(b) *the conditions of such bond, whether as to the amount thereof, or as to the provision of sureties or the number thereof or the pecuniary extent of their liability shall not be more onerous than those specified in the order under Section 112.*

(4) For the purposes of this section the fact that a person is a habitual offender or is so desperate or dangerous as to render his being at large without security hazardous to the community may be proved by evidence of general repute or otherwise.

(5) Where two or more persons have been associated together in the matter under inquiry, they may be dealt with in the same or separate inquiries as the Magistrate shall think just.

Change.—Subsection (3) and the italicised words in subsection (4) have been added by sec. 19 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923). The reasons are stated below. Subsections (3) and (4) have been renumbered as (4) and (5).

286. Sub-sec. (1)—Inquiry into truth of information :— Under this section a Magistrate is bound to inquire into the truth of the information notwithstanding that the accused admits the allegations against him and consents to furnish security—*K. E. v Nga Yan Shin*, U B R. (1902-3) 1, *Allahditto v. Emp.*, 10 S.L.R. 101, 26 Cr.L.J. 1041 See Note 236 under sec. 107.

It is not competent to a Magistrate to dispense with the inquiry provided for by this section, and to base his order merely on the result of another case recently tried by him—*Emperor v. Mul Chand*, 37 All 30 (31).

The inquiry to be held under this section is a full judicial inquiry. It must be conducted judicially and becomes a judicial proceeding. All

the formalities of a judicial proceeding have to be observed in the inquiry—*Sher Zaman v Emperor*, 1899 P.R. 10; *Nur Mahomed v. Nil Rutton*, 18 W.R. 2. The object of the inquiry is that the accused should have an opportunity to exculpate himself—*Q. v. Isree Pershad*, 20 W.R. 18, *Anon.*, 4 M.H.C.R. App. 22

Place of inquiry:—The inquiry should, wherever possible, be held in the village where the parties reside, so as to avoid witnesses being needlessly harassed and to enable the accused without difficulty to procure the attendance of persons willing to speak in his favour—1 Bur. S R 546. The inquiry should not be held in a place which is outside the local limits of the Magistrate's jurisdiction and where he has no power to conduct any proceedings; if he does so, the order passed thereon is void—*Sonaram v. K E.*, 3 C L J 195, 3 Cr L.J. 246

Summoning witnesses —It is quite clear that the accused person when appearing to show cause must be ready with his evidence. If he has been unable to bring the witnesses with him on account of the shortness of the notice or other reasonable cause, it is his duty, when he appears, to apply at once for summons to the witnesses he proposes to call—*Emp. v. Narayan*, 11 Bom L R 1385, *Chulan v Sukedad*, 23 W.R. 9. A Magistrate is bound to assist both parties in bringing their witnesses by issuing summons to attend—*Q. v. Cheyt Singh*, 22 W R 70

When a Magistrate is of opinion that the expenses for calling witnesses should be charged from parties, he should realise the expenses before issuing the summons—*Govind Sahai v. King Emp.*, 12 A L.J. 263, 15 Cr L J 363.

The accused person must be given sufficient time to bring his witnesses and have their evidence recorded. Where the accused has not had this opportunity, the order against him must be set aside—*Keramuddin v Emp.*, 41 Cal 806; *Q. v Cheyt Singh*, 22 W R 70, *Q E v. Nathu*, 11 All. 214; *Ponthiram v Emp.*, 38 C L.J. 285, 25 Cr.L.J. 293

The inquiry ought to be conducted with attention to the ordinary form of justice. The defendant should have every opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses produced against him, of making his own statement, and of calling witnesses on his behalf—*Anon.*, 4 M H C R. App 22.

Defence by Pleader:—The person against whom proceedings have been initiated under this Chapter has a right to be defended by a pleader—*Jhota Singh v. Q E*, 23 Cal. 493, *Emp v Girand*, 25 All 375. See notes under sec. 340

287. Further evidence:—The words "further evidence" indicate that some evidence may be taken by the Magistrate even before drawing up the preliminary order under section 112—*K E v Nga Po*, U.B.R 1905 Cr. P. C 29, 2 Cr.L.J. 462

The Magistrate trying a case is bound by law to hear those witnesses only whose list is sent up by the Police along with the case, and as soon as the witnesses produced in support of the case have been heard, the Magistrate is then to ascertain the names of the persons likely to be

acquainted with the facts of the case, and shall summon to give evidence only such of them as he thinks necessary. He is not bound by law to, and should not, save in very exceptional cases, call the other witnesses that the police or any one else may from time to time choose to produce—*Govind Sahai v Emp*, 12 A.L.J. 262, 15 Cr.L.J. 363.

In a proceeding under this section it is erroneous on the part of the Magistrate to admit fresh evidence for the prosecution after the close of the defence case. No further evidence can be admitted except under sec 540 for which valid reasons must be recorded—*Ganga Singh v K. E*, 10 A L J. 383, 13 Cr L J 772.

288. Sub-section (2)—Nature of procedure :—An inquiry in a proceeding for security to keep the peace must be made in the same way as in a trial of a summons case—*Emp v. Bidyapati*, 25 All. 273. See also *Cal G R & C O* page 82. If it is tried as a warrant case, the proceedings would be vitiated—*Uttam Chand v. K. E.*, A.I.R. 1924 All 695, 26 Cr L J 430. The Magistrate must proceed as nearly as practicable in the same way as under sec 242. He must state to the accused the particulars of the matter against him and ask him if he can show cause why he should not be required to execute bonds. The question 'are you willing to execute the bond?' answered by a statement that the accused would execute a bond, is not a sufficient compliance with the requirements of this section—*In re Palaniappa*, 34 Mad. 139. In an inquiry under sec 107, the deposition need not be read over to the witness in the presence of the accused. See 52 Cal. 668 cited in Note 1028 under sec 360. If the complainant is absent, the proper order is one of discharge under sec 119, but not of acquittal under sec 247—*Ashrafali v Nasu Sarkar*, 31 C W N 398, 28 Cr L J 479 (480).

An inquiry in a good-behaviour case must be conducted as if it were a warrant case, and the procedure in secs 251-256 must be followed. According to those sections an accused person cannot be called upon to enter on his defence until the prosecution closes its case (sec. 256)—*Ganga Singh v. K. E*, 10 A L J 383, 13 Cr L.J. 772. The Calcutta and the Punjab High Courts are of opinion that the procedure prescribed for warrant cases is not to be followed strictly but "is as nearly as practicable" to be observed, therefore, the accused cannot invoke the aid of sec 256 and is not entitled to ask the Court to recall the witnesses who have given evidence against him for further cross-examination—*Crown v. Ahmed Baksh*, 1916 P R 1, 17 Cr L J. 84; *Chintamon v. Emp.*, 35 Cal. 243; *Buz v. Emp.*, 8 Lah 265, 28 Cr L.J. 239.

'Except that no charge need be framed':—The reason for this exception is obvious. What is equivalent to a charge has already been framed in the order served upon the accused, in accordance with sec. 112—*Tirlok v. Emp.*, 25 A L.J. 749, 28 Cr.L J 792 (793).

Sub-section (3) :—"This sub-section has been added to enable the Magistrate in emergent cases to take immediate steps to preserve the public peace or for the public safety by taking security pending the detailed inquiry"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914).

The Court passing an order under clause (3) of this section must state its reasons in writing for passing the order; i.e. he must state that there was a likelihood of the accused committing a breach of the peace. Where all that the Magistrate said was that the order was passed on account of emergency, held that the order was bad and must be set aside—*Sahib Dino v. Emp.*, 21 S.L.R. 93, 28 Cr.L.J. 173

Where a Magistrate postpones the case after the accused has notified his intention to make a transfer application, he has jurisdiction to pass an order under clause (3) pending the completion of the inquiry—*Sahib Dino v. Emp.* (supra), *Baqridi v. Emp.*, 26 A.L.J. 398, 29 Cr.L.J. 448 (449).

289. Sub-section (4)—Evidence of general repute :— See this subject fully discussed in Note 272 under section 110.

Prior to the amendment of this sub-section, evidence of general repute was admissible only in those cases where the person was a habitual offender within the meaning of clauses (a) to (e) of section 110. It could not be adduced to prove under clause (f) of that section that a man was a desperate and dangerous character—*Emp v Indar*, 40 All 372, *Ganapati v. Emp.*, 19 Cr.L.J. 871 (Nag.), *In re Ranga Reddi*, 43 Mad. 450; *Kalai v. Emp.*, 29 Cal. 779, *Babu Murtaza v. K. E.*, 9 O.C. 69, *Emp. v. Hurmat*, 2 A.L.J. 174; *Wahid Ali v. Emp.*, 11 C.W.N. 789, *Akhoy v. Q. E.*, 5 C.W.N. 249, *Nur Muhammad v. Crown*, 1917 P.W.R. 8. These rulings are no longer good law in view of the amendment of sub-section (4) of the present section.

But the evidence of general repute is not admissible in a case where a person is called upon to furnish security under section 107 of the Code—*Emp. v. Bidyapati*, 25 All. 273; *Banarasi Das v. Emp.*, 1888 P.R. 16.

"Or otherwise"—According to the general rule of interpretation the word "otherwise" must be read as meaning something *eiusdem generis* with the particular or particulars alleged above it, e.g. hearsay evidence. It is clear that the intention of the Legislature is that the Magistrate should use very large discretion as to the evidence which he may admit in the proceedings—*Emp. v. Kallu Mal*, 1904 A.W.N. 140.

The expression 'or otherwise' would include statements made by some of the co-accused amounting to a confession of the actual commission of the offence and incriminating the other accused—*Sarju v. Emp.*, 41 All. 231.

290. Sub-section (5)—Joint trial :—Under this section, the persons who had been associated together may be tried jointly. But there must be clear evidence to prove the association—*Deodhari v. Emp.*, 6 P.L.T. 810, 26 Cr.L.J. 738. Where several persons are proceeded against under sec. 110, clause (5) of sec. 117 does not make it a condition precedent to such joint inquiry that the suspects shall be shown to be associated together in the order itself. It is a permissive clause which permits a joint inquiry being held where such persons are, as a matter of fact, associated together—*Tannor v. Emp.* 19 S.L.R. 176, 26 Cr.L.J. 1399. Where it was clearly established that the accused (who were father

and his three sons) were associated together and formed a gang, and the evidence against them was all the same, *held* that the case was one in which the accused could be rightly dealt with together and that any minute inquiry into the complicity of each of the accused individually was not necessary—*Parasulla v. K. E.*, 13 C.W.N. 244. Where the essence of the charge was that the accused formed one gang with one purpose, namely that of harassing the complainant, and each act spoken to by the witnesses was an act prompted by that common object and directed towards accomplishing it, and the evidence of the common association of all the persons for that one purpose was particularly strong, *held* that they could be jointly tried—*Taranagoud v. Emp.*, 51 Mad. 515, 29 Cr.L.J. 77 (79). If a gang of disorderly persons join together in jointly committing acts of violence or criminal intimidation, proceedings against the whole gang in the same case are proper, and it suffices in such cases that some members of the gang committed various acts. It is not necessary that the evidence should establish that on every occasion the whole gang were together. It is sufficient if the evidence establishes that there is a gang of persons joining together to commit such acts as the security-section exists to prevent—*Bakaram v. Emp.*, 23 Cr.L.J. 741 (Nag). Where certain persons serving under a common master were found to have committed certain acts of extortion for the benefit of their master, *held* that although each of the acts alleged was not done by all of them together, yet they were so associated together as to justify a joint inquiry—*Srikanta v. Emp.*, 9 C.W.N. 898.

The fact that persons are members of an undivided family would not by itself render each member liable for the misconduct of any other member. The test to be applied is, whether there has been habitual association between the persons charged in respect of the misconduct alleged in the complaint—*Kripasindhu v. Emp.*, 1918 M.W.N. 751, 19 Cr.L.J. 905. Where no such association is proved, a joint inquiry is improper; but the trial need not be set aside, unless it is shown that the accused was actually prejudiced or that the trial led to an improper order being passed—*Babu Murtaza v. K. E.*, 9 O.C. 69, *Q. E. v. Abdul Kadir*, 11 All. 452.

Even where the association of the several accused is established satisfactorily, the Magistrate has a discretion to try the accused jointly or separately—*Hari Telang v. Q. E.*, 27 Cal. 781; *Hossein v. Emp.*, 11 Cal. 96; *Jai Govind v. K. E.*, 15 O.C. 263. Although there is no legal prohibition in jointly trying a number of persons proceeded against under sec. 107, still it is highly unjust and unfair to proceed against them jointly unless it is apparent that they formed a gang. The case of each has to be considered separately and this is not likely to be effected if the trial is joint—*Muhammed Ismail v. Emp.*, 21 A.L.J. 841, 25 Cr.L.J. 982.

Association, what is not:—In the absence of any evidence to prove that the persons constituted a gang, the mere fact that they belonged to one tribe and village with a bad name is not sufficient evidence of association, and therefore they cannot be tried jointly in one and the same proceeding—*Murad v. Emp.*, 1895 P.R. 1. Thus, the fact that the

accused persons are close neighbours and had been previously implicated in good many cases together, does not lead to the inference that they were associated together in the particular offence under inquiry, and does not justify a joint trial of them all—*Jogendra v. Emp.*, 21 Cr.L.J. 700 (Cal.)

The word 'association' cannot apply to such cases where the offence is purely personal to the offender. For instance, the question whether the person is a habitual thief or not is personal to himself and forms a separate matter by itself. So, where four persons were charged under Sec. 110 (a) as being thieves by habit, it was held that there was an error in law in trying them all together—*K E v Po Tive*, 4 L B R 46, 6 Cr. L.J. 284. So also, the fact that the accused are desperate and dangerous persons hazardous to the community, is a fact which pertains to each accused separately, and there is no such connection between them in regard to their character which may be deemed as habitual association. Consequently, proceedings should be taken separately against each of the accused persons—*Hari Telang v. Q E*, 27 Cal 781 (783), *In re Kullfi Gounden*, 47 M.L.J. 689, A I R. 1925 Mad 189, 26 Cr.L.J. 673

Again, sub-section (5) does not authorise a Magistrate to deal with persons charged under separate sections in one and the same inquiry. Thus, a person called upon to give security under section 109, and another person called upon to give security under sec 110 cannot be tried together in the same proceeding—*K E v. Mehen*, 8 O.C. 91, 2 Cr L J 224

And lastly, two contending parties opposed to one another and inclined to commit an offence involving a breach of the peace, cannot be said to have been associated together, and a joint trial of such contending parties is illegal—*Pran Krishna v. Emp.*, 8 C.W.N 180. *In re Ganapathi*, 31 Mad. 276, *Kamat v Emp.*, 11 C.W.N 472, *Har Datt v. Emp.*, 14 A.L.J. 268, 17 Cr.L.J. 165, *Kishore v Emp.*, 10 P.L.T. 768, 26 Cr L.J. 1248. But in 9 All 452 it has been held that such a joint trial is not *ipso facto* null and void, except where the accused has been prejudiced thereby.

Separate finding and evidence :—Where proceedings are taken jointly against more persons than one under this sub-section, the Magistrate must come to a separate finding as regards each of them individually—*Ajodhya v. Emp.*, 35 Cal 929, *Kalu Mirza v Emp* 37 Cal 91, *Murad v. Emp.*, 1895 P.R 1, *Brijnandan v. Emp.*, 37 All 33, 16 Cr L J 46; *Khairao v. Emp.*, 19 S.L.R. 96; and the judgment must show that the Magistrate has considered the case of each individual accused—*Kalu Mirza v. Emp.*, 37 Cal. 91. The case of each person is to be considered on its own merits, and it should not be allowed to be mixed up or prejudiced by that of the others—*Q E. v Nathu*, 11 All 214, *Md Ismail v. Emp.*, 21 A.L.J. 811, 25 Cr L.J 952. Upon general principles every accused person is entitled to insist that his case shall be tried separately from the case of other persons similarly circumstanced—*Q E v. Abdul Kadir*, 9 All. 452, *Bahadur Shah v Emp.*, 1910 P.R 4, 10 Cr L.J. 591.

The Magistrate must insist upon definite evidence being given against each person charged—*Jai Govind v. K. E.*, 15 O.C. 263, 13 Cr.L.J. 760. What is evidence against one cannot be treated as evidence against all others, without discriminating between the cases of the various persons implicated—*Q. E. v. Abdul Kadir*, 9 All. 452; *Emp. v. Angnu Singh*, 45 All. 109 (111). Thus, where the evidence recorded by the Magistrate has bearing only on 11 out of 26 persons called upon to show cause, his order binding down all the 26 persons is not valid; it is valid only as regards those against whom the evidence is relevant—*In re Kassim Biswas*, 10 C.L.R. 335.

118. (1) If, upon such inquiry, it is proved that it is necessary for keeping the peace or maintaining good behaviour as the case may be, that the person in respect of whom the inquiry is made should execute a bond, with or without sureties, the Magistrate shall make an order accordingly :

Provided—

first, that no person shall be ordered to give security of a nature different from, or of an amount larger than, or for a period longer than, that specified in the order made under section 112;

secondly, that the amount of every bond shall be fixed with due regard to the circumstances of the case and shall not be excessive;

thirdly, that, when the person in respect of whom the inquiry is made is a minor, the bond shall be executed only by his sureties.

291. "If it is proved etc."—Evidence :—These words show that an order under this section cannot be made without inquiry and proof—*Q. E. v. Gaiba, Ratanlal* 585 (586). The Magistrate must give his reason for finding it proved that security is necessary—*In re Raja*, 10 Bom. 174 (175). The finding of the Magistrate must be based on clear and full evidence. As much detail as possible should be required before making an order under this section—*Emp. v. Hamidulla*, 1889 A.W.N. 114.

The mere fact that the accused person says that he is willing to give security to keep the peace is not the kind of proof required by this section is a condition precedent to the taking of security—*Prem Singh v. Crown*, 1917 P.R. 27, 18 Cr.L.J. 847; *Crown v. Sheodan*, 1915 P.R. 24. See Note 236 under sec. 107. When the accused denied the allegations but expressed his willingness to execute a bond, whereupon he

was ordered ■ execute ■ bond, the order was held to be illegal, in as much as the accused denied every allegation on the basis of which he was considered liable to furnish security, and no evidence was taken to prove those allegations—*Emp. v. Rai Singh*, 20 Cr.L.J. 105; *Emp. v. Kurwa*, 26 A.L.J. 519, 30 Cr.L.J. 122 (124).

As to the nature of evidence, see notes under Secs 107, 110.

292. Order for security :—The object of this section is the prevention and not the punishment of offences, and consequently a Magistrate when passing an order in terms of this section, ought not to have any direct intention of inflicting punishment—*Q ■ v Kandhara*, 7 All. 67. Therefore, a Magistrate ought not to impose arbitrary conditions not essential for the object in view, which it would be impossible for the accused to fulfil, still less impossible conditions. The order must not be tantamount to saying that the prisoner shall not furnish any security at all but must go to jail. It is not in the power of the Magistrate to pass such order. The object of the law is that the person charged shall furnish, if he can, good and sufficient security—*In re Narain Soobodhee*, 22 W.R. 37.

According to the first proviso to this section, the final order must not be at variance with the preliminary order. Thus, the Magistrate cannot vary the conditional order passed under sec 112 by imposing further conditions in the final order—*Ramanand v. K. E.*, 11 O.C. 267, 8 Cr.L.J. 344, *Emp. v. Jangi Singh*, 1906 A.W.N. 276, 4 Cr.L.J. 405. So also, it is illegal to require a bond for good behaviour, when the notice was to show cause with respect to keeping the peace—*Driver v. Q. E.*, 25 Cal. 798. Similarly, the Magistrate is not competent to demand security with reference to sec. 110, when the preliminary order was with reference to sec. 109—*K. E. v Nga He*, U ■ R. (1897—1901) 24. (In such a case, the proper course is to institute fresh proceedings—*Ibid*) So again, the Magistrate is not justified in demanding security for a larger amount than what was communicated to the accused in the preliminary order—*Kishen v. Crown*, 1907 P.W.R. 11, 5 Cr.L.J. 219, *Isree Pershad*, 18 W.R. 61; *Emp. v. Debi*, 1885 A.W.N. 30; nor is he justified in demanding sureties when the summons made no mention of sureties at all—*Q v. Isree Pershad*, 18 W.R. 61. In cases where heavier security is deemed necessary, the Magistrate ought to issue fresh summons setting forth the amount intended to be taken—*Isree Pershad*, 18 W.R. 61; *Emp v. Md. Ismail*, 1881 A.W.N 152.

Moreover, the Magistrate cannot in the final order direct the accused to give security for a longer period than what was mentioned in the notice under section 112—*Ramchandra v. Emp.*, 26 Mad 471.

A person against whom an order is passed under this section must be given sufficient time to furnish security. Where the Magistrate ordered the accused to furnish security with four sureties of Rs. 3,000 each on the very day, and imprisoned the accused on his failure to do so, held that the order was illegal and must be set aside—*Maung Tun v. Emp.*, 4 Bur L.J. 172, 27 Cr.L.J. 318.

Supplementary order for larger security :—A Magistrate passed a final order directing certain persons to furnish security in certain amounts. A month later he passed another order directing one of the accused to furnish security in a much bigger sum and stating that he had overlooked that this accused had been called upon in the preliminary order to furnish a larger security. It was held that the second order was *ultra vires*. After the Magistrate had finished his case, it was beyond his power to alter the order—*Rajkumar v. Emp.*, 17 A.L.J. 335.

293. Amount of security :—Under proviso (2), in fixing the amount of security, the Magistrate should have due regard to the circumstances of the case, and the security should not be disproportionate to the ability of the accused to furnish it, with reference to his means and station in life—*Q. E. v. Rama*, 16 Bom. 372; *Q. E. v. Nathu*, 6 All. 214, *In re Umbica*, 1 C.L.R. 268, *In re Juggut*, 2 Cal. 110; *Ali v. Emp.*, 1900 P.R. 17, *Jawaya v. Emp.*, 1890 P.R. 30, *Firal v. Emp.*, 5 S.L.R. 10, 12 Cr.L.J. 110. *In re Nilmadhub*, 19 W.R. 1; *Q. v. Gholam Mahomed*, 22 W.R. 17, *Anon.*, 4 M.H.C.R. App. 46, 2 Weir 52. The amount should be such as to give the accused a fair chance of complying with the conditions of the security, and the Magistrate should not fix an amount for which there is a probability of the accused being unable to find security—*Ali v. Emp.*, 1900 P.R. 17; *Wasia v. Emp.*, 1901 P.R. 28; *Barkat v. Crown*, 1900 P.R. 24; *Anon.*, 2 Weir 52, 4 M.H.C.R. App. 46; *Emp. v. Dedar*, 2 Cal. 384. When the accused is unable to give security for the amount required and remains in jail, it is an index that the Magistrate has not exercised a proper discretion in fixing the amount—*Q. E. v. Raza Ali*, 23 All. 80.

There is no warrant in law for taking separate bonds from the accused and his sureties individually and severally, exceeding in the aggregate the amount for which the accused is liable—*Jawaya v. Empress*, 1890 P.R. 30.

Magistrate to state grounds .—On a requisition from the High Court, the Magistrate is bound to state the grounds upon which he fixed the amount of security. Where the amount of security is *prima facie* unreasonable, the High Court can call upon the Magistrate to state the grounds for fixing that amount—*In re Juggut*, 2 Cal. 110, *Ram Singh v. Emp.*, 1883 P.R. 1.

House property as security .—The accused was ordered under this section to furnish a bond for Rs. 200 and a respectable surety. Such a surety came forward and offered security in the shape of house property worth Rs. 500. The Magistrate rejected the surety. It was held that the surety being respectable and the house being worth Rs. 500 should have been accepted, though it was true that under sec. 514 only moveable property could be attached and sold during the surety's lifetime for the recovery of the penalty—*Nanhe v. Emp.*, 16 A.L.J. 503, 19 Cr.L.J. 711.

293A. Minor :—In the case of a minor the bond shall be executed only by his sureties. See proviso 3. The reason for this proviso is no

doubt the incapacity of the minor to contract—*K. E. v. Mipyn*, 4 L.B.R. 12, 8 Cr.L.J. 123.

294. Revision by High Court :—The power to demand security from suspected persons is a power that is almost as much of an executive as of a judicial nature; and the jurisdiction with which the Magistrate is invested with regard to suspected persons is a very large one. It would be going counter to the spirit of the Code to give persons ordered to furnish security a remedy in the nature of an appeal to the High Court, which has not been granted to them by the Legislature. Therefore the High Court will interfere with the orders passed by a Magistrate only on the very clearest and strongest grounds which demonstrate that there has been in the particular case a gross miscarriage of justice—*Balmukand v. Emp.*, 1889 P.R. 23

The High Court will interfere in revision where the order is based on no evidence on the record—*Sher Singh v. Hari Singh*, 1912 P.L.R. 195, 13 Cr.L.J. 720, *Emp. v. Sukhdeo*, 14 A.L.J. 215, 17 Cr.L.J. 157; or where the materials on which the order was passed are clearly insufficient to support the order—*Nafar Chandra v. Emp.*, 38 C.L.J. 198, or where there is nothing on the record to show that an inquiry as required by sec 117 was held—*Mul Chand v. K.E.*, 37 All 30, 12 A.L.J. 1262, *Emp. v. Sukhdeo*, 14 A.L.J. 215. It will also interfere where the judgment of the District Judge deciding an appeal under section 110 is a very short one and does not show that evidence was all examined and carefully weighed—*Sarwan v. Emp.*, 14 A.L.J. 279, 17 Cr.L.J. 167, *Babu Pershad v. Emp.*, 13 Cr.L.J. 9 (All); or where the Magistrate disbelieved the evidence produced by the accused without any substantial reason—*Miharban v. Emp.*, 16 Cr.L.J. 805, 13 A.L.J. 1046; *Hakim Singh v. Emp.*, 13 A.L.J. 1055, 16 Cr.L.J. 810; or where the Magistrate has not given due effect to the evidence for the defence—*Gayani v. Emp.*, 17 Cr.L.J. 461 (All), or where the Lower Appellate Court in hearing the appeal has not taken the trouble to rehear the case—*Ibid.*

The High Court has the power to interfere in revision where the exercise of discretion being required by law, the lower Court exercised no discretion at all or exercised its discretion in a wholly unreasonable and improper manner, e.g. where the Magistrate ordered security to be furnished in an unreasonably large sum out of all proportion to the means of the accused—*In re Juggut*, 2 Cal 110. The High Court may interfere in revision if there is a material error in any judicial proceeding, i.e. an error resulting in an unjust order for security—*Ibid.*

See also Note 276 under sec. 110

Appeal.—See sec. 406

119. If, on an inquiry under section 117, it is not proved that it is necessary for keeping the peace or maintaining good behaviour, as the case may be, that

Discharge of person
informed against.

the person in respect of whom the inquiry is made should execute a bond, the Magistrate shall make an entry on the record to that effect, and if such person is in custody only for the purposes of the inquiry, shall release him, or, if such person is not in custody, shall discharge him.

295. Further inquiry :—The word 'discharge' means merely a permission to depart. It does not mean the discharge of an 'accused' person as contemplated by sec 437 (now 436) so as to enable further proceedings being instituted under that section against the person discharged under this section—*Velu v Chidambara*, 33 Mad 85. Section 437 (now 436) does not enable a Court to direct further inquiry in a case of discharge of a person against whom security proceedings were instituted under Chapter VIII, because such a person is not an 'accused' within the meaning of that section—*Q. E v. Imam Mandal*, 27 Cal 662; *Dayanath v Emp*, 33 Cal 8; *Muhammad Khan v. Emp*, 1905 P.R 42, *Emp v Roshan Singh*, 46 All 235, 22 A.L.J 129; *Narain v. Durga*, 1911 P.R. 6, 12 Cr L.J. 232, *Ismail v Nollan*, 1914 U.B.R 1st Qr 3, 15 Cr L.J 531. (But the contrary view has been taken in *Fyazuddin*, 24 All 148; *Kharga*, 36 All 147; *Manna v. Emp*, 1903 P.R 24; *Mona Puna*, 16 Bom. 661; *Baba Yeshwanta*, 35 Bom. 401; and *Mutsaddi Lal*, 21 All 107, where it is held that the person proceeded against under this chapter may be said to be an 'accused' person and further inquiry may therefore be directed)

Section 430 as now amended in 1923 clearly applies only to the case of a person *accused of an 'offence'*, further inquiry cannot therefore be directed against a person discharged under sec 119, because the person proceeded against under this chapter is not accused of an *offence*. The rulings cited above within brackets are no longer good law. See Note 1180 under sec. 436

C.—Proceedings in all Cases subsequent to Order to furnish Security.

120. (1) If any person, in respect of whom an order requiring security is made under section 106 or section 118, is, at the time such order is made, sentenced to, or undergoing a sentence of, imprisonment, the period for which such security is required shall commence on the expiration of such sentence.

(2) In other cases such period shall commence on the date of such order, unless the Magistrate, for sufficient reason, fixes a later date.

296. "On the expiration of the sentence":—Under this section, a convict undergoing a sentence of imprisonment cannot be obliged to give security, until the imprisonment ends; nor can an order for imprisonment (under Sec. 123) in default be made till then—*Q. E. v. Appa*, Ratanlal 765; *Emp. v. Rangya*, 4 Bom. L.R. 934; *Q. E. v. Pandu*, Ratanlal 774; *Kya Wa v. K E.*, 5 L.B.R. 34, 10 Cr.L.J. 69; *Emp. v. Jhapdey*, 22 Cr.L.J. 95 (All.). If, in the meantime, he is convicted of another offence, and sentenced to a fresh term of imprisonment, the order for security should not be passed until after the expiry of both imprisonments. If, before such expiry, the prisoner gives the required security, the Magistrate cannot pass an order of imprisonment under sec 123—*Q. E. v. Pandu*, Ratanlal 774.

The accused was convicted under sec. 147 I P C. but was released on bail pending an appeal against the conviction. While he was on bail, proceedings were taken against him under sec 110 of this Code and he was ordered to furnish security, or in default, to undergo imprisonment. His appeal was afterwards dismissed and the Magistrate ordered that as he was undergoing imprisonment in default of furnishing security, the sentence under sec 147 I P C would commence after the expiry of the sentence under sec. 110 Cr P C. Held that the order was illegal, being in contravention of subsection (1) of this section—*Emp. v. Jhabdey*, 22 Cr.L.J. 95 (All.)

Sub-section (2):—*Date of such order*—It means the date of the final order under sec 118, and not the date of the preliminary order under sec. 112—*Teranagowd*, 51 Mad 515, 29 Cr L J 77 (78)

Fixing later date—The object of this sub-section is to allow a Magistrate to grant time to the accused instead of at once proceeding to order imprisonment as if in default. This is shown by Sec. 123 which provides that the security may be given on or before the date on which the period for such security commences—*Mad Abdul Bari v. Emp.*, 4 C.W.N. 121. The Magistrate has power under this section to postpone the date from which the security should take effect, i.e., to give the accused time within which to furnish it, and if the accused absconds during the extended time, the sureties who were responsible for the accused's attendance would be made liable—*Mustaqimuddin v. Emp.*, 24 A L J. 327, 27 Cr.L.J. 377 (378)

Where an order is passed on the accused under sec 118, and then on the request of the accused the Magistrate grants him 12 days' time to furnish the required security, and during this 12 days' time he is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the date of the order under sec 118, it is not competent to the Magistrate to fix the date of the expiry of such sentence as the date for computing the period from which such security is to be furnished. The case falls neither under clause (1) nor under clause (2) of this section, and the Magistrate is bound to proceed at once under sec. 123 and order imprisonment of the accused—*Emp v Ahmed*, 20 S L R. 163 (F.B.), 27 Cr.L.J. 865. An order for security was made under sec. 118 on October 20, but upon the failure of the accused to give security, he

was ordered to be imprisoned for one year under sec. 123, on October 29. But between October 20 and October 29, he was convicted of a substantive offence and sentenced to 7 years' rigorous imprisonment. *Held* that under sec. 120 (2) the period of the order under sec. 118 commenced on October 20, and the Magistrate should not have made any order under sec. 123 at all. However, the two sentences were concurrent—*Emp. v Abu Farid*, 29 Bom.L.R. 700, 28 Cr.L.J. 652.

The provisions of the two clauses of this section may be thus explained. If on the date of the order passed under sec. 118 the suspect is undergoing imprisonment for a substantive offence, the provisions of clause (1) come into operation, and the period of security does not commence till the suspect has served out his substantive sentence of imprisonment. The proper procedure under the circumstances would be that the Magistrate should not pass the order for detention of the suspect under sec. 123 at once but postpone further proceedings under that section, till the suspect has served out the period of sentence for the substantive offence. If on the date of the order under sec. 118, the suspect is not undergoing imprisonment for a substantive offence, his case does not fall within the purview of clause (1) of sec. 120. If, on that date, the suspect asks for time to furnish the required security, it is open to the Magistrate to refuse to grant time and to take immediate action under sec. 123. If however he grants time and before the expiry of the time the suspect is convicted of a substantive offence, and sentenced to imprisonment, the Magistrate should proceed at once to pass an order under sec. 123, which provides for immediate detention in prison of the suspect till he furnishes the required security. This detention should *ipso facto* run concurrently with the substantive sentence which the accused is undergoing—*Emp. v Saidu*, 22 S.L.R. 20, 28 Cr.L.J. 431.

Fresh security.—A second order requiring further security from the same person to commence on the expiration of the term of security already given, passed during the continuance of the first one, is not a proper order. If at the end of the period the act involving a breach of the peace is still continued, a further security can be demanded on fresh proceedings being properly taken—*Md Abdul Bari v Emp.*, 4 C.W.N. 121.

121. The bond to be executed by any such person shall bind him to keep the peace or to be of good behaviour, as the case may be, and in the latter case the commission or attempt to commit, or the abetment of, any offence punishable with imprisonment, wherever it may be committed, is a breach of the bond.

297. Breach of bond for keeping peace:—A bond for keeping the peace will not be forfeited by the commission of any

offence. It can be forfeited only by the commission of offences likely in their consequences to cause a breach of the peace. Thus, a conviction for theft (*In re Haren Chunder*, 18 W.R. 63), or for wrongful confinement or extortion (*In re Zearuddin*, 19 W.R. 48) or for abduction (*Browne v. Chandra*, 1906 P.R. 6, 4 Cr. L.J. 78) or for a secret attempt to poison a person (*Ahmad Gul v. Crown*, 1914 P.R. 22, 11 Cr.L.J. 605) will not entail a forfeiture of the bond.

In *Ananthachari v. Ananthachari*, 2 Mad 169, however, it has been held that it is not necessary that some actually punishable offence should be committed. All that is necessary to show is that some act was done which was likely in its consequence to provoke a breach of the peace.

A bond to keep the peace may be forfeited on the commission of any act involving a breach of the peace, no matter whether the act is committed against the person at whose charge the original order was framed or against any other person—*Jaha Bor*, 15 W R 14. It is also immaterial whether the accused committed the act with his own hands or instigated other persons to do it. In either case the bond is forfeited—*Ananthachari*, 2 Mad 169, *Q v Kally*, 11 W R 52.

If some persons (Hindus) are bound down under section 107 owing to an apprehension of a breach of the peace on account of their interference with the slaughter of cows by the Mahomedans at a particular place, such persons are not debarred from instituting a civil suit to prevent the Mahomedans from slaughtering cows at that place, and the institution of the suit will not amount to a breach of the bond which they were required to furnish. The filing of the civil suit may be extremely provocative to the Mahomedans and may lead to further quarrel and breach of the peace, but it cannot by any stretch of language be called a wrongful act which would entail forfeiture of the bond. The bringing of the civil suit is a perfectly legal action, and the Hindus were acting within their rights in doing so. It is clearly not the intention of the legislature to prevent persons, even though bound down by a security bond, from seeking to enforce their rights in Civil Courts, otherwise, the result will be that no person so bound over would be able to institute a civil or criminal proceeding without endangering the forfeiture of his bond—*Sital v. Crown*, 1 Lah. 310, 21 Cr L J 702.

298. Breach of bond for good behaviour.—A bond for good behaviour will be forfeited by the commission of any offence. Thus, a conviction for causing grievous hurt (*Crown v. Sher Singh*, 1915 P.R. 10, 16 Cr.L.J. 549) or a conviction under Sec 13 of the Gambling Act, III of 1867 (*Emp. v. Abdul Hai*, 1906 A W N 13) would amount to a breach of the bond.

But an actual commission of the offence is necessary for the forfeiture of the bond. Where a person bound down under Sec 109 was found to be in possession of costly clothes, for which he could not satisfactorily account, it was held that the bond should not be forfeited, since there was no proof that he had actually stolen those clothes—*In re Venkataswamy*, 2 Weir 57. The bond is forfeited by the commission

of any offence no matter wherever the offence may be committed. If the bond is entered into in one district and the accused is convicted of committing an assault in another district, the bond is forfeited, and the Magistrate of the former district can proceed against the accused under this section—*Q v. Sham Sundar*, 2 B.L.R. A.C. 11.

The words 'commission of an offence' do not necessarily imply a conviction for an offence. Although it is true that a conviction is considered necessary to establish that an offence has been committed, still there is no authority for the extreme view that the commission of an offence cannot be proved otherwise than by a conviction—*Mansur v. Emp.*, 24 Cr L J 588, *Sheo Jangal v. Emp.*, 50 All. 666, 30 Cr.L.J. 203 (204).

An offence committed in a Native State would amount to a breach of the bond—*Crown v Dewa Singh*, 1910 P.R. 28; but see *Bahadur Singh v Crown*, 1918 P R 26

299. Procedure on breach of bond:—When a person forfeits a bond by being convicted of an offence, the amount of the forfeited bond may be recovered, but he cannot be forthwith imprisoned for the unexpired portion of the term for which security was taken. The Magistrate's remedy is to take fresh proceedings under this Chapter—*Emp v. Jag Deo*, 28 All. 629

A Magistrate is not justified in forfeiting a recognisance under this section without giving the party charged with the breach an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses upon whose evidence the rule to show cause has been issued—*Emp v Nobin*, 4 Cal. 865.

300. Liability of surety —See notes under sec. 514.

It has been held in Punjab that in order to make the surety liable, the conviction of the principal must be for an offence similar to that for which security was given. When men stand sureties in respect of sec. 110, it is to be understood that they undertake liability for only such good conduct on the part of the principal as is indicated by the circumstances under which the security was demanded, and not for any conceivable form of offence committed by the principal. Thus, where a person was required to give security for being suspected as a thief and a habitual receiver of stolen property, and a person was accepted as his surety, and the principal offender was subsequently convicted under sec. 326 I. P. C., held that the surety should not be held liable—*Udham Singh v. K. E.*, 1913 P.R. 15, 14 Cr.L.J. 575. In *Crown v. Sher Singh*, 1915 P.R. 10, 16 Cr.L.J. 549, under similar circumstances, the sureties were not altogether exempted, but were ordered to pay a reduced penalty, viz., Rs. 500 instead of Rs. 1000. The Allahabad High Court holds that the surety is liable for any offence committed by the person bound over, and this section makes no reservation that in order to make the surety liable the offence committed by the person bound over should be *ejusdem generis* with the offence for which he was bound over—*Sheo Jangal*, 50 All. 666, 30 Cr L.J. 203 (204).

A person was put on security for Rs. 1000 for one year, and two other persons stood sureties for him. The person was afterwards convicted under sec. 323 I. P. C. in which offence he was found to have taken only a minor part. *Held*, under the circumstances, that the order of forfeiture of a reasonable sum of Rs. 50 against the sureties was sufficient, and that they need not be burdened—*Falla v. Crown*, 1915 P.R. 6, 16 Cr.L.J. 287.

122. A Magistrate may refuse to accept any surety offered under this Chapter, on the ground that, for reasons to be recorded by the Magistrate, such surety is an unfit person.

122. (1) A Magistrate may refuse to accept any surety offered, or may reject any surety previously accepted by him or his predecessor under this Chapter, on the ground that such surety is an unfit person for the purposes of the bond :

Provided that, before so refusing to accept or rejecting any such surety, he shall either himself hold an inquiry on oath into the fitness of the surety or cause such inquiry to be held and a report to be made thereon by a Magistrate subordinate to him.

(2) Such Magistrate shall before holding the inquiry give reasonable

the substance of the evidence adduced before him.

(3) If the Magistrate is satisfied after considering the evidence so adduced either before him or before a Magistrate deputed under sub-section (1), and the report of such Magistrate (if any), that the surety is an unfit person for the purposes of the bond, he shall make an order refusing to accept or rejecting, as the case may be, such surety and

recording his reasons for so doing:
Provided that before making an order rejecting any surety who has previously been accepted, the Magistrate shall issue his summons or warrant as he thinks fit and cause the person for whom the surety is bound to appear or to be brought before him.

Change.—The whole section has been newly drafted by Sec. 20 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923).

The main changes introduced by this new section are —(1) rejection of a surety previously accepted, (2) inquiry into the fitness of a surety; and (3) delegation of such inquiry to a subordinate Magistrate. The reasons have been stated below in their proper places.

301. Rejection of sureties:—The question as to whether a particular person is fit to stand as surety or not, is a matter for the decision of the Magistrate. The question in every case is one of discretion and the Magistrate's discretion in this matter is not fettered in any way—*In re Jalil*, 13 C.W.N. 80, *Bhawani v K. E.*, 12 A.L.J. 1004, 16 Cr.L.J. 54; *Abdul Karim v K. E.*, 44 Cal 737, 21 C.W.N. 925. But this discretion to accept or reject a surety must be exercised only after a satisfactory inquiry in accordance with law—*Bhawani v K. E.*, 12 A.L.J. 1004; *Albar Ali v Emp.*, 42 Cal 706, 19 C.W.N. 220, *Rayan v Emp.*, 43 Cal 1024, 20 C.W.N. 1133. The Magistrate can refuse or accept any surety only on valid and reasonable grounds and not on mere conjectures and surmises—*Abdul Khan*, 10 C.W.N. 1027; *Asiruddi v Emp.*, 41 Cal. 764, *In re Narain*, 22 W.R. 37. So long as the sureties are of a satisfactory class, and the security offered is good and sufficient, the Magistrate is not justified in rejecting them—*Q. v Gaani*, 7 N.W.P. 249.

After an order is passed under section 118 demanding sureties, the Magistrate cannot introduce any new qualifications while deciding on the suitability of the sureties, and cannot reject them because they do not answer to those qualifications—*Alladitto v. Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1041 (Sind).

Sureties ought not to be rejected merely on the strength of reports of the Police—*Jai Govind v K. E.*, 15 O.C. 263, 13 Cr.L.J. 760, *Abdul Khan*, 10 C.W.N. 1027, *Emp. v Tota*, 25 All. 272; *Panchoo v Emp.*, 29 Cal 455; *Munshi v. Emp.*, 18 A.L.J. 324, 21 Cr.L.J. 365; *Gopi v Emperor*, 20 A.L.J. 760; *K. E. v Kaim Khan*, 1906 P.R. 18; *Zorawar v. Emp.*, 13 A.L.J. 469, 16 Cr.L.J. 445; *Bhawani*, 12 A.L.J. 1001; *Emp. v. Mahro*, 2 S.L.R. 11; *Crown v Kamal*, 2 S.L.R. 15; *Md Ibrahim v. Crown*, 16 Cr.L.J. 100, 8 S.L.R. 173. The implicit acceptance of the opinions expressed in police reports without considering the facts upon which such opinions are based, would place all persons ordered to

furnish security at the mercy of the police—*In re Abdul Khan*, 10 C.W.N. 1027. When a Magistrate bases his orders on a police report, he abrogates the functions imposed on him by law, and allows the decision of the case to rest with the police. If he asks the police to report, it should be with a view merely of enabling them to collect and call evidence. But in every case his order must proceed on a consideration of the evidence and not of the police report—*Imp v. Mahro*, 2 S.L.R. 11, 10 Cr.L.J. 225; *Jai Govind v K E*, 15 O.C. 263, 13 Cr.L.J. 760. The practice of calling in a police officer for a report on the character of the surety is illegal, and the police officer should, if his evidence is necessary, be examined as a witness—*K. E. v. Kaim Khan*, 1906 P.R. 18. Where a surety tendered by the accused is reported by the police to be an unreliable person, it is not for the surety to prove that he is of good character, but for the Magistrate, if he doubts it, to decide the matter upon evidence—*Munshi Singh v Emp*, 18 A.L.J. 324, 21 Cr.L.J. 365. Even a Magistrate cannot rely on his personal knowledge in rejecting a surety and dispense with an inquiry—*Crown v. Piru*, 7 S.L.R. 94, 15 Cr.L.J. 378. When a Magistrate receives private information that the sureties are bad characters, he ought not to reject them on that information alone. He should bring the information to the notice of the sureties and give them an opportunity of controverting it—*Ela Buksh v. Emp.*, 14 C.W.N. 709.

Before the amendment of this section, it was held that when a person had been once accepted as a surety, he could not be rejected subsequently as an unfit person—*Emp. v. Ram Lal*, 1 C.W.N. 304; *Emp v. Pirya Lal*, 1905 P.R. 16, 2 Cr.L.J. 278. But these decisions are now rendered obsolete by reason of the addition of the words "may reject any surety previously accepted." "We have adopted the suggestion that the provisions of the new section 122 should be elaborated so as to enable a Magistrate to reject a surety previously accepted by him or his predecessor"—*Report of the Joint Committee* (1922). The proviso to subsection (3) prescribes a procedure to be followed in such a case.

If the Magistrate is not satisfied with the sureties tendered, he should reject them within a reasonable time so as to give the accused an opportunity of offering fresh sureties—*Maung Tun v Emp*, 4 Bur L.J. 172, 27 Cr.L.J. 318 (319).

302. Test as to fitness—According to the Allahabad High Court the primary test is whether the surety can exercise proper control over the person who has been bound over—*Sheikh Zikri v King Emp.*, 8 A.L.J. 785. Mere pecuniary fitness is not the only test of his fitness. The object of requiring security for good behaviour is not to obtain money for the Crown by the forfeiture of recognisances, but to ensure that the accused should be of good behaviour. It is therefore reasonable to expect that the sureties should not be men residing at such a distance as would make it unlikely that they could exercise any control over the accused—*Q. E. v. Rahim Baksh*, 20 All 206, *Emp. v. Tori*, 1895 A.W.N. 143, *Emp. v. Babu*, 1898 A.W.N. 199; *Manna v Emp.*

15 A.L.J. 848, 18 Cr.L.J. 1039. And this seems to be the intention of the legislature by reason of the addition of the words "for the purposes of the bond."

In Burma it is laid down that the sureties must be persons who are in a position to influence the accused and likely to be able to restrain him—*Nga Hein v. K. E.*, 8 Bur.L.T. 53.

In Sind, it has been held that it is not in itself a disqualification that a person cannot exercise active physical control over the accused; it is no doubt an advantage in a surety to be in a position to send for the accused from time to time to question and warn him and to put physical restraint on him; but a man may be a satisfactory surety if he is in a position to watch the movements of the accused and to ascertain from time to time how he is behaving—*Md. Ibrahim v. Crown*, 8 S.L.R. 173, 16 Cr.L.J. 100. But mere solvency of the surety is not the only test of his fitness. The Magistrate has also to consider the question of the ability of the surety to enforce the good conduct of the accused, as relevant to his fitness—*Emp. v. Md. Pahor*, 1 S.L.R. 46. In another Sind case, however, it is held that sureties cannot be rejected on the ground that they will not be able to influence the accused. The most that a Magistrate can reasonably demand is that they should be respectable men, neighbours of the accused, and solvent up to the amount of the security required—*Crown v. Ahmed*, 1 S.L.R. 14.

In Oudh, it has been held that a surety should not be rejected on the mere ground that he lives at a distance from the accused; but inability to control is a good ground—*Emp. v. Md. Baksh*, 26 O.C. 284. If the sureties undertake to keep the accused within the area of their observation or to adopt other suitable measures for securing the supervision and control needed to keep him in good behaviour, there can be no inherent objection to their being accepted as sufficient, though they reside at a place 18 miles distant from that of the accused—*K. E. v. Rameshwar*, 10 O.L.J. 299, 24 Cr.L.J. 795.

According to the Bombay High Court, the condition attached to a surety for good behaviour, demanded under sec. 112, that he should be able to control the accused is not a desirable condition—*Emp. v. Jiva Natha*, 16 Bom.L.R. 138, 15 Cr.L.J. 268. It is sufficient if the sureties are solvent and respectable. Therefore, where the sureties offered were solvent and respectable, the mere fact that they lived at some distance from the persons bound over and were not in a position to exercise control over those persons was not a good ground for their non-acceptance—*In re Jesha Bhatha*, 44 Bom. 385, 21 Cr.L.J. 377, 23 Bom.L.R. 190.

In Calcutta, however, there is a conflict of decisions as to whether the pecuniary or moral fitness is the primary test. In *Ram Pershad v. K. E.*, 11 C.W.N. 593 and *Adam Sheikh v. Emp.*, 35 Cal. 400 it has been held that the primary test is whether the surety is a person of sufficient substance to warrant his being accepted, and the fact that he cannot supervise or control the person bound over or that he is not a resident of the same village (*Suresh v. Emp.*, 3 C.L.J. 575) is not material.

So also, in *Kalu Mirza v. Emp.*, 37 Cal. 91 and *Rayan v. Emp.*, 43 Cal. 1024, a failure by the sureties to show that they could exercise proper control over the accused was held to be not a proper ground for their rejection. In *Jafar Ali v. Emp.*, 37 Cal. 446, it has been held that the pecuniary test is the primary test, but there may be other objections to be considered, and any such objection must be dealt with in each case as it arises. But in *Asiraddi v. Emp.*, 41 Cal. 764, and *Abdul Karim v. Emp.*, 44 Cal. 737 the fact that the sureties would not be able to exercise proper control over the accused (who was a notorious dacoit) was held to be a proper ground of unfitness of the sureties.

[In the Amendment Bill of 1914 it was expressly provided that the Magistrate would be able to reject a surety on one of the following grounds, viz. (a) that he was not of good moral character; or (b) that he was not of sufficient means to enable him to fulfil his pecuniary liability under the bond, or (c) that he was unable to control the movements or actions of the person by whom the bond was executed. But the Select Committee of 1916 did not accept this amendment, and observed: "We think that it would be a mistake to attempt any definition of unfitness for the purpose of acceptance of a surety, and we recommend that sec. 122 should be left unaffected." The Joint Committee of 1922, however, again added those clauses, but during the debate in the Legislative Assembly (23rd January 1923) they were again deleted.]

What are not disqualifications.—The fact that the sureties offered are the relations of the accused, far from being a disqualification, is a circumstance which would be an additional qualification, if the sureties are in other respects suitable. A relation is more likely than any other person to keep an eye on the accused—*Emp v. Shib Singh*, 25 All. 131; *In re Abdul Khan*, 10 C.W.N. 1027, *Mahala v. Crown*, 1914 P.R. 6; *Suresh v. Emp.*, 3 C.L.J. 575, *Emp v. Miro*, 1 S.L.R. 3; *Mid Wasi v. Emp.*, 22 Cr.L.J. 22 (All.)

A Magistrate should not refuse to accept a surety on the ground that he has already stood surety for another man—*Ghisa v. Emp.*, 24 Cr.L.J. 517, A.L.R. 1924 Oudh 132. So also, a Magistrate cannot reject a surety simply because he is a Wanthanu member. As long as the security is ample, the Court is bound to accept the same without inquiring into the politics of the person standing surety—*Maung Tun v. Emp.*, 4 Bur.L.J. 172, 27 Cr.L.J. 318.

Previous conviction not a disqualification.—The proposed surety is not to be considered as unfit merely by reason of the fact that he was on one occasion convicted of offences—*Emp v. Raghunath*, 26 All. 189, *Budhu Ahir v. K. E.*, 25 C.W.N. 140, or that he was once challaned in a theft case—*Munshi Sing v. Emp.*, 18 A.L.J. 324, 21 Cr.L.J. 365.

Witness not disqualified.—The fact that the proposed surety has given evidence in favour of the accused in the proceeding which resulted in the order for furnishing security, does not disqualify him from standing as a surety for the accused—*Bairagi v. Emp.* 15 Cr.L.J. 727 (All.); *Mid Wasi v. Emp.*, 22 Cr.L.J. 22 (All.) So also the fact that the persons

offered as sureties helped the accused in his defence is no ground for rejecting them—*Gobardhun v. Emp.*, 16 A L J. 263, 16 Cr.L.J. 441.

See also Note 280 (d) under sec 112.

303. Inquiry into the fitness of sureties :—Before the amendment of 1923, this section did not expressly provide for holding an inquiry into the fitness of a surety before accepting or rejecting him. But still in a large number of cases such an inquiry was considered as essential. See *Akbar Ali v Emp.*, 42 Cal 706; *Rayan v. Emp.*, 43 Cal. 1024; *Bhawani v K E.*, 12 A L.J. 1004; *Crown v Piru*, 7 S.L.R. 94, *Manna v Emp.*, 15 A L J 848

Under the present section, the Magistrate can *delegate the inquiry* to a subordinate Magistrate. But under the old law, it was consistently held in a number of decisions that the Magistrate ought himself to make the inquiry into the sufficiency or otherwise of the sureties; he could not delegate the task to a subordinate officer—*Emp. v. Baiwant*, 27 All. 293; *Emp v Tota*, 25 All 272, *K E. v. Kaum Khan*, 1906 P R 18; *Mahala v Crown*, 1914 P.R 6, *Emp. v. Prithi Pal*, 1898 A W N. 154. These cases should no longer be taken as authoritative. But the Magistrate cannot delegate this task to a Police Officer and act upon the report of that officer, see Note 301 *ante* and *Kanwal v. Emp.*, 25 Cr.L J. 91, A I R 1924 Lah 672

A Magistrate of one district has no jurisdiction to make an inquiry into the sufficiency of a surety taken under sec 109 from a vagrant by a Magistrate of another district, even if the latter authorises the former to do so, as a Magistrate of one district has no power to delegate his powers to a Magistrate of another district—*Khuda Bux v Crown*, 1916 P.W.R. 52, 18 Cr L J. 130

Evidence .—The Magistrate can refuse or accept any surety only on tangible evidence recorded and considered by him—*Munshi v Emp.*, 18 A L J. 324. He should examine the sureties as to their fitness and take such evidence as the accused may give and base his decision on the evidence so recorded—*Crown v Piru*, 7 S L R 94; *Emp. v. Mahro*, 2 S.L.R. 11. The inquiry is to be conducted judicially, and the Magistrate has power to call for and record evidence upon oath or affirmation—*Emp. v. Ghulam Mustafa*, 26 All. 371; *Imp. v. Allahdino*, 5 S.L.R. 87. This is now expressly provided in the proviso to subsection (1)

304. Recording reasons :—The Magistrate in rejecting a surety must record his reasons for doing so in his own writing—*Ela Buksh v. Emp.*, 14 C W.N 709; *Kalu Mirza v Emp.*, 37 Cal. 91; *In re Jesha Bhatha*, 22 Bom.L.R. 190, 44 Bom 385. The intention of the Legislature in insisting that a Magistrate should record his reasons for refusing to accept a surety on the ground of unfitness is that the Magistrate should exercise his independent judgment, and should not be guided by the opinions expressed in Police reports without considering the facts upon which such opinions are based.—*In re Abdul Khan*, 10 C.W.N. 1027. When a Magistrate failed to record the reasons and in his explanation to the High Court stated that he did not remember the exact circumstances,

the order rejecting the sureties was set aside.—*Hor Ah v. K. E.*, 13 C.W.N. xxvii.

Appeal :—See section 406A.

305. Interference by High Court :—The question whether a particular person is or is not a fit person to stand as surety is one for the decision of the Magistrate and is left to his discretion which is not fettered in any way—*Jalil v. Emp*, 13 C.W.N. 80 (81); and the High Court will not lightly interfere—*Bhawani v. K. E.*, 12 A.L.J. 1004; *Bairagi v. Emp*, 15 Cr L.J. 727 (All.). But if the discretion has not been judicially exercised, as for instance, where no reasons are given why a surety was rejected (*Hor Ah*, 13 C.W.N. xxvii), the High Court will interfere

123. (1) If any person ordered to give security under section 106 or section 118

Imprisonment in default of security.

does not give such security on or before the date on which the period

for which such security is to be given commences, he shall, except in the case next hereinafter mentioned, be committed to prison, or if he is already in prison, be detained in prison until such period expires or until within such period he gives the security to the Court or Magistrate who made the order requiring it.

(2) When such person has been ordered by a Magistrate to give security for a period

Proceedings when to be laid before High Court or Court of Session.

exceeding one year, such Magistrate shall, if such person does not give such security as aforesaid, issue a

warrant directing him to be detained in prison pending the orders of the Sessions Judge or, if such Magistrate is a Presidency Magistrate, pending the orders of the High Court; and the proceedings shall be laid, as soon as conveniently may be, before such Court.

(3) Such Court, after examining such proceedings and requiring from the Magistrate any further information or evidence which it thinks necessary, may pass such order on the case as it thinks fit :

Provided that the period (if any) for which any person is imprisoned for failure to give security shall not exceed three years.

(3A) If security has been required in the course of the same proceedings from two or more persons in respect

offered as sureties helped the accused in his defence is no ground for rejecting them—*Gobardhun v. Emp.*, 16 A.L.J. 263, 16 Cr.L.J. 441

See also Note 280 (d) under sec 112.

303. Inquiry into the fitness of sureties:—Before the amendment of 1923, this section did not expressly provide for holding an inquiry into the fitness of a surety before accepting or rejecting him. But still in a large number of cases such an inquiry was considered as essential. See *Akbar Ali v. Emp.*, 42 Cal 706, *Rayan v. Emp.*, 43 Cal. 1024, *Bhawani v. K. E.*, 12 A.L.J. 1004; *Crown v. Piru*, 7 S.L.R. 94; *Manna v. Emp.* 15 A.L.J. 849

Under the present section, the Magistrate can *delegate the inquiry* to a subordinate Magistrate. But under the old law, it was consistently held in a number of decisions that the Magistrate ought himself to make the inquiry into the sufficiency or otherwise of the sureties; he could not delegate the task to a subordinate officer—*Emp. v. Balwant*, 27 All. 293; *Emp. v. Tota*, 25 All 272, *K. E. v. Kaim Khan*, 1906 P.R. 18; *Mahala v. Crown*, 1914 P.R. 6, *Emp. v. Prithi Pal*, 1898 A.W.N. 154. These cases should no longer be taken as authoritative. But the Magistrate cannot delegate this task to a Police Officer and act upon the report of that officer, see Note 301 *ante* and *Kanwal v. Emp.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 91, A.I.R. 1924 Lah 672

A Magistrate of one district has no jurisdiction to make an inquiry into the sufficiency of a surety taken under sec 109 from a vagrant by a Magistrate of another district, even if the latter authorises the former to do so, as a Magistrate of one district has no power to delegate his powers to a Magistrate of another district—*Khuda Bux v. Crown*, 1916 P.W.R. 52, 18 Cr.L.J. 130

Evidence—The Magistrate can refuse or accept any surety only on tangible evidence recorded and considered by him—*Munshi v. Emp.*, 18 A.L.J. 324. He should examine the sureties as to their fitness and take such evidence as the accused may give and base his decision on the evidence so recorded—*Crown v. Piru*, 7 S.L.R. 94; *Emp. v. Mahro*, 2 S.L.R. 11. The inquiry is to be conducted judicially, and the Magistrate has power to call for and record evidence upon oath or affirmation—*Emp. v. Ghulam Mustafa*, 26 All 371; *Imp. v. Allahdino*, 5 S.L.R. 87. This is now expressly provided in the proviso to subsection (1)

304. Recording reasons:—The Magistrate in rejecting a surety must record his reasons for doing so in his own writing—*Ela Buksh v. Emp.*, 14 C.W.N. 709, *Kalu Mirza v. Emp.*, 37 Cal. 91; *In re Jessa Bhatha*, 22 Bom.L.R. 190, 44 Bom. 385. The intention of the Legislature in insisting that a Magistrate should record his reasons for refusing to accept a surety on the ground of unfitness is that the Magistrate should exercise his independent judgment, and should not be guided by the opinions expressed in Police reports without considering the facts upon which such opinions are based.—*In re Abdul Khan*, 10 C.W.N. 1027. When a Magistrate failed to record the reasons and in his explanation to the High Court stated that he did not remember the exact circumstances,

v. *Diwan Chand*, 1895 P.R. 14; *Emp. v. Kanji*, 5 Bom.L.R. 26; *Emp. v. Durga*, 6 Bom L.R. 1098. See Note 1083 under sec. 397

Period of imprisonment:—The person failing to give security shall be committed to prison 'until such period expires' i.e. the period of imprisonment in default of security should be the same as the period for which security was demanded under sec. 118. It should be neither for a longer nor for a shorter term. Thus, an order requiring security for good behaviour for a period of six months, and in default, awarding rigorous imprisonment for three months is wrong and bad in form—*Q. E. v. Ganoo*, Ratanlal 584, *K. E. v. Karimuddin*, 23 All. 422. If the Magistrate thinks that the term of imprisonment should be shorter, the proper course is to report the matter to the District Magistrate for taking action under section 124 (2)—*Q. E. v. Moti*, Ratanlal 668. So also, an order awarding imprisonment in default of security for a period longer than that for which the accused was called upon to give security is illegal—*Syed Ahmed*, 2 Weir 57.

The period of imprisonment must be definite; an order directing the accused to be imprisoned until he gives security is bad—*Mallamdi v. Taripulla*, 8 Cal. 644.

It is illegal to fix an absolute period of imprisonment (e.g. for one year), since the accused is entitled to be released the moment he furnishes the security, the sentence ought to run "for one year or until such date within that year as the required security be furnished"—*In re Ibraya Rowthan*, 51 Mad. 178, 53 M.L.J. 762, 28 Cr.L.J. 1034.

307. Sub-section (2)—This sub-section has reference only to the case where default is made in finding security. If the security is given, the section does not apply and no reference to the Court of Session is necessary even though the term of security exceeds one year—*Rai Ishri Pershad v. Q. E.*, 23 Cal. 621 (627), *Ram Kishen v. Emp.*, 15 A.L.J. 822, 40 All. 39, 19 Cr.L.J. 2.

When a Magistrate passes an order for furnishing security for a period exceeding one year, and default is made, imprisonment for default cannot be awarded by the Magistrate. All that he is empowered to do is to detain the accused pending the order of the Sessions Judge—*K. E. v. Mayat Aung*, 4 L.B.R. 135, 7 Cr.L.J. 412; *Mahala v. Crown*, 1914 P.R. 6; *Sundar v. Emp.*, 21 Cr.L.J. 623 (Lah). If the Magistrate passes an order for imprisonment, it will be bad and will not be cured by the District Magistrate reducing on appeal the period of security as well as the term of imprisonment to one year—*Syed Ahmed*, 2 Weir 57. Even a Magistrate cannot pass an order of imprisonment, and then send his order for confirmation to the Sessions Judge—*Emp. v. Jafar*, 1899 A.W.N. 151, because the proceedings are sent to the Sessions Judge under this section not for the purpose of confirming the order of the Magistrate but for passing his own order—*Q. E. v. Myat Aung*, 4 L.B.R. 135; *Emp. v. Rewa Ahir*, 6 C.P.L.R. 27.

'Exceeding one year':—A Magistrate cannot legally amalgamate secs. 109 and 110, and require the execution of two bonds for good behaviour

that where the case of one accused has ~~in~~ be referred to the Sessions Judge under section 123, the case of all should be referred, whether they have given security or not. We have adopted this suggestion"—*Report of the Joint Committee* (1922).

It should be noted in this connection that the provisions of section 406 (which provides for appeals against orders requiring security) have been made inapplicable to a case where proceedings have been laid before a Sessions Judge under this sub-section. See section 406, 2nd proviso, newly enacted in 1923.

309. Sub-section (3B) :—"This sub-section definitely provides the exercise of powers under sec 123 by an Additional Sessions Judge in proceedings transferred to him"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914).

It was held in the case of *Q. E. v. Dayaram, Ratanlal* 830 (see this case cited under sec. 193) that where a reference was made under sec 123 (2), the Sessions Judge had no power to transfer the proceedings to the Additional Sessions Judge and that even sec. 193 (2) did not confer on him that power, because the word "cases" in that section did not include a reference under section 123 (2). The Calcutta High Court however held that sec. 193 must be interpreted in a liberal sense, and that the word "cases" would include a reference under sec 123 (2)—*Benode chari v. Emp.*, 50 Cal 229, 39 C.L.J. 75, 25 Cr.L.J. 573. This conflict is now been set at rest by the present amendment, which empowers Sessions Judges ~~in~~ make over references under this section to the Additional and Assistant Sessions Judges.

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that where the case of one accused has to be referred to the Sessions Judge under section 123, the case of all should be referred, whether they have given security or not. We have adopted this suggestion"—*Report of the Joint Committee* (1922).

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310. Sub-section (6)—*Kind of imprisonment*.—Before the amendment of this sub-section in 1923, imprisonment under all good behaviour cases could be simple or rigorous according to the discretion of the Magistrate. The Amendment Act of 1923 had made a slight alteration by drawing a distinction between cases under sections 108 and 109 on the one side (under which the sentence should always be simple), and cases under sec 110 on the other (under which it could be simple or rigorous).

This clause has been further amended by the Cr.P.C. Second Amendment Act X of 1926, the effect of which is to give a discretion to Magistrates to award either simple or rigorous imprisonment in the case of proceedings under sec. 109. "Several Local Governments have represented that the change (i.e., the amendment made by Act XVIII of 1923) has worked injuriously, as most of the persons against whom proceedings are taken under sec 109 are men for whom simple imprisonment is quite unsuitable"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (Gazette of India, 1925, Part V, p 214)

Although the imprisonment in default of furnishing security under sec. 110 may be simple or rigorous, still as that section is essentially a preventive rather than a punitive provision, the imprisonment awarded in ordinary cases should be simple. Imprisonment of a rigorous character should not be awarded automatically as a general practice, but the Magistrate has to exercise his discretion and to decide whether on the facts of each case the imprisonment should be simple or rigorous—*Gandharf S*

ing of a case. He can call for further information if he desires it, or he can consider the evidence on the record and pass such order as he thinks fit—*Narayan v. Emp.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 1112, A.I.R. 1925 Cal 191.

An order under this sub-section is an original order and not an order confirming the order of the Magistrate. Therefore the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to decide on the fitness of sureties on a bond ordered by the Sessions Court. When the order is of the latter Court, the adequacy of the security should be decided by that Court—*Imp v. Allahdino*, 5 S L R 87, 12 Cr L J. 410

Bail.—The Sessions Judge can admit the accused to bail. The provisions of section 498 regarding admission to bail are particularly wide, and the Court of Session may in any case direct any person to be admitted to bail. There are no words in section 123 (2) controlling the very wide provisions of section 498. The Sessions Judge has under sec. 123 (2) power to revise the order of the Magistrate passed under sec. 118, and he may grant bail, just as in the analogous case of an appeal the Appellate Court can release the accused on bail—*Ahmed Ali v. Emp*, 50 Cal. 969, 37 C.L.J. 592, 24 Cr L.J. 953.

Remand.—In *Jhojha Singh v. Q. E*, 24 Cal 155 (which was decided when the 1882 Code was in force) it was held that the Sessions Judge was not competent to remand a case to the Magistrate to take further evidence. But now the words "requiring from the Magistrate" (newly added in the 1898 Code) show that the Sessions Judge is competent to do so.

Imprisonment.—Although a Sessions Judge is competent to direct under sub-section (3) that the person be imprisoned for any term not exceeding three years, yet it is advisable that the term should always be the same as the period for which security was ordered to be given—*K. E v. Karimuddin*, 23 All 422, *K. E v Myat Aung*, 4 L.B.R. 135.

The imprisonment ordered by the Sessions Judge should begin from the date of the Magistrate's order. Where the Sessions Judge directed that the period of imprisonment ordered by him should commence from the date of his order and not from the date of the Magistrate's order, held that the order in fact amounted to an enhancement of sentence and that it was undesirable that the Court should do so without special reasons, though it had the power—*Allahdad v. Crown*, 17 S.L.R. 160, A.I.R. 1924 Sind 120, 26 Cr.L.J. 179.

Sub-section (3A) :—"We think that where security has been demanded from two or more persons, some or one of whom may be ordered to give security for more than a year, all the parties from whom security is demanded should be dealt with by the Sessions Judge."—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*

"The object of the new sub-section (3A) is to avoid differences of opinion in a single case between the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge. in as much as in a single case one accused person may appeal to the District Magistrate, while the case of another accused person will be referred to the Sessions Judge. The Bombay Government have suggested

that where the case of one accused has to be referred to the Sessions Judge under section 123, the case of all should be referred, whether they have given security or not. We have adopted this suggestion"—*Report of the Joint Committee (1922)*.

It should be noted in this connection that the provisions of section 406 (which provides for appeals against orders requiring security) have been made inapplicable to a case where proceedings have been laid before a Sessions Judge under this sub-section. See section 406, 2nd proviso, newly enacted in 1923.

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This clause has been further amended by the Cr P C. Second Amendment Act X of 1926, the effect of which is to give a discretion to Magistrates to award either simple or rigorous imprisonment in the case of proceedings under sec. 109. "Several Local Governments have represented that the change (*i.e.*, the amendment made by Act XVIII of 1923) has worked injuriously, as most of the persons against whom proceedings are taken under sec. 109 are men for whom simple imprisonment is quite unsuitable"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons (Gazette of India, 1925, Part V, p. 214)*.

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v. *Emp*, 42 All. 563 In passing a sentence of rigorous imprisonment, the Magistrate should give reason why the imprisonment should be of the severer kind. In the case of a man who has never been convicted of any offence, an order of rigorous imprisonment is unreasonable—*In re Umbica*, 1 C.L.R. 268

Where a person who has been asked to furnish security for good behaviour fails to do so, the Magistrate has no power to order *solitary confinement*—*Kundan v Emp.*, 36 All. 495, 12 A.L.J. 823, 15 Cr.L.J. 616.

It is illegal for a Magistrate to pass a sentence of *rigorous imprisonment* in a case under sec 107—*Uttam Chand v. K. E.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 430 (All.).

124. (1) Whenever the District Magistrate or a Chief Presidency Magistrate is of

Power to release persons imprisoned for failing to give security.

opinion that any person imprisoned for failing to give security under this Chapter, * * * may be released without hazard to the community or to any other person, he may order such person to be discharged.

(2) Whenever any person has been imprisoned for failing to give security under this Chapter, the Chief Presidency or District Magistrate may (unless the order has been made by some Court superior to his own) make an order reducing the amount of the security or the number of sureties or the time for which security has been required.

(3) Whenever the District Magistrate or a Chief Presidency Magistrate is of opinion that any person imprisoned for failing to give security under this Chapter as ordered by the Court of Session or High Court may be released without hazard to the community, such Magistrate shall make an immediate report of the case for the orders of the Court of Session or High Court, as the case may be, and such Court may, if it thinks

(3) *An order under sub-section (1) may direct the discharge of such person either without conditions or upon any conditions which such person accepts:*

Provided that any condition imposed shall cease to be operative when the period for which such person was ordered to give security has expired.

fit, order such person to be discharged.

(4) *The Local Government may prescribe the conditions upon which a conditional discharge may be made.*

(5) *If any condition upon which any such person has been discharged is, in the opinion of the District Magistrate or Chief Presidency Magistrate by whom the order of discharge was made or of his successor, not fulfilled, he may cancel the same.*

(6) *When a conditional order of discharge has been cancelled under sub-section (5), such person may be arrested by any police-officer without warrant and shall thereupon be produced before the District Magistrate or Chief Presidency Magistrate.*

Unless such person then gives security in accordance with the terms of the original order for the unexpired portion of the term for which he was in the first instance committed or ordered to be detained (such portion being deemed to be a period equal to the period between the date of the breach of the conditions of discharge and the date on which, except for such conditional discharge, he would have been entitled to release) the District Magistrate or Chief Presidency Magistrate may remand such person to prison to undergo such unexpired portion.

A person remanded to prison under this sub-section shall, subject to the provisions of section 122, be released at any time on giving security in accordance with the terms of the original order for the unexpired portion aforesaid to the Court or Magistrate by whom such order was made, or to its or his successor.

Change :—In sub-section (1), the words "whether by the order of such Magistrate, or that of his predecessor-in-office, or of some subordinate Magistrate" which occurred after the words "under this chapter" have been omitted; sub-section (3) has been omitted and replaced by a new sub-section, and sub-sections (4) to (6) have been newly added, by sec. 22 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923)

"This amendment is mainly intended to enable persons committed to prison under Chapter VIII of the Code to be sent to Industrial Homes and Settlements of the Salvation Army, or to other similar Homes or Settlements, where it may be possible to reform them and make them

accustomed to regular work of a kind which may be useful to them after the expiry of their period of detention. It is proposed to give a District Magistrate or a Chief Presidency Magistrate absolute power to release with or without conditions a person imprisoned for failure to give security, without the intervention of the Court of Session or High Court.”
—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1921).

311. It is entirely within the discretion of the District Magistrate, who as the head of the district is responsible for the peace thereof, to determine when and under what circumstances he should act under this section—*Emp. v Chhotla*, 1893 A.W.N. 183

The order passed by a District Magistrate under this section may be of an original or of a revisional character; that is, the Magistrate may release a person either on the ground that by reason of something occurring after the order for security, there is no longer any apprehension of a breach of the peace and the person may be safely released, or on the ground that on the evidence taken by the Subordinate Magistrate there was no apprehension of a breach of the peace, and no order for security should have been made—*Re Mare Gowd*, 37 Mad. 125 (141) (P.B.), 25 M.L.J. 459, 14 Cr L.J. 546.

125. The Chief Presidency or District Magistrate may at any time, for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, cancel any bond for keeping the peace or for good behaviour executed under this Chapter by order of any Court in his district not superior to his Court.

Power of District Magistrate to cancel any bond for keeping the peace or for good behaviour.

312. Scope :—This section empowers the District Magistrate to cancel a bond but does not authorise him to order that the person whose bond is so cancelled should be imprisoned until a fresh security bond is given—*Baldeo Singh v. Jugal Kishore*, 33 All. 624; *Panchu v. Emp.*, 29 Cal. 455.

313. Cancellation of bond—Ground of cancellation :—The Allahabad High Court (as well as the Oudh Court) has held that a bond can be cancelled only on the ground that it is no longer necessary—*Banarsi v. Partab Singh*, 35 All. 103; *Emp. v Shankar*, 41 All. 651; and that the District Magistrate, in cancelling a bond, is entitled to look only to the circumstances subsequent to the execution of the bond. He can cancel a bond only on the ground that something has supervened since the date of the first Court's order which satisfies the District Magistrate that in view of the facts since come to light there is no longer any necessity to keep the accused person under bond—*Nizamuddin v Md. Ziaul*, 44 All. 614, 20 A.L.J. 521; he can cancel a bond for keeping the peace if there is no ground for thinking that there is any likelihood of a breach of the peace—*Abdur*, 1905 A.W.N. 143. But the District Magistrate is not entitled to look to the circumstances existing at the time of the bond;

thus, the fitness or unfitness of the sureties is a matter which can be decided in reference to the circumstances existing *at the time* of execution of the bond, and the District Magistrate has no power to look to those circumstances and cannot therefore cancel a bond on the ground of unfitness of sureties—*Malabar* 8 O.C. 215, 2 Cr.L.J. 507. In other words, the power conferred by this section to cancel a bond is not to be exercised *as in appeal* against an order of security to keep the peace—*Sita Ram v. Emp.*, 39 All 466, *Nizamuddin v. Md. Ziaul* 44 All 614, 23 Cr.L.J. 308, *Ram Din v. Emp.*, 24 Cr.L.J. 204 (Oudh), *Emp. v. Balwant*, 24 Cr.L.J. 616 (Oudh). This section cannot be used by the Magistrate *as if* he were sitting in appeal and going into the merits of the case. If he thinks that the order is not maintainable on the evidence on record, his duty is not to pass an order under section 125 but to refer the case to the High Court in its revisional side *Nizamuddin v. Md. Ziaul*, 44 All. 614; *Banarsi v. Partab* 35 All 103 *Emp. v. Shankar*, 41 All 651. Two other Allahabad cases, however, do not support this view. Thus, in *Baldeo Singh v. Jugal Kishore*, 33 All 624 (625) it has been held that a District Magistrate can cancel a bond of the accused on the ground that the surety who stood for him was an unfit person. In another Allahabad case, *Emp. v. Lahu* 40 All 140 (virtually dissenting from 35 All 103) it is laid down that there is nothing in the words of sec. 125 to prevent the District Magistrate from cancelling the bond for reasons other than that it is no longer necessary to keep the accused under their bonds, that the District Magistrate can cancel a bond under sec. 125 on the ground that the accused should not have been bound over; and that the District Magistrate can deal with a case under section 125 *as in revision*, and no reference to the High Court is necessary.

The Patna High Court holds that the only order which a District Magistrate can pass under this section is an order cancelling the bond directed to be executed by a subordinate Magistrate, on the ground that there is no longer any likelihood of a breach of the peace. The District Magistrate is not an *appellate* or *revisional* authority, and he has no power to vacate the order of the subordinate Magistrate *as ultra vires* or to quash the proceedings—*Durga Singh v. Amar Dayal*, 3 P.L.T. 103, 23 Cr.L.J. 281.

But the Calcutta High Court is of opinion that the District Magistrate can cancel the bond on *any* sufficient ground, and he is not restricted *as* the grounds which may have arisen *subsequent* to the date of execution of the bond. The jurisdiction of the District Magistrate under this section is not merely an original jurisdiction but may be exercised *as in appeal* or *revision*. He can cancel the bond on the ground that it should never have been required—*Nabu Sardar v. Emp.*, 34 Cal. 1 F.B. (overruling 32 Cal. 948). This decision has been followed by the Punjab, Madras and C. P. Courts. Thus, in *Auditta v. Crown*, 1908 P.W.R. 12, 7 Cr.L.J. 348, it has been held that the District Magistrate has full discretion to consider the evidence, and can set aside the order of security on the merits. The Madras High Court also holds that the order under sec. 125 may be either of an original or of a revisional character, and the District

Magistrate may cancel a bond on any 'sufficient grounds' There is no reason to qualify or restrict the ordinary meaning of the words used. This section was intended to give the District Magistrate the right to review the evidence; and the District Magistrate can cancel a bond on the ground that the evidence before the Subordinate Magistrate was not sufficient to justify the passing of the order for security. The words 'at any time' show that the District Magistrate can cancel the bond at any time however early; if the District Magistrate may, within a few minutes of a Subordinate Magistrate exacting the execution of a bond, cancel it, it could hardly be in consequence of anything that occurred *after* the execution of the bond, that is, the District Magistrate is not bound to look only to the events that have happened *subsequent* to the execution of the bond but is entitled to cancel it on the ground that on the evidence before the Subordinate Magistrate, the bond ought never to have been required—*Re Mare Gowd*, 37 Mad. 125 (F.B.) The same view has been taken in C. P.—*Emp v. Dalli*, 11 N.L.W. 98, 16 Cr.L.J. 555.

The words 'at any time' show that the District Magistrate may cancel the bond at any time however late, even when there is only one day left for the expiration of the period for which the bond has been executed; the delay in obtaining the material on which the bond is cancelled does not invalidate the order of cancellation—*Re Mare Gowd*, 37 Mad. 125 (145, 146) F.B. But an order for the cancellation of the bond cannot be passed before it has been executed—*Barka v. Janmejy*, 32 Cal. 948.

Right of applicant to be heard.—When a Magistrate is moved to exercise his powers under this section to cancel a bond, the applicant or his pleader should, as a matter of general practice, be heard before the application is rejected—*Sita Ram v. Emp*, 39 All. 466, 18 Cr.L.J. 630, 15 A.L.J. 469, *Mehr Baksh*, 1914 P.L.R. 53, 15 Cr.L.J. 143.

Effect of cancellation.—Where a bond is cancelled on the ground that it is no longer necessary or that it has been wrongly taken, both the accused and the surety will be discharged from all liability—*Emp. v. Abdur Rahim*, 1905 A.W.N. 143.

314. Transfer of proceedings.—Where the proceedings under sec. 107 instituted in one district were transferred by the order of the High Court to another district, and a 1st class Magistrate of the latter district ordered security to keep the peace, *held* that it was the District Magistrate of the latter district who had jurisdiction to pass an order under this section for the cancellation of the bond—*Guru Prasanna v. Hari Kumar*, 23 C.W.N. 958, 20 Cr.L.J. 337.

126. (1) Any surety for the peaceable conduct or good behaviour of another person

Discharge of sureties. may at any time apply to a Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate, Sub-divisional Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class to cancel any bond executed under this Chapter within the local limits of his jurisdiction.

(2) On such application being made, the Magistrate shall issue his summons or warrant, as he thinks fit, requiring the person, for whom such surety is bound, to appear or to be brought before him.

Sub-section (3) of this section has been renumbered as section 126A with certain alterations, by the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923). See notes under the next section.

315. This section deals with cases in which the surety wishes to withdraw and to have the bond cancelled and it lays down the procedure which is to be adopted when such security becomes useless owing to the withdrawal of the surety—*Mahabir v K E*, 8 O.C. 215, 2 Cr.L.J. 507.

When the effect of an order discharging a surety is to remit the accused to prison for a term exceeding one year, the Magistrate is bound to refer the case to the Sessions Judge (sec. 123)—*Imp. v. Alladina*, 5 S.L.R. 87, 12 Cr.L.J. 410.

126. (3) When such person appears or is brought before the Magistrate, such Magistrate shall cancel the bond, and shall order such person to give, for the unexpired portion of the term of such bond, fresh security of the same description as the original security. Every such order shall, for the purposes of Sections 121, 122, 123 and 124, be deemed to be an order made under section 106 or Section 118, as the case may be.

126-A. When a person for whose appearance a warrant or summons has been issued under proviso to sub-section (3) of section 122 or under section 126, sub-section (2), appears or is brought before him, the Magistrate shall cancel the bond executed by such person and shall order such person to give, for the unexpired portion of the term of such bond, fresh security of the same description as the original security. Every such order shall, for the purposes of sections 121, 122, 123 and 124, be deemed to be an order made under Section 106 or Section 118, as the case may be.

This was originally sub-section (3) of section 126. It has been renumbered as section 126-A with the italicised words added, by sec. 23 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923). "We think that the procedure set out in sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 126 should apply in the case of a surety subsequently rejected (under sec. 122), and we have added a new clause which makes the necessary amendments in section 126"—*Report of the Joint Committee (1922)*.

CHAPTER IX.

UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLIES.

127. (1) Any Magistrate or officer in charge of a police station may command any *Assembly to disperse on command of Magistrate or police-officer.* unlawful assembly, or any assembly of five or more persons likely to cause a disturbance of the public peace, to disperse; and it shall thereupon be the duty of the members of such assembly to disperse accordingly.

(2) This section applies also to the police in the town of Calcutta.

316. "Officer in charge".—An order directing the dispersal of an assembly passed by an officer (*e g.* Deputy Commissioner of Police) superior in rank to the Police Officer is an order by a lawful authority within the meaning of this section—*Emp v. Tucker*, 7 Bom. 42.

"In all cases of an unlawful assembly, a riot or a disturbance of the peace having occurred or being apprehended, the police will take the initiative, but if they find themselves not strong enough for the occasion, immediate application is to be made to the nearest Magistrate, which under the terms of Act V of 1861, means all persons within the Police District exercising all or any of the powers of a Magistrate, and therefore includes the Tahsildars who are bound on requisition from the Police Inspector to appoint from the residents of the neighbourhood as many Police officers as the said Inspector may deem necessary. All revenue chaprasis, and messengers of all kinds may legally be appointed special Police officers. Thus, the whole resources of the Civil Government are at once on a special occasion brought to the assistance of the Police for the purpose of restoring public order."—*Punj. Pol. Cir.*, Ch XXVII, p 318. See *Punj. Cir.*, 320

317. Unlawful assembly:—An assembly may be for lawful purposes, e.g. a religious procession; but it may excite such opposition as to be likely to cause a breach of the peace. If so, it may be called upon to disperse—*Emp. v. Tucker*, 7 Bom. 42; *Murlidhar v. Emp.*, 1897 P.R. 22.

If an order is promulgated by the Superintendent of Police under sec. 30 of the Police Act (V of 1861) prohibiting persons from organising or promoting processions without a license, and that order is disobeyed, the procedure to be adopted is as provided by sec. 127 of the Cr. P. Code, viz. to order the procession to disperse—*Harekrishna v. Emp.*, 11 P.L.T. 245, 28 Cr.L.J. 443.

Punishment—See Secs. 145, 151 I P.C.

128. If upon being so commanded, any such assembly does not disperse, or if without being so commanded, it conducts itself in such a manner as to show a determination not to disperse, any Magistrate or officer in charge of a police station, whether within or without the presidency-towns, may proceed to disperse such assembly by force, and may require the assistance of any male person not being an officer or soldier in Her Majesty's Army or a volunteer enrolled under the Indian Volunteers Act, 1869, and acting as such, for the purpose of dispersing such assembly, and if necessary, arresting and confining the persons who form part of it, in order to disperse such assembly or that they may be punished according to law.

318. Use of fire arms:—"Where a Magistrate or officer in charge of a Police station engaged in dispersing an unlawful assembly is compelled, in the last resort, to direct the Police to use fire-arms, he shall give the rioters the fullest warning of his intention, warning them beforehand that the fire will be effective, that the ball or buckshot will be used at the first round, and that blank cartridges will not be used. Firing shall cease the instant it is not necessary. Care should be taken not to fire upon persons separated from the crowd, nor to fire over the heads of crowds, as thereby innocent persons may be injured. Blank cartridges should never be served out to Police employed to suppress a riot"—*Bom. Pol. Man.*, p. 70

"On being requisitioned, a squad of Police properly armed and accoutred, and carrying ten rounds of buckshot ammunition per man in command of a responsible officer will proceed with all despatch to the scene. . . . The Magistrate or superior Police-Officer or other subordinate officer, in circumstances may permit, supported by a file (who will duly come to the charge on being halted) will proceed to within speaking

distance of the mob and command II to disperse and distinctly warn it that the fire will be effective and that blank cartridges will not be used. If the mob shows itself aggressive and determined not to disperse, the officer and file aforesaid will fall back, and the squad will on due command to that effect, load, after which another warning to the rioters to disperse will be given, and if not obeyed within a reasonable time, fire will be opened on distinct word of command by the officer in charge of the squad, either by specified number of files or by ranks of subsections or sections, or he may order a volley according to the requirements of the situation. The fire should be so directed as to inflict as little bodily harm III possible, aim in the first instance being taken at the feet of the nearest rioters, and due care being observed to avoid firing on persons separated from the rioters. Firing must cease the moment it is no longer necessary, i.e., on the mob showing the slightest indication of retiring or dispersing * * * After the order "cease fire" and should no further apprehension exist, the wounded would be sent to the nearest hospital, and the senior Police officer will take account of the ammunition used, and if no Magistrate is present, will draw up an accurate account of all that transpired"—C P. Pol Man., page 16.

The power of using fire arms to disperse an unlawful assembly cannot be exercised by any person below the rank of an officer in charge of a police station. An officer-in-charge of a patrol boat, whose powers are no higher than those of an officer-in-charge of an outpost, cannot use fire-arms under this section—*Muhammad Yunus v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 318 (323), A I R 1923 Cal 517, 25 Cr L J. 467.

129. If any such assembly cannot be otherwise dispersed, and if it is necessary for the public security that it should be dispersed, the Magistrate of the highest rank who is present may cause it to be dispersed by military force.

130. (1) When a Magistrate determines to disperse any such assembly by military force, he may require any commissioned or non-commissioned officer in command of any soldiers in Her Majesty's Army or of any volunteers enrolled under the Indian Volunteers Act, 1869, to disperse such assembly by military force, and to arrest and confine such persons forming part of it as the Magistrate may direct, or as it may be necessary to arrest and confine in order to disperse the assembly or to have them punished according to law.

(2) Every such officer shall obey such requisition in such manner as he thinks fit, but in so doing he shall use

Duty of officer commanding troops required by Magistrate to disperse assembly.

Use of military force.

as little force, and do as little injury to person and property, as may be consistent with dispersing the assembly and arresting and detaining such persons.

131. When the public security is manifestly endangered by any such assembly, and when no Magistrate can be communicated with, any commissioned officer of Her Majesty's Army may disperse such assembly by military force, and may arrest and confine any persons forming part of it, in order to disperse such assembly or that they may be punished according to law; but if while he is acting under this section, it becomes practicable for him to communicate with a Magistrate, he shall do so, and shall thenceforward obey the instructions of the Magistrate as to whether he shall or shall not continue such action.

132. No prosecution against any person for any act purporting to be done under this Chapter shall be instituted in any Criminal Court except with the sanction of the Local Government; and—

- (a) no Magistrate or police officer acting under this Chapter in good faith,
- (b) no officer acting under Section 131 in good faith,
- (c) no person doing any act in good faith, in compliance with a requisition under Section 128 or Section 130, and,
- (d) no inferior officer, or soldier, or volunteer doing any act in obedience to any order which he was bound to obey,

shall be deemed to have thereby committed an offence :

Provided that no such prosecution shall be instituted in any criminal Court against any officer or soldier in His Majesty's army except with the sanction of the Governor General in Council.

"The rules for calling out and employing the military in aid of the civil power were first enacted in the Code of 1872 and embody (according to Sir James Stephen) the principles laid down in the charge of Tindal C.J. to the Grand Jury of Bristol in 1832 as to the duty of soldiers in dispersing rioters. The rules in India carry the law somewhat further than it has yet been carried in England, as they expressly indemnify all persons acting in good faith in compliance with the requisitions under secs 128 and 130 and forbid prosecutions of Magistrates, soldiers and Police-officers except with the sanction of the Governor-General in Council"—Whitley Stokes' *Anglo Indian Codes*, Vol. II, Introduction, p. 11.

319. Sanction.—Want of sanction under this section will not be cured by sec. 537—*In re Perumal*, 31 Mad. 80, 17 M.L.J. 533.

The power to disperse an unlawful assembly by force is not given by this Code to any Police-officer below the rank of an officer in charge of a police station. The powers of an officer in charge of a patrol boat are no higher than those of an officer in charge of an outpost; therefore he has no power to act under this chapter, if he so acts (e.g. fires on an unlawful assembly), his action is illegal and does not fall under sec. 128; and no sanction of the Local Government is necessary for his prosecution for such act—*Muhammad Yunus v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 318, 324 (*Bhawal Shooting case*), 25 Cr.L.J. 467, A.I.R. 1923 Cal. 517.

CHAPTER X.

PUBLIC NUISANCES.

133. (1) Whenever a District Magistrate, a Sub-divisional Magistrate or * * * a

Conditional order for removal of nuisance.

Magistrate of the first class considers, on receiving a police-report

or other information and on taking such evidence (if any) as he thinks fit,

that any unlawful obstruction or nuisance should be removed from any way, river or channel which is or may be lawfully used by the public, or from any public place, or

that the conduct of any trade or occupation, or the keeping of any goods or merchandise, is injurious to the health or physical comfort of the community, and that in

consequence such trade or occupation should be prohibited or regulated or such goods or merchandise should be removed or the keeping thereof regulated, or

that the construction of any building or the disposal of any substance, as likely to occasion conflagration or explosion, should be prevented or stopped, or,

that any building, tent or structure or any tree is in such a condition that it is likely to fall and thereby cause injury to persons living or carrying on business in the neighbourhood or passing by, and that in consequence the removal, repair or support of such building, tent or structure, or the removal or support of such tree, is necessary, or

that any tank, well or excavation adjacent to any such way or public place should be fenced in such manner as to prevent danger arising to the public, or

that any dangerous animal should be destroyed, confined or otherwise disposed of,

such Magistrate may make a conditional order requiring the person causing such obstruction or nuisance, or carrying on such trade or occupation, or keeping any such goods or merchandise, or owning, possessing or controlling such building, tent, structure, substance, tank, well or excavation, or owning or possessing such animal or tree, within a time to be fixed in the order,

to remove such obstruction or nuisance; or

to desist from carrying on, or to remove or regulate in such manner as may be directed, such trade or occupation; or

to remove such goods or merchandise, or to regulate the keeping thereof in such manner as may be directed; or

to prevent or stop the erection of, or to remove, repair or support, such building, tent or structure; or

to remove or support such tree; or

to alter the disposal of such substance; or

to fence such tank, well or excavation, as the case may be; or

to destroy, confine or dispose of such dangerous animal in the manner provided in the said order;

or, if he objects so to do,

to appear before himself or some other Magistrate of the first or second class, at a time and place to be fixed by the order, and move to have the order set aside or modified in the manner hereinafter provided.

(2) No order duly made by a Magistrate under this section shall be called in question in any Civil Court.

Explanation.—A “public place” includes also property belonging to the State, camping grounds and grounds left unoccupied for sanitary or recreative purposes.

Change —The entire section has been newly drafted by sec. 24 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923). But the actual changes introduced by the re-drafting are the following:—(a) In sub-section (1) the words “when empowered by the Local Government in this behalf” have been omitted, under the previous law, an ordinary Magistrate of the first class could take proceedings under this section only when he was specially empowered by the Local Government. under the present law, all Magistrates of the first class are competent to deal with the case, and no special empowering is necessary; (b) the words ‘regulated’ and ‘the keeping of goods should be regulated’ have been newly added in para 3, (c) the words ‘tent or structure or any tree’ have been added in para 5; and (d) para 7 (relating to the disposal of dangerous animals) has been newly added. Certain consequential changes have also been made in the subsequent paras of this section.

320. Application of this Chapter :—The provisions of this Chapter should be so worked as not to become themselves a nuisance to the community at large. Although every person is bound to so use his property that it may not work legal damage or harm to his neighbour, yet on the other hand, no one has a right to interfere with the free and full enjoyment by such person of his property, except on clear and absolute proof that such use of it by him is producing such legal damage or harm; and therefore a lawful and necessary trade (e.g., tanning) ought not to be interfered with unless it is proved to be injurious to the health or physical comfort of the community—*Shadi v. Emp.* 1888 P.R. 17.

This section deals with the condition of things at the time when the order is made. It is not meant to apply to what may happen at some indefinite time in the future or under quite abnormal circumstances. Therefore, a Magistrate is not competent to order an occupation to be

prohibited, or a tree to be cut down or a building to be demolished, merely because at some future time the occupation may become injurious to the health of the neighbourhood, or the tree may cause an obstruction to public thoroughfare or the building may become dangerous to passers-by—*Gokal Chand v. Emp.*, 1 Lah 163, 21 Cr.L.J. 462; *Gokal v. Emp.*, 22 A L J. 436, 26 Cr.L.J. 104, *Rajman v. Emp.*, 1890 P.R. 5

In all criminal proceedings initiated under this section, the Magistrate should bear in mind that he is supposed to be acting purely in the interests of the public, and should be on his guard against any tendency to use the section as a substitute for litigation in the Civil Courts, in order to obtain settlement of private disputes—*Farrand Ali v. Hakim Ali*, 37 All. 26 (28) Where the alleged obstruction to a public road has been existing for 15 or 16 years, the matter is one to be decided by a Civil Court, and sec. 133 is not intended to be applied in such cases to avoid the necessity of filing a civil suit—*Ghurahu v. Sakatray* 21 A L J 112, 27 Cr.L.J. 27 (29)

This chapter does not apply to Presidency Towns, as Presidency Magistrates are not empowered to act under this chapter

321. Secs. 133 and 144—Sec 144 is more general and sec. 133 is more specific, therefore nuisances specially provided for in this section are taken out of the general provisions of section 144 of the Code—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 58, *Huri Mohun*, 10 W R 53 But where an order prohibiting a nuisance cannot be made under this section, e.g. an order prohibiting burial in certain places on sanitary grounds, it should be made under the more general sections (143 or 144)—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 64. If proceedings are taken under sec. 133, the procedure laid down in the present chapter must be obeyed, and the matter cannot be disposed of summarily under sec. 144—*Q. v. Pithi*, 8 W R. 37.

But the essential difference between the two sections is that sec. 133 expressly directs that the injunctive order should be an order nisi, i.e., it is an order accompanied by a condition that it is not to operate if the party shows cause, while sec 144 speaks only of an absolute order—*Huri Mohun*, 10 W.R 53

322. Secs. 133 and 147—Sec. 133 is not a bar to a proceeding under sec. 147. The fact that sec 133 expressly provides for an order by the Magistrate directing the removal of an obstruction to a pathway does not necessarily imply that a similar order cannot be passed under sec 147—*Karuppana v. Kandasami*, 26 M L J 223, 15 Cr L J 362. But when proceedings have been taken under section 133, no order can be passed under sec 147—*Abdool Rackman v. Safar Ali*, 15 C W N. 667, 12 Cr.L.J 43.

323. Nature of proceedings—Proceedings under this section are more of the nature of civil than of criminal proceedings, and the person against whom proceedings are taken under this section is not an 'accused' person within the meaning of sec 342. He can give evidence

on his own behalf and may be examined on oath—*Hirananda v. Emp.*, 9 C.W.N 983 Proceedings under this chapter are not proceedings in respect of offences, and further inquiry cannot be ordered under sec. 436 if the proceedings are dropped by the Magistrate—*Srinath v. Ainaddi*, 24 Cal. 395. But orders passed on proceedings under this chapter are orders passed in 'a criminal trial' for the purpose of section 15 of the Letters Patent, and no appeal lies against an order passed by a single Judge of the High Court under sec. 439 revising an order of the Magistrate—*Subbayya v. Ramayya*, 39 Mad. 537, 11 Cr.L.J. 349

Magistrates empowered :—It has already been pointed out above (under heading 'Change' supra) that all first class Magistrates are now authorised to take action under this section, and it is no longer necessary that they should be specially empowered by the Local Government. In the United Provinces and in C P, the Local Government may invest Municipal Boards with the powers of a District Magistrate to institute proceedings under this section. See sec 57 of N. W. P. Municipalities Act XV of 1883, and sec 86 of the C. P. Municipal Act XVIII of 1889.

The Presidency Magistrates are not empowered to act under this chapter. In nuisance cases, they act under the Penal Code, the Police Acts, the Municipal Acts and other Local enactments, dealing with special kinds of nuisances

Third class Magistrates cannot hold any inquiry under this chapter—*Inasaddar v. Isimulla*, 50 C L J 291, 1929 Cr C. 600 (601)

324. Unlawful obstruction :—Obstruction to a public road is a nuisance though no practical inconvenience is caused—*Q. E. v. Umrao*, 23 All 84, *Kedar Nath*, 23 All 159. And it is absolutely irrelevant with what motive an obstruction upon the public highway is caused—*Kedar Nath*, supra Encroachment upon the public road is an obstruction and a nuisance by itself, even though it may not cause any inconvenience. The question of the sufficient width of the road being left for public use is no ground for allowing the encroachment or obstruction to continue. The public has a right to use every inch of the public path—*Jagroshan v. Madan*, 6 Pat 428, 28 Cr.L J 910 (911)

A dam constructed across a public river which amounts to an obstruction to the river and causes damage to the lower riparian owners may be ordered to be removed under this section—*Jagannath v. Chandika*, 11 O.L.J. 616, 21 Cr.L.J. 55 Where a cattle market is situated in a congested part of the town, so that owing to the cattle having to be driven through narrow and congested lanes, obstruction and inconvenience are caused to the public, it may be suppressed by an order under this section—*Mahendra v. Emp.*, 22 Cr L J 582 (Cal)

The obstruction must be *permanent*, and not temporary—*Emp. v. Dewrao*, 6 Bom L.R. 358, and it must be an *existing* obstruction, a Magistrate cannot make any order as to what should be done in case of future obstructions—*Kashi v. Yar Md.*, 21 W.R. 10. Thus, where a solid and vigorous branch of a tree is 15 feet above the level of a road

in a village, it cannot be said that at such a height it causes an obstruction, having regard to the normal traffic, and it cannot be ordered to be cut down merely because it is likely at some future time and under abnormal circumstances to prove an obstruction—*Gokul v. Emp.*, 22 A.L.J. 436, 26 Cr.L.J. 104.

Where a proceeding under this section is instituted against a number of persons for various acts of unlawful obstruction to a public way, it is essential that the order should state accurately with regard to each person the specific obstruction made by him which he is required to remove, unless it is alleged that all the persons are jointly responsible for all the obstructions complained of—*Ramohan v. Emp.* 44 Cal 61 (65), 20 C.W.N. 1171, 17 Cr.L.J. 409.

Where on a complaint being made to a Magistrate that a certain person had erected a platform on a public thoroughfare and had thereby obstructed it, the Magistrate ordered that such portion of the platform as might be obstructing the highway should be removed, held that the order was vague, the Magistrate ought to have definitely pointed out and marked off how much of the platform should be removed—*Jhau Lal v. Emp.*, 23 A.L.J. 43, 26 Cr.L.J. 731, A I R 1925 All 310.

Under this section, it is only the power to order the removal of an obstruction (e.g. a bund) which is given to a Magistrate. There is no provision for the reconstruction of a bund which has once been removed under this section—*Rahimuddi v. Sher Ali*, 40 C.L.J. 597, 26 Cr.L.J. 517 (518).

325. Public : "Public place" :—The provisions of this section apply to those cases where the obstruction is caused to a public thoroughfare—*In re Chundernath*, 5 Cal 875; *Jagannath v. Parmeshwar*, 36 All. 209; *In re Maharana*, 22 Bom 988. It is not necessary that the way should be one which is generally used by the public; it is sufficient if the way is one which is or may be lawfully used by the public—*Hriday v. Shilb Chandra*, 10 Cr.L.J. 210 (Cal.), *Churaman v. Emp.*, 12 A.L.J. 1024, *Teni Prasad v. Sarfoo*, 20 Cr.L.J. 556 (Pat.), *Rangi v. B. N. W. Ry.*, 4 P.L.T. 402. But the fact that the residents of a particular village have a right to take cattle across a field is not sufficient to constitute a public right of way—*Junnu v. Emp.*, 1906 A W N 190. A railway land is not necessarily a public place—*Rangi v. B N W. Ry.*, 4 P.L.T. 402.

In order that action may be taken under this section for the removal of an unlawful obstruction, the way, river or channel where the obstruction is made must be one of public use, and the obstruction must be of that public use. An obstruction which is not caused to the people in general but to a certain number of agriculturists of a particular village using a certain channel does not fall under this section—*Munna Tewari v. Chandrabali*, 50 All 871, 26 A.L.J. 1285, 29 Cr.L.J. 661 (662), following *In re Maharana*, 22 Bom. 988. An obstruction to a private path (*In re Balaji*, 4 Bom. L R 882; *Gouri Shankar v. Bhagalu*, 11 O.L.J.

659, 25 Cr.L.J. 1118), or to a private drain (*Shoodun*, 5 W.R. 58), or to a private channel (*Jagannath v. Parameshwar*, 36 All. 209) does not come within the purview of this section. A latrine which is not built on any public place but on a man's own private land is not a nuisance—*Gauri Shankar*, 26 A.L.J. 86, 29 Cr.L.J. 233.

If a private right is set up by the defendant, the procedure of the new section 139A will apply.

326. Nuisance:—As to nuisances under the Penal Code, see secs 268 to 294A, I. P. C.

Keeping a gaming-house is a nuisance if crowds of disorderly persons flock there and cause annoyance to the public—*Q. E. v. Thandavarayuda*, 14 Mad 364. A burning ghat may not itself be a nuisance, but if the ghat or ground is in such an offensive state or if cremation is performed upon it in such a way, as to be a source of injury, annoyance or danger to the neighbouring people, it will become a nuisance—*Indra Nath v. Q. E.*, 25 Cal 425. So also, if a privy is allowed to remain in such a condition as to be a nuisance to passers-by lawfully using a public place or way, proceedings to cause the nuisance to be abated may be instituted under this section—*In re Balaji*, 4 Bom. L.R. 882, *Gauri Shankar*, 26 A.L.J. 86, 29 Cr.L.J. 233. But this section does not empower a Magistrate to order a privy to be removed merely because it has been only recently made in any locality—*In re Balaji*, *supra*.

Slaughtering cattle, though it might be offensive to the prejudice and sentiments of a community, is not a nuisance—*Hadgee Mozhur Ali*, 25 W.R. 72. Selling fish on the roadside is not a public nuisance, unless annoyance has been caused to the public—1 Bur. L.T. 94. The act of a manager of a bonemill in permitting a large stock of bones to remain uncovered in the open air for a long time so as to become rotten and to emit a smell noxious to the neighbouring people or passers-by, constitutes a public nuisance—*Emp. v. Berckefeld*, 34 Cal 73. A noise which is injurious to the physical comfort of the community is a nuisance—*Krishna Mohan v. A. K. Guha*, 32 C.L.J. 42, 21 Cr.L.J. 669.

A private owner may be guilty of acts done on his private property, if it gives rise to a public nuisance to those living in the neighbourhood. Therefore the owner of a cremation ground may fairly be held to create a nuisance, if he allows the cremation of bodies upon that ground to be so performed as to annoy or endanger the lives and properties of persons living in the vicinity—*Indra Nath v. Q. E.*, 25 Cal 425.

A nuisance is not legalised by long enjoyment. No prescriptive right can be acquired to commit, maintain or continue a public nuisance involving actual danger to the health of the community—*In re Sheik Mohidin*, 2 Weir 59; *Municipal Commissioners v. Mahomed Ali*, 16 W.R. 6, 7 B.L.R. 499; *In re Balaji*, 4 Bom. L.R. 882; *Jagroshan v. Madan Pande*, 6 Pat. 428, 28 Cr.L.J. 910 (911). Thus, an old slaughter-house can be removed, if it becomes offensive to the health of the neighbourhood—*Municipal Commissioners v. Mahomed Ali*, *supra*.

But although no length of enjoyment can legalise a public nuisance, yet such fact may tend to show that the dispute was a *bona fide* dispute of title such as would have the effect of ousting the Magistrate of his jurisdiction (under section 139A). Therefore, the Magistrate is bound to see whether the fact of such long possession and enjoyment of the nuisance has not given to the objection of the person so enjoying it the character of a *bona fide* dispute as to title—*Preonath v. Gobordhone*, 25 Cal. 278.

"Should be removed".—These words show that the nuisance must be something which is capable of being removed. If it is not capable of being removed, (e.g. some objectionable accompaniments to a religious ceremony practised by the members of a religious sect) this section does not apply—*K. E. v. Faizal Hussain*, 1901 A W N 126.

327. Offensive trade or occupation—The proprietor of a cremation ground who puts his land at the disposal of any one who wishes to cremate a dead body, cannot be said to be carrying on any trade or occupation merely because he makes his profit by charging a high rent from a tenant who sells wood to the persons coming to cremate a dead body—*Jndra Nath v Q E* 25 Cal 425.

Para 3 deals only with trades which are in themselves injurious to the health or physical comfort of the community, and not with those which are in themselves innocent, but in the course of which the manager or prier commits a public nuisance—*Barro v Emp* 1888 P R 47. Thus, keeping a house of public entertainment is not by itself an offensive trade—*Ibid*.

This section relates to an *existing* state of affairs and not to the possibility of future results. Where an occupation is perfectly innocent at present, the mere fact that it may in future become offensive to the neighbours is no ground for issuing an order under this section. Where there is no evidence that the occupation of manufacturing bricks is in itself injurious to the health or that the petitioners were so working it that the health of any one was being injured, no order under this section can be made in anticipation of the occupation being injurious to the health of the community in future—*Gokal Chand v. Emp* . 1 Lah. 163, 21 Cr.L.J. 462.

In order to bring a trade or occupation within the operation of this section, it must be shown that the interference with public comfort was considerable and a large section of the public was affected injuriously—*Fazal Din v Crown*, 1911 P L R 117, 12 Cr L J 146. The working of rice-husking machines through the whole night in a residential quarter is a public nuisance, being injurious to the comfort of the whole neighbourhood—*Phiraya v K. E* , 1904 P R 9. A lawful and necessary occupation such as tanning ought not to be interfered with unless it is proved that it is injurious to the health of the community—*Shadi v Emp.*, 1888 P R. 17. Cultivation of maize, jowars, or *bujree* within a short distance from the town is not an injurious occupation—*Moti Shah v. Crown*, 1889 P.R. 39. A person who opens a new market close to an existing market in the village cannot be held to be carrying on a trade

or occupation that is injurious to the health or physical comfort of the community, nor does the fact that the people in one market are sometimes forcibly dragged from it to the rival one, giving rise to mutual recrimination and abuse, justify an order under this section—*In re Moidin*, 2 Weir 62, *Moidin v Abdulla*, 14 M L J. 207. But the Magistrate can in such a case take action under sec. 144 (see Note 373).

The discharge, into a river, of an effluent which might be injurious to the health of the people who use the water in such stream can be prohibited by an order under this section. It is of the utmost importance that sources of public water supply must be maintained pure and free from pollution by industrial factories; but such pollution must be convincingly proved before any order can be passed against the wrong-doer. The question whether the water of a river has been thus contaminated is one which calls for scientific inquiry and cannot be decided merely upon the opinion of the neighbouring villagers—*Deshi Sugar Mill v Topsi Kahar*, 8 P L T 302, 28 Cr L J 317.

A prostitute who behaves orderly and quietly and creates no open scandal by riotous living and causes no actual discomfort to the neighbourhood cannot be removed from her house merely on the ground of her bad character—*Nando Kumaree v. Anund Mohan*, 24 W.R. 68. So also, the mere existence of houses of prostitutes by the roadside or the fact that they ply their trade in their houses, cannot affect the physical comfort of the passers-by—*Basanta v. Emp.*, 5 C.W.N. 566. But where they are on the public road soliciting passers-by, their occupation is certainly injurious to the comfort of the community and may be stopped by an order under this section—*Nur Jan v. Emp.*, 1900 P.R. 2; though for the purposes of the Penal Code such an act does not amount to a public nuisance within the meaning of sec. 268 of that Code—*Q. E. v. Nanni*, 22 All 113.

Under the old law, if a trade or occupation was found to be offensive, the Magistrate had to pass an order *totally prohibiting* it; under the present law, it may be ordered to be *regulated* instead of being totally suppressed.

The Magistrate has no power, while ordering a party to stop the occupation of brick making, to order him to fill up the pits made by him. The 'removal' of the trade or occupation does not mean the restoration of *status quo* by filling up the pits—*Bhagat Ram v. Emp.*, 51 All. 489, 30 Cr.L.J. 561 (562).

328. Building likely to fall :—There must be proof that the state of the building is dangerous in *praesenti* and not in *futuro*. That the building might become dangerous by another man altering the adjoining premises in future or undermining the building in question is not a ground of action under this section—*Rajawan v. Empress*, 1890 P.R. 5.

Persons living etc. in the neighbourhood :—This section is limited to injuries likely to be caused to passers-by or "to persons living or carrying on business in the neighbourhood," i.e., those persons who are living

actually in the alleged dangerous building or in the servant's houses in the compound belonging to it, as well as those members of the public whose ordinary vocations may take them to the neighbourhood of the building complained of. Therefore, a Magistrate cannot, under this section, order the owner to repair his house which is standing in his own compound at a distance from the public road—*Q. E. v. Jasodanand*, 20 All 501.

329. Filling up excavations An order to fill up and bring in to one level with the adjacent land, excavations made for taking mud for the manufacture of bricks, is illegal, as the Magistrate can only order them to be fenced, even if they are by the side of a public way—*In re Sulemanji*, 22 Bom. 714 Cf 51 All 449 cited in Note 327 ante.

Fencing a tank—Where a tank is used as a reservoir for water, the Magistrate can order to have it fenced to prevent accidents, but where it is proved to be injurious to the health and comfort of the community, he may treat it as a public nuisance and cause it to be filled up—*In re Bisloo*, 10 W R 27.

330. Procedure to be strictly followed—Where a Magistrate commences proceedings under sec 133, he is not at liberty to proceed otherwise than in conformity with the rules laid down in this chapter—*Q. v. Pitti Singh*, 8 W R 37 "Cases have come before the Judicial Commissioner in which proceedings under Chapter X have been instituted on a vernacular order merely initiated by the Magistrate. In proceedings thus *laxly* instituted, other irregularities have naturally followed. The accused has not received proper notice of what he was required to do, and has not been given an opportunity of appearing to show cause against the conditional order made by the Magistrate. The Judicial Commissioner would impress upon every Magistrate exercising powers under Chapter X the necessity of recording in each case a formal order in his own hand, stating the information he has received and the order he proposes to issue, and of seeing that a proper notice is issued to the accused giving him full information of what he is required to do and opportunity of appearing to show cause against the order, if he wishes to do so"—*C. P. Cr. Ctr*, Part II, No. 8.

Taking evidence—Before passing a conditional order under this section a Magistrate is not bound to take evidence, because the proceedings under this section are entirely *ex parte*; but he should do so before making the order absolute under sec. 137—*Srinath v. Ainaddi*, 24 Cal. 395.

331. Nature of order :—An order under this section is *ex parte*—*Srinath v. Ainaddi*, 24 Cal. 395

The order shall be a written one, if no written order is passed, the procedure is faulty, and a person cannot be convicted of disobeying such an order—*Govt v. Choonee Lal*, 2 Agra 1.

The order should be directed to particular individuals, and must not be general, except in cases of emergency, to which Chapter XI applies, when they can be addressed to the public generally—*Q. E. v. Jokhu*, 8

All 99. A person disobeying a general order passed under this section (e.g. an order prohibiting the establishment of cotton-ginning yards in several villages of a taluk) cannot be convicted under section 188 I. P. Code—*Q E v. Manek Chand, Ratanlal* 342. The disobedience of a general order passed under this section prohibiting the public in general from frequenting the roads and paths of a certain village between certain hours, is not punishable under sec. 188 I. P. C.—*In re Komul Kisto*, 12 C L R 231.

The order under this section must not be vague, it must be such that the persons to whom it is directed will be able to learn from its contents what they are ordered to do, for the purpose of complying with it—*Kali Mohan v. Nakari*, 11 C L J. 114. If the order is ambiguous and open to two interpretations, the one most favourable to the accused will be adopted—*Parbuitv v. Q E*, 16 Cal 9.

The order must be conditional, and not absolute. Every order should state the time within which and the place where the person to whom it is issued may appear and move to have it set aside—*Emp. v. Brajo Kanta*, 9 Cal 637. Disobedience of an order which fixes no time or place is not an offence under sec. 188 I. P. C.—*Shwe Pe v. Emp.*, 1 Bur. S R. 363.

And lastly, the order must be confined to the removal of the nuisance only, and should not direct the removal of the whole thing; for instance, in the case of a tank, the order should be to fence the tank and not to fill up the tank—*In re Bistoo* 10 W R 27. If the Magistrate finds a burning ghat to be a nuisance, he cannot order the removal of the ghat itself but can order the removal of the nuisance, i.e. he can take such steps as would result in the cremation ceasing to be a nuisance—*Indra Nath v. Q E*, 25 Cal 425. In a case where sparks from a forge might set fire to a cotton stored in an adjoining building, the Magistrate cannot order the removal of the forge, but should order its construction in such a way that sparks shall not issue out of it into the open air—*In re Lahanu*, Ratanlal 872. If the branch of a tree is likely to fall on passers-by, the Magistrate should not order the tree to be cut down but may secure the safety of the public by ordering proper support to be given so as to prevent the branch from falling—*Gokul v. Emp.* 22 A L J 436, 26 Cr. L J 104. If the use of a latrine is made in such a way as to be a nuisance to the neighbours, the Magistrate should order the owner to remove the nuisance of the manure and not to remove the latrine itself—*Gauri Shankar v. Srikrishna*, 26 A L J 86, 29 Cr L J 233.

332. Dropping of proceedings :—If a Magistrate is satisfied that there are no sufficient grounds for taking action under this section, he can drop the proceedings—*Iskur Churn v. Kali Churn*, 8 Cal. 833; *Sonai v. Jogendra*, 1 C L R. 486. Thus, where the Magistrate, before making a final order comes to know that the road is not a public one, he can drop the proceedings and abstain from carrying out the order for the removal of the obstruction—*In re Becharam*, 15 W R 67. In such cases, the High Court will not interfere in revision with the order of the Magistrate dropping the proceedings—*Sonai v. Jogendra*, 1 C L R. 486.

Proceedings once dropped can be revived, if sufficient cause is shown—*Ishan Chandra v. Prasanna*, 5 C.W.N. 173

Further inquiry :—Sec. 437 (now 436) enables a superior Court to direct further inquiry in case of offences. But proceedings under this chapter are not proceedings in respect of offences, and therefore sec. 437 (now 436) cannot apply. So, if a Magistrate drops proceedings under this section, neither the District Magistrate nor the Sessions Judge can order further inquiry under sec. 437 (now 436)—*Srinath v. Ainuddi*, 24 Cal. 395. The proper procedure for the District Magistrate in such a case is to refer the matter to the High Court—*Indra Nath v. Q. E.*, 25 Cal. 425; *Prithipal v. K. E.*, 2 O.W.N. 549, 26 Cr L J 1251

333. Orders not under this section :—A Magistrate has no jurisdiction under this section to pass the following orders :—

(1) An order regarding the custody and guardianship of children—*Anon.*, 11 Weir 66 (67).

(2) An order directing the construction of a new drain—*Bishu Nath v. Emp.*, 1900 A.W.N. 138

(3) An order on a person to lop off branches of a tree of his, which overhung a certain house and were thus dangerous in affording facility to thieves—*Emp. v. Hiralal*, 1893 A.W.N. 222

(4) An order to close a graveyard—*Sheo Saran v. Lal Mda.*, 12 C.W.N. 70

(5) An order prohibiting persons to drink the water of a certain well—*Emp. v. Sheoamber*, 1893 A.W.N. 145

(6) A general order prohibiting the public to frequent the roads and places of a certain village between certain hours—*In re Komul Kisto*, 12 C.L.R. 231.

(7) An order calling upon a person to repair a well, and upon his failure to do so, directing him to pay a fine, wherefrom the Magistrate ordered the well to be repaired, is an illegal order—*Reg. v. Tatyia*, Ratanlal 50.

(8) An order directing a person not to cultivate his land—*Dhan Singh v. K. E.*, 1 A.L.J. 615.

334. Civil Suits :—No suit will lie in a Civil Court to set aside an order passed under this section, and the Civil Courts have no jurisdiction to question or set aside such order—*Chander Seekur*, 12 W.R. (F.B.) 18 (overruling 7 W.R. 95); *Rooke v. Peare Lal Coal Co.*, 11 W.R. 434 (civil); *Ujalamoyi v. Chandra*, 4 B.L.R. 24. Thus, a Civil Court has no jurisdiction to order a road which has been declared by the Magistrate as a public road, to be closed—*Rooke*, 11 W.R. 434 (civil). But in spite of an order under this section a suit will lie for a declaration under sec. 42 of the Special Relief Act against any one of the public who claims to use the road as a public road—*Chuni Lal v. Ram Kishan*, 15 Cal. 460, *Gooroo v. Probhoo*, 19 W.R. 426 (civil), *Muttee Ram v. Mohi Lal*, 6 Cal. 291, *Nilkanthappa v. Magistrate*, 11 Bom. 670.

Since a Magistrate's order under this section is not a conclusive determination of the question of *title*, it is competent to a Civil Court to try the question whether a land is private property or a public place—*Muttee Ram v. Mohi Lal*, 11 Cal. 291.

The suit will lie, as regards a public road, not against the Magistrate but against the Secretary of State—*Nilkanthappa*, 11 Bom 670; but of course it is open to the party to bring a declaratory suit against any member of the public who may use the road as a public one, and in such cases, it is unnecessary to make the Secretary of State a party—*Chuni Lal v. Ram Kishen*, 15 Cal 460

335. Revision—The High Court can interfere when the Magistrate acted without jurisdiction or in excess of his jurisdiction or when there was an error in law. Where the Magistrate came to a finding after considering all the evidence before him, the High Court cannot interfere on the ground that the finding was erroneous—*Angels v. Cargill*, 9 B.L.R. 417. But the High Court can interfere when there is no evidence or no reasonable evidence on record to justify the Magistrate's finding or where the finding arrived at is perverse or such as no reasonable man could have arrived at on the evidence produced—*Abdul Wahid v. Abdullah*, 45 All 656 (661), *Municipal Commissioners v. Amanat Ali*, 7 B.L.R. 516. The High Court will interfere where an attempt has been made to abuse the powers of the Court, that is, where the Magistrate has given a decision regarding matters which properly lie within the cognizance of Civil Courts (as for instance, in a case when a *bona fide* claim of right in a way or road has been set up by a party)—*Abdul Wahid v. Abdullah*, 45 All 656 (657), 21 A.L.J. 529

Further, it is not the practice of the High Court to entertain an application in revision against an order made by a Magistrate in a proceeding under this section, unless the party aggrieved had first moved the Sessions Judge under secs 435 and 438—*Rash Behari v. Phani Bhushan*, 48 Cal. 534, 22 Cr.L.J. 650

336. Death of party.—An order under this section or under the subsequent sections of this chapter is an order against a particular individual. When that individual dies, the order ceases to have any effect and must be considered spent, and the Magistrate would not be entitled to act under sec. 140 (2). If he considers it necessary to issue another order against the successor of the deceased, he must take separate proceedings—*Jugal Kishore v. Emp*, 26 A.L.J. 405, 29 Cr.L.J. 445 (446).

134. (1) The order shall, if practicable, be served on the person against whom it is made in manner herein provided for service of a summons.

Service or notification of order.

(2) If such order cannot be so served, it shall be notified by proclamation, published in such manner as the Local Government may by rule direct, and a copy

thereof shall be stuck up at such place or places as may be fittest for conveying the information to such person.

337. Non-service of notice :—The terms of this section are directory and ought to be followed; but an omission to follow its provisions is a mere irregularity and does not nullify the order—*Parbuly v. Q. E.*, 16 Cal 9. Thus, the non-service of notice does not invalidate the order if the parties admit that they knew of the existence of the notice—*Hochan v. Elliot*, 5 W.R. 4. Where the parties had information of the order, it is immaterial that the mode in which it was brought to their notice was not in strict accordance with the provisions of this section—*Nur Jan v. Emp.*, 1900 P R 2; *Khushi Ram v. Crown*, 4 Lah 224 (229). So, where the persons against whom the order was made were residents of a Mohalla, and the order instead of being served on them personally was stuck up in some conspicuous place of the Mohalla, and the parties came to know of the order, held that the service of the order, though irregular, did not affect its validity—*Khushi Ram v. Crown*, 4 Lah 224 (229), 24 Cr.L.J. 457, 5 Lah. L.J. 420.

Proclamation .—In Bengal, the proclamation is to be made by beat of drum—*Calcutta Gazette*, 1883, Part III, p. 245. In Bombay, it is to be made by beat of drum, and by publication in the Bombay Gazette and such local newspapers as the Magistrate directs—*Bombay Gazette*, 1901, Part I, p. 779.

135. The person against whom such order is made shall—

Person to whom order is addressed to obey or shew cause or claim jury. (a) perform within the time and in the manner specified in the order, the act directed thereby; or

(b) appear in accordance with such order and either show cause against the same, or apply to the Magistrate by whom it was made, to appoint a jury to try whether the same is reasonable and proper.

Change .—The italicised words have been added by sec 25 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923).

338. Application to show cause or for jury :—Since the proceeding under sec. 133 is in the first instance entirely *ex parte*, and since the report or other information whereon the Magistrate has taken action before making the conditional order under section 133 is no evidence against the opposite party, it is consequently desirable that reasonable opportunity should be given to the opposite party to show cause as contemplated by this section and to adduce evidence as prescribed by section 137—*Raimohan v Emp.*, 44 Cal 61 (64), 20 C W N 1171.

Under this section a party cannot both show cause and apply for a jury at the same time, he has the right to adopt only one of the alternatives—*Kishori Lal*, 13 C.W.N. 367.

The application for the appointment of a jury must be made to the Magistrate by whom the conditional order under sec. 133 was made. Where the defendant appears and demands a jury under sec. 135, the matter must be disposed of by the Magistrate issuing the conditional order, and not by any other Magistrate to whom the case might have been referred for inquiry. If the defendant does not demand a jury but appears and shows cause, the Magistrate who issued the conditional order under sec. 133 may make over the case to any other Magistrate for disposal—*Jagroshan v. Madan Pande*, 11 Pat. 428, 11 P.L.T. 452, 28 Cr.L.J. 910 (911).

339. Bona fide claim :—If the person against whom an order under sec. 133 is made claims a private right of way, the question as to whether the claim set up by the defendant is a bona fide one is to be decided by the Magistrate himself and not to be left to the jury—*Kylash v. Ram Lal*, 26 Cal 869. See Note 359 under sec. 139A, sub-sec. (3). A case can be referred to the jury only after the Magistrate has decided that the claim set up by the petitioner is not a bona fide claim, and that the way alleged to be obstructed is one which is or may be lawfully used by the public. The jury is not competent to decide the question whether there is a public right of way. What the jury has to consider is whether the order passed by the Magistrate under sec. 133 is a reasonable and proper order—*Nasrullah v. Akiluddin*, 3 C.W.N. 345; *Kylash v. Ram Lal*, 26 Cal 869, *Dulalram v. Baishnab*, 10 C.W.N. 845; *Matukdhari v. Harimadhab*, 31 Cal 979, *Ma Ashrafuddin v. Sk Karim Baksh*, 18 C.W.N. 1148, 15 Cr.L.J. 515. Therefore a Magistrate is not competent to make a reference to the jury without first determining whether the way is a public thoroughfare or not, or without determining whether the claim set up by the opposite party is bona fide or not—*Dulalram v. Baishnab Charan*, 10 C.W.N. 845, *Matukdhari v. Harimadhab*, 31 Cal 979; *Kylash v. Ram Lal*, 26 Cal 869, *Sk. Imrat Ali v. Sk Amjad Ali*, 2 P.L.J. 67, 18 Cr.L.J. 452; *Khushi Ram v. Crown*, 4 Lah. 224 (226). If, however, the Magistrate, through a mistaken view of the law, makes a reference to the jury, without finding whether the way is a public way or not, the jury would be met by a bona fide objection that the way is private property, which would render them powerless to proceed, the Magistrate will then have to take up the matter himself again, and if the claim is bona fide, will have to refer the parties to a Civil Court—*In re Chundernath*, 5 Cal. 875.

When a person has applied for a jury and a jury has been appointed, the party cannot set up the plea that he caused the obstruction under a bona fide claim of private right to the way—*In re Lachman*, 22 All. 267; *Emp v. Ram Bilas*, 30 All. 364. The application for a jury will operate as a waiver of the plea of bona fide claim. Once a jury is appointed on the application of the person against whom an order has been made under sec. 133, it is not open to him at a later stage to set up a claim of right to the subject of contention and to have his claim determined by the Magistrate before the jury proceed with the matter—*Ah Yway v. Ma Gyi*, 7 Bur. L.T. 23, 15 Cr.L.J. 269.

136. If such person does not perform such act or appear and show cause or apply for the appointment of a jury as required by section 135, he shall be liable to the penalty prescribed in that behalf in Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code, and the order shall be made absolute.

340. Object of section :—The provisions of this section are stringent, because the intention is to create facilities for conditional orders, which Magistrates are authorised to pass under this chapter, becoming final without needless delay, and thereby promptly to ensure public safety—*Q E. v Narayana*, 12 Mad 475. Therefore, an order under this section must be passed without delay. Where a conditional order passed under section 133 was made absolute 4 years later, the High Court treated the final order as resting on no conditional order and reversed it—*In re Rangabai*, 23 Bom.L.R. 844, 22 Cr L.J. 605

341. Order absolute :—This section conclusively presumes that the conditional order under sec 133 was correctly made—*Narayana*, 12 Mad. 475. Where an order has become absolute under this section, it cannot be questioned in any subsequent proceeding even if its legality were not fully established—*Nur Jan*, 1900 P R 2 It is not competent to the party to go behind the order and question its validity in any way—*Q E. v. Bishambar*, 13 All. 577. But where the Magistrate makes an order which he had no jurisdiction to pass, the party affected by it can go behind the order—*Jasodanand*, 20 All 501

Even though an order has been made absolute under this section by reason of the party not being able to attend on the date fixed, the Magistrate can set aside the *ex parte* order on the appearance of the party. In such a case the Magistrate must proceed to record evidence as provided by sec 137 and shall then either make the order absolute again or shall drop the proceedings, as the case may be—*Ramsaran v Ram Lagan*, 19 Cr L J. 214 (Pat)

342. No further notice necessary —Whenever the time fixed in the order under sec 133 has been allowed by the defendant to pass without compliance with the order or without protest, the liability to punishment attaches at once, and no further notice is necessary under sec 140—*Aluvala Guruviah*, 31 Mad 280

137. (1) If he appears and shows cause against the order, the Magistrate shall take evidence in the matter as in a summons-case.

Procedure where he appears to show cause.

(2) If the Magistrate is satisfied that the order is not reasonable and proper, no further proceedings shall be taken in the case.

(3) If the Magistrate is not so satisfied, the order shall be made absolute.

343. 'Magistrate':—The power to issue a conditional order belongs only to the Magistrate mentioned in the beginning of Sec. 133. The power to appoint a jury also belongs to the Magistrate who made the conditional order (see sec. 135). But the Magistrate who is to hold the inquiry under section 137 need not be the Magistrate who made the order under sec. 133, the Magistrate in section 137 is the Magistrate *before whom the party is ordered to appear* (see sec. 133); he may be either the Magistrate himself who issued the conditional order, or a Magistrate of the first or second class mentioned in the last para of section 133 (1). This seems to be the meaning of sections 133 and 137 read together. Therefore, where a Magistrate issuing a conditional order under sec. 133 required certain persons to appear before a 2nd class Magistrate, the latter can exercise his powers under section 137 and can take evidence, confirm the conditional order or stay further proceedings. See *In re Narasimha*, 9 Mad. 201, *Preonath v. Gobordhone*, 25 Cal. 278; *Venkanna*, 2 Weir 61; *Jagroshan v. Madan*, 6 Pat 428, 8 P.L.T. 452, 28 Cr.L.J. 910 (911).

344. Taking evidence.—When a party appears to show cause, the Magistrate is bound to take evidence as in a summons case. He cannot make the order absolute without taking evidence—*Jassi v. Emp.*, 20 A.L.J. 692, 25 Cr.L.J. 266, *Q. E. v. Ramchandra*, 1 Bom. L.R. 783; *In re Mahadaji*, 11 Bom. 375, *Bechan v. Emp.*, 47 All. 341, 26 Cr.L.J. 905, *Sant Sahai v. Lachman Singh*, 9 O.L.J. 64, 23 Cr.L.J. 250; *Attar Singh v. Hari Singh*, 27 P.L.R. 764, 28 Cr.L.J. 60. Even if the party appears after the time fixed in the order, but before the case is taken up, the Magistrate is bound to hear his objection and take evidence for the order he has to make—*In re Bistoo*, 10 W.R. 27. The absence of the objector at an adjourned hearing after he has once appeared to show cause will not absolve the Magistrate of his duty of taking some evidence at least before making the order absolute—*In re Ram Singh*, 2 Bom. L.R. 818; *Bechan v. Emp.*, (supra). The Magistrate cannot act solely on his own opinion, he is bound to take evidence as the basis of his order which he is to make—*Doraisami v. Sudarsana*, 17 M.L.T. 142, 16 Cr.L.J. 207; *In re Mahadaji*, 11 Bom. 375, *Kolandavelu*, 2 Weir 62. It is illegal for him to make the order absolute solely on the report of a Tahsildar. He must go into the evidence adduced by the defendant and record his findings—*Ismail v. Banda*, 20 A.L.J. 657, 27 Cr.L.J. 864; *Ran Bahadar v. Bhagwati*, 27 Cr.L.J. 1254, 3 O.W.N. 844, *Abdul Karim v. Emp.*, 49 All. 453, 25 A.L.J. 424, 28 Cr.L.J. 294. The report or information received by the Magistrate before passing the conditional order under sec. 133 is no evidence against the other party (the proceeding under sec. 133 being entirely *ex parte*) and the Magistrate cannot act upon it but is bound to take evidence in the presence of the opposite party—*Srinath v. Ainaddi*, 24 Cal. 395; *Raimohan v. Emp.*, 44 Cal. 61. He also cannot, even with the consent of the parties, refer the matter to a subordinate Magistrate for inquiry and report, and then pass the final order on the basis of that

report; he must take the evidence himself—*In re Kariyappa Ningappa*, 47 Bom 89; he cannot base his decision upon the information gathered from a personal local inspection, instead of taking evidence, even though the parties agree to abide by his decision—*Upendra v. Rampal*, 10 C.L.J. 482; *Doraiswami v. Sudarsana*, 17 M.L.T. 142; *Ramohan v. Emp.*, 44 Cal. 61 (64); *Kalisaday v. Sidheswar*, 23 C.W.N. 1054, 20 Cr.L.J. 322; *Biru v. Gokul*, 20 Cr.L.J. 217 (Pat.), *K. E. v. Kanhaiya Lal*, 24 O.C. 267; *Balbhadra*, 1 P.L.W. 292, 18 Cr.L.J. 448; *Turkha v. Nanak*, 49 All 475, 25 A.L.J. 377, 28 Cr.L.J. 291. This section does not authorise a Magistrate to assume the role of an arbitrator, even though the parties agree to his being so, and to pass an order after a local inquiry without recording evidence—*Chandra Mandal v. Ram Mandal*, 21 C.W.N. 926, 18 Cr.L.J. 738; *Upendra v. Rampal*, 10 C.L.J. 482, *Bhoora v. Tara Singh*, 49 All. 270, 25 A.L.J. 155, 28 Cr.L.J. 159. Such action on the part of the Magistrate in ignoring the clear provisions of sec. 137 amounts to a substantial error of law (and not a mere error of procedure) and cannot be cured by sec. 537—*Bhoora v. Tara Singh* (supra).

A conditional order under sec. 133 cannot be made absolute without the first party being called upon to adduce evidence in support of his claim, even though the second party does not, after showing cause under sec. 135, appear to give evidence in support of the denial of the right claimed by the first party—*Akhoy v. Lalchand*, 31 C.W.N. 963, 28 Cr.L.J. 859 (860).

345. Dropping of proceedings:—See Note 332 under sec. 113. The Magistrate cannot make an order dropping the proceedings under sub-section (2) of this section without taking evidence in the matter as directed by sub-section (1)—*Shew Kelaon v. Nayan*, 22 Cr.L.J. 239 (Cal.). Where in a proceeding in respect of an alleged obstruction to a public way, the Magistrate made a conditional order but dropped the proceedings on the opposite party taking the objection in showing cause that the Court had no jurisdiction to proceed with the inquiry on the ground that the identical way had previously been the subject matter of an inquiry under sec. 133 by a Court of competent jurisdiction, held that the Magistrate was bound to take evidence as prescribed by sub-section (1) of this section; it was open to the Magistrate after taking evidence to consider whether there was a complete answer to the case against the opposite party or whether the case was one where the parties should be referred to the civil Court for the determination of a matter which the Magistrate considered he could not decide—*Sarojebashini v. Sripati Charan*, 42 Cal 702, 16 Cr.L.J. 415, 19 C.W.N. 332.

346. Procedure.—As in a summons-case, the complainant shall first begin by calling his witness, who may then be cross-examined by the other party. After the complainant has finished, the other party shall let in his evidence—*Hingu v. K. E.*, 31 All. 453, 6 A.L.J. 685 (686). The opposite party is not bound to produce evidence until the party who has set the law in motion has produced his evidence—*Indar v. K. E.*, 11 A.L.J. 931, 15 Cr.L.J. 23; *In re Dakshinamurthi*, 18 Cr.L.J. 848 (Mad.).

When a Magistrate passed a conditional order under sec. 133, and on the day fixed the accused put in a written statement to the effect that no obstruction to the public thoroughfare had been caused, and produced a number of witnesses who deposed to the same effect, but the Magistrate without recording any evidence for the prosecution made the order absolute under this section, it was held that the Magistrate's order was illegal, since he should have proceeded as in a summons-case—*Crown v Sita Ram*, 1917 P.R. 32; *Jassi v. Emp.* 20 A.L.J. 692, 25 Cr L.J. 266.

The Court is bound at the party's request to compel the attendance of witnesses—*Bhomar v. Digambar*, 6 C.W.N. 548.

Reference to jury—Reference to a jury is entirely optional with the party against whom the order is made; but if he applies for a jury, he is bound by their verdict. If no reference is made, the order made by the Magistrate under this section will become final—*Khodabuksh v. Monglai*, 14 Cal 60

347. Illegal order.—Where a conditional order under Sec. 133 was passed without jurisdiction, the subsequent order under this section confirming the conditional order is also illegal—*In re Jaswant Singh*, Ratanlal 516.

Illegality of procedure cannot be cured:—Where a Magistrate, instead of taking the evidence himself as provided by this section, sent the case to a subordinate Magistrate for inquiry and report, and then made the order absolute on the basis of that report, held that there was a complete disregard of the imperative provisions of this section. It is not a mere irregularity of procedure but a grave illegality which cannot be cured under Sec. 537 even by the consent of the parties—*In re Kariyappa*, 47 Bom 89

Procedure where he claims jury.

shall—

138. (1) On receiving an application under Section 135 to appoint a jury, the Magistrate

- (a) forthwith appoint a jury consisting of an uneven number of persons not less than five, of whom the foreman and one-half of the remaining members shall be nominated by such Magistrate, and the other members by the applicant;
- (b) summon such foreman and members to attend at such place and time as the Magistrate thinks fit; and
- (c) fix a time within which they are to return their verdict.

(2) The time so fixed may, for good cause shown, be extended by the Magistrate.

348. Section imperative.—This section leaves no discretion to the Magistrate, and he is bound to appoint a jury, when he is asked to do so—*Anon*, 2 Weir 63; *Kishori Lal*, 13 C.W.N. 367. If he refuses to do so, he acts illegally—*Gaunde Rai*, 1887 P.R. 19, *In re Mothoor*, 2 C.L.R. 509.

349. Appointment of jury:—The Magistrate to whom an application to appoint a jury is made cannot delegate that duty to another Magistrate—*Q. E. v. Vilhu*, *Ratanlal* 460.

The word 'forthwith' must be interpreted in a reasonable way; it merely means that the Magistrate shall appoint the jury as soon as he reasonably can. Therefore, where the Magistrate appointed the jury 2 days after the parties applied for a jury, held that the terms of this section were substantially complied with, and there was no unreasonable delay—*Khushi Ram v. Crown*, 4 Lah 224 (229).

The appointment or the cancelment of appointment of a jury must be made in the presence of the parties and not behind their back—*In re Chundernath*, 5 Cal 875.

In nominating the foreman and one half of the remaining members of the jury it is the duty of the Magistrate to exercise his own independent judgment and not to accept persons who may be put forward by the complainant—*Upendra v. Khitish*, 23 Cal 499, *Kylash v. Ram Lal*, 26 Cal 869; *In re Kothari*, 31 Bom. L.R. 79, 30 Cr.L.J. 785 (786). The following persons should not be appointed as jurors:—(a) Complainant and his witnesses; because it is plainly against the principles of right and equity that a person should be compelled to submit his case to the arbitration of his adversary—*Brindaban v. Dwarka*, 22 W.R. 47; (b) Friends and supporters of the complainant—*Farjand Ali v. Hakim Ali*, 37 All 26, 16 Cr.L.J. 40, *Mir Imam v. Q. E.*, 1897 P.R. 4, (c) Nominees of the party interested in upholding the Magistrate's order (i.e. nominees of the complainant)—*Rajah Shalyananda v. Camperdown Pressing Co.*, 21 W.R. 43, *Kylash v. Ram Lal*, 26 Cal 869 *Upendra v. Khitish*, 23 Cal 499, *In re Kothari*, *supra*.

A Magistrate has no power to veto the appointment of a person nominated by the applicant—*Mir Imam v. Q. E.*, 1897 P.R. 4.

The summons to jury should specify the time and place when and where the jurors should attend—*Emp v. Ram Saran*, 5 All 7.

350. Jury improperly constituted—If the Magistrate appoints the foreman of the jury alone, the jury is not a properly constituted one—*Dino Nath v. Hur Gobind*, 16 W.R. 23. Where one of the five jurors remains absent, and the foreman substitutes a juror in the place of the absent one, he acts illegally because he has no such power, and the jury is not legally constituted—*Bhyrub*, 10 C.L.J. 193. If one of the jurors declines to act or remains absent, the Magistrate cannot pro-

ceed with the inquiry unless he appoints another juror in his place—*Uma Churn v Joshein*, 11 Cal. 84.

A jury consisting of less than five persons is not a properly constituted one, and an order based on the verdict of such a jury is invalid—*Ajit v Jamatulla*, 22 Cr L.J. 511 (Cal)

351. Procedure :—This chapter does not lay down any rules as to the procedure which a jury appointed under this section should adopt in inquiring into a matter submitted to them—*Emp v Rari Bilas*, 30 All. 364. The jury is bound to hear the parties and their witnesses. They cannot decide a matter referred to them merely on local inspection without taking evidence—*Kylash v Ram Lal*, 26 Cal. 869, *Adhar Chandra v. Ambika*, 11 C W N. 886

352. Verdict after time fixed :—Where a jury appointed under this section had considered the matter referred to them, and the individual members of the jury had given in their opinion to the foreman, but he sent in his report after the time fixed but before a final order was made by the Magistrate, it was held that the Magistrate should act on the verdict of the jury, and should not appoint a second jury—*Sk. Nazum-uddy v Hasim Khan*, 21 W R 54

*Extension of time .—*The power conferred by sub-section (2) for the extension of time for delivery of verdict can be exercised by the Magistrate only and cannot be delegated to the foreman of the jury—*Q. E. v. Kedar Nath*, 23 All 159

353. Reference to arbitration :—As the dispute under this chapter is of a public nature, in which public interests are involved, the case cannot be referred to arbitrators by agreement of parties—*Rajabalam v. Nawlak*, 2 P L T 6, 22 Cr L J. 327, *Ajit Shaikh v Jamatulla*, 22 Cr.L.J. 511 (Cal)

139. (1) If the jury or a majority of the jurors find that the order of the Magistrate is reasonable and proper as originally made, or subject to a modification which the Magistrate accepts, the Magistrate shall make the order absolute, subject to such modification (if any).

Procedure where jury finds Magistrate's order to be reasonable

(2) In other cases, no further proceedings shall be taken under this Chapter.

354. Verdict of the jury :—The jurors are not to give their individual and separate opinions to the Magistrate, but they are to consult together and then express their collective opinion through their foreman—*Q E. v. Khushali Ram*, 111 All 158.

The findings of all the members

not agree in every detail; but if the Magistrate taken as a whole

is improper, the jurors shall be counted together as unanimously object-
ing to the order—*Q. v. Nakari*, 25 W.R. 31.

Where one of the five jurors declined to act, and the remaining four being equally divided in opinion, the Magistrate declined to pass any order under sec 139, and struck off the case, held that the course adopted by the Magistrate was irregular, he should have summoned a fresh jury and commenced the inquiry afresh—*Uma Churn v. Joshein* 11 Cal 84

The only thing which the jury is to consider is whether the conditional order passed by the Magistrate under sec 133 is reasonable and proper. They cannot enter into the question of rights of parties—*In re Chundernath*, 5 Cal 875; *Matukdhar v. Harimadhab*, 31 Cal 979, *Dulalram v. Baishnab*, 10 C.W.N 845; *Nasaruddi v. Akiluddi*, 3 C.W.N. 345 They cannot decide the question of bona fides of the claim set up by the opposite party—See Notes 339 and 359 under secs 135 and 139A

Verdict of majority.—The 'majority' means a majority of the persons appointed, and not a majority of the persons attending—*Durga Charan v. Sashi*, 13 Cal. 275. Moreover, all the persons appointed as jurors must act, and the verdict of the majority must be the verdict of the majority of the persons appointed. Therefore, where one juror out of five was all along absent, the Magistrate cannot accept the verdict of the four persons who attended, treating it as the verdict of the majority—*Promotha v. Basanta*, 11 Cr.L.J 402 (Cal). So also, a decision by three out of five, in the absence of the other two, is invalid—*Q. E. v. Kedar Nath*, 23 All. 159. So again, a verdict is defective when four out of five jurors were present at the time of the local investigation and one was absent. Such a verdict is illegal and cannot be acted upon, and a fresh jury should be appointed—*Srimati Dasya v. Nibaran*, 24 C.W.N 928, 21 Cr.L.J 448

The finding of the jury should be arrived at after each juror exercises his own discretion in the matter. A verdict given by jurors, some of whom blindly follow the opinion of others, is not proper. Where out of five jurors two only saw the place, and the third never visited it, but passed his opinion solely on what had been told him by the other two, it was held that the opinion of the so-called majority was not that of a legal majority—*Pelambar v. Nasaruddy*, 25 W.R. 4

Objection to verdict.—The party objecting to the verdict must show *prima facie* that either the jury did not apply a judicial discretion to the case, or that they could not have arrived at that verdict by a proper exercise of their discretion on the materials before them—*Bindaban v. Dwarka*, 23 W.R. 15.

355. Magistrate bound by verdict.—A Magistrate is not at liberty to take only a part of the verdict, he is bound to be guided by their whole decision. If any part of their verdict is ambiguous, he can ask them to express their opinion clearly—*Q. v. Poholee*, 12 W.R. 28.

If the jury finds the Magistrate's order to be wrong, he is bound by the verdict and must stop further proceedings. It is only when the

jury finds the Magistrate's order to be reasonable and proper that he can proceed to enforce the order—*Ibid.*

The Magistrate must accept the verdict in its entirety. If one part of the verdict is erroneous (e.g. If the verdict provides for the reconstruction of an obstruction) the whole verdict must be rejected. The Magistrate cannot split up the verdict and accept that part of the verdict which is correct, rejecting the portion which is erroneous—*Rahimaddi v. Sher Ali*, 40 C.L.J. 597, 26 Cr L.J. 517 (518)

Remitting the case to another Magistrate :—On receipt of the verdict of the jury, the Magistrate is not competent to remit the case for disposal to a second class Magistrate. The 1st class Magistrate is alone competent to deal with the case further and must dispose of the case himself—*Angapa v. Perumal*, 43 Mad 316

356. Reference to High Court :—The decision of the jury appointed under sec. 138 is not a proceeding in a Criminal Court which the District Magistrate can call for and examine and refer to the High Court under sec. 435—*Anon.*, Ratanlal 336

139A. (1) *Where an order is made under Section 133 for the purpose of preventing obstruction, nuisance or danger to the public in the use of any way, river, channel or place, the Magistrate shall, on the appearance before him of the person against whom the order was made, question him as to whether he denies the existence of any public right in respect of the way, river, channel or place, and, if he does so, the Magistrate shall, before proceeding under Section 137 or Section 138, inquire into the matter.*

Procedure where existence of public right is denied.

(2) *If in such inquiry the Magistrate finds that there is any reliable evidence in support of such denial, he shall stay the proceeding until the matter of the existence of such right has been decided by a competent Civil Court; and, if he finds that there is no such evidence, he shall proceed as laid down in Section 137 or Section 138, as the case may require.*

(3) *A person who has, on being questioned by the Magistrate under sub-section (1), failed to deny the existence of a public right of the nature therein referred to or who, having made such denial, has failed to adduce reliable evidence in support thereof, shall not in the subsequent proceedings be permitted to make any such*

denial, nor shall any question in respect of the existence of any such public right be inquired into by any jury appointed under Section 138.

This section has been newly added by sec 26 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923).

The procedure which ought to be followed by the Magistrate in case a *bona fide* claim of right is set up by the petitioner, was not laid down in any section of this chapter under the previous law. But a large volume of caselaw had gathered round this point, which the Legislature has now thought fit to crystallize into a new section.

"The principal question in connection with this clause is whether, as provided in the Bill, questions of title in relation to rights of way and the like should, for the purposes of the Chapter, be finally decided by the Magistrate, or whether the almost uniform decisions of the High Courts, which lay down that the Magistrate must stay proceedings if he is satisfied that the question has been raised *bona fide*, should be followed. We prefer to accept the latter view as laid down in *Manipur Dey v Bidhu Bhusan Sirkar*, 1 L.R. 42 Cal 158; and we have provided for it as a special case in a new section 139-A."—*Report of the Joint Committee* (1922).

The leading case on this subject is *Manipur Dey v Bidhu Bhusan Sirkar*, 42 Cal. 158, 18 C.W.N. 1086, 15 Cr.L.J. 698 (referred to in the above Report of the Joint Committee) which has laid down the following important propositions of law: If the party against whom the order is contemplated to be passed under sec 133 raises a question that the pathway is not a public property in the sense of the provisions of this section, the Magistrate trying the case should be careful not only to decide as to whether the pathway in question is situate on a private land or is for public use, but he should, even when the claim of the objector is not sustained, find whether the claim is *bona fide* or is set up only to oust the jurisdiction of the Court. If the Magistrate finds that the claim which is set up is a mere pretence, he should then proceed to pass a final order and make the rule issued by him absolute. If, however, he finds that the claim, although not substantiated, is not a mere pretence and is not raised to oust the jurisdiction of the Court but that it is raised *bona fide*, he should stay his hand and refer the party to the Civil Court. And if the party within a reasonable time does not have recourse to the Civil Court, the Magistrate may then proceed to make the rule absolute.

Where the defendant does not deny the existence of a public road at the place alleged to have been encroached, but merely denies that he has encroached upon it, this section has no application—*Ghurahu v. Shakal Raj*, 24 A.L.J. 112, 27 Cr.L.J. 27 (29).

357. Bona fide claim :—If there is a *bona fide* dispute as to the existence of a public right, the powers under sections 133-137 as regards obstruction to public ways cannot be exercised by the Magistrate—

In re Narayan, 4 Bom L.R. 687; *In re Dnyanoba*, 15 Bom. L.R. 57, 14 Cr.L.J. 74, *In re Maharana Jaswatsangji*, 22 Bom. 988, *Basaruddin v. Baharali*, 11 Cal. 8; *Nando v. Kusum*, 1 C.L.J. 434; *Venkanna*, 2 Weir 61. But the claim in order to have this effect must be *bona fide* and not a mere pretence to oust jurisdiction. The mere assertion of a claim made without reasonable ground or honest belief in it or honest intention to support it, will not oust a Criminal Court of its jurisdiction under these sections—*Luckhee v. Ram Kumar*, 15 Cal. 504; *Preonath v. Gobordhone*, 25 Cal. 278, *Durlabh v. Bhuban*, 22 Cr.L.J. 450 (Cal.); *Sudhansudhar v. Rahim*, 22 Cr.L.J. 577 (Cal.) It is not open to any person illegally causing obstruction to a public property to set up a bogus question of title to such property for the purpose of ousting the jurisdiction of a Magistrate, and notwithstanding the raising of such a question, the Magistrate is entitled to hear the case sufficiently to enable him to make up his mind whether or not a *bona fide* question of title is raised—*Emp v Dost Muhammad* 28 All 98 (99). A claim set up to annoy an enemy of the claimant cannot be called a *bona fide* claim—*Nando v. Kusum*, 1 C L J 434

Therefore, when a person against whom an order is made under section 133 to remove an obstruction from a public way, claims it is a private way, the Magistrate should first determine whether the claim is *bona fide* or not—*Kylash v Ram Lal*, 26 Cal 869, *Matukdhari v. Hari Madhab*, 31 Cal 979, *Manipur Dey v Bidhu Bhusan*, 42 Cal. 158; *Upendra v Kshitish*, 23 Cal 499, *Nasaruddi v Aktluddi*, 3 C.W.N. 345; *Rakhal v Kailash*, 7 C W N 117, *Dulalram v Baishnab*, 10 C.W.N. 845, *Sk Imrat v Amjad*, 2 P L J 67, *Thakur Sao v Abdul Aziz*, 4 Pat. 783, 27 Cr L J 9 In the absence of a finding as to the *bona fides* of the claim set up by the petitioners to the subject matter of the dispute, the judgment is liable to be set aside—*Chandra v Ram Mandal*, 21 C.W.N. 926, 18 Cr L J. 738, *Bhagat v. Ramrup*, 21 C L J 116, 16 Cr.L.J. 160 The question of *bona fides* of a claim is a question of fact, and has to be enquired into like any other question of fact—*Nundo Gopal v Kusum*, 1 C L J 434, *Teni Prasad v. Sarjoo*, 20 Cr L J 556 (Pat.).

If, however, the encroachment complained of is made on a way which is admittedly public, the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is not ousted, and it is not necessary, in order to give jurisdiction to the Magistrate, that there should be a finding as to the *bona fide* character of any claim that might be made by the accused to any particular piece of ground on which the encroachment is made—*Adhore v Ambika*, 6 C.W.N. 886. Similarly, if upon inquiry the Magistrate finds that the channel in question is a public channel, the Magistrate is not bound to inquire whether the accused has a *bona fide* claim of right to the channel, or to refer the matter to the Civil Court, but has jurisdiction to proceed with the case—*Fakir Mullick v. Emp.*, 28 C L.J. 211.

A *bona fide* claim should be set up at or before the hearing, but not afterwards, and the Magistrate who finds the claim not to be *bona fide* should state the reasons for his decision, which is subject to revision by

the High Court—*Luckhee v. Ram Kumar*, 15 Cal 564; *Rakhal v. Kailash*, 7 C.W.N. 117.

In *Emp v. Dost Muhammad*, 28 All. 98, the Allahabad High Court seems to have laid down that the moment a *bona fide* dispute as to title is raised by the defendant, the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is ousted and the Magistrate is bound to stop the proceeding and to refer the parties to a civil suit. That ruling has been dissented from in a recent case of the same High Court, in which it has been held that the Magistrate's jurisdiction is not ousted merely by reason of the defendant raising a *bona fide* dispute as to title, but he is entitled to decide whether the way obstructed by the defendant is a public way—*Abdul Wahid v Abdullah*, 45 All 656 (660), 21 A L J. 529

357A. Procedure—The provisions of this section are imperative, and as soon as the accused denies a public right, the Magistrate ought to inquire into the matter and find whether the place obstructed is a public one or not. If, instead of doing so, he at once proceeds under sec 137 to take evidence from the complainant, the trial is vitiated by wrong procedure and the final order is liable to be set aside—*Raghunath v Emp.*, 23 A.L.J. 187, 26 Cr.L.J. 873, A I R 1925 All 311. *Munna Lal v Emp*, 24 A.L.J. 361, 27 Cr.L.J. 473 Where there is a denial of the existence of a public right, it is the duty of a Magistrate to inquire into this matter and come to a conclusion under the provisions of sec 139A, and on the result of this conclusion would depend the question whether he should stay proceedings or should proceed under sec. 137 or 138—*Rahanaddy v. Hasanali*, 30 C.W.N. 648, 27 Cr.L.J. 878.

As soon as the accused appears before him, the Magistrate is bound to question him as to whether he denies the existence of any public right in respect of the way, river, etc., and if he does so, the Magistrate shall, before proceeding under sec. 137 or 138, inquire into the matter. It is the duty of the Magistrate to follow the above procedure without waiting for the objection to be raised by the accused, and the Magistrate cannot refuse to inquire into the matter because the objection was not taken until a late stage of the case—*Sk. Sadir v Sabarali*, 29 C W N 649, 26 Cr L.J. 1168, A I.R. 1925 Cal 736. When the opposite party denies the existence of the public right, the Magistrate's first duty is to make the inquiry under this section, and until this inquiry is completed, he cannot order the party to adduce evidence under sec. 137—*Etraí Mandal v Emp*, 33 C.W.N 201, 30 Cr.L.J 622

Inquiry by subordinate Magistrate—This section contemplates an inquiry by the Magistrate himself who initiated the proceedings under sec. 133, and he cannot depute another Magistrate to make the inquiry and report. The Magistrate has to see whether there is or is not reliable evidence in support of the denial of the existence of the alleged public right, and this is a matter better determined by the Magistrate if he has heard the evidence himself than if he merely read the report of a subordinate Magistrate—*Inasaddar v. Isimullah*, 50 C L J 291, 1929 Cr C. 600 (601)

Dispute between Government and private individual:—In case of a dispute between the Government and a private individual as to the right to the ground on which an encroachment is alleged to have been made by the latter by building a wall, a Magistrate should not proceed under this section, until the dispute is settled in a Civil Court—*In re Jeysang, Ratanlal* 378, *In re Ram Singh*, 2 Bom. L.R. 818

358. Sub section (2) :—The law requires first of all that the party shall appear before the Magistrate and deny the existence of the public right in question, secondly, that he shall produce some reliable evidence, and thirdly, that such evidence shall be legal evidence and shall support the denial. If these three conditions are satisfied, then the Magistrate's jurisdiction ceases to exist—*Thakur Sao v Abdul Aziz*, 4 Pat 783, 27 Cr L J 9

If the Magistrate finds that the claim is *bona fide*, he should abstain from further action and should allow the party to substantiate his claim in a Civil Court—*Luckhee v Ram Kumar*, 15 Cal. 564; *Q. E. v Bissessur*, 17 Cal 562, *Nasaruddi v. Akiluddi*, 3 C.W.N 345, *Belat Ali v. Abdur Rahim*, 8 C.W.N. 143; *Manipur Dey v Bidhu Bhushan*, 42 Cal. 158, *Khushi Ram v Crown*, 4 Lah. 224 (231), *Preonath v. Gobordhone*, 25 Cal 278, *Nunda v Kusum*, 1 C.L.J 434; *Dost Muhammad*, 28 All. 98, *Murad v Emp*, 1903 P.R. 2, *Muse Bagas*, 10 Bom. L.R. 563; *Rangi v B N W Ry. Co.*, 4 P.L.T 402; *Thakur Sao v. Abdul Aziz*, 4 Pat 783, *Emp v Sahigram*, 4 C.P.L.R. 142. So also, where the question as to whether the way is private or public is seriously disputed and its decision becomes a difficult matter of mixed fact and law, the Magistrate should decline to decide it, and should send the parties to a Civil Court—*Abdul Wahid v Abdulla*, 45 All 656 (666), 21 A.L.J. 529. When a *bona fide* question of title is raised, the Magistrate cannot proceed any further in the matter, he cannot decide whether the title exists or not—*Emp v Dost Muhammad*, 28 All 98, he is not competent to decide whether the title is barred by limitation or not—*Kamini Kumar v. Emp*, 35 Cal 283. When proceedings are stayed under this section, the Magistrate's jurisdiction ceases, and he is not even entitled to say which party is to file the civil suit—*Hari Chand v Durga*, 28 Cr.L.J. 363 (Lah.). In *Ram Sagar v Alek Naskar*, 49 Cal. 682 (F.B.), 26 C.W.N 442, the Calcutta High Court considered all the above cases and held that even though the Magistrate found that the claim of right set up by the defendant was *bona fide*, his jurisdiction was not thereby ousted, but he was entitled to proceed with the case and was not bound to refer the parties to a Civil Court. But this ruling is superseded by the present section.

If the Magistrate finds that the claim is made *bona fide*, he should allow the defendant a reasonable time within which to establish his rights in a Civil Court, and in the meantime proceedings may be stayed. If the defendant does not assert his right in a Civil Court within a reasonable time, the Magistrate should proceed with the case—*Belat Ali v. Abdur Rahim*, 8 C.W.N. 143, *Ram Sagar v. Alek Naskar*, 49 Cal. 682 (F.B.)

at p. 693; *Lakshan Chandra v. Bilas*, 22 Cr.L.J. 351 (Cal.); *Manipur Dey v. Bidhu Bhusan*, 42 Cal. 158.

The Magistrate is not entitled to demand that the evidence shall be sufficient to satisfy him that no public right exists. This section only requires evidence and not *proof*, and the only condition is that upon the materials before him the Magistrate has no reason to think the evidence false. The Magistrate has no jurisdiction to weigh the evidence and to determine on which side the balance leans. He has no jurisdiction to inquire into the actual existence of the public right claimed by the petitioners—*Thakur Sao v. Abdul Aziz*, 4 Pat. 783, 27 Cr.L.J. 9. It is not the duty of the Magistrate to come to a finding whether the evidence is in his opinion sufficient to support the case of the party, all he has to see is whether there is any reliable evidence in support of the denial of the public right—*Ude Singh v. Mohammada*, 10 Lah 151, 29 Cr.L.J. 698 (699). This section does not authorise a Magistrate to look into the question of title and decide for himself whether the accused's case is or is not true. All that the Magistrate is to see is whether there is any reliable evidence in support of the denial of the existence of a public right. If there is some reliable evidence in support of such denial, then the proceedings under the Code have to be stayed until the matter of the existence of such right has been decided by a competent Civil Court—*Munna Lal v. Emp.*, 24 A.L.J. 361, 27 Cr.L.J. 473.

359. Sub-section (3) :—Question shall not be inquired into by jury :—The question as to whether the claim set up by the defendant is a *bona fide* one or whether the place is a public way or not, is to be decided by the Magistrate himself and not to be left to the jury. The jury is not competent to decide the question whether there is or is not a public right of way. They can merely find whether the Magistrate's order as originally made is reasonable and proper—*Kylash v. Ram Lal*, 26 Cal. 869, *Dulalram v. Baishnab Charan*, 10 C.W.N. 845, *Nasiruddi v. Akiluddi*, 3 C.W.N. 345, *Matuk Dhari v. Hari Madhab*, 31 Cal. 979; *In re Chundernath*, 5 Cal. 875, *Sheikh Imrat v. Sheikh Amjad*, 2 P.L.J. 67, *Khushi Ram v. Crown*, 4 Lah 224 (231), 24 Cr.L.J. 457. *Contra—Emp v Ram Bilas*, 30 All 364, where it was held that it was within the competence of the jury to decide as to the validity of an objection that the way alleged to have been obstructed was not a public way. But this Allahabad ruling has been disapproved of by the Legislature and is rendered obsolete by this section. "We think that the only question to be left to the jury should be whether the measures directed by the Magistrate to be taken are reasonable and proper, and in view of the decision in 30 All 364 we think it desirable that this should be made clear"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*.

140. (1) When an order has been made absolute under Section 136, Section 137 or Section 139, the Magistrate shall give notice of the same to the

Procedure on order being made absolute.

person against whom the order was made, and shall further require him to perform the act directed by the order within a time to be fixed in the notice, and inform him that in case of disobedience he will be liable to the penalty provided by Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code.

(2) If such act is not performed within the time fixed, the Magistrate may cause it to be performed, and may recover the costs of performing it, either by the sale of any building, goods or other property removed by the order, or by the distress and sale of any other moveable property of such person within or without the local limits of such Magistrate's jurisdiction. If such other property is without such limits, the order shall authorize its attachment and sale when endorsed by the Magistrate within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property to be attached is found. -

(3) No suit shall lie in respect of anything done in good faith under this section.

360. A person who neither complies with the order passed under Sec 133, nor protests against it within the time fixed, can be prosecuted under sec 136 without further notice being given under this section—*Aluvula Guruviah*, 31 Mad 280 (cited in Note 342 under sec 136); *Q. E. v. Bishambar*, 13 All 577

Cancellation of order by succeeding Magistrate—If a final order is passed by a Magistrate under this chapter, a succeeding Magistrate cannot go behind the order and question its legality, as if he were sitting in judgment over it as a Court of Appeal. Therefore, if an application is made under this section to the succeeding Magistrate for the enforcement of an order passed by a preceding Magistrate, the former cannot reject the application on the ground that the order passed by his predecessor was an illegal order—*Kiran Chandra v Ramesh Chandra*, 27 C.W.N 459, 24 Cr.L.J 317

A Magistrate has no jurisdiction to cancel an order passed by his predecessor for removal of a nuisance under sec 133, on the ground that one of the parties to the proceedings had not been properly served with notice or on the ground that the nuisance was in existence for a long time—*Shahabuddin v. Abdul Kadir*, 31 C.W.N 530, 44 C.L.J. 211, 28 Cr.L.J 30.

Costs—The question as to from which party or parties the costs for the removal of a nuisance should be recovered has to be determined upon a consideration of the question as to the parties upon whom the notices

in connection with the proceedings were served; It is unjust to make an order for recovery of costs from a party who was not actually served with any notice of the said proceedings—*Shahabuddin v. Abdul Kader*, (supra).

141. If the applicant, by neglect or otherwise, prevents the appointment of the jury, or if from any cause the jury appointed do not return their verdict within the time fixed or within such further time as the Magistrate may in his discretion allow, the Magistrate may pass such order as he thinks fit, and such order shall be executed in the manner provided by Section 140.

Procedure on failure to appoint jury or omission to return verdict.

361. Jury failing to return verdict :—If the jury fails to return a verdict within the time allowed by law, the Magistrate may pass such order as he thinks fit. Therefore, where on the failure of the jury to return a verdict, the Magistrate inspected the spot and called for a report from the police and thereafter confirmed his original order, held that the final order was perfectly legal—*Shyamsundar v. Emp*, 24 A.L.J. 165, 27 Cr.L.J. 981. When the majority of the jurors perversely refuse to return a verdict for fear of displeasing either party, the Magistrate can discharge them and appoint a new jury—*Girwar Lal v. Bansidhar*, 44 All 575. Where upon failure of the jury to return their verdict, the petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and prayed for appointment of a fresh jury, it was held that the Magistrate ought to have appointed a new jury and not made the original order absolute—*Shub Chandra v. Hriday*, 12 C.W.N. 1047. Under this section, the Magistrate, upon failure of the jury to return a verdict, has a discretion to pass such order as he thinks fit. Therefore, where the foreman of the jury simply returned the papers without a verdict, the Magistrate had jurisdiction to make the order absolute—*Jiblal v. Gena Sahu*, 4 P.L.T 15, 24 Cr.L.J 492. But it is desirable that under such circumstances the Magistrate should inquire into the case and should give the party an opportunity of showing cause and procuring evidence, before he makes the order absolute under this section—*Jiblal v. Gena*, 4 P.L.T. 16, *Ajodhya Tewari v. Emp*, 4 P.L.T 13, 24 Cr.L.J. 583. But if upon the failure of the jury to return their verdict, the petitioners did not take any action to move the Magistrate for taking evidence on their behalf, the Magistrate was justified in making the order absolute—*Kishori Lal v. Emp*, 13 C.W.N 367.

Fine .—An order sentencing a man to a fine for the nuisance, and an additional fine for each day he continues it after the conviction, is illegal—*In re Sagar Dutt*, 1 B.L.R.O.C. 41.

142. (1) If a Magistrate making an order under Section 133 considers that immediate measures should be taken to prevent imminent danger or injury of a serious kind to the public, he may, whether a jury is to be, or has been, appointed or not, issue such an injunction to the person against whom the order was made, as is required to obviate or prevent such danger or injury pending the determination of the matter.

(2) In default of such person forthwith obeying such injunction, the Magistrate may himself use, or cause to be used, such measures as he thinks fit to obviate such danger or to prevent such injury.

(3) No suit shall lie in respect of anything done in good faith by a Magistrate under this section.

362. Imminent danger :—An injunction under this section can be issued only when there is imminent danger or fear of injury of a serious kind to the public—*Q v Brojendra*, 21 W.R. 86 Where a Magistrate who makes an order under this section, subsequently directs further inquiry to be made, the Magistrate must be held to have abandoned the proceedings under this section, and he should have proceeded under secs. 136 and 137 instead of fining the party under sec 188 I P. C.—*Ibid*

No injunction can be issued under this section when the danger has passed away—*Q v Indoobhooshun*, 1 W.R. 8

143. A District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, or any other Magistrate empowered by the Local Government or the District Magistrate in this behalf, may order any person not to repeat or continue a public nuisance, as defined in the Indian Penal Code or any special or local law.

Magistrate may prohibit repetition or continuance of public nuisance.

Secs. 143 and 144 :—This section enables the Magistrate to prevent the continuing of public nuisance, whereas Sec. 144 enables him to prevent it for the first time—*Q. E. v. Saminadha*, 19 Mad. 464.

363. Scope of section :—A person will be bound by an order under this section only when the order is issued to him personally and not by a proclamation addressed generally to the public at large—*Q E. v. Jolhu*, 8 All. 99; *Q. v. Sharoda*, 2 W.R. 32.

Revision :—It was formerly held that orders under secs 143 and 144 were not open to revision because they were not 'proceedings' within the meaning of sec. 435—*Emp. v. Bisheshur*, 1892 A.W.N. 102. But now by reason of the omission of sub-section (3) of section 435 by the Amendment Act of 1923, orders under section 143 will henceforth be liable to revision.

CHAPTER XI.

TEMPORARY ORDERS IN URGENT CASES OF NUISANCE OR APPREHENDED DANGER.

144. (1) In cases where, in the opinion of a District Magistrate, a Chief Presidency Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, or of any other Magistrate *not being a Magistrate of the third class specially empowered by the Local Government or the Chief Presidency Magistrate or the District Magistrate to act under this section, there is sufficient ground for proceeding under this section and immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable,*

Power to issue order absolute at once in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger.

such Magistrate may, by a written order stating the material facts of the case and served in manner provided by Section 134, direct any person to abstain from a certain act or to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management, if such Magistrate considers that such direction is likely to prevent, or tends to prevent obstruction, annoyance or injury, or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed, or danger to human life, health or safety, or a disturbance of the public tranquillity, or a riot, or an affray.

(2) An order under this section may, in cases of emergency or in cases where the circumstances do not admit of the serving in due time of a notice upon the person against whom the order is directed, be passed *ex-parte*.

(3) An order under this section may be directed to a particular individual, or to the public generally when frequenting or visiting a particular place.

(4) Any Magistrate may, *either on his own motion or on the application of any person aggrieved*, rescind or alter any order made under this section by himself or any Magistrate subordinate to him, or by his predecessor in office.

(5) *Where such an application is received, the Magistrate shall afford the applicant an early opportunity of appearing before him either in person or by pleader and shewing cause against the order; and, if the Magistrate rejects the application wholly or in part, he shall record in writing his reasons for so doing.*

(6) No order under this section shall remain in force for more than two months from the making thereof; unless in cases of danger to human life, health or safety or a likelihood of a riot or an affray, the Local Government, by notification in the official Gazette, otherwise directs.

Change.—The italicised words in sub-sections (1) and (4) have been added, sub-section (5) has been newly enacted and the old sub-section (5) has been renumbered as sub-section (6), by section 27 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923). The reasons have been stated below in their proper places

364. Application of this section:—The power conferred by this section upon a Magistrate is an extraordinary power and the Magistrate should resort to it only when he is satisfied that other powers with which he is entrusted are insufficient. The authority of the Magistrate should be exercised in defence of rights rather than in their suppression, in repression of illegal, rather than in interference with lawful, acts—*Sundaram v. Q.*, 6 Mad. 203. When a breach of the peace is anticipated, action should be taken against the potential law-breakers, and not against peaceful citizens whom it is expected that the law breakers will molest—*Khazan Chand v. Emp.*, 28 Cr L J 345 (Lah). It is the duty of the Magistrate to support all lawful acts as far as possible—*Venkataramana v. K. E.*, 22 M L T. 323, 19 Cr. L. J. 56. His first duty is to secure to every person the enjoyment of his rights under the law, and by measures of precaution to deter those who seek to invade the rights of others, but if he apprehends that the lawful exercise of right may lead to civil tumult and he doubts whether he has available a sufficient force to repress such tumult or to render it innocuous, regard for the public welfare is allowed to override temporarily the private right, and the Magistrate is authorised

to interdict its exercise—*Mathialu v. Bapun*, 2 Mad. 140; *Tekait Kunj Behari v. Bhiko*, 5 C.W.N. 329. The first duty of the Government is the preservation of life and property, and to secure this end power is conferred by this section on its officers to interfere even with the ordinary rights of the members of the community—*Sundram v. Q.*, 6 Mad. 203. Where there is a conflict between a public interest and private right, the former must prevail. And so, although the Hindus may have obtained from a competent civil Court a declaration of their right to conduct processions with music before mosques, the Magistrate may, in the interest of the public peace, prohibit the Hindus from taking any such procession in any street where there are mosques—*In re Viswanadha Rao*, 51 Mad. 1006 (F.B.), 55 M.L.J. 442, 30 Cr.L.J. 31 (32). An order under sec. 144 may sometimes interfere with the legal rights of individuals, but when such interference is necessary, it is the duty of the Magistrate to limit it as much as possible; and for that purpose he should afterwards hold an inquiry into the circumstances and determine whether as a matter of fact the act prohibited as likely to lead to a breach of the peace is within or in excess of the legal rights of the person forbidden to do it. If it is found that a man is doing that which he is legally entitled to do, and that his neighbour chooses to take offence thereat and to create a disturbance in consequence, it is clear that the duty of the Magistrate is not to continue to deprive the first of the exercise of his legal rights, but to restrain the second from illegally interfering with exercise of legal rights—*Abdool v. Lucky Narain*, 5 Cal. 132 (134, 135), *Blong v. K. E.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 1178 (Pat.); *Q. E. v. Kazi Fazloddin*, Ratanlal 967. It is the obvious duty of the Executive to uphold the civil rights declared by its own Civil Courts. No doubt, the interests of the public peace are paramount, but where the Magistrate is aware that there will probably be a disturbance of the petitioner's civil rights at recurring seasons every year, it is his duty to exhaust every measure at his disposal to uphold the declared civil rights before he abandons the attempt, and he should resort to sec. 144 only if there is no time or opportunity for any other course. If there is time or opportunity, the Magistrate may bind over those persons who threaten to interfere with the petitioner's civil rights, to keep the peace, or may get down sufficient force to meet the crisis. It is not a proper course to do nothing to meet the crisis, and then call in sec. 144 to tide him over it—*Venkatasubba v. Emp.*, 52 M.L.J. 298, 28 Cr.L.J. 325 (326), *Venkatasubbayya v. Md. Falaiddin*, 52 M.L.J. 651, 28 Cr.L.J. 509 (510).

Moreover, this section was never intended to vest a Magistrate with powers to decide disputes of a civil nature between private individuals and to usurp the functions of a Civil Court. It is not permissible for a Magistrate, under the cover of an order under this section to dispossess a particular individual from certain property and to deliver possession of it to another—*Hafizuddin v. Laborde*, 50 All. 414, 28 Cr.L.J. 991 (992).

365. Magistrates empowered :—Since the power to be exercised under this section is an extraordinary power, the law is careful to confer this power upon those Magistrates alone, whose discretion is

prominently guaranteed by their responsible position or by selection—*Sundram v. Q.*, ■ Mad. 203

In the Punjab, all Magistrates of 1st and 2nd class have been empowered to act under this section—*Punjab Gazette*, 1883, Part I, p. 52. So also in Upper Burma. In Bombay, Assistant Superintendents of Police have been empowered to act under section 144. See *Bombay Gazette*, 1883, Part I, page 396

When a Magistrate passes an order under this section, the record should show in clear and unmistakable terms the authority under which he professes to act—*Thudamawara v. Emp.*, 1 Rang. 49, 2 Bur. L.J. 22, 24 Cr.L.J. 727.

By the Amendment Act of 1923, third class Magistrates have been expressly prohibited from being empowered under this section. "We do not think that powers under section 144 should be granted to a Magistrate of the third class, and we have provided for this by a small amendment"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*.

366. Conditions precedent :—Proceedings under this section may be taken only in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger; the existence of these circumstances is a condition precedent to an action under this section—*In re Krishna Mohun*, 1 C.L.R. 58. This section is to be applied in cases of urgency, and should not be allowed to take the place of any other provision of law (e.g. sec. 133) which might be more appropriate. And before proceeding under this section, the Magistrate should hold an inquiry and record the urgency of the matter—*Kamini v. Harendra*, 38 Cal 876. Where the complaint was that a person by closing a drain and obstructing the flow of the rain water of another house endangered the safety of the house, but the owner could drain off the water in some other way, held that it was not an urgent case of nuisance or apprehended danger, and action under sec. 144 was not justified—*Haji Ali v. Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 560, A I R. 1925 All. 678. Before taking action under this section the Magistrate should be of opinion that immediate prevention or speedy remedy is necessary, and he should state in the order the materials upon which his opinion as to the urgency of the matter is based—*Karoolal v. Shyam Lal*, 32 Cal 935. *Hafizuddin*, 50 All 414, 28 Cr.L.J. 991 (1922). Jurisdiction under this section depends on the urgency of the case, and the mere statement of the Magistrate that he considered the danger to be imminent is not sufficient to give him jurisdiction if the facts set out by him show that really there was no urgent necessity for taking action—*Chandra Nath v. E. I. Ry.*, 23 C.W.N. 145, 19 Cr.L.J. 951. The record of the Magistrate should disclose the existence of an emergency which called for an *ex parte* order under this section or that there was no sufficient time to serve notice on the party affected thereby. But a Magistrate ought not to treat a case as a case of emergency merely because some people threaten to commit a breach of the peace, unless he had no sufficient police or other force at his command to prevent an immediate breach of the peace and unless he is further unable to find out the persons threatening to commit a breach of the peace so as to bind them over to

keep the peace—*Venkataramana v. K. E.*, 1917 M.W.N. 724, 19 Cr.L.J. 56.

'There is sufficient ground for proceeding'.—These words have been added during the Debate in the Legislative Assembly, on the same grounds on which a similar amendment has been made in sec. 107. See the *Legislative Assembly Debates*, January 25, 1923, pages 1495—1496.

A Subordinate Magistrate passing an order under this section ought to use his own judicial mind on the report of the police, and to come to his own conclusion whether a temporary and urgent order ought to be passed, and should not be guided entirely by the "instructions" issued by the District Magistrate (which are not legally binding on him), though he ought to give due respect to the advice of the District Magistrate—*Govinda v. Perumal*, 38 Mad 489 (490).

An order under this section must be based upon proper evidence. In the absence of such evidence, the Magistrate cannot pass an order merely on the complaint of one party—*Chandra Kantla v. K. E.*, 20 C.W.N. 981, 17 Cr.L.J. 464. So also, the Magistrate cannot act upon mere surmise or assumption (*Bhyroo*, 11 W.R. 46), or merely on the strength of a Police-report without hearing the petitioner or giving him an opportunity of being heard—*In re Bhyroo Dyal*, 11 W.R. 46. A proceeding under this section is a judicial proceeding, and a Magistrate cannot dispose of such a proceeding by examining witnesses behind the back of the parties and on the strength of a local inspection of which he gave no notice to the parties—*Gobinda Ram v. Basantilal*, 7 Pat 269, 30 Cr.L.J. 302 (304).

367. Order—Nature and contents.—(a) The order must be in writing; the words in the section are 'written order'. There must be a written order directed to the accused and duly promulgated, before he can be prosecuted for disobedience of the order—*Mul Raj v. K. E.*, 1905 P.R. 36.

(b) The order must contain a statement of the "material facts" which the Magistrate considers to be the facts of the case, and upon the footing of which he bases his order—*Karoolal v. Shyamlal*, 32 Cal 935; *Hafiz-uddin*, 50 All 414, 28 Cr.L.J. 991 (992). A mere recital of the fact that in the opinion of the Magistrate there was sufficient ground for proceeding under this section is not enough, the order should state the material facts relating to the case in order to show that there was justification for making the order—*Blong v. Emp.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 1178, A.I.R. 1924 Pat. 767. The material facts include the circumstances showing why the Magistrate was temporarily unable to prevent a breach of the peace by intending peace-breakers—*Venkataramana v. K. E.*, 22 M.L.T. 323. Where the order did not state the material facts, it was set aside—*Karoolal v. Shyamlal*, 32 Cal 935, *Govinda Chetty v. Emp.*, 27 M.L.J. 628, 14 Cr.L.J. 658.

(c) The order must be *specific and definite* in its terms. An order that the petitioner should not go to a particular village and should not allow any of his servants or relatives or friends to go there, is of the most

indefinite character as to time and person—*Golam Md. v. Bhuban*, 2 C.W.N. 422. Similarly, an order directing the petitioners not to commit any act which is likely to induce a breach of the peace, and not to take forcible possession of a village not in their possession, is indefinite and bad in law—*Bibi Kulsum v. Umatul*, 11 C.W.N. 121.

(d) The order must be confined to the particular act for which the danger is apprehended, any order prohibiting a course of conduct or an occupation involving a series of acts done at certain intervals and spread over a period of time (e.g. an order prohibiting inoculation) is illegal and must be set aside—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 67.

(e) The duration of the order must be co-extensive with the emergency; it should not be wider than is necessary to prevent the emergency. The Magistrate cannot issue an order intending to have effect for all time—*Muthialu v. Bapun*, 2 Mad 140, *In re Pedda Chari*, 2 Weir 74. Thus, the Magistrate is not competent to pass an order directing that all processions should stop music when passing a certain place of worship at any time, when it is not shown that assemblies are held in the place for the purpose of worship at all hours of the day—*Muthialu v. Bapun*, 2 Mad 140, *Pedda Chari*, 2 Weir 74.

(f) The order must not be general and sweeping in its terms. A Magistrate cannot in general terms forbid two parties to use any musical instrument in the neighbourhood of each other's house, though he may forbid the use of musical instruments for the purpose of mutual annoyance—*Ram Chander*, 6 W.R. 40.

(g) The order must not be in its nature irrevocable, e.g., an order to cut down trees—*Mohun v. Obhoy*, 13 W.R. 72; or an order for division of crops—*Umatul v. Nemai*, 32 Cal 154.

368. Service of order :—The order must be served in the manner provided by sec. 134, i.e. served personally. If it is not served personally, a conviction under sec. 188 I. P. C. for disobedience of the order is illegal—*Reg v. Sukar, Ratanlal* 30.

369. Abstain from certain act :—The words 'certain act' means a definite act. An order directing a person not to collect rents from the ryots generally, without mentioning any particular ryots, is not an order to abstain from a 'certain act'—*Abayeswari v. Siddheswari*, 16 Cal. 80; *Ananda v. Carr Stephen*, 19 Cal. 127, *Prem Chand v. Dharm Das*, 9 C.W.N. 392. See also *Golam v. Bhuban*, 2 C.W.N. 422 and *Kulsum v. Umatul*, 11 C.W.N. 121 cited in Notes 367 above. But an order directing a person not to interfere with the management of a particular temple or a particular mutt is a direction to abstain from a 'certain act' and is a valid order under this section—*Ramanadhan v. Murugappa*, 24 Mad. 45; *Vanamamalai*, 3 Mad. 354, *Q. E. v. Abbi Reddi*, 18 Mad. 402. So also, an order directing the trustee of a Vaishnavite temple to abstain from interfering with the conduct of Adhyapakam service is an order restraining a person from doing a certain act and is valid—*In re Srinivasathathachariar*, 11 Cr.L.J. 933 (Mad.).

370. "Take certain order with respect to property"
 —Property whether moveable or immoveable :—It has been held in *Q. v. Goluck Chunder*, 12 W.R. 38 that the power conferred by this section refers only to and is restricted to *immoveable* property of the kind set forth in the next Chapter. The Magistrate cannot make an order regarding the custody of money, in respect of which a breach of the peace is likely to take place. See also *Ananda v. Carr Stephen*, 19 Cal 127 (129) which lays down that this section relates to interference or dealing of some kind with the *land* itself or something erected or standing on the land. But there is nothing in the section to justify this view

Property outside jurisdiction.—No order can be made by a Magistrate under this section when the property in respect of which the order is made is situated outside the local limits of his jurisdiction—*Roop Lal v. David*, 2 C.W.N. 572.

371. Orders under this section :—The following orders can be passed by a Magistrate under this section —

(a) An order prohibiting burials in certain places, on sanitary ground —*In re Khaja Bhoj*, 2 Weir 64,

(b) An order directing that two rival sects of Muhammadans should enter and worship in a particular mosque only at particular hours—*Q. E. v. Abdulla*, 24 Mad 262,

(c) An order to the priests of a temple to heighten and widen the doorway, so as to prevent overcrowding of pilgrims—*Reg v. Ramchandra*, 6 B.H.C.R. 36,

(d) An order that certain persons should abstain from interfering with the Badves in the performance of their daily puja of the god *Vishoba*, is a valid order, if the Magistrate is of opinion that the interference with the puja is likely to cause annoyance to the worshippers—*In re Vasudeo Apaji*, 4 Bom L.R. 582;

(e) An order prohibiting a procession on the ground that the Magistrate would not be able to prevent a breach of the peace with the force at his disposal—*Arumuga v. Perumalswamy*, 15 Cr L J 30 (Mad.);

(f) An order prohibiting a meeting, if owing to the prevalence of ill-feeling between certain persons likely to attend the meeting a breach of the peace is to be apprehended—*Nga Ti v. Maung Kyaw*, 11 Bur.L.T. 59, 18 Cr.L.J. 512.

372. Improper orders under this section :—A Magistrate is competent to issue an order directing a person to abstain from certain act or to take certain order with certain property, and such an order can be passed under this section, only when the object of the order is to prevent obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person or danger to human life, health or safety, or a disturbance of the public tranquillity or a riot or an affray, and when immediate prevention or speedy remedy is necessary. Therefore the following orders, not being orders of the above description, are not valid under this section —

(a) An order directing the ryots to refrain from reaping the crops they have sown, unless they pay the Government rent—*Isab v. Emp.*, 8 C.W.N. 373.

(b) An order stopping the erection of an embankment on the ground that the erection may cause loss to the opposite party—*Ram Autar v. Krishnaput*, 13 C.W.N. 188.

(c) An order prohibiting a person to excavate a tank in his own land on the apprehension that the house of the opposite party would go down into the bed of the tank—*Kamini v. Harendra*, 38 Cal 876, 13 Cr.L.J. 126.

(d) An order directing the owners of cattle to take proper care of them and not to allow them to stray on the high road—*In re Amiraddi*, 3 B.L.R.A.C. 45, Q. v. *Mozajor*, 9 B.L.R. App. 36.

(e) An order that prostitutes who had built huts, should remove their huts, because people visiting them will endanger their lives by having to cross a railway line—*In re Bireswar*, 2 C.W.N. 70.

(f) An order directing the removal of an embankment whereby adjacent lands are in danger of being flooded—*Anon.*, 5 M.H.C.R. App. 19.

(g) An order directing the removal of a dam which obstructs the flood of water through an irrigation channel—*Emp v. Prayag*, 9 Cal. 103.

(h) An order in respect of collection of market dues—*Q. v. Sulem Singh*, 23 W.R. 57.

(i) An order directing the owner of a building which has fallen down on his own land, to re-erect the building—*In re Rahmatulla*, 17 All. 485.

(j) An order regarding custody of children—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 68.

(k) An order directing that certain hedges should be pruned—*Reg v. Bapuji*, Ratanlal 81.

(l) An order regulating boat traffic at a certain landing place on the ground that the over-crowding of boats was dangerous to the health of the residents of the town—*Q. E v Pratap*, 25 Cal. 852.

(m) An order passed with the consent of parties, that certain articles with respect to which there was a dispute, should be removed to the custody of the Court—*Leong Mow v Tchun*, 12 C.W.N. 1044; or an order directing the village Munsiff to take possession of the disputed property—*Baganathi v Velayce*, (1916) 2 M.W.N. 88, 17 Cr.L.J. 190.

(n) An order directing that certain person should continue to live in the haveli in which they were at the date of the order, and that a police guard should keep watch on the outer door, only allowing certain specified persons to enter the haveli—*Faizulnissa v. Fatz Md.*, 1878 P.R. 33.

(o) An order by a Magistrate holding that the first of two parties was in possession, and directing that the second party should not interfere with the possession of the first party—*Parkar v. Pam Khelawan*, 11 C.W.N. 271; or an order attaching immoveable property—*Nawab Syed Mohiuddin v. K. E.*, 13 C.W.N. cxix. In such cases the Magistrate should act under Section 145.

(p) An order directing division of crops between two rival landlords—*Umatal v. Nemai*, 32 Cal. 154.

(q) An order forbidding people of either party to read prayers in a mosque, on account of an apprehension of a breach of the peace (there being at the time an ill-feeling between the parties regarding the management of the mosque) is illegal—*Haji Md. Ismail v Barkat Ali*, 26 C.W.N. 904.

373. Orders regarding hats or markets.—A Magistrate may direct one of two rival *hat*-holders to change the day of his *hat*, so as not to interfere with the days of the *hat* of the other proprietor, if the Magistrate is of opinion that the holding of two *hats* on the same day will lead to a breach of the peace—*Abbas Ali v. Illim Meah*, 14 W R 40, or he may direct that one of two rival *hat*-holders should not hold his *hat* on the same day as another—*Bykuntram*, 18 W R. 47, *Nagendra v. Rakhal Das*, 23 C.W.N. 141; *Parameshwar v. Emp.*, 3 P.L.T. 268, or where a new *hat* is established within half a mile of an old one, the Magistrate may order the new *hat*-holder to abstain from holding his *hat* on certain days—*Mitterjeet v. Raj Kumar*, 18 W R 22. But the Magistrate cannot direct one of the two *hat*-holders to hold his *hat* on particular days e.g. Saturdays and Tuesdays only, for though the section empowers the Magistrate to make an order prohibiting a person from holding his *hat* on certain specified days (*viz* the days on which the rival *hat* is held) the law does not empower him to direct that *hats* shall be held only on certain days, leaving the party no option to hold his *hat* on some other days on which his rival does not hold his *hat*—*Shyamanand v. Emp.*, 31 Cal. 990.

A general order prohibiting the holding of *hats* for an indefinite period is illegal—*Bidhu Ranjan v. Ramesh*, 11 C.W.N. 223, *Md. Bakar Ali v. Hanwant*, 1897 A.W.N. 59; *Parameshwar v. Emp.*, 3 P.L.T. 268. An order forbidding certain persons from establishing a *hat* at certain places, and giving a vague direction not to interfere in any way with the trade of another *hat*, is improper—*Satish Chandra v. Emp.*, 11 C.W.N. 79.

The right to hold a *hat* is a man's lawful right and he has the right to establish the *hat* in the place and on the days most advantageous to him (*Sheeb Chunder v. Suddut Ally*, 4 W R. 12) provided that no breach of the peace is caused by any dispute between two *hat*-holders. Therefore, an order of a Magistrate directing that one of the two rival *hat*-holders should not hold his *hat* opposite to that of the other but should hold it a mile away is illegal because such an order would render the *hat* of no use to him—*Shurut Chunder v. Bama Churn*, 4 C.L.E. 410. A general order prohibiting a person absolutely from holding a *hat* within an extensive area is illegal, for a person is entitled to exercise all rights of ownership on his property, and the holding of a *hat* on one's own property is not a wrongful act—*Benowari v. Pranab Krishna*, 26 C.W.N. 663, *Rakhal Das v. Emp.*, 19 C.W.N. 248.

An order can be passed under this section only on the grounds specified in the section, *viz* grounds of apprehended danger etc. Thus, an order to close a *hat* can be passed on the ground that it was very near

to another *hat*, and a breach of the peace was apprehended—*Bholanath v. Komuruddin*, 20 W.R. 53. Thus, where the owner of a market forcibly dragged vendors to the market and otherwise molested the public by conducting passers-by into the market with the object of making them buy there instead of in the adjacent bazar, *held* that the Magistrate was justified in prohibiting the owner from holding the market for a certain period—*Ram Gopal v. Narayandas*, 55 Cal. 1077, 32 C.W.N. 613, 29 Cr L J 423 (425). But an order prohibiting a party from holding a *hat* on a particular day cannot be passed merely on the ground that another party had long been used to hold a *hat* on the adjacent land on the following day—*Banee Madhab v. Wooma Nath*, 21 W.R. 26. Even where there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace, the likelihood must be imminent, a Magistrate cannot restrain the holding of a *hat* merely because there is already a *hat* existing, and the ulterior consequence of holding the new *hat* may be a breach of the peace—*Rakhal Das v. Emp.*, 19 C W N 248, 13 Cr L J 511. If disturbance is anticipated, the proper procedure would be to act under section 107—*Benowari v. Pranab Krishna*, 26 C W N 663.

373A. Effect of order under this section :—An order under this section restraining a certain person from going upon the land of another, should not be treated as a substantive evidence of possession of the latter, in a case of rioting which subsequently takes place in respect of the possession of the land. No importance should be attached to a temporary injunction under this section which is intended only for emergencies. Having regard to the peculiar jurisdiction conferred by this section, no inference can be drawn from it as to the possession of either party—*Gita Prasad v. K E.*, 5 P L T 656, 25 Cr.L.J. 919, A.I.R. 1925 Pat 17.

374. Order contrary to Civil Court decree :—The Magistrate has no jurisdiction to pass an order the effect of which would be to interfere with the orders of a Civil Court—*In re Rahmatulla*, 17 All. 485; *Umatul v. Nema*, 32 Cal 154. It is the duty of the Criminal Courts to respect the opinions of the Civil Courts, and no order contrary to that of the Civil Court should be passed by a Magistrate under this section when the Civil Court has passed an order of temporary injunction against one party—*Murari v. Aiyasami*, 1922 M.W.N. 612, 23 Cr.L.J. 689. Where the landlords of a certain share in an estate had obtained a decree in a Civil Court for arrears of rent and for ejectment of their tenants, and also obtained possession under the decree, but the Magistrate at the instance of the tenants passed an order prohibiting the landlords from interfering with the possession of the tenants as the landlords were unable to point out the particular lands of which they had obtained possession under the decree, *held* that the order was illegal being contrary to the Civil Court decree, as its effect would be to deprive the landlords of the lands to which they were entitled under the decree; *held* further that it was on the tenants to shew what lands they held from the landlords—*Gobinda Sahu v. Sims*, 6 C.W.N. 466. Where a person purchasing some property at a sale in execution of a mortgage-decree is put

in possession of the same, ■ Magistrate is not competent under this section to order the purchaser or any of his subordinates to refrain from entering upon the lands and the properties—*Roop Lal v. David Manook*, 2 C.W.N. 572.

375. Question of title.—A Magistrate acting under this section has no business to adjudicate upon rights and has no jurisdiction to decide upon any question of title or possession, the only question before him is whether ■ breach of the peace is imminent and to make an order with the object of preventing a breach of the peace—*Appala Narasimhulu v. Mahant*, 11 M.L.J. 122. Therefore a Magistrate's order directing the petitioner to take certain idols into the house of a certain person on the ground that the latter is entitled to them according to long usage, is illegal—*Kamal v. Jalindra*, 8 C W N 376.

376. Notice to file statements—This section does not authorise a Magistrate to issue notice upon the parties for filing written statements before the Court on a fixed date. The issue of such a notice is not within the contemplation of the section and is a clear innovation beyond the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. Such a notice being in effect a notice contemplated by section 145 (1), (although professedly issued under sec. 144), the High Court under its powers of superintendence and control will prohibit the innovation and will order the Magistrate to convert the proceedings under sec. 144 into proceedings under Chapter XII, and to complete the proceedings by following the procedure prescribed by Chapter XII—*Kaniz Amina v K E*, 3 P.L.J. 243, 19 Cr L J 869.

377. Secs. 144, 145—Dispute relating to immoveable property :—Section 144 is a larger and more general section than sec. 145. An order under sec. 144 can be made under various circumstances including a danger of a breach of the peace arising from disputes as regards possession, sec. 145 is of limited scope and applies only where there is a danger of a breach of the peace due to such dispute. The former section is discretionary, the latter is mandatory. Therefore where the special condition of section 145 is fulfilled, section 144 yields to sec. 145, so that when the Magistrate finds that there is a real dispute tending to a breach of the peace, he is bound to institute a proceeding under section 145 irrespective of any order that he might have originally made under section 144—*Sheobalak v. Kamaruddin*, 2 Pat 94, 107 (F B), 3 P L T. 573, 23 Cr L J 549

Where there is a dispute regarding possession of immoveable properties between the rival parties, and a breach of the peace is likely to ensue, the proper procedure to be adopted by the Magistrate is to pass an order in ■ proceeding under sec 145 deciding the question of possession on evidence, and not an order in a proceeding under this section—*Parkar v. Ram Khalawan*, 11 C W N 271, *Kaniz Amina v K E*, 3 P.L.J 243; *Gobinda v Basanti Lal*, 7 Pat 269, 30 Cr L J 302 (304); *Lachman v Dhuru*, 19 Cr.L.J 1002 (Pat), *Tarapada v Emp*, 1 P L T. 72, 21 Cr L.J. 241. By adopting a procedure under sec 145, in such a case, the Magistrate puts himself in a position to effectively and conclu-

sively settle the dispute between the parties. Otherwise the dispute might still exist at the end of two months—*Joyanti*, 27 Cal. 785; *Tarapada*, 1 P.L.T. 72; *Bhairo v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 377; *Shaman v. Thakuri*, 1 P.L.T. 369, 21 Cr.L.J. 625. Sec. 144 applies only where possession is either undisputed or clear beyond any shadow of doubt, but where possession relating to immoveable property is disputed, the proper procedure is to take proceedings under sec. 145 which will permanently settle the dispute so far as the Criminal Courts are concerned—*Bhairo v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 377, 21 Cr.L.J. 646, *Gouri Dutt v. Gobind*, 1 P.L.T. 44; *Tarapada v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 72; *Madan v. Fal Chand*, 2 P.L.T. 484, 22 Cr.L.J. 685. In cases of apprehension of a breach of the peace the Magistrate may act under sec. 144, or 107. See Note 234 under sec. 107.

Section 144 is of general application, and contains nothing which ousts the Magistrate's jurisdiction in case of *bona fide* disputes as to possession of land. Therefore where section 107 or 145 will meet with the requirements of the case, section 144 is not an appropriate remedy, and if it is found that the danger is not so imminent and that it can be otherwise averted, an order under sec. 144 will be without jurisdiction—*Sheobalak v. Kamaruddin* 2 Pat 94 (F.B.), 3 P.L.T. 573, 23 Cr.L.J. 549; *Munni Lal v. Gatti*, 6 P.L.T. 746, 26 Cr.L.J. 1229

The use of sec. 144 is a suitable method of avoiding a breach of the peace, only if it is clear that the claim of the party creating the disturbance is not a claim made in good faith—*Kaniz Amina v. K. E.*, 3 P.L.J. 143, 19 Cr.L.J. 869. Where it is clear upon the materials before the Magistrate that one of the parties is in possession, and that another person whose claim to possession is a mere pretence is threatening to interfere with that possession, the Magistrate is bound to maintain the party in possession, and forbid the party who is not in possession by a summary order under sec. 144 of the Code, if immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable. Sometimes it may even be necessary to take action against the party who is actually in possession; but in every case it must be shown that the conditions required by sec. 144 exist. What the Court deprecates is the habitual and unjustified use of sec. 144 as a substitute for sections 107 and 145—*per* Mullick J. in *Sheobalak v. Kamaruddin*, 2 Pat 94, 101 (F.B.), 23 Cr.L.J. 549, *Ahmed Ali v. Sabed*, 33 C.W.N. 858, 30 Cr.L.J. 1027 (1029). If on the expiry of the injunction under section 144, there is any further apprehension of a breach of the peace, the appropriate procedure would be to take proceedings under sec. 145 (but not under sec. 107)—*Abinash v. Lokenath*, 19 Cr.L.J. 367 (Cal).

The subsistence of an order under section 144 does not take away the power of the Court to take proceedings under section 145. Therefore, where in a dispute between the trustees of a temple as to the possession and management of the temple and its properties, an order under section 144 was passed, and during the subsistence of that order proceedings under section 145 were initiated, and pending final orders the properties were attached and a receiver was appointed, held that the procedure was not illegal—*Gopala v. Krishnaswamy*, 27 M.L.T. 234, 21

can be directed to the public generally, only *when frequenting or visiting a particular place*. Therefore, where, owing to the prevalence of cholera, the District Magistrate issued a notification in the form of a proclamation forbidding the public in general to give caste-dinners in that city, it was held that the order not being directed to a particular person nor to the public *when frequenting a particular place* (but to residents) was illegal in its manner of publication. In another Bombay case also it has been similarly held that an order directing all persons in Surat City to abstain from interfering with the destruction of dogs is *ultra vires*, as the Magistrate has power only to direct an order to a particular person or to the public generally when frequenting or visiting a particular place—*Emp v. Bhagubai*, 16 Bom L R 684. The Calcutta High Court likewise holds that an order which directs the public in general to abstain from attending *hat* is illegal, since it is not until the public attends the *hat* that the order can be binding on them. The order can only be issued to the public generally when frequenting or visiting a particular place—*Asutosh v. Harish*, 29 C.W N. 411, 26 Cr.L J. 874. But in *Abdul Gaffur v. Emp.*, 18 O C 70, it has been held that the words “frequentingplace” are intended to extend rather than to limit the scope of the order, so as to include therein the *residents* of the locality as well as casual or frequent visitors from outside the limits of the locality.

380. Clause (4)—Rescinding or altering an order :—

A Magistrate who passed an order under this section, without taking evidence, can afterwards cancel the order, if after hearing the evidence he finds that there is no reason to apprehend a breach of the peace—*Mohun Sardar v. Obhoy*, 13 W R 72

Applications for rescinding or modifying *ex parte* orders under this section should be disposed of as quickly as possible, but it is not illegal to put off an inquiry for a reasonable time within two months—*Salish v. Emp*, 11 C W N 79, 4 Cr.L J 433

An order passed under this section by a Joint Magistrate, while acting as a District Magistrate, can be rescinded or altered, after his reversion to the post of Joint Magistrate, by the next District Magistrate, and the latter cannot transfer an application for rescission or alteration to the former—*Sudarsanam v. Srinivasachari*, 16 Cr L.J. 74 (Mad.).

It was once held by the Patna High Court that a District Magistrate could rescind or alter an order of a subordinate Magistrate only on the ground that having regard to circumstances which had happened since the passing of the order, the reason for its having been passed did no longer exist so that an alteration or rescission of the order was necessary as a corollary; he could not reverse the order of a subordinate Magistrate on grounds existing at the date of the order, i.e., he could not, sitting as it were in appeal or revision, reverse the order on grounds which interfered with the discretionary power of the Magistrate who originally made the order—*Cheddi Lal v. Mahabir*, 2 P.L.T. 650, 23 Cr.L J 27. But this decision has been overruled by a later Full Bench case where it has been laid down that the powers given by this sub-section need not be confined

to cases where there has been a change of circumstances since the original order was made. If the Magistrate has power to rescind an order previously made by a subordinate Magistrate because the circumstances no longer require it to remain in force, he would equally have power to rescind it if he is satisfied that it never ought to have been made—*Sheobalak v. Kamaruddin*, 2 Pat. 94 (F.B.), 3 P.L.T. 573.

A District Magistrate in cancelling an order of the subordinate Magistrate is not competent to substitute an order of his own in the nature of an innovation. Thus, where in a case of dispute as regards immoveable property, the subordinate Magistrate started a proceeding under this section, and considering the claims of the second party to be a mere pretence, passed an order against such second party, but the District Magistrate under clause (4) cancelled the Sub-Magistrate's order and substituted an order of his own, prohibiting the first party from cutting crop, it was held that the order of the District Magistrate was in the nature of an innovation and therefore without jurisdiction and must be set aside—*Ganpat v. K. E.*, 3 P.L.J. 287, 19 Cr L.J. 880.

Although a District Magistrate may rescind or alter an order made by a subordinate Magistrate, still he cannot direct the subordinate Magistrate to initiate proceedings under section 145 instead of under sec. 144; because it is the subordinate Magistrate who has to satisfy himself by the exercise of his own independent judgment and upon proper materials as to the existence of a reasonable apprehension of danger, and the District Magistrate acts illegally in interfering with that discretion by directing him to substitute proceedings under sec. 145 in place of proceedings under sec. 144—*Kailash v. Kunja Bihari*, 24 Cal 391; *Tiloki Rai v. Emp.*, 2 P.L.T. 392; *Cheddi Lal v. Mahabir*, 2 P.L.T. 650, 23 Cr.L.J. 27; *Kedar Nath v. Bijoy*, 33 C.W.N. 723, 1929 Cr. C. 385. If the District Magistrate is of opinion that proceedings under sec. 144 had been wrongly drawn up and that the right course would be to take action under sec. 145, the proper course for the District Magistrate would be to make a reference to the High Court under sec. 438—*Kedar Nath v. Bijoy*, *supra*.

Intermediate order:—Except orders contemplated by sub-section (4) (i.e., orders of rescission or alternation) no other intermediate order can be made while an order under sec. 144 is still in force. When the High Court has issued a rule in any case, it takes full seisin of the case, and it is the High Court alone that can pass *ad interim* orders in the case. The Magistrate against whose order the rule is issued has no such jurisdiction—*Satish Chandra v. Emp.*, 11 C.W.N. 79.

Revival of order:—When a Magistrate set aside his order and struck the case off the file, he had no power to revive it without a fresh proceeding—*Bradley v. Jameson*, 8 Cal 580.

Clause (5):—"It was suggested to us that section 144 should be elaborated so as to enable a person aggrieved by an order made under the section to require the Magistrate to make a judicial inquiry regarding the truth of the information on which he had acted, and thereby to bring

in the revisional powers of the High Court. We think this proposal goes too far, and that it is necessary to maintain the executive character of proceedings under section 144. We have not therefore accepted this suggestion. We are, however, prepared—and we have proposed an amendment to this effect—to lay down that a person aggrieved shall be entitled to apply to the Magistrate and show cause against the order, and that the Magistrate shall give him an opportunity to be heard in person or by pleader and shall record an order in writing on the application, giving his reasons where he rejects it”—*Report of the Joint Committee (1922)*.

381. Clause (6)—Duration of order :—An order under this section is *temporary* and is to remain in force for only two months. An order for perpetual injunction passed under this section is beyond the jurisdiction of the Magistrate—*Q E v. Sheodin*, 10 All. 115; *Bradley v. Jameson*, 8 Cal 580. *Gopi Mohun v. Taramoni*, 5 Cal 7; *In re Meyyaru Ammal*, 1914 M.W.N. 169, 15 Cr.L.J. 145. Thus, an order prohibiting a landlord from ever holding hats on his land on certain days is illegal—*Gopi Mohan v. Taramoni*, 5 Cal. 7. So also, an order that a certain person should abstain from taking any part in the management till another is duly evicted from management, is *ultra vires*—*Ramanadhan v. Murugappa*, 24 Mad. 45; so also, an order that no rents should be collected from the tenants by their contending landlords until their rights have been established by a Civil Court—*Prosanna v. Emp.*, 8 C.L.R. 231; or an order directing a party not to interfere with the land without the order of a competent Court—*Runjit v. Lachman*, 7 C.W.N. 140.

A temporary injunction can be passed under this section even though the dispute demands a permanent injunction for final settlement. Thus, where disputes were going on between the applicant and the opposite party, and the latter used to strike a bell continuously at night time in order to annoy the applicant, who thereupon applied to the Magistrate for an injunction, held that the Magistrate could pass a temporary order under this section—*In re C. J. R.*, 22 Bom. L.R. 157 (per Hayward J.); but Shah J held that the Magistrate could pass no order under this section because the applicant's application was for the prevention of a nuisance which was not temporary but permanent.

Non-specification of time :—An order under this section is not bad merely because it does not state that its operation is confined to two months or some shorter period. Under this sub-section, it will be presumed, in the absence of anything to the contrary, that the duration of the order is limited to the full period of two months—*Ram Nath v. Emp.*, 34 Cal 897; *Ponnappa v. Vanamamalai*, 1919 M.W.N. 872, 20 Cr.L.J. 755. In another case the Madras High Court has held that an order which is indefinite as to time is to that extent without jurisdiction—*Muthukumaraswami v. Md. Rowther*, 42 M.L.J. 352, 23 Cr.L.J. 404.

Extension of time by successive orders :—A Magistrate cannot by passing successive orders, extend the operation of this section beyond the time limit prescribed by this section—*Satish v. Emp.*, 11 C.W.N. 79; *Bisseswar v. Emp.*, 17 Cr.L.J. 200, 20 C.W.N. 758; *Gouri Dutt v. Govind*,

1 P.L.T. 44, 20 Cr.L.J. 829; *Murari v. Ayyasami*, 1922 M.W.N. 612, 23 Cr.L.J. 689. If there is really a very serious danger of a breach of the peace he can take action under section 107—*Rash Behari v. Jagnarain*, 3 P.L.J. 130; *Ganesh v. Nader Ali*, 13 C.W.N. cclxviii. But he cannot, under the shelter of this section, assume a jurisdiction to prohibit persons by a permanent injunction, by arbitrary and successive renewals of orders under this section—*Govinda v. Perumal*, 38 Mad. 489; *Govinda Chetty v. Emp.*, 27 M.L.J. 628, *Ranjit v. Luchman*, 7 C.W.N. 140. The period cannot be extended by drawing up the same order once more and merely adding a large number of persons to whom it is directed. Such a proceeding is an attempt to evade the provisions of this clause and is illegal—*Ashutosh v. Haris Chandra*, 29 C.W.N. 411, 26 Cr.L.J. 874.

Extension of time by Local Government:—The last three lines of this section lay down that the Local Government may extend the order in cases of danger to human life, etc. and it can extend the order for any length of time. The fact that the heading of this Chapter refers to "temporary orders" does not support the contention that the Local Government has only power to extend the order for a definite and very limited time. The Legislature has not seen fit to limit the time for which the force of the order may be extended by the Local Government, and under the terms of this section it is competent to the Local Government to extend the order so long as the danger which is apprehended continues to exist. Moreover, in extending the order, it is not necessary for the Local Government to state its reasons or even to state the fact of a likelihood of a riot or affray or other danger which it apprehends—*Emp. v. Bhure Mal*, 45 All 526 (527), 24 Cr.L.J. 689.

382. Revision:—Sub-section (3) of section 435, which disallowed the powers of revision of the High Court, the Sessions Judge etc., in respect of proceedings under sec. 144, has now been omitted by the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act XVIII of 1923; and the effect of the omission is to overrule all the cases in which it was held that the High Court had no power under secs. 435 and 439 of this Code to interfere in revision with orders under this section. Under the old law, the High Court could revise an order passed under this section, not by virtue of sec. 439 of the Code but by virtue of the powers conferred upon it by sec. 15 of the Charter Act (*Govinda v. Perumal*, 38 Mad. 489; *Bradley v. Jameson*, 8 Cal. 580; *Abayeswari v. Shidheswari*, 16 Cal. 80) and this power could be exercised only by the Chartered High Courts and not by non-chartered High Courts, e.g. the Chief Courts or the Judicial Commissioners' Courts. Under the old law, the High Court could revise under sec. 439 of this Code an order passed under sec. 144, only when the order was ultra vires or without jurisdiction, that is, when the order was such that it could not be made under this section (even though it purported to be made under this section) and therefore did not fall within the purview of this section—*Ananda v. Carr Stephen* 19, Cal. 127, *Roop Lal v. David Monook*, 2 C.W.N. 572, *Isab v. Emp.*, 11 C.W.N. 373; *Q. E. v. Partap Chunder*, 25 Cal. 852; *Emp. v. Prayag*, 11 Cal. 103; *Pataniappa v. Dorasamy*, 18 Mad. 402, *Gopi Mohon v. Taramoni*, 5 Cal.

7. Under the present law, it is submitted, the High Court, both chartered and nonchartered, (as also the Sessions Judge, and the District Magistrate) can call for the record of a proceeding under this section, and the order may be revised by the High Court on any ground whatsoever. The Madras High Court, however, is of opinion that an order of a Magistrate acting under sec 144 is merely administrative in character, and is not the order of a Court, and is therefore not liable to be revised by the High Court under sec 435—*Vedappan v. Perianan*, 52 Mad 69, 55 M.L.J. 621, 30 Cr.L.J. 119, following *Nataraja v. Rungasami*, 47 Mad. 56 (58).

The High Court does not ordinarily interfere in revision with an order under this section when other remedies are open to the aggrieved party, especially because the High Court is unwilling to reject the opinion of the Magistrate responsible for the peace of his locality that there is an emergency which justified an *ex parte* order—*Venkataramana v. K. E.*, 22 M.L.T. 323, 19 Cr.L.J. 56. The Magistrate is the sole Judge as to whether the material is sufficient or not to justify an order under this section—*Bansi v. Emp.*, 19 Cr.L.J. 113 (Pat.).

The High Court can set aside an order under this section even though two months had expired from the date thereof—*Chandranath v. E. I. Ry.*, 23 C.W.N. 145, *Bisheswar v. Emp.*, 20 C.W.N. 758; *Chandrakanta v. K. E.*, 20 C.W.N. 981, *Dhanraj v. Bharat*, 6 P.L.T. 253, 26 Cr.L.J. 260; *Muthukumaraswami v. Md Rowther*, 42 M.L.J. 352. In *Govinda v. Perumal*, 38 Mad 489 (490) and *Kuppu v. Poomalai*, 47 M.L.J. 439, 25 Cr.L.J. 1304, however, the High Court declined to set aside the order, as the two months during which the order would remain in force were almost expiring on the date of hearing.

383. Reference:—An order under this section not being a judicial proceeding, a District Magistrate cannot refer it to the High Court, but can himself deal with it in his executive capacity—*Anon.*, Ratanlal 129. Or the party aggrieved by the order may apply to the District Magistrate to recall the order, and failing him, to the Local Government—*Mad. H. C. Pro.*, 5-12-1879.

384. Punishment:—See sec. 188 I. P. C.

The Magistrate issuing the order under this section cannot himself punish a man for disobeying his order—*Chandra Kanta v. K. E.*, 20 C.W.N. 981, 17 Cr.L.J. 461, *Reg v. Ranchod Dayal*, 10 B.H.C.R. 424; *Reg v. Tatiya*, Ratanlal 50; *Brojonath v. Emp.*, 4 C.W.N. 226.

385. Civil suit:—An order under this section is not a bar to the institution of a civil suit by the party on whom the order is made. Therefore, where the plaintiffs and the defendants are owners of adjoining properties and the defendants have obtained an order of the Magistrate under sec. 144 preventing the plaintiffs from erecting certain buildings on their own property, without adjudication of the private rights of the parties, it is open to the plaintiffs to sue the defendants for a declaration that they are entitled to make use of their property and erect buildings on it as they desire, and for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with them in so doing; and the order under section 144, far from being a

bar to such suit, would itself furnish the cause of action for the suit—*Baba Sah v. Mahomed Hussain*, 42 M.L.J. 179, 15 L.W. 68, A.I.R. 1922 Mad. 123.

386. Proceedings judicial:—Inquiries under this section before an order is issued are judicial proceedings within the meaning of sec. 4 (m); and the Magistrate can take action under sec. 476 if he thinks that false evidence has been given before him in such proceedings—*Q. E. v. Tirunarasimhachari*, 19 Mad 18. (Section 476 as amended in 1923 is no longer limited to *judicial* proceedings, but applies to *any* proceeding).

CHAPTER XII.

DISPUTES AS TO IMMOVEABLE PROPERTY.

In proceedings under this Chapter, the Magistrate should distinctly indicate under what section of the Code he takes proceedings. It should not be left to the higher Courts to speculate to see under what section the order was passed—*Srinivasa v. Ranganathan*, 18 Cr.L.J. 295 (Mad).

145. (1) Whenever a District Magistrate, Sub-Divisional Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class is satisfied from a police-report or other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof, within the local limits of his jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in person or by pleader, within a time to be fixed by such Magistrate, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute.

(2) For the purposes of this section the expression "land or water" includes building, markets, fisheries, crops or other produce of land, and the rents or profits of any such property.

(3) A copy of the order shall be served in manner provided by this Code for the service of a summons upon

such person or persons as the Magistrate may direct, and at least one copy shall be published by being affixed to some conspicuous place at or near the subject of dispute.

(4) The Magistrate shall then, without reference to the merits of the claims of any of such parties to a right to possess the subject of dispute, peruse the statements so put in, hear the parties, receive *all such evidence as may be* produced by them respectively, consider the effect of such evidence, take such further evidence (if any) as he thinks necessary, and, if possible, decide whether any and which of the parties was at the date of the order beforementioned in such possession of the said subject :

Provided that, if it appears to the Magistrate that any party has within two months next before the date of such order been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed, he may treat the party so dispossessed as if he had been in possession at such date :

Provided also, that, if the Magistrate considers the case one of emergency, he may at any time attach the subject of dispute, pending his decision under this section.

(5) Nothing in this section shall preclude any party so required to attend, or any other person interested, from showing that no such dispute as aforesaid exists or has existed ; and in such case, the Magistrate shall cancel his said order, and all further proceedings thereon shall be stayed, but, subject to such cancellation, the order of the Magistrate under sub-section (1) shall be final.

(6) If the Magistrate decides that one of the parties was or should under the first proviso to sub-section (4) be treated as being in such possession of the said subject, he shall issue an order declaring such party to be entitled to possession thereof until evicted therefrom in due course of law and forbidding all disturbance of possession until such eviction, and when he proceeds under the first proviso to sub-section (4), may restore to possession the party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed.

Party in possession to retain possession until legally evicted.

(7) *When any party to any such proceeding dies, the Magistrate may cause the legal representative of the deceased party to be made a party to the proceeding, and shall thereupon continue the inquiry, and if any question arises as to who the legal representative of a deceased party for the purpose of such proceeding is, all persons claiming to be representatives of the deceased party shall be made parties thereto.*

(8) *If the Magistrate is of opinion that any crop or other produce of the property, the subject of dispute in a proceeding under this section pending before him, is subject to speedy and natural decay, he may make an order for the proper custody or sale of such property, and, upon the completion of the inquiry, shall make such order for the disposal of such property, or the sale-proceeds thereof, as he thinks fit.*

(9) *The Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, at any stage of the proceedings under this section, on the application of either party, issue summons to any witness directing him to attend or to produce any document or thing.*

(10) *Nothing in this section shall be deemed to be in derogation of the powers of the Magistrate to proceed under Section 107.*

Change —The amendments as shown by the italicised words have been made by sec 27 of the Crim Pro. Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923) The reasons have been stated below in their proper places

387. Object and scope of section.—Section 145 is intended only to provide a speedy remedy for the prevention of breaches of peace arising out of disputes relating to immoveable property by maintaining one or other of the parties in possession—*Debi Prasad v. Sheodat*, 30 All 41, *Tarapada v. Nurul Haq*, 32 Cal. 1093, *Krishna Kamini v. Abdul*, 30 Cal 155; *Manindra v. Barada Kanta*, 30 Cal 112, *Ramchandra v. Monohar*, 21 Cal. 29 The object of this section is to enable a Magistrate to intervene and pass a temporary order in regard to the possession of property in dispute, having effect until the actual right of one of the parties has been determined by a competent Civil Court—*Daulat v. Rameswari*, 26 Cal 625, *Kunja Behari v. Khetra*, 29 Cal 208

Litigants often resort to section 145 as an easy way of getting possession without the expense, delay and trouble of a civil suit regarding the land in dispute, and Courts should be on guard against an abuse of legal

powers—*Ma Ma Gyi v. K. E.*, 2 Bur. L.J. 295, 25 Cr.L.J. 1161. Sec. 145 is frequently misapplied in practice, and parties try to use the Criminal Courts for the settlement of what are really civil disputes, in order to evade the Court fees of civil cases. This fact should make Magistrates careful not to be induced by the pleaders before them into allowing what is really a civil case to be argued in a Criminal Court, with a consequent waste of public time and to the detriment not only of other litigants but also of the Magistrate himself—*In re Mallappa*, 28 Bom. L.R. 488, 27 Cr.L.J. 734 (735). The object of this section is only to prevent a breach of the peace and not to protect or maintain anybody in possession. Courts should take action under this section only if there is a report or information of a breach of the peace and the same cannot be obviated without an order under this section—*Phutanja v Emp.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 1109 (Nag.).

388. Secs. 107, 144, and 145 :—As to whether a Magistrate should proceed under sec 107 or 144 or 145, in case of disputes relating to immoveable property between the rival parties likely to cause a breach of the peace, see Notes 334 and 377 under secs 107 and 144, where the subject has been fully discussed.

Where a Magistrate initiated proceedings under sec. 144 and at a later stage intimated to the parties who were present in Court his intention to draw up proceedings under sec. 143, held that the Magistrate was not guilty of any irregularity—*Chadhari v Raja Ramsingh*, 19 Cr.L.J. 396 (Pat).

389. Nature of proceedings under this section :—A proceeding under this section is taken for the prevention of crime; it does not arise out of or deals with a crime already committed. Therefore a proceeding under this section is not a 'criminal' case within the meaning of sec 526—*In re Pandurang* 25 Bom 179, *Farid v Piru*, 8 S.L.R. 215, 16 Cr.L.J. 249. An action taken under this section is a quasi-executive action—*Pandurang*, 25 Bom 179. A proceeding under this section is in reality a civil one—*Sukh Lal v Tara Chand*, 33 Cal 68. *Contra*—*In re Arumuga*, 20 Mad 188, *Jaggu v. Maru* 34 All 533, *Misri v. Narasingh*, 2 P.L.T. 186 and *Sardar Karam Singh v Hearsey*, 11 O.C. 61, 7 Cr.L.J. 423, where it is held that a case under this section is a criminal case and the High Court has power to transfer it under sec. 526 of this Code, or under clause 29. Letters Patent. It should be noted, however, that the word 'criminal' in sec 526 has now been omitted, so that the question as to whether a proceeding under this section is a criminal or civil one is immaterial for the purpose of sec 526, the High Court is competent to transfer the proceeding, under the provision of that section.

Though the Court dealing with a case under this section is a criminal Court, yet an order under this section is not one made in a 'criminal trial' within the meaning of sec 15 of the Letters Patent, and therefore an appeal lies from an order of a single Judge of a Chartered High Court—*Raja of Kalahasti v. Narasimha*, 17 M.L.J. 158. But see *Subbayya v. Ramayya*, 39 Mad 537 (cited in Note 323) in respect of a proceeding under sec 133.

Competency of Magistrates :—Bench of Magistrate :—A Bench of Magistrates exercising first class powers may be invested, by virtue of sec. 15 (2), with powers to take proceedings under this section. The decision in *Sufferuddin v. Ibrahim*, 3 Cal. 754 under the old Code of 1872 is no longer good law.

390. "Is satisfied" :—Before taking proceedings under this section, the Magistrate must satisfy himself that there is an existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace, and he ought not to assume jurisdiction in those cases where the suggested apprehension of a breach of the peace is merely colorable and made to induce him to deal with matters properly cognisable by the Civil Courts—*Obhoy Chandra v. Md. Sabir*, 10 Cal. 78 (80). Unless the Magistrate is satisfied that there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace, he cannot proceed under this section—*H. V. Low & Co., v. Manindra Chandra*, 3 Pat. 809 (814). It is necessary that the Magistrate should himself inquire into the likelihood of a breach of the peace, and should come to a judicial decision upon it—*Anundee v. Soonat*, 9 W.R. 64. An order of the Magistrate merely on the complainant's petition, without determining whether any breach of the peace was likely to occur, or enquiring whether the accused had any evidence, is bad in law, since the Magistrate has failed to find the facts that were necessary to constitute the foundation of his jurisdiction—*Budhu v. Emp.*, 1885 P R 6. The ground stated by the Magistrate must be such as to satisfy a Court of Revision before which such case may be brought by any of the parties concerned—*Dhanput v. Chatterput*, 20 Cal 513.

The fact that the Magistrate is satisfied as to the necessity of proceedings under this section and the ground of his being so satisfied must appear on the record—*Ganga Prasad v. Narain*, 15 All. 394, and in the first order directing the issue of notice—*In re Pandurang*, 24 Bom 527, 2 Bom L.R. 84, *Jagomohan v. Ramkumar*, 28 Cal. 416, *Posukha v. Tandalagara*, 4 M L T 213, 8 Cr L J 399.

Power of High Court or Sessions Judge etc to direct proceedings :—The Magistrate must satisfy himself and use his own discretion as to the necessity of proceedings. Therefore neither the High Court nor the Sessions Judge has power to order a Magistrate to take proceedings under this chapter—*In re Kali Prosonno*, 23 W R. 58, *Manindra v. Barada*, 30 Cal 112; *Q. E v Govind Chandra*, 20 Cal 520, *Anundee v. Soonat*, 9 W.R. 64. If the Magistrate is satisfied that there was no likelihood of a breach of the peace, the High Court cannot direct him to be satisfied as to such likelihood and to take proceedings under this section—*H. V. Low & Co v Manindra Chandra*, 3 Pat 809 (814). So also, the High Court has no power to direct the revival of proceedings after they have been stayed by the Magistrate—*Manindra v. Barada Kanta* 30 Cal 112.

Where a Subdivisional Magistrate, having regard to the circumstances of the case, came to the conclusion that proceedings under sec 144 should be taken, and made an order accordingly, the District Magistrate had no authority to direct the Sub-divisional Magistrate to institute proceedings

under section 145—*Kailash v. Kunja Behari*, 24 Cal. 391. The question whether proceedings under sec. 145 should or should not be taken is entirely a matter within the Magistrate's own discretion, and a District Magistrate has no authority to direct him to institute the proceedings. But where proceedings were at first instituted under sec. 145 by the Deputy Magistrate in respect of a portion of land, but the District Magistrate directed him to include the whole of the disputed land in the proceedings, and it appeared that the police report and other materials before the Deputy Magistrate disclosed the existence of a dispute concerning the whole of the land, and the Deputy Magistrate thereafter included the entire land in the proceedings, held that the action of the Deputy Magistrate was not improper—*Nripendra v. Sasadhar*, 34 C.W.N. 82 (85).

But where a Sub-divisional Magistrate refused to take proceedings under section 145 because in his opinion there was no sufficient ground for such proceedings, the District Magistrate was competent to take such proceedings himself, if he was of a different opinion, and the refusal of the Sub-divisional Magistrate could not operate as a bar to such proceedings—*Baida Nath v. Nibaran*, 29 Cal 242, *Benoy Chandra v. Kala Chand*, 43 C.L.J. 586, 27 Cr.L.J. 1083.

391. Police-report :—A Police report upon which a Magistrate bases his initial order under this section should contain a statement of the facts from which the Magistrate may be satisfied as to the existence of a likelihood of a breach of the peace. But there is no inflexible rule that the police report must show that the disputing parties are actually assembling men or doing some other specific overt acts—*Kuloda Kinkar v. Danesh*, 33 Cal 33. A police report which sets out sufficiently substantial reasons for believing that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace relating to a certain land exists, is a good foundation of proceedings under this section—*Dhanput v. Chatterput*, 20 Cal 513. But a police report which does not state that there was any apprehension of a breach of the peace, is not sufficient to give the Magistrate jurisdiction under this section—*Radha Gobind v. Gossain Mohendra*, 11 C.W.N. 340. But this is not an inflexible rule, and the fact that the police report stated that there was no likelihood of a breach of the peace would not by itself take away the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to proceed under this section, if upon a consideration of the materials before him and by exercising his own independent judgment he came to the conclusion that there was a likelihood of a breach of the peace—*Ganga Bishun v. Rao*, 5 P.L.T. 252, 26 Cr.L.J. 133.

A Magistrate is in no way bound to act on all that is stated in the Police report before him—*Laldhar v. Sakdeo*, 27 Cal. 892; *Ahmed Ali v. Sabid*, 33 C.W.N. 858. He is to exercise his own independent judgment upon the materials placed before him, and to arrive at a conclusion as to whether upon those materials there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace. He would not be justified in acting merely upon an expression of opinion by the police—*Ganga Bishun v. Rao*, 5 P.L.T. 252, 26 Cr.L.J. 133; *Ahmed Ali v. Sabid*, supra. Thus, where the police report showed that the parties disputing over a tank were big Zemindars, and that although

there was nothing to show that a breach of the peace was likely to happen, yet such a breach was not impossible, it was held that the Magistrate ought not to proceed upon such report, which was merely an expression of opinion by the Police—*Maharaj Bahadur v. Ranjit Singh*, 11 C.W.N. 835; *Surjakanta v. Jagodindra*, 11 C.W.N. 198; *Kuloda Kinkar v. Danesh*, 33 Cal. 33.

The report must contain a definite statement by a responsible police-officer to the effect that he apprehends that there will be a disturbance of the peace which is beyond his power to prevent. When no such report is sent to the Magistrate, it is an indication of the absence of any likelihood of a breach of the peace—*Phutanja v. Emp.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 1109 (Nag.).

Evidentiary value.—A Police report is not itself evidence although it may be sufficient to justify a Magistrate in taking action under this section—*In re Bhadreswari*, 16 W.R. 17, 7 ■ L.R. 329. The police report and the evidence contained therein about the factum of possession is inadmissible in evidence in a proceeding under this section except for the purpose of initiating the proceeding—*Kulbans v. Ram Singh*, 1 P.L.T. 501, 21 Cr.L.J. 735

392. "Other information"—The Magistrate may act on any information and without any formal complaint being made before him. He is not confined to evidence recorded on oath—*In re Kishoree Mohun*, 19 W.R. 10

The word 'information' does not refer to any particular way in which a Magistrate's attention should be drawn. It is wide enough to cover the knowledge of the Magistrate derived by reading the petition filed by the parties in another proceeding which satisfies him that a breach of the peace was imminent—*Jhama v. Thakuri*, 1 P.L.T. 369, 21 Cr.L.J. 625.

But a telegram is not a sufficient information—*In re Hari Lal*, 22 Bom 949 (1956); so also a statement made by a witness in the course of a trial that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists—*Q. E. v. Gobind Chandra*, 20 Cal. 520, or a mere petition by an officer in the employ of a party interested in the dispute, that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists, is not a sufficient basis of proceedings under this section—*Tirumalraja v. Lodd Gobind Doss*, 29 Mad 561. Where there is no police report, the statement of interested parties as regards the existence of a breach of the peace must be received with great caution, but if a Magistrate has reason to believe such statement, he does not act without jurisdiction—*Joymangal v. Kanta Gope*, 24 Cr.L.J. 304

393. Dispute—The Magistrate's jurisdiction under this section depends upon there being a dispute likely to create a breach of the peace, and when the parties appear before the Magistrate, if they are able to show, or if it otherwise appears to him that there ■ no dispute, or no such dispute as is likely to induce a breach of the peace, the Magistrate should hold his hands and not proceed further—*Gobind v. Abdul Sayad*, ■ Cal 835. Thus, when the rights of the parties have been determined by a competent court, the dispute is at an end and it is the duty of the Magistrate to maintain the right of the successful party, and the defeated

party will not be allowed to invoke the aid of the Magistrate and the police to neutralise the effect of the decree of the competent Civil Court—*Gobind v. Abdul*, 6 Cal. 835; *Daulat v. Rameswari*, 26 Cal. 625; *Sims v. Johurry*, 5 C.W.N. 563; *Kunja Behari v. Khetra Pal*, 29 Cal. 208. The proper course for a Magistrate to pursue, if the defeated party does any act that may probably occasion a breach of the peace, is to take action under sec. 107—*Gobind v. Abdul*, 6 Cal. 835; *Amriteshwari v. Darpa Narain*, 7 C.W.N. 558, *Subba Nayak v. Trincall*, 7 Mad. 460. If, however, the successful party in the Civil Court allows the unsuccessful party to get into and retain possession for a sufficiently long period of time, the Magistrate may make a declaration in favour of the unsuccessful party in the civil suit if he clearly finds possession in his favour—*Agni Kumar v. Mantazaddin*, 56 Cal. 290 (F.B.), 32 C.W.N. 1173, 30 Cr L.J. 69 (84). As to the effect of a prior decree of a Civil Court, see Note 438 *infra*.

The term 'dispute' means a reasonable dispute, a *bona fide* dispute, a dispute between parties who have each some semblance of a right or supposed right—*Gobind v. Abdul Sayad*, 6 Cal. 835. In every case in which a Magistrate finds that there is a *bona fide* dispute about land, no matter how erroneous the contention of one or other of the parties may be, he ought to adopt the procedure laid down in sec. 145. But if the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that the defendants are wrongfully and without any *bona fide* claim seeking to eject the other party by force and a breach of the peace is imminent, he is not bound to act under this section but is justified in making an order under sec. 107—*Emp. v. Ram Baran*, 28 All. 406. A Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court has recently laid down that the words "*bona fide*" should not be imported into this section, for if the Magistrate has to decide whether the dispute is *bona fide* or not, it would be to require him to go into the question of the merits or the claims of a party to a right to possess the subject of dispute, which he is forbidden to do by sub-section (4)—*Agni Kumar v. Mantazaddin*, *supra*.

394. Likelihood of breach of peace :—The basis of the Magistrate's jurisdiction under this section is the likelihood of a breach of the peace. Therefore, where in his order directing the issue of a proceeding under this section, the Magistrate was of opinion that there was no likelihood of a breach of the peace but that as the dispute was one relating to possession, section 145 was applicable, *held* that the Magistrate acted without jurisdiction—*Sib Narayan v. Satish*, 24 C.W.N. 621, 21 Cr L.J. 593. Where the police report did not disclose that there was any apprehension of a breach of the peace, the Magistrate's order under this section was without jurisdiction—*Ram Sarup v. Darsano*, 1 P.L.T. 387, 21 Cr L.J. 748.

The term 'likely' in this section does not mean that the breach of the peace complained of must be imminent or likely to happen immediately but simply signifies that there is a probability or a likelihood of a breach of the peace—*Balmukund v. Crown*, 1 S.L.R. 50, 8 Cr.L.J. 170. The

Magistrate must decide in each case whether there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace, and it is not enough on the one hand that the breach is merely probable, nor is it necessary that it should be 'imminent' as indicating a higher degree of chance of the event happening than is denoted by the 'likelihood' of it—*Kulada Kinkar v. Danesh* 33 Cal 33. But a mere probability that a breach of the peace may occur if no proceedings are taken will not justify the Magistrate in taking action under this section, he must be satisfied of the existence of a dispute likely to induce a breach of the peace, rendering it necessary for him to take immediate steps for its prevention—*Damodar v. Syamanund*, 7 Cal 385. An order under this section will be justified if there is an immediate danger of a breach of the peace—*Janu v. Moniruddin*, 8 C.W.N. 590. If there be no present danger of a breach of the peace, the fact that a breach may happen at a future time will not justify an order under this section—*Stewart v. Hubert*, 33 C.W.N. 509, 30 Cr.L.J. 977. A mere finding that the parties are in a contesting mood, without any finding as to the likelihood of a breach of the peace, is insufficient—*Munnu Lal v. Harde Ram*, 29 O.C. 23, 12 O.L.J. 256, 26 Cr.L.J. 944. When there is ample time to have the dispute settled in the Civil Court, action under this section is not justified—*Choley Lal v. Emp.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 227, A.I.R. 1924 Oudh 341.

Where a party was acting properly and within his rights, there is no reason to suppose that any breach of the peace was likely to be committed by him—*Dejoy Singha v. Emp.*, 3 C.W.N. 463. The mere fact that a person complains of being dispossessed of his land is no reason for the institution of proceedings under this section, if the petition made by the complainant refers only to the commission of various offences, none of which necessarily involves a breach of the peace—*Kasu v. Moti Molla*, 4 C.W.N. 57.

There must be a likelihood of a breach of the peace on the date on which the Magistrate draws up proceedings. He cannot take proceedings on the strength of a Police report which is more than three months old, when he has no information that a breach of the peace is likely to occur at the time of his taking action—*Chhedil Lal v. Mahabir*, 2 P.L.T. 650, 23 Cr.L.J. 27. Where at the date of the initial order the materials before the Magistrate do not disclose the existence of such dispute as is likely to result in a breach of the peace, the order made by him would not be void, if it appears from the evidence in the course of the trial that there was at the date of the initiation of the proceedings a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace—*Kuloda Kinkar v. Danesh*, 33 Cal 33 (dissenting from *Kali Kissen v. Anund*, 23 Cal 557).

The primary object of this section is the preservation of peace. Therefore, if it is found during the proceedings that there is no likelihood of the peace being disturbed, there is no necessity for the Magistrate to continue the proceedings—*Ramchandra v. Monohur*, 21 Cal 29. If the Magistrate, after some inquiry comes to the conclusion that there is no danger of a breach of the peace, he can refuse to draw up a preliminary order—*Mooliyamal v. Ali Md.*, 111 S.L.R. 278, 26 Cr.L.J. 1333. The

Magistrate has jurisdiction to decline to proceed with the inquiry, whenever it is shown to his satisfaction that the dispute no longer exists or that the danger has disappeared—*Kamulammal v. Vavu Rowther*, 4 L.W. 57, 17 Cr.L.J. 138. See notes under sub-section (5).

Inquiry and Record.—A Magistrate who purports to act under this section must himself enquire into the question whether a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists and must record a judicial decision thereon. Where a preliminary order was made on the report of a *Zaildar* and the parties had had no opportunity of producing their evidence before the *Zaildar*, held that in the absence of judicial evidence showing the likelihood of a breach of the peace, the report of the *Zaildar* could not be invoked in support of an order under this section—*Prem Singh v. Crown*, 1917 P L R. 115, 18 Cr L J. 565; *Md. Musallier v. Kunji*, 2 Weir 117. The Magistrate must also record the ground of his belief as to the existence of such likelihood—*In re Kumud Narain*, 4 Cal. 650

The law does not require the Magistrate to record an express finding in his judgment (final order) that a breach of the peace was imminent. Such a finding in respect of the existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace is a matter to be considered in relation to the preliminary order—*Magimunnisa v Ahmedunnissa*, 2 O W.N. 704, 26 Cr. L J 1581.

395. Subject matter of dispute.—*Land or water*.—The words in the 1882 Code were "tangible immoveable property." The present section is not limited to tangible immoveable property, but empowers the Magistrate to take cognisance of a dispute concerning any "land or water" or boundaries thereof, and subsection (2) gives an explanation of the words—*Murbullubh v. Luckmeshwar*, 26 Cal 188. See notes under sub-section (2) *infra*

Proceedings under this section cannot be instituted with respect to moveable properties—*Hira Lal v Emp*, 11 O.L.J. 59, 25 Cr.L.J. 440. Thus, a dispute as regards the offerings made at a temple is a dispute regarding moveable property, and a Magistrate cannot make a declaration that one of the parties is in possession of such offerings—*Gui Ram v Lal Behary*, 37 Cal 578, *Ram Saran v. Raghunandan*, 38 Cal 387; *Sobhag Singh v. Bakhtawar Singh*, 23 N L.R. 84, 28 Cr L.J. 687 (688)

Property must be specified.—To bring a case under this section, the property which is the subject of dispute must be capable of being accurately defined—*Surb Narain v. Birj Mohun*, 23 Cal. 80. Therefore a Magistrate cannot take action in the case of a dispute about an undivided share of land, or rent or profit issuing from such undivided share, because the subject matter of the dispute is uncertain, and the boundaries of the land are undefined—*Mon Mohan v. Rajendra*, 7 C.W.N 462.

Before a proceeding is drawn up by the Magistrate, the subject matter of dispute should be clearly determined—*Maharaja Suryakanta v. Maharaja Jagadindra*, 11 C.W.N. 199; *Sabid Mandal v. Lakshmi*, 7 C.W.N. 599. Absence of clear specification of the subject matter of dispute in the pro-

ceedings is a serious defect—*Sib Narain v. Satish*, 24 C.W.N. 621, 21 Cr.L.J. 593. But where the parties are not at dispute upon the question as to what the disputed lands are, the real question being which party was entitled to possession under a Civil Court decree, the want of a proper specification of the boundaries of the property will not vitiate the proceedings—*Sims v. Johurry*, 5 C.W.N. 563; *Jhaman v. Thakuri*, 1 P.L.T. 369, 21 Cr.L.J. 625.

An order under this section which does not specify by metes and bounds the lands in dispute may be amended by the Magistrate himself—*Baboo Reddi v. Kullappa*, 2 Weir 107. But an order which gives no information as to the subject matter of dispute and which leaves the persons to whom notice is ordered to be issued quite in the dark as to the property in regard to which they have to put forward their respective claims, is not merely defective but invalid and liable to be set aside in revision—*In re Martin*, 27 All. 296.

396. "Within jurisdiction".—A Magistrate cannot pass orders respecting lands situate outside the local limits of his jurisdiction—*Goluck v. Raj Mohun*, 17 W.R. 33. Therefore where a *jalkar* was situate partly within and partly without the local limits of his jurisdiction, and proceedings were taken with regard to the *jalkar* as a whole, the whole proceedings were set aside, and the Magistrate was allowed an option to institute fresh proceedings with regard to such portion of the *jalkar* as came within his jurisdiction—*Korban v. Raja Srinath*, 1 C.L.J. 329.

A District Magistrate cannot transfer a case to a sub-Divisional Magistrate if the land concerned is not within the local limits of the latter's jurisdiction—*Chellapatti v. Subba*, 52 Mad 241, 55 M.L.J. 693, 30 Cr.L.J. 340 (341). But where a Magistrate having local jurisdiction has taken the initiatory step by passing an order under sub-section (1), he can thereafter transfer the case to a subordinate Magistrate, although the latter has no local jurisdiction in the case—*In re Arumuga*, 26 Mad 188; *Satish v. Rajendra*, 22 Cal. 698.

Where it is uncertain in which of two local areas the land in dispute is situated, proceedings may be taken by a Magistrate having jurisdiction over any of such areas—*Iklas v. Raghuraj*, 12 O.C. 400, 11 Cr.L.J. 333. See also *Audendra v. Daman Singh*, 16 Cr.L.J. 527 (All.).

A Magistrate of one district has jurisdiction to institute proceedings under Sec. 145 on a report drawn up by a police officer of another district in respect of such portions of the land or water as lie within the limits of his jurisdiction—*Ishan Chander v. Garth*, 29 Cal 885.

397. Preliminary Order.—The making of a formal order under sub-section (1) is absolutely necessary to the initiation of proceedings under this section—*Nathu Ram v. Emp.*, 15 A.L.J. 270, 18 Cr.L.J. 557, *Kaku v. Harnaman*, 1917 P.W.R. 28; and an omission to make such an order and to draw up a proceeding under sub-section (1), will render all subsequent proceedings void—*Banwari v. Hriday*, 32 Cal. 552; *Sukru v. Ram Pergash*, 30 Cal 443. *Banka Singh v. Gokul*, 49 All. 325, 25 A.L.J.

246, 28 Cr.L.J. 231; *Dhaniram v. Kaliram*, 26 P.L.R. 712; *Kaku v. Harnaman*, 1917 P.W.R. 28; *Sher Khan v. Fazl Ilahi*, 26 P.L.R. 187, 26 Cr.L.J. 1177; *Hakam v. Ralja Ram*, 4 Lah 66, 24 Cr.L.J. 751; *Md. Hasham v. Md. Jhami*, 20 Cr.L.J. 124 (Oudh); *Manik v. Azimuddi*, 11 C.W.N. 923; *Jamuna v. Mohan*, 2 P.L.T. 724, 23 Cr.L.J. 64. In *Sajad Hussain v. Nanak Chand*, 1917 P.W.R. 22, 18 Cr.L.J. 461 (following *Muhammad Sharef v. Dhanpat*, 1914 P.W.R. 15, 15 Cr.L.J. 279) however, it has been held that the omission to record the preliminary order is not a fatal defect, if the Magistrate afterwards in the presence of parties record an order which essentially complies with the requirements of this sub-section. So also, in *Nur Baksh v. Crown*, 1917 P.W.R. 26, 18 Cr.L.J. 633, the omission to record a preliminary order in writing or to serve it on the parties did not invalidate the subsequent proceedings, where the parties appeared before the Magistrate who explained matters to them fully and they evidently understood everything that was requisite. The Rangoon High Court also holds that the omission to draw up a preliminary order is a mere irregularity curable by sec. 537, where no objection was taken before the Magistrate and no party was prejudiced—*Mg Po Lon v. Mg. Ba*, 3 Bur. L.J. 256, 26 Cr.L.J. 324.

But where no order was recorded, no notice issued, no written statements called for, and no inquiry held, the order must be deemed to be an order without jurisdiction and therefore void—*Mahadeo v. Bishu*, 25 All 537, *Tara Chand v. Behari Lal*, 1916 P.R. 22, 18 Cr.L.J. 36; *Budhan v. Ram Rakha*, 1915 P.L.R. 169, 16 Cr.L.J. 628; *Banka Singh v. Gokul*, 49 All 325, 28 Cr.L.J. 231.

An order under this section must state all the particulars necessary to enable the Magistrate to act under this section, otherwise the proceedings are without jurisdiction. It is not sufficient that the Magistrate should have before him a police report, that he should have given orders thereon and that a written order be drawn up according to the terms of this section. It is his duty to draw up an order which in all respects satisfies the requirements of law. The written order should be correct and complete in its terms—*Mohesh v. Narain*, 27 Cal 981.

"The essential points to be kept in mind in connection with proceedings under this section are as follows:—

(a) The Magistrate should in his order, which must be in writing, declare himself satisfied from a proper report or other information, and for reasons given, that a dispute exists concerning land within the local limits of his jurisdiction, and that the dispute is one likely to cause a breach of the peace.

(b) When land is in dispute, the boundaries should be duly defined in the order, and care should be taken to include nothing beyond the subject of dispute.

(c) The order should proceed to require the parties concerned in the dispute to attend the Magistrate's Court in person or by pleader on a certain date, to file written statements of their respective claims as

regards the fact of actual possession, and to be prepared with their oral and documentary evidence there and then.

(d) The date should be so fixed as to allow reasonable time for the due service and return of the notice promulgating the order and the production of evidence.

(e) A copy of the order should be published and affixed in or near the subject of dispute.

(f) The forms prescribed in Schedule V should be used, such modifications being made therein as the circumstances of the case may require."—*Cal. G. R. & C. O.*, pp. 10, 11.

Where the Magistrate purported to pass an executive order, but from the form of the order it was evident that it was a thinly disguised order under sec. 145, but no formalities of sec. 145 were observed (*viz.*, no preliminary order was made, no written statement called for), held that the order was passed without jurisdiction and must be set aside—*Harbans v. Md. Syad*, 26 Cr L.J. 1511, A I.R. 1926 Pat 51.

398. Statement of grounds :—A Magistrate's order in instituting proceedings under this section ought to set out the grounds on which he is satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists—*Jagomohan v Ramkumar*, 28 Cal 416, *Dan Pershad v Ganesh*, 11 A L J 696, 14 Cr L J 495, *Palkabai v Jagannath*, 6 C.P.L.R. 21; *In re Pandurang*, 2 Bom L.R. 84, *Khubi v Darbari*, 2 P.L.T 267, 22 Cr L J 481. Even where the Magistrate acts upon a local inquiry held by himself, he is still bound to state the grounds upon which he is satisfied that there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace—*Nityanund v. Paresh Nath*, 32 Cal 771.

Omission to state grounds.—The object of drawing up a proceeding prior to the issue of notice is to inform the parties of the grounds or information which satisfy the Magistrate that a dispute exists—*Sabid Mundal v. Lakshmi*, 7 C.W.N 599. For it is the intention of the law, not only that the Magistrate should have sufficient grounds for proceeding under sec. 145, but that he should inform the parties concerned of the grounds on which he is proceeding—*Q E v. Gobind Chandra*, 20 Cal 520. Therefore, where the Magistrate omits in the preliminary order to state the grounds for his being satisfied as to the likelihood of a breach of the peace, the final order is without jurisdiction and must be set aside—*Nityanund v. Paresh Nath*, 32 Cal 771, *Nga Po Tin v. Nga Po Saung*, 1 Rang 53, *Ma Gyi v. K E.*, 2 Bur L.J. 295, 25 Cr L J. 1161. But the other High Courts take a different view. Thus, the Allahabad High Court holds that failure on the part of the Magistrate to set forth explicitly the grounds for his being satisfied that there was a likelihood of a breach of the peace will not vitiate the proceedings if there was otherwise a substantial compliance with the requirements of this section—*Har Prasad v. Pandurang* 1905 A W N 260, *Har Piar v. Nathe Lal*, 18 A.L.J. 1140; *Babban v Baldeo*, 4 A L J 91. In *Bakhshullah v Latafatunnissa*, 1884 A W N. 317, it has been held that the omission to state the grounds is a mere irregularity curable by Sec 537. Similar view is taken by the

Oudh and Sindh Courts—*Parbhu Dayal v. Emp.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 1139 (Oudh); *Md. Mahdisha v. Wahdalsah*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1292 (Sind). The Madras High Court also lays down that once the Magistrate is satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists, he has jurisdiction, and his subsequent action must be considered in relation to procedure and not to jurisdiction. The irregularity, if any, would be cured by section 537—*Kamal Kutty v. Udayavarma*, 36 Mad 275, 23 M.L.J. 499, 13 Cr.L.J. 753, and in *In re Chennapudayan*, 30 Mad. 548 and *Chockalingam v. Ammalalchi*, 2 Weir 98, the High Court refused to interfere in revision unless either of the parties had been prejudiced by the Magistrate's omission to record the grounds. The Rangoon High Court has also recently held that although it is right and proper in order to avoid a hasty action that a Magistrate would be required to state the grounds of his belief as to the necessity of an inquiry, still where the inquiry has been carried out by the Magistrate with considerable thoroughness, and no injustice has been done to any party as a result of the omission to state the grounds which caused him to take action under this section, his order cannot be set aside merely because of such omission—*Maung Pu v. Maung Chit*, 5 Rang. 129, 28 Cr.L.J. 623.

But in his final order, the Magistrate should sufficiently state his reasons, so that the High Court in revision may determine whether or not the Magistrate has complied with the provisions of sub-section (4) and directed his mind to the consideration of the evidence—*Bhuban Chandra v. Nibaran*, 49 Cal 187.

A mere omission by the Magistrate to record the source of information will not invalidate the proceedings, where the Magistrate held the inquiry in the presence of the parties, and they were aware of the fact in the course of the inquiry—*Sabid Mondal v. Lakshmi*, 7 C.W.N. 599.

Where the Magistrate omitted to state in detail the grounds of his satisfaction that a breach of the peace was likely to happen, but referred in a petition which contained such grounds and also recorded that there was no denial of the same by the opposite party, it was held that there was a substantial compliance with the provisions of this section and that the order was valid—*Sayid Mahomed v. Sayid Khadir*, 16 M.L.J. 148.

Reference to police report—An initial order made by the Magistrate under sub-sec (1) is not defective merely because it is not self-contained and does not state in express terms the grounds upon which he is satisfied, when such grounds appear in the police report upon which it is founded and to which it makes reference, and which is incorporated in it—*Khosh Mohamed v. Nazir Mahomed*, 33 Cal. 352; *Goluck Chandra v. Kali Charan*, 13 Cal. 175. Where the police report sets out sufficient grounds and is expressly referred to in the initial order by the Magistrate, such an order sufficiently fulfils the requirements of the law—*Khosh Md. v. Nazir Md.*, 33 Cal. 352. If the Police report or other information shows that there is a dispute and the Magistrate believes it, and issues the preliminary order, basing his information on such report only, he acquires sufficient jurisdiction to act under this section and it is not necessary for him to

set out any further reasons for his being satisfied as to the existence of such a dispute. His order is final and the High Court will not scrutinize the said reasons—*Krishnappa v. Alamelu*, 5 L.W. 165, 18 Cr.L.J. 23. But it is remarked in *Kali Krishna v. Golam Ali*, 7 Cal. 46 that it is the duty of the Magistrate to record distinctly what the law requires to be recorded, and he performs his duty in an unsatisfactory manner if without stating the grounds he merely refers to a police report.

399. Parties concerned :—The Magistrate should do his best to ascertain who are the parties concerned in the dispute in a case under sec. 145. But his order cannot be pronounced to be vitiated by any error of jurisdiction merely because such inquiry has not been made or carried far enough—*Krishna Kamini v. Abdul Jubbar*, 30 Cal 155 (F.B.) at p. 193. It is upon the basis of the information conveyed to him that the Magistrate is in the first instance to select the persons whom he will require to attend his Court for the purpose of laying their claims before him—*Ibid* (at p. 196). It is the initial duty of a Magistrate in a proceeding under this section to find out what parties are concerned in the dispute that has arisen, and he should also determine which parties are in actual possession. Proceedings under this section are not without jurisdiction because some of the parties are concerned only with possession of a portion of the land in dispute—*Narayan v. Chandrabhaga*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1289 (Nag.).

The words "parties concerned" should not be so narrowly construed as to mean only the persons actually disputing but should be extended to persons who are concerned as claiming to be in possession. Had it been intended to confine the proceeding to the actual disputants, the Legislature would have used the words 'parties disputing' instead of the words 'parties concerned'—*per* Hill J. in *Krishna Kamini v. Abdul Jubbar*, 30 Cal 155 (F.B.) at p. 198. Proceedings under this section are not without jurisdiction merely because some of those persons (i.e. persons claiming to be in possession) are not likely to cause a breach of the peace—*Abadi Begam v. Mirza Ahmed*, 11 O.L.J. 757, A.L.R. 1925 Oudh 190. Although a person is not one of the parties to the dispute but is in possession of a part of the land, he is a necessary party to the proceedings and should be asked to file a written statement—*Ram Bhushan v. Ram Lakshan*, A.I.R. 1925 Oudh 484, 26 Cr.L.J. 630.

It was held in several Calcutta cases that the words 'parties concerned' in this section meant not only the persons who were actually disputing but also the persons interested in or claiming a right to the property in dispute, and the Magistrate was bound to ascertain those persons and to give notice to them all so that the whole matter, so far as his Court was concerned, might be disposed of in one proceeding—*Ram Chandra v. Monohur*, 21 Cal. 29 (32); *Laldhari v. Sukhdeo*, 27 Cal 892 (904), *Ganesh Jalia v. Ayubal*, 4 C.W.N. 753, *Mangal Halder v. Naimuddi*, 6 C.W.N. 101. But these cases must be deemed to have been overruled by the Full Bench case of *Krishna Kamini v. Abdul Jubbar*, 30 Cal 155, in which Prinsep, C. J., referring to the above cases, made the following remarks (at pp 183, 184) :—"The reported cases seem to have proceeded on the

ground that proceedings under sec. 145 should be regulated on the same principles as if the Magistrate were trying a civil suit involving a right to possession, and that unless all persons having any possible claim are made parties to those proceedings, they are bad for want of jurisdiction. But the law does not require this, nor is it the object of proceedings under sec. 145 that the Magistrate should deal with the matter before him as if he were acting as a Civil Court.....It may be very desirable that such parties (i.e., the parties who may be *interested in, or may have a claim to the property in dispute*) should be heard, so as to avoid a possible injustice by determining in their absence an issue which may affect their rights. But the law nowhere declares that such person is entitled to come into the proceedings and that the refusal of the Magistrate to hear him amounts to a refusal to exercise jurisdiction under the law. The object in view is to prevent a breach of the peace between certain parties found to be in dispute by determining the subject matter of that dispute, not the determination of actual possession or a right to possession in regard to all persons who *may possibly be concerned in such a matter.*" In the same case, Hill J. observed (at pp. 195, 196): "The scope of the inquiry under this section is confined to the *fact of actual possession* irrespective of the merits of the claims of the parties concerned. A claim merely to a *right to possession* as distinguished from a claim to be in possession, would be outside the scope of the inquiry. To require the Magistrate to ascertain who are the persons interested in or claiming a right to the property in dispute would be to impose on him in some cases an almost impossible task, and would undoubtedly have the effect of unduly prolonging and greatly embarrassing his proceedings and of depriving them altogether in many instances of their summary character."

The Madras High Court, however, is of opinion (following the old Calcutta cases) that the words 'parties concerned' included persons who are interested in or claim a right to the property in dispute—*Q. E. v. Kuppayyar*, 18 Mad 51; *Nagoji v. Subbarayulu*, 5 L.W. 118, 18 Cr.L.J. 44.

Owners, occupiers—This section concerns owners as well as occupiers. When a Zeminder has let his lands in farm, he and his farmers and their occupying ryots are all in their degree concerned in the dispute as to possession, and they ought to be maintained in the possession of the interests which they severally enjoy—*Harak Narain v. Luchmi*, 5 C.L.R. 287.

Landlords, tenants:—Where in a dispute concerning the ownership and possession of land between a zeminder as well as his tenants on one side, and another Zeminder as well as his tenants on the other (so that the dispute was of a dual character) the Zeminders were made parties, but the tenants were not, it was held that the presence of the tenants was essentially necessary for the proper and effectual decision of the case, and the omission to join them as parties was illegal and without jurisdiction—*Laldhari v. Sukdeo*, 27 Cal 892. Where the dispute existed only among the tenants of the rival Zeminders, and the Zeminders not being

concerned in the dispute did not move in the matter themselves, the omission to add the Zeminders as parties to the dispute would not vitiate the proceedings—*Manik v. Govind*, 6 C.W.N. 206. Where the Zeminders on both sides claim possession through their respective tenants, the presence of the rival tenants is necessary and they must be made parties. The order passed in favour of one tenant as against the other, is a good and valid order—*Gurudas v. Kedarnath*, 38 Cal 889, 15 C.L.J. 184, 12 Cr.L.J. 408.

Where the disputed land considered of several plots of land all held by tenants on a yearly rent of half the produce, and the parties to the proceedings were the *lakhirajdar* and the *patnidar*, the dispute between whom was as to the right to collect rent, and it appeared that as regards some of the plots there was a dispute as to what tenants were in possession, it was held that as regards the plots about which there was a dispute as to what tenants held the lands, the Magistrate should not have passed any order in the absence of the tenants, because they might be very seriously prejudiced by an order in favour of one or other of the parties to these proceedings—*Hari Das v. Abdul*, 19 C.W.N. 959, 16 Cr L J 590.

Where the petitioners allege that the landlords have fraudulently attempted to dispute their possession by setting up false tenants as cultivators of the lands in dispute, the landlords are the real parties—*Raj Kumar v. Mahadev*, 4 C.W.N. 748.

Agent or Manager or Servant—Where the person in whose favour an order was made under this section regarding a dispute as to the right to dig coal in a certain mouza, was merely the manager of the coal company claiming the property, held that the possession of such person was not one as contemplated by this section, and the order was bad as the parties really interested were not before the Court—*Behary Lal v. Darby*, 21 Cal 915. The person in possession of land merely as agent or manager is not a party concerned within the meaning of this section—*Brown v. Pruthiraj*, 25 Cal. 423; *Jhabu v. Rutherford*, 7 C.W.N. 208; *Newaz v. Rambhulbhai*, 21 Cal. 916 (Note). An order passed against servants without their masters being on the record is one made without jurisdiction—*Nagori v. Subbarayudu*, 5 L.W. 118, 18 Cr L.J. 44. But if the actual proprietors are not resident within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, an order under this section can be made in favour of the person who claims to be in possession as agent or manager of the proprietors—*Dhondai v. Follet*, 31 Cal 48 (F.B.). If both the master and the servant are resident within the Magistrate's jurisdiction, the master must be made a party to the proceedings—*Jitbahadur v. Bansrap*, 6 C.L.R. 193.

In *Bholanath v. Wood*, 32 Cal 287 and *Chhakauri v. Ishar*, 6 P.L.T. 799, 27 Cr L J 142 (143), however, it was held that where the Magistrate made the manager a party to the proceedings instead of the proprietor, who was resident within the Magistrate's jurisdiction, the course adopted by the Magistrate was a mere irregularity or at most an error of law, which did not vitiate the proceedings.

Receiver—Where the land in dispute is in the possession of a receiver appointed by a Civil Court, his possession is the possession of the Court.

Such an officer cannot be described as a party interested in a dispute under section 145. Even if such officer can be so described, their will be no jurisdiction in the Magistrate to make any order on him under, this section without the sanction of the Court appointing him—*Dunne v. Chandra Kishore*, 30 Cal. 593. In a dispute between the old and the new tenants of an estate, the receiver who granted new leases to the new tenants and who himself was not in actual possession was not a proper party to the proceedings—*Chinna Veeranna v. Narayanaswamy*, 11 M.L.T. 502, 12 Cr.L.J. 185.

Reversioner :—A person who is the next reversioner to the estate is not a person concerned in the dispute, and is not a necessary party because he has no right to present possession—*In re Behari Lal*, 24 All. 443

Minor :—A minor who is interested in the dispute is a proper party, but he is not a necessary party as he is not a party likely to cause a breach of the peace. Non-service of notice on the minor does not invalidate the proceedings—*Nandan v. Siaram*, 7 P.L.T. 156, 26 Cr.L.J. 1287.

400. Non-joinder of parties :—Questions of misjoinder or non-joinder of parties do not ordinarily go to the jurisdiction. Such questions as whether A ought to have been added as being a person likely to be affected by the proceeding or B omitted as not being concerned in it, or whether C was added at too late a stage, are questions of procedure by which the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is not affected—*Krishna Kamani v. Abdul*, 30 Cal. 155, 200 (F.B.); *Nandan v. Siaram*, 7 P.L.T. 156, 26 Cr.L.J. 1287, A.L.R. 1926 Pat. 67. Therefore, proceedings under this section are not without jurisdiction, because some person claiming to have possession of portions of lands in dispute has not been made a party, when he was not one of the parties in the dispute so far as appeared from the information on which the Magistrate acted, and when such person does not appear and raise any objection. And further, proceedings under this section are not without jurisdiction merely because the parties that have been joined are concerned only with possession of portions of the land in dispute—*Krishna Kamani v. Abdul*, 30 Cal. 155 (F.B.); *Sajani Kanta v. Shamsheer Ali*, 24 Cr.L.J. 235; *Narayan v. Chandrabhaga*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1289 (Nag.)

But non-joinder of persons concerned in a dispute, whose presence is essentially necessary for the purpose of a proper decision of the case, involves a question of jurisdiction, and the High Court has power to set aside an order made in a proceeding in which such persons are not made parties—*Anesh Mollah v. Ejaharuddi*, 28 Cal. 446.

401. Addition of parties :—It was held in *Protap Narain v. Rajendra Narayan*, 24 Cal. 55 (F.B.) that a Magistrate had no power to add parties after the institution of proceedings under this section, and that if in the course of the proceedings it appeared to the Magistrate that it was absolutely necessary that other parties should be required to attend and he was satisfied that they were concerned in the dispute, the only course open to him was to initiate a new proceeding.

But this case was decided under sec. 145 of the old Code of 1882, in which sub-section (3) regarding the service and publication of notice did not exist. The opinion of the Full Bench in *Protap v Rajendra*, 24 Cal. 55 cannot in view of the alteration of law introduced by sub-section (3) of sec. 145, as it now stands, be regarded as binding authority on the construction of the section. Sub-section (3) has been enacted not simply for the purpose of regulating the issue and service of notice generally under this section, but it is also intended to empower the Magistrate, after he has issued the order provided for by sub-section (1) to the persons claiming to be in possession, to bring in any other persons whom from subsequent information it may seem to him proper to have before him—*Krishna Kamani v. Abdul Jubbar*, 30 Cal 155 (F B) at pp. 197, 199. And the addition of those persons does not put an end to the original proceeding, and does not require the initiation of any fresh proceeding—*Ibid* (at pp. 192, 193, 201)

The Magistrate has very wide powers with respect to the persons whom he will bring into the proceeding. He may alter or add to the array of parties either of his own motion or on the application of any one claiming to be concerned in the dispute (i.e., claiming to be in possession). But the Magistrate can add parties at any time up to the commencement of the inquiry under sub-section (4). He has no power to add fresh parties after the opening of the inquiry. The section contains no provision for the addition of parties after the commencement of the inquiry, and it was no doubt considered that the power conferred on the Magistrate by sub-section (3) of summoning such persons as he deemed proper, and the means prescribed by the same clause for giving publicity to the proceeding, provided a sufficient guarantee that before the actual inquiry is entered upon, all parties really concerned will either have been summoned to attend the proceedings or will have had the opportunity of doing so afforded them if they care to avail themselves of it. It would lead to much inconvenience and delay if it were held that any one claiming to be concerned in the dispute was entitled to come in and join in the proceedings after the commencement of the inquiry. It would probably be necessary in such a case to start the inquiry afresh, as the party added would have a right to have the evidence taken in his presence, and if several claimants successively were to come in this way, it is evident that the proceeding might be indefinitely prolonged—*per Hill J* in *Krishna Kamani v. Abdul*, 30 Cal. 155 (198, 199). The same Judge again remarked in the same case (at p 201) —“If parties are added after the inquiry has begun, I do not think that it would be necessary, in consequence, to initiate fresh proceedings, but evidence previously taken ought, if the parties so added require it, to be again taken in their presence.”

402. 'His Court'—This means the Court of the Magistrate who issued the preliminary order. A preliminary order issued by a Magistrate directing the parties to appear before another Magistrate is illegal—*Misri v Narasing*, 2 P.L.T 186, 22 Cr L J 483

403. Written statement—The statement made by a party in a written statement filed under this section ought to be proved like any

other statement, and therefore a Magistrate is not competent to pass an order in favour of a party merely on the strength of his written statement—*Kefatulla v. Ferozuddin*, 5 C.W.N. 71. An order based on the written statement of one of the parties, and upon the failure of the other party to file his statement, without some evidence on the part of the party filing the statement in support of it, is without jurisdiction—*Gobind v. Nibaran*, 11 C.W.N. 642.

The Magistrate should take written statements from all parties. The object of this section is to put an end to disputes as to possession. This object cannot be gained until all the contending parties are on the record and an opportunity is given to them to put forward their respective claims. If the written statements of some of the parties are rejected, the effect would be that the Magistrate's decision under this section will not be binding upon them—*Raghunath v. Rajkishore*, 5 P.L.T. 458, 25 Cr.L.J. 906.

Where the Magistrate has taken any evidence in a case, he is not justified in refusing to proceed with it merely because the parties neglected to file written statements on the day fixed for filing them. The Magistrate is wrong in saying that he has nothing before him to decide. He ought to proceed with the inquiry—*In re Goluck Chunder*, 11 W.R. 9. The mere fact that a party did not put in a written statement would not take away the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to proceed with the case. It is incumbent on the Magistrate to make the inquiry and to take such evidence as the parties offer, irrespective of the fact that one or other of the parties failed to put in a written statement; he has to take evidence if offered by any of the parties and to decide the case upon such evidence—*Ramjharla v. Piar Koeri*, 4 P.L.T. 308, 24 Cr.L.J. 557.

. Granting time—Although a Magistrate has a discretion to refuse an application for time to file a written statement—*Gobind v. Nibaran*, 8 C.W.N. 642, still he ought to grant time to enable the party to file it. Therefore, where on the day appointed for hearing a case under Sec. 145, the parties although present filed no written statement nor produced any evidence, and the Magistrate refusing to grant time heard the parties and being unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was in possession, attached the property under sec. 146, it was held that the Magistrate had failed to exercise jurisdiction when he refused to grant time, and that he ought to have granted time to allow regular proceedings to be followed—*Sh. Mansar Ali v. Matullah*, 12 C.W.N. 896.

404. Actual possession :—The possession contemplated by this section is the actual possession of the subject of dispute. The power or competency of the Magistrate to interfere depends upon the very fact that the possession of the land is in dispute—*Rajendra v. Md. Arzumand*, 9 C.W.N. 887. The possession in regard to which the Magistrate's jurisdiction under this section should be exercised must be of a real and tangible character—*Bejoy Nath v. Bengal Coal Co. Ltd.*, 23 W.R. 45 (48).

Actual possession means actual physical possession, it means the possession of the person who has his feet on the land, who is ploughing

it, sowing or growing crops in it, entirely irrespective of whether he has any right or title to possess it. Actual possession is not the same as a right to possession nor does it mean lawful or legal possession. This is clear from subsection (4), for the Magistrate is not to determine who has a right to possess—*Syed Ambar Ali v. Piran Ali*, 55 Cal 826, 32 C.W.N. 275 (280), 29 Cr.L.J. 503.

By actual possession is meant not merely bodily possession but the possession of a master by his servant, or the possession of a landlord by his immediate tenant, or the possession of the person who has the property in the land by the usufructuary—*Sutherland v. Crowdy*, 18 W.R. 11 (13).

Whether the possession is on behalf of others or in one's own right is quite irrelevant. This section is concerned solely with the fact of actual possession whether lawful or unlawful, whether in contemplation of law enjoyed by the possessor in his own right or on behalf of others—*Narayana v. Kandasami*, 3 L.W. 164, 16 Cr.L.J. 525; *Taruja v. Asamuddi*, 4 C.W.N. 426.

Possession of landlord by receiving rent from tenants is actual possession under this section—*Narain Das v. Emp.*, 1884 P.R. 19, *Nobin Chunder v. Jogendranath*, 25 W.R. 18, *Mohesh v. K. E.*, 11 O.L.J. 743, 26 Cr.L.J. 398. The fact that tenants attorn to strangers by payment of rent to them, does not put an end to the tenancy so as to affect the possession of the landlord, and deprive him of his right to have recourse to this section in case of a likelihood of a breach of the peace, and to have his possession of the right to collect rent maintained—*Sarbananda v. Pransankar*, 15 Cal. 527. A lambardar who is in management of a village for the benefit of the three co-sharers of the village and who is himself a co-sharer must be deemed to be in possession under this section—*Ramdai v. Parbati*, 1890 A.W.N. 178.

The possession contemplated by this section is absolute, continuing and not occasional possession. Where the petitioners claim possession of a market stall for only one day in the week, this section is inapplicable—*Nayan Manjari v. Fazley Haq*, 49 Cal 871. So also, where one of the parties to a proceeding under this section claimed only the right to worship on the disputed land on only one day in the year and the right to make due and proper preparations for the holding of that worship by erecting huts for the purpose of holding *pujah*, held that the right of such party was in the nature of an easement and not in the nature of possession, and proceedings under this section could not be taken as this section contemplates absolute continuing possession of either party—*Manik Chandra v. Preo Nath*, 17 C.W.N. 205, 13 Cr.L.J. 789. But it is not intended that possession must be such as should be exercised every day of the year. Continuity of possession should be understood with reference to the object over which it is exercised. By continuous possession is meant such possession which a party in possession may have occasion to exercise and has exercised and exercises whenever he likes. With respect to lands which are fallow and liable to be submerged, possession must be presumed to be with the owner until the contrary is proved. Occasional acts of user of such land by the owner constitute possession.

for the purposes of this section—*Loke Nath v. Bazlal Gani*, 31 C.W.N. 334, 28 Cr L J. 343.

Wrongful possession :—The words "actual possession" mean actual physical possession even though *wrongful*, e.g. that of a recent trespasser in actual physical possession at the time of the proceedings—*Agni Kumar v. Mantazaddin*, 56 Cal 290 (F.B.), 32 C.W.N. 1173, 30 Cr.L.J. 69; *Shriram v. Samirmal*, 24 N.L.R. 148, 29 Cr.L.J. 902 (904); *Syd Ambar Ali v. Piran Ali*, 55 Cal. 826, 32 C.W.N. 275 (280). The Magistrate's duty is to determine actual possession and not whether the possession is rightful or wrongful—*In re Sangarbasawa*, 7 Bom. L.R. 18, 2 Cr.L.J. 28; *Shriram v. Samirmal*, 24 N.L.R. 148, 29 Cr.L.J. 902 (903). The possession referred to in this clause is actual possession at the time of the initiation of proceedings and not possession at the date of the Magistrate's order. Therefore, possession though obtained by wrongful means but complete at the time of inquiry is actual possession within the meaning of this section—*Q. E v. Gauhar*, 1897 P.R. 5.

Origin of possession —A Magistrate ought to inquire into the question as to who is in actual possession of the property in dispute; he has no concern as to how the party obtained possession, provided that the possession dates more than two months prior to the date of the preliminary order—*Ambler v. Pushong*, 11 Cal 365, *Dastur v. Fell*, 6 B.H.C.R. 30.

Actual possession, what is not .—Possession by tenant is not possession of landlord in cases where there is a dispute between the tenant and the landlord as to the fact of possession—*Baboo Reddi v. Kullappa*, 2 Weir 107. Also, in case of dispute between two rival zemindars, constructive possession through intermediate holders (e.g. *ticcadars*) to whom the ryots pay rents, is not contemplated by this section—*Emp. v. Thacoor Dayal*, 3 Cal 320. This section does not contemplate the possession of a superior landlord to whom the occupier of the land does not pay rent. It contemplates the possession of a landlord by his immediate tenant i.e., the person who pays rent to him—*Sutherland v. Crowdy*, 18 W.R. 11 (13).

The possession contemplated by this section is a real tangible possession; therefore, where a party claims *under a document* or agreement the right to do certain things over a large extent of territory, the performance of acts under such alleged right in one portion of the ground over which the right extends is not of itself a sufficient possession on which the Magistrate's order under this section may be based for the purpose of forbidding in a distant locality acts necessarily not in conflict with such possession but in variance with the right—*Bejay Nath v. Bengal Coal Co.*, 23 W.R. 45 (48). So also, the mere purchase at an execution sale, without delivery of possession, does not amount to possession of the property purchased, and the rights of the purchaser will not be protected by this section—*Ragava Aiyanger v. Krishnasamy*, 31 Mad 416.

The possession given by Amin in butwara proceedings is simply one of ownership, and not of occupancy, and is not contemplated by this section—*Mackenzie v. Shere Bahadur*, 4 Cal. 378; *In re Juggodeshary*, 3 C.L.R. 94.

A succession certificate only authorises the holder to collect the debts

of the deceased and is no bar to the Magistrate maintaining another party in possession of the lands belonging in the deceased—*Seetaram v. Roy Sheo Golam*, 18 W.R. 34.

Possession of forest land:—In a dispute regarding forest land, the right to possession of which was exercised by cutting timber from time to time and removing the timber upon a certain price being paid for, it is necessary to inquire as to who was in undisturbed possession of the land in dispute by felling the trees and removing the same without objection, on the occasion immediately preceding the time when the dispute arose, and whichever party be found to have been in possession on that occasion should be presumed to have possession when the proceedings commenced—*Jagatkishore v. Ashanulla*, 16 Cal. 281. Where it was found that certain jungle lands were in the *khas* possession of the Zemindar, and the other party without claiming any easement or customary right cut a few trees and encroached upon a small portion of the jungle, held that such intermittent encroachment did not oust the possession of the Zemindar—*Bhola Nath v. Wood*, 32 Cal. 287.

Permissive possession:—Possession contemplated by this section is possession based on a claim of right to possession. The possession of a person which is merely permissive cannot come within the purview of this section. Thus, the possession of an agent or servant which is permissive cannot give a party to a proceeding a *locus standi* as against his principal or master—*Nritta Gopal v. Chandi Charan*, 10 C.W.N. 1088, 4 Cr L.J. 215, *Bajrao v. Dadibai*, 27 Cr L.J. 212 (Nag.)

405. Joint possession:—Section 145 contemplates a dispute between two parties, each of whom asserts the right to hold *exclusive* possession of the property as against the other (*Bidhu Bhusan v. Annoda*, 6 C.W.N. 883) and not a dispute between a party claiming to hold *joint* possession with another and the latter contesting such right. Such a dispute nearly always arises out of a claim to hold a specific share in the property, and this obviously is a matter which no Criminal Court can properly deal with. Therefore, where two parties are in joint possession of the property in dispute, and one of them tries to evict the other so as to endanger the public peace, this section does not apply, and an order allowing one of the parties to be in possession till evicted by law is bad—*Tarujan v. Asamuddi*, 4 C.W.N. 426; *Krishna v. Radhasyam*, 7 C.W.N. 118; *Dhani Ram v. Bholanath*, 1902 P.R. 23, *Nrittya Gopal v. Chandi Charan*, 10 C.W.N. 1088; *Makhan v. Barada*, 11 C.W.N. 512, 3 Cr L.J. 296; *Shamlal v. Rajendra*, 1 P.L.T. 594, 21 Cr L.J. 790, *Arjun v. Chandan*, 24 O.C. 167, 22 Cr.L.J. 625.

This section is not intended to regulate the mode of enjoyment, and when the parties are jointly entitled, an order under sec 145 should not be made—*Surb Narain v. Birj Mohun*, 23 Cal. 80. This section clearly refers to exclusive possession, and is not capable of being so construed as to authorise a Magistrate to take cognizance and dispose of disputes regarding joint possession—*Dani Ram v. Bhola Nath*, 1902 P.R. 23. So where the Magistrate passed an order to the effect that one party was in possession throughout the year, while the other was entitled to possession

jointly with the former for a portion of the year, held that the order was beyond the scope of sec. 145 and was made without jurisdiction. The Magistrate was only authorised to decide which of the parties was in possession; he had jurisdiction only to find possession but not the mode of possession or how the possession was to be exercised—*Rahini Nandan v. Jadunandan*, 30 C.W.N. 873. The object aimed at by the Legislature is the prevention of a breach of the peace. This can be secured by asking one of the parties to keep away from the property. But where both parties have been in joint possession and are still prepared to commit a breach of the peace by trying to oust one another, it will not be in the interests of the preventive remedy that both should be maintained in possession. It will certainly not help to maintain order and peace. That is the reason why Courts have declined to declare the joint possession of the contending parties—*Mohammad Koolayappa v. Sheikh Abdul*, 27 M.L.J. 169, 15 Cr.L.J. 572. Even in such cases, the Magistrate is not competent to put one of the parties in possession—*Veerabhadra v. Shanmugan*, 17 Cr.L.J. 76 (Mad). Where it was found that the second party was in possession of the disputed land on behalf of the first party as also on behalf of himself, both parties being members of the same family, and the Magistrate declared the second party to be in possession, the order was without jurisdiction—*Kinnu Mandal v. Haji Baul*, 23 C.W.N. 1051.

Where the parties do not claim joint possession, but each party claims exclusive possession, it cannot be said that it is a claim for joint possession making this section inapplicable—*Bidhu Bhusan v. Annoda*, 6 C.W.N. 883, *Rampharia v. Piar Koeri*, 4 P.L.T. 308; *Malan v. Makhan Singh*, 2 Lah. 372, 23 Cr.L.J. 225, *Basudeo v. Mahadeo*, 8 P.L.T. 454, 26 Cr.L.J. 1187. Thus, where the case is one of exclusive possession claimed by each set of landlords through their respective tenants, the Magistrate has jurisdiction to pass an order in favour of one tenant against the other persons setting up their tenancy—*Gurudas v. Kedar Nath*, 38 Cal. 889, 12 Cr.L.J. 408, 15 C.L.J. 184. And the fact that there may be a joint title to land does not prevent the application of this section, if the Magistrate finds that possession is with one party—*Bajinath v. Street*, 20 C.W.N. 518, 17 Cr.L.J. 251. *Malan v. Makhan Singh*, 2 Lah. 372. The only question for the Magistrate is whether either party has actual possession, and if he finds that one party has actual possession of a defined area and the other party has not, he can make an order under the section irrespective of the fact that the parties may have joint title to the land—*Basanta Kumari v. Mohesh*, 40 Cal. 982, 17 C.W.N. 944, 14 Cr.L.J. 269.

Where it has been declared by a Civil Court that the property is joint and partition has been ordered, no proceedings under this section can be taken until the partition has been effected—*Dharani Kanta v. Girija Kanta*, 8 C.W.N. 485.

If the co-shares have by express or tacit arrangement made a partition between themselves so that each of them is in possession of a specified and demarcated portion of the estate, there is nothing to prevent the application of this section—*Basanta Kumari v. Mohesh*, 40 Cal. 982. So also, where it was found that each party to the dispute was in possession

of separate dwelling rooms in the same house, the Magistrate was competent to pass an order that the separate possession of each party should continue—*In re Krishnasami*, 2 Weir 108

Debtor property being by nature impartible and inalienable, possession of such property by co-shebaits must always be necessarily joint and as such beyond the scope of an order under this section. Where one of several co-shebaits had been entrusted with the sole management of the debtor estate for convenience, a dispute between him and the other co-shebaits claiming to have joint management with him is not a fit subject for a proceedings under this section—*Nritta Gopal v Chandi Charan*, 10 C.W.N. 1088

406. Clause (2)—‘Land or Water’.—These words have been substituted for the words ‘tangible immoveable property’ occurring in the Code of 1882; and this sub-section gives an explanation of the expression.

Building—Temple.—A dispute relating to possession of a temple comes within the provisions of this section—*Sundara v Vallinayaka*, 2 Weir 110 (111), whether the temple be wholly or partly private property or dedicated to purposes of public worship—*Anon.*, 2 Weir 99 (100) As regards dispute arising between two pujaries regarding the right to perform the puja in a temple, see Note 466 under sec 147

Markets.—A dispute about the exclusive right to collect the entire toll from one partitioned half of the market may be a subject of proceedings under this section—*Dunne v Chandra Kishore*, 30 Cal 593.

Fisheries.—Under the Code of 1882, by reason of the word ‘tangible’ occurring in the section, incorporeal rights were excluded from the operation of this section—*Pramatha v Durga*, 11 Cal 413; and therefore a dispute concerning the right of fishing in a *jalkar* was not governed by this section—*Krishna v. Troilokia*, 12 Cal 539, *Anundmoyi v Shurnomoyi*, 13 Cal. 179 The present Code expressly uses the word ‘fisheries’; and therefore where there is *bona fide* dispute about a fishery or *jalkar* right, proceedings under this section may be properly instituted—*Balajit v. Bhoju*, 35 Cal. 117

Where parties have *joint* rights in a certain fishery and neither of them can be considered as claiming exclusive possession, and a dispute arises with regard to its possession, this section is inapplicable, because joint possession does not come within this section. ■ what was in dispute was not a share in the fishery but a share in its profits (i.e., either the fish caught or their price when sold) it might have been dealt with under this section—*Bhabanath v. Pcary*, 11 C.L.J. 412, 11 Cr.L.J. 370.

Alluvial lands.—In the case of alluvial lands (in Bengal) recently reformed, where questions of breach of the peace arise, it is open to the Magistrate to deal with the matter either under the Bengal Alluvial Lands Act (V of 1920) or under the provisions of section 145 of this Code. This section has not been impliedly repealed by Act V of 1920 in the case of alluvial lands recently formed—*Abdul Jabbar v. Mafizuddi*, 28 C.W.N. 783, 25 Cr L J 1167, A I R. 1924 Cal. 980.

Crops or other produce.:—The word ‘land’ includes crops or other

produce of land—2 Weir 108 But crops mean standing crops and not crops which have been severed from the land and stored on the thrashing floor—*Ramzan v. Janardhan*, 30 Cal. 110; *Basudeo v. Mahadeo*, 5 P.L.T. 454, 26 Cr.L.J. 1187; *Ganga Prosad v. Narain*, 15 All. 394; *Chaurasi v. Ram Shankar*, 28 All. 266; *Relumal v. Pherumal*, 22 S.L.R. 386, 29 Cr.L.J. 857 (859); *Ram Bhajan*, 25 O.C. 137, 23 Cr.L.J. 650 Contra—*In re Krishnasami*, 2 Weir 108 and *Rahimdin v. Emp.*, 22 S.L.R. 151, 28 Cr.L.J. 989 (990), where it has been held that crops include cut and stored crops.

Mines—A dispute as regards mines and minerals and the right to work mines falls under this section, as mining rights must reasonably be regarded as falling within the definition of the term 'land' which is intended to cover all profits derivable from land—*Andrew Yule & Co v. Skone*, 4 P.L.J. 154, 20 Cr.L.J. 199, *Mahadeo Dutt v. Sarkar*, 24 Cr.L.J. 263; *Bimala Prosad v. Tata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd.*, 35 C.L.J. 456, 24 Cr.L.J. 103.

Trees severed from the land do not come within the purview of this section, and no order under this section can be made with respect to them—*Sajad Husain v. Nanak Chand*, 1917 P.W.R. 22, 18 Cr.L.J. 461. But trees growing on the land come within this section, as being 'produce of land.' But lac which is not a part of the tree itself but is a parasitic growth on it, is not a 'produce of land' or 'crop'—*Ali Mahammad v. Fakiruddin*, 24 C.W.N. 1039, 22 Cr.L.J. 131. The right to tap a tree is an intangible property and may be the subject of proceedings under this section—*Jiblal v. Emp.*, 3 P.L.J. 316, 19 Cr.L.J. 656. It would more properly come under sec 147.

Rents—A dispute as to collect rents is a dispute concerning land, within the meaning of this section—*Pramatha v. Durga Churn*, 11 Cal. 413, *Sarbananda v. Pran Sankar*, 15 Cal. 527, *Ramasami v. Danakoti*, 12 Mad. 88, *In re Tirumalayappa*, 18 Cr.L.J. 156 (Mad.); *Abhayessari v. Sidhessari*, 16 Cal. 513, *Laldhari v. Sukdeo*, 27 Cal. 892 (903); *Sri Mohan v. Narsing*, 27 Cal. 259, *Haridas v. Abdul Matleb*, 19 C.W.N. 959, 16 Cr.L.J. 590 The decision in *Durga v. Phulzari*, 1885 A.W.N. 299 (decided under the Code of 1882) is no longer good law.

Where there is no dispute as to the possession of, or extent of share in, a certain immoveable property, and the dispute is merely as to who is entitled to collect rents on behalf of all from the tenants, this section does not apply—*Ma. Fazil v. Ma. Abdul Samad*, 10 O.C. 89, 5 Cr.L.J. 394, *Akaloo v. Mohesh*, 36 Cal. 986, *Ramlachan v. Emp.*, 36 All. 143, 12 A.L.J. 162, *i.e.*, where there is no dispute as to the possession or share of land, a Magistrate cannot under this section determine the method by which the possession of the parties is to be exercised or the method by which the parties in possession are to collect the profits of land—*Akaloo v. Mohesh*, 36 Cal. 986, 11 Cr.L.J. 28.

This section applies where the dispute is as regards the collection of rents between joint owners governed by the Mitakshara Law, as for instance where one of the joint owners dismisses the common manager and

claims to collect the rents separately on his behalf—*Sri Mohan v. Narsing*, 27 Cal. 259 (261).

Profits.—The profits must arise out of or emanate from immoveable property; therefore fees paid by pilgrims at Gaya at performing Sradh ceremonies cannot be said to arise out of land, and proceedings under this section cannot be instituted in respect of a dispute regarding such fees—*Narayan v. Bhugwan*, 3 C.L.J. 137. So also, a right to the offerings given by worshippers for the worship of any deity cannot be said to be a right to profits issuing out of the temple, but arising out of the deity irrespective of the temple building in which the deity may happen to dwell. A dispute relating to the rights to the offerings only is a dispute relating to moveable property and is outside the scope of this section—*Ram Saran v. Raghunandan*, 38 Cal. 387, 13 C.L.J. 445, 12 Cr.L.J. 3; *Guiram v. Lalbehari*, 37 Cal. 578, 14 C.W.N. 611, 11 Cr.L.J. 292, *Rao Sobhag Singh v. Thakur Bakhtawar*, 23 N.L.R. 84. So also, a dispute concerning the right to take sandalwood paste, when removed from an idol, does not fall under this section—*In re Pandurang*, 4 Bom. L.R. 438. A dispute with respect to the collection of offerings at a karbala cannot be the subject matter of a proceeding under this section—*Ghulam Sibtain v. Kaniz Khaton*, 5 P.L.J. 246, 1 P.L.T. 608, 21 Cr.L.J. 572.

A dispute as to the right to collect fees (as mere remuneration for conducting the business of the market) from the sellers of a market, the payment of such fees being purely voluntary on the part of the sellers and being in no way connected with the ordinary rents and profits of the market, and not being a perquisite of the Zemindar, is not a dispute as to the profits of a market within the meaning of this section—*Ram Lochan v. Emp.*, 36 All. 143, 12 A.L.J. 162.

Right to ferry.—The right to a ferry, i.e., the right to carry passengers and their goods to and fro in a boat across a river, cannot be treated apart from the possession of lands used on either side of the stream for the purpose of landing them. Therefore, a dispute regarding a ferry including the land and the water upon which the right is exercised, comes under this section—*Murballabh v. Luchmeswar*, 26 Cal. 188. But questions relating to rights to use a ferry come under section 147 and not under this section—*Harbulla v. Bajrang*, 3 C.W.N. 148.

A right to a bund (i.e., a completed bund) should be distinguished from a right to construct a bund. In the former case sec. 145 applies, in the latter case sec. 147, as it is a right of user of water—*Sashi Bhusan v. Debendra*, 33 C.W.N. 1004 (1005).

Disputes as regards easements fall more appropriately under sec. 147 than under this section—*Kali Kumar v. Bejoy*, 21 Cr.L.J. 697 (Cal.), *Asaram v. Chotu Lal*, 22 Cr.L.J. 768 (Nag.), e.g. a dispute as regards the right to use a well—*Nanhe v. Jamid-ul-Rahman*, 23 A.L.J. 41, 26 Cr.L.J. 683.

407. Clause (3)—Service of Notice.—A copy of the order, stating the grounds of the Magistrate's satisfaction must be served on the parties, for it is the intention of the law, not only that the Magistrate

should have sufficient grounds for proceeding under this section, but that he should inform the parties concerned of the grounds on which the proceedings had been instituted—*Q. E. v. Gobind Chandra*, 20 Cal. 520.

A Magistrate, before proceeding under this section, ought to satisfy himself that a notice of the proceeding and a copy of the order drawn up under clause (1) have been duly served on the parties alleging the non-receipt of the notice, and the Magistrate's omission to do so vitiates all subsequent proceedings—*Sripati v. Ram Kumar*, 8 C.W.N. 76

When the Court decides to take action, all processes should be served at the expense of the Crown—*Phutanja v. Emp.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 1109 (Nag.).

Local service of notice—This clause also provides for the publication of a copy of the order in a conspicuous place at or near the subject of dispute; and the publication of such notice is a condition precedent to the exercise of a Magistrate's jurisdiction in an inquiry under sub-section (4)—*Nawab Khaja Solemulla v. Ishan Chandra*, 2 C.W.N. 909.

The provision regarding the local service of notice was made with the intention of guarding against collusive proceedings as well as to give to any one interested, who may, through an oversight or otherwise, not have received a summons, an opportunity of coming in with his claim, and to notify generally to all persons in the locality that a proceeding under this section has been set on foot—*Krishna Kamini v. Abdul Jabbar*, 30 Cal. 155, 197 (F.B.) As regards the effect of clause (3) on the power of the Magistrate to add parties, see the same case (30 Cal. 155) cited in Note 401 ante

Form of notice—Though the section prescribes no particular mode of giving notice, the language of this section indicates that the notice shall be to known individuals, and not in the form of a general citation or public proclamation—*In re Kumud Narain*, 4 Cal. 650.

Notice under section 107 or 147 not sufficient—Where notice was issued under section 107 to show cause why the accused should not execute a bond for keeping the peace, and the Magistrate when he tried the case recorded an order in the course of which he stated that on facts the case was one for the application of sec. 145, and not one under sec. 107, and proceeded at once to pass an order under clause (6) of this section, the order was held to be bad—*Sukru v. Ram Pergash*, 30 Cal. 443. Similarly, where a Magistrate gave notice under sec. 147 and started proceedings under that section, but on objection being taken, did not decide whether sec. 147 was applicable to the proceedings but passed an order purporting to be under sec. 145, without giving notice of his intention to act under sec. 145, the Magistrate's order was made without jurisdiction—*Subramania v. Sanyasia*, 111 M.L.J. 18. In both these cases the Magistrate ought to have issued fresh notice under sec. 145.

Proof of service :—Where one of the parties denies the service of the order, the written return of the serving peon is not sufficient proof of the service. The Magistrate should examine the serving peon and allow him to be cross-examined on this point—*Lowsen v. Kali Charan*, 2 C.W.N. 719.

Non-service of personal notice:—Failure to serve the notice upon the parties concerned is a mere irregularity cured by sec. 537 if the party professing to be aggrieved has full knowledge of the proceedings—*Mg Maul v. Mg Po*, 3 Rang 109, *Bidhyadhar v. Jagdish*, 7 O.C. 334; *Bhure Khan v. Fakira*, 25 Cr.L.J. 159 (Nag.). such omission will not render the proceedings void, if the parties were present and no prejudice was caused—*Debi Prasad v. Sheodat* 30 All 41, or if the parties appeared before the Magistrate who explained matters to them fully, and they evidently understood everything that was requisite *Nur Bakhsh v. Crown*, 1917 P.W.R. 26, 18 Cr.L.J. 633, or if the person did not question the order—*In re Chennappudayan*, 30 Mad 549. But if the party professing to be aggrieved had no knowledge of the proceedings, the omission in serve notice on him vitiated the trial—*Sago Patel v. Parashram*, 28 Cr.L.J. 418 (Nag.) According to the Patna High Court, non-service of the notice is by itself a grave irregularity which vitiates the trial—*Ram Sahai v. Deonandan*, 10 Cr.L.J. 71 (Pat.), *Sheonandan v. Wahidul*, 19 Cr.L.J. 112 (Pat.), but non-service of notice on one member invalidates the proceedings only so far as that member is concerned, and does not invalidate the whole proceedings—*Nandan v. Siaram* 7 P.L.T. 150, 20 Cr.L.J. 1287.

Where service of the notice was not effected on the applicant, and there was nothing to show that the Magistrate ordered or took steps to have a copy of the preliminary order affixed to a conspicuous place at or near the subject of dispute, the proceedings of the Magistrate were set aside—*Sago Patel v. Parashram*, 28 Cr.L.J. 418 (Nag.) Where the Magistrate did not serve any notice upon any person, nor did he affix a notice on the property in dispute, nor received a written statement from either party, and passed the order in the absence of one party, the proceedings of the Magistrate were exceedingly irregular and were bad for want of jurisdiction—*Ahmed Chowdhury v. Parbati*, 35 Cal 774; *Abdulla v. Gunda*, 1907 P.R. 7; *Basawan v. Tilak*, 4 P.L.T. 723, 24 Cr.L.J. 345. If the proceedings are heard and order passed *ex parte* on account of the absence of a party, and that party afterwards appears and alleges non-service of notice and applies for rehearing of the case, the Magistrate cannot reject the application but is bound to re-open the case after satisfying himself as to the truth of such allegation—*Kali Charan v. Abdul Laskar*, 21 C.W.N. 902, 21 Cr.L.J. 848.

Omission of publication of notice:—The provision as to the publication of the order in some conspicuous place near the property in dispute is directory and a matter of procedure only. Omission to publish the notice is not an illegality which deprives the Magistrate of his jurisdiction, and unless it be shown that some one interested has been materially prejudiced by the omission, the High Court will not interfere—*Sukh Lal v. Tara Chand*, 33 Cal 68 F.B. (overruling 8 C.W.N. 590 and 9 C.W.N. 909); *Debi Prasad v. Sheodat*, 30 All. 41; *Muhammad Sharif v. Dhanpat*, 1914 P.W.R. 15; *Iklas v. Raghuraj*, 12 O.C. 400, 11 Cr.L.J. 69; *Bhure Khan v. Fakira*, 25 Cr.L.J. 159 (Nag.); *Maung Maung v. Maung Yon*,

3 Rang. 169, 27 Cr.L.J. 660; *Md. Mahdisha v. Wahdasha*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1292 (Sind).

Warrant to compel attendance of party:—Under this section, the matter in issue is not the commission of an offence, but the settlement of a dispute, and it is entirely optional with the parties to attend or not; therefore the issue of a warrant to compel the attendance of any party is illegal—*Kefatulla v. Feruzuddin*, 5 C.W.N. 71.

408. Clause (4)—Inquiry:—An inquiry as to possession is made not for the purpose of strengthening the possession of one party or the other, in the dispute between them, but because such an inquiry is necessary for the making of an order under sub-section (6) declaring the party in possession to be entitled to retain it, until eviction by a Civil Court—*Manindra v. Barada Kanta*, 30 Cal. 112

Inquiry by subordinate Magistrate—The inquiry contemplated by this section is a personal inquiry to be made by the Magistrate who passed the preliminary order. He has no jurisdiction, even with the consent of parties, to make over the inquiry to any other Magistrate. Sub-section (4) clearly contemplates only an inquiry by the person directed by the Statute to hold it, and by that person and no one else. This section read as a whole does not give the person charged with the inquiry the power to delegate the duties to any other person to hold an inquiry or to ascertain facts which the law requires the Magistrate to do himself—*Hamdul Haque v. Sk Atai*, 2 P.L.J. 86, 18 Cr.L.J. 145.

Therefore, an order under this section based upon the report of a Subordinate Magistrate made after inquiry by such Magistrate is illegal—*Anon.*, 4 M.H.C.R. App. 20. Though sec 148 enables a Magistrate acting under this section to depute a Subordinate Magistrate to make a local investigation, he ought not to depute to such Subordinate Magistrate the whole investigation under this section, but on the receipt of the report of such Magistrate, should himself take written statements from the parties and receive the evidence produced by them and conclude the investigation—*Anon.*, 2 Weir 118.

If a Magistrate omits to take evidence as required by clause (4) but refers it to a Subordinate Magistrate to report thereon, his order based on such evidence alone is made without jurisdiction and must be set aside—*Arumuga v. Venkatasubbier*, 31 Mad. 82. But in a later Madras case it has been held that the order based on the report of a Sub-Magistrate is not without jurisdiction. The essential requisite to give jurisdiction to a Magistrate is that he must be satisfied about the existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. His subsequent action is a matter of procedure and not of jurisdiction—*Jagannatha v. Venkatagopalakrishna*, 37 M.L.J. 589, 20 Cr.L.J. 773 (dissenting from 31 Mad. 82).

409. Procedure:—“It should be impressed upon Magistrates that the whole object of and only excuse for proceedings under sec 145 is the prevention of a breach of the peace supposed to be imminent, and that the procedure to be followed in disposing of such cases is that laid

down in section 145, sub-section (4) of the Code, which must be strictly observed. It should be the primary aim of the Inquiry officer, therefore, to arrive at his decision with the utmost promptitude consistent with an adequate investigation into the dispute before him, and he should be specially careful not to permit the proceedings to assume the complexion of a civil suit, or in any way to countenance an endeavour on the part of either party to secure any advantage for the purposes of civil litigation.

"The trying Magistrate should be in a position to insist upon the taking up of the case on the date fixed for hearing, and it should not be necessary to grant adjournment after adjournment simply because the parties are not given due notice of the proceedings, or by reason of the proceedings themselves being inaccurate or incomplete. Once the case is commenced, the hearing should be continued *de die in diem* until the Magistrate is in a position to arrive at a decision, but in doing so he must remember that the sole object of his inquiry is to determine, if possible, the fact of actual possession, and that even in the case of an *ex parte* proceeding, there must be some recorded evidence to justify the order passed by him."

—*Cal. G. R. & C. O.*, pp. 10, 11. *Sastee Sahu v Nathani* 6 P L T 259, 26 Cr L J. 105.

The sole procedure in an inquiry under section 145 by a Magistrate is as to who was in actual possession of the land in dispute, and a Magistrate should not deal with such proceeding as if it were a civil suit by framing several issues and trying them—*Kochal v. Romesh Chandra*, 35 Cal. 705.

It is incumbent on Magistrates to dispose of proceedings under this section as quickly as possible, and therefore the procedure of a summons case is to be followed and not that of a warrant case—*Moff Singh v. Dhanukdhari*, 24 Cr.L.J. 595; see also *Biswanath v. Shivanand*, 2 P.L.T. 330, 22 Cr.L.J. 430, *Harendra v. Bhobani*, 11 Cal. 762, and *Ram Chandra v. Monohur*, 21 Cal. 29, where the procedure of a summons case has been recommended. In another Calcutta case it has been remarked that in cases dealing with taking securities for keeping the peace or for good behaviour as also in cases of public nuisance, the Legislature has expressly provided that in some specified instances the procedure of a summons case, and in others the procedure of warrant cases shall be followed, but in this section the Legislature has deliberately omitted to specify the procedure. The conclusion, therefore, is that neither the procedure prescribed for a summons case nor that of a warrant case is to be followed, as such a protracted investigation would defeat the very object in view, viz., an effective prevention of a breach of the peace. The proceedings under section 145 are intended to be prompt and should be concluded without delay and the Magistrate may adopt a procedure which will best carry out the object of the Legislature—*Tarapada v Nurul Huq*, 32 Cal 1093, 11 C.L.J. 280. The same view is taken in *Surya Kanta v Hem Chandra*, 30 Cal 508. But from the Report of the Joint Committee cited in Notes 413 and 436 below (which speaks of the amendment of subs. 4 and 5 as made by adopting the phraseology of section 244) it appears that the Legislature intends the procedure to be that of a summons case.

Such parties:—The words “such parties” must be interpreted with reference to the words ‘parties concerned in such dispute’ is sub-section (1), the effect being to restrict the inquiry to the parties concerned in the dispute, notwithstanding that persons other than those may have been summoned by the Magistrate or may have come in of their own accord on the publication of the copy of the order in the locality—*Krishna Kamini v. Abdul Jabbar*, 30 Cal 155 (F.B.) at p. 198.

410. Question of title.—In a case under this section, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to inquire into the *rights* of parties. What he has got to look to is the fact of *possession* only—*Arju Mea v Arman Mea*, 7 C.L.J. 369, *In re Pandurang*, 25 Bom. 179. The whole scheme of Chapter XII contemplates an inquiry solely with reference to the fact of actual possession, irrespective of *title*. The crucial point to be decided in proceedings under this section is as to who is in actual possession of the subject in dispute, and not who is *entitled* to such possession. This section contemplates a determination of the question of possession without reference to the merits of the respective claims of the disputing parties to a right to possess the subject of dispute—*Tarapada v. Nurul Huq*, 32 Cal. 1093, *Amir Hassan v. Qadir Baksh*, 28 P.L.R. 107, 28 Cr.L.J. 328, *Kaku v Harnaman*, 1917 P.W.R. 28; *Subda v. Kushal*, 27 Cr.L.J. 784, 7 P.L.T. 873, *Subbarama v Mariya*, 16 M.L.T. 52, 15 Cr.L.J. 559, *Daimulla v. Maharulla*, 27 Cal 918, *Chockalingam v. Ammalalchi*, 2 Weir 99, *Abdul Wahab v Emp.* 27 Cr.L.J. 44 (Oudh); *Emp. v. Man Kumari*, 25 Cr.L.J. 1081 (Oudh), *In re Mallappa*, 28 Bom. L.R. 488, 27 Cr.L.J. 734 (735). Even a trespasser can be maintained in possession—*Subda v. Kushal Singh* (supra). Where a Magistrate in deciding a case under this section refers to the claim of any of the parties to a right to possess the land in dispute, he exceeds his jurisdiction and his order will be set aside—*Ram Dayal v. Kedarnath*, 6 C.L.J. 182; *Prayag Mahafon v Gobind*, 32 Cal. 602.

The Magistrate may, if necessary, take and consider evidence of title to enable him to decide the question of actual possession, but proof of title is not proof of actual possession—*Panaganti Parthasarathy v. Pallikapa*, 34 Mad. 138. Where no sufficient evidence of possession is produced by the parties, the Magistrate may use evidence of title merely to guide and assist his mind in coming to a decision upon the question of possession—*Kali Kristo v. Golam Ali*, 7 Cal. 46, *Raja Babu v. Muddun Mohun*, 14 Cal. 169; *Ramesh Chandra v. Mahim Chandra*, 35 C.L.J. 156, 22 Cr.L.J. 350, *Ram Sarup v. Darsano*, 1 P.L.T. 387, 21 Cr.L.J. 748; *Adaikhan v. Nallakaruppan*, 1922 M.W.N. 12, 23 Cr.L.J. 197.

But if the Magistrate finds that the evidence of possession on both sides is equally *unreliable*, he cannot rely on the presumption that possession follows title; in such a case he should act under sec. 146. If, however, he finds the evidence on both sides reliable and equally balanced and he is unable to conclude from such evidence which party is in possession, then he is entitled to corroborate the evidence of possession given by one side by the presumption as to possession arising from the title which he

finds in that side—*Alshoy v. Brojeswar*, 26 C.W.N. 1000, 24 Cr.L.J. 141. But he must use the evidence of title for this limited purpose. If instead of proceeding to decide as to the actual possession he virtually puts aside the consideration of this question and determines the question of title alone, he is doing that which the law has forbidden him to do—*Kali Krista v. Gola Ali*, 7 Cal 46. And a decision under this section ought to be based upon evidence of possession and not of title—*Ibid*. Where evidence of possession is available, a Magistrate acts clearly without jurisdiction in deciding the claim of the parties to possession on documentary evidence of title—*Juthen v. Ram Narain* 18 C.W.N. 700, 13 Cr.L.J. 202, *Srimanavedan v. Parapravan* 39 M.L.J. 73, 21 Cr.L.J. 46.

411. Perusal of statements.—The Magistrate shall peruse the written statements of both parties. An *ex parte* order made on the written statement of one of the parties and upon the failure of the other party to file one, without some evidence on the side of the party filing the written statement in support of it, is without jurisdiction—*Gobind Chandra v. Niharan*, 8 C.W.N. 642; *Najeri v. Jamalati* 12 C.W.N. 771. And the Magistrate fails to exercise jurisdiction if he refuses to grant further time to the parties to file written statements—*Sh. Mansar Ali v. Matiullah*, 12 C.W.N. 890. See Note 403 *ante*.

412. "Hear the parties":—These words mean that the Magistrate must hear the arguments at the conclusion of the evidence on both sides, just as it is the procedure prescribed in a summons trial; and the refusal of the Magistrate to hear the arguments of the parties violates the final order—*Dhabari v. Gorakh Prasad*, 19 Cr.L.J. 741, 5 P.L.W. 103; *Ghulam Shibtain v. Kaniz*, 5 P.L.J. 210, 21 Cr.L.J. 572.

413. Receiving evidence:—The Magistrate is bound to examine the parties and receive evidence—*In re Dyawappa* 17 Bom.L.R. 382, 16 Cr.L.J. 434. An order under this section without taking evidence is invalid and must be set aside—*Manik v. Azimuddin*, 11 C.W.N. 923; *Jhenger v. Baljnath*, 11 A.L.J. 586, 14 Cr.L.J. 277; *Lowsen v. Kali Charan*, 8 C.W.N. 719, *Tara Chand v. Behari*, 1916 P.R. 22, 18 Cr.L.J. 36; *Fateh Sher Khan v. Crown*, 1916 P.R. 4, 17 Cr.L.J. 129, *Palani v. Kulandavelu*, 43 M.L.J. 716, *Velayuda v. Narayan*, 2 L.W. 1208; *Marudanayakam v. Md. Rowthen*, 17 Cr.L.J. 217 (Mad.), *Basawan v. Tilak*, 4 P.L.T. 723. A decision of a Magistrate based upon mere local inquiry, and discarding the evidence altogether is bad as one made without jurisdiction—*Lal Behari v. Bejoy*, 10 C.W.N. 181, *Shahadat v. Tajuddin*, 46 Cal 1056; *Srimanavedan v. Parapravan*, 38 M.L.J. 73, *Gagan v. Karimuddin*, 25 C.W.N. 1007, 23 Cr.L.J. 199, *Govt v. Kali Chandra*, 16 W.R. 13. A Magistrate will be acting illegally in the exercise of his jurisdiction if instead of taking the evidence tendered by the parties he proceeds to the spot and decides the case only on the statements of witnesses picked up by himself—*Khubi v. Darbari* 2 P.L.T. 267, 22 Cr.L.J. 481. An order passed by a Magistrate on the basis of his own knowledge without recording any evidence, and relying solely on the evidence in another case, is invalid—*Raza Husain v. Mehdi Hasan*, 25

O.C. 148, 23 Cr.L.J. 684. So also, an order passed merely on a consideration of the written statements and without taking any evidence is invalid and must be set aside—*Kolha v. Muneswar*, 34 Cal. 840; *Gobind Chandra v. Nibaran*, 8 C.W.N. 642. Similarly, an order under this section without giving either party an opportunity of adducing oral evidence as to possession is illegal and liable to be set aside—*Sakhayur v. Alhadi*, 21 C.W.N. 928, 19 Cr.L.J. 108.

The Magistrate must consider both oral and documentary evidence in the case—*Kailash v. Jai Narain*, 1 P.L.T. 291, 21 Cr.L.J. 601; *Hanuman v. Sheo Chandra*, 2 P.L.T. 333. The Magistrate must discuss the evidence on which he comes to the conclusion that a certain party is in possession. Mere prominent mention of his inspection and of the fact that in the course of his inspection he found hundreds of people who were in favour of the second party, is not a ground upon which possession may be found in favour of that party—*Adbud Misser v. Satruhan*, 8 P.L.T. 755, 28 Cr.L.J. 603 (604).

It is not open to a Magistrate to refuse the evidence tendered to him—*Tirumalraja v. Lodd Govind Doss*, 29 Mad. 561. The Magistrate's act in preventing the objector from producing evidence to prove his case constitutes such a grave irregularity as to amount to an abuse of jurisdiction; and the Magistrate's order is in consequence open to revision—*Dani Ram v. Bhola Nath*, 1902 P.R. 23. The Magistrate is bound to grant adjournment for the production of important evidence; if he refuses to do so, his order is liable to be set aside—*Biswambhar v. Amiuddin*, 25 C.W.N. 602, 22 Cr.L.J. 335. If the evidence rejected is a material document affecting possession of a party, its rejection might furnish a good ground of grievance to that party—*Udit Narayan v. Sundaram*, 20 Cr.L.J. 234 (Pat).

The record must show the ground of rejection of evidence. A general remark in an order that the oral evidence is not reliable, without referring to it and without giving any reason, is not a proper disposal of the case on the evidence—*Lakhpai v. Emp.*, 4 P.L.T. 579, 24 Cr.L.J. 482.

The words "receive all such evidence as may be produced" have been substituted for the words "receive the evidence produced." This shows that the Magistrate is now bound to receive all the evidence produced by the parties and has no discretion to refuse any evidence. "In order to meet certain difficulties which have arisen in connection with the words 'receive the evidence produced by them' in sec. 145 (4) we have made an amendment adopting the phraseology of section 244 (1)"—*Report of the Joint Committee* (1922).

Examination of witnesses:—An order passed without examining the witnesses is without jurisdiction—*Marudanayagam v. Md. Rowthen*, 17 Cr.L.J. 217 (Mad.); *Nojem v. Jamalali*, 12 C.W.N. 771. So also, an order passed on the evidence of a person who was not a witness of any of the parties is bad—*Lowsen v. Kali Charan*, 8 C.W.N. 719; *Fateh Sher Khan v. Crown*, 1916 P.R. 4, 17 Cr.L.J. 129.

Under the old law, a mere refusal by the Magistrate to examine a particular witness in a proceeding under this section was not necessarily a ground of interference by the High Court—*Surya Kanta v. Hem Chandra*, 30 Cal. 508. A Magistrate was not bound to examine all the witnesses adduced by the parties but could limit the number for good and sufficient reasons. He had a discretion in the matter of examining witnesses—*Samir Sheikh v. Jahed Sheikh*, 3 C.L.J. 478 (explaining *Manmatha v. Baroda*, 31 Cal. 685), *Abhayessari v. Sidhessari*, 16 Cal. 513. Therefore where a Magistrate after examining ten of the witnesses produced by a party, refused to examine any further witnesses on the ground that the evidence sought to be adduced was worthless, it was held that the Magistrate had not acted without jurisdiction—*In re Nathu Mal*, 24 All. 315.

The present Amendment of this sub-section however, makes it obligatory on the Magistrate to examine all the witnesses produced by the parties, and leaves no discretion to him in this matter.

But the Court has undoubted jurisdiction to curtail the number of unnecessary witnesses upon the ground that their examination will delay and possibly defeat the ends of justice, though he cannot arbitrarily restrict the number of witnesses that a party wishes to examine—*Biswanath v. Shivanand*, 2 P.L.T. 330, 22 Cr.L.J. 430, *Wahidunnissa v. Fichit Lal*, 24 Cr.L.J. 954 (Pat).

Summons to witnesses :—See sub-section (9) and notes thereunder.

Admission by party :—If one of the parties admits that the other is in possession, the Judge is not bound to take any evidence—*Gangadharam v. Sankarappa*, 9 M.L.T. 91, 12 Cr.L.J. 47. Although it is necessary ordinarily to record evidence in a case under this section before passing final orders, it cannot be said that it is indispensable to do so when the case is completely given up by the opposite party. An admission by the Mukhtear that his client had no actual possession is sufficient to dispense with the evidence—*Haro Mohan v. Gobind*, 7 C.W.N. 351.

Withdrawal of proceedings :—Where after proceedings under this section had been properly instituted, the first party examined some witnesses and then represented to the Court that he would conduct the case in the Civil Court and gave an undertaking not to enter upon the said land until the matter should have been settled by the Civil Court, whereupon the Magistrate passed an order reciting the terms of the petition and declaring the second party to be in possession, held that the omission by the Magistrate to take evidence on behalf of the second party or to record a formal finding as to possession did not vitiate the order—*Yar Md v. Hayat Md.*, 18 Cr.L.J. 1024 (Cal.).

415. Evidence recorded by predecessor :—Since a proceeding under this section is an inquiry within the meaning of sec. 4 (k), a Magistrate may act on evidence taken by his predecessor by virtue of sec. 350. The decision in 23 W.R. 62 is no longer good law.

416. Reference to arbitrators :—This section requires the Magistrate himself to receive the evidence adduced by the parties, and

on a consideration thereof to come to a decision. The procedure laid down by this section does not contemplate that the question as to who is in actual possession should be delegated, even by consent of parties, to arbitrators—*Banwari v. Hriday*, 32 Cal. 552; *Hamidul v. Sheikh Atait*, 2 P.L.J. 86, 18 Cr.L.J. 145, *Jamuna Das v. Hanuman*, 25 C.W.N. 719, 22 Cr.L.J. 623. But where the parties themselves agreed that the question of possession should be decided by an arbitrator, and the matter was thereupon referred to arbitration, the Magistrate was bound to take into consideration the finding of fact by the arbitrators as to which party was in actual possession—*Taramoni v. Gyanendra*, 7 C.W.N. 461. So also, where the dispute was referred to arbitration by consent of parties both of whom accepted the award that followed, it was not open to the Magistrate to insist on the production of evidence—*Haladhar v. Bulaki*, 3 P.L.J. 248, 19 Cr.L.J. 266. Where the parties themselves applied that the matter should be referred to arbitration, and the Magistrate made an order in terms of the award, the parties were not entitled afterwards to object to the course, and the High Court declined to interfere in revision—*Janki v. Kalika Miser*, 6 C.W.N. 618.

In *Uttam Singh v. Jodhan Rai*, 3 Pat. 288, 7 P.L.T. 288, 27 Cr.L.J. 230, Foster J. considered all the above cases and came to the conclusion that a distinction should be drawn between cases in which the reference to arbitration was made for the purpose of deciding existing and past possession, and cases in which the reference was made for deciding future possession. The scheme of an inquiry under sub-section (4) of sec. 145 is retrospective and not prospective, that is, the Magistrate is to consider who was in possession at the date of the institution of the proceeding or within two months prior thereto, and not who is entitled to possession and will henceforth be in possession of the property in dispute. Therefore, if the reference to arbitration is made for the purpose of deciding the question as to who was in possession at the date of the institution of the proceedings, such reference is not improper, and the Magistrate can pass an order on the basis of the award of the arbitrators. But if the reference is made for the purpose of deciding future possession, and the arbitrators give an award to the effect that the disputed lands will be divided among the parties, the award is prospective, and the Magistrate cannot pass any order on the basis of that award.

In the same case it has also been decided (at p. 294) that if the parties refer the disputes to arbitration, and the arbitrators give an award, it shows that the parties have come to a settlement of their disputes, and that there is no longer any likelihood of a breach of the peace. In such a case the Magistrate should pass an order under sub-section (5) dropping the proceedings, and cannot pass a final order (declaring the possession of the parties in terms of the award) under sub-section (6).

417. Decision as to possession :—An order under this section merely declaring one of the parties to be in possession, without deciding and giving a finding as to who was in actual possession of the land in dispute on the date of the preliminary order, is one made entirely with-

out jurisdiction and consequently void—*Kochai v. Romesh*, 35 Cal 795; *Peria Subba v. Sinna Subba*, 45 M.L.J. 56, 23 Cr.L.J. 670.

Where the Magistrate made no attempt to deal with the question of possession but made some general observation in regard to the ownership of the property, and declared the petitioner to be in possession, held that the order was an obvious infringement of the provisions of this section—*Shukulathi v. Gulam Moideen*, 1022 M.W.N. 689, 16 L.W. 338.

If it is difficult for a Magistrate trying a case under this section to come to a conclusion as to the fact of possession, the wise and proper course to be adopted is to pass an order under sec 146. If in such a case he passes an order under sec. 145, the High Court in revision can alter the order under sec 145 into one under sec. 146—*Reid v. Richardson*, 14 Cal 361; *Kattras Coal Co. v. Shikristo*, 22 Cal 297.

As to the effect of a previous Civil Court decree as regards possession, see Notes 438 and 439 *post*

418. Possession at the date of the order :—The question of possession has to be determined with reference to a specified point of time, viz., the date of the initial order, or in the case of forcible dispossession, a date within two months next preceding such order—*Tarapada v. Nurul Haq*, 32 Cal. 1093. The rulings in 11 Cal. 365, 12 Cal 521, 12 Cal 539, 20 W R 51, 15 Bom. 152, 18 Mad 41, 13 All. 362 are no longer good law.

The actual possession of the land in dispute is the only subject for inquiry. The fact of symbolical possession delivered under the C. P. Code has no bearing on the Magisterial inquiry—*Ramalingam v. Raja of Ramnad*, 16 Cr.L.J. 736 (Mad); *Promoda v. Khetra*, 25 Cr.L.J. 1104 (Cal). Where a party is given symbolical possession of certain lands, and shortly afterwards proceedings under sec 145 are instituted in respect of the same land, it is incumbent on the Magistrate to go into the fact of actual possession between the two dates and consider the evidence tendered on that question before passing the final order—*Hazari Khan v. Najar Chandra*, 22 C.W.N. 479, 18 Cr L.J. 718, *Syed Ambar Ali v. Piran Ali*, 55 Cal. 826, 32 C.W.N. 275, 29 Cr L.J. 503. Where it was found that notwithstanding the delivery of symbolical possession given to the auction purchasers (second party), the judgment-debtor and his heirs and representatives (first party) had continued all along to be in possession and were in actual possession on the day on which proceedings under this section were instituted, but the Magistrate made his final order in favour of the second party, held that the order made in favour of the second party could not be supported, as they were not in actual possession at the date of the order—*Shahabai v. Bhaghari*, 49 Cal 177 (180), 24 Cr L.J. 875.

Where the Magistrate found one party to have been in possession a few days before the date of the preliminary order, and confirmed his possession without finding who was in possession on the date of the preliminary order itself, but the interval between the two dates was very short (viz., 5 days only), and there was nothing on the record to show that there was any change of possession in that short interval, and the party confirmed

in possession had a decree of a Civil Court declaring him entitled to possession, held that the order of the Magistrate was valid—*Id. Hussain v. Pachayappa*, 42 M L J. 147, 23 Cr.L.J. 92. But, where the Magistrate declared possession in favour of the opposite party as evidenced by certain documents of title relating to a period as old as 10 years prior to the proceeding, without taking further evidence, oral or documentary, to see whether that possession continued up to the date of proceeding, the High Court set aside the order as contrary to the provisions of this sub-section—*Juthan v. Ram Narayan*, 18 C.W.N. 700, 15 Cr.L.J. 202.

Land under water—Where the Magistrate made the final order in favour of one party, finding that as there could not be any act of peaceful possession within two months of the date of the proceeding owing to the land being under water, the possession in the current year was to be presumed in favour of the man who was in possession during the previous years, it was held that the order was in direct contravention of this section and the Magistrate should have passed an order under Sec. 146—*Satyendra v. Krishnadhan*, 20 C.W.N. 1014, 18 Cr.L.J. 80.

Joint possession—See Note 405 ante.

419. Forcible and wrongful possession :—The Magistrate's duty is to find peaceful possession. Ouster of a person lawfully in possession by a trespasser does not confer on the latter any rights which can be recognised under this section. The Magistrate must look to the possession which may be termed peaceful. He must go back to the time when the present dispute originated and not to the result of the dispute itself—*In re Mohesh Chandra*, 4 Cal. 417. The recent occupation of a trespasser is not a possession which a Magistrate can direct the party to retain under this section. The possession is still with the person ousted by the trespasser, and an order directing him to have possession and the trespasser to be dispossessed is the proper order to be made—*Ram Singh v. Dalla*, 1876 P R. 8. Where it appeared that one of the parties within two months prior to the proceedings obtained sanction from the Municipality and proceeded to dig a tank on the land in dispute to the exclusion of another party who was then found to be in possession, it was held that it was forcible and wrongful dispossession within the meaning of this section, and possession must be deemed to be in the party dispossessed—*Manmatha Nath v. Ganga*, 20 C.W.N. 978, 17 Cr.L.J. 449. But where the Magistrate finds that on the date when the proceedings under this section were instituted and for more than two months preceding that date, the members of the first party have been and are in possession, although the members of the second party obtained delivery of possession of the property through Court a year ago, held that the Magistrate should pass his order in favour of the first party—*Shahabai v. Bhajahari*, 49 Cal. 177 (181), 24 Cr.L.J. 875.

This proviso lays down that if a party has been dispossessed within two months before the date of the preliminary order, the other party should be maintained in possession. But if through delay in the action of the Magistrate the preliminary order is not passed within two months

of the date of dispossession, the dispossessor should not have the benefit of the delay. The proviso should be interpreted reasonably and not literally—*Srinivasa v. Dasaratha*, 52 Mad. 66, 30 Cr.L.J. 144; *Chinchilada v. Chintalasami*, 28 Cr.L.J. 782 (783).

If a person has been turned out of possession and submits to the ouster, and the other party, whether rightfully or wrongfully, is in peaceful possession, a Magistrate will not go behind the period when possession may be found to have become peaceable—*In re Bunwari Lal*, 1 C.L.R. 136. For, the point for inquiry under this section is not whether any of the claimants has taken possession of the subject of dispute by force, but whether the struggle for it has ceased, leaving it in the hands of one of them. If the struggle has ceased, the party in whose hands it remains is in actual possession which the Magistrate is bound to recognise under this section—*Q. E. v. Gauhar*, 1897 P.R. 5. If, however, the struggle for possession is still proceeding between the party who has taken forcible possession and the rightful owner, or if neither party can show his complete control over the subject at the time when the proceedings are taken, neither party is to be regarded as in possession, and the Magistrate is to take action under section 146—*Ibid*.

'Forcible' does not mean that actual force or violence should have been used, when the dispossession of a person is effected by a show of criminal force, that person is said to be forcibly dispossessed—*Sita Nath v. Harvey*, 25 C.W.N. 601, 22 Cr.L.J. 637.

But the mere ouster of people having no title to the land, by the rightful owner, without using any physical violence, and by removing things which had no right to be on the land, cannot be said to be an unlawful and forcible entry on the land within the meaning of this section, and the persons so ousted cannot be treated to have been in possession—*Collector of Howrah v. Santak*, 44 C.L.J. 593, 28 Cr.L.J. 210. Where a landlord resumes possession of an abandoned holding after compliance with the procedure laid down in sec 87 Bengal Tenancy Act, it cannot be said that he has taken forcible possession of the holding—*Nikunja Behari v. Usabati*, 31 C.W.N. 242, 28 Cr.L.J. 245.

This sub-section contemplates that the dispossession should be forcible as well as wrongful, the mere wrongful dispossession, without any evidence to show that it was forcible as well, does not come within the purview of this section. The remedy of the party wrongfully dispossessed lies only in the Civil Court—*H. V. Low & Co v. Manindra Chandra*, 3 Pat. 809 (813, 814), 26 Cr.L.J. 268, *Ata Husain v. Latif*, 28 Cr.L.J. 437 (All.).

The words "wrongfully dispossessed" mean dispossessed without due warrant of law, or dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law, even though the dispossessor be the rightful owner—*Bat Jiba v. Chandulal*, 27 Bom. L.R. 1353, A.I.R. 1926 Bom 91, 27 Cr.L.J. 661.

420. Attachment:—See the 2nd proviso to clause (4) Power is given to a Magistrate for the purpose of preserving the peace, and only for that purpose, to attach the disputed property. An order of attachment

cannot be passed for the mere purpose of avoiding a future litigation in respect of the right to the present produce of the land in dispute—*Atma Singh v. Harnam*, 7 Lah 136, 27 P.L.R. 341, 27 Cr L.J. 761.

An order for attachment under the proviso to clause (4) would remain in force only pending the Magistrate's decision, and not until a decree or order of the Civil Court is obtained—*Farid v. Piru*, 8 S.L.R. 207, 16 Cr L.J. 235.

Where a land was attached under this section and the crops standing on the land were sold and the sale proceeds kept in deposit in the Court, but the preliminary order was afterwards cancelled by the Magistrate on the ground that there was no immediate danger of a breach of the peace, the Magistrate could order the sale-proceeds to be restored to the persons who raised the crops—*Suryanarayana v. Ankineed*, 47 Mad. 713 (715), 46 M.L.J. 565, 25 Cr L.J. 978, *Mahalakshmi v. Subbarayadu*, 17 L.W. 429, 24 Cr L.J. 783, or he could order the money to be kept in deposit in the Court, until one party or the other obtained an order in his favour—*Suryanarayana v. Ankineed*, 47 Mad 713 (716); *Chenga Reddi v. Ramasamy*, 16 Cr L.J. 104 (Mad).

Moveable property—This section does not authorise the Magistrate to attach moveables—*Q E v. Ramchandra*, Ratanlal 891; *Gopala v. Krishnaswamy*, 27 M.L.T. 234, 21 Cr L.J. 73; *Arjun v. Chandan*, 24 O.C. 167, 22 Cr L.J. 625, *Gajraj v. Emp.*, 20 A.L.J. 906.

Postponement of proceedings—A Magistrate has no jurisdiction to pass an order postponing *sine die* a proceeding under this section, at the same time retaining under attachment the property covered by the proceeding, on grounds extraneous to the proceeding—*Abdul Rauf v. Rahimuddin*, 13 C.W.N. 104, ■ Cr.L.J. 35

421. Appointment of receiver—A Magistrate cannot appoint a receiver under the proviso to clause (4) of this section before the commencement of the inquiry. He can do so only under Sec. 146, and after the conclusion of the inquiry—*Subhadramma v. Satyam*, 1910 M.W.N. 821, 11 Cr L.J. 536, *Mewa Lal v. Emp.*, 3 P.L.J. 147, 19 Cr L.J. 249, *Emp. v. Diwan*, 30 P.L.R. 23, 30 Cr L.J. 411 (413); *Dasrath v. Tarachand*, 21 N.L.R. 191, 26 Cr L.J. 1378. Even if a Magistrate appoints a receiver under this section, such receiver will only be an agent or servant of the Magistrate acting under his order. The right to attach (under the second proviso to this clause) carries with it the right to take the necessary steps for the custody and management of the property, and the Magistrate may appoint a receiver for that purpose—*Srinivasa v. Sathayappa*, 13 Cr L.J. 295 (Mad). The power of such receiver will not be the same as that of a receiver appointed under sec. 146. His duty will be simply to take and keep possession of the properties attached and to make an inventory thereof—*Gopala v. Krishna-swami*, 27 M.L.T. 234, 21 Cr.L.J. 73

The amount of the receiver's remuneration should be reasonable, and should not in any case exceed the amount of the nett income realised by the receiver—*Yamunabai v. Emp.*, 27 Cr.L.J. 22, 8 N.L.J. 167.

A receiver can be appointed only by the Magistrate while the inquiry is proceeding and only when he is satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace still exists. The High Court in revision cannot appoint a receiver, because the inquiry is already over and there is no longer any likelihood of a breach of the peace, in the Magistrate's order has put one party in possession of the property in dispute—*Marudayya v. Shanmugasundara*, 49 M.L.J. 593, A I.R. 1926 Mad. 139, 27 Cr.L.J. 126.

422. Joint Inquiry :—(1) *One dispute as to several plots :—* When the dispute is one, the fact that it embraces several distinct parcels of land does not necessitate an independent proceeding in respect of each. His findings should naturally be directed to possession of particular plots, but the fact that he did not take separate proceedings in respect to each plot would not invalidate his entire proceedings—*Krishna Kamini v Abdul Jabbar*, 30 Cal. 155 (F B) at pp 185, 200; *Sajani Kanta v. Shamsher*, 24 Cr L J. 235 (Cal). Although it may be desirable under such circumstances to deal with each dispute relating to each of several plots separately, it is impossible to extend to such proceedings the strict rule of procedure observed in civil actions—*Manik Mandal v. Gobinda*, 11 C.W.N 206. To draw up one proceeding with respect to several plots of land claimed to be in the possession of different persons would not be bad, if it was shown that none of the parties had been precluded from giving any evidence and no party was prejudiced by the Magistrate's action in not taking separate proceedings—*Ishwar Chandra v. Ambica Charan*, 5 C.W.N 544; *Gajadhar v Thakur Singh*, 26 Cr.L.J 424 (Pat.).

(2) *Different disputes as to different subjects :—* Where the parties are found to be in possession of different and separate pieces of land, e.g., when the dispute is alleged to exist in 230 villages and each village stands on its own footing, the Magistrate does not exercise proper jurisdiction if he clubs together 230 subjects of dispute and treats them as one. The Magistrate should decide which party is in possession of this or that village, instead of arbitrarily finding that one party was in possession of all the villages—*Tirumalraja v Lodd Gobind Doss*, 29 Mad. 561, *Crown v. Jamal*, 1 S L.R. 25, 11 Cr.L.J 265. When there are independent disputes relating to distinct parcels of land, they ought to be dealt with in separate proceedings—*Krishna Kamini v Abdul*, 30 Cal 155 (200) (F.B.).

(3) *Different claims :—* In a dispute regarding possession of 708 bighas of land belonging to a Zemindari, the parties to the dispute were persons interested as tenants under the Zemindari on the one side, and on the other side persons claiming under the same Zemindar to be interested in various portions of the land as their mawasi jote in different quantities and under interests acquired at different times; and the Magistrate tried the case together and passed an order in favour of the former, directing that they as a body should remain in possession until evicted therefrom by order of a Civil Court, held that the Magistrate should have distinctly specified which persons were entitled as against which, and to which, portion of the land in dispute. The proceedings were set aside—*Kutuhul v. Uma Singh*, 15 Cal 31.

there is no reason why he should not be able to stay further proceedings on similar information, without being obliged to record such evidence as the parties may produce with the same formality as he would have done if he had gone on with his inquiry instead of dropping it—*Suryanarayan v Ankineed*, 47 Mad 713 (715), 35 M.L.T. 68, 25 Cr.L.J. 978

When a Magistrate cancels an order under this sub-section, he has no jurisdiction to allow one of the parties to reap the crops to the exclusion of the other—*Karimuddi v Namuddi*, 3 C.L.J. 573. When the Magistrate has cancelled his preliminary order and dropped the proceedings, he becomes *junctus officio* and has no jurisdiction to direct the delivery of the property or of its sale-proceeds (e.g., where the property is sold, being perishable) to one of the contending parties. The proper course under these circumstances is to retain the property or its sale-proceeds in court, until one of the parties obtains an order of a Civil Court—*Narasayya v Venkiah*, 49 Mad 232, 49 M.L.J. 784, 27 Cr.L.J. 85; *Chenga v Ramasamy*, 16 Cr.L.J. 104 (Mad); *Dasrath v Tarachand*, 21 N.L.R. 191, 26 Cr.L.J. 1378

A Magistrate has jurisdiction to cancel the order of his predecessor—*In re Krishnasami*, 2 Weir 108. Where a proceeding under sec. 145 has been drawn up by a Deputy Magistrate, the District Magistrate can cancel the proceeding after transferring the case to his own file, and on a consideration of the facts and after hearing the objections of the parties—*Tara Charan v Bengal Coal Co., Ltd.*, 13 C.W.N. 125.

Effect of cancellation—An order striking off proceedings under this section does not amount to an adjudication of the question of possession for the purpose of sub-section (6)—*Manindra v Baroda*, 30 Cal. 112.

Fresh proceedings—When proceedings under this section are struck off on the ground that there is no immediate apprehension of a breach of the peace, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to *revive* the proceedings. He can only start fresh proceedings upon fresh materials which must be specific relating to the lands in dispute. A general state of affairs in the locality is insufficient—*Khubi v Darbari*, 2 P.L.T. 267, 22 Cr.L.J. 481. If it is intended to take fresh proceedings upon new materials, it is necessary for the Magistrate to record such materials in his order renewing the proceedings—*Manik v Azimuddi*, 6 C.W.N. 923.

But a Magistrate can, after withdrawing the proceedings under this section, start proceedings under sec. 10 of the Bengal Alluvial Lands Act, 1920—*Digendra v Janaki*, 33 C.W.N. 1115 (1117).

425. Clause (6)—Final Order :—

Contents—Whether sections 366 and 367 do or do not apply to proceedings under sec. 145, the Magistrate in his final order must give reasons for his decision sufficient to enable the High Court to determine whether he has complied with the terms of sub-section (4) and directed his mind to the consideration of the evidence adduced before him, and whether he has acted with jurisdiction in making his final order. A statement in the final order that the witnesses have been examined, pleaders have

been heard on both sides, and oral and documentary evidence of both parties has been considered, is of a stereotyped nature applicable to any and every case and does not enable the High Court to understand what in fact the evidence was or to say that the mind of the trying Magistrate had been properly and sufficiently directed to its consideration. Such a final order is bad and the case must be retried—*Bhuban Chandra v. Nibaran*, 49 Cal 187 (189), 25 C.W.N. 887, 22 Cr.L.J. 499; *Peria Subba v. Sinna Subbaya*, 31 M.L.T. 312, 45 M.L.J. 56, 23 Cr.L.J. 670; *Mothahar Ali v. Eshaque*, 39 C.L.J. 366, 25 Cr.L.J. 1115; *Ishan Chandra v. Hriday*, 29 C.W.N. 475, 26 Cr.L.J. 915, 41 C.L.J. 357.

Signature —A Magistrate should sign his name in full to a judicial order under this section and should also note his official position—*Nojem v. Jamalali* 12 C.W.N. 771

Who can pass order —The jurisdiction to make a final order under this section is not personal to the Magistrate who initiates the proceedings; and a District Magistrate may of his own motion transfer a case under this chapter to another Magistrate of the first class subordinate to him, and the latter can pass the final order—*Ram Kissors v. Dwarka*, 10 C.W.N. 1095; *Satish Chandra v. Rajendra*, 22 Cal 898 (901).

But where a Magistrate who heard a case under this section handed over his charge to another Magistrate and was transferred to another district, and subsequently delivered the final order in the case, held that once he had handed over the charge and was transferred to another district he became *functus officio* and ceased to have any jurisdiction. In the case He therefore acted without jurisdiction in delivering the final order—*Jagatbandhu v. Jagabandhu*, 38 C.L.J. 201, 25 Cr.L.J. 192 (following *Emp. v. Anand Sarup*, 3 All. 563).

"Or should...be treated as being" :—"We think that this sub-section should apply not only to the case of a party in actual possession but also to one who is to be treated as being in possession under the proviso to sub-section (4), and we have amended sub-section (6) in this sense"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*.

426. "May restore to possession" etc. :—"Power has been given to restore to possession a party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914). "We think that this is a logical carrying out of the provision contained in the first proviso to sub-section (4)"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*

Prior to this amendment, it was held in several cases that the only order which a Magistrate was competent to pass under this section was one declaring one of the parties to be entitled to possession, but he had no jurisdiction to deliver possession or to oust one person and place another in possession of the property—*Tulsi Ram v. Abrar Ahmad*, 37 All. 654, 13 A.L.J. 932, 16 Cr.L.J. 714; *Emp. v. Rameshar*, 27 All. 300; *Sheorani v. Baij Nath*, 14 A.L.J. 146, 17 Cr.L.J. 145; *Moore v. Monoranjan*, 12 C.W.N. 696 (699); *Ranendra Narain v. Kishori*, 14 C.W.N. 78, 11 Cr.L.J. 26; *Ram Ratton v. Nettra Kally*, 4 Cal. 339. These cases are no longer of any authority.

there is no reason why he should not be able to stay further proceedings on similar information, without being obliged to record such evidence as the parties may produce with the same formality as he would have done if he had gone on with his inquiry instead of dropping it—*Suryanarayan v. Ankineed*, 47 Mad 713 (715), 35 M.L.T. 68, 25 Cr.L.J. 978

When a Magistrate cancels an order under this sub-section, he has no jurisdiction to allow one of the parties to reap the crops to the exclusion of the other—*Karimuddi v. Naimuddi*, 3 C.L.J. 573. When the Magistrate has cancelled his preliminary order and dropped the proceedings, he becomes *junctus officio* and has no jurisdiction to direct the delivery of the property or of its sale-proceeds (*e.g.*, where the property is sold, being perishable) to one of the contending parties. The proper course under these circumstances is to retain the property or its sale-proceeds in court, until one of the parties obtains an order of a Civil Court—*Narasayya v. Venkiah*, 49 Mad 232, 49 M.L.J. 784, 27 Cr.L.J. 85; *Chenga v. Ramasamy*, 16 Cr.L.J. 104 (Mad.); *Dasrath v. Tarachand*, 21 N.L.R. 191, 26 Cr.L.J. 1378.

A Magistrate has jurisdiction to cancel the order of his predecessor—*In re Krishnasami*, 2 Weir 108. Where a proceeding under sec. 145 has been drawn up by a Deputy Magistrate, the District Magistrate can cancel the proceeding after transferring the case to his own file, and on a consideration of the facts and after hearing the objections of the parties—*Tara Charan v. Bengal Coal Co., Ltd.*, 13 C.W.N. 125.

Effect of cancellation :—An order striking off proceedings under this section does not amount to an adjudication of the question of possession for the purpose of sub-section (6)—*Manindra v. Baroda*, 30 Cal. 112.

Fresh proceedings :—When proceedings under this section are struck off on the ground that there is no immediate apprehension of a breach of the peace, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to *revive* the proceedings. He can only start fresh proceedings upon fresh materials which must be specific relating to the lands in dispute. A general state of affairs in the locality is insufficient—*Khubi v. Darbari*, 2 P.L.T. 267, 22 Cr.L.J. 481. If it is intended to take fresh proceedings upon new materials, it is necessary for the Magistrate to record such materials in his order renewing the proceedings—*Manik v. Azimuddi*, 6 C.W.N. 923.

But a Magistrate can, after withdrawing the proceedings under this section, start proceedings under sec. 10 of the Bengal Alluvial Lands Act, 1920—*Digendra v. Janaki*, 33 C.W.N. 1115 (1117).

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contending its validity the burden of proving his title. The onus is not upon the person in possession to show that the judgment in his favour is right; it is for his opponent to show that it is wrong, and where and why it is wrong—*Ibid.* The onus is on the plaintiff to show that the person in possession under the order of the Magistrate has no right in possession—*Manindra v. Saradindu*, 23 C.W.N. 593.

Appointment of Receiver by Civil Court:—The fact that there is an order under this section does not bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to appoint a Receiver under O. XL, C. P. Code, 1908. The C. P. Code and the powers of the Civil Court under that Code are in no way fettered by an order that may be passed by a Magistrate under this section. The Magistrate's order is only intended to control any period up to the time when the Civil Court takes seizure of the matter—*Barkatunnissa v. Abdul Aziz*, 22 All. 214.

Mamlatdar's order as to possession.—An order under this section does not take away the jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar or any other Civil Court to decide who was in actual possession before the date of the order.—*Nagappa v. Syed Badruddin*, 26 Bom. 353

Suit under sec 9 Specific Relief Act—An unsuccessful party in a proceeding under this section cannot be said to have been *dispossessed*, and therefore he has no cause of action to bring a suit under sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act.—*Moore v. Manoranjan*, 12 C.W.N. 696. But where the plaintiff was forcibly dispossessed by the defendant before the institution of proceedings under this section, and the trespasser's possession was maintained by the Magistrate, the plaintiff is entitled to sue under sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act—*Jwala v. Ganga Prasad*, 30 All. 331.

Evidentiary value:—Orders of Magistrates under this section are admissible in evidence to show the fact that such orders were made. They are also evidence of the following facts all or which appear from the orders themselves, viz., who the parties in dispute were, what the land in dispute was, and who was declared entitled to retain possession. For this purpose and to this extent such orders are admissible in evidence for and against every one, when the fact of possession and the date of order has to be ascertained. If the order refers to a map, that map is admissible in evidence to render the order intelligible—*Dinomont v. Brojo Mohini*, 29 Cal. 187 (P.C.), 6 C.W.N. 386.

429. Orders which cannot be made under this section:—The final order should declare which party is in possession and should state that he will continue in possession until evicted therefrom in due course of law, and should forbid all disturbance of such possession. An order in these terms "I warn the opposite party not to interfere with the possession of the first party in any way" is not one in sufficient compliance with the law—*Khubi v. Darbari*, 2 P.L.T. 267, 22 Cr L J 481. Where possession is found to be in one party, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to grant to the other party permission to cultivate the lands in dispute pending any suit that might be subsequently brought—*Shib Churn v. Ishen*, 18 W.R. 27. A Magistrate has no jurisdiction to order a

division of crops on the land between the parties—*Ram Narain v. Kailash*, 8 C.L.J. 242. Nor can he order that a person shall be maintained in possession until he has reaped the crops and then he shall give way to another—*In re Bunwari Lal*, 1 C.L.R. 136.

Where a Magistrate found that the disputed land was in the possession of the second party, and declared that party to be in possession of the land, but directed that two pathways on the land should be made over to the first party, held that there was nothing in this section which gave the Magistrate power to pass an order of this kind—*Asit Mohan v. Sarat Chandra*, 17 C.W.N. 793, 14 Cr L.J. 391. But the Bombay High Court dissents from this ruling and holds that in proceedings under this section, it is competent to the Magistrate not only to award possession of the land in dispute but also to grant a right of way to one of the parties. If the Magistrate has power to put the petitioners in possession of a certain portion of a land, he is also empowered (under sec 147, if not under sec 145) to give them a lesser right, viz the right to pass over a strip in that land—*In re Amarsang*, 48 Bom 512 (515), 26 Bom.L.R. 436.

In a dispute as to the right to tap a tree, the Magistrate cannot direct that a passage should be left, for the purpose of such tapping, in a wall which was being built by the second party—*Jiblal v. Emp*, 3 P.L.J. 316, 19 Cr L.J. 656.

A Magistrate is not competent to pass an order directing the method by which the possession is to be exercised or the agency by which the person in possession is to collect the profits—*Akaloo v. Mohesh Lal*, 36 Cal 986, 11 Cr.L.J. 28.

430. Supplementary order without notice :—Proceedings under this section were drawn up in respect of certain premises consisting of a *dalan*, a hotel and a privy, and the Magistrate made his final order with regard to the first two. Subsequently, the omission in respect of the privy being brought to his notice by one of the parties, the Magistrate declared that party's possession of it without notice to the other party. It was held that the order in respect of the privy should not have been made without hearing the other party—*Natabar v. Bireswar*, 22 C.W.N. 552, 19 Cr L.J. 732.

431. Order in respect of land not covered by proceedings :—In a proceeding under this section, the Magistrate is bound to ascertain and define the land in dispute, and he has no jurisdiction to pass an order in respect of lands which were not covered by the Initiatory proceeding—*Amriteswar v. Darpa Narain*, 7 C.W.N. 558; *Sukhari v. Ram Khelawan*, 4 P.L.T. 372, 24 Cr L.J. 309; *Uttam Singh v. Jodhan Rai*, 3 Pat 288 (295), 27 Cr L.J. 220.

A Magistrate would also be exceeding his jurisdiction if his final order covers plots of land not included in the preliminary order passed under sub-section (1)—*Chaman Singh v. Gook*, 11 C.W.N. xliii.

432. Alteration of proceedings :—If a Magistrate, after having initiated proceedings under sec. 145, afterwards finds that the dis-

pute is as regards a right of way over a land, rather than regarding the possession of the land, he can alter the proceedings under sec. 145 into proceedings under sec. 147 and pass an order under the latter section—*In re Amarsang*, 48 Bom. 512 (515), 26 Bom.L.R. 436; *Anath Bandhu v. Wahid Ali*, 26 Cr.L.J. 558 (Cal).

433. Persons bound by the order :—The parties whom the Magistrate has to deal with are not merely the actual parties to, but all persons who may be concerned in, the dispute, the object being to prevent a breach of the peace. Therefore it is not only the actual parties but *all parties who may have notice* of the proceedings that are bound by the order—*In re Nathubhai*, 11 Bom.L.R. 277. This is borne out by sub-section (3) which lays down that the preliminary order must be published at some conspicuous place at or near the subject of dispute. An order under this section is binding not only on the actual parties but also on persons who, though not made parties, were aware of the proceedings and acted in collusion with the second party—*Satya Charan v. K. E.*, 33 C.W.N. 1002 (1004). Once a declaration has been made as regards the possession of a land, it is binding on all persons interested therein. Consequently, it is for the person who disputes that possession, whether he was a party to the proceedings or not, to institute a suit in a Civil Court—*Jainath v. Ramiah Khan*, 10 P.L.T. 689, 30 Cr.L.J. 840 (841). The Oudh Chief Court, however, has been of opinion that orders under this section are not binding on persons who were not made parties to the proceedings. See *Muqimunnissa v. Ahmedunnissa*, 2 O.W.N. 704, 26 Cr.L.J. 1581; *Mahesh v. K.E.*, 11 O.L.J. 743, 20 Cr.L.J. 398.

An order under this section binds not only the actual parties but their *representatives* also. It is binding on a purchaser from the person against whom it was made and with knowledge of such order—*Goluck v. Kali Charan*, 13 Cal 175. It is binding upon all persons who may claim the property through the parties to the proceedings under a title derived subsequent to the order—*Jogendra v. Brojendra*, 23 Cal 731.

But a person who was merely examined as a witness in the proceeding is not a party bound by an order under this section—*Q. E. v. Kuppayyar*, 18 Mad 51.

434. Duration of the order :—An order of the Magistrate is meant to be a *temporary* order and is to be in operation until one or other of the parties applies for and obtains a determination of his rights in a Civil Court—*Amriteswari v. Darpa Narain*, 7 C.W.N. 558, *Kunja Behari v. Kheta Pal*, 29 Cal 208. It is intended to control only the period up to the time when the Civil Court takes seisin of the matter and passes such order as may be necessary for the protection of the property—*Barkatunnissa v. Abdul Aziz*, 22 All 214. This section does not empower a Magistrate to make an order *permanently* settling the difference of the parties—*Mad. High Court Pro.*, 23-6-1883.

435. Subsection (7)—Continuation of proceedings :
—Before the amendment of 1923, this sub-section stood as follows :—

“Proceedings under this section shall not abate by reason only of the death of any of the parties thereto.”

The sub-section has now been expanded. “The Magistrate has been authorised, on the death of a party, to make his legal representative a party to the proceedings, and if necessary, to decide who such legal representative is”—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914).

This clause supersedes the decision in *Bechu v. Debkumari*, 21 Cal. 404, where it was held that a son could not be made a party in place of his deceased father.

The words “may cause” show that the Magistrate is not bound to continue the proceedings on the death of a party. The provision in clause (7) is intended to keep alive the jurisdiction of the Court where the danger to the peace still exists inspite of the death of any party to the proceedings. If however, the dispute no longer exists and the danger has disappeared, the Magistrate has jurisdiction to discontinue the proceedings—*Kamalammal v Vavu Rowther*, 4 L.W. 57, 17 Cr.L.J. 138.

Death of Petitioner before High Court :—The death of the petitioner (who applied for revision of an order of a District Magistrate) during the pendency of the application for revision in the High Court, causes the application to abate. This sub-section only applies to proceedings before a Magistrate—*Krishen Deo v Hari Singh*, 1919 P.R. 23, 20 Cr.L.J. 730; *Subbaraju v Ramachandra*, 4 L.W. 440, 17 Cr.L.J. 369.

Sub-section (8) :—“The Magistrate has been empowered to pass necessary orders for the custody or sale of the property in dispute which is subject to speedy and natural decay”—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914). Thus, if the subject matter of dispute is a crop growing on the land, the Magistrate can cause the crop to be sold by auction and the price placed in deposit, as was done in *Mir Singh v. Makkhan*, 45 All. 404.

436. Sub-section (9) :—“We have added this sub-section on the lines of section 244 (2)”—*Report of the Joint Committee* (1922). Even prior to this amendment, there has been a large number of decisions empowering the Magistrate to issue summons to witnesses, which are given below.

Summons to witnesses —If the parties cannot procure the attendance of witnesses, it is the Magistrate's duty to issue summons for their attendance—*Ram Chandra v. Monohur*, 21 Cal. 29; *Surya Kanta v. Hem Chandra*, 30 Cal. 508. When an application for the issue of summonses to witnesses is made at a proper time, the Magistrate should not arbitrarily refuse his assistance merely on the ground that the number of witnesses mentioned is large—*Hurendra v. Bhowani*, 11 Cal. 762, or on the ground that the application for the issue of summonses is vexatious—*Gajuddi v. Ainuddi*, 18 C.W.N. 94, 15 Cr.L.J. 79. But it is not obligatory on a Magistrate to assist the parties in producing their witnesses, and they

cannot claim — a matter of right that processes should be issued by the Court to enable them to bring forward their evidence—*Tarapada v. Nurul Haq*, 32 Cal. 1093; *Harendra v. Girish Chandra*, 38 Cal. 24, 11 Cr.L.J. 530; *Arjun v. Juggar Nath*, 3 P.L.T. 433, 23 Cr.L.J. 275. A Magistrate is not bound to exhaust the processes of the Court in order to enforce the attendance of witnesses that do not appear or cannot be found—*Haripada v. Sanyasi*, 17 C.W.N. 144, 14 Cr.L.J. 40. Cf. the words "may if he thinks fit" in the sub-section

437. Sub-section (10)—Power to proceed under Sec. 107:—In *Balajit v. Bhoju*, 35 Cal. 117, it has been held that the word 'shall' in sub-section 1 ('he shall make an order in writing' etc.) is mandatory; and therefore where there is a *bona fide* dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace, the Magistrate is bound to proceed under this section, and he has no discretion to act under sec. 107. It was proposed by the Amending Bill of 1914 to substitute the word 'may' for 'shall', so as to give the Magistrate a discretion to proceed either under Sec. 107 or under Sec. 145. The Select Committee of 1916, instead of making the verbal alteration, added the present sub-section

There may be cases in which it would be necessary to bind parties over under section 107, in order to prevent a breach of the peace even though proceedings under sec. 145 had been taken. An order under section 145 is no bar to the passing of an order under sec. 107—*In re Muthia*, 36 Mad. 315, 14 Cr.L.J. 559, *K. E. v. Bandi*, 24 O.C. 21, 22 Cr.L.J. 384

Miscellaneous :—

438. Effect of prior decree on a proceeding under this section :—Where there is a decree of a Civil Court for possession in respect of the disputed land, the duty of a Criminal Court proceeding under this section is to find which party held such Civil Court decree and then to maintain that party in possession—*Sims v. Johurry*, 5 C.W.N. 563; *Atul Hazra v. Uma Charan*, 20 C.W.N. 796, 17 Cr.L.J. 182; *Md. Husain v. Pachayappa*, 42 M.L.J. 147, *Ram Krishna v. Emp.*, 3 P.L.T. 335, 23 Cr.L.J. 321; *Kedar Nath v. Jaleswar*, 4 P.L.T. 248; *Gobind Chander v. Abdul*, 6 Cal. 835, *Kunja Behari v. Khetra Pal*, 29 Cal. 208. It is the duty of the Magistrate to maintain any order which has been passed by the Civil Court, and therefore to take proceedings which must necessarily have the effect of modifying or cancelling such order or of interfering with the rights of parties determined by a Civil Court, — to assume a jurisdiction that the law does not contemplate—*Doulat v. Rameswari*, 26 Cal. 625, *In re Pandurang*, 24 Bom. 527; *Baldeo v. Raj Ballam*, 2 A.L.J. 274, *Brahmanath v. Sundarnath*, 17 A.L.J. 434, 20 Cr.L.J. 410; *Behari Gir v. Bhubaneswari*, 1 P.L.T. 9, 1 P.L.J. 104, 21 Cr.L.J. 200, *Abhoy Mandal v. Basu Rai*, 27 C.W.N. 267, 37 C.L.J. 256, *Durganand v. Hiranand*, 25 Cr.L.J. 331 (Pat)

Thus, where a Nazir acting under the authority of the Civil Court puts the auction-purchaser in possession of a *haut*, the Magistrate is not

competent to direct the judgment-debtor, who raises the plea that the property is debutter, to be retained in possession until ousted by a Civil Court, but should see that the possession as given by the Nazir is maintained, leaving it to the judgment-debtor to substantiate his claim as shebait in a Civil Court—*In re Chutraput Singh*, 5 C.L.R. 200. In a proceeding under this section, the Magistrate has no right to compel a party who has obtained a decree from a Civil Court in respect of the property in dispute to go back to the Civil Court and get something else. The Magistrate has nothing to do but to give effect to the decree of the Civil Court—*Lachmi v. Partab*, 27 Cr.L.J. 43 (Oudh). The Magistrate cannot ignore the decree of the Civil Court on the ground that that Court had no jurisdiction over the property. He cannot go behind the decision of the Civil Court and ignore the decree, even though that Court had no jurisdiction over the land. It is not for the Magistrate to question the validity of a decree that has not been set aside by a competent Court—*Abhoy Mondal v. Basu Rai*, 27 C.W.N. 267; *Tufani v. Bibi Umatul*, 5 P.L.T. 535, A.I.R. 1923 Pat. 765. Where a decree-holder has obtained delivery of possession under O. 21, rule 35, C.P. Code, in execution of his decree, the judgment debtor is precluded from raising the question, and a Magistrate acts illegally in starting a case under sec. 145 of the Crim. Pro. Code and in not upholding the Civil Court's decree and the delivery of possession given by that Court—*Behari v. Rani Bhubaneswari*, 5 P.L.J. 104, 21 Cr.L.J. 200. Where the Civil Court decree has defined the boundaries of a *jalkar* right, the Magistrate in instituting proceedings under this section ought to follow that decree and not to attempt an explanation of it—*Fani Bhusan v. Jamiruddin*, 6 C.W.N. 161. Where one of the parties to a dispute regarding the land has been actually put in possession of the same by a Civil Court, as a result of sale under its decree, it is the duty of a Criminal Court to uphold the status of that party as established by the Civil Court—*Krishna Alhadini v. Radha Syam*, 7 C.W.N. 118.

Where a dispute between the parties had been terminated by an order under the provisions of secs. 40 and 41 of the Bengal Survey Act, and there had also been an entry in the Record of Rights in accordance with that order, the Magistrate should, in determining the question of possession between the parties in a proceeding under this section, presume that the possession of the land was with the person who had title as determined by the decision under the Survey Act, and which title was further to be presumed from the entry in the Record of Rights—*Prafulla v. Hodding*, 21 C.W.N. 1059, 26 C.L.J. 39, 18 Cr.L.J. 988; *Srinath v. Pravat Chandra*, 18 Cr.L.J. 301 (Cal). A summary decision under the Bengal Land Registration Act is entitled to the same respect as a Civil Court decree on the question of possession, in a proceeding under this section—*Kulbans v. Ramsidh*, 1 P.L.T. 501, 21 Cr.L.J. 735; *Baba Lal v. Manager, Bettia Estate*, 1 P.L.T. 588, 21 Cr.L.J. 785. But if in the land registration proceedings there was no adjudication of possession by the Revenue Courts, and they refused to register the name of a particular party, the Magistrate in a proceeding under this section is

bound to determine as to which of the parties is in actual and physical possession of the property in dispute—*Babu Lal v. Manager, Bettia Estate*, 1 P.L.T. 588.

The Magistrate, in giving effect to a decree of the Civil Court is not entitled to go behind it or to put his own interpretation or construction upon it—*In re Raja Leelanand*, 1 C.L.R. 273; *Abhoy Mondal v. Basu Rai*, 27 C.W.N. 267. Thus, where in execution of a Civil Court decree in a suit in which only one of the members of a Mitakshara family was a party, the whole of the family property was delivered over to the purchaser, it was not competent to a Magistrate acting under this section to declare that the purchaser should be put into possession of a fractional share and that the shares of those persons who were not made parties to the suit ought not to have been included in the decree—*Madholal v. Jaglal*, 8 C.W.N. 841.

But every previous decree of a Civil Court or order of a Criminal Court is not necessarily conclusive; the evidentiary value to be attached to such a decree or order must depend upon the circumstances of each particular case—*Kuloda Kinkar v. Danesh*, 33 Cal 33. No hard and fast rule can be laid down to the effect that a Magistrate in a proceeding under this section must give effect to a prior decision or order of a Civil or Criminal Court. The Magistrate is not bound to maintain the decision blindly. If he finds that after the passing of the decree the possession of the party to whom possession was delivered by the Civil Court has been disturbed or that the property has changed hands, he has jurisdiction to pass orders irrespective of the Civil Court decree—*Parmeswar v. Kailaspati*, 1 P.L.J. 336, 17 Cr.L.J. 369; *Bhulan v. Kumari*, 5 P.L.T. 69, 25 Cr.L.J. 951; *Kedar Nath v. Jaleswar*, 4 P.L.T. 248, 24 Cr.L.J. 467; *Ram Baran v. Sagina*, 4 P.L.T. 333, 24 Cr.L.J. 939. So also, it is open to a Magistrate to go behind the order passed in favour of a party under the Survey and Settlement Act and the Bengal Tenancy Act. It is also open to the Magistrate to hold that on the evidence the presumption arising from an entry in the Record of Rights has been rebutted—*Syed Sadek Raza v. Sachindra*, 37 C.L.J. 128, 24 Cr.L.J. 569.

439. In order that the decree of the Civil Court may be binding on the Magistrate, three things are necessary, namely —

(1) *First, the decree must be recent*—It is the duty of the Magistrate to maintain the rights of the parties, when such rights have been declared by a competent Court within a time not remote from that of his taking proceedings under this section—*Doulat v. Rameshwari*, 26 Cal 625, *Pratap v. Sundarbans*, 24 Cr.L.J. 279, 3 P.L.T. 628, *Parameswar v. Kailaspati*, 1 P.L.J. 336; *Kedarnath v. Jaleswar*, 4 P.L.T. 248, *Rambaran v. Sagina*, 4 P.L.T. 333. Thus, it is the duty of the Magistrate to have found possession in accordance with the decree of the Civil Court, when a party had been put into possession by that Court eight days prior to the institution of proceedings under this section—*Gulraj v. Sheikh Bhatoor*, 32 Cal. 796, or within three months or so—*Kunja Behari v. Khetra Lal*, 29 Cal 208, C.W.N. 39, *Durganand v. Hiranand*, 25 Cr.L.J. 89 (Pat).

But if the decree of the Civil Court is not recent but several years old, it would be unsafe to act on that documentary evidence alone—*Q. v. Boohee Khan*, 5 W.R. 79 A decree which is 23 years old is not conclusive as to the question of possession, because it is not absolutely impossible that the party who obtained the decree 23 years ago should have been subsequently dispossessed—*Lowsen v. Kali Charan*, 8 C.W.N. 719. So also, with the case of a decree 17 years old—*Kuloda Kinkar v. Dancesh*, 33 Cal. 33 Even a decree four years old is not sufficiently conclusive, and the Magistrate in disregarding that decree would not be acting without jurisdiction—*Matangi Charan v. Lakhani*, 11 C.W.N. cxx.

(2) Secondly, the decree must have been passed between the same parties. A decree passed *ex parte* under which only symbolical possession was delivered or one which was not *inter partes* is not binding on a criminal court in proceedings under this section—*Promoda v. Khetra*, 25 Cr.L.J. 1104 (Cal.), *Atul v. Srinath*, 23 C.W.N. 982, 20 Cr.L.J. 840

(3) Thirdly, the decree or order of the Court must give possession.—Possession must have been given to one of the parties either by the decree itself, or by an order of the Court in execution of the decree (e.g. to an auction-purchaser)

Where the Civil Court deals only with the question of proprietorship of land, the decree of such Court will not bar a Magistrate from deciding the question of possession under this section—*Baldeo v. Raj Ballam*, 2 A.L.J. 274, 2 Cr.L.J. 236 Under sec. 145, the Magistrate has to make an inquiry as to possession which may be quite contrary to title supported by a decree of a Civil Court—*In re Anya Shidya*, 29 Bom.L.R. 715, 29 Cr.L.J. 578 (579) So also, where the suit in which the decree was passed was merely one for damages, in which the determination of title was incidentally necessary, but the suit was neither for possession nor for declaration of title, the decree in such suit was not conclusive as to possession and the Magistrate was competent to take proceedings under this section, see *Subbarama v. Mariya*, 1914 M.W.N. 798, 1 L.W. 403, 15 Cr.L.J. 559, *Shriram v. Samirnal*, 24 N.L.R. 148, 29 Cr.L.J. 902 (903). So also, where the question of possession was raised by the parties, but was neither fought out between them nor decided by the Court, the decree would not bar a proceeding under this section—*Annaswamy v. Muthu Kumara*, 15 Cr.L.J. 663 (Mad.)

There must be actual delivery of possession under the decree or order of the Civil Court. Where merely the sale was confirmed and the sale certificate issued, but there was no delivery of possession, actual or symbolical, to the petitioners, their rights were not protected from proceedings under this section—*Ragava v. Krishnasami*, 31 Mad. 416 Symbolical possession given to the purchaser would raise the presumption that the purchaser had possession, although it may be that slight evidence would suffice to rebut that presumption—*Raja Babu v. Muddu Mohan*, 14 Cal. 169. So, where it was found that in spite of symbolical possession being given to one party the other party continued in possession, the Magistrate had to determine who was in actual possession and it was no part

of his duty to protect the symbolical possession given by the Civil Court—*Ambar Ali v. Piran Ali*, 55 Cal. 826, 32 C.W.N. 275, 29 Cr.L.J. 503. See note 418 ante.

Where an order (of a Criminal Court) under section 522 of this Code was passed, directing restoration of immoveable property, but possession as a fact was never delivered to the petitioners, such infructuous order would not bar the jurisdiction of the Magistrate in taking proceedings under this section in respect of the same property—*Probhat v. Prosanna*, 18 C.W.N. 1088, 15 Cr.L.J. 700.

Effect of previous decree on third party—Where in a proceeding under this section, it appeared that the first party had previously brought a suit for rent against some persons (tenants) not parties to the proceeding and purchased the disputed properties at a sale held in execution of an *ex parte* decree obtained therein, and had been put in possession without the knowledge of the second party, and the Magistrate found that the rent suit brought by the landlord against the tenants in possession was not a *bona fide* one and declared the second party to be in possession of the disputed land, it was held that under the circumstances of the case the order of the Magistrate was not erroneous and was not liable to be set aside. A previous decree of the Civil Court relating to the proceedings in dispute may throw light upon the evidence on the matter, but the evidentiary value to be attached to such a piece of evidence must depend upon the particular circumstances of the individual case. Decrees of Courts so far as third parties are concerned may have different value in different cases. Where for instance, there has been a real contest between the parties to a suit, and upon an *adjudication regarding title or possession* a party has been awarded a decree and has been put in possession in execution of such a decree, it would be conclusive upon any person even though he was not a party to the decree. But cases of *money decrees* followed by sale of property would stand on a different footing. In these cases, the sale in execution only passes the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor; consequently there is no adjudication regarding title to property, and therefore it is not conclusive upon a third person as regards possession or title—*Atul v. Srinath*, 23 C.W.N. 982 (1985), 30 C.L.J. 123, 20 Cr.L.J. 840.

In estimating the value of delivery of possession against third parties, it is also material to see what is the true nature of the possession said to have been delivered—*Atul v. Srinath*, 23 C.W.N. 982 (1985).

440. Effect of previous decision of criminal courts as to possession :—In proceedings under sec 145, the Magistrates have always upheld the possession given by Civil Courts. But possession given by Criminal Courts cannot be treated in the same manner as possession given by the Civil Courts is treated in cases under this section—*Kedar v. Lalit*, 2 C.L.J. 147. A Magistrate does not act without jurisdiction merely because he does not accept the decision in a previous case of rioting as to possession—*Bhulan v. Kumari*, 5 P.L.T. 69, 25 Cr.L.J. 951. A judgment of a Criminal Court in which a person was acquitted, and in which it was

incidentally found that he was in possession can only be evidence of the fact that there was such a case and that it ended in such acquittal, but the finding on the question of possession which is a ground of such acquittal can hardly be any evidence in subsequent proceedings between the parties with regard to the property in dispute—*Shashimukhi v. Sarat Chandra*, 31 C.W.N. 310, 28 Cr.L.J. 329 (331).

But when proceedings had once been taken under sec. 145, in which the Magistrate had decided the second party to be in possession of the property until the decision of a Civil Court was obtained, but the parties instead of going to the Civil Court continued to dispute among themselves, whereupon fresh proceedings were taken under sec. 145, held that the Magistrate in deciding the second case was concluded by the previous decision of the Criminal Court as to possession, and was not entitled to take any action contrary to that decision, unless he found that there had been a change of possession since the decision of the first case—*Jagat Singh v. Sunder Singh*, 27 P.L.J. 630, 27 Cr.L.J. 815.

441. Suit for damages for improper proceedings:—Where proceedings are initiated under this section by a party who is eventually unsuccessful, it is open to the successful party to sue for damages. The damages in such a case are remote and are sufficiently compensated by any order for costs that might be made in the proceedings—*Ram Das v. Md. Faqir*, 20 A.L.J. 205, A.I.R. 1922 All. 143.

442. Effect of order under this section on a subsequent civil suit:—An order under this section does not decide any question of title. Therefore where a case under section 145 was compromised by the parties, and the Magistrate passed an order in terms of that compromise, it was held that the order simply settled the question of possession but did not determine the question of title, and the parties were not therefore precluded by the order from having recourse to the Civil Court for the determination of that question—*Gopi Das v. Madho Lal*, 45 All. 162, 20 A.L.J. 932.

Effect of order on a subsequent criminal case:—Although the Magistrate may declare a certain party to be in possession of a certain field, the other party on being subsequently charged under sec. 379 I. P. Code for carrying away the crops of the field may show by adducing evidence that he was in actual possession of the field in spite of the order under sec. 145 declaring the first party in possession—*Rakhal v. Makham*, 31 C.W.N. 964, 28 Cr.L.J. 827.

Limitation for subsequent civil suit:—See Art. 47 of the Indian Limitation Act.

443. Striking off proceedings:—Where proceedings under this section have once been started, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to strike them off. He must pass an order under sub-section (5) or (6) of sec. 145 or under sec. 146—*Trilochan v. Joggeswar*, 20 Cr.L.J. 464 (Pat.); *Sawke v. Nathuni*, 6 P.L.T. 258, 26 Cr.L.J. 105.

444. Fresh proceedings :—When an order under clause (6) has been passed, the proceedings terminate and a Magistrate cannot institute fresh proceedings so long as such order is in force—*Sadhu v. Mahammad Ali*, 15 C.W.N. 568, 12 Cr.L.J. 32. When a final order has been passed and one of the parties has been declared to be in possession, the order of the Magistrate is binding on all the parties, and the unsuccessful party cannot be allowed to disturb the possession of the other party without having recourse to a civil suit. It is not proper for a Magistrate to initiate fresh proceedings at his instance—*Aran Sardar v. Hara Sundar*, 27 C.W.N. 171, 24 Cr.L.J. 97. But where the parties compromised and filed a petition of compromise and according to the terms thereof the Magistrate ordered the land to be in the possession of both sides ■ stated in the petition of compromise, such an order was one falling under clause (5) showing that no dispute existed, and not an order under clause (6), and the Magistrate could therefore institute fresh proceedings—*Sadhu v. Mahammad Ali*, 15 C.W.N. 568, 12 Cr.L.J. 32.

When a party has been declared to be in possession as a result of proceedings under section 145, fresh proceedings under the same section cannot be started against him unless it is shown that the previous order has been duly vacated or possession has been amicably surrendered. But subsequent proceeding can be started and fresh order made in respect of properties other than the one comprised in the first order—*Bajit Lal v. Harakh Singh*, 1 P.L.T. 557, 21 Cr.L.J. 753.

During pendency of High Court rule :—During the pendency of a rule issued upon the District Magistrate to show cause why his order under sec 145 should not be set aside, it is irregular and highly improper for a Subordinate Magistrate to institute fresh proceedings, as the proceedings in the Lower Court with reference to the matter in dispute must be considered to have been stayed. When a rule is issued by the High Court on the District Magistrate staying further proceedings, all Subordinate Magistrates are bound by it, and would not be justified in instituting fresh proceedings during the pendency of the rule—*Pran Ballabh v. Rash Behari*, 4 C.L.J. 418, 4 Cr.L.J. 397.

Fresh Materials :—When an order striking off proceedings under this section is passed, its effect is to destroy the proceedings, and anything done thereafter under this section must start afresh upon fresh materials, and not stand upon the basis of the earlier proceedings—*Tarini v. Amulya*, 20 Cal. 867, *Manik v. Azimuddi*, 6 C.W.N. 923, *Khubi v. Darbati*, 2 P.L.T. 267, 22 Cr.L.J. 481; *Ghulam Md v. Crown*, 3 Lah. 401.

Power of High Court :—The High Court cannot direct the revival of proceedings under sec 145, when they have been stayed by the Magistrate—*Manindra v. Barada Kanta*, 30 Cal. 112.

445. Further Inquiry :—Sec 437 (now 436) allows a further inquiry into a complaint, which means under sec 4 (h) a complaint of an 'offence'; and since sec 145 is not directed to any offence at all, sec 436 does not authorise a District Magistrate or Sessions Judge to order a

further inquiry into a case under sec. 145—*Chathu v. Niranjan*, 20 Cal 729.

446. Review:—There is no authority for holding that a Magistrate can review a final order passed by himself under this section—*Parbutty v Sajjad Ahmad*, 35 Cal. 350; *Ram Dulare v. Ajodhya*, 16 O.C. 192, 14 Cr L J. 605. *Narayan v. Chandrabhaga*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1289 (Nag); *Lallan v. Ram Richcha*, 43 All 258, 24 A.L.J. 227, 27 Cr.L.J. 466. The remedy of the person aggrieved is to go to the Civil Court—*Lallan v Ram Richcha* (supra)

447. Revision—Under sub-section (3) of section 435, before it was omitted by the Amendment Act of 1923, proceedings under this Chapter were not liable to revision by any Court, whether by the High Court or by the Sessions Judge or by the District Magistrate; so that the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under section 439 of this Code was not competent to revise an order passed under this Chapter—*Laldhari v Sukdeo*, 27 Cal 892; *In re Pandurang*, 25 Bom. 179; *Kamal Kutty v Udayvarma*, 36 Mad. 275; *Pulani v. Rathna*, 26 M L J 208; *Maharaj Tewari v Har Charan*, 26 All. 144; *Jhingai v Ram Partap*, 31 All 150, *Syeda v Lal Singh*, 36 All 233, *Babban v. Baldeo*, 4 A.L.J. 91, *Nathu Ram v. Emp.*, 15 A L J. 270; *Har Hari v. Natha Lal*, 18 A.L.J. 1140, *Ibadulla v. Rahatulla*, 18 O.C. 69, 16 Cr.L.J. 541; *Balmukund v Crown*, 1 S L R 50; *Farid v. Piru*, 1 S L R.207

In order to exercise its revisional power in respect of orders passed under this Chapter, the High Court had to invoke the aid of sec. 15 of the Charter Act—*Murballabh v Luchmeswar*, 26 Cal. 188; *Laldhari v. Sukdeo*, 27 Cal. 892; *Sakhlai v Tarachand*, 33 Cal. 68; *Sri Mohan v Narasingh*, 27 Cal 259, *Jagamahan v Ram Kumar*, 28 Cal. 416; *In re Nathu Lal*, 24 All. 315, or sec 107 of the Government of India Act—*Nathu Ram v Emp.*, 15 A L J 270; *Parameswari v. Kailashpali*, 1 P.L.J. 336; *Thylae v Srirangaraya*, 43 M.L.J. 624; *Moiram v. Brijan*, 47 Cal 438; *Ali Md v. Piggott*, 48 Cal 522. But this power could be exercised only by the Chartered High Courts, and not by the non-chartered High Courts, e.g., the Chief Courts and the Judicial Commissioner's Courts

And the only cases in which the High Court could exercise its powers of revision were those in which the proceedings, though purporting to be proceedings under this Chapter, were not really so; as for instance where there was an initial want of jurisdiction by reason of there being no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace, or by reason of the Magistrate not being a first class Magistrate, or where the Magistrate exceeded his jurisdiction by exercising powers not conferred by this section—*In re Pandurang*, 24 Bom. 527; *Nga Shit v. Nga Ya*, U.B.R. (1917) 33, 19 Cr.L.J. 389; *Nga Hpay v. Nga Aung*, 19 Cr.L.J. 381; *In re Pandurang*, 25 Bom 179; *Mahadeo v. Basu*, 25 All. 537; *Thylae v. Srirangaraya*, 43 M.L.J. 624; *Wajid Ali v. Abdul*, 5 O C 1; *Udai Bhan v. Ram Samujh*, 19 O.C. 136, 18 Cr.L.J. 100. And unless there was want of jurisdiction on the part of the Magistrate, the High Court could not exercise its power of revision even though the decision of the Magistrate was wrong—

Chintamani v. Jagannath, 19 C.W.N. 123 (124); *Iklas v. Raghuraj*, 12 O.C. 400, 11 Cr.L.J. 69.

Now, by the Amendment Act XVIII of 1923, sub-section (3) of section 435 has been omitted, and the effect of this amendment is to confer on the High Court the power of revision under this Code in respect of orders under this Chapter. These orders can now be revised by the High Court not only on the question of jurisdiction but also on the question of illegality—*Chhakauri v. Isher Singh*, 6 P.L.T. 799, 27 Cr.L.J. 142, A.I.R. 1926 Pat. 196.

But though the High Court is invested with powers of revision, still orders passed by a competent Magistrate are not to be lightly interfered with by the High Court except in exceptional cases, first because the object of such orders is to preserve peace, and secondly because the aggrieved party has his remedy by a civil suit—*Krishnappier v. Alamelu*, 5 L.W. 165, 18 Cr.L.J. 23, *In re Lingaraja*, 17 Cr.L.J. 143 (Mad.); *Hardeo v. Ram Charitar*, 17 Cr.L.J. 286 (Pat). Proceedings under this chapter are of a special nature, and are such that the Magistrates may be allowed greater liberty in carrying out those provisions than they are allowed in trying ordinary crime, because upon the Magistrate and the police is thrown the burden of maintaining the public peace. In this view, it is undesirable that such orders should be interfered with in revision, unless they are made without jurisdiction and are obviously unreasonable or unjust—*Sudalaimuthu v. Enan*, 16 Cr.L.J. 767 (Mad). Where a Magistrate duly empowered to act under this Chapter takes proper proceedings and passes an order, the High Court has no power to revise the proceedings either under this Code or under section 15 of the Charter Act—*Jhingai v. Ram Pratap*, 31 All. 150, or under section 107 of the Government of India Act—*Matukdhari v. Jaisari*, 39 All. 612, 15 A.L.J. 576; *Sundar Nath v. Emp.*, 40 All. 364; *Sakhawat v. Emp.*, 17 A.L.J. 321, 41 All. 302. Thus, the High Court as a Court of Revision cannot interfere with the decision of a trial Court on the fact of possession so long as there is evidence in support of the finding—*Abdul Satar v. Udha Lal*, 8 Lah.L.J. 47, 27 P.L.R. 102, 27 Cr.L.J. 471. Where the evidence had been fully discussed by the Trial Court, any attempt on the part of the High Court to review the evidence and interfere with the decision of the Magistrate would be to convert an application for revision into an appeal—*Abdul Satar v. Udha Lal*, (supra).

The District Magistrate cannot himself set aside the decision of the lower Court passed under sec. 145; he must refer the case to the High Court under sec. 438—*Eseruddi v. Otaruddi*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1166, A.I.R. 1925 Cal 1234; *Hiralal v. Emp.*, 11 O.L.J. 59, 25 Cr.L.J. 440, A.I.R. 1924 Oudh 331.

448. Grounds of interference :—The High Court has the power to interfere where in a proceeding under this section necessary parties were left out or wrong persons were made parties—*Laldhari v. Sukdeo*, 27 Cal 892, or where the Magistrate refused to receive the evidence tendered to him—*Tirumalraja v. Lodd Gobind Doss*, 29 Mad.

561; *Jhengar v. Baijnath*, 11 A.L.J. 586; *Kolha Koer v. Muneswar*, 34 Cal 840, *Patil v. Ganapati*, 10 Cr.L.J. 529 (Pat); or where the Magistrate's finding of fact as regards possession was perverse and contrary to a mass of un rebutted evidence—*Emp. v. Sarju Prosad*, 27 O.C. 290, 25 Cr.L.J. 1066, or where no order in writing such as is required by sub-section (1) was recorded by the Magistrate—*Hakam v. Ralia Ram*, 4 Lah. 66, *Kaku v. Harnaman*, 1917 P.W.R. 28; *Md. Hasham v. Md. Jhami*, 20 Cr.L.J. 124, *Bihari v. Chajju*, 1907 A.W.N. 49, *Budhan v. Ram Rakha*, 1915 P.L.R. 169, 16 Cr.L.J. 628; or where the Magistrate adopted none of the procedure required under this section and passed an order without any reference thereto—*Dewan Chand v. Emp.*, 1899 P.R. 2; *Dhani Ram v. Bhola Nath*, 1902 P.R. 23, *Abdulla v. Gunda*, 1907 P.R. 7, *Budhan v. Ram Rakha*, 1915 P.L.R. 169, 16 Cr.L.J. 628; *Tara Chand v. Behari*, 1916 P.R. 22, 18 Cr.L.J. 36, or where the Magistrate refused to issue process for the attendance of material witnesses—*Surya Kanta v. Hem Chunder*, 30 Cal 508 *Madhab Chandra v. Martin*, 30 Cal 508 (Note), or where no opportunity was given by the Magistrate to the applicant to produce his evidence—2 C.L.J. 286n; or where the Magistrate discarded the evidence altogether and based his decision merely upon his local inquiry—*Lal Behari v. Bejoy Sankar*, 10 C.W.N. 181; or where the proceedings were initiated by the Magistrate on a vague Police report—*Suryakanta v. Jagadindra*, 11 C.W.N. 198, or where the Magistrate declared possession with a party who had long been out of possession—*Shankar v. Bhayaji*, 20 Cr.L.J. 445 (Nag); or where the Magistrate passed an order in respect of a property which was not in dispute and declared the property to be in the possession of a person who was not a party to the proceedings—*Radhamohan v. Naimuddi*, 19 Cr.L.J. 653 (Cal)

449. What the High Court can do in revision :—The High Court, in the exercise of its power of revision, is competent to consider the whole evidence—*Reid v. Richardson*, 14 Cal 361; and to find out whether there was evidence on which the Magistrate could come to the conclusion which he arrived at—*Raja Babu v. Muddun Mohun*, 14 Cal 169; and can pass the proper order which the Lower Court ought to have made. Thus, where it is difficult to come to a conclusion as to the fact of possession, the wise and proper course is to pass an order of attachment under section 146, and if in such a case the Magistrate has passed an order under sec. 145, the High Court in revision can alter the order under sec. 145 into one under sec. 146—*Reid v. Richardson*, 14 Cal 361, *Katras Jheria Coal Co v. Sibkristo*, 22 Cal. 297; *Satyendra v. Krishnodhone*, 20 C.W.N. 1014, 11 Cr.L.J. 80. The High Court in revision can alter an order of the Magistrate under sec. 145 into an order under sec. 147—*In re Amarsang*, 48 Bom. 512 (515). The High Court has inherent power to give directions as to the disposal of property which was attached and has been dealt with by a subordinate Magistrate in the course of proceedings instituted without jurisdiction under this section—*Ali Muhammad v. Piggott*, 48 Cal. 522 (F.B.), 32 C.L.J. 270, 22 Cr.L.J. 213

Costs in revision :—See note 478 under sec. 148.

146. (1) If the Magistrate decides that none of the parties was then in such possession, or is unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was then in such possession of the subject of dispute, he may attach it until a competent Court has determined the rights of the parties thereto, or the person entitled to possession thereof;

Power to attach subject of dispute.

Provided that the District Magistrate or the Magistrate who has attached the subject of dispute may withdraw the attachment at any time if he is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of a breach of the peace in regard to the subject of dispute.

(2) When the Magistrate attaches the subject of dispute, he may, if he thinks fit, and if no receiver of the property, the subject-matter in dispute, has been appointed by any Civil Court, appoint a receiver thereof, who, subject to the control of the Magistrate, shall have all the powers of a receiver appointed under the Code of Civil Procedure :

Provided that, in the event of a receiver of the property, the subject-matter in dispute, being subsequently appointed by any Civil Court, possession shall be made over to him by the receiver appointed by the Magistrate, who shall thereupon be discharged.

Change :—The two provisos and the italicised words in sub-section (2) have been added by sec. 29 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923). For reasons see below.

450. Conditions precedent .—In order to give jurisdiction for an order under sec. 146, it is necessary that there should be jurisdiction over the proceedings under sec. 145, which again pre-suppose a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. If there was no dispute concerning any land, there would be no jurisdiction of a Magistrate to proceed under secs 145 and 146—*Ballam v. Lal Babu*, 19 Cr L J. 105 (Pat). Sec 146 is a continuation of sec 145, and therefore the initiation of proceedings under sec 145 is preliminary to an order under sec 146. Where the record showed that the Magistrate made an order under this section without following the procedure prescribed by sec 145 and without making an order in writing and that there was nothing to show that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed, the attachment was set aside by the High Court—*Azizuddin v. Emp*, 2 A L-J 149.

The legality of an order under sec 146 depends upon its having been preceded by legal proceedings under sec. 145, and where the whole pro-

ceedings under sec 145 are illegal (e.g. by reason of the Magistrate's failure to comply with the requirements of clause 4 of sec. 145), an order made in the case under sec 146 cannot stand on a better footing—*Subbarama v. Mariya Pillai*, 1 L.W. 493, 15 Cr.L.J. 559

451. Magistrate's duty to make inquiry and take evidence—It is the duty of the Magistrate, before taking proceedings under this section, to take evidence and make inquiry (see clause 4 of sec. 145) in order to ascertain, if possible, who was in possession—*Parsuram v. Shivajalan*, 3 P.L.T. 434, 23 Cr.L.J. 277; *In re Ram Soondaree*, 1 C.L.R. 86. An order passed under this section without examining any witnesses, although a number of them were present in Court, is invalid—*Siba Nath v. Ramkishore*, 35 C.L.J. 291, 23 Cr.L.J. 688. Unless and until a Magistrate has made the inquiry contemplated by sec 145, that is to say, unless he has received and considered the evidence produced by the parties, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to proceed under sec 146—*Inayatulla v. Amanat*, 1 O.L.J. 242, 15 Cr.L.J. 470; *Daulatali v. Hedait*, 32 C.W.N. 843; *Khedan v. Hussaini*, 2 P.L.T. 15, 22 Cr.L.J. 323, *Ambika v. Wazedali*, 23 C.W.N. 910. Where a Magistrate in a proceeding under sec. 145 made an order under sec. 146 on the ground that it was doubtful which of the parties was in actual possession, without judicially considering the important documentary evidence of possession placed before him, it was held that the order must be set aside and the case re-heard by another Magistrate—*Ambika v. Wazedali*, 23 C.W.N. 910, 20 Cr.L.J. 342.

Where the Magistrate did not make the slightest attempt to satisfy himself as to the factum of possession, and attached the land without taking any evidence and making any local inquiry—*Sheo Balak v. Bhagwat*, 40 Cal. 105, 16 C.W.N. 1052, or where the order of attachment was passed without examining the witnesses cited by the petitioner—*Neelamegam v. Muragappa*, 2 Weir 110; or where the Magistrate discarded and rejected practically every piece of evidence that might have led to a correct finding as to possession—*Prafulla v. Hodding*, 21 C.W.N. 1059, 26 C.L.J. 39; or where the Magistrate omitted to receive the evidence produced by a party and passed his order merely on a consideration of the written statements of the parties—*Kolha v. Muneswar*, 34 Cal. 840, his order was without jurisdiction. So also, where in a proceeding under sec. 145, the parties appeared on the day of hearing but did not file any written statement nor produced any evidence, and the Magistrate without granting time to the parties for the production of evidence or for filing written statements, said that it was impossible to come to a conclusion as to the fact of possession and passed an order under this section, the order was without jurisdiction and therefore invalid—*Sk. Mansar Ali v. Matiulla*, 12 C.W.N. 896. But where the parties failed to adduce evidence, even though sufficient time was allowed to them to do so, the Magistrate could proceed under this section—*Ronendra v. Kishori Lal*, 14 C.W.N. 80, 11 Cr.L.J. 26.

But it is not incumbent on the Magistrate to make a local investigation as contemplated by sec. 148. A Magistrate who attaches the

property without such an investigation does not commit an error in procedure—*Upendra v. Prasanna*, 20 Cr.L.J. 17 (Cal.).

Effect of prior decree of Civil Court:—If the matter which is in dispute under sec. 147 has already been adjudicated upon by a Civil Court, the Magistrate will have no jurisdiction to enquire into a claim which is entirely contrary to that Court's decree—*In re Anya Shidya*, 29 Bom. L.R. 715 Where the petitioner had been put into possession of certain lands in execution of a decree obtained by him in a Civil Court establishing his right to them, the Magistrate was not competent to attach the lands under section 146 It was his duty to have found possession in accordance with the decree—*Gulraj v. Sk. Bhatoo*, 32 Cal. 796. Even though the petitioner has not obtained possession of the property in accordance with the Civil Court decree, still when the Civil Court has determined the rights of the parties and has also determined the possession so far as it was in its power to do so, it is not competent for the Magistrate to say that he is unable to determine the question of possession, and to attach the property under sec. 146. The order of attachment is unjustifiable—*Parabhans v. Sheodarshan*, 48 All. 397, 24 A.L.J. 399, 27 Cr.L.J. 559. See Note 438 under section 145

452. Inability to decide the fact of possession:—The doubt upon which a Magistrate can act under this section must be the result of his inability to determine the question of possession upon the evidence offered by both parties, and not a doubt in his mind entertained without receiving evidence and without inquiry—*Khedan v. Hussani*, 2 P.L.T. 15; *Sheobalak v. Bhagwat*, 40 Cal. 105; *Ambica v. Wazedali*, 23 C.W.N. 910 The Magistrate would not be justified in saying that it was not possible to ascertain who was in possession, and in attaching the property, merely because the parties did not appear He ought to have made some inquiry into the question of possession—*Parasuram v. Shibjatan*, 3 P.L.T. 434, 23 Cr.L.J. 277 In order to show the Magistrate's inability to decide the question of possession, he ought to discuss the evidence in the case, and give reasons for his inability—*Khedan v. Hussani*, 2 P.L.T. 15, 22 Cr.L.J. 323 Where the order under this section did not show that it was not possible on the evidence to decide as to the fact of possession, but would rather seem to indicate that the Magistrate could not or would not decide whether the witnesses on either side were to be believed, the order was set aside. This section is not meant to relieve the Magistrate from the duty of deciding the case on the merits, but allows an order of attachment to be made only when it is not possible to decide which party is in possession—*Neelamegan v. Mooroguppa*, 2 Weir 110 A Magistrate should be extremely reluctant to attach the property in dispute. In cases where the land is jungle or waste, it is quite possible that the Magistrate may be unable to satisfy himself as to the possession of the parties But where the land is admittedly subject to cultivation year by year and season by season, the Magistrate will be only admitting his own weakness if he states that he cannot come to a decision It is his duty to collect information and sift it, and decide the fact of possession—*Rani Bahal v. Rang Bahadur*, 5 P.L.T. 589, 25 Cr.L.J. 1295, A.I.R. 1924

Pat. 804. The Magistrate ought to make a reasonable effort to decide the question as to possession, and ought not to attach the property so long as it is possible for him to decide which of the contesting parties was really in possession of the property, and if he can decide that question in favour of one of the parties, he should give effect to that decision by passing an order under section 145 (6)—*Wayezul v. Shobrati*, 4 P.L.T. 441, 24 Cr.L.J. 754.

Nature of possession—In a dispute between the wife of a lunatic and the manager of his estate as to the possession of certain property, there was no doubt that the wife was in actual possession of the property, but the only doubt existed as to the *nature of the possession*, that is whether her possession was on her own behalf or on behalf of her lunatic husband; it was held that such a doubt as to the *nature of the possession* would not justify a Magistrate in taking action under this section—*In re Juggodeshary*, 3 C.L.R. 94.

Portion of subject of dispute—Where there is a dispute as regards the possession of a fishery extending over several miles in length, and the Magistrate is unable to satisfy himself as to the possession of the whole length in question, he should ascertain so far as he can the possession of some portion or portions thereof. As regards the portion as to which he is able to say that so and so is in possession he should proceed under section 145, and only as to the remainder should he proceed under section 146—*Upendra v. Prasanna*, 20 Cr.L.J. 17 (Cal.)

Rights of parties—The Magistrate can attach the property only when he decides that none of the parties is in possession, or when he cannot satisfy himself as to which of the parties is in possession; but he cannot take action under this section merely because he is unable to satisfy himself as to which of the parties is entitled to possession or has a right to the property. Inability to decide the right to the property cannot justify an order of attachment of the property—*In re Somanath*, 11 Bom. L.R. 723.

'Then':—i.e., at the date of the preliminary order passed under section 145 (1). See notes under section 145 (4).

453. When attachment can be made:—When it is difficult for a Magistrate trying a case under section 145 to come to a conclusion as to the fact of possession, the wise and proper course to be adopted is to pass an order of attachment under this section and not to pass any order under sec. 145—*Reid v. Richardson*, 14 Cal. 361. To entitle a Magistrate to make an order of attachment, he must either decide that none of the parties are in actual possession, or that he is unable to satisfy himself as to which of them is in possession—*Nathu Ram v. Emperor*, 15 A.L.J. 270, 18 Cr.L.J. 557. This section was intended to apply to a case in which on the evidence before him a Magistrate could not find possession with either of the parties—*Jayanti v. Middleton*, 27 Cal. 785.

Where the Magistrate finds neither the first party nor the second party in possession, but finds that actual possession is with a stranger

who does not claim a right to be in possession, the Magistrate should proceed to attach the property—*Bhagjogin v. Emp.*, 20 Cr.L.J. 215 (Cal.).

When both parties are in possession of the disputed property, no order under this section can be made—*Md. Koolayappa v. Shaik Abdul Khadir*, 27 M.L.J. 169, 15 Cr.L.J. 572. Where the Magistrate found that both parties were at the time of the order collecting rents from the raiyats, this amounted to a finding that both parties were in possession, and consequently the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to order attachment under this section—*Rajendra v. Mahomed Arzumand*, 9 C.W.N. 887.

454. Order of attachment:—An order under this section cannot be made in the absence of the parties or *ex parte*; the proper course is to pass the order in the presence of both parties—*Luchmee v. Bhusi*, 19 Cr.L.J. 225 (Pat.).

A Magistrate in passing an order under this section must give reasons for making the order—*Khedan v. Hussaini*, 2 P.L.T. 15, 22 Cr.L.J. 323. But the High Court will not interfere with the judgment of a Magistrate under this section merely on the ground that the order is brief and does not state reasons at length. If the High Court is satisfied that the Magistrate has given full consideration to the evidence on the record, it will not interfere—*Kanai v. Hyder Ali*, 37 C.L.J. 127, 24 Cr.L.J. 575.

Signature of Magistrate—Where in a proceeding under this section, the Magistrate initialled the order, instead of signing it, it was held to be a mere irregularity, not affecting the order—*Deo Sarun*, 12 C.L.R. 221.

455. What property can be attached:—In order that an order might be passed under sec. 145 or 146, the subject matter of the dispute must be clearly determined—*Suryakanta v. Jagadindra*, 11 C.W.N. 198.

The 'subject of dispute' referred to in secs. 145 and 146 must be read as referring to the whole or to any component part or parts of the property in dispute. If the component part in respect of which the dispute exists is distinct and separable from the rest, the Magistrate is not bound to attach the whole property but may attach that part only. If, however, the subject matter in dispute is indivisible and must be dealt with as a whole, it must be dealt with in such a way as to make in regard to it one order under this section—*Sadar Ali v. Abdul*, 5 C.W.N. 710; see also *Katras Jheria Coal Co. v. Shibkisto*, 22 Cal. 297 cited in Note 427 under sec. 145.

Temple—To attach a temple does not necessarily mean that the temple must be closed altogether. When third parties or the general community are interested in it, it is the duty of the Magistrate, when assuming charge of it in order to preserve the public peace, to make the best arrangements possible to preserve the rights of such third parties or the public, and to have the *pūja* of the temple performed—*Sundara v. Vallinayaka*, 2 Weir 110, *In re Mattusami*, 2 Weir 112.

Crops—The Magistrate has no jurisdiction to attach crops cut and stored, the word 'crops' occurring in sec. 145 refers to standing crops alone—*Ramzan v. Janardhan*, 30 Cal. 110.

In a dispute between the rival landlords as to the possession of land, the Magistrate is not competent to attach the crops on the land belonging to the tenants—*Denomoni v. Mazafar Ali*, 5 C.W.N. 105.

Moveables.—The Magistrate ordering attachment of immoveable property can take charge of all moveables found inside the immoveable property, although he cannot attach the moveable property by itself under this section. Therefore, where the Magistrate attached a *muth* and took charge of all the moveables (e.g. cattle, jewellery) that were found by him in the *muth* at the time of attachment, it was held that the Magistrate acted legally—*Bharat Das v. Ram Charitar*, 1 P.L.J. 356, 18 Cr.L.J. 287; *Gokul Nath v. Baram Nath*, 24 A.L.J. 383, 27 Cr.L.J. 429.

Cultivation of attached land:—A person who cultivates immoveable property which has been attached by a Magistrate under this section commits the offence of criminal trespass, and he is liable to be punished under sec 447 I.P.C.—*Nagori v. Q. E.*, 8 M.L.J. 253. No suit for damages for the loss of profits resulting from the non-cultivation of land owing to an attachment under this section lies against any party—*Ammani v. Sellayi Ammal*, 6 Mad 426.

456. Powers of Magistrate:—A Magistrate attaching a property under this section has the power to make any order regarding the management of the property. The High Court will not interfere with such order—*Lokenath v. Nedu*, 29 Cal 382. He can lease the land attached—*Greesh Chunder*, 17 W 38, or after cancelling a lease already granted, can grant a fresh lease—*Lokenath v. Nedu*, 29 Cal. 392.

A Magistrate passing an order under this section is entitled to refuse to hand over the value of the produce of the property to any of the parties to the dispute, but he has no power to treat the profits as *derelict* and as the property of the Government—*Mohar Singh v. Crown*, 1911 P.L.R. 123, 12 Cr.L.J. 403.

A Magistrate attaching a property under this section cannot hand over possession of the property to one of the contending parties on failure of the other to institute a suit for possession in the Civil Court—*Ram Kumar v. Thakur Ojha*, 3 P.L.T. 648, 23 Cr.L.J. 562.

457. Possession by Magistrate:—When a Magistrate attaches lands under this section, the possession of the Magistrate must be taken to be a possession on behalf of such of the rival parties as might establish a right to possession by a civil suit—*Beni Prasad v. Shahzada*, 32 Cal 856. That is, the Magistrate's possession is not adverse to the true owner. The legal possession of the property is said to be in the true owner during the period of attachment—*Raja of Venkatagiri v. Isakapalli*, 26 Mad. 410; *Panna Lal v. Panchu*, 49 Cal. 544; *Brojendra v. Sarojini*, 20 C.W.N. 481; *Sarat Chandra v. Bibhabati*, 34 C.L.J. 302.

458. Decision of a competent Court:—The attachment is to continue until a competent Court has determined the rights of the parties; and therefore it is the duty of a Magistrate to withdraw the attachment and release the property as soon as it is brought to his notice that—

a competent Court has determined the rights of the parties or of the person entitled to possession—*Maharaja of Venkatagiri v. Srinivasa*, 17 M.L.T. 392, 16 Cr.L.J. 481. The Magistrate is bound to abide by the subsequent decision of a competent Civil Court and to withdraw the attachment, even though the suit in the Civil Court was not *inter partes*, (as for instance where the suit was instituted by a third party, and the first party and some members of the second party were not made parties to it)—*Asesh Kumar v. Kishori Mohan*, 39 C.L.J. 353, 25 Cr.L.J. 937. The fact that an appeal has been preferred against the decision of the Civil Court and is pending is no good reason for the Magistrate to keep the property any longer in attachment—*Crown v. Abdul Aziz*, 1917 P.W.R. 46, 19 Cr.L.J. 261; *Ramsri v. Sri Krishan*, 46 All. 879, 22 A.L.J. 803; *Maung Tha Zan v. Maung Ba Gale*, 7 Bur.L.T. 293, 15 Cr.L.J. 500.

It is not necessary that there should be a decree in favour of all of the parties to enable the Magistrate to withdraw an attachment made under this section; and if there is an adjudication by a Civil Court in favour of some at least of the parties, that is sufficient for the purpose of enabling the Magistrate to walk out of the property—*Vithoba v. Narasinga*, 20 M.L.T. 247, 4 L.W. 55, 17 Cr.L.J. 331.

The expression '*competent Court*' means not only a Civil Court, but includes a Survey Court—*Ambler v. Sami Ahmed*, 37 Cal 331, 11 Cr.L.J. 372.

Under the Code of 1882, the words were '*Civil Court*' and therefore it was held in *Ganga Prasad v. Narain*, 15 All 394, that this section did not authorise a Magistrate to pass an order of attachment in a dispute between parties, whose rights would have to be determined by a Revenue Court. But this ruling is no longer good law, and the Magistrate can release the property attached and hand it over to one of the parties, as soon as the Revenue Court has given a decision in favour of that party—*Ram Sri v. Sri Krishan*, 46 All. 879 (881), 22 A.L.J. 803, 25 Cr.L.J. 1242; *Surendra Bikram v. K. E.*, 25 O.C. 242.

But an entry in the Record of Rights cannot be regarded as constituting an adjudication by a competent Court of the rights of parties—*Kutiswar v. Jitendra*, 30 C.W.N. 646, 26 Cr.L.J. 1055.

459. Persons bound by order of attachment :—Judicial proceedings cannot bind a person who is not a party to them. A final order under this section cannot be made against persons who were neither made parties to the proceedings under sec 145, nor were regarded as such by the Magistrate (though notices had been issued upon them to file written statements and they entered appearance but did nothing else)—*Janoki Nath v. Q. E.*, 3 C.W.N. 329

460. Proviso—withdrawal of attachment :—"We have introduced a new clause which by an amendment of section 146 will enable a District Magistrate to withdraw the attachment of property at any time when he is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of a breach of the peace"—*Report of the Joint Committee* (1922).

Once an order under sec. 146 has been passed, it can come to an end only under one of two circumstances, the first being that there is no longer any likelihood of a breach of the peace, in which case the Magistrate is competent to withdraw the order of attachment, and he can do so at any time at which if he is satisfied that there is no further any likelihood; and secondly, it is competent for a Magistrate to release the subject matter of the dispute from attachment if a competent Court has determined the right of the parties to the proceedings or the person entitled to possession—*Kutiswar v Jitendra*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1033, 30 C.W.N. 646.

Where the petitioner presented an application to the Magistrate praying for the release of the attached house on the ground that the other claimant had died and that he (the petitioner) was his heir, and the Magistrate refused the application as no judgment of a competent Court declaring the rights of parties was produced, *held* that the Magistrate ought to have granted the application and released the property from attachment, because by the death of the other claimant all likelihood of a breach of the peace had disappeared—*Khushi Ram v. Crown*, 1 Lah. 451. This proviso now expressly provides for the case.

But the Magistrate can cancel the order of attachment under the proviso only on the ground that there is no longer any likelihood of a breach of the peace. He cannot cancel the attachment on any other ground e.g. on the ground that the attachment is not practicable—*Ram Dulare v. Ajudhya*, 16 O.C. 192, 14 Cr.L.J. 605.

Where the property attached under sec. 146 is released by the Magistrate on being satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of a breach of the peace, the Magistrate should not simply direct the Receiver to abandon the property without making over the possession or the books of account to anybody, and leave the parties to scramble for the estate. This is not the intention of the Legislature. Under this proviso, it is open to the Magistrate to make over the possession to any person he thinks fit, and he must of course exercise a judicial discretion in deciding to whom the possession is to be given. There may also be cases in which it is sufficient for him to make an order withdrawing the attachment and leave some person to take possession, without handing over the possession of the property to anybody—*Ali Bahadur v. Emp.*, 2 O.W.N. 868, 26 Cr.L.J. 1629.

461. Sub-section (2)—Appointment of Receiver :—A Magistrate is entitled to appoint a receiver under this sub-section only after the termination of the inquiry as to possession conducted under sec. 145 (4). The appointment of a receiver before the completion of the inquiry is without jurisdiction—*Lakshminarayana v. Gnanaprakasa*, 13 Cr.L.J. 536 (Mad.).

The passing of an order of attachment does not by itself justify the appointment of a receiver, unless on a subsequent inquiry the appointment of a receiver is found necessary—*Raza Hussain v. Mehdi Hasan*, 25 O.C. 148, 23 Cr.L.J. 684.

A receiver appointed under this section is entitled, unless some special circumstance is established, not only to the subject matter of the proceedings but also to all accretions to the property, and can give good title to a tenant under him—*Madhu v. Sabar Ali*, 14 C.W.N. 681, 11 Cr.L.J. 288

Proviso :—"We recommend the addition of a proviso to section 146 (2) to meet the case of an overlapping appointment of a receiver by the Civil Court"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*.

462. Revision :—By reason of the omission of sub-section (3) of section 435 by the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act of 1923, orders passed under this section are now liable to revision under this Code. See Note 447 under sec. 145

463. Review :—An order under this section is in the nature of a judgment and cannot be reviewed by the same Court—*Luchmi v. Bhusi*, 10 Cr.L.J. 225 (Pat.); *Raj Kumar v. Thakur Ojha*, 3 P.L.T. 648, *Ram Dulare v. Ajudhya*, 16 O.C. 192; see section 369. When a property is attached under this section, the Magistrate has jurisdiction to release it from attachment, but he has no jurisdiction to review his own order releasing the attached property—*Ballam v. Lal Babu*, 19 Cr.L.J. 105 (Pat.).

147. Whenever any such Magistrate is satisfied as aforesaid that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning the right of use of any land or water (including any right of way or other easement over the same) within the local limits of his jurisdiction, he may inquire into the matter in manner provided by section 145, and may, if it appears to him that such right exists, make an order permitting such thing to be done, or directing that such thing shall not be done, as the case may be, until the person object-

147. (1) Whenever any District Magistrate, Sub-divisional Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class is satisfied from a police-report or other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists regarding any alleged right of user of any land or water as explained in section 145, sub-section (2) (whether such right be claimed as an easement or otherwise) within the local limits of his jurisdiction, he may make an order in writing stating the grounds of his being so satisfied and re-

Dispute concerning case-ments, etc.

Dispute concerning right of use of immoveable property, etc.

ing to such thing being done, or claiming that such thing may be done obtains the decision of a competent Court adjudging him to be entitled to prevent the doing of, or to do such thing, as the case may be :

Provided that no order shall be passed under this section permitting the doing of anything where the right to do such thing is exerciseable at all times of the year, unless such right has been exercised within three months next before the institution of the inquiry ; or, where the right is exerciseable only at particular seasons or on particular occasions, unless the right has been exercised during the last of such seasons or occasions before such institution.

requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend the Court in person or by pleader within a time to be fixed by such Magistrate, and to put in written statements of their respective claims, and shall thereafter inquire into the matter in the manner provided in section 145 and the provisions of that section shall, as far as may be, be applicable in the case of such inquiry.

(2) *If it appears to such Magistrate that such right exists, he may make an order prohibiting any interference with the exercise of such right :*

Provided that no such order shall be made where the right is exerciseable at all times of the year, unless such right has been exercised within three months next before the institution of the inquiry ; or, where the right is exerciseable only at particular seasons or on particular occasions, unless the right has been exercised during the last of such seasons or on the last of such occasions before such institution.

(3) *If it appears to such Magistrate that such right does not exist, he may make*

an order prohibiting any exercise of the alleged right.

(4) *An order under this section shall be subject to any subsequent decision of a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction.*

Change :—This section has been redrafted by sec. 30 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923); the substantial changes effected by this redrafting have been shown by the italicised passages.

The principal changes are :—“(1) The definition of the subject matter in dispute has been modified so as to avoid the difficulties which have been created by decisions raising doubts as to the applicability of the section to rights not resembling easements or to rights acquired by contract; (2) the specific reference to rights of way has been omitted, as it has been questioned whether it might not by implication exclude negative easements from the scope of this section, (3) the nature of the orders which a Magistrate may pass (see sub-sections 2 and 3) and their continuance pending the order of a competent Civil Court to the contrary (see sub-section 4) have been clearly defined”—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914) (4) The words “make an order in writing . . . respective claims” have been added in order to bring this section into a line with sec. 145. “Doubts have been expressed as to the procedure to be followed in cases under section 147, and we have introduced amendments here to make it clear that the procedure is to be that laid down by section 145”—*Report of the Joint Committee* 1922)

464. Dispute :—The dispute contemplated by this section must at any rate be some substantial dispute necessitating the interference, in some way or other, of the criminal authorities. It would not be sufficient that there should be a mere discussion or verbal altercation between persons claiming rights of the kind described. There must be an actual dispute—*Maharaja of Burdwan v. Chairman, Darjeeling Municipality*, 5 Cal 194. See Note 393 under section 145.

If on entering on an inquiry a Magistrate finds that the rights of parties have been judicially ascertained by a previous decision, he should not enter into any investigation, as he cannot assume that a dispute would be continued on a question which has been set at rest by a judicial decision on the rights of parties—*In re Balkrishna*, 11 Cr. 584 (587).

465. Likelihood of breach of peace :—An order under this section may be passed under this section unless the Magistrate is of opinion that the dispute is likely to cause a breach of the peace—*Kolanda v. Gopal*, 11 M. L. J. 193, *Parashram v. Gopal*, 25 Cr. L. J. 353 (Nag.). If a Magistrate give jurisdiction to a Magistrate under this section, he may rely on from Police reports or other materials that there is an *imminent* likelihood of breach of peace.

a breach of the peace resulting from a dispute between the parties concerned. Where the materials before the Magistrate did not disclose the fact that there was an imminent danger of a breach of the peace, any evidence that he might have taken later on, in the course of the trial, could not give him a jurisdiction which he did not otherwise possess—*Kali Kissen v. Anund*, 23 Cal 557. But see *Kuloda Kinkar v. Danesh*, 33 Cal. 33 cited in Note 394 under sec. 145.

466. Right to use land or water :—This section applies to disputes as to the right to use any land or water, as distinct from disputes as to title to or possession of the land itself, for which provision is made by sec. 145—*Ram Dulare v. Ajudhya*, 16 O.C. 192, 14 Cr.L.J. 605.

In a Madras case it was held that the words "land or water" used in this section should be taken in their ordinary significance without the extended meaning given to them by section 145—*Palaniyandi v. Palaniappa*, 17 Cr.L.J. 325 (Mad.). In a Calcutta case also it was held that the word 'land' in this section did not include crop or produce as in sec. 145—*Ali Mohammad v. Fakiruddin*, 24 C.W.N. 1039, 22 Cr.L.J. 131. The present amendment, however, expressly lays down that those words are to have the same meaning as in sec. 145.

Since this section as now amended includes rights claimed as an easement, it therefore applies to rights to the use of land or water belonging to others. See also *Emp v. Ganpat*, 4 C.W.N. 779. The contrary view taken in *Arunachalam v. Chidambaram*, 29 Mad. 97 is no longer correct.

Right to tola from a 'hat' —A dispute as regards the right to collect 'tolas' (small perquisites) from a hat on one day every year, is one concerning the right of use of any land within the meaning of this section—*Sarat v. Mobarak*, 21 C.W.N. 439, 24 C.L.J. 437, 18 Cr.L.J. 113.

Rights arising out of contract :—Prior to the present amendment of this section, it was held that a dispute between a landlord and his tenant regarding the right of the latter to reconstruct a gola which had fallen down was not a matter properly coming within the operation of sec. 147. The settlement of such a dispute involved issues of right which could properly be determined by a Civil Court. The right of use of land contemplated by sec. 147 was one of an entirely different description resembling a right of easement, and not one arising from the terms of a contract between landlord and tenant—*Emp v. Ganpat*, 4 C.W.N. 779. See also *Arunachalam v. Chidambaram*, 29 Mad. 97. But this is no longer the law. By reason of the present amendment, the rights arising out of a contract will also fall under this section. See notes under "Change" above. Before the present amendment, the words of the section were "the right of use of any land and water (including any right of way or other easement over the same)". The words of the present section are more general.

Right to use of water :—A Magistrate can take action under this section if he is satisfied that a dispute regarding the right to irrigate from a tank is likely to cause a breach of the peace—*Q. E. v. Bechan*, O.S.C.

64 Where it was found that the plaintiff had a right to the flow of water for purposes of irrigation from a certain channel passing through a village of the defendant who obstructed such flow by erecting *bunds*, the Magistrate was competent, under this section, to direct the removal of the obstruction—*Pasupati v. Nandalal*, 5 C.W.N. 67; *Dalmir v. Khodadad*, 36 Cal. 923, 14 C.W.N. 179; *Q v. Madho Churn*, 13 W.R. 51.

Where Christians were prevented by Hindus from the lawful exercise of their right to take water from a well, it was held that the Magistrate had jurisdiction under this section to pass an order prohibiting the Hindus from interfering with the exercise of that right—*Hindus v. Christians*, 21 M.L.J. 466, 11 Cr.L.J. 721.

Right to let off water:—The right to let off water by the natural course in which it has always flowed and would always flow, so as to prevent inundation of one's own land, is a natural right of every landholder to the use and enjoyment of his own land. Where the second party erected a *bund* on the boundary of the first party's village to prevent the flow of such water, the Magistrate had jurisdiction to direct the removal of the *bund*—*Dowlat v. Siva Pershad*, 15 C.L.J. 267, 12 Cr.L.J. 319.

Right to fish:—There is nothing in this section which limits its operation only to easements. This section relates also to rights in the nature of easements, for instance, the right to fish in a *bhi*—*Dukhi Molla v. Halway*, 23 Cal. 55; *Kall Kissen v. Anund Chunder*, 23 Cal. 557.

Right to ferry:—A dispute regarding right to use a ferry comes within the scope of this section—*Harbullabh v. Bajrang*, 3 C.W.N. 148.

Right to take sandal paste from idol.—A right to take sandalwood paste removed from the person of the idol is not a right to the use of any land or water within the meaning of this section, and therefore this section does not apply to a dispute regarding such right—*In re Pandurang*, 4 Bom. L.R. 438.

Right to bury the dead is a right contemplated by this section, and the Magistrate has to see whether the right which is exercisable only on particular occasions or particular seasons was exercised during the last of such seasons or occasions—*Mad Abdul v. Mad. Ashroff*, 51 Mad. 522, 29 Cr.L.J. 644 (645).

Right to worship.—A right to perform the duties of a Pujari in a temple is not a right to the use of any land. It is the worship which is disputed and not the use of land. Therefore, a dispute regarding such a right cannot be the basis of a proceeding under this section—*Guram v. Lal Behary*, 37 Cal. 578, *Surendra v. Sashi Bhusan*, 52 Cal. 959, 42 C.L.J. 127, 27 Cr.L.J. 239. Where the matters in dispute cannot be adjudicated by a Civil Court (e.g. disputes relating to performance of worship and other religious ceremonies), Magistrates have no jurisdiction to deal with those matters under sec. 147. In such matters, if the Magistrate apprehends that there will be a breach of the peace, he is to adopt the procedure prescribed by Chapter VIII, and to take security—

469. Inquiry as under Sec. 145 :—A case under this section is to be decided by the same procedure and on the same principles as a case under sec. 145—*Ram Saran v. Raghunandan*, 38 Cal. 387. Section 147 clearly says that the procedure under this section must be as under sec. 145, which includes the filing of written statements, taking of evidence, and if necessary, local investigation. Therefore, an order under section 147 passed on proceedings taken under sec. 133, without any action in accordance with sec. 145, is without jurisdiction—*Abdool v. Safar Ali*, 15 C.W.N. 667, 12 Cr.L.J. 43. Where the petitioners set up a right of easement over a road which the opposite party attempted to close, and the Magistrate, instead of following the procedure laid down in this section, went over to the office of the opposite party, examined certain documents and correspondences in respect of the road, and then passed an order declaring the road to belong to the opposite party and forbidding the petitioners to enter upon the road, held that the procedure was wholly unjustifiable, as he made inquiries in the absence of the petitioners, and without giving them an opportunity of adducing their own evidence and examining witnesses, and passed the order without coming to a distinct finding as to the alleged right of easement set up by the petitioners—*Narendra v. E. I. Ry.*, 5 P.L.T. 419, 25 Cr.L.J. 455, A.I.R. 1924 Pat. 717.

When proceedings are started under sec. 145 on the basis of a police report, but during the trial the Court finds it is a matter falling under sec. 147, he can convert the proceedings into one under that section—*Anath Bandhu v. Wahid Ali*, 26 Cr.L.J. 558 (Cal); *In re Amarsang*, 48 Bom 512 (515), 26 Bom L.R. 436.

Long and protracted inquiry—Question of title :—Where a case under this section is likely to involve a long and complicated inquiry and the presence of a large number of people, the proper course for the Magistrate to follow is to bind down under sec. 107 such of the persons as are likely to disturb the peace—*Kali Kissen v. Anund*, 23 Cal. 557. So also, where the settlement of a dispute involves issues of right which can only be determined by a Civil Court, the proper course for the Magistrate is to proceed under sec. 107—*Emp v. Ganpat* 4 C.W.N. 779; *Arunachalam v. Chidambaram*, 29 Mad 97, *Dalmir v. Khodadad*, 36 Cal 923, 10 Cr.L.J. 579. This section does not convert the Magistrate into a Civil Court, which is to determine the rights between the parties or to discuss and consider any proprietary damage done to individuals—*Rosik Lal v. Kartik*, 22 W.R. 48.

Inquiry by subordinate Magistrate :—Where a District Magistrate, on being satisfied that there exists a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace as regards the right to perform a religious ceremony, refers the case to a Magistrate for inquiry, the latter is bound under this section to inquire into the matter in the manner provided by sec. 145—*In re Dhyaneswar*, 3 Bom L.R. 416. But see Note 408 under Section 145.

470. Notice to parties :—The inquiry contemplated by this section is a judicial inquiry and the opinion to be formed must be a judicial one formed upon evidence legally before the Magistrate. The evidence before the Magistrate would not be legal, if it were taken behind the back

of persons who claimed or denied the right, *i.e.*, if they had not been represented in the inquiry and had no notice of it—*Bathoo Lal v. Domi Lal*, 21 Cal. 727. Where an order was passed under this section without giving notice to the party concerned, the order was without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside—*Crown v. Bhana*, 1909 P.R. 12, 11 Cr.L.J. 61. Where the proceedings were originally started in respect of a portion of a pathway, but subsequently the Court amended the proceedings by making them applicable to the whole pathway without notice to the party affected, held that the final order was not binding on the party affected—*Janaki v. Monmohan*, 25 Cr.L.J. 674, A.I.R. 1925 Cal. 263.

Actual notice should be given to all the persons claiming or denying the right, notice to servants of such persons is not equivalent to notice to them—*Bathoo Lal v. Domi Lal*, 21 Cal. 727. The inquiry presumes not that one party only, but that both parties to the dispute, will be afforded an opportunity of appearing and adducing evidence on all the material facts—*In re Alfred Lindsay*, 4 Mad. 121.

471. Parties :—In an inquiry under this section, it is sufficient if persons who claim for themselves the right, though that right be derived from others (*e.g.*, right to fish in a *bhil*), are made parties. It is not necessary that the proprietors (of the *bhil*) should be added as parties—*Dukhi v. Halway*, 23 Cal. 55.

A Magistrate is not competent to add parties to a proceeding under sec. 147, after making a preliminary order. An order made after the addition of parties is null and void only as against the added party, but is binding on those to whom it is properly directed—*Pasupati v. Nando Lal*, 5 C.W.N. 67. The Nagpur J. C. Court holds that the addition of parties after making the preliminary order is a mere irregularity which does not vitiate the proceedings—*Parashram v. Gopal*, 25 Cr.L.J. 353.

472. Evidence :—The inquiry contemplated by the section is a judicial inquiry and the opinion of the Magistrate must be a judicial one formed upon evidence legally before him—*Bathoo Lal v. Domi Lal*, 21 Cal. 727. A party against whom proceedings are instituted is entitled to produce evidence to prove that the case does not fall within this section—*Crown v. Bhana*, 1909 P.R. 12, 11 Cr.L.J. 61.

An order passed merely on a written statement, without taking any evidence in proof of the allegation contained in the written statement, is bad in law—*Md. Noor v. Bikkari*, 30 Cal. 918. So also, an order passed without giving the parties an opportunity of calling evidence is one without jurisdiction—*Pilaji v. Darya*, 20 Cr.L.J. 110 (Nag). See also *Narendra v. E. I. Ry.*, 1 P.L.T. 419 cited in Note 469 above.

But where the allegation of one party is admitted by the other, no evidence is necessary in addition to the written statement—*Haromohan v. Gobind*, 7 C.W.N. 351.

Local inspection :—In a matter under this section, the Magistrate is bound to hear the evidence tendered by the parties. He cannot summarily deal with the case after local inspection—*Emp. v. Ganpat*, 4 C.W.N. 779.

469. Inquiry as under Sec. 145:—A case under this section is to be decided by the same procedure and on the same principles as a case under sec. 145—*Ram Saran v. Raghunandan*, 38 Cal. 387. Section 147 clearly says that the procedure under this section must be as under sec. 145, which includes the filing of written statements, taking of evidence, and if necessary, local investigation. Therefore, an order under section 147 passed on proceedings taken under sec. 133, without any action in accordance with sec. 145, is without jurisdiction—*Abdool v. Safar Ali*, 15 C.W.N. 667, 12 Cr.L.J. 43. Where the petitioners set up a right of easement over a road which the opposite party attempted to close, and the Magistrate, instead of following the procedure laid down in this section, went over to the office of the opposite party, examined certain documents and correspondences in respect of the road, and then passed an order declaring the road to belong to the opposite party and forbidding the petitioners to enter upon the road, held that the procedure was wholly unjustifiable, as he made inquiries in the absence of the petitioners, and without giving them an opportunity of adducing their own evidence and examining witnesses, and passed the order without coming to a distinct finding as to the alleged right of easement set up by the petitioners—*Narendra v. E. I. Ry.*, 5 P.L.T. 419, 25 Cr.L.J. 455, A.I.R. 1924 Pat. 717.

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of persons who claimed or denied the right, i.e., if they had not been represented at the inquiry and had no notice of it—*Bathoo Lal v. Domi Lal*, 21 Cal. 727. Where an order was passed under this section without giving notice to the party concerned, the order was without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside—*Crown v. Bhana*, 1909 P.R. 12, 11 Cr.L.J. 61. Where the proceedings were originally started in respect of a portion of a pathway, but subsequently the Court amended the proceedings by making them applicable to the whole pathway without notice to the party affected, held that the final order was not binding on the party affected—*Janaki v. Monmohan*, 25 Cr.L.J. 674, A I R. 1925 Cal 263.

Actual notice should be given to all the persons claiming or denying the right; notice to servants of such persons is not equivalent to notice to them—*Bathoo Lal v. Domi Lal*, 21 Cal 727. The inquiry presumes not that one party only, but that both parties to the dispute, will be afforded an opportunity of appearing and adducing evidence on all the material facts—*In re Alfred Lindsay*, 4 Mad. 121.

471. Parties :—In an inquiry under this section, it is sufficient if persons who claim for themselves the right, though that right be derived from others (e.g., right to fish in a *bhal*), are made parties. It is not necessary that the proprietors (of the *bhal*) should be added as parties—*Dukhi v. Halway*, 23 Cal 55.

A Magistrate is not competent to add parties to a proceeding under sec. 147, after making a preliminary order. An order made after the addition of parties is null and void only as against the added party, but is binding on those to whom it is properly directed—*Pasupati v. Nando Lal*, 5 C.W.N. 67. The Nagpur J. C. Court holds that the addition of parties after making the preliminary order is a mere irregularity which does not vitiate the proceedings—*Parashram v. Gopal*, 25 Cr.L.J. 353.

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An order passed merely on a written statement, without taking any evidence in proof of the allegation contained in the written statement, is bad in law—*Md. Noor v. Bikkam*, 30 Cal. 918. So also, an order passed without giving the parties an opportunity of calling evidence is one without jurisdiction—*Pilaji v. Darya*, 20 Cr.L.J. 110 (Nag). See also *Narendra v. E. I. Ry.*, 3 P L T. 419 cited in Note 469 above.

But where the allegation of one party is admitted by the other, no evidence is necessary in addition to the written statement—*Haromohan v. Gobind*, 7 C.W.N. 351.

Local inspection :—In a matter under this section, the Magistrate is bound to hear the evidence tendered by the parties. He cannot summarily deal with the case after local inspection—*Emp. v. Ganpat*, 4 C.W.N 779.

A decision of the Magistrate based substantially upon impressions obtained as a result of his local inspection is bad and liable to be set aside. But a decision based on the *evidence* as well as local inspection (the one corroborating the other) is not illegal—*Muhammad Musa v. Shyam Sundar*, 2 P.L.T. 681, 22 Cr.L.J. 739. The Magistrate can make a local inspection even prior to taking evidence in the case. But the finding must be based on evidence duly recorded and not merely upon the impressions formed on local inspection—*Abdul Hamid v. Hasan Raza*, 4 P.L.T. 297, 24 Cr.L.J. 487.

473. Proviso—User of right :—In the absence of a finding that the right has been exercised within the periods specified by the proviso to sub-section (2), the final order under this section cannot be maintained—*Sirkawal v. Bhuja Singh*, 5 P.L.T. 457, 25 Cr.L.J. 996. Where the right is exerciseable at all times of the year, there must be a finding that the right was exercised within three months—*Guru Prasad v. Lachman*, 14 Cr.L.J. 303 (Cal.); *Crown v. Bhana*, 1909 P.R. 12; *Grant v. Padarath*, 2 P.L.T. 364, 22 Cr.L.J. 463. Where it is proved that the first party have had an uninterrupted use of water of a *nala* for a period of 20 years, which they have enjoyed as an easement and as of right, and the erection of a *bund* has led to a dispute, there is then a sufficient finding that the right in dispute has been exercised within either of the periods mentioned in the proviso—*Pasupati v. Nanda Lal*, 5 C.W.N. 67. Where it is found that the Hindus had used a public street and had taken a procession along that street on a previous season, the Magistrate has jurisdiction to pass an order allowing the Hindus to take the procession on the present season and prohibiting the Muhammadans from interfering with the use by the Hindus of that street—*Amir Khan v. Mahalingam*, 51 Mad. 174, 53 M.L.J. 523, 28 Cr.L.J. 948 (949). Where the non-exercise of the right within the period specified in the proviso was due to circumstances beyond the control of the party claiming the right, e.g. where the non-exercise was due to obstructions caused by the opponents of such party, the proviso to subsection (2) does not apply. The proviso obviously contemplates a non-exercise for reasons within the control of the persons claiming the right—*In re Basappa*, 27 Bom.L.R. 1058, 26 Cr.L.J. 1422.

Burden of proof—The right to restrain another from exercising the ordinary proprietary rights over his own land, e.g. the right to restrain another from cutting a *bund* on his own land and thus getting a liberal supply of water on his own land, is of the nature of an easement different from the ordinary rights of owners of land. The burden of proof that such a right exists lies on the party alleging it—*Harī Mohan v. Kissen Sundari*, 11 Cal. 52.

"Institution of the inquiry":—The date of the institution of the inquiry within the meaning of the proviso does not refer to the date when the formal proceedings are drawn up under this section. An inquiry is instituted within three months of the obstruction complained of, within the meaning of the proviso, where the Magistrate hears the pleaders of the parties, and directs a local inquiry within three months of the date

of the obstruction, even though the formal order is drawn up after three months—*Rama Nath v. Saroda*, 44 C.L.J. 214, 28 Cr.L.J. 1.

The 'inquiry' that is contemplated by the proviso is the inquiry by the Magistrate into the rights of parties, and not an inquiry by the Police into the existence of the likelihood of a breach of the peace. Where in the case of an alleged obstruction of a pathway, proceedings under sec. 147 are drawn up by the Magistrate more than three months after the date of the obstruction complained of, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to proceed under this section. The fact that he ordered a *police inquiry within three months* of the obstruction cannot give him jurisdiction—*Ram Chandra v. Aditya*, 53 Cal 851, 30 C.W.N. 863, 27 Cr.L.J. 1089.

474. Nature of order :—The order under this section is one permitting a thing to be done or directing that a thing shall not be done. This section does not enable the Magistrate to make a purely *declaratory* order. It only enables him to prevent arbitrary interruption by any person of rights actually enjoyed which have been exercised by the public or by a person or class or persons—*Maharaja of Burdwan v. Chairman, Darjeeling Municipality*, 5 Cal 194. This section is not intended to provide a substitute for a civil suit to declare the rights of parties, but only empowers the Magistrate to order that possession shall not be taken by any party to the exclusion of the public until that party establishes his right in a Civil Court—*Moonshee Hurukh Lal*, 6 W.N. 74.

The words of subsection (2) do not give the Magistrate any power of directing one of the parties to do a *positive act* by way of mandatory injunction. The power given by this clause is analogous to the power of a Civil Court to grant a temporary injunction by issuing a *prohibitory* order restraining any person from doing any act which interferes with the right of another. Therefore, where the second party raised a wall on his own land blocking the windows in the house of the first party and thereby shut out light and air from a room in that house, the Magistrate had no power to order the second party to demolish the wall—*Hari Mali v. Hari Dasi*, 41 C.L.J. 568, 26 Cr.L.J. 1265, 30 C.W.N. 238. But prior to the amendment of this section, a Magistrate was competent to make an order for the removal of an obstruction to a right of way, if there was a likelihood of a breach of the peace in consequence of such obstruction—*Lalit Chandra v. Tarant*, 5 C.W.N. 335; or an order for the removal of an obstruction to the right to the flow of water caused by the erection of *bunds*—*Pasupati v. Nandalal*, 3 C.W.N. 67; *Dalmir v. Khodadad*, 36 Cal 923; *Manzur Hussain v. Gouri Lal*, 20 Cr.L.J. 209 (Pat.). If the obstruction is caused to a *public way* or thoroughfare, the Magistrate has no power to order the removal of such obstruction under this section, but should proceed under Chapter X (Sec. 133)—*In re Lutchniah*, 1 Weir 143; *Baroda Persad v. Mudoo Soodun*, 5 W.R. 5; *In re Alfred Lindsay*, 4 Mad 121. In *Karuppanna v. Kandasami*, 26 M.L.J. 233, 15 Cr.L.J. 362, and *Sudalamuthu v. Enan*, 16 Cr.L.J. 767 (Mad.), however, it has been held that Sec. 147 can be applied whether the right of way claimed is a right to a public path or a private path;

of persons who claimed or denied the right, *i.e.*, if they had not been represented at the inquiry and had no notice of it—*Bathoo Lal v. Domi Lal*, 21 Cal. 727. Where an order was passed under this section without giving notice to the party concerned, the order was without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside—*Crown v. Bhana*, 1909 P.R. 12, 11 Cr.L.J. 61. Where the proceedings were originally started in respect of a portion of a pathway, but subsequently the Court amended the proceedings by making them applicable to the whole pathway without notice to the party affected, held that the final order was not binding on the party affected—*Janaki v. Monmohan*, 25 Cr.L.J. 674, A.I.R. 1925 Cal. 263.

Actual notice should be given to all the persons claiming or denying the right; notice to servants of such persons is not equivalent to notice to them—*Bathoo Lal v. Domi Lal*, 21 Cal. 727. The inquiry presumes not that one party only, but that both parties to the dispute, will be afforded an opportunity of appearing and adducing evidence on all the material facts—*In re Alfred Lindsay*, 4 Mad. 121.

471. Parties.—In an inquiry under this section, it is sufficient if persons who claim for themselves the right, though that right be derived from others (*e.g.*, right to fish in a *bhui*), are made parties. It is not necessary that the proprietors (of the *bhui*) should be added as parties—*Dukhi v. Halway*, 23 Cal. 55.

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472. Evidence.—The inquiry contemplated by the section is a judicial inquiry and the opinion of the Magistrate must be a judicial one formed upon evidence legally before him—*Bathoo Lal v. Domi Lal*, 21 Cal. 727. A party against whom proceedings are instituted is entitled to produce evidence to prove that the case does not fall within this section—*Crown v. Bhana*, 1909 P.R. 12, 11 Cr.L.J. 61.

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But where the allegation of one party is admitted by the other, no evidence is necessary in addition to the written statement—*Haromohan v. Gobind*, 7 C.W.N. 351.

Local inspection.—In a matter under this section, the Magistrate is bound to hear the evidence tendered by the parties. He cannot summarily deal with the case after local inspection—*Emp v. Ganpat*, 4 C.W.N. 779:

the terms of the section are wide enough to cover both cases, and the fact that Sec. 133 expressly provides for an order by the Magistrate directing the removal of obstruction to public pathways does not necessarily imply that a similar order cannot be passed in proceedings under Sec. 147.

This section does not enable the Magistrate to order the Police to remove the obstruction. There is no indication in the Code that the Legislature intended the Magistrate to carry out an order under this section through the agency of the Police. This section clearly contemplates orders directed to persons who are parties to the dispute—*Dalmir v. Khodadad*, 36 Cal. 923, *contra*—*Dowlat v. Siva Prasad*, 15 C.L.J. 267, 12 Cr.L.J. 319 where it was held that the Magistrate had jurisdiction to direct the complaining party to remove the obstruction with the assistance of the Police.

Under sub-section (3) a Magistrate has jurisdiction to make a prohibitive order ("order directing that such thing shall not be done,") against a party who is found not to have the right which he claims. Where the 1st. party claimed a right of passage over certain land which the other party denied, and the Magistrate found that the right of easement did not exist, the Magistrate had jurisdiction to pass an order directing that the first party should not use the right of passage until he obtained the decision of a competent Court adjudging his right—*Pyari Mohan v. Harish Chandra* 23 C.W.N. 956, 20 Cr.L.J. 251.

Order must affect parties only—This section contemplates an order to be passed between parties to the proceedings only. An order affecting persons who are not parties to the proceedings is not within the purview of this section and is therefore liable to be set aside as affecting jurisdiction—*Pillai v. Darya*, 20 Cr.L.J. 110 (Nag).

Order contrary to Civil Court's decree—If the matter which is in dispute under this section (e.g. a disputed fishery right) has already been adjudicated upon by a Civil Court, a Magistrate has no jurisdiction to enquire into a claim which is entirely contrary to that Court's decree—*In re Anya Shidya*, 29 Bom. L.R. 715, 28 Cr.L.J. 578 (579).

Duration of order—An order under this section is bad in form, if it contains no restriction of time for which it is to operate—*In re Almaran*, 14 Bom. 25.

475. Revival of proceedings—Where during the pendency of proceedings under sec. 147, the parties referred the dispute to arbitration, whereupon the Magistrate made an order to the effect that further proceedings were unnecessary, and they were therefore stayed, but after the arbitration proceedings (which remained pending for one year) became ineffectual, the Magistrate continued the proceedings under sec. 147, held that the Magistrate's order staying further proceedings ousted his jurisdiction to continue the proceedings. Moreover, the Magistrate could not revive the proceedings unless he had drawn up fresh proceedings—and unless he was satisfied that there was a fresh dispute likely to cause a fresh breach of the peace after the arbitration proceedings ceased; and he was not justified in assuming that the causes which originally existed

instance, in cases in which it is necessary to ascertain by measurement the disputed areas of land or to ascertain whether particular lands are identical with the lands detailed in documents, and in such cases only. When, however, any fact can be elicited by evidence, that evidence should be heard by the Court itself"—*Cal H C Cir. No 41 of 1866*. The scope of local inquiry is extremely limited. It should be restricted solely to some question relating to the feature of the property about which the dispute has arisen, and should not be directed to any matter which can be proved before the Magistrate by oral evidence, such as the question of actual possession—*In re Baikunt*, 3 C.L.R. 134; *Lachmi Narain v. Mukhram*, 24 Cr L J 507 (Pat). The object of local inspection is to understand and appreciate the topography of the land in dispute in order to aid the Magistrate in appreciating the evidence offered by the Court, but the local inspection cannot take the place of legal evidence, much less the result thereof can be used as a basis for the decision—*Ram Ratan v Tarak Nath*, 25 Cr L J 412, A.L.R. 1922 Pat. 249. Thus, in a case where the levels and the falls of water are concerned, local inspection is imminently necessary—*Dowlat v. Siva Prasad*, 15 C.L.J. 267, 12 Cr L.J. 319. So also, where rights of irrigation and rights of taking water through particular reservoirs are concerned, a local inspection is immediately necessary—*Abdul Hamid v. Hasan*, 4 P.L.T. 297, 24 Cr L J 487.

There is no hard and fast rule that in every case under this chapter a local investigation must be held whether the parties desire it or not—*Upendra v Prasanno*, 20 Cr L J 17 (Cal). For instance, it is not incumbent on the Magistrate to hold such an investigation whenever he is unable to ascertain as to which party is in possession—*Ibid*.

The term "local inquiry" in this section contemplates delegation of judicial functions, the mere making a survey of the disputed land preparing a map thereof do not amount to a local inquiry under this section, because they are not judicial but purely ministerial acts; and such acts can be entrusted to a person other than a Magistrate e.g. to a pleader Commissioner (or even an amin). The report of such a person cannot be read as evidence under subsection (2) but he must be called as a witness and examined and cross-examined as to his report—*Chulai Mahto v. Surendra*, 1 Pat 75, 3 P.L.T. 17, 23 Cr L J 152.

Who can make the inquiry —The trying Magistrate can himself make the local inquiry. Though as a rule it is better to have the local investigation carried out by some other person, there is nothing in law to prevent the presiding Magistrate from conducting the inquiry himself, provided he records what he saw and does not act upon hearsay evidence—*Dowlat v. Siva Prasad*, 15 C.L.J. 267; *Abdul Hamid v Hasan*, 4 P.L.T. 297, 24 Cr.L.J. 487.

This section empowers the presiding Magistrate to depute a subordinate Magistrate to make the inquiry, but the person deputed must be a Magistrate, not a *Kanungoe*—*In re Uma Churn*, 7 C.L.R. 352. If, however, the trying Magistrate deposes a *Kanungoe* to make an inquiry,

his report cannot be taken as evidence in the case, like the report of a sub-Magistrate, but the Kanungoe (like any other private person who has seen the place) must come into the witness-box and depose on oath as to what he saw—*Achambit v. Sarada*, 12 Cr.L.J. 480 (Cal.)

The deputed Magistrate must make the inquiry himself; he cannot delegate it to some body else—*Jaiwant v. Rama Rao*, 20 Cr.L.J. 107 (Nag.).

Recording evidence by the deputed Magistrate—The local inquiry authorised by this section is not merely a local inspection by the sub-Magistrate, but includes the act of recording evidence by such Magistrate in the course of the inquiry. But the recording of evidence by the sub-Magistrate does not absolve the trying Magistrate from the duty imposed upon him by sec. 145 (4) of receiving the evidence produced before him by the parties and taking any further evidence he may think necessary. Where a first class Magistrate recorded no evidence himself but acted solely upon the evidence taken by a sub-Magistrate at a local inquiry, the former must be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction, but this defect or irregularity would be cured by sec 537 and the High Court would not interfere—*Muthusamy v. Kalinga*, 33 M.L.J. 78, 18 Cr.L.J. 715.

477. Report of the deputed Magistrate :—Subsection (2) provides that the report of the deputed Magistrate may be read as evidence in the case, but it is not necessary to examine such Magistrate on oath as a witness—*Achambit v. Sarada*, 12 Cr.L.J. 480 (Cal.).

When a local inquiry is instituted, and the result reported, such report becomes a part of the proceedings in the case, and the party affected by it is entitled to be acquainted with the result of it and to have an opportunity of rebutting the report, if he thinks necessary so to do—*Jaiwant v. Rama Rao*, 20 Cr.L.J. 107 (Nag.); *Mir Dhunoo v. Brown*, 21 W.R. 25. If a Magistrate makes a local inquiry he must make a note of what he saw and must place it on the record so that the parties may be in a position to know what impression the Magistrate has got by the local inquiry. It is possible that the Magistrate may have formed a wrong impression, and if the results of his inspection are recorded, the parties would be in a position to know if there has been an error, and to remove the wrong impression formed by the Magistrate *Abdul Hamid v. Hasan*, 4 P.L.T. 297, 24 Cr.L.J. 487.

Decision based on report.—A Magistrate cannot base his decision merely on the report of the subordinate Magistrate, without examining any witness—*Pitambar v. Saroda*, 10 A.L.J. 465, 13 Cr.L.J. 777; *Ramratan v. Taraknath*, 25 Cr.L.J. 412 (Pat.). In *Muthusami v. Kalinga*, 17 Cr.L.J. 478 (Mad.) and *Piziruddin v. Totajennissa*, 14 Cr.L.J. 302 (Cal.) however, the Magistrate deciding the case on the basis of the report of the inquiry was held to have acted within his jurisdiction. Where the trying Magistrate based his order on the report of the sub-Magistrate and on the evidence recorded by him during the local inquiry, and both parties were quite content to abide by the result of the sub-Magistrate's inquiry, and no objections were advanced before the trying Magistrate against the

sub-Magistrate's finding, it was held that the order of the trying Magistrate was not without jurisdiction and should not be interfered with in revision—*Muthusami v. Kalanga*, 33 M.L.J. 78, 18 Cr.L.J. 715

478. Costs :—Before this section was amended by the 1923 Amendment Act, it was held that the only costs which a Magistrate could award under this section were those incurred for witnesses or pleaders' fees or both. He could not make an order for any other costs, e.g. costs on account of damage to crops—*Prayag v. Gobind*, 32 Cal. 602. So also, he could not include in the costs the penalty paid by one party on behalf of the other under section 44 (3), Stamp Act in respect of an improperly stamped document produced in evidence in a proceeding under sec. 145 of this Code—*Popuri v. Tummalaganta*, 13 M.L.T. 224, 13 Cr.L.J. 297.

Under the present section as amended, the word "include" shows that the Magistrate is able to award costs other than those incurred for witnesses or pleaders' fees

In awarding costs for witnesses and pleaders' fees, the Magistrate should not include additional costs incurred for extra fees and for travelling and other expenses of a like nature incurred for bringing pleaders or counsels from a distance—*Rajendra v. Md. Arzumund*, 9 C.W.N. 887.

A Magistrate has jurisdiction to award only the actual costs incurred; and the order must give particulars as to how the Magistrate arrived at the figure, otherwise the order is bad—*Uday Narain v. Satish*, 14 C.W.N. 1xxiii. The order awarding costs is a judicial order and therefore must be based on proper materials, there must be materials on the record to show that the Magistrate arrived at the figure as the result of a calculation of the costs incurred by the party. An order arbitrarily awarding a round sum of Rs 50 or Rs 100 as costs, without there being anything on the record to show that the said amount was actually incurred, is bad in law and must be set aside—*Jhama v. Thakuri*, 1 P.L.T. 369, 21 Cr.L.J. 625; *Hira Mahton v. Raj Kumar*, 3 P.L.T. 484, 23 Cr.L.J. 508, *Khufi v. Darbari*, 2 P.L.T. 267, *Manglu v. Ramdhani*, 9 P.L.T. 835, 30 Cr.L.J. 252. So, before making an order as to costs, it is necessary and proper that the Magistrate should hold an inquiry as to what expenditure in costs was actually incurred—*Nemdhari v. Ram Tahal*, 17 Cr.L.J. 348 (Pat.)

The Magistrate may direct that the costs of any party are to be paid by any other party to the proceeding, but not by persons who are not parties to the proceeding—*Emp v. Chet Khan*, 27 Cr.L.J. 21 (Oudh).

If the costs are such as would fall within the scope of this section, the High Court will not consider whether they are excessive or deficient—*Bansi v. Syed Mohd. Akbar*, 15 C.W.N. 811, 12 Cr.L.J. 376.

The costs will be recoverable as fines. See Sec. 547. The words "All costs.....fines" have been omitted as unnecessary, because a general provision to that effect has been made in sec. 547.

Costs in revision :—The costs referred to in this section are the costs incurred in the magisterial proceedings. Magistrates have power

under this section to direct by whom any costs incurred by the parties in proceedings before them under this Chapter are to be paid. So also, the High Court in revision can pass any order which the Magistrate himself could have passed, *i.e.*, the High Court can in revision direct the costs incurred before the Magistrate to be paid by one party to another. But the High Court cannot, in revision of proceedings under Ch XII, direct the costs incurred before the High Court in revision to be paid by one party to another. Even the award of costs cannot be treated as incidental or consequential to the disposal of a revision petition within the meaning of sec 423 (1) (d), for it does not necessarily follow from an order passed in revision—*Veerappa v. Avudayammal*, 48 Mad. 262 (F.B.), 48 M.L.J. 106, 26 Cr.L.J. 707.

But the Bombay High Court is of opinion that the High Court can award the costs incurred in the hearing of the revision petition: such power is given by sec 439 read with sec 423 (d)—*Bal Jiba v. Chandulal*, 27 Bom L.R. 1353, A.I.R. 1926 Bom. 91, 27 Cr.L.J. 661.

Who can order costs:—Only the Magistrate who passes the final order under Sec. 145, 146 or 147 can pass an order awarding costs, though the actual assessment may be made by his successor. This cannot be interpreted as authorising the successor of the Magistrate who passed the final order under sec. 145 to award costs to the successful party. Where the Magistrate making the final order declaring possession left the district, and his successor made an order granting costs, the order as to costs was set aside as made without jurisdiction—*Ikias v. Raja Raghuraj*, 13 O.C. 66, 11 Cr.L.J. 335.

The Magistrate passing the order as to costs must be the Magistrate passing the decision in the case—*Najar Chandra v. Siddhartha*, 47 Cal. 974, 24 C.W.N. 672; *Mangla v. Ramdhani*, 9 P.L.T. 835, 30 Cr.L.J. 252. But he may or may not be the Magistrate who initiated the proceedings under this chapter. Where the proceedings under this chapter are initiated by one Magistrate, and the final order is passed by another, it is the latter Magistrate who can award costs—*Vythinadha v. Mayandi*, 29 Mad. 373.

Time of awarding costs—An order for costs should ordinarily be made at the time of the original order and in the presence of parties—*Q. E. v. Tomijuddi*, 24 Cal. 757; *Ikias v. Raja Raghuraj*, 13 O.C. 66, 11 Cr.L.J. 335. The award of costs under this section should be made by the Magistrate at the time of giving his decision, unless for any reason the consideration of the matter is reserved for any future stage of the proceedings—*Binoda Sundari v. Kali Krishna*, 22 Cal. 387. There is no hard and fast rule which lays down that an order for costs must necessarily be made at the time the judgment is delivered—*Dowlat v. Siva Prasad*, 15 C.L.J. 267. The order for costs may be made within a reasonable time after the passing of the judgment—*Najar v. Siddhartha*, 47 Cal. 974, 24 C.W.N. 672; *Mangla v. Ramdhani*, *supra*. In the usual course an award should almost invariably be contemporaneous with the decision of the main question and the order passed thereon. But the

fact that the award of costs has not been made at the very time of the decision of the case, does not necessarily render the award invalid; and when the circumstances of a case really require it, the disposal of the question of costs may be postponed—*Vythinaatha v. Mayandi*, 29 Mad. 373.

If the order awarding costs is not passed at the time of passing the decision in the case, it must be passed within a reasonable time after the disposal of the case and in the presence of both parties—*Vythinaatha v. Mayandi*, 29 Mad. 373; *Najar v. Siddhartha*, 47 Cal. 974; *Dowlat v. Siva Pershad*, 15 C.L.J. 267. What is reasonable time must depend upon the circumstances of each case—*Najar v. Siddhartha*, 47 Cal. 974. An order awarding costs made long (three months) after the original order and without giving notice to the parties affected and without allowing them an opportunity to appear and show cause is bad—*Q. E. v. Tomijuddi*, 24 Cal. 757; *Palaniandi v. Sammandi*, 16 L.W. 613; *Manglu v. Ramdhani*, supra. But an order awarding costs made ten days after the passing of the order under sec. 145 (6) is not illegal by reason of the delay—*Chadhar v. Ramsingh*, 19 Cr.L.J. 390 (Pat.).

478A. Assessment of costs.—*Who can assess costs.*—Where the Magistrate who passed the decision under Sec 145 had already awarded the costs, it is not necessary that the costs should be assessed by the same officer who decided the case—*Giridhar v. Ebadulla*, 22 Cal. 384. Another Magistrate (e.g. his successor) has jurisdiction to assess the amount of costs—*Ma Ershad Ali v. Saroda*, 23 Cal. 37 (dissenting from *Bhojal v. Nirban*, 21 Cal 609); *Giridhar*, 22 Cal. 384; *Bansi v. Syed Mohd.*, 15 C.W.N 811, *Subbiah v. Chokkalunga*, 27 M.L.J 613, 15 Cr.L.J 676. Though a Magistrate did not himself pass the order under sec. 145, still he has jurisdiction to assess costs—*Dilbas v. Desrati*, 10 C.W.N 1030.

Time of assessing costs.—An order awarding and assessing costs should be made at the time of the original order—*Q. E. v. Tomijuddi*, 24 Cal. 757. This shows that the assessment of costs should be contemporaneous with the order awarding costs. But there is no inflexible rule that the costs must be assessed at the time of passing the decision in the case—*Giridhar v. Ebadulla*, 22 Cal 384. Once an order as to costs is made, the amount of costs may be subsequently assessed—*Emp. v. Medapati*, 14 M.L.T. 195, 14 Cr.L.J 570. But the assessment must be made within a reasonable time after the award of costs. An assessment of costs more than two years after the date of the order awarding the costs is bad in law—*Bhojal v. Nirban*, 21 Cal 609.

Application by legal representative for assessment of costs.—Where through the negligence of the Court's officers, the amount of costs was not included in the final order directing payment of costs to the petitioner, and nearly three years after, the legal representative of the petitioner (the petitioner having died in the interval) applied to the Magistrate's successor in office for the costs being assessed, held that the application was sustainable and the applicant was entitled to have the costs assessed, although this Code contains no special provision for bringing

on record the representatives of the deceased parties—*Subbia v. Chockalinga*, 27 M.L.J. 613, 15 Cr L.J. 676.

Notice to parties :—An order awarding costs should be made in the presence of parties—*Vythinaatha v. Mayandi*, 29 Mad 373. An order awarding and assessing costs without allowing all the parties affected an opportunity to appear and show cause is bad—*Q. E. v. Tomijuddi*, 24 Cal. 757. A Magistrate has no jurisdiction to pass an order under this section making the party liable for a certain sum as costs without notice to him so that he may have an opportunity of contesting the same—*Prakash v. Ram Prasad*, 28 Cal 302, *Bansi v. Syed Mohd.*, 15 C.W.N. 811; *Divarka v. Nathuni*, 19 Cr.L.J. 764 (Pat).

Even an order setting aside a previous order as to costs cannot be passed without giving notice to the opposite party—*Dilbasi v. Deoraff*, 10 C.W.N. 1030.

Revision :—Orders under this section are now open to revision. See Note 447 under sec. 145. The ruling in *Rajendra v. Md. Arzumand*, 11 C.W.N. 887 is no longer correct.

CHAPTER XIII.

PREVENTIVE ACTION OF THE POLICE.

149. Every police-officer may interpose for the purpose of preventing, and shall, to the best of his ability, prevent, the commission of any cognizable offence.

Police may prevent cognizable offences

478B. Scope :—This section provides for the prevention of cognizable offences only. Section 23 of the Police Act (V of 1861) appears to give wider powers for the prevention of offences in general—*K. E. v. Nga Kala*, 8 L.B.R. 329, 17 Cr L.J. 347.

The words 'interpose' in this section connotes the idea of actively intervening and not merely a prohibition by word of mouth. The word is not wide enough to cover all orders given by police-officers. It was not intended by the Legislature that the police officer would be empowered to pass all sorts of sweeping orders, with the consequence of the disobedience being punishable under sec. 188 I. P. Code. Such wide powers vested in a police officer would interfere unreasonably with the ordinary liberty of private citizens and could not have been contemplated by this section—*Emp. v. Raghunath*, 47 All. 205, 26 Cr.L.J. 599, A.I.R. 1925 All 165.

150. Every police-officer receiving information of a design to commit any cognizable offence shall communicate such information to the police-officer to whom he is subordinate, and to any other officer whose duty it is to prevent or take cognizance of the commission of any such offence.

As to the powers and duties of a police-officer, see secs. 82-85.

151. A police-officer knowing of a design to commit any cognizable offence may arrest, without orders from a Magistrate and without a warrant, the person so designing, if it appears to such officer that the commission of the offence cannot be otherwise prevented.

By sec. 151, a Police officer may arrest without warrant, if it appears to him that the commission of an offence cannot otherwise be prevented. Should he do so, his subsequent procedure must be regulated by sec 60—*Bengal Police Manual*, 2nd Edition, p. 374.

152. A police-officer may, of his own authority, interpose to prevent any injury attempted to be committed in his view to any public property, moveable or immoveable, or the removal or injury of any public landmark or buoy or other mark used for navigation.

153. (1) Any officer in charge of a police-station may, without a warrant, enter any place within the limits of such station for the purpose of inspecting or searching for any weights or measures or instruments for weighing, used or kept therein, whenever he has reason to believe that there are in such place any weights, measures or instruments for weighing which are false.

(2) If he finds in such place any weights, measures or instruments for weighing which are false, he may seize the same and may send them to a Magistrate having jurisdiction.

478C. This section expressly authorises an inspection of the weights and measures by an officer-in-charge of a Police station. In comparing the weights used in the bazar, some reasonable allowance should be made for wear and tear and of the rough and ready methods of bazar shop-keepers—*Crown v. Nanak Chand*, 1913 P.R. 20, 15 Cr L J 11.

This section does not apply to the Police in the towns of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, because similar provisions have been made in Calcutta by secs. 55 and 56 of the Calcutta Police Act (Bengal Act IV of 1886), in Bombay by sec. 4 of the Bombay City Police Act IV of 1902, and in Madras by sec. 32 of the Madras City Police Act III of 1888

See Act XXXI of 1871 relating to weights and measures of capacity, and the rules framed under sec. 11 of that Act. As to offences relating to weights and measures, see Chapter XIII, I. P. Code

PART V.

INFORMATION TO THE POLICE AND THEIR POWERS TO INVESTIGATE.

CHAPTER XIV.

This Chapter, except secs. 155, does not apply to the Police in the towns of Calcutta and Bombay. Sec. 155 only applies to the Police of Calcutta and Bombay.—*Q. E. v. Nilmadhab*, 15 Cal. 595; *Q. E. v. Visram Babaji*, 21 Bom. 495 (499). For Section 164, see Note 509 under that section

154. Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the Local Government may prescribe in this behalf.

Information in cognizable cases.

479. Scope—This section enables a Station House Officer to receive and record the information of the commission of a cognizable offence *outside* his station limits, though he has no power under Sec. 157 to conduct an investigation in respect of such offence—*Nandamuri v. Emp.*, 1914 M.W.N. 382, 15 Cr L J. 622.

480. First Information :—The word "information" in this section means something in the nature of a complaint or accusation, or at least information of a crime, given with the object of putting the police in motion in order to investigate, as distinguished from information obtained by the Police when already investigating a crime. When the information which is first given to the police is of such a vague and indefinite character that it cannot be treated as coming under section 154, so as to make it incumbent upon the officer in charge of the police station to start an investigation, and he may reasonably require more information before doing so, any further information given to him in such circumstances may fall within section 154. In such a case such further information will not fall within section 162. The information referred to in section 154 may come from more than one source, and more than one such information

may be recorded in or about the same time under the section; but once the police have taken active steps to investigate, any written statements taken by them fall within section 162 and are inadmissible in evidence—*Gansa Oraon v. K. E.*, 2 Pat. 517, 4 P.L.T. 462, 24 Cr.L.J. 641.

The information referred to in this section is the first information of the offence by whomsoever given. The first information is that information which is given to the police first in point of time and not that which the police may select and record as first information—*K. E. v. Bhutnath*, 7 C.W.N. 345. Thus, where upon information given by the Chowkidar of an offence, which was duly recorded in the station diary, the Sub-Inspector went to the Hospital to see the dying man and took down his dying statement and filed it as the first information, it was held that the statement of the Chowkidar, and not that of the dying man, was the first information of the offence—*K. E. v. Daulat*, 6 C.W.N. 921. Where a person reported to a police officer that he had seen a certain woman with her throat cut, and the officer did not make a record of the fact but subsequently treated an information lodged by the woman's father as the first information in the case, held that the unrecorded information, and not the information given by the woman's father, was in fact the first information—*Chandrika v. K. E.*, 1 Pat. 401, 3 P.L.T. 771, A.I.R. 1922 Pat. 535. The information given by a Chowkidar to the effect that the mother of the accused had told him that the latter had assaulted his younger brother whilst under the influence of drink and that he (the Chowkidar) had seen blood-stains on the younger brother's head, was entered in the station-diary but not signed by the Chowkidar, and the police officer proceeded to the scene of occurrence and there took down the statement of the wife of the accused and took her thumb impression thereon; held that the Chowkidar's information was the first information in the case and that the statement made by the wife of the accused to the investigating officer was not admissible in evidence (sec 162)—*Gansa Oraon v. K. E.*, 2 Pat. 517.

A statement made by a witness during investigation after the police officer has actually arrived at the scene and himself seen what has happened is not first information—*Chittar Singh v. Emp.*, 47 All. 280, 23 A.L.J. 14, 20 Cr.L.J. 554. A statement by a witness to the police officer in the course of an investigation under the chapter and recorded under sec. 161 cannot be treated as first information given to the Police under sec. 154—*Sultan v. Wellbourne*, 3 Rang. 577, A.I.R. 1925 Rang. 364, 26 Cr.L.J. 1532. The first information is the information given out immediately after the occurrence and reported to the Police and not the information which has been elicited in the course of the investigation. The first information is the basis upon which an investigation under this chapter commences. It is erroneously thought that the information on which an investigation is commenced is not the first information of the offence, and that when in the course of investigation something has been elicited which shows that an offence has been committed a first information can be recorded. This is certainly not what the law contemplates. In nearly every trial it is important that it should be known to the judicial officer what were

the facts given out immediately after the occurrence and reported to the police, and the object of a first information is to render him so acquainted—*K. E. v. Bhut Nath*, 7 C.W.N. 345; *Peary Mohan v. Weston*, 16 C.W.N. 145, 13 Cr.L.J. 65; *Autor Singh v. Emp.*, 17 C.W.N. 1213, 14 Cr.L.J. 642. The first information is the basis of the case, and whether it be true or false, it at any rate usually represents what was intended by the informant to be the case set up by him at the time. All Criminal Courts should bear in mind the importance of examining, when there appears to be any necessity to do so, the first information of an offence reduced to writing in accordance with this section. In view of the notorious tendency in this country to improve upon the original statement of facts to strengthen the case as it proceeds and sometimes to add to the persons originally named as the offenders, it is of great importance to know what was said at first.—C P. Cr. Cir., Part II, No. 9.

Where the first information was recorded by a police-officer some hours after he had begun investigation of the case, but there was no previous information recorded and reduced to writing by him, the report falls under this section—*Dargahi v. Emp.*, 52 Cal 499, 26 Cr.L.J. 1213, A.I.R. 1925 Cal 831. But a statement recorded several days after the commencement of the investigation, and after there has been some development is not only not the first information but has very little or no value at all as the original story, because it can be made to fit into the case as then developed—*Emp v. Kampu*, 11 C.W.N. 554; *Peary Mohan v. Weston*, 16 C.W.N. 145, 13 Cr.L.J. 65 (Midnapur Damage Suit).

An information given to a village Magistrate which it was his bounden duty to pass on to a Police Station House officer who recorded it, must be considered as having been given to the latter and recorded as first information under this section, and cannot be regarded as a statement recorded during the course of an investigation under sec. 162—*Emp. v. Venkatarayudu*, 28 Mad 565. A statement which is merely the reproduction by the person making it of the statement said to have been made by another person is not first information and not admissible in evidence as such; and although the evidence given by that person who furnished the information to the informant could be contradicted by the evidence of the latter, it could not under Sec. 155 (3) Evidence Act, be contradicted by what the police recorded as the first information—*Emp v. Dina Bandhu*, 8 C.W.N. 218. Where a person who was assaulted sent a telegram to the Police complaining of the offence, and the Police Sub-Inspector turned up on the spot and recorded a statement from the complainant, held that the telegram was not a first information as it was not reduced to writing on an oral statement nor a writing given to the police signed by the person making the statement. It was the statement subsequently recorded by the Police Sub-Inspector that was the first information—*Chidambaram*, 55 M.L.J. 231, 29 Cr.L.J. 717 (718).

481. Evidentiary value :—The first information recorded by the police is of considerable value at the trial, because it shows on what materials the investigation commenced and what was the story then told

—*Emp. v. Kampu Kuki*, 11 C.W.N. 554. In every trial it is important that it should be known to the judicial officer what are the facts given out immediately after the occurrence and reported to the police, and the object of the first information is to render him so acquainted. For that purpose the diary in which the first information was recorded as well as the memorandum, if any, made by the police of what the informant said, is admissible in evidence—*K. E. v. Bhutnath*, 7 C.W.N. 345.

But although the first information is a document of considerable importance which is in practice always and very rightly produced and proved in criminal trials, yet it is not a piece of substantive evidence and can be used only as a previous statement admissible to corroborate or contradict a statement made subsequently in Court—*Choghatta v. Emp.*, 27 Cr.L.J. 121 (Lah.), *Autor Singh v. Emp.*, 17 C.W.N. 1213, 14 Cr.L.J. 642; *Chittar v. Emp.*, 47 All. 280, 23 A.L.J. 14, 26 Cr.L.J. 554, *Ibrahim*, 8 Lah. 605, 28 Cr.L.J. 983 (985). A report of the commission of an offence made at a thana may be used in a criminal trial to corroborate or cross-examine a witness, though such reports are no evidence of the existence of facts therein mentioned—*Q. E. v. Ram Sukh*, 1897 A.W.N. 47.

As the first information report can only be used by the prosecution for the purpose of corroborating in the witness-box the person who supplied the information contained in the document, it follows that if the informant himself can only speak from hearsay, the report cannot be used to corroborate such inadmissible evidence of the witness—*Saffan Singh v. Emp.*, 6 Lah. 437, 26 Cr.L.J. 1489, A.I.R. 1925 Lah. 418.

"Officer in charge of a police station" :—As to the powers of superior Police officers under this section, see sec. 551. In the absence of the Sub-Inspector or Head constable, a constable left in charge of a Police station cannot accept any complaint or prepare and submit the first information report of any crime reported to him, unless the Local Government shall have given him powers under section 4 (p).

482. "Shall be reduced to writing" :—The object of a first information being to show what was the manner in which the occurrence was related when the case was first started, it should always be carefully and accurately recorded—*Peary Mohan v. Weston*, 16 C.W.N. 145. The first information must be recorded at once, and it is not proper to wait until it is certain that an offence has been committed; See *K. E. v. Bhutnath*, 7 C.W.N. 345; *Emp. v. Kampu Kuki*, 11 C.W.N. 554. If the information be given orally, it must be recorded in plain and simple language, as nearly as possible in the informant's own words. The use of technical or legal expressions or high flown language or of lengthy and involved sentences is forbidden—*Ben. Pol. Code*, p. 372. It is of the utmost importance in recording the first information, that the actual words of the complainant should be used and not an Urdu translation of them. The recorder should take down the complaint as it is made and not merely his own impression of what the complainant meant to say—*Reg. and Ord. N.W.P.*, p. 268.

Power to question the informant :—If the information, whether given orally or presented in writing, be not complete in itself,

Police officer should elicit by interrogation such further information as may be necessary—*Beng. Pol. Code*, p. 372. See also *C. P. Pol. Man.*, p. 147.

483. "Shall be signed" :—The informant's statement when complete should be read over to him and he must sign it. The report should show that this has been done. In "heinous cases" the statement should be read over to the informant in the presence of one or more respectable and uninterested witnesses, who should also be asked to sign it—*Beng. Pol. Code*, p. 372.

*Procedure in the case of written informations :—*If the information be tendered in writing, it will be endorsed with the date of presentation, and the person tendering should be required to sign it (if he has not already done so). If the written information relates to facts with which the person tendering it is acquainted, and which he is able and willing to state orally, the mere incident that a written report is presented does not make it unnecessary to take down the information from the reporter's own lips. If the person who brings the written information knows nothing of the facts to which it refers, he should be required to state the circumstances under which he brought it—*C P Pol. Man.*, p. 147.

Diary :—The substance of the information shall be entered in a book, which is called the Station or General Diary, in which are recorded the substance of the information, the names of the complainants and of persons arrested, offences charged, property taken into possession and witnesses examined. See sec. 44 of the Police Act (V of 1861). This Diary is different from the Special Diary mentioned in sec. 172.

484. Punishment :—As to punishment for giving false information to the Police, see secs. 182, 203, 211 I.P.C. Even if the information is not reduced to writing under this section, the person giving the false information may be convicted for preferring a false charge under sec. 211 I.P.C.—*Mallappa v Emp*, 27 Mad 127.

A police officer refusing to enter in the Diary a report made to him concerning the commission of an offence, and making instead an entry totally different from the information given, is punishable under sec. 177 I.P.C.—*Q. E. v. Md Ismail Khan*, 20 All. 151.

As to punishment for refusal by the person giving information to sign the statement made by him, see sec. 180 I.P.C.

155. (1) When information is given to an officer in charge of a police-station of the commission, within the limits of such station, of a non-cognizable offence, he shall enter in a book to be kept as aforesaid the substance of such information and refer the informant to the Magistrate.

Information in non-cognizable cases.

(2) No police-officer shall investigate a non-cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate of the first or second class having power to try such case or commit the same for trial, or of a Presidency Magistrate.

(3) Any police-officer receiving such order may exercise the same powers in respect of the investigation (except the power to arrest without warrant) as an officer in charge of a police-station may exercise in a cognizable case.

484A. Scope :—This section applies to the Police in the towns of Calcutta and Bombay; see *Queen Emp v. Nilmadhab*, 15 Cal. 595; *Q. E. v. Visram Babaji*, 21 Bom. 495.

485. Investigation into non-cognizable cases :—Under this section, a Police-officer cannot investigate a non-cognizable case and cannot submit a report with reference to it, without the order of a Magistrate. If he receives information relating to the commission of a non-cognizable offence, he should enter the substance of it in the diary and refer the informant to a Magistrate. If a Police-officer of his own motion, as where he has seen the alleged offence committed, makes a formal report or complaint in respect of a non-cognizable offence, it will amount to a complaint within the meaning of sec. 4 (h), for there is no provision by which he can in such a case make a Police report—*K. E. v. Sada*, 26 Bom. 150.

A police officer is not competent to make an investigation into a non-cognizable offence, but the investigation of a non-cognizable offence would not be illegal if it is made during the investigation of a cognizable offence—*Emp. v. Shivaswami*, 51 Bom. 498, 29 Bom.L.R. 742, 28 Cr.L.J. 939.

A Police-officer who has been ordered by a Magistrate to investigate a non-cognizable offence, cannot legally delegate the duty of making the investigation to a chief constable—*Q. E. v. Kalidas*, Ratanlal 488.

It is incumbent upon a police-officer, who investigates a non-cognizable case under the orders of a Magistrate, to keep the diary, for which provision is made in sec. 172—*Hira Lal v Crown*, 1918 P.R. 16, 1918 P.L.R. 63, 19 Cr.L.J. 517.

The power to arrest without warrant is expressly taken away by this section from the Police in the investigation of a non-cognizable offence—*Nga Po v Q E*, U.B.R (1897-1901) 31.

After the investigation is over, it is the duty of the Police to submit a report to the Magistrate under sec 173. Where information was given to the Police of the commission of a non-cognizable offence, and the Magistrate ordered the Police to investigate the case and report, and the

Police officer should elicit by interrogation such further information as may be necessary—*Beng. Pol. Code*, p. 372. See also *C. P. Pol. Man.*, p. 147.

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After the investigation is over, it is the duty of the Police to submit a report to the Magistrate under sec. 173. Where information was given to the Police of the commission of a non-cognizable offence, and the Magistrate ordered the Police to investigate the case and report, and

Police without submitting any report instituted proceedings against the informants under sec. 211 of the I.P.C. for giving false information, and the accused were convicted, it was held that the conviction was illegal; the Police should not be allowed to prosecute without submitting the report of the original case to the Magistrate and without having that case disposed of by the Magistrate—*Emp. v. Appa Ragho*, 17 Bom.L.R. 69, 16 Cr.L.J. 161.

486. Magistrate's power to direct investigation:—In *In re Jankidas*, 12 Bom. 161, it is laid down that this section is conversant only with the powers of Police-officers, but it confers no power or authority on Magistrates to direct a local investigation by the Police or to call for a Police report; Magistrates can do so only under sec. 202 after taking cognizance of the case. But this view is quite unintelligible and renders sub-section (2) meaningless. In *Emp. v. Vishwanath*, 11 Bom.L.R. 589, 4 Cr.L.J. 183, it has been correctly held that a Magistrate has jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of this section to refer a matter to the police for investigation and report, even without a complaint, and without examining the complainant. So also in *In re Asadulla*, 6 M.L.T. 259, 11 Cr.L.J. 156, the Magistrate was held competent to order an investigation without first taking cognizance of the offence under sec. 190.

156. (1) Any officer in charge of a police-station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XV relating to the place of inquiry or trial.

(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate.

(3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above mentioned.

487. Scope:—The reference to Chap. XV in this section does not limit the application of this section to offences only, but the investigation may extend to cases within the scope of section 55—*Emp. v. Bhajan*, 1893 A.W.N. 124.

This section only empowers the Magistrate to direct investigation, and a Court of Session has no power to do so—*K. E. v. All*, 1910 P.R. 11.

If there is a delay in the investigation by the Police, it is the duty of the committing Magistrate, and failing him, of the Sessions Judge, to inquire fully into the circumstances of the delay to consider its bearing on the prosecution story—*Q. E. v. Majesty*, 11 Bom.L.R. 1092.

Subsection (3) of this section does not empower a Magistrate, *after he has taken cognizance* of a case, to order a police investigation under sec. 156 and to direct the police to submit a report. Sec. 156 (3) only empowers the Magistrate to order a police inquiry in a case where the Magistrate does not himself issue process at once. When a Magistrate takes cognizance of a complaint under sec. 200, and refers the case to the police for inquiry under sec. 202, it is for him to pass the necessary order on the police report either under sec. 203 or under sec. 204. He cannot direct the police, if they find the case to be established, to submit a charge-sheet. In other words, the Magistrate, after he had acted under Ch. XVI cannot proceed under Ch. XIV—*Isaf Nasya v. Emp.*, 54 Cal. 303, 28 Cr.L.J. 577.

157. (1) If, from information received or other-

wise, an officer in charge of a police-station has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under Section 156 to investigate, he shall forthwith send a report of the same to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offence upon a police-report, and shall proceed in person, or shall depute one of his subordinate officers *not being below such rank as the Local Government may by general or special order prescribe in this behalf* to proceed to the spot, to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case and, if necessary, to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender :

Provided as follows :—

(a) when any information as to the commission of

any such offence is given against any person by name and the case is not of a serious nature, the officer

When local investigation dispensed with.

in charge of a police-station need not proceed in person or depute a subordinate officer to make an investigation on the spot ;

(b) if it appear to the officer in charge of a police-

station that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an investigation, he shall not investigate the case.

When police officer in charge sees no sufficient ground for investigation.

(2) In each of the cases mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso to sub-section (1), the officer in charge

of the police-station shall state in his said report his reasons for not fully complying with the requirements of that sub-section, *and in the case mentioned in clause (b) such officer shall also forthwith notify to the informant, if any, in such manner as may be prescribed by the Local Government, the fact that he will not investigate the case or cause it to be investigated.*

Change :—The italicised words have been added by sec. 32 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923.

"Not below suchbehalf" :—This provision did not exist in the Bill of 1914, but the Select Committee which sat on the Bill in 1916 added the words "not below the rank of a Sub-Inspector." The amendment, however, did not meet with the approval of the Joint Committee and they made the present amendment. "In view of the general objection to the amendment which confines investigations to officers not below the rank of a Sub-Inspector, we have made an amendment which enables Local Governments to specify a lower rank. We recognise that police work in some provinces might be severely hampered by the above restriction"—*Report of the Joint Committee (1922).*

"And if necessary to take measures" :—These words have been substituted for the words "and to take such measures as may be necessary." Under the old law the taking of measures necessary for the discovery and arrest of the offender was *incumbent* on the police officer; under the present law, the police officer has an option to take measures for the arrest of the offender 'if necessary' "This amendment makes it clear that the Police have a discretion in arresting a person accused in a cognizable case"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons (1914).*

"And in the caseinvestigated" :—"This amendment provides that if the Police do not investigate a complaint, the complainant shall be informed to that effect"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons (1914).* The words "in such manner as may be prescribed by the Local Government" have been added by the Select Committee of 1916.

Secs. 154 and 157 :—Whereas every information covered by the former section (154) must be reduced to writing as provided in that section, it is only that information which raises a reasonable suspicion of the commission of a cognizable offence within the jurisdiction of the Police officer to whom it is given, which compels action under the latter section (157) although of course a report would be sent to the Magistrate—*Punjab Cir., Chap. XLV., page 171.*

487A. "From information received" :—These words refer to the information given under Sec. 154—*Jagdaml v. Mahadeo, 14 C.W.N. 326; Nandamuri v. Emp., 1914 M W N 382, 15 Cr.L.J. 622.*

488. Investigation of offence outside jurisdiction :—There is nothing in this section to prevent the police of one police-station from conducting an investigation within the jurisdiction of another police circle. Therefore where the police Inspector of T circle during the in-

vestigation of a burglary sent some constables to the house of the accused situated in another police circle and the constables locked the house in question and kept guard of the house, it was held that the Inspector of T circle did not act *ultra vires*—*Natha Singh v. Crown*, 1915 P.R. 12, 16 Cr.L.J. 551.

489. Report :—The report required by this section is the first report of the offence which an officer in charge of a Police station is required to make to a Magistrate as soon as he receives information of an offence and before entering on its investigation. It is to be made direct to the Magistrate in order that he may have an early information and be in a position to act, if necessary, under Sec. 159—*Bombay Police Manual*, page 91.

A report under this section is necessary for taking proceedings under sec 159—*Mouli v. Naurangi*, 4 C.W.N. 351. The Police report under this section would give the Magistrate jurisdiction to enter upon an inquiry. But he may determine as he thinks fit, either to take no further steps or to take cognizance of the offence under Sec 190 (b) or to proceed under Sec. 203—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 119.

Failure to send a report as required by this section is a serious breach of duty which may lead to failure of justice. Such conduct on the part of the police would lead to a grave suspicion that the police were collecting false evidence—*Crown v. Balogh Khan*, 4 S.L.R. 38, 11 Cr.L.J. 498.

Report, whether a complaint—A report submitted in the usual way under secs. 157 and 173 is not intended to be and could not be a complaint within the meaning of Sec. 195—*Mokham v. K. E.*, 6 O.C. 1.

Report, whether public document—*Right of accused to get copies before trial* :—The report made by a Police officer in compliance with this section is not a public document within the meaning of sec. 74 of the Evidence Act, and consequently an accused person is not entitled before trial to have a copy of such report—*Arumugam v. Karuppayi*, 20 Mad. 189.

158. (1) Every report sent to a Magistrate under S. 157 shall, if the Local Govern-

Report under section 157 how submitted.

ment so directs, be submitted through such superior officer of police as the Local Government, by general or special order, appoints in that behalf.

(2) Such superior officer may give such instructions to the officer in charge of the Police station as he thinks fit, and shall, after recording such instructions on such report, transmit the same without delay to the Magistrate.

159. Such Magistrate, on receiving such report,

Power to hold investigation or preliminary inquiry.

may direct an investigation or, if he thinks fit, at once proceed, or depute any Magistrate subordinate

to him to proceed, to hold a preliminary inquiry into, or otherwise to dispose of, the case in manner provided in this Code.

490. Magistrate's power to hold investigation or inquiry :—An inquiry can be made under this section only on a police report submitted within the terms of section 157, *i.e.* on a preliminary report made *before* the completion of the police investigation or inquiry; but if the report is submitted *after investigation*, the Magistrate is not empowered to act under this section. Thus, where information was laid before the police charging a person with criminal trespass into a house with intent to have improper intercourse with a female therein, and the police reported that they did not believe that the object was to commit the offence stated but that they were not disinclined to believe the charge of trespass, it was held that as the report was made after investigation into the offence, the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to act under this section—*Mauli v. Naurangi*, 4 C.W.N. 351.

The inquiry which a Magistrate is competent to hold under this section is a *preliminary inquiry*. Therefore where a report of the commission of an offence has been made by the police *after full inquiry* into the truth of the information given them as to the commission of the offence, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to make any further inquiry into the same offence—*In re Kandhiya Lal*, 1899 A.W.N. 87.

An inquiry under this section can be made only on the submission of a police report, if, however, a complaint is made to the Magistrate, he is bound to proceed under sec. 200—*Loke Nath v. Sanyasi*, 30 Cal. 923.

Where a case comes before a first class Magistrate under the provisions of secs. 157 and 159, he can depute a Sub-Deputy Magistrate to hold an investigation or a preliminary inquiry. The latter can also, under sec. 164 (1), record a statement of a witness made before him in the course of the police investigation—*Harendra v. Emp.*, 40 C.L.J. 313, 26 Cr.L.J. 307.

The expression "preliminary inquiry" in this section appears to be used in a different sense from its use in section 288, where it refers to inquiries under ch. XVIII, prior to commitment to the sessions, which are held after the police investigation is complete, after the chargesheet is drawn up, and after the accused is forwarded under custody under sec. 170 to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the case—*Pedda v. K. E.*, 45 Mad. 230 (233).

491. When Magistrate cannot try the case :—Where a Magistrate took an active part in the capture of parties charged with the commission of an offence, and then tried them himself on that charge, it was held that he was bound to state to the accused, so far as he could, what were the facts he himself observed and to which he himself could bear testimony; and the prisoner in such a situation had a right to cross-examine the Magistrate whose evidence should be recorded and form part of the record in the case. The proper course, however, for the

Magistrate to have taken in such a case would have been to decline to try the case, and to ask that it should be taken up by some other Magistrate—*In re Hurro Chunder*, 20 W.R. 76

160. Any police-officer making an investigation under this Chapter may, by order to require attendance in writing, require the attendance of witnesses. before himself of any person being within the limits of his own or any adjoining station, who, from the information given or otherwise, appears to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case; and such person shall attend as so required.

492. Order in writing :—The order to attend under this section must be in writing. In the absence of an order in writing, a person required orally to appear before a police officer as a witness cannot be convicted under section 174 I.P.C. for disobedience of such order—*In re Veerasamy*, 1 Weir 88. So also, where a Police Inspector sent a constable to bring two persons for inquiring of them about an offence, and the order was not in writing, the persons need not accompany the constable. If the persons accompanied the constable, they could not be said to have been in lawful custody of the constable, and any person inducing those persons not to accompany the constable could not be held guilty of rescuing them from lawful custody—*Q. E. v. Purshotam*, Ratanlal 850.

493. "Require the attendance" :—An officer in charge of a police station may require the attendance of persons whose evidence is necessary, and the persons summoned are bound to obey the order; but in no case can the police compel a witness by force to attend before him—*Q. v. Tarinee*, 7 W.R. 3; *Q. E. v. Purshotam*, Ratanlal 850. See also *Bengal Police Manual*, 2nd Ed., p. 378

Detention :—A police officer has no power to arrest or to detain even for a single moment any person whose evidence is required for the purpose of investigation—*Q. v. Tarinee*, 7 W.R. 3

Security bond to appear :—There is no provision in this Code authorising a police-officer to take security-bond for the production of any person before the police, and the Magistrate has therefore no power to alter it and impose fresh conditions under it—*In re Chandra Sekhar*, 11 Cal 77. But see *Crown v. Kanshi Ram*, 1913 P.R. 22, 14 Cr.L.J. 631, cited under secs 497 and 499.

494. Who may be required to attend :—Accused :—This section applies only in the case of persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case, i.e., witnesses or possible witnesses only, an order under this section cannot be made requiring the attendance of an accused person, with a view to his answering the charge made against him. The intention of the legislature seems to have been only to provide a facility for obtaining evidence and not for procuring the attendance of the accused, who may be arrested at any time if necessary

—*Q. E. v. Saminada*, 7 Mad. 274, *Emp. v. Ratan*, 4 Bom. L.R. 644; *Emp. v. Nga Tha*, 4 Rang. 72, 27 Cr.L.J. 881; *Q. E. v. Jadub Das*, 27 Cal. 295. Therefore where the accused person refused to obey an order under this section, and was therefore taken into custody by the police, it was held that the Police was guilty of wrongful confinement, although the police was justified in arresting without warrant upon the original charge made against the accused—*Lakshimigadu*, 2 Weir 121.

Woman —It is an unusual course for the Police to take a number of women away from their village to the police-station on the pretext that they wished to examine them. The examination should be properly conducted at the women's own houses—*Haladhar*, 9 C.W.N. 199.

"Shall attend" :—If a person fails to attend before a police officer making an investigation under this chapter, he is liable to be prosecuted for an offence under section 174 I.P.C.—*Q. E. v. Jogendra*, 24 Cal. 320.

495. Magistrate's power to interfere or issue warrant :
—A Magistrate has no power to issue a warrant for the arrest and production of a person in order that such person may give evidence before the Police during an investigation under this chapter—*Q. E. v. Jogendra*, 24 Cal. 320. He cannot interfere with the exercise of discretion given to a police officer to summon witnesses, though he might offer his suggestion or advise the Police officer as to a particular course of action—*In re Sankatchand*, Ratanlal 133.

161. (1) Any police-officer making an investigation under this Chapter or any police officer not below such rank as the local Government may, by general or special order, prescribe in this behalf, acting on the requisition of such officer, may examine orally any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case.

(2) Such person shall be bound to answer all questions relating to such case put to him by such officer, other than questions the answers to which would have a tendency to expose him to a criminal charge or to a penalty or forfeiture.

Change :—The italicised words have been added by sec. 33 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923). This amendment is similar to that made in section 157 (1).

Scope —The provisions of this section should not be utilised in any but "*heinous cases*." Heinous cases include cases triable exclusively by a Court of Session and those cases in which special diaries are sub-

mitted through the Magistrate either to the Commissioner only or both to the Commissioner and to the Deputy Inspector-General or Inspector-General of Police—*Beng. Pol. Code*, p. 432.

496. Examination of accused before arrest :—When a police officer has evidence before him, upon which he is bound to arrest a person, he should not, preliminary to his arrest, obtain a statement from that person professedly under this section and reduce it to writing—*Q. E. v. Jadub Das*, 27 Cal. 295.

497. Statements of witnesses .—*Not privileged under sec. 172 ;—*Where a Police officer making an investigation under this section took statements from the persons who were afterwards called as witnesses, the accused person would be entitled to call for and inspect such documents and cross-examine the witnesses thereon, as such statements would not amount to a portion of the diary referred to in sec 172—*Bikas v. Q. E.*, 16 Cal 610; *Sheru Sha v. Q. E.*, 20 Cal. 642, *Emp. v. Rudra Singh*, 1896 A.W.N 193 *Contra—Q. E. v. Mannu*, 19 All 390, *Q. E. v. Nasiruddin*, 16 All 207. But under the amended section 162, these statements, whether included in the diary or not, can be used only under the circumstances mentioned in sec. 162.

*Statements not the property of Police .—*There is no prohibition against any person present at the time when depositions are being taken or confessions made, to take down in writing what either a prisoner or a witness says—*In re Kristo Lal Nag*, 10 Cal. 256.

498. Recording of statements :—Statements made by a witness to a police officer under this section during an investigation may be reduced to writing. But it is not obligatory on the Police officer to reduce to writing any statement made to him. He may do so only if he likes—*Reg v. Uttamchand*, 11 B.H.C.R. 120. The words "and may reduce into writing any statement made by the person so examined" which occurred in the Code of 1882 at the end of the first para have been omitted from the Code in 1898.

It was held that the statements of witnesses should not be recorded in the special diary mentioned in sec. 172—*Dadan Gazi v. Emp.*, 33 Cal. 1023 But it does not now matter whether these statements are recorded in the special diary or not, their use being controlled solely by sec. 162 (*Woodroffe*, p. 178). Cf. the words "whether in a Police diary or otherwise" occurring in sec. 162

It is not necessary that the statements of witnesses recorded under this section should be in the form of alternative question and answer. It is enough if the statement so recorded is substantially an answer to the questions put to the witnesses—*Q. E. v. Bhagwantia*, 15 All. 11; *Q. E. v. Abdur Rahaman*, 1896 P R 7.

The statements need not be signed by the witnesses. It is not illegal for a police officer obtaining the signature of witnesses to a statement under this section to authenticate his record of such statement, but there is nothing to compel them to sign it—*Q. E. v. Bhagwantia*, 15 All 11.

499. Privilege of witnesses :—A statement made by a witness in answer to a question put to him by a police officer in the course of an investigation under this section is privileged, and cannot be made the foundation of a charge of defamation—*Q. E. v. Govinda*, 16 Mad. 235; nor can he be made liable in an action for damages for any words spoken during such investigation—*Methuram v. Jagannath*, 28 Cal. 794

*Witness not bound to speak the truth :—*Under the Code of 1882 a witness was bound to answer truly all questions put to him under this section, but the effect of the omission of the word 'truly' from the Code of 1898 has been to do away with the legal obligation to speak the truth—*Nga Pyn v. Emp.* 10 Bur L.T. 259, 18 Cr.L.J. 844. Therefore witnesses cannot be prosecuted for giving false evidence under this section—*Q. E. v. Sankaralinga*, 23 Mad. 544, *Nga Po v. K. E.*, 10 Bur.L.T. 203, 18 Cr L J 98 The Select Committee (1898) observed :—"It seems to us unfair that a man should be liable to be convicted of giving false evidence on the strength or by the aid of a statement supposed to have been given to a Police officer, but which is not given on oath, which he has not signed, and which he has had no opportunity of verifying; such statement may be hurriedly taken down as rough notes; the police officer is not trained in taking evidence, and the notes are often fairred out by another officer. They bear no resemblance to depositions and ought to have no weight as such attached to them. The provisions of sections 202 and 203 of the Penal Code appear to us to afford a sufficient safeguard against false information "

This change in the law supersedes the following cases decided under the Code of 1882 and earlier Codes—10 Cal. 405; 8 C.L.R. 236; 20 W.R. 41, 8 Bom. 216, 11 Bom. 659, 15 All. 11; 1896 P.R. 7.

Since a person making a statement under this section cannot be said to "give information" within the meaning of sec. 182 I. P. C., he cannot be prosecuted under that section for giving false information if the statement made by him be false—*Mangu v. Crown*, 1914 P.L.R. 227, 15 Cr.L.J. 650, nor under section 211 I. P. C.—*Chinna v. Emp.*, 31 Mad. 506.

500. Refusal to answer questions :—Under this section, a person answering questions put by a police officer is not bound to answer truly. Therefore a refusal to answer such questions is not punishable under sec. 179 I. P. C.—*In re Savani*, 1 Weir 111; *Q. E. v. Sankarlinga*, 23 Mad. 544; *Gul Hasan v. K. E.*, 1903 P.R. 27; *Crown v. Mahmud*, 6 S.L.R. 277, 14 Cr L.J. 302.

*Incriminating questions :—*Under subsection (2), a witness is not bound to answer any question put to him by a police officer, the answer to which would have a tendency to expose him to a criminal charge—*Q. E. v. Annia*, Ratanlal 518; *Q. E. v. Kalidas*, Ratanlal 488. A person examined under this section by the police with respect to an offence with which he may himself be charged and convicted is not bound to speak the truth, and in such a case a conviction for giving false evidence would be illegal—*Q. E. v. Usaphkhan*, Ratanlal 619.

162. (1) No statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under this Chapter shall, if taken down in writing, be signed by the person making it; nor shall such writing be used as evidence: Provided that, when any witness is called for the prosecution whose statement has been taken down in writing as aforesaid, the Court shall, on the request of the accused, refer to such writing and may then, if the Court thinks it expedient in the interests of justice, direct that the accused be furnished with a copy thereof: and such statement may be used to impeach the credit of such witness in the manner provided by the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

162. (1) No statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under this Chapter shall, if reduced into writing, be signed by the person making it; nor shall any such statement or any record thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement or record, be used for any purpose (save as hereinafter provided) at an inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made:

Provided that, when any witness is called for the prosecution in such inquiry or trial whose statement has been reduced into writing as aforesaid, the Court shall, on the request of the accused, refer to such writing and * * * direct that the accused be furnished with a copy thereof, in order that any part of such statement, if duly proved, may be used to contradict such witness in the manner provided by section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. When any part of such statement is so used, any

499. Privilege of witnesses :—A statement made by a witness in answer to a question put to him by a police officer in the course of an investigation under this section is privileged, and cannot be made the foundation of a charge of defamation—*Q. E. v. Govinda*, 16 Mad. 235; nor can he be made liable in an action for damages for any words spoken during such investigation—*Methuram v. Jagannath*, 28 Cal. 794.

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was provided that no statement made by a witness if reduced to writing should be used as evidence *against the accused*, thus making it clear that the provision in question was intended for the benefit of the accused.

"The new section did not lay down in terms that the accused might not use the written record of a witness' statement for the purpose of his defence, and indeed it rather suggested that he was entitled to do so. Accordingly cases occurred in which the accused demanded to see the statements which the police had taken down, in order that he might use, for the purpose of his defence, anything that appeared therein to his advantage, and the Calcutta High Court ruled that he was entitled to do so. The Allahabad High Court, on the other hand, held that the writings in effect formed part of the police-distry and were therefore privileged from inspection, and this was the position which stood to be dealt with when the Amending Act of 1893 was under consideration. There was evidently a good deal to be said on both sides as will appear from the report of the Select Committee (1893) on the Bill which is quoted in *extenso* below :—

'The question involved (namely, whether the accused is entitled to inspect statements taken down by the police under section 161) is full of difficulty. In the first place, it is essential in the interests of public justice that the sources of police information should be kept secret. If the names of informers or detectives and the nature of their information be disclosed, the detection of crime would be seriously crippled. In the second place, it is unfair to a witness that his evidence should be discredited on the strength of an *alleged statement made to a policeman*, which he may have had no opportunity of verifying or correcting. Such statements must necessarily be often taken down hurriedly and may be incorrectly copied out. They are not taken down as depositions, or with regard to the rules of evidence, but merely to aid the police in the course of their investigation. But in the third place, it may be most important for the accused to show that a witness called for the prosecution is telling a story substantially different from that which he told when first questioned by the police. We have endeavoured to reconcile these conflicting interests by reverting to the language of the Codes of 1861 and 1872, and adding a proviso compelling the Court, on the application of the accused, to refer to such statements, and then empowering it in its discretion to allow him to have copies of them. We then provide for the mode in which these statements are to be used. It is clear that a witness ought not to have his credit impeached on the strength of a statement alleged to have been made to a policeman, unless and until it is shown that he has made that statement.'

"The result was not altogether a happy one. It will be noticed that the section deals mainly with the *writing* and enacts that it shall not be used in evidence, with a proviso that the Court may in its discretion direct the accused to be furnished with a copy of it—presumably only in order that the accused may know that there is something in the writing which may help his defence—and goes on to say that the statement (*i.e.*, what

the witness said to the Police officer) may be used in the ordinary course to impeach the credit of the witness, obviously implying that for this purpose it must be duly proved.

"It seems clear that all that the amendment of 1898 intended to effect was to make it clear that the accused had no right to call for or see the record of any statements taken down by the police under section 161, unless the Court thought that in the interests of justice he should be allowed to do so. It did not purport to deal with, and has left untouched, the further question whether or not a statement made by a witness under section 161, as apart from the written record of the statement, might be used by the prosecution for the purpose of corroborating one of their witnesses under section 157 of the Evidence Act, and this is at all events one of the principal difficulties with which we have to deal now.

"The re-draft of the section which we propose will make it clear that the statements taken under section 161 (and not merely the written records of such statements) are not to be used in any way or for any purposes except as allowed by the proviso. Having regard to the fact that the making of such statements is compulsory under section 161, and to the way in which, and the circumstances under which, they are usually recorded, we do not think that they are of any corroborative value where the witness merely repeats the same statement in Court, and that they ought not therefore to be allowed to be used for the purpose of corroboration under section 157 of the Evidence Act. If the really material fact to the prosecution is that a statement was made to the police on a particular date or at a particular place, this fact will of course still be provable in the ordinary course, and it will be open to the Courts or to a jury to make any proper deduction from this fact and the action which was taken on it. The amendment will also, we think, make it clear that if the accused wishes to rely on anything in the previous statement of a witness to the police, of which he has been allowed by the Court to have a copy, he will have to prove it in the ordinary way. If the witness admits this in cross-examination, it will of course be sufficient; if he denies the contradiction and the police officer who took it down is called by the prosecution, the previous statement of the witness on the point may be proved by him; if he is not called by the prosecution, the Court would no doubt itself in most cases call him, or if the accused is calling evidence in support of his defence, it may be worth his while to call the Police officer himself. But it is clear that unless the previous contradictory statement is proved in some way in accordance with law, it ought not to depreciate the witness's statement on oath. It will be observed that under our amendment, if any part of the previous statement of the witness is used for the purpose of cross-examination by the accused, any other part of it may be used by the prosecution within the proper limits of re-examination. This is, we think, the only way in which the previous statement ought to be allowed to be used by the prosecution"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916.*

500A. Scope of section :—The ban of sec. 162 applies only to statements made to a police-officer making an investigation under Chap. XIV. If the investigation contemplated by that Chapter is finished,

then this section cannot be invoked to prohibit any statement made to a police-officer at some time *subsequent* to the investigation. If, on the other hand, statements made to police-officers when preparing a map or holding an identification parade are statements made in the course of an investigation under Ch. XIV, then they fall within the scope of the prohibition embodied in sec. 162—*Emp v. Nga Than*, 4 Rang. 72, 5 Bur. L. J. 30, 27 Cr. L. J. 881.

The first information report (sec. 154) against an accused is not a statement within the contemplation of sec. 162, in as much as it is not made in the course of an investigation. Again, section 154 requires it to be signed, whereas statements under sec. 162 are forbidden to be signed, even when recorded in writing—*Azimaddy v. Emp.*, 54 Cal. 237, 44 C. L. J. 253, 28 Cr. L. J. 99 (101). Where a person who was assaulted sent a telegram to the Police, and the Police Inspector went to the place and recorded a statement from the complainant, *held* that this statement did not fall under sec. 162 as it was not made to a police officer in the course of investigation. The Inspector went to the place not to make investigation and collect evidence but to see whether his suspicion that an offence had been committed was justified—*Chidambaram*, 55 M. L. J. 231, 29 Cr. L. J. 717 (718).

Section 162 is clear enough to exclude from evidence any statement made by any person, and therefore a statement by the investigating officer that he examined witnesses for the defence in the course of the investigation is not admissible in evidence—*Bhagurath v. Emp.*, 30 C. W. N. 142, 27 Cr. L. J. 222.

Statements made to a police officer in the course of an investigation under sec. 174, even though it is conducted in the presence of two or more respectable men are none-the-less statements made to a police officer "in the course of an investigation" under this Chapter, within the meaning of sec. 162—*In re Maruthamuthu Kudumban*, 50 Mad. 750, 52 M. L. J. 601, 28 Cr. L. J. 463 (464).

This section may be thus explained. The first paragraph provides that no statement made to the police in the course of an investigation shall be admissible at the inquiry or trial. In consequence, no witness may be asked what he said to the Police during the investigation, nor may any Police-officer be asked what a witness said to him during the investigation, nor may any bystander be questioned as to what he heard another person say to the Police-officer during the investigation. The second paragraph (proviso) loosens the rigidity of the first paragraph to a certain extent. In consequence of this paragraph, when a witness for the prosecution is being examined, if an accused has reason to believe that the statement which the witness is making in Court differs from the statement which he made to the Police, then the accused or his advocate may ask the Court to refer to the record of any statement made by the witness to the police, and if it be found that there is any variation between the two statements the defence are entitled to a copy of the record of the statement made to the Police. That copy must then be proved, and the witness may

cross-examined on that statement under sec 145 Evidence Act, and his attention must be drawn to the particular points in which his statement in Court differs from the record of his statement to the Police—*Bana Singh v. Emp.*, 6 Rang. 137, 29 Cr.L.J. 701 (702).

501. Statement.—A statement made by a witness to the Police that he knew nothing about the occurrence, or a statement that he did not say anything to the police about the occurrence is not a 'statement' within the meaning of sec. 162, otherwise the absence of a statement would be equivalent to a statement—*Aseruddin v. Emp.*, 53 Cal. 980, 28 Cr.L.J. 273 (274). (But it is doubtful if such a statement would not be a statement under sec. 161—*Ibid.*).

The 'statement' contemplated by sec 162 is not a complete statement recording every word uttered by the witness. It is immaterial whether the statement as recorded is the actual record of the words used by the witness. It is sufficient, even if the statement is recorded in the form of a memorandum of what the witness had said to the police-officer; such a statement is available for the purpose of contradicting the witness—*Mafzaddy v. Emp.*, 31 C.W.N 940, 28 Cr.L.J. 805 (806).

A statement can be made by other means than by words. Therefore, the gesture of the accused (which is to all intents and purposes a statement) in pointing out to the Police where the revolver was, is inadmissible in evidence—*Emp v Nga Kyng*, 3 Rang. 656, 27 Cr.L.J. 658.

Oral statement.—The language of the old section was: "nor shall such writing be used as evidence" And so a distinction was drawn between an oral statement and a written statement, and it was laid down that only written statements were excluded from evidence, but the admission of oral statements was not forbidden—*Emp. v. Nilakanta*, 35 Mad. 247, 13 Cr.L.J. 305, *Muthu Kumarasami v. Emp.*, 35 Mad. 397, 13 Cr.L.J. 352. The amended section uses the words "nor shall any such statement or any record thereof be used" That is, the language of the present section is much wider than that of the old section, and excludes any statement (oral statement as well as written statement) from being used for any purpose. And the expression "if reduced into writing" is intended only to qualify the verb "shall be signed" and is not a clause descriptive of the word "statement"—*Thimmappa v. Timappa*, 51 Mad. 967 (F.B.), 29 Cr.L.J. 1098 (1101), overruling *In re Venkatasubbiah*, 43 Mad. 640. This is also the view of the Rangoon High Court—*Emp. v. Nga Tha*, 4 Rang. 72 (F.B.), 27 Cr.L.J. 881, 5 Bur.L.J. 30. See also *Bahadur Singh v. Emp.*, 7 Lah. 264, 27 Cr.L.J. 803 (805); *Azmaddy v Emp.*, 54 Cal 237, 29 Cr.L.J. 99 (102).

Statement of approver.—This section covers a statement made by an approver to the police before he was tendered pardon. But even if it does not, such a statement can be used to corroborate or contradict the approver as a previous statement of a witness, under the ordinary provisions of the Evidence Act—*Hazara v. Emp*, 9 Lah. 389, 29 Cr.L.J. 348 (349).

Statement must not be signed :—Statements of witnesses taken in the course of police investigation must not be signed; even if they are signed contrary to the provisions of this section, they do not thereby become statements taken under sec 154 and do not become admissible as first information. The police by violating the provisions of section 162 and thus committing an illegality cannot make admissible statements which are inadmissible under the law—*In re Narayana Menon*, A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 106, 25 Cr.L.J. 401.

501A. Statement of accused :—This section refers only to statements of persons examined as witnesses by the police in the course of investigation and not to statements made by accused persons as such—*Rannun v. K. E.*, 7 Lah 84, 27 Cr.L.J. 709; *Hussain v. Emp.*, 20 S.L.R. 74, 27 Cr.L.J. 456, *Ganpati v. Emp.*, 6 N.L.R. 180, 12 Cr.L.J. 60; *Newaz Ali*, 33 C.W.N. 257, 30 Cr.L.J. 916, *Azimaddy v. Emp.*, 54 Cal. 237, 28 Cr.L.J. 99. A statement made by an accused person to the police which is not in the nature of a confession, is not inadmissible in evidence—*Sikander v. Crown*, 1918 P.R. 36, 20 Cr.L.J. 83; *Jogwa Dhanup v. Emp.*, 5 Pat. 63, 27 Cr.L.J. 484; *Emp. v. Nga Tha*, 4 Rang 72, 27 Cr.L.J. 881; *Sheobalak*, 29 Cr.L.J. 400, 11 N.L.J. 7. The Sind Court holds that the words 'statement of any person' refer to the statement of a person examined as a witness in the course of police investigation and do not include the statement of an accused person in respect of 'whom such investigation is being held—*Adho v. Emp.*, 19 S.L.R. 6, 26 Cr.L.J. 897, *Umer Daraz v. Emp.*, 19 S.L. 142, 26 Cr.L.J. 778.

502. Use of statement :—See the first proviso. Under sec. 162, as recently amended by the Amendment Act of 1923, statements made by any person to a Police-officer in the course of an investigation under Ch XIV shall not be used for any purpose except to contradict a witness at the request of the accused in the manner provided in the first proviso of the section—*Gahur Howladar v. Emp.*, 30 C.W.N. 503, 27 Cr.L.J. 641.

Under the old section the police officer who recorded the statement could use it to refresh his memory—*Q. E. v. Mannu*, 19 All. 390; *Q. E. v. Zakir Husain*, 21 All. 159, *Q. E. v. Sitaram*, 11 Bom. 657; *Emp. v. Narayan Raghunath*, 32 Bom. 111 (per Batty J.); *Imp. v. Jijibhai*, 22 Bom. 596; *Roghuni v. Emp.*, 8 Cal. 455, *Q. E. v. Wardhan*, Ratanlal 503; (Contra—*Dadan Gazi v. Emp.*, 33 Cal. 1023). Under the present law, such use of the statement is not permitted.

A statement made by a witness to the police can be used only by the accused, and that also only to contradict the witness, it cannot be used by the prosecution to corroborate the statements of its own witnesses before the Court, such a procedure is distinctly opposed to the provision of the law in this behalf—*Emp. v. Jijibhai*, 22 Bom. 596, *K. E. v. Kumaramuthu*, 25 M.L.T. 379, 20 Cr.L.J. 354, *Jhari Gope v. Emp.*, 8 Pat. 279, 30 Cr.L.J. 858; *Bhulai v. K. E.*, 13 O.C. 7, 11 Cr.L.J. 117. Section 157 of the Evidence Act lays down that in order to corroborate the testimony of a witness, any former statement made by such witness relating to the same fact is admissible in evidence; but this general rule is controlled by

the special provisions of sec. 162 Cr P.Code. Under this section not only is the record of the statement of a witness taken under sec. 161 excluded from evidence, but also the proof of such statement by oral evidence for the purpose of corroborating the testimony of the witness for the prosecution—*Rakha v. Crown*, 6 Lah. 171, 26 P.L.R. 304, 27 Cr.L.J. 438 (439).

The only way a witness can be contradicted by statements made to the police under the provisions of this section is to prove his written statement and put it to the witness under sec. 145 Evidence Act to permit him to explain the contradictions if any. Statements made to the police cannot be used at a trial in any other way—*Emp. v. Ibrahim*, 11 Lah. 605, 28 Cr.L.J. 983 (986).

This section does not prevent the prosecution, after a witness has made a statement, from asking him simply whether he made that statement to the police, or when a witness has made a statement in his evidence, from asking the Sub-Inspector whether in fact the witness had made that statement to him. In doing this, there is no use of the statement recorded by the police during their investigation; the witnesses or the sub-Inspector are merely asked as to a certain fact—*Quhi Mian v. Emp.*, 4 Pat. 204, A I.R. 1925 Pat 450, 27 Cr.L.J. 524.

Where a Magistrate used the statements made before the chief constable during the police inquiry, without conforming to the provisions of this section, and without affording the accused an opportunity of cross-examining the constable, and considered those statements as corroborative of the evidence given by the witnesses at the trial, and convicted those whose names were mentioned both in Court and in those statements, and acquitted those whose names were not mentioned therein, held that such use of the statements was grossly irregular and the whole trial was bad, and that the irregularity was not cured by sec. 537—*Emp. v. Babaji*, 11 Bom L R 366, 5 Cr L J. 353.

It is also illegal for a Magistrate to use as evidence against the accused the statements made by prosecution witnesses before the police by comparing them with their depositions, and, as a result of that comparison, to convict him—*Emp v Laxman*, 9 Bom.L.R. 895; *Emp. v. Narayan*, 32 Bom. 111; *Bahawala v. Emp.*, 1886 P.R. 17.

The statement cannot be used to make up for the deficiency in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses—*Q. E. v. Haribai*, Ratanlal 935; *Isab Mandal v. Q. E.*, 28 Cal. 348.

This section does not prohibit the use of statements made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under Ch. XIV, in proceedings under sec. 476, in cases where the alleged offence which is under consideration in the proceedings under sec. 476 was not under investigation at the time when the statement was made. But a statement made to the police in an investigation under Ch XIV in respect of one alleged offence cannot be used at an inquiry or trial in respect of a different offence which happened to be separately under investigation at the time when the statement was made—*U Htin Gyaw v. Emp*, 5 Rang-26, 29 Cr.L.J. 433.

Whether in a Police Diary or otherwise :—These words have been added by the Amendment Act of 1923. The object of making this amendment is that the police should no longer claim any privilege in respect of any statement on the ground that it is a statement recorded under sec. 172. There is now no distinction between a statement recorded under sec. 162 and a statement recorded under sec. 172, if a police officer purports to record a statement under the latter section. Whether a statement is recorded under sec. 162 or 172, an accused person is entitled to a copy of it for cross-examination—*Mafizaddi v. Emp.*, 31 C.W.N. 940, 28 Cr.L.J. 805. Statements made to the investigating Police officer, even though they are part of the Investigating officer's diary, can be used for the purpose of contradicting the witnesses who made the statements, in cross-examination—*Jadunandan v. Emp.*, 2 Luck. 605, 28 Cr.L.J. 802 (804). The accused is not entitled to see the Police diary, but when the statement of a prosecution witness has been reduced into writing in a Police diary, the accused is entitled to ask the Court to refer to it and to be entitled to a copy of it—*Sulaiman v. Emp.*, 6 Rang. 672, 30 Cr.L.J. 538.

502A. First Proviso—Scope .—The proviso deals with one case and one case only, the case of witnesses called for the prosecution, whose statements have been taken down in writing as aforesaid. And the only concession it makes to the accused is to allow him, upon his request, and subject to the Court's discretion (under the second proviso) to have access to a copy of the recorded statement, and thereupon to use it for one purpose and one purpose only, viz., to break down the evidence of the prosecution witnesses already standing against him. On the face of it, the proviso does not cover the case of a witness for the defence, whose statements may have been recorded by a policeman, nor allows the prosecution to impeach the credit of such a witness by examining him upon any written statement he may have made to the police—*Emp. v. Narayan*, 32 Bom. 111, Q. E. v. *Madho*, 15 All. 25; *Nga Yon v. Emp.*, U.B.R. (1918) 84, 19 Cr.L.J. 726; *K. E. v. Vithu*, 26 Bom.L.R. 965, 26 Cr.L.J. 223, A.I.R. 1924 Bom. 510. According to the recently amended provisions of section 162, statements of witnesses recorded by the investigating officer can only be used to assist the accused in particular by showing that a witness who in Court deposes to certain facts has in such a statement at an earlier stage given an account or made statements which are contradictory to the testimony which he gives in Court. They cannot be used in cross-examining the witnesses not merely to show contradictions but at large for the purposes of showing that the statements did not corroborate or assist the story as put forward in the first information report—*Badri Chowdhuri v. K. E.*, 6 P.L.T. 620, 27 Cr.L.J. 362.

The first proviso to this section makes an exception in favour of the accused, but it is an exception most jealously circumscribed under the proviso itself "Any part of such statement" which has been reduced to writing may in certain limited circumstances be used to contradict the witnesses who made it. The limitations are strict: (1) only the statement of a prosecution witness can be used, and (2) only if it has been reduced to writing; (3) only a part of the statement recorded can be used; (4) such

part must be duly proved: (5) it must be contradiction of the evidence of the witness in Court; (6) it must be used as provided in section 145 of the Evidence Act, that is, it can be used only after the attention of the witness has been drawn to it or to those parts of it which it is intended to use for the purpose of contradiction, and there are others. Such a statement which does not contradict the testimony of the witness cannot be proved in any circumstances, and it is not permissible to use the recorded statement as a whole to show that the witness did not say something to the investigating officer—*Badri Chowdhury v. K. E.*, supra (per Macpherson J). But in a later case, the same High Court has taken a different view. "To construe section 162 as meaning that, while, any part of the statement of a witness to the Police may be used to contradict him, yet if the contradiction consists in this that a statement made at the trial was not made in any part of the statement to the Police, such a contradiction cannot be proved, seems to be an artificial construction. I am unable to adopt it and, with respect, I must dissent from that view"—per Ross J. in *Ilaf Khan v. Emp.*, 5 Pat. 346, 7 P. L. T. 364, 27 Cr. L. J. 796 (dissenting from *Badri Chowdhury v. Emp.*, cited above).

The words 'if duly proved' in the proviso clearly show that the record of the statement cannot be admitted in evidence straightway, but that the officer before whom the statement was made should ordinarily be examined as to any alleged statement or omitted statement that is relied upon by the accused for the purpose of contradicting the witness—*K. E. v. Vithu*, 26 Bom. L. R. 965, A. I. R. 1924 Bom. 510, 26 Cr. L. J. 223.

There is no presumption as to the genuineness of the statements of witnesses entered in the police diaries, and unless they are duly proved, the evidence given in Court cannot be contradicted by them—*Labh Singh v. Emp.*, 6 Lah. 24, 26 Cr. L. J. 1153 (1154).

'On the request of the accused'—The procedure prescribed by sec. 162 must be strictly followed. A court is not justified in admitting a statement made by a person to a police officer, unless the accused or his pleader asks the court to refer to such record. Sec. 162 is in this point explicit—*Nga Po v. Emp.*, 4 Rang. 356, 27 Cr. L. J. 1371.

503. Right of accused to get copy of statement:— Under the first proviso as it stood before the present amendment, the words 'may if the Court thinks it expedient' (see the old section cited parallel) show that the accused was not entitled, as a matter of right, to obtain access to a copy of the written statement. His right to obtain such copy was left to the discretion of the Court—*Emp. v. Narayan*, 32 Bom. 111; *Q. E. v. Nasiruddin*, 16 All. 207. The accused could get a copy only if the Court thought it expedient in the interests of justice to furnish him with such copy—*Dadan Gazi v. Emp.*, 33 Cal. 1023; *In re Thiruvengadam*, 26 M. L. J. 182, 15 Cr. L. J. 289.

Under the present law, the words "shall direct" would seem to give the accused a right to obtain the copies. See *Venkatasubbiah v. Emp.*, 19 Mad. 640, 48 M. L. J. 195, 26 Cr. L. J. 721. (But such right has again been curtailed by the second proviso). Under the amended section 162.

it is obligatory on the part of a Judge to give the accused copies of the statements recorded under sec. 161, subject only to the exclusion of irrelevant matters which the public interest requires should not be disclosed—*Madari Sikdar v. Emp.*, 54 Cal 307, 28 Cr.L.J. 582. The language of this section is mandatory, and a Court has no power to refuse the application for copies. This section does not authorise the Court to look into the statement in the Police-diaries for the purpose of finding out whether it is contradictory to the statement made in Court or not, before granting the application. The accused has the right to get the copies and examine the statement for himself to find out whether there are contradictions, even though the court has formed an opinion that there are no contradictions—*Jhari Gope v. Emp.*, 8 Pat. 279, 30 Cr.L.J. 858.

The application to get a copy of the recorded statement must be made at the time when the prosecution witness, whom it is desired to test by reference to his recorded statements, appears on the box. But if, after all the prosecution witnesses have been examined, the defence applies to the Court to summon the Inspector of Police to appear with his diary, the application may be refused. But even in such a case, the Court ought to send and peruse the statements recorded in the diary, and if on such perusal it thinks that it would be expedient in the ends of justice (and that otherwise a gross miscarriage of justice may result) to allow the accused to use such statements, it would be open to the Court to furnish the accused with copies of the statements even at such a late stage and recall the witnesses and permit cross-examination—*Dadan Gazi v. Emp.*, 33 Cal. 1023.

The stage in an inquiry or trial at which an accused person is entitled to ask for a copy of a statement made by a prosecution witness to the police in the course of the investigation is the stage when the witness is called for the prosecution; that is, when he is under cross-examination and has already made a statement which the accused wishes to contradict by proof of his former statements to the police. Consequently the accused is not entitled to the copies before cross-examination is opened at all—in *re Peramasami*, 22 L.W. 784, 27 Cr.L.J. 100; *Emp. v. Shaikh Usman*, 52 Bom 195, 29 Bom L.R. 1581, 29 Cr.L.J. 221 (223). It is only at the time of cross-examination and when the cross-examination has laid the foundation for the suggestion that the evidence given by the witness in Court is contradicted by his statement recorded under sec. 161, that the accused is entitled to ask the Judge to refer to the writing and grant him copies. Sec. 162 does not impose a duty upon the Judge of granting copies of the statement recorded under sec. 161 before the cross-examination has been opened—*Madari Sikdar v. Emp.*, 54 Cal. 307, 28 Cr.L.J. 582. Two points in particular stand out in the proviso. In the first place, the question of furnishing to the accused a copy of the statement does not at all arise until the witness who made the statement is called for the prosecution at the inquiry or trial; and secondly, the Court is not competent to direct that the accused be furnished with a copy of the statement if it contains something which constitutes a contradiction of a statement

by the witness in his deposition at such inquiry or trial. These two circumstances must co-exist before an accused is entitled under this proviso to such copy—*Sagdat Mian v. Emp.*, 11 Pat 329, 28 Cr.L.J. 709 (714). The Patna High Court, however, has held in another case that the accused is entitled to a copy as soon as the witness is produced in Court, and there is nothing in this section which requires that the cross-examination must be opened before the accused is entitled to a copy—*Ram Gulam v. Emp.*, 7 Pat 205, 29 Cr.L.J. 297 (dissenting from 22 L.W. 784, 54 Cal. 307, 6 Pat. 329). The case of *Madari Sikdar* (supra) has been doubted in a later Calcutta case, *Babarali v. Emp.*, 56 Cal. 840, 30 Cr.L.J. 580 (582).

This section entitles the accused to a copy of the statement made by a witness to the police in order that it might be used for contradicting the statement made by the witness in Court. But where the witness was discharged without being examined or cross-examined, so that he made no statement in Court, the accused is not entitled to get copy of that witness' statement to the police—*Wajid Ali v. Emp.*, 7 Pat. 153, 30 Cr.L.J. 273 (275).

Where the accused was furnished with materially inaccurate copies of the statements of a prosecution witness recorded in the police diary, and on discovering the mistake he applied to have that witness recalled for the purpose of re-cross-examination in order generally to impeach his credit, but the Court refused the application, held that the accused was entitled to have the witness recalled, and the Court committed an error of law in refusing the application—*Sadananda v. Ramasray*, 21 Cr.L.J. 289 (Pat.).

If the accused have not availed themselves of the opportunity of asking for the copies of the statement during the committing Magistrate's inquiry, they have no further right under this section than to ask the Judge at the time of trial for such copies—*Babarali v. Emp.*, 56 Cal. 840, 30 Cr.L.J. 580 (582).

504. Second proviso:—This proviso did not occur in the Bills of 1914 and 1921 nor in the Reports of the Committees, but was added during the Debate in the Assembly. See the *Legislative Assembly Debates*, February 14, 1923, pages 2224-2243.

The provisions of sec. 162 are imperative that the Court shall, on the request of the accused, direct that the accused be furnished with a copy of the statement of the witnesses before the Police. But a refusal to grant copies can only be made if the requirements of the second proviso are satisfied; namely, if the Court is of opinion that any part of any such statement is not relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry or trial, or that its disclosure to the accused is not essential in the interests of justice, and is inexpedient in the public interests, the Court shall record such opinion before excluding such parts from the copy of the statement furnished to the accused. The application for copies should not be rejected on the mere ground that it might help the defence or that possibly

there was no contradiction—*Chedi Prosad v. Emp.*, 8 P.L.T. 613, 28 Cr.L.J. 597.

505. Subsection (2):—Dying declarations:—The dying statement of a deceased must be taken in the presence of the accused person; if not so taken, the writing cannot be admitted to prove the statement made. The statement may however be proved in the ordinary way by a person who heard it and the writing may be used for the purpose of refreshing the witnesses' memory—*Emp v Samiruddin*, 8 Cal 211; *K. E v Daulat*, 6 C.W.N. 921, *Abdul Jahl v Emp.*, 1886 P.R. 13.

It is advisable, where a dying declaration is elicited by questions, to set out the questions and answers, and if possible it should be taken in the presence of the accused who should then be allowed to cross-examine if he likes—*K. E v Madura*, 6 C.W.N. 72.

Where the document containing the dying declaration was not signed by the deponent, and the Police-officer was not bound by law to take it down in writing, held that the proper method of proving the oral statement of a dying man was by the oral evidence of any person who heard it, that person being allowed to refresh his memory by reference to the notes he made or read at the time—*Bhagwan v. Emp.*, 10 N.L.R. 19, 15 Cr L.J. 243

163. (1) No police-officer or other person in authority shall offer or make, or cause to be offered or made, any such inducement, threat or promise as is mentioned in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Section 24.

(2) But no police-officer or other person shall prevent, by any caution or otherwise, any person from making in the course of any investigation under this Chapter any statement which he may be disposed to make of his own free will.

506. Person in authority:—This term is not defined in the Act. But it must not be used in any restricted sense, so as to mean only a person who has control over the prosecution of the accused. The test would seem to be, whether the person had authority to interfere with the matter, and any concern or interest in it would be sufficient to give him that authority—*Reg v. Navroji*, 9 B.H.C.R. 358.

The following are persons in authority:—Honorary Magistrate—*Q. v. Ramdhun*, 1 W.R. 24; a Magistrate or Sessions Judge recording a confession—*Emp. v. Asghar*, 2 All. 260; *Q. E. v. Uzeer*, 10 Cal. 715; Village Magistrate—*Thandraya v Emp.*, 26 Mad. 38; Police Patel—*Emp. v. Rama*, 3 Bom. 12; *Emp. v. Fakira*, 40 Bom 220; Panchayitdar—*Emp. v. Ganesh*, 50 Cal. 127; *Nazir v. Emp.*, 9 C.W.N. 474; *Emp. v. Jesha*

by the witness in his deposition at such inquiry or trial. These two circumstances must co-exist before an accused is entitled under this proviso to such copy—*Saadat Alian v. Emp.*, 3 Pat. 329, 28 Cr.L.J. 709 (714). The Patna High Court, however, has held in another case that the accused is entitled to a copy as soon as the witness is produced in Court, and there is nothing in this section which requires that the cross-examination must be opened before the accused is entitled to a copy—*Ram Gulam v. Emp.*, 7 Pat. 205, 29 Cr.L.J. 297 (dissenting from 22 L.W. 784, 54 Cal. 307, 6 Pat. 329). The case of *Madari Sikdar* (supra) has been doubted in a later Calcutta case, *Babarali v. Emp.*, 56 Cal. 840, 30 Cr.L.J. 580 (582).

This section entitles the accused to a copy of the statement made by a witness to the police in order that it might be used for contradicting the statement made by the witness in Court. But where the witness was discharged without being examined or cross-examined, so that he made no statement in Court, the accused is not entitled to get copy of that witness' statement to the police—*Wajid Ali v. Emp.*, 7 Pat. 153, 30 Cr.L.J. 273 (275).

Where the accused was furnished with materially inaccurate copies of the statements of a prosecution witness recorded in the police diary, and on discovering the mistake he applied to have that witness recalled for the purpose of re-cross-examination in order generally to impeach his credit, but the Court refused the application, held that the accused was entitled to have the witness recalled, and the Court committed an error of law in refusing the application—*Sadananda v. Ramasray*, 21 Cr.L.J. 289 (Pat.).

If the accused have not availed themselves of the opportunity of asking for the copies of the statement during the committing Magistrate's inquiry, they have no further right under this section than to ask the Judge at the time of trial for such copies—*Babarali v. Emp.*, 56 Cal. 840, 30 Cr.L.J. 580 (582).

504. Second proviso:—This proviso did not occur in the Bills of 1914 and 1921 nor in the Reports of the Committees, but was added during the Debate in the Assembly. See the *Legislative Assembly Debates*, February 14, 1923, pages 2224-2243.

The provisions of sec. 162 are imperative that the Court shall, on the request of the accused, direct that the accused be furnished with a copy of the statement of the witnesses before the Police. But a refusal to grant copies can only be made if the requirements of the second proviso are satisfied; namely, if the Court is of opinion that any part of any such statement is not relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry or trial, or that its disclosure to the accused is not essential in the interests of justice, and is inexpedient in the public interests, the Court shall record such opinion before excluding such parts from the copy of the statement furnished to the accused. The application for copies should not be rejected on the mere ground that it might help the defence or that possibly

Mad. 38; "You had better tell the truth"—*Q. E. v. Uzeer*, 10 Cal. 775; "You had better pay the money than go to jail and it would be better for you to tell the truth"—*Re Navroji*, 9 II H.C.R. 358, "Tell me what you know about it, if you will not, I can do nothing for you, and I will send for the constable"—*Mukherji v Q E*, U.B.R. (1897-1901) 147; "If you confess the truth, nothing will happen to you"—*Q. E. v. Luchoo*, 5 N.W.P.H.C.R. 86; "If you confess to the Magistrate, you will get off"—*Q. v Ramdhan*, 1 W E 24, "Tell me what happened and I will take steps to get you off"—*Emp v Rama*, 3 Bom 12; "It is of no use to deny it, for there are the man and the boy who will swear that they saw you do it"—*Mukherji v Q E*, U.B.R. (1897-1901) 147

What are not inducements, etc—Exhortation to speak the truth—*Gulab v. Emp.*, 1894 P E 9, *Emp. v. Jesha Bewa*, 11 C.W.N. 904; holding out hopes of divine forgiveness—5 M L J 29 (Journal), threatening excommunication from caste for life—*Ibid.*, "I know the whole thing"—*K. E. v. Rango*, 3 Bom L R 404, "Take care, we know more than you think we know", these words amount only to a caution and not to a threat—*Ibid.*

164. (1) Any Presidency Magistrate, any Magistrate of the first class and any

Power to record statements and confessions.

Magistrate of the 2nd class specially empowered in this behalf by the Local Government may, if he is not a police officer, record any statement or confession made to him in the course of an investigation under this Chapter or at any time afterwards before the commencement of the inquiry or trial.

(2) Such statements shall be recorded in such of the manners hereinafter prescribed for recording evidence as is, in his opinion, best fitted for the circumstances of the case. Such confessions shall be recorded and signed in the manner provided in Section 364, and such statements or confessions shall then be forwarded to the Magistrate by whom the case is to be inquired into or tried.

(3) A Magistrate shall, before recording any such confession, explain to the person making it that he is not bound to make a confession and that if he does so it may be used as evidence against him, and no Magistrate shall record any such confession unless, upon questioning the person making it, he has reason to believe that it was made voluntarily; and, when he records any

he shall make a memorandum at the foot of such record to the following effect :—

"I have explained to (name) that he is not bound to make a confession and that, if he does so, any confession he may make may be used as evidence against him and I believe that this confession was voluntarily made. It was taken in my presence and hearing and was read over to the person making it and admitted by him to be correct, and it contains a full and true account of the statement made by him.

*(Signed) A. B.
Magistrate."*

Explanation.—It is not necessary that the Magistrate receiving and recording a confession or statement should be a Magistrate having jurisdiction in the case.

Change.—The italicised words in sub-section (1) have been substituted for "Every Magistrate," and the italicised words in sub-section (3) have been added, by section 35 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1928). The reasons have been thus stated :

"We think that confessions and statements should not be recorded under the section by third class Magistrates at all, or by second class Magistrates unless specially empowered. We consider that a statutory obligation should be laid on a Magistrate acting under the section to warn an accused person about to make a confession that the same may be used against him, and we think that the certificate prescribed by sub-section (3) should record the fact that the warning had been given."—*Report of the Joint Committee (1922)*

508. Object of section :—The object of police proceedings is to collect information as a preliminary step to the production of evidence in judicial proceedings against an accused person. For this purpose, any person may be examined and any statement may be reduced to writing by the Police. But no statement made to the Police can be used in evidence against the accused. To these provisions the present section seems to be supplementary. The Magistrate may prepare, what the Police may not, a record of any statement, be it a confession or not, which is made to him before judicial proceedings commence—*Lalu v. Emp.*, 1893 P.R. 2.

This section does not enable a police-officer, who has obtained a statement incriminating the accused, made by some person, to send such person to a Magistrate practically under custody, to have him examined and his statement recorded before the judicial inquiry or trial, for fixing him down to that statement in the subsequent judicial proceedings—*Q. E. v. Jadub.* 27 Cal. 295.

509. Scope of section :—This section under the old law did not apply to the Police in the town of Calcutta. Therefore it did not apply to a statement made by a person in custody to a Magistrate in Calcutta in the course of an investigation made by the Police in the town of Calcutta—*Q. E. v. Nilmadhab*, 15 Cal. 595. Nor did this section apply to the town of Bombay—*Q. E. v. Visram Babaji*, 21 Bom. 495.

The present section has been made applicable to confessions recorded in Presidency towns, by reason of the reference to Presidency Magistrates at the beginning of the section. But it should be noted that even in spite of this amendment, the application of this section to Presidency towns is extremely limited. Sub-section (2) (a) of sec 1 of this Code expressly lays down that nothing contained in this Code, in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, shall apply to the police in the town of Calcutta (or Bombay). The only sections in Chap. XIV which are applicable to the Police of Calcutta (or Bombay) are sec 155 and sec. 156 (3); and sec 164 so far as Presidency towns are concerned applies only to confessions recorded under those two sections. That is, section 164 applies to confessions made in the course of investigations held by the Calcutta Police only where the Police investigation is either an investigation in a non-cognizable case held under the orders of a Presidency Magistrate as contemplated by sec 155, or is an investigation into a cognizable case held under the orders of a Presidency Magistrate as contemplated by section 156 (3)—*Emp. v. Panch Kari*, 52 Cal. 67, 29 C.W.N. 300, 26 Cr L.J. 782. The Patna High Court, however, does not accept this narrow interpretation, and holds that a Presidency Magistrate is empowered to record a confession in Calcutta during a police-investigation there in any case. The Amendment has been made in 1923 to allow a Presidency Magistrate to record a confession in Calcutta in the course of a police-investigation; otherwise the amendment is altogether meaningless. Section 1 bars the application of the Code to the Police, it does not bar the application of the Code to a Magistrate not being a Police-officer—*Nilmadhab v. Emp.*, 11 Pat. 171, 27 Cr.L.J. 957. Where an investigation is held outside Calcutta, and a Presidency Magistrate records a confession in Calcutta, this section undoubtedly applies—*Nilmadhab v. Emp.*, (supra).

This section applies to a confession made in the course of an investigation. Where an accused is arrested in Calcutta in pursuance of a request made by the Police at Burdwan who evidently were holding the investigation with regard to the matter under the provisions of Ch XIV, the arrest and production of the accused before a Magistrate at Calcutta for the recording of confession must be taken to have been an act done in the process of investigation that was being held, and the Magistrate is bound to comply with the provisions of sec. 164 in recording the confession—*Emp. v. Garib Hari*, 30 C.W.N. 454, 27 Cr.L.J. 621.

Native State —A confession made to a Magistrate of a Native State who duly recorded and certified the same according to the provisions of this Code would be admissible in evidence in a British Court—*Badan v. K. E.*, 1909 P.R. 2; *Q. E. v. Nagla*, 22 Bom 235; *Q. E. v. S*

Singh, 12 All. 595. In *Bhola v. K. E.*, 1907 P.R. 8 it was held, however, that a confession so recorded by a Magistrate in a Native State was not entitled to the same weight as a confession recorded by a Magistrate in British India in strict compliance with the terms of this Code, and Courts should hesitate to convict the accused upon such confession standing alone. See also *In re Chinna Venkadu*, 2 Weir 125, where it is held that a confession made before a Foreign Court, even if it is certified according to the provisions of this section, cannot be used in evidence, unless it is sworn to like confessions made to private individuals. See also *Emp. v. Dhanka*, 16 Bom L.R. 261, 15 Cr.L.J. 433, where it is held that the Magistrate of a Native State recording a confession must be examined to prove the confession, before it can be used as evidence.

A Magistrate having jurisdiction in a district in British India cannot record a confession in a place in a Native State in connection with an offence committed in his district—*Mahar Singh v. Emp.*, 19 A.L.J. 355, 22 Cr.L.J. 567.

510. Who can record statement or confession:—

The power to record statements and confessions under this section is given to Magistrates not being Police officers. Magistrates who are also police officers (e.g. patels in Bombay) are not competent to record statements or confessions—*Q. E. v. Bhima*, 17 Bom. 485. So also, Police officers having magisterial powers have no power to record statements—*Q. v. Hurribole*, 1 Cal 207.

Where a Tahsildar, having powers of a Magistrate and being invested by the Local Government with power to take cognizance of offences upon complaint or police-report, was conducting an inquiry on complaint received, held that he must be deemed to have been doing so as a Magistrate and not as a police-officer—*K. E. v. Gulabu*, 35 All 260, 11 A.L.J. 286.

A third class Magistrate has no power to record a statement under sec. 164. A statement so recorded by him is not evidence in a stage of judicial proceeding, and if it is contradicted afterwards before a Magistrate having jurisdiction and holding a preliminary inquiry, it will not furnish an alternative charge of giving false evidence in a judicial proceeding—*Emp. v. Shettappa*, 14 Bom.L.R. 753, 13 Cr.L.J. 709.

An Honorary Magistrate, who is a member of an independent Bench with third class powers, cannot record a confession or statement—*Emp. v. Nuri Sheikh*, 20 Cal 483. The ruling in *Ghinna v. Emp.*, 3 P.L.J. 291, 19 Cr.L.J. 135, in which it was held that an Honorary Magistrate of the third class not empowered to sit singly had nevertheless power to record a confession, is rendered obsolete by the present amendment.

Where a case comes before a first class Magistrate under secs 157 and 159, he can depute a Sub-Deputy Magistrate to hold an investigation or a preliminary inquiry. The latter can, under the provisions of this section, record a statement of a witness made before him in the course of the police investigation, and therefore this is admissible as a statement made

in the course of an investigation—*Harendra v. Emp.*, 40 C L.J. 313, A.I.R. 1925 Cal. 161, 26 Cr.L.J. 307

A Magistrate who directs the police investigation is not incompetent to record a statement or confession under this section. On the other hand, it is the duty of the Magistrate who directs a police investigation or holds a preliminary inquiry under this Code to record statements under sec. 164; it is his duty to see that the accused confesses voluntarily, and to record his confessions truly—*Emp v. Maisri*, ■ S L R. 31, 12 Cr.L.J. 489.

A confession or statement under this section may be recorded by ■ Magistrate who afterwards conducts the inquiry or trial—*Barindra v. Emp.*, 37 Cal. 467. A Magistrate is not debarred from recording the confession of an accused person under this section merely because it may be afterwards his duty to hold a preliminary inquiry—*Anon.*, Ratanlal 121. A confession freely made to a Magistrate and recorded under this section is not inadmissible if the Magistrate thought proper, or if it so happened that he was the only Magistrate, to take the case and commit it to the Sessions Court—*Emp v Lal Sheikh*, 3 C W N 387. The decision in *Emp. v. Anuntram*, 5 Cal. 954 is no longer good law

511. "May record" :—The Magistrate may record the statement or confession, it is not obligatory on the Magistrate to do so. There is nothing in law to support the proposition that in order to make an oral extrajudicial confession admissible in evidence it must be reduced to writing. The confession may be proved by the evidence of the Magistrate—*Feroz v. Crown*, 1918 P.R. 11; *Emp. v. Maruti*, 21 Bom.L.R. 1065, 21 Cr.L.J. 65, (*per* Hayward J.; *Shah J. contra*); *Tangudupalli v. Emp.*, 45 Mad 230, 42 M L.J. 37, 23 Cr.L.J. 680. *Contra*—*Legal Remembrancer v. Lalit Mohan*, 49 Cal. 167 where it is held that a confession not recorded as provided by this section cannot be proved by the evidence of the Magistrate

512. Statement or Confession :—The word 'statement' means the statement of a witness and does not mean the statement of an accused person. This section does not provide for recording any statement of an accused person other than a confession; the reason is that the section relates to a stage of the case, viz. the Police-investigation stage, at which statements of the accused which are other than voluntary confessions and which are to be elicited by his examination are not intended to be obtained from him—*Q E. v. Bhairab*, 2 C.W.N. 102. In other words, this section provides for the recording of two classes of things, viz. (1) the statement of a person who appears before the Magistrate as a witness, and (2) the confession of a person accused of an offence—*Emp. v. Malka*, 2 Bom. 643; *Crown v. Andal*, 5 ■ L.R. 174, 13 Cr.L.J. 33.

Contra—The Punjab Chief Court has held that the distinction that is made in this section is between statements that are confessions and statements that are not; and not between persons by whom statements of either character are made, and this distinction is made merely to prescribe different modes of recording (sub-sec. 2); and that it is nowhere

or implied in this section that the statement of an accused person cannot be recorded unless it is a confession—*Lalu v. Emp.*, 1893 P.R. 2. The Calcutta High Court also has recently laid down that the word 'statement' is not limited to a statement made by a witness; a statement made by an accused and not amounting to a confession is a statement within the meaning of this section—*Abdul Rahim v. Emp.*, 41 C.L.J. 474, 26 Cr.L.J. 1279. See also *Legal Remembrancer v. Lalit Mohan*, 49 Cal. 167 where it is laid down that under this section there can be no distinction between a statement made by an accused and a confession made by him, and that a statement made by an accused that he had committed a murder must be recorded as provided by this section. The Patna High Court is also of opinion that this section contemplates a statement made by an accused person before a Magistrate which is not a confession but is wholly of an exculpatory nature—*Golam Md. v. Emp.*, 4 Pat. 327, 6 P.L.T. 598, 26 Cr.L.J. 878.

513. At what stage can statement and confession be recorded.—A statement or confession must be recorded under this section in the course of an investigation under this chapter or at any time afterwards, but before the commencement of the inquiry or trial. Therefore, where the Magistrate recorded confessions of the accused before he took cognizance of the case and before the examination of the prosecution witness began, it was held that the confessions were duly recorded under this section—*Barindra v. Emp.*, 37 Cal. 467. This section refers to a confession or statement recorded during an inquiry before the Police and not during an inquiry by the Magistrate. Therefore, where during an inquiry under section 202, the Magistrate recorded a statement made by a person against whom the complaint was filed, it was held that the statement could not be regarded as having been recorded under this section, because the statement was made during an inquiry by the Magistrate and not during an inquiry before the Police. Such a statement was not admissible against the accused without further proof—*Sat Narain v. Emp.*, 32 Cal. 1085 (1089).

514. Procedure:—Under this section, in the course of the investigation, the Magistrate is entitled to record any voluntary statement made by the accused person, but he is not entitled to examine the accused person in respect of the facts of the case. That power is given by sec. 342—*Gya Singh v. Mohamed*, 5 C.W.N. 864.

A Magistrate should not, before recording a confession, look into a police report to see what the accused had stated to the Police—*Jogibans v. Emp.*, 13 C.W.N. 861, 10 Cr.L.J. 125.

The Magistrate should not hold out any inducement. Where after the prisoner had made a long confessional statement, he was told by the Magistrate that if he stated all that he knew, he would then be examined as an approver and witness, it was held that the conduct of the Magistrate was highly improper—*In re Kosa Govindan*, 2 Weir 137. See also *Emp. v. Tara*, 45 All. 633 cited under sec. 163. But unless this inducement was actually held out to the accused by the Magistrate or by some

person in authority, the mere fact that the accused was under an impression that if he confessed he would be made an approver would not make the confession bad. The mere thought in the mind of the accused would not affect the admissibility of the confession—*Nirmadhab v. Emp.*, 5 Pat. 171, 27 Cr.L.J. 957.

The Magistrate must not put any question to the accused tending to incriminate him—*In re Rajappa*, 2 Weir 130.

A statement cannot be said to be properly recorded under this section if a police officer is present at the time and is allowed to put questions to the accused—*Indrasain v. Emp.*, 21 Cr.L.J. 418 (Lah.); *Jogiban v. Emp.*, 13 C.W.N. 801. "It is not proper to allow the Police officer who brought the prisoner to be present while the confession is being recorded by a Muharrir and to suggest questions to be put to the confessing prisoner"—*Cal. G. R. & C. O.* page 8; *Emp. v. Ramanand*, 1895 A.W.N. 221.

There is no warrant or justification for the intervention of a third party (e.g. police officer or another Magistrate) as the questioner, directly or indirectly, of a confessing prisoner—*Jogiban v. Emperor*, 13 C.W.N. 861, 10 Cr.L.J. 125.

Confessions should be recorded in open Court. A Magistrate acts improperly in recording the confession at a late hour in the night (viz. at 11-30 p.m.) after the accused had been subjected to interrogation by a police officer for 3 or 4 hours, and had broken down under the continued questioning—*K. E. v. Pramatha*, 30 C.L.J. 503, 21 Cr.L.J. 260. But of course the fact of the confession being recorded late at night is by itself not a sufficient proof against its voluntariness—*Abdul Salim v. Emp.*, 49 Cal. 573 (598). The Patna High Court holds that the Code does not contain any provision that the confession must be recorded in open Court; and therefore a Magistrate does not act illegally if he brings the accused to his house and records the confession there—*Nirmadhab v. Emp.*, 5 Pat. 171, 27 Cr.L.J. 957.

If the confession is a lengthy one, and cannot be finished in one day, the Magistrate is competent to record the confession piecemeal from day to day. But in such a case the Magistrate should not, during the period of confession, return the accused to the custody of the Police at night—*Nirmadhab v. Emp.*, 5 Pat. 171, 27 Cr.L.J. 957.

Power to administer oath.—The person making a statement under this section is a witness within the meaning of sec 5 of the Oaths Act, and therefore one to whom oath might be administered; and a charge of perjury can be framed under sec. 193 I. P. C. against the person making a false statement on oath under this section—*Q. E. v. Alagu*, 16 Mad. 421; *Emp. v. Tasadduk*, 1908 A.W.N. 73; *Suppa Tevan v. Emp.*, 29 Mad. 89. *Contra*—*Hari Charan v. Q. E.*, 27 Cal. 455; *Lala v. Emp.*, 1893 P.R. 2 (per Plowden J.).

Mode of examination of accused.—The proper mode for a Magistrate to examine an accused person under this section is to ask him if he wishes to make any statement or confession. If he says no, the Magistrate should

not proceed to interrogate him, but if such person wishes to make any statement, the Magistrate should write down the statement or confession and ask the accused such questions as may be necessary to ascertain clearly what his meaning is—*Empress v. Baji*, 5 C.P.L.R. 13; *Kesho Singh v. K. E.*, 20 O.C. 136, 18 Cr.L.J. 742

It is not permissible to question the accused closely and at great length for the purpose of extracting statements to be afterwards used as evidence—*Kesho Singh v. K. E.*, 20 O.C. 136, 18 Cr.L.J. 742.

515. Retracted confession :—A retracted confession can be acted upon if it is voluntarily made and is corroborated by other evidence. When the voluntary confession of a prisoner is corroborated by the confession of another prisoner, and the two confessions are strongly corroborated by the mass of evidence which has been recorded in the case, the confession of the former prisoner, even though subsequently retracted, can be made the basis of his conviction—*Nilmadhab v. Emp.*, 5 Pat. 171, 27 Cr.L.J. 957.

A retracted confession cannot be given any weight unless it is well corroborated by reliable evidence—*Ramai v. K. E.*, 3 Pat. 872, A.I.R. 1925 Pat 191, 26 Cr.L.J. 314. But in some other cases it has been laid down that a retracted confession, if proved to have been voluntarily made, can be considered along with the other evidence of the case. 'No binding rule can be laid down such as that a retracted confession must be supported by independent reliable evidence corroborating it in material particulars. The Court should treat the value of a retracted confession as a matter of prudence rather than of law—*Q. E. v. Gharya*, 19 Bom. 728; *Q. E. v. Gangia*, 23 Bom. 316; *Q. E. v. Raman*, 21 Mad. 83; *Jawan v. Crown*, 1914 P.R. 30; *Emp. v. Indra Chandra*, 2 C.W.N. 637; *Manna Lal v. K. E.*, 27 O.C. 40, A.I.R. 1925 Oudh 1, 25 Cr.L.J. 49. It is not illegal to base a conviction upon the uncorroborated confession of an accused person (subsequently retracted) provided that the Court is satisfied that the confession was voluntary and is true in fact—*Jawan v. Crown*, 1914 P.R. 30, 15 Cr.L.J. 626. Experience and common sense show that in the absence of corroboration in material particulars it is not safe to convict on a confession, unless, from the peculiar circumstances on which it was made and judging from the reasons of the retraction, there remains a high degree of certainty that the confession, notwithstanding its having been resiled from, is genuine—*Jawan v. Crown*, 1914 P.R. 30; *Q. E. v. Mahabir*, 18 All. 78. If a Judge believes that a confession though subsequently withdrawn contains a true account of the prisoner's crime, the Judge is bound to act, so far as the prisoner is concerned, on the confession which he believed to be true—*Emp. v. Kehri*, 29 All. 434; *Q. E. v. Maiku*, 20 All. 133. The weight to be given to such a confession depends upon the circumstances under which it was generally given and the circumstances under which it was retracted, including the reasons given by the prisoner for his retraction—*Sajjad Husain v. Emp.*, 1903 P.R. 16; *Q. E. v. Raman*, 21 Mad. 83; *Manna Lal v. K. E.*, 27 O.C. 40, 25 Cr.L.J. 49. Thus, where a confession was made under police coercion and

subsequently withdrawn, it is certainly inadmissible in evidence—*Motijan v Crown* 6 C.W.N. 380; *Sinari v Emp.* 2 A.L.J. 100, 2 Cr.L.J. 59.

Where a confession is retracted, it is the duty of the Court that is called to act upon it, especially in a case of murder, to enquire into all the material points and surrounding circumstances and satisfy itself that the confession cannot but be true *K E v Dargaya*, 3 Bom.L.R. 441.

Where in the course of the investigation of an offence, a witness makes a statement of a confessional nature which is recorded by the Magistrate under this section as a statement and not as a confession, and subsequently in the course of the preliminary inquiry before the committing Magistrate he retracts that statement, it is admissible in evidence against that witness on a prosecution for perjury—*In re Madhala Ramakrishna* 30 Mad 977.

516. Sub-section (2):—Mode of recording:—The confession is to be recorded in the manner provided by sec 364, i.e., in the form of questions and answers. The Magistrate is bound to record every question that he asks. It is of great importance that this provision of the law should be obeyed, otherwise it may be impossible to tell how far a witness voluntarily deposes to a matter, and how far it was extracted from him by questioning even in the nature of cross-examination. If the confession is not recorded in this manner, the record is defective—*Hasan Ali v K E*, 23 A.L.J. 719, 20 Cr.L.J. 1209, A.I.R. 1926 All. 22. Where a confession is recorded not in the form of questions and answers, as required by section 364, but in a narrative form, the defect is not a fatal one, and the confession is admissible in evidence, provided that the accused is not prejudiced by the irregularity. Section 533 would cure the defect—*Fekoo v. Empress*, 14 Cal. 539; *Emp. v. Munahl*, 11 Cal. 610; *Khudiram v. Emp.*, 9 C.L.J. 55; *Emp. v. Deo Dat*, 45 All. 100, 20 A.L.J. 915, *Emp. v. Anta*, 1892 A.W.N. 60.

Where, however, the confession was not recorded in the manner prescribed in section 364, but there was only a gist of the confession in a narrative form, and where it moreover appeared that the confession was not voluntary, it was held to be inadmissible in evidence—*Emp. v. Garib Hari*, 30 C.W.N. 454, 27 Cr.L.J. 621; *Nga San v. Emp.*, 11 Cr.L.J. 41 (Bur.).

*Language of record:—*See Note 1038 under sec. 364.

Signature —The object of requiring the signature of an accused person to the record of his confession is probably to furnish a strong test to whether the confession was voluntary and free, and to afford him a *locus penitentiae*, before the completion of the record, of indicating that the confession was not voluntary or was made under improper influence—*Reg v Bai Ratan*, 10 B.H.C.R. 166. The signature is taken as a voucher of the authenticity of the statement and not as an admission of its correctness—*Khudiram v. Emp.*, 9 C.L.J. 55.

The confession of the accused if not signed by the accused or attested by his mark, is not admissible in evidence—*Reg v. Bai Ratan*, 10 B.H.

C R. 166; but under sec. 533, parol evidence may be given of the terms of the confession, and those terms, if and when proved, may be admitted and used as evidence in the case, if the defect (non-signature) is such that it has not affected the merits of the defence—*Q. E. v. Raghunath*, 23 Bom. 221. So also, if the accused subsequently signed the confession without objection as soon as the non-signature was noticed, the defect would be cured by sec. 533 by the evidence of the Magistrate as to the authenticity of the statement—*Khudiram v. Emp.*, 9 C.L.J. 55.

If the accused is able to write, his thumb-impression will not be sufficient—*Sadananda v. Emp.* 32 Cal 550.

The Magistrate must sign the record of confession as well as the memorandum—*Emp. v. Lal Shaikh*, 3 C.W.N. 387.

See also Note 1040 under sec. 364

517. Sub-section (3)—Confession must be voluntary :

—A confession, in order to be admissible in evidence, must be made voluntarily and without pressure—*K. E. v. Gulab*, 35 All. 260, 11 A.L.J. 286, *In re Pisari*, 2 Weir 137. No statement should be recorded under this section unless the person making it is a free agent and voluntarily agrees to have his statement taken down—*Hira Lal v. Emp.*, 1918 P.R. 16, 19 Cr.L.J. 517. A Magistrate acting under this section must question the accused in order to be affirmatively satisfied of the voluntariness of the confession, and in case of doubt he ought not to record it ■ give the certificate—*Q. E. v. Basvanta*, 25 Bom. 168; *Neki v. Emp.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 116 (Lah.) The Magistrate should ascertain whether the confessional statement is made voluntarily, at the beginning of the statement and not at the end—*In re Rayappa* 2 Weir 136. A Magistrate should not proceed to record a confession, unless he first has reason to believe that the person is about to make it voluntarily, and he should therefore begin by enquiring into the point whether the confession is voluntarily made. Where a Magistrate recorded a confession of an accused without first satisfying himself as to its being voluntary, and then at the end of it put one comprehensive question as to the nature of the confession, it was held that he had not complied with the provisions of this section—*Q. E. v. Appa*, 1 Bom.L.R. 357, *Kandhai v. Emp.*, 1 O.L.J. 407, 15 Cr.L.J. 633. In *Pulin Tanti v. Emp.*, 40 Cal 873 (876) it was held that the fact that the Magistrate instead of asking the accused about the voluntary nature of the confession at the commencement of the confessional statement asked him at the end, was merely a defect of form which did not alter the character of the confession.

"It is desirable that Magistrates should act with deliberation in examining persons brought before them for the purpose of making confession and should, as far as possible, satisfy themselves that the confession is voluntary—and this not merely from the declaration of the accused, but from an attentive observation of his demeanour."—*Cal. G. R. & C. O.* page 8.

When a confession made by the accused is alleged by him to have been obtained by ill-treatment or other improper inducements, the Court

should carefully inquire into the truth of such allegations—*Reg. v. Koshi Nath* 11 B.H.C.R. 120; and it will not be presumed that it was induced—*Reg. v. Rajarat* 11 B.H.C.R. 137. and if the Court sees any ground of exclusion mentioned in sec. 24 Evidence Act (inducement, threat, promise), it may reject the confession, though at the time of record it appeared to be a voluntary confession—*Umar v. Emp.* 1457 P.R. 51, *Emp. v. Dewan Kahar* 4 P.L.T. 146. But the Court cannot, merely on surmise or conjecture, hold that the confession was produced by inducement, threat or promise. There must be in the confession itself or in the evidence or in the surrounding circumstances something to justify the inference that the confession was really not a voluntary one—*Emp. v. Dewan Kahar* 4 P.L.T. 166, 21 Cr.L.J. 497, A.I.R. 1923 Pat. 13.

When it appeared that an accused person was illegally confined in solitary confinement for about a fortnight, that the police had access to him, that pressure was brought to bear upon him through his father, mother and brother, that the desirability of a confession was pressed upon him by the District Magistrate as a means of saving himself and his relatives from threatened pains and penalties, that his father was illegally detained in *hajat* for a long time without any charge that he then made a confession which was recorded without legal precautions and in the immediate presence of a police officer who put incriminating questions to the accused and helped in amplifying the confession, held that such confession was not voluntary and was not admissible in evidence—*Jogivan v. Emp.* 13 C.W.N. 861, 10 Cr.L.J. 125.

Mere subsequent retraction of a confession duly recorded and certified is not enough to show that it was not made voluntarily—*Q. E. v. Basvania*, 25 Bom. 168.

Questions to be put to accused:—Under the present Amendment, the Magistrate should not only question the accused about the voluntariness of the confession, but should also warn him that he is not bound to make any confession, and that if he makes any, it will be used as evidence against him. This Amendment supersedes the ruling in *Q. E. v. Uteer*, 10 Cal. 775, (in which it was held that the Magistrate ought not to give any warning to the accused in the effect that what the accused was going to say would be evidence against him).

If the procedure of this section is not followed prior to the recording of a confession, the statement of the accused cannot be admitted in evidence against him or his co-accused—*Balan Singh v. Emp.*, 7 Lah. L.J. 39, 26 Cr.L.J. 731. Unless it is proved that the Magistrate explained to him that he need not make any confession and that it might be used against him, the confession is not admissible in evidence—*Bahawala v. Crown* 6 Lah. 183, 26 Cr.L.J. 1238, A.I.R. 1925 Lah. 432.

The Magistrate should not be content with a few formal questions. The section contemplates that the Magistrate shall hear the confession first, without making any record, and shall then put questions to ascertain whether the confession is voluntary, and then if he has reason to believe that it is voluntary, he may record the confession, writing out in full

every question put by him and every answer given by the accused, and following the provisions of sec. 364. The questioning of the accused before recording a confession is a matter of substance and not of mere form, and if it has been omitted, the omission is a fatal one and cannot be cured by any evidence under sec. 533—*Ananda v. Parbati*, 3 L.B.R. 173; *Shwe Sin v. K. E.*, 3 L.B.R. 213, 4 Cr.L.J. 385; *Farid v. Crown*, 2 Lah. 325 (328). Where the only warning which the Magistrate gives to the accused is that he asks the accused whether he is willing to make a confession, and that if he makes a confession it will be used as evidence against him, but he does not put questions to the accused to find out whether the reply which the accused is about to give is a voluntary one, there is no compliance with the requirements of law for recording a confession—*Emp. v. Garib Hari*, 30 C.W.N. 454, 27 Cr.L.J. 621. "No Magistrate shall record any such confession, unless upon questioning the person making it, he has reason to believe that it was made voluntarily. It is the invariable practice of the Deputy Magistrates in this Province to ignore entirely this provision of the Code. It is considered sufficient to make use of a stock phrase which in this instance runs: 'I am a Magistrate, if you want to make any statement of your own accord, you may do so, do not make any statement which you have been tutored by others to make' and then follows the story of the crime without any answer whatever to the Magistrate's formula. To my mind a Magistrate might just as well say to the accused '*hocus pocus*' or '*abracadabra*.'" Such phrases would be as much a compliance with the terms of sec. 164 (3) as any formula now in vogue. What is meant by the Code is that the Magistrate should ask the accused some such question as "Why are you confessing? Are you sorry for your crime or is it that some one has told you that you will gain something by a confession?" and refuse to proceed with the recording of the confession until he has had a satisfactory answer to his question"—*per Roe J. in Ragho v. Emp.*, 18 Cr.L.J. 721 (Pat.) Where a Magistrate questioned the accused person thus: "It appears that you have committed murder and absconded by escaping from custody; you have now come; what have you to say?" held that the question was extremely improper—*In re Pisani*, 2 Weir 137.

In order to ascertain whether the confession is voluntary, the Magistrate is bound to question the accused closely as to his motive in making a confession, and if he fails to do so, he has no jurisdiction to say that he is satisfied as to the voluntary nature of the confession—*Ragho v. Emp.*, 18 Cr.L.J. 721 (Pat.) In a more recent case of the same High Court, however, it has been held that it is not necessary that the Magistrate should have questioned the accused as to his motives in making the confession, though as a rule of prudence it is better that he should do so—*Emp. v. Dewan Kahar*, 4 P.L.T. 186, 24 Cr.L.J. 497.

It would be going much too far to say that a Magistrate recording a statement or a confession cannot and should not ask a single question of the deponent. He would be justified in putting questions to clear up any matter which is ambiguous on the face of the statement, but he is wholly unjustified in extracting, by questions from the deponent, any facts

which the deponent has not spoken to in his Court. Everything must depend on the nature of the questioning and the object of it, and the mere fact that an answer was elicited by a question does not make the proceedings improper or the statement inadmissible as a confession—*Hasan Ali v. K. E.*, 23 A.L.J. 719, 26 Cr.L.J. 1209, A.I.R. 1926 All. 22. It is desirable that the Magistrate in recording the confession should put various questions to the accused to enable him to decide whether the confession is a voluntary one or not, but there is nothing in law which lays down that a Magistrate cannot satisfy himself as to the voluntariness of the confession by putting a single question to the accused—*Emp. v. Dewan Kahar*, 4 P.L.T. 186, 24 Cr.L.J. 497.

No express form of question is prescribed, and the extent to which the Magistrate should question the accused must largely depend on the particular facts of each case. There are cases which on the face of them attract the suspicion of a Magistrate, and there are others which do not attract any suspicion at all, and it is impossible to lay down any hard and fast rule on the subject. The Court must in each case satisfy itself that the Magistrate honestly believed and took steps to ascertain that the confession was a voluntary one—*Thibu v. Emp.*, 4 P.L.T. 279, 24 Cr.L.J. 649.

518. Police custody :—A confession obtained after the accused had been in custody for some time is always open to grave suspicion—*Q. E. v. Gobardhan*, 9 All. 528; *Motijan v. Crown*, 11 C.W.N. 380. When a Magistrate records the confession of a person who has been in police custody, he should ascertain and record the period during which the accused had been in custody, to satisfy himself whether the confession is voluntary or not—*Q. E. v. Narayan*, 25 Bom. 543. But where an accused was actually produced before the Magistrate as soon as he was arrested, and was produced before him the next day for recording the confession, held that the confession should not be ignored on the ground that the Magistrate did not ask him how long he was in Police custody—*Emp. v. Dewan Kahar*, 4 P.L.T. 186, 24 Cr.L.J. 497. The fact and duration of Police custody has a material bearing on the question whether a confession is voluntary or not—*Jogibai v. Emp.*, 13 C.W.N. 861, 10 Cr.L.J. 125. The unjustifiable violence used by the Police to the accused for his arrest, his illegal detention in police custody for more than 24 hours after his arrest, and the marks on his person—all these must be held to have vitiated the voluntary character of his confession, and it is therefore inadmissible in evidence—*Q. E. v. Appa*, 1 Bom. L.R. 357. But a confession cannot be rejected on the sole ground that the accused had been a long time in police custody—*Q. E. v. Mahadhu*, Ratanlal 720. The Punjab Chief Court holds that even if the accused is in the custody of a police officer when he makes the confession, yet the confession being made before a Magistrate is not excluded from being given in evidence by anything contained in sec. 26, Evidence Act, when proved by the evidence of the Magistrate—*Feroz v. Crown*, 1918 P.R. 11, 19 Cr.L.J. 651 (following *Sher Singh v. Emp.*, 1881 P.R. 21).

A prisoner in police custody who was brought before a Magistrate to have his confession recorded, did not cease to be in police custody merely because at the time of recording the confession there was no police officer in the room, when it was found that a police officer was waiting outside the room where the confession was being recorded—*Q. E. v. Lakshmya, Ratanlal* 855 (856)

519. Memorandum:—A confession without a memorandum that it is voluntarily made is bad in law and cannot be admitted in evidence—*Emp. v. Daji*, 6 Bom 288; *Reg v. Shivya*, 1 Bom. 219; *Emp v. Radhe Halwi*, 7 C W N 220, and the want of a memorandum can be cured, if at all, only by the Sessions Judge taking evidence during the trial that the accused had made the statement—*Noshai v. Emp.*, 5 Cal 958; *Q. E. v. Anga Valayan*, 22 Mad. 15.

Where the Magistrate has made a memorandum that the confession was voluntarily made, it may be presumed that it is a correct record of a voluntary confession. Nevertheless, if it is found that the confession was procured by any inducement, threat or promise, it must be treated as irrelevant—*Emp v. Dewan*, 4 P.L.T 186, 24 Cr L J. 497.

The memorandum annexed to a record of confession is not a conclusive evidence of the fact that the confession was voluntarily made, so as to preclude the Court of Appeal from inquiring into the nature of the confession to see whether it was voluntary or not—*Jogiban v. Emp.*, 13 C W N. 861, 10 Cr L J. 125.

The memorandum is required only in the case of confessions made by the accused. A statement of a witness need not be appended by a memorandum that such statement was made voluntarily—*Q. E. v. Jadub*, 27 Cal 295.

A confession does not become unworthy of evidence, merely because the memorandum required by law to be attached thereto has not been written in the exact form prescribed—*Emp. v. Bhairon*, 3 All. 338. It is sufficient if it is in substance the same as that given in this section.

It is most advisable, although the law does not require it, that the Magistrate should record a memorandum of enquiry showing what steps he has taken to fully satisfy himself that an accused person is confessing voluntarily—*Umar din v Crown*, 2 Lah. 129, 23 Cr.L.J. 389.

If the memorandum omitted to state that the confession was voluntarily made, it was held that the Magistrate omitted to observe a most important provision of this section, and the confession was therefore not admissible in evidence—*In re Kottubadi Narasingha*, 2 Weir 140; *Q. E. v. Bhairab*, 2 C.W N 702 (717); but in some recent cases it has been said that the defect would be cured by sec. 533 if the Magistrate afterwards deposed that he believed that the confession was voluntarily made—*Emp. v. Deo Dat*, 45 All. 166, 20 A.L.J. 915; *Ramai v. King Emp.*, 3 Pat. 872 (877), 26 Cr.L.J. 314, *Maksud v. Emp.*, 2 P.L.T. 773.

Under this section as now amended, the Magistrate must explain to the accused that he is not to make any confession and that the confession

may be used as evidence against him, and the memorandum also should record the fact that the explanation was given. But omission to record the fact that the accused was so warned would not make the confession inadmissible in evidence if the Magistrate who recorded the confession was afterwards examined (sec 533) and deposed that he gave the required warning to the accused and the accused understood it—*Ramai v. Emp.*, 3 Pat. 872 (877), 26 Cr. L.J. 314, A.I.R. 1925 Pat. 191; *Bana Singh v. Emp.*, 7 Lah. L.J. 250, 26 P.L.R. 579, 26 Cr. L.J. 1459; *Khemani v. Emp.*, 11 Lah. 58, 26 P.L.R. 316, 26 Cr. L.J. 1074; *Nilmadhab v. Emp.*, 5 Pat. 171, 27 Cr. L.J. 957. But if as a matter of fact, no such explanation was given by the Magistrate to the accused, the defect is not merely one of form but of substance, and sec 533 cannot cure it—*Partap Singh v. Crown*, 6 Lah. 415, 7 Lah. L.J. 482, 27 Cr. L.J. 514; *Mt. Rao v. Crown*, 26 P.L.R. 173, 26 Cr. L.J. 1175.

But the memorandum need not set forth the circumstances under which the confession was made. Thus, an omission to state in the memorandum that the accused was not in police custody at the time when the confession was made, does not make the confession invalid—*In re Bokru, Ratanlal* 534.

An English memorandum as required by sec 364 is not necessary in respect of a confession under this section—*Fekoo v. Empress*, 14 Cal. 539.

Refusal to make a memorandum—Where a Magistrate who recorded the confession of an accused refused to make the memorandum on the ground that the confession did not seem to be voluntary, it was held that under sec 533, the confession could be admitted in evidence during the trial when the Magistrate who recorded it proved that it was made voluntarily—*Harbans v. K. E.*, 8 O.C. 395B. Where the Magistrate refused to make a memorandum on the ground that the accused had been in police custody for 11 days before he was produced before him, and that there was a proposal on the part of the police to treat the accused as an approver, but there was no evidence that the proposal was communicated to the accused, it was held that this ground was not a valid ground and the Sessions Judge ought to have proceeded, in the absence of the memorandum, to take evidence under sec 533 whether the confession was voluntarily made—*Q. E. v. Anga Valayan*, 22 Mad. 15.

520. Explanation—Magistrate without jurisdiction :

—The Explanation to this section lays down that a statement or confession can be recorded by a Magistrate, although he has no jurisdiction in the case. But a Magistrate not having jurisdiction can record the statement of a witness under this section, if the witness appears voluntarily before him, and is not brought before him by the police—*Emp. v. Nuri Sheikh*, 29 Cal. 483. This section will not empower a police officer to compel a witness to go to a local Magistrate not competent to deal with the case, and to get the statement recorded—*Queen Emp. v. Nana, Ratanlal* 468 (469); *Emp. v. Nuri Sheikh*, 29 Cal. 483. Where the police officer has reason to believe that the witness is likely to be gained over by

accused, the proper course is to send the accused and the witness to the Magistrate having jurisdiction without delay—*Emp. v. Nuri Sheikh*, 29 Cal. 483.

165. (1) Whenever an officer in charge of a police-station or a police-officer making an investigation considers that the production of any document or thing is necessary to the conduct of an investigation into any offence which he is authorised to investigate, and there is reason to believe that a person to whom a summons or order under Section 94 has been or might be issued will not or would not produce such document or thing according to the directions of the summons or order, or when such document or thing is not known to be in the possession of any person, such officer may search, or cause search to be made, for the same, in any place within the limits of the station of which he is in charge, or to which he is attached.

165. (1) Whenever an officer in charge of a police-station, or a police-officer making an investigation has reasonable grounds for believing that anything necessary for the purposes of an investigation into any offence which he is authorised to investigate may be found in any place within the limits of the police-station of which he is in charge, or to which he is attached, and that such thing cannot in his opinion be otherwise obtained without undue delay, such officer may, after recording in writing the grounds of his belief, and specifying in such writing, so far as possible, the thing for which search is to be made, search, or cause search to be made, for such thing in any place within the limits of such station.

(2) A police-officer proceeding under sub-section (1) shall, if practicable, conduct the search in person.

(3) If he is unable to conduct the search in person, and there is no other person competent to make the search present at the time, he may after recording in writing his reasons for so doing require any officer sub-

ordinate to him to make the search, and he shall deliver to such subordinate officer an order in writing specifying *the place to be searched and so far as possible the thing for which search is to be made*; and such subordinate officer may thereupon search for such thing in such place.

(4) The provisions of this Code as to search-warrants *and the general provisions as to searches contained in Section 102 and Section 103* shall, so far as may be, apply to a search made under this section.

(5) Copies of any record made under sub-section (1) or sub-section (3) shall *forthwith be sent to the nearest Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence, and the owner or occupier of the place searched shall on application be furnished with a copy of the same by the Magistrate* :

Provided that he shall pay for the same, unless the Magistrate for some special reason thinks fit to furnish it free of cost.

Change :—The changes in this section as shown by the italicised words have been introduced by sec. 36 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923). For reasons see below.

521. Sub-section (1)—General search :—The old section spoke of 'any document or thing' which meant a *specific* document or thing which might be the subject of a summons or order under section 94, that is, it does not authorise a general search on the chance that something might be found—*Bajrang Gope v. Emp.*, 38 Cal 304; *Pran Khan v. K. E.*, 16 C.W.N 1078; *Emp. v. Brikhbhan*, 38 All. 14, 13 A.L.J 979; *Divakar v. Ramamurti*, 35 M.L.J. 127, 19 Cr.L.J. 901. The section speaks of a particular document or thing which is necessary to the conduct of an investigation into an offence and does not authorise a general search e.g. for arms generally—*Clarke v. Brojendra Kishore*, 36 Cal 433, or for stolen property generally—*Bisser Misser v. Emp.*, 41 Cal 261, nor is the requirement of this section fulfilled by framing the warrant as one for 'stolen property relevant to the case'—*Pran Khan v. K. E.*, 16 C.W.N. 1078, 13 Cr.L.J 764

This has now been made clear by the present amendment, by the addition of the specific words "and specifying in such writing ... to be made" These words were added during the Debate on the motion of Mr Rangachariar who observed as follows "I think that it is a vicious thing to allow a police officer to have power to conduct a general search,

without knowing what it is he is going to search for, but merely to see if he can find something incriminating in a person's house. Even the wording of the clause itself ('that such a thing cannot in his opinion be otherwise obtained without undue delay') contemplates that the man himself has some information and that he must know what it is that he is after; and it is necessary that he should record this in writing and forward the record to the Magistrate, so that it will be a check upon irresponsible searches which have frequently disfigured the police administration in various parts of the country"—*Legislative Assembly Debates*, 31st January 1923, p. 1754

Thus, under the amended section it has been held that it does not authorise a search for stolen property generally, but only a search for specified stolen articles. Where a definite list of stolen articles has been given to a police officer and he searches a house for those articles, he is making a search for specified articles, and his action is perfectly legal—*Parash v. Jogendra*, 27 Cr L.J. 1195 (Cal.).

This section is not restricted to a search for what is *stolen* and believed to be stolen property, but it permits a police-officer to make a search of anything necessary for the purposes of an investigation into any offence—*Emp. v. Param Sukh*, 23 A L.J. 1037, 27 Cr.L.J. 11.

Accused's house may be searched:—A police-officer is entitled to search the house of a person for specific articles even though the latter is the person *accused* of the crime—*Parash v. Jogendra*, 27 Cr.L.J. 1195 (Cal.).

522. "Within the limits":—A Station House officer has no power to make a search beyond the local limits of his own circle—*Mir Sha v. Crown*, 8 S L R 1, 16 Cr L J 15; *Krishna Aiyar v. Emp.*, 24 M.L.T. 96, 20 Cr L J 145. Such a search is illegal and resistance to such search is not an offence—*Madho Sonar v Emp.*, 13 A.L.J. 691, 16 Cr.L.J. 589. But see sec. 166 (3) which now authorises a Police officer, under certain circumstances, to make a search within the limits of another police station.

523. Who shall conduct the search:—Sub-section (2) lays down that the officer in charge of a police station or the investigating officer must "conduct the search in person." But this does not mean that the officer must himself make the search *i.e.* ransack boxes, examine the room, dig up the floor or otherwise seek for the property. Nor is it necessary that all these processes should take place under his very eye. Therefore where the Inspector remained outside the house, while the actual search was being made inside by two constables, it was held that the search was not illegal. All that the section means is that the officer should go to the spot and exercise a general superintendence over the search, in contradistinction to the cases where he is unable to go to the spot and deposes a subordinate by a written order to conduct the search in his place—*Sadagopala v Satrugna*, 23 M L J. 445 (dissenting from 17 M L J. 323, where a search made by a constable inside the house while the Inspector was seated outside, was held to be illegal as not being conducted in person by the Inspector).

The Magistrate cannot conduct the search. This section speaks of a search made by a Police officer and not by a Magistrate—*Clarke v. Brojendra*, 36 Cal. 433. The Magistrate can conduct a search only under sec. 105, which section has not been made applicable here.

524. Sub-section (3)—Order in writing.—If the officer cannot himself go to the spot he can depute a subordinate, but the deputation must be by an order in writing. A constable making the search without such a written order does not lawfully exercise the power of a public servant, and resistance to such search is not an offence—*Q. v. Narain*, 7 N.W.P. 200; *Idu Mandal v. Emp.*, 11 C.L.J. 753; *Mir Sha v. Crown*, 11 S.L.R. 1; *Madho Sonar v. Emp.*, 13 A.L.J. 691.

525. Sub-section (4)—Necessity of search warrant : A subordinate Police officer may, however, without a warrant enter a house in search of a person who is charged with having committed a cognizable offence, but he is not empowered to enter a house without a search warrant, in search of property—*Reg. v. Venkatarav*, 7 B.H.C.R. 50.

Witnesses to the search.—Prior to the present amendment it was held that the failure to call inhabitants of the locality as witnesses to the search did not make the search illegal because the provisions of section 103 did not apply to a search under this section—*Sadagopala v. Satrugghna*, 23 M.L.J. 445. This ruling is now rendered obsolete by the present sub-section (4) which makes the general provisions of searches under sections 102 and 103 applicable to searches under this section. But it should be noticed that sub-section (4) is not imperative, and that the provisions of sections 102 and 103 are made applicable only so far as may be. Therefore, the mere fact that in making a search under sec. 165, the police took independent witnesses with them, and did not call witnesses from the locality, did not necessarily render the search illegal—*Shyam Lal v. Emp.*, 28 Cr.L.J. 652 (All.).

Damages for illegal search.—A police officer cannot investigate into a non-cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate (sec. 155); nor can he make a search in respect of it, because he can make a search only in those cases which he can investigate. Therefore a police officer making a search in a non-cognizable case without being authorised by a Magistrate is liable to be sued for damages—*Bahabal v. Tarak Nath*, 24 Cal. 691.

Where a Police officer makes a search for specific stolen property *bona fide*, the person whose premises are searched is not entitled to damages—*Divakar v. Ramamurti*, 35 M.L.J. 127, 19 Cr.L.J. 901.

A police officer not having jurisdiction over the place searched, who takes part in a search conducted by another police officer authorised by the Code to conduct the search, cannot be said to exceed his jurisdiction and is not liable in damages as one making an illegal search—*Asan v. Masilamani*, 42 Mad. 446, 36 M.L.J. 252, 20 Cr.L.J. 422.

525A. Sub-section (5) :—"The object of this amendment is that as soon as a search is made, an immediate report should be made to the nearest Magistrate. The second object is that the person whose house is searched should have copies of the records made under sub-sections (1) and (3). Sub-section (4) as it stands enables the provisions of section 103 to apply, that is, the general rules relating to searches are made applicable. Under section 103 the occupier of the place where the search was made gets only a list of the articles taken, but what I want him to get is the *reason for the search* which has to be recorded in writing, which has to be sent to the Magistrate, and he gets a copy thereof." See the *Legislative Assembly Debates*, 31st January 1923, page 1755.

The provisions of this new sub-section, as well as of sub-section (5) of sec. 166, are intended as an extra safeguard to protect individuals against general or roving searches. Omission by a Police officer to send forthwith to the nearest Magistrate the copies of the record that he has prepared before undertaking the search, affects the validity of the search, and is a ground for setting aside the conviction of the accused—*Lal Mia v Emp*, 43 C.L.J. 184, 27 Cr.L.J. 542.

An order of refusal by the Magistrate to supply copies of the record to the owner or occupier of the house searched is subject to revision by the High Court—*Churamani*, 26 A.L.J. 703, 29 Cr.L.J. 663 (664).

166. (1) An officer in charge of a police-station or a police officer not being below the rank of a Sub-Inspector making an

When officer in charge of police-station may require another to issue search warrant.

investigation may require an officer in charge of another police-station, whether in the same or a different

district, to cause a search to be made in any place, in any case in which the former officer might cause such search to be made within the limits of his own station.

(2) Such officer, on being so required, shall proceed according to the provisions of section 165, and shall forward the thing found, if any, to the officer at whose request the search was made.

(3) Whenever there is reason to believe that the delay occasioned by requiring an officer in charge of another police-station to cause a search to be made under sub-section (1) might result in evidence of the commission of an offence being concealed or destroyed, it shall be lawful for an officer in charge of a police-station or a

police officer making an investigation under this Chapter to search, or cause to be searched, any place in the limits of another police station, in accordance with the provisions of Section 165 as if such place were within the limits of his own station.

(4) Any officer conducting a search under sub-section (3) shall forthwith send notice of the search to the officer in charge of the police station within the limits of which such place is situate, and shall also send with such notice a copy of the list (if any) prepared under Section 103, and shall also send to the nearest Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence, copies of the records referred to in section 165 sub-sections (1) and (3).

(5) The owner or occupier of the place searched shall, on application, be furnished with a copy of any record sent to the Magistrate under sub-section (4):

Provided that he shall pay for the same, unless the Magistrate for some special reason thinks fit to furnish it free of cost.

Change :—The changes have been introduced by sec. 37 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923)

"Not being below the rank of Sub-inspector" :—"We are inclined to think that the powers conferred by section 166 should not be exercised by a police-officer making an investigation who is below the rank of Sub-Inspector. We realise, however that there may be administrative difficulties in this connection, and if such difficulties are pointed out by Local Governments, we should be prepared to retain this clause unamended"—*Report of the Joint Committee (1922)*

Sub-sections (3), (4) :—"These two sub-sections are proposed to be added in order to give power in certain circumstances to an officer in charge of a Police station to search or cause to be searched places within the local limits of another police station"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons (1914).*

Sub-section (5) :—This sub-section and the proviso as well as the words "and shall also .and (3)" in the last three lines of sub-section (4) did not exist in the Bills or the Reports but were added on the motion of Mr. Rangachariar during the Debate in the Legislative Assembly. The reason for this amendment is the same as that for a similar amendment made in sec. 165. See the *Legislative Assembly Debates*, January 31st 1923, page 1757

167. (1) Whenever it appears that any investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours, Chapter cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by Section 61, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well-founded, the officer in charge of the police-station shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the accused (if any) to such Magistrate.

167. (1) Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody and it appears that the investigation * * * cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by Section 61, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well-founded, the officer in charge of the police-station or the police officer making the investigation if he is not below the rank of Sub-Inspector shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the accused (* *) to such Magistrate.

(2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole. If he has not jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction :

Provided that no Magistrate of the third class, and no Magistrate of the second class not specially empowered in this behalf by the Local Government, shall authorise detention in the custody of the police.

(3) A Magistrate authorizing under this section detention in the custody of the police shall record his reasons for so doing.

(4) If such order is given by a Magistrate other than the District Magistrate or Sub-divisional Magistrate, he shall forward a copy of his order, with his reasons for making it, to the Magistrate to whom he is immediately subordinate.

Change.—The italicised words in subsection (1) and the proviso in sub-section (2) have been inserted by sec. 38 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. The reasons are stated below.

526. Scope :—Prior to the present amendment, the first six lines of this section ran thus.—“Whenever it appears that any investigation under this chapter cannot be completed” etc., and this section applied only to investigations *under this chapter* and gave no authority to a Magistrate to remand an accused person to custody in proceedings under Chapter VIII, in order to enable the police to arrest other persons jointly accused with him—*Emp v Basya*, 5 Bom L R 27, *Raghunandan v Emp*, 32 Cal. 80, 8 C W N 779, *In re Subbarayya*, 39 Mad 928, *K E. v. Rameshwar*, 38 All. 262. These rulings are no longer good law, because the words “under this chapter” have now been omitted by the Amendment Act of 1923. The same view has been taken by Woodroffe (*Criminal Procedure*, p. 188).

527. 24 hours fixed by sec. 61 :—Having regard to the provisions of this section and of sec. 31 and to the requirements of justice, the intention of the Legislature is that the accused persons should be brought before the Magistrate competent to try or commit, with as little delay as possible—*Q E. v. Engadu*, 11 Mad. 98.

‘Not below the rank of Sub-inspector’ :—“In sec. 167, however, which confers a power to ask for a remand, we would confine the operation to investigating officers not below the rank of sub-Inspector” —*Report of the Joint Committee (1922)*.

528. “Forward the accused to the Magistrate” :—Before a Magistrate remands an accused person to police custody, the accused must be produced before him—*Peary Mohan v. Weston*, 16 C.W.N. 145, 13 Cr.L.J. 65. Where the accused is not brought before the Magistrate, it is illegal for him to remand the prisoner on the application of the police—*Crown v Shera*, 1867 P.R. 39.

529. Sub-section (2)—Magistrate’s power to detain :—Under this section, a Magistrate, on a mere perusal of the entries in the Police diaries may from time to time authorise the detention of the accused for a term not exceeding 15 days on the whole. Thereafter he can, under sec. 344 by a warrant, remand the accused for any term not exceeding ‘

days at a time, if there is sufficient evidence to suspect that the accused has committed an offence and that further evidence may be obtained by such remand—*Narendra Lal v. Emp.*, 36 Cal. 166.

An application for remand to police custody must be made personally by the chief Police officer present to the chief Magisterial officer present, unless this is impossible owing to the absence of one of the officers concerned or through some other exceptional cause—*Peary Mohan v. Weston*, 16 C W N. 145, 13 Cr L J 65.

The power under sec. 167 is given to detain the prisoners in custody while the police make the investigation, and before the inquiry; but the custody mentioned in sec. 344 is quite different and is intended for under-trial prisoners, i.e., when the inquiry or trial has begun or is about to begin—*Q. E. v. Engadu*, 11 Mad. 98; *In re Krishnaji*, 23 Bom. 32; *In re Nagendra Nath*, 51 Cal. 402 (412).

Under the proviso to this sub-section newly added, the power of detention is confined to first-class Magistrates and to second-class Magistrates specially empowered. The reason is that the period of detention is just the time which is taken advantage of by inexperienced Magistrates for extorting confessions and other things. Therefore the power of detention should be given only to experienced Magistrates. "We consider that the Bill does not go far enough in its restriction of the Magistrates who should be authorised to remand to police custody. We would confine the power to first-class Magistrates and to second-class Magistrates specially empowered"—*Report of the Joint Committee* (1922).

530. Period of detention.—The period for which a Magistrate can authorise the detention of the accused in police custody is under this section 15 days on the whole—*In re Krishnaji*, 23 Bom. 32; *Harquol v. Emp.*, 1902 P N 24, *Q. E. v. Engadu*, 11 Mad. 98; *Q. v. Bassooram*, 19 W R. 36.

In ordering further detention when there are good reasons for it, a Magistrate should invariably limit the term as much as possible to what may be necessary for the object in view—*Emp. v. Kampu Kuki*, 11 C W.N. 554.

531 Sub-section (3)—Grounds of detention:—Where a Magistrate orders the detention of an accused person in police custody, he must record sufficient reasons for the same—*In re Krishnaji*, 23 Bom. 32; *Peary Mohan v. Weston*, 16 C W N. 145. Before he orders the detention of an accused person, he should ascertain how long the accused had been under police surveillance or influence, and in recording the reasons for detention he should note all the information that he is able to obtain on the subject—*Emp. v. Madar*, 1885 A W.N. 59.

By requiring the Magistrate to record his reasons in case of sanctioning detention in police custody, the law contemplates that the Magistrate should consider whether on the facts placed before him there are good grounds for allowing such detention. There must be at least something to satisfy the Magistrate that the presence of the person arrested would,

during the police investigation, assist in some discovery of evidence—*Emp. v. Kampu Kuki*, 11 C.W.N. 554. The reasons which are to be recorded must be reasons showing the particular necessity which exists in each particular case for leaving the prisoner in the hands of the Police. Under no circumstances should an accused person be remanded to police custody unless it is made clear that his presence is actually needed in order to serve some important purpose connected with the completion of the inquiry—*Emp. v. Madar*, 1885 A.W.M. 59. Thus, when the accused had confessed before the Magistrate and had pointed out some of the properties stolen and was waiting to do more, but was unable to do so because the Police were by law unable without a special order to detain him, it was held that an order for detention should be made—*Emp. v. Kampu*, 11 C.W.N. 554.

But the fact that the accused is wanted by the police for the purpose of pointing out the places through which he passed on his way to commit a dacoity, or for the purpose of obtaining his identification in the village is not a sufficient reason for sanctioning detention—*Amir Khan v. K. E.*, 7 C.W.N. 457. So also, it would be improper for a Magistrate to sanction the detention of a person in police custody so that he may be forced to give a clue to the stolen property—*Q. E. v. Rugonath*, 3 N.W.P. 275. An accused person may be remanded if it is likely that further evidence may be obtained, but he cannot be remanded on a mere expectation that time will show his guilt or that further fact would come to light—*Khuda Bakhsh v. Crown*, 1872 P.R. 17; or simply for the purpose of verifying his confession recorded under section 164—*Emp. v. Radho Halwai*, 7 C.W.N. 220.

168. When any subordinate police-officer has made

<p>Report of investigation by subordinate police officer.</p>	<p>any investigation under this Chapter, he shall report the result of such investigation to the officer in charge of the police-station.</p>
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532. It was formerly held that a report made by a subordinate Police Officer under this section was not a public document within the meaning of section 74, Evidence Act, and an accused person was not entitled to a copy of it before trial—*Q. E. v. Arumagan*, 20 Mad. 189. But now see sec 173, sub-section (4)

169. If, upon an investigation under this Chapter,

<p>Release of accused when evidence deficient.</p>	<p>it appears to the officer in charge of the police-station or to the police-officer making the investigation, that there is not sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, such officer shall, if such person is in custody, release him on his executing a bond, with or</p>
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without sureties, as such officer may direct, to appear, if and when so required, before a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police-report and to try the accused or commit him for trial.

Change.—The words “or to the police-officer making the investigation” have been added by section 39 of the Crim. Pro. Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. “In the case of sec. 169, we agree that the power contemplated by the section should be exercisable by investigating officers and we see no reason in this case to restrict the power to officers not below the rank of Sub-Inspector. With regard to section 170, however, we consider that the direct responsibility for sending up a case should rest with the officer in charge of the police-station.”—*Report of the Joint Committee (1922).*

533. Power of Police Officer :—This section does not authorise a police-officer to entertain an application for withdrawal of a complaint. Permitting a complainant to withdraw is a judicial act, the exercise of which is vested in the Magistrate under Secs. 248 and 345, and the police have no authority to interfere in such matters—*Anonymous, Ratanlal 91.*

Re-arrest .—The admission to bail by the Police under this section is a purely provisional arrangement; and therefore if the Magistrate considers that the evidence does establish a *prima facie* case of a non-bailable offence, the accused should be re-arrested and forwarded to the Magistrate in custody—*Anonymous, Ratanlal 121*

170. (1) If, upon an investigation under this Chapter, it appears to the officer in charge of the police-station that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground as aforesaid, such officer shall forward the accused under custody to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence upon a police-report and to try the accused or commit him for trial, or if the offence is bailable and the accused is able to give security, shall take security from him for his appearance before such Magistrate on a day fixed and for his attendance from day to day before such Magistrate until otherwise directed.

(2) When the officer in charge of a police-station forwards an accused person to a Magistrate or takes security for his appearance before such Magistrate under this section, he shall send to such Magistrate any weapon or other article which it may be necessary to produce

before him, and shall require the complainant (if any) and so many of the persons who appear to such officer to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case as he may think necessary, to execute a bond, to appear before the Magistrate as thereby directed and prosecute or give evidence (as the case may be) in the matter of the charge against the accused.

(3) If the Court of the District Magistrate or Sub-divisional Magistrate is mentioned in the bond, such Court shall be held to include any Court to which such Magistrate may refer the case for inquiry or trial, provided reasonable notice of such reference is given to such complainant or persons.

(4) * * * * *

(5) The officer in whose presence the bond is executed shall deliver a copy thereof to one of the persons who executed it, and shall then send to the Magistrate the original with his report.

Change.—Sub-section (4) has been recently omitted by the Crim. Pro. Code Amendment Act II of 1926. The reasons for the omission have been thus stated :—"Subsection (4) of section 170 provides that the day fixed under this section shall be the day whereon the accused person is to appear, if security for his appearance has been taken, or the day on which he may be expected to arrive at the Court of the Magistrate, if he is to be forwarded in custody. This provision requires, for example, that all witnesses shall be bound down to appear before the Magistrate on the date when the accused is expected to arrive at the Court if he is forwarded in custody. It has been found to be inconvenient, and, it is understood, is not frequently followed in practice"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (Gazette of India, 1925, Part V, p. 214).

534. "Shall forward" :—As soon as it appears to the investigating police officer that there is sufficient ground for forwarding the accused, the police officer is bound to forward the accused, and has no option but to do so—*Govinda v. Emp.*, 16 N.L.R. 9, 21 Cr.L.J. 769

"On a day fixed" :—A recognisance taken from a prisoner binding him to attend the Court to answer a charge against him, should specify a particular day for his attendance—*Q v. Pooran*, 11 W.R. 47.

The police should not bind over witnesses to appear and give evidence long after the prisoner is brought before the Magistrate—*Govt. v. Madun Das*, 6 W.R. 52

535. Right of accused to copy of charge sheet at the beginning of trial :—It was held under the old law that a Magistrate

was entitled to refuse to give the accused, at the commencement of the trial, a copy of the Police charge-sheet, containing the whole of the prosecution evidence and extracts from the police diaries—*Q. E. v. Venkataratnam*, 19 Mad. 14; but this is no longer good law in view of the new subsection (4) of sec 173 which now entitles the accused to get a copy of the charge sheet before trial.

Complainant and witnesses not to be required to accompany police officer.

171. No complainant or witness on his way to the Court of the Magistrate shall be required to accompany a police officer,

or shall be subjected to unnecessary restraint or in-

Conplainants and witnesses not to be subjected to restraint.

convenience, or required to give any security for his appearance other than his own bond;

Provided that, if any complainant or witness refuses

Recusant complainant or witness may be forwarded in custody.

to attend or execute a bond as directed in Section 170, the officer in charge of the police-station may

forward him in custody to the Magistrate who may detain him in custody until he executes such bond, or until the hearing of the case is completed.

536. **Unnecessary restraint** —Where a witness was kept under police surveillance for about four days, it was held that there was no warrant in the law to keep a witness under such unnecessary restraint and that under such circumstances the evidence of the witness could not be accepted as given voluntarily—*Bajrangi Lal v Emp*, 4 C.W.N. 49

172. (1) Every police-officer making an investigation

Diary of proceedings in investigation.

under this Chapter shall day by day enter his proceedings in the investigation in a diary, setting

forth the time at which the information reached him, the time at which he began and closed his investigation, the place or places visited by him, and a statement of the circumstances ascertained through this investigation.

(2) Any Criminal Court may send for the police-diaries of a case under inquiry or trial in such Court, and may use such diaries, not as evidence in the case, but to aid it in such inquiry or trial. Neither the accused nor

his agents shall be entitled to call for such diaries, nor shall he or they be entitled to see them merely because they are referred to by the Court; but if they are used by the police-officer who made them, to refresh his memory, or if the Court uses them for the purpose of contradicting such police officer, the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Section 161 or Section 145, as the case may be, shall apply.

537. Scope—This section does not deal with the recording of statement made by witnesses. No mention is made in this section of the recording of any statement of a witness. What is intended to be recorded under this section is what the Sub-Inspector did, the places where he went, the people he visited, what he saw, etc. No statement can be said to be recorded under this section so as to be a privileged one—*Mafizaddi v. Emp*, 31 C.W.N. 940, 28 Cr L.J. 805. This section does not provide for the recording of statements of witnesses. Any statements of witnesses that are recorded, in whatever form they may be recorded, are recorded under sec. 161, and the accused has the right to ask for a copy of such statements, to use them for the purpose of contradicting the witnesses for the prosecution—*Sadhu Shaikh v. K. E.*, 32 C.W.N. 280 (281), 29 Cr L.J. 531.

Diary to be kept properly:—Though Police-diaries are not evidence in the case against the accused, still it is very essential for criminal trials that they should be properly kept in the manner provided by the Code, and Magistrates should enforce the observance of law in this respect—*Crown v. Shera*, 1867 P.R. 39. See also *Punj. Clr.*, p. 174.

It is incumbent upon a Police-officer who investigates a case under this chapter to keep the diary as provided by this section, and the omission to keep the diary deprives the Court of the very valuable assistance which such diaries can give, if legitimately used—*Hiralal v. Crown*, 1918 P.R. 16, 19 Cr L.J. 517.

"Court may send for diaries":—Sessions Judges should not issue a general order directing the Police diaries, in all cases committed for trial to the Court of Session and in every criminal appeal, to be transmitted to them. They are only authorised to send for the diaries of cases under trial before them, if they think it necessary in such cases to peruse the diaries—*Q. E. v. Mannu*, 19 All. 390 (F.B.).

538. Use of diary :—

Diary not an evidence in the case:—Police diaries are not original evidence of the matters contained therein—*Dal Singh v. K. E.*, 44 Cal. 876 (P.C.), 21 C.W.N. 818; *Q. E. v. Zahur Husain*, 21 All. 159; *In re Niravati*, 11 Weir 143; *Anonymous*, 2 Weir 142. The Court should not take the facts and statements contained in the diaries as the material which would help it to come to a finding, for this would be using the diary as an evidence in the case—*Syed Abdul Rahim v. Sabhu*, 10

of the special diary or of any part of it. His right is limited to *inspection* only in certain cases. Where the diary is used by the Court for the purpose of enabling the Police officer who made it to refresh his memory, or for the purpose of contradicting him, the provisions of sec. 161 of the Evidence Act apply, and the accused or his agent is entitled *in* *see* (but not to get a copy of) such diary and to cross-examine such Police officer thereupon—*Q E v Mannu*, 19 All 390 (F.B.).

The right of the accused to inspect the police diary is limited to that portion of the diary from which the police officer who gave evidence refreshed his memory. He is not entitled to an inspection of anything more—*Lachmi v K E*, 2 Pat 74, *Q E v Mannu*, 19 All. 390 (F B.)

540. Contents of the diary—Statements under sec. 161—Before the Amendment Act of 1923, it was held that statements made to a police officer by a person whom he was examining under sec. 161 should not be recorded in the special diary—*Dadan Gazi v. Emp*, 33 Cal 1023; *Sheru Shah v Q E*, 20 Cal. 642. A contrary view was taken in *Q. E. v Mannu*, 19 All. 390. "But now whatever opinion may be held as to whether the Diary is a proper place for statements, the Police cannot by entering the statements in the Special Diary under sec. 172 protect them from the provisions of section 162, but they are liable to be produced under the conditions laid down in the latter section"—Woodroffe's *Crim Pro*, p 192

173. (1) Every investigation under this Chapter
 shall be completed without unnecessary delay, and, as soon as it is completed, the officer in charge of the police-station shall—

Report of police officer.

(a) forward, to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police-report, a report, in the form prescribed by the Local Government, setting forth the names of the parties, the nature of the information and the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case, and stating whether the accused (if arrested) has been forwarded in custody or has been released on his bond, and if so, whether with or without sureties, and

(b) communicate, in such manner as may be prescribed by the Local Government, the action taken by him, to the person, if any,

by whom the information relating to the commission of the offence was first given.

(2) Where a superior officer of police has been appointed under Section 158, the report shall, in any cases in which the Local Government by general or special order so directs, be submitted through that officer, and he may, pending the orders of the Magistrate, direct the officer in charge of the police-station to make further investigation.

(3) Whenever it appears from a report forwarded under this section that the accused has been released on his bond, the Magistrate shall make such order for the discharge of such bond or otherwise as he thinks fit.

(4) *A copy of any report forwarded under this section shall on application be furnished to the accused before the commencement of the inquiry or trial :*

Provided that the same shall be paid for unless the Magistrate for some special reason thinks fit to furnish it free of cost.

Change :—Clause (b) and sub-section (4) have been added by sec. 40 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. "The principal change effected is to prescribe that the Police shall communicate the result of their investigation to the person by whom the first information was given"—*Statement of Object and Reasons* (1914). For reason of sub-section (4), see below

541. Police report .—It is the duty of the Police to make a report in every investigation under this Chapter. Where a person gave information to the Police of the commission of a non-cognizable offence, and the Police obtained the authority of a Magistrate, under section 155, to investigate the case, and *without making any report* instituted proceedings against that person under section 211 I. P. C. which ended in his conviction, it was held that the conviction was illegal in the absence of a Police report under this section—*Emp. v Appa Ragho*, 17 Bom L.R. 69, 111 Cr L.J. 161.

There is no legal limit to the number of investigations which can be held into a crime, and when one has been completed by the submission of a report under this section, another may be begun on further information received—*Divakar v Ramamurthi*, 35 M L J 127, 19 Cr L J 901.

The report must set forth the 'nature of the information.' A report which omits to set forth the information is defective, and a Magistrate

taking cognizance of a case on such report acts illegally—*Lee v. Adhikary*, 37 Cal. 49, 14 C.W.N. 304.

It is sufficient if the Police report contains the names of the parties, the nature of the information and the names of the persons acquainted with the circumstances of the case. The report need not state whether in the opinion of the police the accused are guilty or not. Where the police sent up their report wherein they mentioned the names of two persons and stated that certain witnesses spoke against them on account of enmity but that if the Court thought that there was evidence against them, the Court might issue warrant, *held* that the report was a police-report within the meaning of this section—*Mehrab v. Emp.*, 17 S.L.R. 150, A.I.R. 1924 Sind 71, 26 Cr.L.J. 181.

On receipt of a police report under this section, the Magistrate can take cognizance of the case under sec. 190(b). If instead of doing so, he proceeded to make over the case to a subordinate Magistrate for enquiry and report as if he had taken cognizance of the case on a complaint, *held* that the proceedings of the Magistrate were irregular—*Abdullah v. K. E.*, 40 Cal. 854, 17 C.W.N. 1004, 14 Cr.L.J. 297.

Order to strike off case :—A Magistrate's order directing a case reported to him by the Police under this section, to be struck off is not a judicial order dismissing a complaint, and cannot be reviewed by the Sessions Judge under sec. 437 (now 436)—*Q. E. v. Kamru, Ratanlal* 521

Sub-section (4) :—"This amendment relates to the supply to the accused person of a copy of the charge sheet in the case in which he is being prosecuted. There has been considerable difficulty in this matter on account of the rulings of various Courts that copies of charge sheets should not be furnished to accused persons. Some Courts went to the length of holding that till the accused brings his defence, a copy of the charge sheet should not be furnished to him. It has worked a great hardship. The accused has to grope in the dark as to what case he has to meet, who the prosecution witnesses are, and what their evidence is going to be. This amendment is therefore very necessary. Before a case begins or the inquiry or trial commences, an accused person ought to be furnished with a copy of the charge on which he is being prosecuted. Just as he is furnished with a copy of the complaint on which he is being prosecuted, so also this charge sheet is the information on which the Magistrate takes cognizance, and it is but right that the accused should be granted a copy of it"—*Legislative Assembly Debates*, 31st January, 1923, pages 1763-1764.

Before the enactment of this sub-section, it was held that the report made by a Police officer under this section not being a public document within the meaning of Sec. 74 of the Evidence Act, the accused was not entitled to get a copy of the report before trial—*Q. E. v. Arumugam*, 20 Mad. 189; *Q. E. v. Venkataratnam*, 19 Mad. 14. But these cases are now overruled by this sub-section.

174. (1) The officer in charge of a police-station or some other police officer specially empowered by the Local Government in that behalf, on receiving information that a person—

- (a) has committed suicide, or
- (b) has been killed by another, or by an animal, or by machinery, or by an accident, or
- (c) has died under circumstances raising a reasonable suspicion that some other person has committed an offence,

shall immediately give intimation thereof to the nearest Magistrate empowered to hold inquests, and, unless otherwise directed by any rule prescribed by the Local Government, or by any general or special order of the District or Sub-divisional Magistrate, shall proceed to the place where the body of such deceased person is, and there, in the presence of two or more respectable inhabitants of the neighbourhood, shall make an investigation, and draw up a report of the apparent cause of death, describing such wounds, fractures, bruises and other marks of injury as may be found on the body, and stating in what manner, or by what weapon or instrument (if any), such marks appear to have been inflicted.

(2) The report shall be signed by such police-officer and other persons, or by so many of them as concur therein, and shall be forthwith forwarded to the District Magistrate or the Sub-divisional Magistrate.

(3) When there is any doubt regarding the cause of death, or when for any other reason the police-officer considers it expedient so to do, he shall, subject to such rules as the Local Government may prescribe in this behalf, forward the body, with a view to its being examined, to the nearest Civil Surgeon, or other qualified medical man appointed in this behalf by the Local Government, if the state of the weather and the distance admit of its being so forwarded without risk of such putrefaction on the road as would render such examination useless.

(4) In the Presidencies of Fort St. George and Bombay, investigations under this section may be made by the head of the village, who shall then report the result to the nearest Magistrate authorised to hold inquests.

(5) The following Magistrates are empowered to hold inquests, namely, any District Magistrate, Sub-divisional Magistrate or *Magistrate of the first class* and any Magistrate especially empowered in this behalf by the Local Government or the District Magistrate.

Change—In sub-section (5) the words "or Magistrate of the first class" have been newly added by sec 41 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. By this amendment, all first class Magistrates have been generally empowered to hold inquests.

Magistrates empowered :—In the Punjab, all Magistrates of the 1st and second class have been specially empowered to hold inquests under this section—*Punjab Gazette*, 1883, pp. 23, 52. In Bombay, all Magistrates (except Honorary Magistrates), all District Superintendents and Assistant Superintendents of Police are empowered to act under this section—*Bombay Government Gazette*, 1872, p. 1325; *Ibid*, 1873, p. 18.

District Magistrates should inform District Superintendents of Police which of the subordinate Magistrates have been authorised under section 37 read with sec 174 Cr P C to hold inquests. The District Superintendent of Police will thus be enabled to instruct his subordinates as to the particular Magistrates to whom the intimation required by this section is to be sent, and the intimations will give those Magistrates the opportunity of proceeding under sec 176, when it may be desirable to do so—*C. P. Cr Cir*, Part II, No 10.

542. Scope—When the body cannot be found or has been buried, there can be no investigation under section 174. This section is intended to apply to cases in which an inquest is necessary, which presupposes that the corpse must be available—*Gul Hassan v. K E.*, 1908 P.R. 27.

543. Report :—The report is different from the final or complete report mentioned in sec 173. Inquest reports must be written up and completed on the spot where the inquest over the corpse is being held. Immediately the inquest is closed, the report thereof will be put into a cover and handed over in the presence of the *Panchaytdars* to the constable about to take the corpse to the Medical Officer's station for examination—*Mad. Pol. Man*, Vol 1, p. 85.

Considering the important nature of the evidence which is generally supplied by the results of the *post mortem* examination, it is necessary that in such cases the result of the observation, external and internal, should be fully recorded. A *verbatim* report of the statements of witnesses examined at the inquest may often be of great use to the Court

in testing the value of evidence subsequently given—*In re Pachudayan*, 9 M.L.T. 321, 12 Cr.L.J. 124

When a Medical officer is not examined at the beginning of a *post mortem* inquiry, a copy of the *post mortem* certificate ought to be given to the accused for the purpose of enabling him to conduct his defence. Similarly, he should be given a copy of the inquest report (excluding statements made therein, which the accused is not entitled to get, under sec. 162) when the investigating police officer is not examined at the beginning of the inquiry—*In re Maruthamuthu Kudumban*, 50 Mad 750, 52 M.L.J. 601, 28 Cr.L.J. 463 (464)

Special diary not necessary in all cases :—The Lieutenant-Governor does not think that special diaries are intended or necessary in all cases of inquiry into unnatural deaths. The report described in sec. 174 Cr P Code is very much the same in character as the special diary of sec. 172. If the Police officer investigating sees reason to suspect crime, the inquiry becomes one under sec. 172 and special diaries become as a matter of course necessary, but in ordinary cases in which the inquiry is made and completed in a few hours, there seems to be no necessity of reporting the facts first in a special diary and then in the report prescribed by sec. 174. When however the inquiry is prolonged or lasts for more than one day, the diary should be sent to inform the District Superintendent and Magistrate of what is going on. The Lieutenant Governor would therefore rule that in cases of any complexity or in which the inquiry lasts over one day, or in which a crime is suspected, special diaries should be sent in anticipation of the final report, which will be made under sec. 173 if a crime is detected, and under sec. 174 if the death is from accident or unnatural causes. It is to be understood that in the station Diary everything done by the Police will be entered"—*Bengal Police Circular*, 1872, page 107

175. (1) A police-officer proceeding under Section 174 may by order in writing

Power to summon persons.

summon two or more persons as aforesaid for the purpose of the said investigation, and any other person who appears to be acquainted with the facts of the case. Every person so summoned shall be bound to attend and to answer truly all questions other than questions the answers to which would have a tendency to expose him to a criminal charge, or to a penalty or forfeiture.

(2) If the facts do not disclose a cognizable offence to which section 170 applies, such persons shall not be required by the police-officer to attend a Magistrate's Court.

Punishment.—A person who fails to attend in obedience to the order issued under this section is punishable under sec. 174 I. P. Code.

It should be noticed, however, that the word 'truly' which has been omitted from sec. 161 is still retained under this section, probably through oversight; but whether retained through oversight or otherwise, the word cannot be ignored, and a person giving false answers to questions put to him is liable to prosecution for giving false evidence, under sec. 193 I. P. C. If he refuses in answer the questions, he is punishable under sec. 179 I. P. C.

It should be further noted that the obligation to answer truly all questions attaches only to the persons *summoned* by the Police-officer. If a person voluntarily comes forward without any summons, and makes false statements, he cannot be prosecuted for perjury—*Id. Hayat v. Crown*, 23 Cr.L.J. 82, A.I.R. 1922 Lah 133, 1922 P.W.R. 6.

544. Record of statement:—The statements of witnesses examined at the inquest should be recorded *verbatim* in the report, as the statements may be of great use to the Court in testing the value of evidence subsequently given—*In re Pachudajan*, 9 M.L.T. 321, 12 Cr.L.J. 124.

176. (1) When any person dies while in the custody of the police, the nearest Magistrate empowered to hold inquests shall, and, in any other case mentioned in Section 174, clauses (a), (b) and (c) of subsection (1), any Magistrate so empowered may, hold an inquiry into the cause of death either instead of or in addition to the investigation held by the police-officer, and, if he does so, he shall have all the powers in conducting it which he would have in holding an inquiry into an offence. The Magistrate holding such an inquiry shall record the evidence taken by him in connection therewith in any of the manner hereinafter prescribed according to the circumstances of the case.

(2) Whenever such Magistrate considers it expedient to make an examination of the dead body of any person who has been already interred in order to discover the cause of his death, the Magistrate may cause the body to be disinterred and examined.

545. Object:—This section proceeds on the basis that enquiry into a suspicious death should not depend merely upon the opinion the Police may form, but that there should be a further check by enabling

a local Magistrate to hold an independent inquiry—*In re Laxminarayan*, 30 Bom.L.R. 1050, 29 Cr.L.J. 1063 (1071).

Jurisdiction of Presidency Magistrates :—The Presidency Magistrate is not ousted of his jurisdiction to hold a preliminary inquiry into a charge of murder, because the Coroner has held an inquiry into the cause of death and has committed the accused to the High Court under sec. 25 of the Coroner's Act (IV of 1871)—*Q. E v Md Rajudin*, 16 Bom. 159; *Emp v. Jogeshwar*, 31 Cal 1

Power to disinter corpses —A Police officer making an investigation under this section has no power to cause a dead body which has been already interred, to be disinterred in order to examine it. Such power is conferred on a Coroner under section 11 of the Coroner's Act (IV of 1871) and on a Magistrate holding an inquest under the present section.

546. Revision —Proceedings under this section are now liable to revision by the Court under secs. 435 and 439, by reason of the repeal of sub-section (3) of section 435 by the Amendment Act of 1923—*In re Laxminarayan*, 30 Bom.L.R. 1050, 29 Cr L.J. 1063 (1066).

In an earlier Calcutta case it has been held that there is nothing in this section which requires that a Magistrate holding an inquiry under this section is bound to make a report or to come to a finding, the report of the inquiry under this section into the cause of a suspicious death is not a judicial proceeding, and therefore where he sent a report of the result of his inquiry to his executive superior (the District Magistrate) the High Court could not call for it under sec. 435—*In re Troylokhanath*, 3 Cal. 742 (752, 753) In other words, an inquiry under sec. 176 is a judicial proceeding, but the report of an inquiry under this section is not so, and cannot be sent for by the High Court under sec 435.

PART VI.

PROCEEDINGS IN PROSECUTIONS.

CHAPTER XV.

OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE CRIMINAL COURTS IN INQUIRIES AND TRIALS.

A—Place of Inquiry or Trial.

177. Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it was committed.

Ordinary place of inquiry and trial.

547. General Rule :—All crime is local; the jurisdiction over the crime belongs to the country where the crime is committed—*Macleod v Attorney-General*, L R (1891) A.C. 458 Crimes in their nature are local, and the jurisdiction of crimes is local—*Rafael v Verelst*, 2 Blackstone, p. 1058 Crime is purely local i.e. depends on the law of the place in which it is committed, and not on the nationality of the person who commits it—*Sirdar Gurdayal v. Rajah of Furidkote*, [1894] A.C. 670. Therefore British Indian Courts have no jurisdiction to try for offences committed and completed outside the British territory—*Ibrahim v. Emp.*, 1894 P.R. 7, *Q. E v Ranchhod*, 2 Bom L.R. 337; *Siddha v Biligiri*, 7 Mad. 354; *Anonymous*, 6 M H C R App. 3. As to the jurisdiction of British Indian Courts over offences committed by subjects of the Crown in places outside British India, see sec 188.

548. Offence :—This chapter deals with the place of inquiry and trial in respect of offences only; an application under sec. 488 for maintenance is not a complaint of an offence, and the provisions of this section are not applicable to determine the jurisdiction of a Court competent to entertain such application—*Hildephonsus v. Malone*, 1885 P 13, *Bishen Das v Nanaki*, 1893 P R 3. *Contra*—*Bibi Nur v. Shah Walait*, 1883 P.R. 11 and *In re Malcolm De Castro*, 13 All 348, where it was held that neglect to maintain a wife being an offence punishable under this Code under sec. 488, the place for its trial must be determined by the provisions of this Chapter But the recent amendment of sub-section (9) of sec 488 shows that that section does not contemplate any offence

So also, proceedings under Chapter XII are not proceedings in respect of an offence, and therefore sec. 182 does not apply to a proceeding under

sec. 145—*Maharaja Harbullubh v. Bajrang Das*, 3 C.W.N. 148; nor does sec. 185 apply to determine jurisdiction in respect of such proceeding—*Rudra Pratap v. Dewan*, 12 A.L.J. 390, 18 Cr.L.J. 520.

Similar remarks may also apply to proceedings under Chapters VIII and X.

“Ordinarily”.—The word “ordinarily” indicates that this section is a general one and must be read subject to any special provisions of law which may modify it. The rule laid down in this section has been relaxed or modified by several succeeding sections. Thus, this section must be read subject to the special provisions of sec. 197 (2) which override the general rule contained in this section—*K. E. v. Maung Ka*, 4 L.B.R. 265.

549. Local Jurisdiction.—Although this section lays down that every offence must be inquired into and tried by the Court within whose jurisdiction it was committed, still if the offence is inquired into or tried by a Magistrate who has no territorial jurisdiction over the place where the offence was committed, it would be at most an irregularity which would be cured by sec. 531 if such commitment or trial has occasioned no failure of justice—*Rayan Kutti v. Emp.*, 26 Mad. 640; *Asst. Sessions Judge v. Ramammal*, 36 Mad. 387, *Emp. v. Doraisamy*, 30 Mad. 94. Where a Magistrate, being empowered to commit to the sessions, but having no territorial jurisdiction over the place in which the offence is alleged to have been committed, commits a case to a Sessions Court which has jurisdiction over the place, the commitment is valid and cannot be quashed under sec. 532, although the objection to such commitment is taken before the commitment—*Q. E. v. Abbi Redi*, 17 Mad. 402. But no Judge or Magistrate can try or pass an order of committal in respect of an offence committed outside the Province altogether. Such a trial or order of committal is illegal and the illegality cannot be cured by section 531—*Bhagwatia v. Q. E.*, 3 Pat. 417 (422), 26 Cr.L.J. 49, A.I.R. 1925 Pat. 187.

Commitment to wrong Sessions.—Where a Magistrate commits a case to a Sessions Court other than the one within whose local jurisdiction the offence has been committed, the commitment is merely irregular and would be cured by sec. 531, and the High Court will not quash the commitment but will direct the transfer of the case to the Court having jurisdiction—*Q. E. v. Thaku*, 8 Bom. 312; *Q. E. v. Atmaram*, 2 Bom. L.R. 394, *Q. E. v. Ram Dei*, 18 All. 350. But the Madras High Court, dissenting from the above cases, and following the Privy Council ruling in *Ledgerd v. Bull*, 9 All. 191, has laid down that a commitment to a Sessions Court having no territorial jurisdiction over the offence is illegal and must be set aside, and the High Court would not be justified in upholding the commitment and directing the transfer of the case to the proper Sessions Court—*Asst. Sessions Judge v. Ramammal*, 36 Mad. 387 (391). This is also the view of the Patna High Court in *Bhagwatia v. K. E.*, 3 Pat. 417, 26 Cr.L.J. 49. But where a commitment was made to the High Court Sessions in respect of two offences, one of which was committed within, and the other without, the original jurisdiction of the

High Court, *held* that the High Court could, on the grounds of expediency and convenience, proceed with the trial, the irregularity being cured by sec. 531. Even if the High Court had no jurisdiction on its original side to try the case, an order could be made under sec. 526 directing the trial to take place at the High Court Sessions. And the High Court ordered accordingly—*Ganapathi v. Rex*, 42 Mad 791, 37 M.L.J. 60, 20 Cr.L.J. 484

Several offences —Where two different offences are committed in the course of the same transaction, the case should be tried by a Magistrate who has jurisdiction to try both the offences; it would not be a proper course that a Magistrate who has jurisdiction over one of them should try that offence, leaving the other to be tried by another Magistrate. Such a procedure would be highly inconvenient—*In re Ponnusami*, 2 Weir 144

550. Holding trial outside British India :—The mere fact that an offence has been committed within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate would not enable him to try that offence at some place outside British India—*Q. E. v. Maniklal*, Ratanlal 376.

551. Effect of irregular arrest :—The irregularity of an arrest is not a ground for invalidating all proceedings and trials subsequent to the arrest—*Sobha v. Emp.*, 1899 P.R. 6; *Crown v. Gobinda*, 1911 P.R. 1. Thus, a Magistrate should not acquit an accused merely because the officer who arrested the accused did not belong to the circle in which the arrest was made—*Emp. v. Ravalu*, 26 Mad 124. And so, where the subject of a Native State, who having committed an offence in British India escaped into the Native State, was arrested by the British police without the intervention of that State, *held* that the subsequent trial and conviction of the accused were not affected by the irregularity of the arrest—*Sobha v. Emp.*, 1899 P.R. 6

552. Effect of transfer of territory to Native State :—Where an offence was committed in a place within British territory, but some time after the commitment of the case to the Court of Session and before the commencement of the trial, the place in which the offence was committed ceased to be a British territory and became part of a Native State, it was held that this fact did not oust the jurisdiction of the British Court to try the offence—*K. E. v. Ram Naresh*, 34 All. 118, 9 A.L.J. 51; *K. E. v. Ganga*, 9 A.L.J. 696, 34 All. 451. Similarly, if, pending an appeal from a conviction, the place where the offence had been committed was transferred to a Native State, it was held that this transfer of territory did not deprive the Court in which the appeal had been filed of its jurisdiction to hear it—*Mahabir v. K. E.*, 33 All. 578, 8 A.L.J. 630.

178. Notwithstanding anything contained in Sec-

tion 177, the Local Government may direct that any cases or class of cases committed for trial in any district may be tried in any sessions divisions :

Power to order cases to be tried in different sessions divisions.

Provided that such direction is not repugnant to any direction previously issued by the High Court under Section 15 of the Indian High Courts Act, 1861, or Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915, or under this Code, Section 526.

553. Local Government's power in Burma :—The Local Government of Burma has no power to transfer a case committed to the Court of the Recorder of Rangoon for trial, to the Court of the Commissioner. But it can transfer a case from the District of Rangoon to the Sessions Judge of Pegu—*Q. E. v. Nga Tha*, 10 Cal. 643.

179. When a person is accused of the commission of any offence by reason of any thing which has been done, and of any consequence which has ensued, such offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any such thing has been done, or any such consequence has ensued.

Accused triable in district where act is done or where consequence ensues.

Illustrations.

(a) A is wounded within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Court X, and dies within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Court Z. The offence of the culpable homicide of A may be inquired into or tried by X or Z.

(b) A is wounded within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Court X, and is, during ten days within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Court Y, and during ten days more within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Court Z, unable in the local limits of the jurisdiction of either Court Y or Court Z to follow his ordinary pursuits. The offence of causing grievous hurt to A may be inquired into or tried by X, Y or Z.

(c) A is put in fear of injury within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Court X, and is thereby induced, within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Court Y, to deliver property to the person who put him in fear. The offence of extortion committed on A may be inquired into or tried either by X or Y.

(d) A is wounded in the Native State of Baroda, and dies of his wounds in Poona. The offence of causing A's death may be inquired into and tried in Poona.

554. Scope of section —This section applies when the act (or omission) is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of any consequence which has ensued. But where the act (or omission) is a complete offence *irrespective of any consequence* which

has ensued, this section does not apply, and the offence is to be inquired into and tried only by the Court within whose jurisdiction the act was committed (Sec. 177). Thus—

Examples—(a) The offence of falsification of accounts (sec. 477A, I. P. C.) is complete as soon as the accounts are falsified, and any consequence resulting from it is immaterial for the offence. Therefore, it is to be tried only by the Court within whose jurisdiction the accounts were falsified, and not by any other Court—*Swaminathan v. Annamalai*, 4 M.L.T. 481, 9 Cr. L.J. 92.

(b) Where a person who was assaulted by the accused in Baroda had his leg completely broken there and then came to British India where he remained for 2 months in the hospital, it was held that the offence of grievous hurt was complete in Baroda by the fracture of the leg, irrespective of any consequence (viz. the injured man lying in hospital) ensuing in British India, therefore the offence could not be tried in British India—*Sirdar Meru v. Jethabhai*, 8 Bom. L.R. 513.

(c) Where a dacoity was committed in a Native State and some stolen property was found concealed by the accused in the British territory, it was held that the offence of dacoity was complete in the Native State, irrespective of retaining the stolen property in the British territory, and could not be tried in British India—*Reg v. Lakhya*, 1 Bom. 50.

(d) Where a woman sold in District A her minor girl to a prostitute, who took the girl to District B, it was held that the offence of selling a minor girl for the purposes of prostitution was complete in District A, and that the possession of the girl in District B was not a consequence completing the offence; the Magistrate of District B had no jurisdiction to try the offence—6 Agra 46.

(e) The offence of infringement of copyright is complete as soon as the book infringing the copyright is printed, and it does not depend for its completion upon any consequence (e.g. loss of money to the complainant) such as is contemplated by Sec. 179. Therefore, the offence is to be inquired into and tried under Sec. 177 at the place where the infringing book was printed—*Kalidas v. Karam Chand*, 1916 P.R. 28, 18 Cr. L.J. 353.

(f) Where a person consigned some goods from District F to District K, and the consignee misappropriated the goods at K, it was held that the consignee could be tried in K and not in F, because the accused was not charged by reason of any consequence or loss which ensued to the consignor at F, but solely by reason of what was alleged to have been done at K—*Nirbhai Ram v. Kallu Ram*, 4 O.C. 376.

(g) Where a complaint was made before a Magistrate at Aligarh that a person had dishonestly and fraudulently, two days after he became insolvent, realised at Calcutta the money due in respect of certain hundies which the complainant purchased, it was held that the offence should be inquired into at Calcutta where the offence (sec. 415 I. P. C.) was committed and not at Aligarh where the loss ensued to the complainant—*Babu Lal v. Ghansham*, 5 A.L.J. 333.

(h) Where the offence of kidnapping is committed outside British India, the subsequent act of conveying the kidnapped person to British India is not such a consequence as is contemplated by this section, so as to give jurisdiction to a British Indian Court over the offence committed outside British India—*Bhula Santal v. Dama Santal*, 20 C.W.N. 62, 17 Cr.L.J. 128; *Jai Mal Singh v. Q. E.*, 1901 P.R. 1, *Crown v. Koochri*, 7 S.L.R. 17, 14 Cr.L.J. 439.

(i) Two persons were alleged to have induced another to purchase a barrel at Meerut on the false representation that the barrel contained a certain quantity of spirits. At Agra it was discovered that the quantity was less than what it was represented to contain. It was held that the Agra Court had no jurisdiction, because the offence of fraud had been committed at Meerut, and that sec 179 did not apply in as much as the discovery of the fraud after the delivery of the article was not a 'consequence which has ensued' within the meaning of the section—*Pragdas v. Daulatram*, 13 A.L.J. 1067, 16 Cr.L.J. 825

(j) Where a petition under sec 21 of the Income Tax Act (1916) was falsely verified at a place in the Tanjore District and was presented in the Ramnad District, held that the offence of false verification was completed in the Tanjore District, and the Ramnad Magistrate had no jurisdiction—*In re Mohideen*, 45 Mad 839, 43 M.L.J. 475, 23 Cr.L.J. 619

(k) The accused sent from Madras a V. P. parcel to the complainant at Hyderabad in consequence of an order by the complainant for some tea. The complainant paid the V. P. amount, and took delivery of the parcel which on opening was found to contain only saw-dust. In a trial on a charge of cheating preferred by the complainant against the accused at Madras, held that the deceit and the delivery of the parcel in consequence of the deceit were complete when the money was handed over to the Post office at Hyderabad, and the subsequent delivery of the money by the Post office to the accused at Madras was not a necessary ingredient of the offence, and the offence being committed wholly at Hyderabad, sec 179 did not apply and the Madras Court had no jurisdiction to try the offence—*Kaleek v. Emp.* 52 M.L.J. 511, 28 Cr.L.J. 452

555. Criminal misappropriation:—In case of the offence of criminal misappropriation or breach of trust, the consequence of wrongful gain or wrongful loss is not an essential part of the crime, and a person is not accused of the offence by reason of it, therefore the offence is triable where the dishonest use or disposal took place, and not where the loss ensued to the complainant—*Rambilas v. Emp.* 38 Mad 639, 29 M.L.J. 175; *Simhachalam v. Ratu Kanta*, 44 Cal 912, 21 C.W.N. 573; *Jaw Karan v. Sargoo*, 1 P.L.T. 200, 21 Cr.L.J. 519, *Banerjee v. Potnis*, 20 N.L.R. 72, 25 Cr.L.J. 922, *Abdul Salam v. Ramnewal*, 21 Cr.L.J. 149; *Abdul Haq v. Emp.* 23 Cr.L.J. 743 (Lah), *Ahmed Ibrahim v. Haji A. Gunny*, 1 Rang 56, 24 Cr.L.J. 746 In *Asst Sessions Judge v. Ramasami*, 38 Mad 779, however, where certain jewels were entrusted to a person in a Native State for sale on commission, and he converted the jewels to his own use, it was held that since the loss of the jewels,

which was the consequence, occurred in British India (where the complainant resided) the Magistrate of the British Indian Court had jurisdiction under this section. See also *Behari Lal v. Gangadin*, 27 Cr.L.J. 1104 (All.), where the forum of trial of the offence of criminal misappropriation was decided with reference to the place where the consequence of criminal misappropriation took place. See also *Q. E. v. O'Brien*, 19 All 111 and *Abdul Latif v. Abu Md Kasim*, 26 C.W.N. 175 where it is held that the offence of criminal breach of trust by an agent can be tried by the Court having jurisdiction in the place where the principal resides. This difference of opinion hangs upon the different interpretation put on the word "consequence" occurring in this section. See Note 557 *infra*, and Note 563 under sec 181. In a recent Allahabad case it has been held that the offence of criminal misappropriation may be tried either at the place where the offence was committed or at the place where the consequence ensued (i.e. where the complainant suffered loss)—*Md Rashid Khan v. Emp*, 27 Cr.L.J. 992 (All.).

556. Cases where either Court has jurisdiction:—

Where an act is an offence by reason of any consequence which has ensued, the offence is triable either by the Court within whose jurisdiction the act was committed or by the Court within whose jurisdiction the consequence has ensued. Thus:—

(a) Where a petition presented to a person at Lahore contained defamatory statements against another, and was published at Amritsar, it was held that the Amritsar Court had jurisdiction to try the offence of defamation, because the publication at Amritsar completed the offence and was a consequence by reason of which the accused was charged with the offence of defamation—*Mahesh Das v. Emp*, 1885 P.R. 44

(b) Where A sent goods by Railway from Karachi to Lahore under a false description, the Court at Lahore could under this section try A for the offence of cheating, as the consequence of A's act, viz., the loss of freight to the Railway Company was an ingredient of the offence and took place at Lahore, the Headquarters of the Railway Company—*Ghulam Ali v. Q. E.*, 1900 P.R. 7

(c) In fulfilment of a contract the accused consigned several tins of groundnut oil at Salem (Madras) to the complainant at Dhulia (Bombay). The tins when opened were found to contain groundnut oil mixed with rock oil. The complainant thereupon filed a complaint of cheating in the Magistrate's Court at Dhulia. Held that the Dhulia Court had jurisdiction, for the deception took place at Dhulia where the complainant became the victim of the deceit in consequence of the accused's act—*Emp v. Jamnadas*, 17 Bom L.R. 389, 16 Cr.L.J. 433, *Yusuf Ali v. Wahajuddin*, 12 A.L.J. 1022, 16 Cr.L.J. 719.

(d) Where an alleged defamatory letter is written and posted in Madras with a view to its being read at Tinnevely, the offence of defamation is triable either in Madras or in Tinnevely—*Krishnamurti v. Parasurama*, 44 M.L.J. 648, 32 M.L.T. 164, 24 Cr.L.J. 309.

(e) Where the accused residing at Lahore recovered money from a

Bank at Bombay on a forged draft of the Amritsar Branch of the Punjab National Bank of Lahore, it was held that the Lahore Court has jurisdiction to try the accused for an offence under sec. 420 I.P.C., as the consequence (viz., loss to the P. N. Bank) contemplated by this section ensued in Lahore where the Head Office of the Bank was situated—*Ishar Das v. K. E.*, 1908 P.W.R. 18, 8 Cr.L.J. 75.

(f) The offence of cheating may be tried either at the place where the cheating was committed (where the accused resided) or at the place where the complainant resided—*Girdhar v. Emp.*, 21 A.L.J. 621, 24 Cr.L.J. 929.

557. Consequence :—The 'consequence' mentioned in this Section is the *primary* consequence, and not any secondary consequence of the offence. The primary consequence should be taken into consideration in determining the jurisdiction. Thus, where an accused living in Nandyal was appointed agent for the sale of the oil of the complainant living in Madras, and when called on to account the accused failed to do so, it was held that the offence of criminal breach of trust was triable at Nandyal and not at Madras, because the firm's loss at Nandyal was a primary consequence, and the loss at Madras, the firm's head quarters where the funds were kept, is a secondary one which is not sufficient to attract the operation of this section—*Krishnamachari v. Shaw Wallace & Co.*, 39 Mad. 576, 16 Cr.L.J. 491. The same view is taken in *Gunananda v. Senti*, 26 Cr.L.J. 725, 29 C.W.N. 432; *Rambilas v. Emp.*, 38 Mad. 639; *Simhachalam v. Ratikanta*, 44 Cal. 912; and *Ganesh Lal v. Nand Kishore*, 34 All. 487, 10 A.L.J. 45. But in *Langridge v. Atkins*, 35 All. 29, *Sheo Shankar v. Mohan*, 19 A.L.J. 69, *Emp. v. Ramratan*, 46 Bom. 641, *Mahadeo v. K. E.*, 32 All. 397, *Uttam Chand v. Emp.*, 1902 P.R. 2, *Lakhmi Chand v. Emp.*, 1901 P.R. 24, *Q. E. v. Obrien*, 19 All. 111, *Asst Sess. Judge v. Ramasami*, 38 Mad. 779, *Abdul Latif v. Abu Md. Kasim*, 26 C.W.N. 175, *Govind v. Emp.*, 22 S.L.R. 404, 30 Cr.L.J. 249, and *Md. Rashid Khan v. Emp.*, 27 Cr.L.J. 992 (All.), a wider interpretation has been put on the word 'consequence' which has been taken to include such secondary consequence as loss resulting to the employer, by criminal breach of trust or failure to account for moneys misappropriated, at the head office of the firm; and the Court of the place where such secondary consequence ensues has been held to have jurisdiction over the offence. See also Note 563 under sec. 181.

Offence in Native State—Consequence in British India—See 38 Mad. 779 cited above. See the same case cited under sec. 188.

Illustrations :—The illustrations are not exhaustive, and to hold that all the consequences prescribed by the Legislature as conferring jurisdiction are limited to those specified in the illustrations is not justified by the language of the section—*Ishar Das v. K. E.*, 1908 P.W.R. 18, 8 Cr.L.J. 75. The illustration (d) to this section must be applied with certain restriction. The offender in that illustration must be taken to be a subject of the British Government, and a certificate of the Political Agent must be obtained under sec. 188 before he can be tried. If the offender is a subject of the Native State, he cannot be tried by the British Courts.

180. When an act is an offence by reason of its relation to any other act which is also an offence or which would be an offence if the doer were capable of committing an offence, a charge of the first-mentioned offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction either act was done.

Illustrations.

(a) A charge of abetment may be inquired into or tried either by the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the abetment was committed, or by the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the offence abetted was committed.

(b) A charge of receiving or retaining stolen goods may be inquired into or tried either by the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the goods were stolen, or by any Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any of them were at any time dishonestly received or retained.

(c) A charge of wrongfully concealing a person known to have been kidnapped may be inquired into or tried by the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the wrongful concealing, or by the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the kidnapping, took place.

558. Scope of section—Foreign territory :—The Code extends only to British territory, and the present section assumes the offence therein indicated to have been committed in a local jurisdiction created by the Code. Therefore, where a foreign subject in a foreign territory instigated the commission of an offence which was in consequence committed in British territory, it was held that the instigation not having taken place in any district created by this Code, the instigator was not amenable to the jurisdiction of a British Court—*Reg v. Pirtai*, 10 B.H.C.R. 356; *Kishen Koer v. Crown*, 1878 P.R. 20. When a house-breaking took place in a district in British India, and a non-British subject residing in a Native State was found to be in possession of the stolen property, held, that that person was not triable by the British Courts—*Md. Hussain v. Crown*, 2 Lah.L.J. 348, 23 Cr.L.J. 560. The operation of this Code cannot be extended beyond the British territory, so as to give jurisdiction to a British Court to try a non-British subject residing outside British India for the offence of retaining stolen properties, although the theft of those properties might have taken place in British India—*Moheswari v. K. E.*, 18 C.W.N. 1178, 15 Cr.L.J. 537; *Q. E. v. Kirpal Singh*, 9 All 523, *Reg v. Bechar*, 4 B.H.C.R. 38. If, however, an Indian British subject is found in the Native State in possession of property stolen in

British India, he can be tried by a Court in British India under this section, but a certificate of the Political Agent under sec. 188 would be necessary—*Sessions Judge v. Sundara*, 8 M.L.T. 54, 11 Cr.L.J. 306.

If, however, the contrary things happen, *i.e.*, if the theft takes place outside British territory, and the stolen property is brought within British India, the offence of retaining stolen property may be tried in British India, although the offence of theft which was committed outside British India cannot be tried here—*Q. E. v. Abdul Latib*, 10 Bom. 186, *Reg. v. Lakhya*, 1 Bom. 50; *Emp. v. Sunkur*, 6 Cal. 307. *Contra*—*Emp. v. Moorga Chetty*, 5 Bom. 338 and *Anonymous*, 2 Weir 145. These two decisions are however no longer good law in view of the words "whether the transfer has been made or the misappropriation or breach of trust has been committed within or without British India" added to Sec 410 I. P. C. by the Penal Code Amendment Act VIII of 1892.

559. Abetment :—Where a person sends a letter to another through post inciting him to the commission of an offence, he is guilty of the offence of abetment as soon as the letter is received by and the contents known to the addressee, and is triable at the place where the letter is received—*Q. E. v. Sheo Dial*, 16 All. 389.

Although an abetment of an offence might have taken place outside the territorial jurisdiction of a Magistrate, yet under this section the abettor can be tried by a Magistrate within whose territorial jurisdiction the offence abetted was committed—*In re Chinnannagoud*, 1 Weir 155.

Where the abetment of the offence, as well as the offence itself, is committed in N (a place in the province of Bengal) but the abettor has a house in J (a place in the province of Behar), the charge of abetment should be inquired into and tried in N and not in J. A committal order in respect of the charge of abetment passed by a Court in Behar is without jurisdiction and must be quashed. If the abetment is committed both in a place inside the province of Behar, as well as in a place outside that province, it may be inquired into and tried in a Court of Behar—*Bhagwatia v. K. E.*, 3 Pat. 417 (424), 26 Cr.L.J. 49.

Abetment in British India of offence committed outside British India.—Where a British subject abets in British India an offence committed outside British India, he may under the amended section 108A I. P. C. be tried in British India—*Q. E. v. Baku*, 24 Bom. 287. In view of sec 108A I. P. C. the decision in *Q. E. v. Ganpatral*, 19 Bom. 105 is no longer good law.

560. Conspiracy—The offence of an attempt to murder a person in district R in pursuance of a conspiracy entered into in district M can be inquired into and tried in either of the two districts—*Gurdit Singh v. Crown*, 1917 P.R. 24, 18 Cr.L.J. 514. But the Calcutta High Court is of opinion that if a conspiracy is entered into in District A and acts are committed in pursuance of that conspiracy in District B, the Magistrate of District A can try the conspiracy but cannot try the accused in the same trial for acts committed outside his district. Even the fact that the offences could have been tried jointly under sec 239 if committed within his

jurisdiction will not give him jurisdiction to try them—*Bissessar v. Emp.*, 28 C.W.N. 975, A I R 1924 Cal. 1034, 26 Cr.L.J. 207.

181. (1) The offence of being a thug, of being a thug and committing murder, of dacoity with murder, of having belonged to a gang of dacoits, or of having escaped from custody, may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the person charged is.

(2) The offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of trust may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any part of the property which is the subject of the offence was received or retained by the accused person or the offence was committed.

(3) The offence of stealing anything may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such thing was stolen or was possessed by the thief or by any person who received or retained the same knowing or having reason to believe it to be stolen.

(3) The offence of theft or any offence which includes theft or the possession of stolen property, may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such offence was committed or the property stolen was possessed by the thief or by any person who received or retained the same knowing or having reason to believe it to be stolen.

(4) The offence of kidnapping or abduction may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the person kidnapped or abducted was kidnapped or abducted or was conveyed or concealed or detained.

560A. Change —Sub-section (3) has been redrafted by sec. 42 of the Crim Pro Code Amendment Act XVIII of 1923, but the actual change

effected by this redrafting is the addition of the words "or any offence which includes theft or possession of stolen property." "We accept this clause but would enlarge the enumeration of offences to include the possession of stolen property. This will also cover the case of extortion. See the definition in sec. 410 I. P. C."—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916.*

As a result of this amendment, sec. 181 (3) means that the offence of being in possession of stolen property may be inquired into either at the place where it was stolen or where it was found to be dishonestly possessed. This indeed is expressly stated in Illustration (b) to sec. 180. It must be conceded that the language of sub-section (3) of sec. 181 is open to objection. The words 'such offence' are intended to mean the offence of theft, but grammatically these words would mean any offence of possession of stolen property—*Emp v Bhima*, 24 A L.J. 148, 27 Cr.L.J. 21 (22), A.I.R. 1926 All. 167.

561. Scope of section .—This section does not apply to the case of an offence committed by a person who is not a British subject, *outside British territory*. This section is intended to regulate the jurisdiction of Courts in British India, in respect of offences committed in British India, and cannot vary or abrogate the ordinary rule that no foreign subject can be tried in British India for an offence committed outside British India—*Emp. v Baldewa*, 28 All. 372. This section only applies as between Courts of different local areas whose jurisdiction has been limited under sec. 12—*Imp. v. Tribhun*, 5 S L.R. 266; *Reg. v. Adivigadu*, 1 Mad. 171.

Thus, where a dacoity or theft was committed in a Native State, and part of the stolen property was found to have been concealed by the accused in British territory, *held* that the offence of dacoity could not be tried by British Indian Courts, although the offence of retaining stolen property could be tried by such Courts, the retaining having taken place in British territory—*Reg. v. Lakhya*, 1 Bom 50; *Q E v Abdul Latif*, 10 Bom. 186; and *Emp. v. Sunkur*, 6 Cal 307 cited under sec 180; see also *Reg v. Adivigadu*, 1 Mad 171. When a person escaped from lawful custody in a Native State and came into British India, *held* that the British Court had no jurisdiction to try him for an offence under sec. 224 I.P.C., as it was committed out of British India—*Q E v Souza*, Ratanlal 870. So also, where a criminal breach of trust was committed in a Native State, a Court in British India had no jurisdiction—*Imp v. Tribhun*, 5 S L R 266, 13 Cr L J. 530. Where the offence of kidnapping was committed out of British India, and the minor was brought into British India, a British Court had no jurisdiction as the offence was complete out of British India, even the fact that the person kidnapped was conveyed to British India would not give the British Court jurisdiction, because the words 'was conveyed' in this section do not import any separate or distinct offence, where the offence was complete previous to such conveying—*Jamal Singh v Emp*, 1901 P.R. 1, *Crown v Koochri*, 7 S L R. 17, 14 Cr L.J. 439, *Bhuta Santal v Dama*, 20 C.W N. 62, 17 Cr.L J 128. The complainant sent a sum of money from Burma to

the accused, who was his agent in Japan. The accused misappropriated the money whereupon the complainant took criminal proceedings in Rangoon. Held that the offence of criminal misappropriation was complete when the conversion was done with the intent of causing wrongful gain to the offender, and did not depend on the consequence of wrongful loss which had ensued to the complainant. The conversion having taken place in Japan, the Rangoon Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint—*Ahmed Ebrahim v. Hajee Abdul Ganny*, 1 Rang 58, 24 Cr.L.J. 746.

562. Belonging to a gang of dacoits.—Where a resident of a Native State was arrested in that State and was brought before a Court in British India and charged with the offence of belonging to a gang of dacoits who had committed dacoities within the jurisdiction of that Court, it was held that the Magistrate had jurisdiction over the accused, as the accused was within his district at the time of the charge—*Crown v. Govinda*, 1911 P R 1, 12 Cr L J 113.

"Is".—The word 'is' at the end of sub-section (1) does not mean 'is of his own accord'. The Magistrate has jurisdiction, whether the accused has come within the local limits of his jurisdiction of his own accord or has been brought there by force (i.e., under arrest)—*Ibid*.

563. Criminal misappropriation etc..—See *Nirbhai Ram v. Kallu Ram*, 4 O C 376, *Rambilas v. Emp*, 38 Mad. 639, *Simhachalam v. Ratikanta*, 44 Cal 912, *Langridge v. Atkins*, 35 All. 29, *Abdul Latif v. Md. Karim*, 26 C W N 175, *Q. E. v. Obrien*, 19 All. 111, *Krishnamachari v. Shaw Wallace & Co.*, 39 Mad 576, and *Ganesh v. Nand Kishore*, 34 All. 487 cited under Sec 179. In all these cases, the applicability or non-applicability of sec 179 to cases of criminal misappropriation or breach of trust was decided with reference to the meaning of the word 'consequence' occurring in that section. But in some other cases it has been held that since the offence of criminal misappropriation or breach of trust is specifically provided for in sec. 181, the place of trial of the offence must be determined in accordance with the provisions of this section, without reference to the 'consequence' mentioned in sec. 179. See *Mahlab Din v. Emp*, 25 Cr L J 410, A I R 1924 Lah 663; *Dina Nath v. Tuls Ram*, 8 Lah L J. 471, 26 Cr L J 136; *Gunananda v. Santi Prakash*, 29 C W N. 432, 26 Cr.L J 725. The Allahabad High Court also recently holds that in respect of the offence of criminal breach of trust, sec 179 is controlled by sec. 181, and the offence can only be inquired into and tried by the Court within whose jurisdiction the offence was committed or the property (the subject of the offence) was received or retained by the accused. Therefore, where the complainant residing at Basti appointed the accused as his commission agent in Bombay, and advanced money to him from time to time to purchase and sell goods at Bombay on behalf of the complainant, but the accused misappropriated the money including the profits derived from the purchase and sale of goods on behalf of the complainant, held that the Basti Court had no jurisdiction to try the offence of criminal breach of trust, which was triable by the Bombay

Court alone—*Girdhar v. K. E.*, 21 A.L.J. 621, 24 Cr.L.J. 929, A.I.R. 1924 All 77. Where the complainant charged the accused under Sec 408 I. P. C. alleging that the complainant had engaged the accused to manage a branch firm at Rurki, that accounts were sent by the accused to Rawalpindi for some time but subsequently discontinued, and that on inspection of accounts it was found that the accused had made false entries in respect of certain items it was held that in as much as the allegation in the complaint referred to specific items in respect of which the accused was charged with having committed the offence of criminal breach of trust at Rurki, the Rawalpindi Court had no jurisdiction to try the case—*Crown v. Raghubir*, 1915 P R 22. Where the accused is under a liability to render accounts at a particular place and fails to do so by reason of his having committed an offence of criminal breach of trust which is alleged against him, the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction that place is situated may inquire into and try the offence under the provisions of this section—*Gunananda v. Santi Prakash*, 29 C.W.N. 432, 41 C.L.J. 80, 26 Cr.L.J. 725, *Yacoob v. Abdul Gunny*, 6 Rang. 380, 29 Cr.L.J. 940; *Ram Sahai v. Krishna*, 27 Cr.L.J. 900, A.I.R. 1926 Lah 119, 7 Lah.L.J. 586. Where the accused was entrusted with a railway receipt for goods in one district with instructions to take delivery of the goods at their destination in another district and to sell them on complainant's account, and the accused sold them and misappropriated the sale-proceeds, it was held that the offence was triable by the Court within the jurisdiction of which the goods were sold and the money was received and misappropriated. It was held further that the "property which was the subject of the offence" in this case was not the railway receipt but the money received on sale of the goods—*Kasi Chetty v. Kasi Chetty*, 10 Bur.L.T. 50, 18 Cr.L.J. 645.

In view of the specific provisions contained in sec 181 (2) with regard to the jurisdiction of the Courts to try the offence of criminal breach of trust, a Court within whose jurisdiction the property which is the subject matter of the offence was received or retained, has jurisdiction to try such offence even though the actual offence is committed outside its limits. Even if the property is received quite properly and innocently at one place and is subsequently dealt with at another place dishonestly by the accused, he can be tried at the place where he received or retained the property—*Emp v. Laxman*, 51 Bom 101, 28 Bom.L.R. 1292, 28 Cr.L.J. 44.

Sub-section (3).—The offences of theft and the possession of stolen property cannot be tried by a Magistrate if neither the offence of theft was committed nor the property possessed within his jurisdiction, even though a conspiracy to commit these offences was entered into in a place within his jurisdiction—*Bissessar v. Emp*, 28 C.W.N. 975, 26 Cr.L.J. 207.

564. Sub-section (4).—*Scope*—This sub-section refers only to cases of kidnapping and abduction, but it does not apply to offences under Chapter XX of the I. P. C., e.g. detaining a married woman for the

purpose of illicit intercourse. Such offence is to be inquired into only in the district where the detention of the woman occurs—*Jaswant v. Crown*, 1918 P.L.R. 51, 18 Cr.L.J. 438.

Kidnapping—Sub-section (4) was for the first time added in the Code of 1898. Prior to 1898, it was held that the offence of kidnapping, not being a continuing offence, could be tried only by the Court within the local limits of which the minor was taken out, and not by the Court within whose jurisdiction the minor was confined—*Emp. v. Surja*, 1883 A.W.N. 164; *Emp. v. Prasadi*, 1887 A.W.N. 139; nor by the Court within whose jurisdiction such minor was conveyed—*Emp. v. Budha*, 1883 A.W.N. 67. But these decisions are no longer good law. See also *Q. E. v. Ramdei*, 18 All. 350, *Q. E. v. Ram Sundar*, 19 All. 109, *Emp. v. Tika*, 26 All. 197, *Nemai v. Q. E.*, 27 Cal. 1041, *Rakhal v. Q. E.*, 2 C.W.N. 81, where it has been held that the offence of kidnapping is not a continuing offence but is complete as soon as the minor is taken out of the custody of the lawful guardian.

The words 'kidnapping' and 'abduction' do not include an offence of wrongfully confining or keeping in confinement a kidnapped person—*Badlu v. Emperor*, 25 Cr.L.J. 552, A.I.R. 1924 All. 545, 21 A.L.J. 912. A girl was kidnapped in the Budaun district by D and B. These men took the girl to a place in Etah district where they met two other men H and A, and the four men then took the girl to Karnal district in Panjab to the house of one Dallu. Held that the offence committed by D and B (*viz* kidnapping, sec. 366 I. P. C.) may be tried in Budaun, Etah, or Karnal, the offence committed by H and A (*viz* keeping in confinement a kidnapped person, sec. 368 I. P. C.) should be tried in Etah, and the offence committed by Dallu (sec. 368 I. P. C.) should be tried in Karnal—*Ibid*.

A person kidnapped outside British India and conveyed into British territory cannot be tried by British Courts. See *Bhuta Santal v. Dama Santal*, 20 C.W.N. 62, *Jai Mal Singh v. Crown*, 1901 P.R. 1 and *Crown v. Koochri*, 7 S.L.R. 17 cited under Note 561 above.

182. When it is uncertain in which of several local

Place of inquiry or trial where scene of offence is uncertain or not in one district only or where offence is continuing or consists of several acts.

areas an offence was committed, or where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or

where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed

in more local areas than one, or where it consists of several acts done in different local areas,

it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.

565. Object of section—This section intends to provide for the difficulty which would arise where there is a conflict between the

different areas, in order to prevent an accused person from getting off entirely because there may be some doubt as to what particular Magistrate has jurisdiction to try the case—*Bichitranand v. Bhagbut*, 16 Cal. 667. Where there is an uncertainty in which of two districts the scene of an alleged offence lies, sec 182 is applicable and the offence may be tried by the Court of either district—*Punardeo v. Ram Saran*, 25 Cal. 858. Thus, where the accused who was a travelling agent of a firm, employed to sell goods, sold the goods, and misappropriated some of the money, and it was not possible to say exactly where the various acts of embezzlement took place, it was held that according to the first para of this section the accused was triable either at the place where the firm was situated or at one of the various districts through which the accused travelled—*Mahadeo v. K. E.*, 32 All 397, 7 A.L.J. 319.

If a defamatory letter is posted in Madras with a view to its being read in Tinnevely, the offence of defamation is triable either in Madras or in Tinnevely under sec 179 or 182—*Krishnamurthi v. Parasurama*, 44 M.L.J. 648, 24 Cr.L.J. 309. An offence under section 134 of the Companies Act, 1913 (default in filing balance sheet), even though the Company is situate outside Calcutta, can be tried by the Presidency Magistrate of Calcutta, because the office of the Registrar of joint stock companies with whom the balance sheet is to be filed is in Calcutta—*Debendra v. Registrar of Joint Stock Companies*, 45 Cal 486, 490.

Where in a case of uncertainty as to local area, the trying Magistrate was of opinion that the offence was triable in his Court, but the accused moved the District Magistrate, who relying upon the report of a S. D. O. held that the offence should be tried in another Court, and quashed the proceedings held before the trying Magistrate, held that the District Magistrate ought to have issued notice to the complainant and come to a proper finding of his own on the question of the local jurisdiction, instead of relying solely on the report of the S. D. O.; held further that the District Magistrate could not quash the proceedings but ought to have made a reference to the High Court—*Kasim Ali v. Md. Tafajjal*, 49 C.L.J. 62, 30 Cr.L.J. 401 (402).

Continuing offence :—If a person has several adulterous sexual intercourse with a woman at several places, the offence committed is not a continuing offence, nor does it consist of 'several acts done in different local areas'—*In re Shankar*, 53 Bom 69, 30 Cr.L.J. 54 (55).

566. Local area .—The words 'local area' mean a local area to which the Code applies, and not a local area in a foreign country or in a portion of the British Empire to which the Code has no application—*Bichitranand v. Bhagbut*, 16 Cal 667. Moreover, the expression includes Sessions Division, District or Sub-division, and cannot be restricted to mean the scene of an alleged occurrence only. Therefore this section applies where the place of occurrence is known but it is doubtful to which sessions division the place belongs—*Punardeo v. Ram Saran*, 25 Cal. 858.

183. An offence committed whilst the offender is

Offence committed on a journey. in the course of performing a journey or voyage may be inquired into or tried by a Court through or into the local limits of whose jurisdiction the offender, or the person against whom, or the thing in respect of which, the offence was committed, passed in the course of that journey or voyage.

567. Object and Scope—The object of this section is to remove doubts and inconveniences as regards the exact locality in which the offences alleged to have occurred in a journey or voyage had been actually committed or completed—*Q v Malony*, 1 M.H.C.R. 193.

But this section only applies where the offence is committed in British India and not in a foreign territory. The word 'journey' does not include a journey in a foreign territory but is confined in its meaning to a journey within the territories of British India. Where during the course of a journey through foreign territory and British India, the carrier to whom certain goods were entrusted committed criminal breach of trust in respect of those goods, and there was nothing to show that the offence took place during the journey in British India, the offence could not be tried by any Court in British India—*Nadar v. Emp.*, 24 Cr.L.J. 579 (Lah.).

568. Offence committed in a journey :—Under this section, if a person is accused before a Court of an offence committed during a journey or voyage, he may be tried by that Court if any part of that journey or voyage during which the offence was committed is within the local limits of the Court's jurisdiction—*Q v. Malony*, 1 M.H.C.R. 193. And the Courts competent to try the case of an offender in respect of an offence committed in a journey are the Courts through or into the local limits of whose jurisdiction the offender in the course of the journey passed at the time the offence was committed—*Aminulla v. P. M. Guha*, 1 C.L.J. 334. Thus, if a theft is committed from a running train, the offence may be said to have been committed during a journey, and it can be inquired into and tried by any Court having jurisdiction over any part of the country through which the train passed during the course of its journey, no matter in whose jurisdiction the offence was committed—*Lazarus v. Emp.*, 24 Cr.L.J. 253 (Lah). Where the offence is committed in the course of a railway journey, the accused can be tried at the place of destination, though the offence was actually committed outside the jurisdiction of that Court—*Emp. v. Moulabux*, 25 Cr.L.J. 439, A.I.R. 1925 Sind. 177.

But this section is applicable only when the journey or voyage is continuous and uninterrupted. Therefore, where an offence was alleged to have been committed by the accused in the course of a journey from Bombay to Howrah, but in fact took place between Bombay and Allahabad, at which place both the complainant and the accused broke the

journey and then proceeded separately by different trains to Howrah, it was held that the journey from Bombay to Howrah not being continuous, the Magistrate at Howrah had no jurisdiction to try the offence—*Q. v. Piran*, 21 W.R. 66. Where a guard of a train going from Coimbatore to Madras was found drunk and detained at Arkonam on the way, but he broke away, got into train and arrived at Madras, it was held that the journey must be deemed to have been broken at Arkonam, and the offence (of being drunk, under sec. 27 of the Railways Act) could not be tried at Madras—*Q. v. Malony*, 1 M.H.C.R. 193.

But any short stoppage in the course of a journey does not break the journey. Thus, where some articles were missed from a boat during a halt at S, in the course of a journey to C, it was held that the journey would not be deemed to have been broken by the halt at S, and that the offence of theft could be tried at C—*Q. v. Abdul Ali*, 25 W.R. 45.

569. Voyage on High Seas :—This section applies only to the trial of offences committed in British India. The words 'journey or voyage' do not include a voyage on the High Seas, or in a foreign territory, but are confined only to a voyage or journey within the territories of British India—*Bapu Dald v. Q.* 5 Mad 23.

But in *Q. E. v. Ismail*, Ratania 181, where the accused and the complainant sailed from Bombay to Honawar, and during the voyage the accused threw a box of the complainant into the sea, it was held that the Magistrate at Honawar, through whose jurisdiction the accused passed during the voyage, had jurisdiction to try the offence of mischief (although it was committed on the High Seas, about 9 miles off from the coast).

184. All offences against the provisions of any law for the time being in force relating

to Railways, Telegraph, the Post-Office or Arms and Ammunition may be inquired into or tried in a presidency town, whether the offence is stated to have been committed within such town or not :

Provided that the offender and all the witnesses necessary for his prosecution are to be found within such town.

185. Whenever any doubt arises as to the Court by which any offence should under the preceding provi-

185. (1) Whenever a question arises as to which of two or more Courts subordinate to the same High

High Court to decide, in case of doubt, district where inquiry or trial shall take place.

High Court to decide, in case of doubt, district where inquiry or trial shall take place.

sions of this chapter be inquired into or tried, the High Court, within the local limits of whose appellate criminal jurisdiction the offender actually is, may decide by which Court the offence shall be inquired into or tried.

Court ought to inquire into or try any offence, it shall be decided by that High Court.

(2) *Where two or more Courts not subordinate to the same High Court have taken cognizance of the same offence, the High Court within the local limits of whose appellate criminal jurisdiction the proceedings were first commenced may direct the trial of such offender to be held in any Court subordinate to it, and if it so decides, all other proceedings against such person in respect of such offence shall be discontinued. If such High Court, upon the matter having been brought to its notice, does not so decide, any other High Court within the local limits of whose appellate criminal jurisdiction such proceedings are pending may give a like direction, and upon its so doing all other such proceedings shall be discontinued.*

Change .—This section has been redrafted by sec 43 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act XVIII of 1923 For reasons see below.

570. Sub-section (1) —Nature of the doubt :—The decision of the High Court can be sought not only where the doubt arises as to whether one Court or another has jurisdiction, but also where the doubt is on the point whether the choice between two Courts, both of

which have jurisdiction to try the offence, should be decided on the ground of general convenience—*Charu Chandra v. Emp.*, 44 Cal. 595 F.B. (overruling *Rajani Benode v. All India Banking Co.*, 41 Cal. 305); *Emp. v. Chaichal*, 5 L.B.R. 17, 9 Cr.L.J. 581.

Again, the doubt must be as to the jurisdiction of the Court by which an offence is to be inquired into or tried, and not as to whether a particular Magistrate is competent to try or commit the accused for trial—*Emp. v. Glegg*, 1887 P.R. 13; *Emp. v. Tulak*, 3 All. 251. Where no doubt exists as to the jurisdiction of the Court, this section does not apply—*Gurdit Singh v. Crown*, 1917 P.R. 24, 18 Cr.L.J. 514, *Girdhar v. K. E.*, 21 A.L.J. 621, 24 Cr.L.J. 929.

571. Sub-section (2)—Power of High Court to transfer case from Court outside jurisdiction :—Where the nominee of a policy-holder, resident within the District Chittagong (Bengal) brought a charge of cheating in the Chittagong Magistrate's Court against the Insurance Company having its head office at Gujranwalla (Punjab) and a branch office at Chittagong, and the Insurance Company also brought a charge of cheating against the nominee in the Gujranwalla Magistrate's Court, both charges relating to the payment of the amount secured on the policy, it was held that the Calcutta High Court could properly make an order under sec. 185 to the effect that the offence should be inquired into and tried at Chittagong, and transfer the case from the Court of Gujranwalla to that of Chittagong—*Hiran Kumar v. Mangal Sein*, 17 C.W.N. 761, 14 Cr.L.J. 398. In another Calcutta case also it was held that this section was comprehensive enough to be applicable to a case instituted in a Court beyond the local limits of the Appellate Criminal Jurisdiction of the High Court where the offender actually was—*Charu Chandra v. Emp.*, 44 Cal. 595 (F.B.), 21 C.W.N. 320. *Contra*—The Madras High Court, however, was of opinion that the High Court had no power to direct the transfer of a case pending before a Magistrate not subject to its appellate jurisdiction—*Mahomed Ghouse v. Nathu*, 40 Mad. 835, 18 Cr.L.J. 148.

This subsection has been enacted to remove this conflict of opinion. By adopting the Madras view it practically disallows the High Court to transfer a case from a Court outside its jurisdiction, and lays down a new procedure in case of such contingency. "In view of the conflicting decisions in the Indian Law Reports, 44 Cal. 595, and Indian Law Reports, 40 Mad. 835, it is proposed to make it clear that one High Court has no power, whether by implication or otherwise, to transfer a case to itself from another High Court or *vice versa*, or to decide which of two other High Courts should try a particular case"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1921).

By adopting the simple procedure laid down in this subsection, the High Court will be relieved of the cumbrous procedure of a reference to the Governor-General for an order under sec. 527.

186. (1) When a Presidency Magistrate, a District Magistrate, a Subdivisional Magistrate or, if he is specially

Power to issue summons or warrant for offence committed beyond local jurisdiction.

empowered in this behalf by the Local Government, a Magistrate of

the first class, sees reason to believe that any person within the local limits of his jurisdiction has committed without such limits (whether within or without British India) an offence which cannot under the provisions of Sections 177 to 184 (both inclusive) or any other law for the time being in force, be inquired into or tried within such local limits, but is under some law for the time being in force triable in British India, such Magistrate may inquire into the offence as if it had been committed within such local limits, and compel such person in manner hereinbefore provided to appear

Magistrate's procedure on arrest.

before him, and send such person to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to inquire into or try such offence, or if such offence is bailable, take a bond with or without sureties, for his appearance before such Magistrate.

(2) When there are more Magistrates than one having such jurisdiction and the Magistrate acting under this section cannot satisfy himself as to the Magistrate to or before whom such person should be sent or bound to appear, the case shall be reported for the orders of the High Court.

"Empowered" —If a Magistrate who is not empowered under this section finds that he has no jurisdiction under this Chapter, he can decline jurisdiction—*Q. E. v. Ramji, Ratanlal* 849 But if a Magistrate not empowered under this section acts in good faith, his proceedings will not be set aside for want of jurisdiction, the defect being cured by sec 529.

572. Power of High Court :—The High Court, under sec. 29 of the Letters Patent, can direct a Magistrate to make a preliminary inquiry and to commit for trial to the Sessions, a case falling within this section. But where the circumstances of a case fall exactly within the terms of this section, the procedure must be governed by such special provision and not by the general provisions of the Letters Patent, except in extremely exceptional cases—*Oriental Govt. Security Life Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Masilamani*, 2 Weir 146 (147).

573. Issue of warrant from outside jurisdiction :—It is not necessary that the Magistrate issuing the warrant should be present within the local limits of his jurisdiction at the time of issuing it. Where a Magistrate of Ahmedabad District issued from a place in Kathiawar a warrant for the apprehension of a person who was in Ahmedabad for an offence committed in Kathiawar, it was held that the issuing of the warrant from Kathiawar by the Magistrate without being present in the Ahmedabad District in which he had jurisdiction, was not beyond his competency—*Reg v. Locha Kala*, 1 Bom. 340.

187. (1) If the person has been arrested under a warrant issued under Section 186

Procedure where
warrant issued by sub-
ordinate Magistrate.

by a Magistrate other than a Presidency Magistrate or District Magistrate, such Magistrate shall send

the person arrested to the District or Sub-divisional Magistrate to whom he is subordinate, unless the Magistrate having jurisdiction to inquire into or try such offence issues his warrant for the arrest of such person, in which case the person arrested shall be delivered to the police-officer executing such warrant or shall be sent to the Magistrate by whom such warrant was issued.

(2) If the offence which the person arrested is alleged or suspected to have committed is one which may be inquired into or tried by any Criminal Court in the same district other than that of the Magistrate acting under Section 186, such Magistrate shall send such person to such Court.

“Send the person to the District Magistrate” :—

Where a British Indian subject was arrested in a British district by a first class Magistrate for an offence committed in a Native State, and the Political Agent's certificate (required by sec. 188) was obtained, it was unnecessary to send the accused to the District Magistrate under this section, and the First Class Magistrate was competent to hold the preliminary inquiry himself—*Reg v. Kahandas, Ratanlal* 97.

188. When a Native Indian subject of Her Majesty

Liability of British
subjects for offences
committed out of Bri-
tish India.

commits an offence at any place without and beyond the limits of British India, or

when any British subject commits an offence in the territories of any Native Prince or Chief in India, or
when a servant of the Queen (whether a British

subject or not) commits an offence in the territories of any Native Prince or Chief in India,

he may be dealt with in respect of such offence as if it had been committed at any place within British India at which he may be found :

Provided that *notwithstanding anything in any of the preceding sections of this chapter*, Political Agent to certify fitness of in- no charge as to any such offence
 quiry into charge. shall be inquired into in British India unless the Political Agent, if there is one, for the territory in which the offence is alleged to have been committed, certifies that, in his opinion, the charge ought to be inquired into in British India, and, where there is no Political Agent, the sanction of the Local Government shall be required :

Provided, also, that any proceedings taken against any person under this section, which would be a bar to subsequent proceedings against such person for the same offence if such offence had been committed in British India, shall be a bar to further proceedings against him under the *Indian Extradition Act, 1903*, in respect of the same offence in any territory beyond the limits of British India.

Change :—The italicised words in the first proviso have been added by sec 44 of the Cr P C Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923.

In the second proviso, the words "Indian Extradition Act, 1903" have been substituted for the words "Foreign Jurisdiction and Extradition Act, 1879." This is consequential to the repeal of the old Act by the Act of 1903.

575. This section controls the preceding sections :—
 Sections 177 to 184 are controlled by the provisions of sec. 188, so that if the offence specified in those sections (177—184) happen to be committed outside British India, those sections would cease to apply, and the special provision of Sec 188 would come in. Thus, to give concrete illustrations, where the offence of criminal breach of trust was committed in a Native State by a British subject, then according to sec. 181, independently of sec 188, such offence could not have been tried by a British Court. But as secs. 177—184 are controlled by sec. 188, the latter section would apply, and would give jurisdiction to a British Court to try the offence, but the certificate of a Political Agent would be absolutely necessary—*Emp v. Tribhuan*, 5 S L.R. 266, 13 Cr L J 530. So also, where a person was kidnapped in a Native State and conveyed to

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181 would not apply but the case would fall under certificate of the Political Agent would be a preliminary of the offence by a British Court—*Crown v. Koochri*, v. *Emperor*, 41 All. 452, 17 A.L.J. 450, 20 Cr.L.J. If an Indian subject is found in a Native State in possession, he can be tried in British India for an offence under but the certificate of the Political Agent would be *Judge v Sundara*, 8 M.L.T. 54, 11 Cr.L.J. 306.

In this case, where the complainant in a place in British India found jewels to the accused, a Native Indian subject of the offence on commission, and the latter pledged the jewels in his possession, converted them to his use, it was held that the loss was the consequence, occurred to the complainant in his possession was sufficient under sec. 179 to give jurisdiction to the Court to try the offence, that secs 179—184 should be read with sec. 188, and that no certificate of the Political Agent is required—*Assistant Sessions Judge v Ramaswami*, 38 Mad 779, 11 Cr.L.J. 207. This view of the law is totally unaltered by the provisions of this chapter. Chapter "have now provided to make it clear that sec 188 controls the provisions of this chapter. The Select Committee observe "except the Madras High Court seem to make it doubtful if the subject to the provisions of sections 179—184, and unable to clear this up. We are not satisfied that this

was the intention of section 188, and in our opinion it is safer, when a man is tried in British India in respect of an offence committed in a Native State, to require the Political Agent's certificate in every case. The amendment which we propose will make this clear"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*

576. Illegal arrest.—See notes under sec. 177. A trial under this section will not be vitiated by reason of the fact that the accused has been brought into British India from a foreign territory under an illegal arrest—*Emp v. Vinayak Damodar Savarkar*, 35 Bom 225, 13 Bom. L.R. 296.

577. "Native Indian Subject"—This expression means only a Native Indian subject *de jure* and not *de facto*; a person who is not a Native Indian subject *de jure* but who owns some land in British territory and occasionally resides in British India does not thereby become an Indian subject, amenable to the jurisdiction of a British Indian Court for an offence committed by him in a foreign territory—*Fakir v. Emp.*, 1885 P.R. 1: on appeal from 1883 P.R. 22.

Foreigners :—This section does not apply to an offence committed by a foreigner outside British territory, though he may subsequently be found in British India—*Q. E v Abdul Latib*, 10 Bom 186. British Indian Courts have no jurisdiction to try a foreigner for offences committed and completed outside the British territory—*Ibrahim v. Empress*, 1894 P.R. 7. No foreign subject can be tried in British India for an offence committed outside British India—*Emp. v Baldewa*, 28 All. 372; *Q. E. v.*

Ranchhod, 2 Bom.L.R. 337; *Fakir v. Emp.*, 1883 P.R. 22; *Roda v. Empress*, 1889 P.R. 30. Therefore, where the subject of a Native State committed theft in that State, and was subsequently found in British India in possession of the stolen property, the British Indian Court had no jurisdiction to try him for the offence of theft (but had jurisdiction to try him for retaining stolen property, under sec. 411 I P. C.)—*Emp v. Baldewa*, 28 All 372, *Q. E. v. Abdul Latib*, 10 Bom 186

578. Offence.—The word "offence" in this section means ■ offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code. Thus, the act of giving false evidence before a foreign Court where the oath is administered not under the provisions of the law in force in British India but under the law of that State in relation to proceedings before the Court, is not punishable under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, and cannot be taken cognizance of by Magistrates of British Indian Courts. So also, the offence of lodging a false complaint in a foreign Court is not punishable under the Indian Penal Code, because it cannot be said that a false information was given to a 'public servant' as defined by the Indian Penal Code. Similarly, the act of instituting criminal proceedings and making false charges before a foreign Court does not constitute an offence under sec. 211 of the Indian Penal Code, because the criminal proceedings and false charges contemplated by that section mean proceedings and charges in British India where the Indian Penal Code is in force. Therefore, offences committed in relation to Courts and authorities outside British India do not constitute offences under the Indian Penal Code and cannot be tried by any Court in British India; and a certificate of the Political Agent ■ out of the question—*In re Rambharathi*, 47 Bom. 907, 25 Bom. L.R. 772, 25 Cr.L.J. 333

"May be found"—The word 'found' must be taken to mean not where a person ■ discovered, but where he is actually present, whether he comes of his own accord or is brought under arrest—*Emp. v. Maganlal*, 6 Bom. 622

579. Scope of proviso :—This proviso is of universal application and is not restricted to Native States only. If the offence is committed in a Native State, the certificate of the Political Agent is necessary; ■ the Native State has no Political Agent, the sanction of the Local Government is required. And if the offence is committed in a place other than a Native State, *e.g.* Spain, the sanction of the Local Government ■ likewise necessary—*Imp. v. Chellaram*, 6 S.L.R. 260.

The words "or where there is no Political Agent, the sanction of the Local Government shall be required" have been added to the Code in 1898. Under the previous Codes, when the offence was committed in ■ territory in which there was no Political Agent, no certificate (or sanction) was necessary, as for instance in Goa (*Q. E. v. Daya Bhima*, 13 Bom. 147) or Siam (*Q. E. v. Abdul Husen, Ratanlal* 773) or Cyprus (*Emp. v. Sarmukh*, ■ All 218)

580. Offences on High Seas—Section 188 does not apply to offences committed on the High Seas. The proviso to this section refers

to offences committed in a "territory" and not to offences committed on the High Seas. Therefore an offence committed by a Native Indian subject on the sea at a distance of five or six miles from the coast can be tried by a Magistrate of British India without the sanction of the Local Government—*Emp v Manuel Philip*, 41 Bom. 667; *Po Thaung v. K. E.*, 5 L.B.R. 221, 12 Cr.L.J. 198. The power to try offences committed on the High seas is conferred on Indian Courts by Stat. 23 and 24 Vic., C. 88 (within three miles from the Coast of British India) and Stat. 30 and 31 Vic., C. 124, section 11 (beyond the three miles limit). See *Reg. v. Kastya Rama*, 8 B.H.C.R. 63; *Q. E. v. Sk Abdul Rahaman*, 14 Bom. 227.

581. Certificate of a Political Agent.—The certificate of the Political Agent is the preliminary requisite for the institution of criminal proceedings in a Court of British India for an offence committed outside British India. Want of certificate will invalidate all subsequent proceedings—*Emp. v. Kalicharan*, 24 All. 256; *Q. E. v. Ram Sundar*, 19 All. 109, *Narain v Emp*, 41 All. 452, *Q. E. v. Baku*, 24 Bom. 287; *Sirdar v. Jethabhai*, 8 Bom. L.R. 513, *Q. E. v. Kathaperumal*, 13 Mad. 423, *Bapu v. Q.*, 5 Mad. 23, *Ram Charan v Crown*, 5 Lah. 416. The want of a certificate is not a mere irregularity which can be cured by section 532 by a subsequent production of the certificate—*Q. E. v. Kathaperumal*, 13 Mad. 423. Even where the Magistrate was himself the Political Agent, the defect would not be cured by any subsequent production of the certificate signed by him—*Q. E. v. Kathaperumal*, 13 Mad. 423; *Bapu Dald v. Q.*, 5 Mad. 23, *Q. E. v. Ram Sundar*, 19 All. 109.

An agreement between a Native State and the authorities of a British Indian district, conceding to the British Indian Courts the right to arrest and try British Indian subjects found gambling in the Native State, and *vice versa*, cannot take the place of the certificate or sanction required by this section—*Nandu v. Emp.*, 42 All. 89.

In a sessions case, the certificate of the Political Agent must be obtained before the commencement of the committal proceedings in the Magistrate's Court—*Ruhya Singh v. Crown*, 7 Lah. 468, 27 Cr.L.J. 942 (944), and the proceedings of a Magistrate committing an accused to the Sessions Court before a certificate under sec. 188 is obtained are void and illegal—*Buta Singh v Emp*, 7 Lah. 396, 27 P.L.R. 447, 27 Cr.L.J. 1168. Where a commitment was made without the certificate, the fact that the certificate existed at the date of the commitment, (i.e. it had been signed by the Political Agent before the date of commitment) but had not come into the hands of the Magistrate till after commitment) could not cure the defect—*Emp v Kalicharan*, 24 All. 256. In certain Punjab cases however, it has been held that the want of a certificate is not a fatal defect, but a mere irregularity cured by section 537, if no objection is taken at the trial and no prejudice to the accused has been caused in the defence—*Shamir Khan v Emp*, 1888 P.R. 35, *Roda v Emp*, 1889 P.R. 30; *Fateh Din v. Emperor*, 1902 P.R. 4-(F.B.) Where, however, the defect was observed and objected to by the Sessions Judge, the commit-

ment should be quashed—*Q. E. v. Mastana*, 1899 P.R. 11; *Ram Charan v. Crown*, 5 Lah. 416 (420), A.I.R. 1925 Lah. 185, 27 Cr.L.J. 218.

The proviso lays down that “no charge shall be inquired into in British India unless the Political Agent” etc., and therefore there is nothing illegal in obtaining the certificate or sanction after the complaint has been filed and the inquiry has begun or been completed as far as the framing of the charge—*Emp. v. Sakharani*, 12 Bom. L.R. 667, 11 Cr.L.J. 543, *In re Ram Bharathi*, 47 Bom. 907 (at p. 911). If the certificate is not produced at the time the proceedings have reached the stage of framing a charge, the Magistrate cannot proceed any further, but it is open to him to give the complainant a reasonable time within which to obtain the certificate, and then to continue the proceedings in the event of such certificate being obtained—*Allibhoy v. Emp.*, 19 S.L.R. 122, 25 Cr.L.J. 620, A.I.R. 1925 Sind. 88. In a Bombay case, it has even been held that where the certificate was received after the examination of some prosecution witnesses but before the commitment of the case to the Sessions, the commitment was good, and the irregularity, if any, was cured by sec. 537—*Emp. v. Mahamad Buksh*, 8 Bom. L.R. 507, 4 Cr.L.J. 49.

A document certifying that a case should be tried in British India, and purporting to be signed by the *Under-Secretary for the Political Agent*, is not sufficient, it is necessary that the *Agent* should himself certify. But a certified copy of an order signed by the Agent himself and directing that a certificate should issue under sec. 188 in the particular case sufficiently meets the requirements of this section. If the order is of a date prior to the commencement of committal proceedings in the Magistrate's Court, though the certified copy is produced in the Sessions Court, the commitment is not invalid—*Rukya Singh v. Emp.*, 7 Lah. 468, 27 P.L.R. 708, 27 Cr.L.J. 942.

Magistrate not confined to the charges in the certificate :—The Magistrate is not restricted to the charge mentioned in the certificate. The certificate granted by the Political Agent in respect of an offence will cover every charge which the facts declared in the certificate will suffice to sustain—*Krishna Nath v. Emp.*, 33 All. 514. An order or committal on a charge which is different from that mentioned in the certificate but based upon the same set of facts, will be perfectly valid—*In re Sessions Judge*, 11 M.L.T. 203, 11 Cr.L.J. 531.

Certificate cannot be revoked :—Where the District Magistrate as the Political Agent granted a certificate for the trial of the accused by a Magistrate in British India, it was held that the latter was legally seized of the case, and it was not competent to the Political Agent to recall the certificate and to hand over the accused to the Native State for his trial in that State—*In re Vazir Saheb*, 14 Bom. L.R. 377, 13 Cr.L.J. 537; *In re Hormusjee*, Ratanlal 253.

189. Whenever any such offence as is referred to

Power to direct copies of depositions and exhibits to be received in evidence.

in Section 188 is being inquired into or tried, the Local Government may, if it thinks fit, direct

that copies of depositions made or exhibits produced before the Political Agent or a judicial officer in or for the territory in which such offence is alleged to have been committed shall be received as evidence by the Court holding such inquiry or trial in any case in which such Court might issue a commission for taking evidence as to the matters to which such depositions or exhibits relate.

B.—Conditions requisite for Initiation of Proceedings.

190. (1) Except as hereinafter provided, any **Cognizance of offence by Magistrates.** Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Subdivisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence—

(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence;

(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police officer;

(c) upon information received from any person other than a police-officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.

(2) The Local Government, or the District Magistrate subject to the general or special orders of the Local Government, may empower any Magistrate to take cognizance under subsection (1), clause (a) or clause (b), of offences for which he may try or commit for trial.

(3) The Local Government may empower any Magistrate of the first or second class to take cognizance under sub-section (1), clause (c), of offences for which he may try or commit for trial.

582. **Change :—**The words in clause (b) have been substituted for the words "upon a police report of such facts," by section 45 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. In *K E. v. Sada*, 26 Bom. 150, *Bhairab v Emp*, 46 Cal. 807 (817, 818), *In re Chidambaram*, 32 Mad 3, *Ram Lal v Emp*, 1 P.L.T. 73, *Harihar v. K. E.*, 23 C.W.N. 481, *Emp. v. Ghulam Husain*, 6 Lah.L.J. 606, 25 Cr.L.J. 1361, and *Q E. v Nga Shwe*, 1 L.B.R. 18 it was held that the term *police report* in this clause was used in a technical sense meaning

ment should be quashed—*Q. E. v. Mastana*, 1899 P.R. 11; *Ram Charan v. Crown*, 5 Lah 416 (420), A.I.R. 1925 Lah. 185, 27 Cr.L.J. 218

The proviso lays down that "no charge shall be inquired into in British India unless the Political Agent" etc., and therefore there is nothing illegal in obtaining the certificate or sanction after the complaint has been filed and the inquiry has begun or been completed as far as the framing of the charge—*Emp v. Sakharani*, 12 Bom. L.R. 667, 11 Cr.L.J. 543, *In re Ram Bharathi*, 47 Bom 907 (at p 911) If the certificate is not produced at the time the proceedings have reached the stage of framing a charge, the Magistrate cannot proceed any further, but it is open to him to give the complainant a reasonable time within which to obtain the certificate, and then to continue the proceedings in the event of such certificate being obtained—*Allubhoy v. Emp*, 19 S.L.R. 122, 25 Cr.L.J. 620, A.I.R. 1925 Sind 88 In a Bombay case, it has even been held that where the certificate was received after the examination of some prosecution witnesses but before the commitment of the case to the Sessions, the commitment was good, and the irregularity, if any, was cured by sec. 537—*Emp v. Mahamad Buksh*, 8 Bom L.R. 507, 4 Cr.L.J. 49.

A document certifying that a case should be tried in British India, and purporting to be signed by the *Under-Secretary for the Political Agent*, is not sufficient, it is necessary that the *Agent* should himself certify. But a certified copy of an order signed by the Agent himself and directing that a certificate should issue under sec. 188 in the particular case sufficiently meets the requirements of this section. If the order is of a date prior to the commencement of committal proceedings in the Magistrate's Court, though the certified copy is produced in the Sessions Court, the commitment is not invalid—*Rukya Singh v. Emp.*, 7 Lah 468, 27 P.L.R. 708, 27 Cr.L.J. 842.

Magistrate not confined to the charges in the certificate :—The Magistrate is not restricted to the charge mentioned in the certificate. The certificate granted by the Political Agent in respect of an offence will cover every charge which the facts declared in the certificate will suffice to sustain—*Krishna Nath v. Emp*, 33 All. 514 An order or committal on a charge which is different from that mentioned in the certificate but based upon the same set of facts, will be perfectly valid—*In re Sessions Judge*, 8 M.L.T. 203, 11 Cr.L.J. 531.

Certificate cannot be revoked :—Where the District Magistrate as the Political Agent granted a certificate for the trial of the accused by a Magistrate in British India, it was held that the latter was legally seized of the case, and it was not competent to the Political Agent to recall the certificate and to hand over the accused to the Native State for his trial in that State—*In re Vazir Saheb*, 14 Bom. L.R. 377, 13 Cr.L.J. 537; *In re Hormusjee, Ratanlal* 253.

189. Whenever any such offence as is referred to

Power to direct copies of depositions and exhibits to be received in evidence.

in Section 188 is being inquired into or tried, the Local Government may, if it thinks fit, direct

that copies of depositions made or exhibits produced before the Political Agent or a judicial officer in or for the territory in which such offence is alleged to have been committed shall be received as evidence by the Court holding such inquiry or trial in any case in which such Court might issue a commission for taking evidence as to the matters to which such depositions or exhibits relate.

B.—Conditions requisite for Initiation of Proceedings.

190. (1) Except as hereinafter provided, any ^{Cognizance of offence by Magistrates.} Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Subdivisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence—

(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence;

(b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police officer;

(c) upon information received from any person other than a police-officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.

(2) The Local Government, or the District Magistrate subject to the general or special orders of the Local Government, may empower any Magistrate to take cognizance under subsection (1), clause (a) or clause (b), of offences for which he may try or commit for trial.

(3) The Local Government may empower any Magistrate of the first or second class to take cognizance under sub-section (1), clause (c), of offences for which he may try or commit for trial.

582. Change :—The words in clause (b) have been substituted for the words "upon a police report of such facts," by section 45 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. In *K. E. v. Sada*, 26 Bom. 150, *Bhairab v. Emp.*, 46 Cal. 807 (817, 818), *In re Chidambaram*, 32 Mad. 3, *Ram Lal v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 73, *Harihar v. K. E.*, 23 C.W.N. 481, *Emp. v. Ghulam Husain*, 6 Lah L.J. 606, 25 Cr.L.J. 1361, and *Q. E. v. Nga Shwe*, 1 L.B.R. 18 it was held that the term *police report* in this clause was used in a technical sense as meaning

the report of the police in a *cognizable* case only, and that since a police officer had no power to make a report in a non-cognizable case, a police report in such a case was to be treated as a complaint under clause (a) and the procedure of sec. 200 was to be followed by the Magistrate. Under the present amendment, the wording of clause (b) is quite general, and would empower a Magistrate to take cognizance of a non-cognizable offence upon a report in writing by a police-officer—*Emp. v. Shivaswami*, 51 Bom. 498, 29 Bom. L.R. 742, 28 Cr.L.J. 939; *Public Prosecutor v. Ratnavelu*, 49 Mad 525, 27 Cr.L.J. 1031 (F.B.) (overruling *In re Perumal*, 22 L.W. 209, 26 Cr.L.J. 1550). The present amendment lays down that the report of a police officer in a non-cognizable case is a report under clause (b) all the same, and not a complaint under clause (a), and the Magistrate will not have to follow the procedure of Chapter XVI, e.g. to examine the complainant (i.e. the police-officer) on oath. See *Bholanath v. Emp.*, 28 C.W.N. 490, 26 Cr.L.J. 68, *Public Prosecutor v. Ratnavelu*, (supra); *Shankar Lal v. Emp.*, 9 Lah. 280, 28 Cr.L.J. 821 (822); *Prag Datt v. Emp.*, 51 All 382, 27 A.L.J. 68.

Moreover, before the present amendment, the words 'police report' were used in a technical sense to mean a police report under section 170 or 173 i.e., a report made *after investigation*, and not an information sent by the Police to the Magistrate before making any investigation—*Ahmed Khan v. Emp.*, 5 S.L.R. 1, 12 Cr.L.J. 92; *Emp. v. Khusaldas*, 6 S.L.R. 82, 13 Cr.L.J. 752, *In re Nagendra Nath*, 51 Cal 402 (413); *King Emp. v. Sada*, 26 Bom. 150 (157). Under the present amendment the words have been changed altogether and replaced by the non-technical words "report made by any police officer" which would certainly include a report or information given *before* investigation. Even before the present amendment, it was held in a Sind case that the Police report referred to in this section was not confined to a report under sec. 173 but was wide enough to cover reports under other sections of the Chapter (e.g., reports under secs. 157 and 168), nor was it confined to reports under Ch. XIV alone—*Mehrab v. Crown*, 17 S.L.R. 150 (dissenting from 5 S.L.R. 1).

583. Magistrates empowered :—Under this section a third class Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence under clauses (a) and (b) only i.e. upon a complaint or a police report—*K. E. v. Sada*, 26 Bom. 150.

The District Magistrate of the Civil and Military Station of Bangalore has jurisdiction to take cognizance of and try offences committed by European British subjects in accordance with the provisions of this Code—*In re Lawrance*, 34 Mad 346 (F.B.).

If a Magistrate not empowered to take cognizance under cl. (a) or (b) does so under a *bona fide* mistake, his proceedings will not be set aside merely on the ground of his not being empowered—Sec. 529 (e). But the proceedings under clause (c) of a Magistrate not empowered to take cognizance under that clause are void—sec. 530 (k).

If a Magistrate not empowered to take cognizance of offences upon complaint (e.g. a second class Magistrate who is not competent to take

cognizance of a murder case) nevertheless takes cognizance of the case, sends the complaint to the police for inquiry, and on receiving the police report, dismisses the complaint as false and prosecutes the complainant under sec. 211 I. P. Code for making a false complaint, *held* that the action of the Magistrate in taking cognizance of the offence may be cured by sec. 529 (e), but the further action of the Magistrate in prosecuting the complainant for making a false complaint cannot be validated by sec. 529 (e)—*Bengali Gope v. K. E.*, 5 Pat. 447, 7 P.L.T. 335, 27 Cr.L.J. 704.

The District Magistrate cannot authorize a second class Magistrate to take cognizance of complaints of offences which the second class Magistrate is not competent to try (e.g. a case of murder). Section 37 and Schedule IV of this Code must be read with sec. 190, and there is nothing in these provisions to extend the power which the District Magistrate can confer—*Bengali Gope v. K. E.*, (supra)

A Magistrate duly empowered under this section to take cognizance of an offence cannot refuse to take cognizance on the ground that the gravity of the offence requires severer punishment than he can inflict—*Q. E. v. Gema, Ratanlal* 375

584. Offence :—A Magistrate authorised under this section to take cognizance of an offence upon complaint, can take cognizance of an offence under sec. 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act, even in the absence of a special authorisation in that behalf, because the very definition of the word 'offence' in section 4 clause (o) includes any act in respect of which a complaint may be made under section 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act—*Emp. v. Visvanatha*, 44 Bom. 42, 21 Bom. L.R 1084, 21 Cr.L.J. 95; *Deenadayalu v. Ratna*, 50 Mad. 841, 52 M.L.J. 251, 28 Cr.L.J. 301. See also *Budhan v. Issur*, 34 Cal. 926 (927).

585. "Taking cognizance" :—The expression "to take cognizance" has not been defined in the Code, and it is difficult to ascertain at what precise stage of the case cognizance is said to be taken. When a Magistrate in charge, on receipt of a police report, makes over the case to another Magistrate for inquiry, and the latter after taking evidence summons the accused, it is the latter Magistrate and not the former who is said to have taken cognizance of the offence—*Ananta Ram v. Sk. Altab*, 17 C.W.N. 795, 14 Cr.L.J. 425. A Magistrate cannot be said to have taken cognizance of a case under section 107 until he issues notice to the person charged to show cause why he should not be proceeded against under that section. Therefore, where the Police reported the matter to the District Magistrate who ordered the case to be transferred to the file of the Headquarters Deputy Magistrate, who then issued notice to the accused, *held* that it was the latter Magistrate and not the District Magistrate who took cognizance of the case—*Konda Reddy v. K. M.*, 41 Mad. 246 (249)

Taking cognizance does not involve any formal action or indeed action of any kind but occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to a suspected commission of an offence. Where a police report of a case was submitted to the Subdivisional Officer on the 24th April 1909, a

the case was afterwards withdrawn by the District Magistrate to his own file on the 20th January 1910, held that the District Magistrate took cognizance of the case on the 20th January 1910—*Sourindra v. Emp.*, 37 Cal. 412.

Where an officer who is also a Magistrate holds a departmental inquiry and charges are made before him, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance—*Q. E. v. Karigowda*, 19 Bom. 51.

In cases where sanction or certificate is necessary (i.e., cases under secs 132, 188, 197) the Magistrate is not competent to take cognizance upon a mere complaint unaccompanied by the requisite sanction or certificate—*Durga Das v. Q. E.*, 27 Cal. 820. See also *Lalit Chandra v. Emp.*, 39 Cal. 119, 13 Cr L.J. 433.

A Magistrate is not debarred from taking cognizance of an offence simply because another Magistrate has already taken cognizance of the same and is in seisin of the case. But since the accused person cannot be tried twice for the same offence, the proper course is for the one Magistrate to transfer his case to the other, and thus a multiplicity of trials can be avoided—*Hari Satya v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 482, 24 Cr L.J. 710, 37 C.L.J. 327.

The three alternatives upon which a Magistrate may take proceedings are not mutually exclusive. It is not correct to say that a Magistrate while taking cognizance of an offence should have done it under some one of the alternatives to the exclusion of the others—*Bharat Kishore v. Judhistr*, 10 P.L.T. 779 (F.B.), 30 Cr L.J. 1056 (1058).

586. Clause (a)—Cognizance upon complaint:—For 'complaint' see sec 4 (h) and notes thereunder.

"Complaint of facts which constitute offence":—Where a complaint presented to the Magistrate contains the offences with which the accused is charged, the fact that it was defective in not stating all the facts necessary to constitute the offence charged is immaterial—*Sardar Dyal Singh v. Q. E.*, 1891 P.R. ■

Who can make a complaint:—A complaint of an offence may be made by any person acquainted with the facts of the case; it need not necessarily be made by the aggrieved party, except in those cases (e.g. under secs. 198; 199) where it is so restricted by the Code—*Farzand Ali v. Hanuman*, 18 All. 465; *In re Ganesh Narain*, 13 Bom. 600; *Dedar Bar v. Shyamapada*, 41 Cal. 1013; *Basirulla v. Asadulla*, 33 C.W.N. 576 (577); *Parshadi v. Balpi*, 14 Cr L.J. 409 (Oudh).

It is not necessary that the person lodging the complaint must have personal knowledge of the facts constituting the offence—*Sukumar v. Mofizuddin*, 25 C.W.N. 357; *Suresh v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 351, 21 Cr L.J. 346; *In re Ganesh*, 13 Bom. 600; *Imp v. Shewak Ram*, 7 S.L.R. 77. 15 Cr.L.J. 369.

Magistrate bound to take cognizance upon complaint:—It cannot be held that the words 'may take cognizance of an offence' mean that a Magistrate is not bound to take cognizance of an offence on receiving a complaint of facts constituting an offence—*Ram Sarap v. K. E.*, 4 O.C.

127. The use of the term "may . . . offence" does not make it optional with a Magistrate to hear a complaint, but refers to the action of the Magistrate in taking cognizance of the offence in either of the specified courses in which the facts constituting the offence may be brought to his notice. He is bound to examine the complainant and can then either issue summons to the accused, or order an inquiry under sec. 202 or dismiss the complaint under sec. 203—*Umer Ali v. Safer Ali*, 13 Cal. 334. He is bound, when the circumstances giving him jurisdiction exist, to receive the complaint and deal with it according to law—*In re Jankidas*, 12 Bom. 161; and has no option to refer it to the police under sec. 156 (3) without taking cognizance of it—*In re Arula*, 10 M.L.T. 120, 12 Cr.L.J. 463. When a complaint is made to a Magistrate of a petty offence ordinarily within the cognizance of heads of villages, the Magistrate is bound to take cognizance of it, to proceed under sec. 200 and to dispose of the complaint according to law. The mere fact that the complaint is also cognizable by the head of the village does not entitle the Magistrate to decline to exercise jurisdiction and to direct the complainant to seek redress from the head of the village—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 237, 7 M.H.C.R. App 31.

Instances where Magistrate acts under Cl (a) and not Cl (c):—Where a complaint is made before a Magistrate, he takes cognizance of the case under clause (a) and not under clause (c), even though he may record on the complaint that he acts under clause (c)—*Meshidi v Rangoon Municipal Committee*, 4 L.B.R. 300, *Emp v Rasid*, 9 Bom. L.R. 212, 5 Cr.L.J. 202; *Girdhari Lal v Emp.*, 1911 P.R. 11; *Jhuna Lal v K. E.*, 2 P.L.J. 657.

Where a complainant charged certain persons with committing a certain offence, and the examination of the complainant revealed an offence different from that mentioned in the complaint, or revealed an additional offence, the Magistrate was competent to take cognizance of the latter offence, and in taking cognizance thereof he acted under clause (a) and not under clause (c), so that sec. 191 did not apply—*Jagat Chandra v. Q. E.*, 26 Cal. 786 (789), *Abdul Rahman v. K. E.*, 4 Bur.L.J. 213, 27 Cr.L.J. 669; on appeal, *Abdul Rahman v Emp.*, 5 Rang 53 (P.C.), 31 C.W.N. 271, 28 Cr.L.J. 259, 52 M.L.J. 585, 25 A.L.J. 117.

Similarly, where the complainant charged several persons with having committed an offence, but the Magistrate after examination of the complainant found out that other persons, not mentioned in the complaint, were concerned in the offence, he was competent to take cognizance in respect of the latter persons also, and in so doing he acted under clause (a) and not under clause (c), so that sec 191 was not applicable to the case—*Jagat Chandra v. Q. E.*, 26 Cal. 786 (789), *Qutba v Emp.*, 1904 P.R. 32; *Nga Paing v. Q. E.*, U.B.R. (1897—1901) 56, *Emp v Imankhan*, 14 Bom.L.R. 141; *Dedar Bax v. Shyamapada*, 41 Cal 1013; *Charu Chandra v. Narendra*, 4 C.W.N. 367, *Sri Kishan v Debt Dayal*, 2 O.W.N. 823, 26 Cr.L.J. 1619.

587. Clause (b)—Police Report—The 'police report' mentioned in this section is not limited to a report mentioned in Chap. XIV.

Where on an information received by post, a Magistrate sent the case to the police for inquiry and report, and on receiving the report took cognizance of the case, it was held that the action taken by him was based on the police report—*Sarfaraz Khan v. K. E.*, 11 A.L.J. 331, 14 Cr.L.J. 218

A police report in a *non-cognizable* case falls within this clause, and there is no authority in the Code for examining a police-officer submitting a police report under this section, as if he were a complainant—*Nga Saw v. K. E.*, 1914 U.B.R. 19, 16 Cr.L.J. 97; *Sk. Abdul Ali v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 446, 59 I.C. 41. See Note 582 above under heading "Change."

A report submitted by a Police officer under sec. 24 of the Police Act falls under this clause—*Sk. Abdul Ali v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 446, 59 I.C. 41. The report of an Excise Sub-Inspector is a Police report for the purposes of this section—*Radhika v. Hamid Ali*, 54 Cal. 371, 28 Cr.L.J. 316.

A Police *challan* is a police report of facts constituting an offence under clause (b) and a Magistrate can take cognizance upon it—*Emp. v. Sundar*, 1901 P.R. 8; *Emp. v. Chet Singh*, 1900 P.R. 22. But a mere suggestion by the police-officer is not a police report, and where a Magistrate issued summons to the accused on the suggestion of a police-officer that the accused injured the crops of the people of the village, it was held that the Magistrate acted illegally, as none of the conditions required by this section had been fulfilled—*Samun v. Emp.*, 1894 P.R. 24.

The police report must state the facts which constitute the offence, that is, the concrete facts which constitute the alleged offence. Where no facts were stated, the mere assertions made by the police that certain offences had been committed, could not be regarded as compliance with the letter or the spirit of the law—*In re Nagendra*, 51 Cal. 402 (414), A I R. 1924 Cal. 476.

So also, a Magistrate cannot take cognizance of an offence on the mere information of a police-officer who has no knowledge of the facts and whom it is impracticable to examine—*Q. E. v. Nga Shwe*, 1 L.B.R. 18.

A prosecution is not legally instituted under section 190 (b) when the police report is defective and does not fulfil all the requirements of sec. 173 (e.g. when it does not set forth the nature of the information) and the first information report under sec. 154 is equally defective in this respect—*Lee v. Adhikari*, 37 Cal. 49. In *Feroja v. Amiruddin*, 16 C.W.N. 1049 it has been remarked that if the police report be defective it is open to the Magistrate to treat it as a complaint, and in that case it will be necessary for him to call upon the Police-officer to appear and substantiate that complaint upon oath.

Magistrate not bound to take cognizance upon police report:—A Magistrate is entitled to refuse to initiate proceedings on the report of the Police in the absence of a complaint—*Bhiku v. K. E.*, 1 A.L.J. 609. He has a discretion either to take cognizance of the offence or to proceed under sec. 203, or to take no further steps—*Anon.*, 2 Weir 119

Instances where Magistrate acts under Clause (b) and not under Clause (c):—Where L. was charged by the police before the Magistrate, and the Magistrate after examining the investigating officer found that another person S should be joined as an accused person, and issued process against him, it was held that the Magistrate took cognizance of S's offence under clause (b) and not under clause (c), and was not bound to act under sec. 191—*Sarwa v. Emp*, 9 N.L.R. 65. The principle is that when a Magistrate takes cognizance under clause (b) on a police report, he takes cognizance of the offence and not merely of the particular person charged in the report as the offender. He can therefore issue process against other persons also who appear to him, on the basis of the report and other materials placed before him when he has taken cognizance of the case, to be concerned in the commission of the offence. When he does so, it is not a case of taking cognizance against such persons under clause (c) of this section.—*Mehrab v. Crown*, 17 S.L.R. 150 (F.B.) overruling 5 S.L.R. 1. Similarly, where the Magistrate issued warrants against persons not named in the complaint or in the first information, but named in a report subsequently made by the police after investigation, it was held that the Magistrate took cognizance of the case under clause (b) and not under clause (c) of this section—*Rajani Kunto v. Emp*, 8 C.W.N. 864. Where a Magistrate while acquitting a certain person sent up by the Police, stated that another person had in his opinion committed the offence, and that the Police should take action against that person, and that person was accordingly sent up and convicted, it was held that the Magistrate acted under clause (b) and not clause (c), and sec. 191 was not applicable—*Hakim Ally v. K. E.*, 4 L.B.R. 137, 7 Cr.L.J. 414. Where an accused person charged by the Police was convicted and the case came up in appeal before a Subdivisional Magistrate, the latter could try the offender himself under sec. 423 (1) (b) if the offence was one within his ordinary jurisdiction; and in so doing the Sub-divisional Magistrate took cognizance of the case not under clause (c) but under clause (b), as he had before him the police charge-sheet stating all the facts—*Emp v. Manikka*, 30 Mad. 228. Where after the close of a trial the Magistrate ordered the police to send up a charge-sheet in respect of a witness for the prosecution, which the Police did, and then the Magistrate tried that person and convicted him, held that the Magistrate took cognizance of the case under clause (b) and not under clause (c), and section 191 did not therefore apply to the case—*Emp. v. Gundoo*, 23 Bom L.R. 842, 22 Cr L.J. 603.

588. Clause (c):—This clause applies only to cases where the private individual who is injured or aggrieved or some one on his part does not come forward to make a formal complaint. It is a provision of law for enabling a public official to take care that justice may be vindicated notwithstanding that the persons individually aggrieved are unwilling or unable to prosecute—*Q. v. Surendra*, 13 W R 27.

Where upon the Sub-Registrar refusing to register a deed, the petitioner appealed to the District Registrar (who was also the District Magistrate) under the provisions of the Registration Act, and the District Registrar finding that the document was a forgery ordered the prosecution of

the petitioner for an offence under sec. 471 I. P. C., held that although the District Registrar, not being a Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court, could not direct a prosecution under sec. 476 of the Cr. P. Code, still his action must be deemed as one under clause (c) of section 190, Cr. P. Code, because in his capacity as District Magistrate he was competent to take cognizance of the offence under this clause, and to transfer the case to a subordinate Magistrate under sec. 191—*Chela Mahto v. K. E.*, 2 Pat. 459, 4 P.L.T. 727, 24 Cr.L.J. 792.

A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence under this clause must comply with the provisions of law laid down in section 191—*Sk. Abdul Ali v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 446, 59 I.C. 41.

This clause has no application when proceedings are instituted against any person under chapter VIII, by a Magistrate upon information, or upon personal knowledge or suspicion—*In re Mithu Khan*, 27 All. 172, *Mahomedally v. Emp.*, 20 S.L.R. 291, 27 Cr.L.J. 1280.

Magistrate should state grounds:—It is most desirable that a Magistrate taking cognizance under clause (c) should record grounds on which he is taking action, and this not only in fairness to the accused who is entitled to know for what reason he is being arrested, but also for his own protection. His omission, however, to do so, does not necessarily vitiate the proceedings where the accused has not in any way been prejudiced—*Maung Nyi v. Emp.*, 4 Bur. L.J. 211, 27 Cr.L.J. 413.

589. Information:—The expression "information received from any person other than a Police officer" means only such information as does not constitute a complaint or a Police report—*Meshidi v. Rangoon Municipal Committee*, 4 L.B.R. 300.

A letter written to the District Magistrate conveying information of an offence and asking for action to be taken can be treated as information under this clause for taking action—*Chhotey Maharaj v. K. E.*, 28 O.C. 33, A.L.R. 1925 Oudh 144, 25 Cr.L.J. 1147.

The information need not contain all the allegations necessary to be proved to establish the offence; it is sufficient if enough is alleged to justify the Magistrate in dealing judicially with the matter. What allegations or how much of the information should be recorded by the Magistrate in such a case, it is difficult to lay down in general terms; if the recorded information is sufficient to justify the Magistrate in considering that a *prima facie* case has been made out, he can take cognizance under this clause—*Rash Behary v. Emp.*, 35 Cal. 1076.

Where the Deputy Commissioner, as a Collector and as such representing the Court of Wards, received information of an offence, he as Magistrate was not competent to act on the information and to issue warrants, as by such action he was practically making himself a Judge in his own case—*Thakur Persad v. Emp.*, 10 C.W.N. 775, *Lakhi Narayan v. Emp.*, 37 Cal. 221 (*per Stephen J.*) But this view does not seem to be correct,

for sec. 191 provides a sufficient safeguard and gives the accused a right to have the case transferred to another Magistrate. On this principle the Madras High Court has held that there can be no objection to a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence upon information received by him in another capacity e.g. as President of the District Board—*Sundarasana v. K. E.*, 43 Mad. 709 (dissenting from 10 C.W.N. 775); *Lakhi Narayan v. Emp.*, 37 Cal. 221 (*per Carnduf J.* dissenting from 10 C.W.N. 775).

The following are held to be 'information' within the meaning of this section:—(a) An anonymous communication—*In re Hari Narain*, 3 C.W.N. 65, *Bhairon v. Emp.*, 51 All. 377, 30 Cr.L.J. 62 (63); (b) communication through post—*Anon.*, 2 Weir 149, *Karim Buksh v. Adil Khan*, 1899 A.W.N. 201; (c) information received from another Magistrate—*Makhan v. Jepson*, 1914 P.L.R. 65, 15 Cr.L.J. 261; 3 C.W.N. cclxii.

Information must be recorded.—A Magistrate taking cognizance upon information under this clause should at least record the information on which he acted, though he may not be obliged to disclose the sources of the information—*Thakur Persad v. Emp.*, 10 C.W.N. 775; *Rash Behary v. Emp.*, 35 Cal. 1076, 12 C.W.N. 1075, but his omission to do so does not necessarily vitiate the proceedings—*Mg Nyi Bu v. K. E.*, 4 Bur. L.J. 211, A I R 1926 Rang 46, 27 Cr.L.J. 413.

Information received from witness.—A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence against a person on evidence given on behalf of another accused person, proceeds under clause (c) of this section—*Raghab v. Emp.*, 3 C.W.N. cclxxix. So also, a Magistrate who takes cognizance of an offence against a witness in a case pending before him, upon the facts disclosed by the evidence of another witness, does so under clause (c) of the present section and not under section 351—*Khudi Ram v. Emp.*, 1 C.W.N. 105. *Contra*—*Yasin Khan v. Emp.*, 5 N.L.R. 113 and *Imp v. Lalu*, 4 S.L.R. 258, 12 Cr.L.J. 399, in which under such circumstances it was held that the Magistrate took cognizance against the new accused under sec. 351 and not under clause (c) of sec. 190. If, however, the Magistrate has already taken cognizance upon a complaint of an offence against some person, and after examination of some witnesses the offences of other persons are revealed, the Magistrate proceeding against the latter does so under clause (a), (since there is a complaint) and not under clause (c)—*Dedar Bux v. Shyamapada*, 41 Cal 1013.

590. Knowledge.—Knowledge means actual personal knowledge of the Magistrate or knowledge based upon evidence legally placed before him—*Q. E. v. Nga Shwe*, 1 L.B.R. 17

Where a Magistrate issued an order under sec. 144 to stop work in a quarry, and took action for the disobedience of that order, and convicted the accused, it was held that the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence on his own knowledge of the facts under this clause—*Crown v. Mul Raj*, 1905 P.R. 36, 2 Cr.L.J. 365. So also, where the accused in disobedience of an order given by a Cantonment Magistrate tied his buffaloes in a certain place, and the Magistrate finding the place filthy in consequence,

sent for the accused and fined him, it was held that the Magistrate took cognizance from his own knowledge under this clause and was debarred from trying the case by virtue of sec. 191—*K. E. v. Abdul Rahim*, 1905 P.R. 8.

A Magistrate who takes part in the initiation of proceedings is not incompetent to take cognizance of the offence, because this clause empowers the Magistrate to take cognizance upon his own 'knowledge', but of course the Magistrate will be debarred under section 556 from trying the case—*Oziullah v. Beni Madhab*, 50 Cal. 135.

591. Suspicion :—Where a Magistrate has a mere suspicion that an offence has been committed, he should not, as a matter of sound judicial discretion, take cognizance of it until some person aggrieved has complained (clause a) or until he has before him a police report (clause b) on the subject based on investigation directed to the offence—*Q. E. v. Sham Lal*, 14 Cal 707.

592. Miscellaneous :—

No Limitation—The general law of limitation is chiefly intended for civil matters and does not apply to the taking cognizance of offences—*Q. E. v. Nageshapa*, 20 Bom. 543.

Complaint in respect of one offence—Cognizance in respect of another—Where a complaint charges certain persons with committing a certain offence, and the examination of the complainant reveals a different offence from that mentioned in the complaint, or reveals an additional offence, the Magistrate is competent to take cognizance of the latter offence—*Jagat Chandra v. Q. E.*, 26 Cal 786 (789). The Magistrate is not bound to adhere to any particular section of the law which may be mentioned by the complainant in his complaint, but may apply any section which he thinks applicable to the case, so long as the parties are not misled and the proper procedure is observed—*Kalidass v. Mohendro*, 12 W.R. 40 (41).

Complaint against some persons, cognizance against others :—Where a complaint is made against some persons and the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence, it is the duty of the Magistrate to deal with the evidence brought before him, and to see that justice is done in regard to any other person who might be proved by the evidence to be concerned in the offence—*Charu Chandra v. Norendra*, 4 C.W.N. xiv. When once a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence, he is competent to take proceedings against all who from the evidence appear to be offenders. His power is not limited only with regard to the persons mentioned in the complaint or Police report—*Bishen Dayal v. Chedi Khan*, 4 C.W.N. 560; *Girdhari Lal v. K. E.*, 21 C.W.N. 950; *Nga Chan v. K. E.*, 1 Bur. L.J. 183; *Mehrab v. Emp.*, 17 S.L.R. 150 (F.B.). See also 26 Cal 786; 1904 P.R. 32; 14 Bom L.R. 141; 41 Cal. 1013; and 4 C.W.N. 367 cited in Note 586 under clause (a); also 9 N.L.R. 65; and 8 C.W.N. 864 cited in Note 587 under clause (b).

191. When a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence under sub-section (1), clause (c), of the preceding section, the accused shall, before any evidence is taken, be informed that he is entitled to have the case tried by another Court, and if the accused, or any of the accused if there be more than one, objects to being tried by such Magistrate, the case shall, instead of being tried by such Magistrate, be committed to the Court of Session or transferred to another Magistrate.

593. Principle :—The principle of this section is that no man ought to be a Judge in his own case. If a Magistrate proceeds against a person upon his own personal knowledge, he is interested in the prosecution and thereby he would practically make himself a Judge in his own case and his pre-conceived opinion as to the guilt of the accused person is likely to bias his mind against that person.

When a Magistrate takes, cognizance *suo motu* either on his own knowledge or suspicion, or upon information received from some person who will not take the responsibility of setting the law in motion, the law, partly out of regard for the susceptibilities of the accused, and partly to inspire confidence in the administration of justice, allows the accused the right to claim to be tried before another Magistrate—*Imp. v. Shewak Ram*, 7 S L R. 77, 15 Cr L J 369 (370).

A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence under clause (c) of section 190, is bound to comply with the provisions of this section—*Sh. Abdul Ali v. Emp.*, 1 P L T. 446. Where on a report being made by a Cantonment official in respect of an offence under sec 92 of the Cantonment Code, the Cantonment Magistrate took cognizance of the case and convicted the accused, *held* that the trial and conviction were illegal as the Magistrate should have informed the accused under this section that he was entitled to have the case transferred to another Magistrate—*Anandi Pershad v. Emp.*, 1920 P L R 124, 21 Cr L J 394. When a Magistrate himself institutes criminal proceedings under sec 476, he is bound to inform the accused that he is entitled to have his case tried by another Court—*K. E. v. Naipal*, 28 O C 1, A I R. 1924 Oudh 448, 25 Cr L J. 1224. Where a matter was brought to the notice of the District Magistrate, and he sent the matter to the S D O, for inquiry and report, and the S D O. reported that the offence had been committed and decided that a case should be instituted, whereupon the District Magistrate ordered the S D O. to try the case, *held* that it was the S D O who had taken cognizance of the case (and not the District Magistrate) and he should have given the accused an opportunity to be tried by a different Magistrate—*Lachhmi Narain*, 4 Luck. 353, 30 Cr L J. 134 (135).

The mere fact that the Magistrate takes cognizance of a case under clause (c) of section 190 does not bring the case within the operative

sent for the accused and fined him, it was held that the Magistrate took cognizance from his own knowledge under this clause and was debarred from trying the case by virtue of sec 191—*K. E. v. Abdul Rahim*, 1905 P.R. 8.

A Magistrate who takes part in the initiation of proceedings is not incompetent to take cognizance of the offence, because this clause empowers the Magistrate to take cognizance upon his own 'knowledge'; but of course the Magistrate will be debarred under section 556 from trying the case—*Oziullah v. Beni Madhab*, 50 Cal 135.

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commit the case to the Sessions. And the commitment involves the holding of a preliminary inquiry. This section empowers the Magistrate to hold a preliminary inquiry even in a case triable by himself; if the case is one triable exclusively by the Sessions Court, the Magistrate is a *fortiori* entitled to hold an inquiry preliminary to commitment—*Q. E. v. Abdul Razzak*, 21 All. 109; *Azam Ali v. Emp.*, 20 Cr.L.J. 47 (Cal.).

But a Magistrate who takes cognizance of a case under sec. 190 (c) cannot, after becoming a District Magistrate, hear an appeal from a conviction in the case (which was tried by another subordinate Magistrate) without following the procedure laid down in Sec. 191, as an appeal is a part of the trial of the offence—*Bansi Lal v. Emp.*, 12 C.W.N. 438.

596. When objection to be taken :—If the accused wants to be tried by another Court, he must express his objection before any evidence is taken—*Murad v. Emp.*, 1894 P.R. 29 (at p. 82).

597. Application of Section to Chapter VIII :—The provisions of secs. 190 and 191 do not apply to proceedings under sec. 110, and a Magistrate who has instituted those proceedings need not inform the person proceeded against that he is entitled to have his case transferred to another Magistrate—*In re Mithu Khan*, 27 All. 172; *Mahomedally v. Emp.*, 20 S.L.R. 291, 27 Cr.L.J. 1280. But in *Alimuddin v. Emp.*, 29 Cal. 392 and *Godhan v. Emp.*, 4 P.L.J. 7, however, it has been held that the principle of this section, viz., that no man ought to be a judge in his case, applies to proceedings under Sec. 110, though they do not relate to offences; therefore, where a Magistrate has initiated proceedings against a person under sec. 110, mainly if not wholly upon his own knowledge of the character of that person, he is incompetent to proceed with the inquiry under sec. 117.

192. (1) Any Chief Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or sub-divisional Magistrate may transfer any case, of which he has taken cognizance, for inquiry or trial, to any Magistrate subordinate to him.

Transfer of cases by Magistrates.

(2) Any District Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the first class who has taken cognizance of any case to transfer it for inquiry or trial to any other specified Magistrate in his district who is competent under this Code to try the accused or commit him for trial; and such Magistrate may dispose of the case accordingly.

'May transfer' .—The power under this section is optional and not obligatory. As in cases which a Magistrate is disqualified from trying and is bound to transfer, see Secs. 487 and 556.

598. 'Any case' .—This section deals with the power of the Magistrate to transfer any case; the words 'any case' are not restricted to

criminal cases only, but are wide enough to include any case triable by any criminal Court, e.g. cases under Chapter VIII—*Chintaman v Emp.*, 35 Cal. 243; *K E v Munna*, 24 All. 151; *Hiranando v. Emp.*, 1 Pat. 621; or cases under Chapter XII—*Satish v. Rajendra*, 22 Cal 898 (902); *Ram Kissore v Dwarka*, 10 C.W.N. 1095; *Mahendra v. Rajpati*, 20 A.L.J. 215; *Abdul Hamid v Hasan*, 4 P.L.T. 297, 24 Cr.L.J. 487. Even if the transfer be not strictly legal, the irregularity would be cured by Sec 529 (f)—*Gurudas v. Gaganendra*, 2 C.L.J. 614; *Akbar v. Domi Lal*, 4 C.W.N. 821.

The word 'case' has not been defined, but reading together sections 192 (1), 190 (a) and 200 (c) it is clear that the term includes a proceeding upon a complaint as soon as the complaint has been received by the Magistrate who takes cognizance of the offence and before he issues any process. A case can therefore be transferred under sec 192 even before a decision to issue process against the accused has been made—*Asaram v Bhagirathi*, 7 N.L.R. 97, 12 Cr.L.J. 437.

Under sub-sec. (1), the Magistrates specified have power to transfer a case to any Magistrate subordinate to him (even though the latter be incompetent to try the case on his own initiative), thus, a complaint under sec. 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act can be entertained only by the District Magistrate or a Magistrate specially authorized; but this section will empower such Magistrate to transfer the case, after taking cognizance of it, to any subordinate Magistrate—*Budhan v. Issur Singh*, 34 Cal. 926 (928).

But if a first class Magistrate transfers a case under subsection (2), he can transfer only those cases to a Subordinate Magistrate which the latter is competent to try or commit for trial.

599. "Of which he has taken cognizance" :—This section empowers the District Magistrate to transfer to Subordinate Magistrates only those cases of which he has taken cognizance. A Magistrate is said to take cognizance of a case under section 107 only when (and not before) he issues notice to the person charged to show cause why he should not be proceeded against under that section. Therefore, where the District Magistrate has not issued any notice to the person charged, that is, where he has not taken cognizance of a case under section 107, he cannot transfer the case to a subordinate Magistrate—*Konda Reddy v. K. E.*, 41 Mad 246. This section enables a District Magistrate or Subdivisional Magistrate to transfer only those cases of which he has taken cognizance under the provisions of Sec. 190. It has no reference to cases which have been transferred to his Court—*Darra v Mukat*, 12 A.L.J. 277, 15 Cr.L.J. 357. In other words, a case which has once been transferred to a District Magistrate or Subdivisional Magistrate cannot be transferred by him again under Sec. 192—*Bashir Husain v. Ali Husain*, 38 All 166; *Crown v. Nga So*, 1 L.B.R. 86; *Anonymous*, 7 M.H.C.R. App 33. But where a case had been transferred by the Chief Court under sec 526 from the Dt. Magistrate of Rohtak to the Dt Magistrate of Hissar with a direction that the latter should either dispose of the case himself or

transfer it to some other competent Magistrate in the District, and the District Magistrate of Hissar transferred the case under sec. 192 to an Honorary Magistrate, held that the District Magistrate of Hissar was competent under this section to make the transfer—*Kishen Singh v. Crown*, 1917 P.R. 30; *Q. E. v. Mata Prasad*, 19 All. 249.

Where a trying Magistrate sends up a report to the District Magistrate that an accused before him has committed perjury and altered a document filed in Court, the report amounts to a complaint, and the District Magistrate can take cognizance of the case under section 190 (a) and transfer it for trial under section 192 to another Magistrate subordinate to him—*Suraj Prasad v. Emp.*, 21 A.L.J. 825; *Emp v. Sundar Sarup*, 26 All 514.

600. At which stage case can be transferred :—The Magistrate can transfer the case, on taking cognizance of it. A District Magistrate is competent, under sec 190, to take cognizance without complaint, and to transfer the case to a subordinate Magistrate without such complaint—*Crown v. Allahwarayo*, 1 S.L.R. 119. He can transfer the case before any process has been issued to the accused—*Asaram v. Bhagirathi*, 7 N.L.R. 97, 12 Cr.L.J. 437. He can transfer a case even after summons has been issued against the accused—*In re Azim Sheikh*, 7 C.L.J. 249; *Eqbal v. Emp*, 20 Cr.L.J. 413 (Pat.). But a case cannot be transferred under this section after it has been partly tried—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 152, e.g. after all the evidence for the prosecution and the defence has been taken—*Q. E. v. Radhe*, 12 All 66. The transfer of a part-heard case, after the framing of the charge and the cross-examination of some of the prosecution witnesses, to another Magistrate for disposal is undesirable. A Magistrate who undertakes a trial and hears the witnesses should, if possible, finish it—*Mazahar Ali v Emp*, 50 Cal 223 (226).

'For inquiry or trial':—This section empowers a Magistrate to transfer a case for inquiry or trial, but it does not empower him to transfer a case simply for the purpose of considering the report of an investigation under sec. 202, which he has himself ordered. The provisions of sections 192 and 202 do not entitle a Magistrate, after he has proceeded under the latter section, to make an order under the provisions of the former section transferring the case for the purpose of being dealt with under sec. 203 or 204, without a fresh investigation as contemplated by sec. 202—*Mahabir v. Giribala*, 29 C.W.N. 508 (509), 26 Cr.L.J. 990, A.I.R. 1925 Cal 742.

601. How much of the case need be transferred :—Where a complaint or a police report deals with several persons, it is not necessary that the entire case, i.e., the case regarding the offences committed according to the complaint or Police report, should be transferred. Whether the entire case has been transferred or not is a question of fact, depending on the intention of the transferring Magistrate, and this intention must be gathered from the order itself. Where no reservation is made, it may be concluded that the entire case has been transferred—*Ajab Lal v Emp*, 32 Cal 783. Thus, where a complaint was lodged

against several persons, and the Magistrate after examining the complainant, issued summons against one of the accused only and transferred the case to a Subordinate Magistrate, it was held that the whole case of the complainant was transferred, and the Subordinate Magistrate could take proceedings against the other accused persons also—*In re Azim Sheikh*, 7 C.L.J. 249.

602. 'Subordinate to him':—A case can be transferred under this section to the Court of a *subordinate* Magistrate and not to a *superior* Magistrate. So, a third class Magistrate cannot transfer a case to a District Magistrate—*Q E v. Radhe*, 12 All. 66

The subordination of the Presidency Magistrate to the Chief Presidency Magistrate shall be deemed to be of the same kind and extent as the subordination of Magistrates and Benches to the District Magistrate under sec. 17 (1) The Chief Presidency Magistrate can under sec. 528 withdraw any case from any Presidency Magistrate and refer it for inquiry or trial to any other Presidency Magistrate—*In re Nageswar*, 1 Bom L.R. 347.

For the purpose of this section, an Additional District Magistrate is subordinate to the District Magistrate; see sec 10 (3).

A village headman is not a Magistrate, and a case cannot be transferred to him—*Q. E. v. Maung Gale*, 1 L.B.R. 59.

603. Effect of transfer:—When a District Magistrate has transferred a case for trial to a Deputy Magistrate, the former ceases to have jurisdiction in the case so long as the transfer is in existence, and cannot take any further steps in the matter (e.g. issue warrants), unless the case is withdrawn to his own file under sec. 528—*Golapdy v. Q E.*, 27 Cal. 979; *Amrit Majhi v. K E.*, 46 Cal. 854. Until the transferring Magistrate withdraws the case from the file of the subordinate Magistrate (to whom the case was transferred) to that of his own Court, he has no power to make any order save an order for further inquiry under sec. 437 (now 436)—*Ajab Lal v. Emp.*, 32 Cal. 783; *Radhaballabh v. Benode Behari*, 30 Cal. 449. In this respect this section differs from sec 202. Under that section the Magistrate receiving a complaint refers it to a subordinate Magistrate only for inquiry and report, and does not cease to have control over the case. The provisions of secs. 192 and 202 are separate and distinct and the powers conferred by one section do not curtail the power conferred by the other—*Amrit Majhi v. K. E.*, 46 Cal. 854.

In a recent case it has been held that a Magistrate who has transferred a case under sec 192 to a Subordinate Magistrate cannot recall the case—*Mahari v Baldeo*, 7 P L.T. 530, 26 Cr.L.J. 1585 (1587). This view, it is submitted, is not correct. The learned Judge seems to have overlooked the new provisions of sec 528 sub-section (4).

When a case is, after issue of process, transferred from one Magistrate to another, the latter stands in the shoes of the Magistrate who originally issued the process. Therefore, if the second Magistrate discharges the accused and *suo motu* issues process against another person

under sec. 190 clause (c), he cannot be said to be acting without jurisdiction—*Hemendra v. Emp.*, 55 Cal. 1274, 30 Cr.L.J. 352.

604. Procedure before transfer :—*Notice to parties :—*Before a case is transferred under this section from one subordinate Court to another, the District Magistrate should give notice to the parties of such transfer—*Teacotta v. Ameer Majee*, 8 Cal. 393; *Umrao v. Fakirchand*, 3 All. 749; *In re Saker Naik*, 2 Bom. L.R. 342; *In re Daud Hussain*, Ratanlal 460; *Imp. v. Sadashiv*, 22 Bom. 549.

*Examination of complainant :—*Under sec. 200, proviso (a), when a complaint is made in writing, the Magistrate is not bound to examine the complainant before transferring the case under this section.

605. Procedure after transfer :—*Examination of complainant :—*If the transferring Magistrate has already examined the complainant, the Magistrate to whom the case is transferred is not bound to examine the complainant again—sec. 200 (c)

*Examination of prosecution witness :—*Even where the transferring Magistrate has examined all the prosecution witnesses, the Magistrate to whom the case is transferred is bound to examine the witnesses again. He cannot act upon the deposition of witnesses recorded by the transferring Magistrate—*Q E v Bashir Khan*, 14 All 346, *In re Totz Venkata*, 2 Weir 152, see also *Dy. Leg. Rem. v Upendra*, 12 C.W.N. 140

606. Transfer by High Court .—In the case of a transfer of a criminal case by the High Court from a Court subordinate to the District Magistrate to the District Magistrate's Court, it will be understood that the District Magistrate should try the case himself, unless the High Court has expressed that the District Magistrate shall have the power to transfer the case to a subordinate Court. But when the High Court transfers a case from the Court of one District Magistrate to the Court of another District Magistrate, it will be understood, unless the contrary is directly expressed, that the Magistrate to whom the transfer is made has power and jurisdiction to apply section 192, and to transfer the case to any Magistrate subordinate to him, who may be competent to try it—*Q E. v Mata Prasad*, 19 All. 249; *Kishen Singh v. Crown*, 1917 P R. 30

193. (1) Except as otherwise expressly provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court of Session shall take cognizance of any offence as a Court of original jurisdiction unless the accused has been committed to it by a Magistrate duly empowered in that behalf

(2) Additional Sessions Judges and Assistant Sessions Judges shall try (2) Additional Sessions Judges and Assistant Sessions Judges shall try

such cases only as the Local Government by general or special order may direct them to try, or, in the case of Assistant Sessions Judges, as the Sessions Judge of the division, by general or special order, may make over to them for trial.

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Change :—The words "in the case of Assistant Sessions Judges" which occurred in subsection (2) after the words "may direct them to try" have been omitted by sec 46 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act XVIII of 1923 "We propose to omit from section 193 (2) the words 'in the case of Assistant Sessions Judges' The section, as it stands at present (i.e. before the amendment) makes a distinction between Additional Sessions Judges and Assistant Sessions Judges, only allowing transfers by the Sessions Judge in the case of the latter. Considerable inconvenience has been felt owing to this limitation, which we propose to remedy by the omission of the words referred to above"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916.* Under the present law, Sessions Judges will be able to make over the cases to Additional Sessions Judges as well ■ to Assistant Sessions Judges.

607. Object of this section :—The object of the requirement of a commitment before trial is to secure, in the case of a person charged with a grave offence, a preliminary inquiry which would afford him the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the circumstances of the offence imputed to him and enable him to make his defence—*Ram Varma v. Q.*, 3 Mad. 351. The law contemplates that in the serious cases of which a Court of Session may take cognizance, the accused should have some information of the case he has to answer—*Q. v. Chinna Vedagiri*, 4 Mad 227.

608. Trial without commitment :—The trial in the Court of Session without a commitment is *ultra vires*—*Q. E. v. Ramatevan*, 15 Mad. 352; *Sharina v. Emp.*, 1884 P.R. 42; *Q. ■ v. Jagat*, 22 Cal 50. The absence of commitment is a defect of substance and not merely of form, and is not cured by section 537—*Sharina v. Emp.*, 1884 P.R. 42. Even where ■ Sessions Judge holds that the approver who is giving evidence before him as a witness is not complying with the conditions of pardon, he cannot try him at once, but can do so only after ■ proper commitment by ■ competent Court—*Q. E. v. Ramatevan*, 15 Mad. 352; *Q. E. v. Jagat Chandra*, 22 Cal. 50.

609. Reference under sec. 123 :—*Power of Additional Sessions Judge*—It was formerly held that a reference to a Court of Session by a Magistrate of a case under section 123 was not a case 'committed'

for trial, and the Court of Session disposing of it did not 'try a case' within the meaning of this section. An Additional Sessions Judge empowered by the Government to try all cases which might be committed for trial by the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass an order on such reference—*In re Dayaram*, Ratanlal, 830. This decision is no longer good law, because the new sub-section (B) of sec. 123 added by the Amendment Act of 1923 expressly authorises the Sessions Judge to make over all references under sec. 123 to the Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge. In *Benode Behari v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 229, the word 'cases' under this section was held to include a reference under sec. 123; but such a laboured interpretation is no longer necessary.

610. Assistant Sessions Judge appointed temporarily—An Assistant Sessions Judge who has been directed by the Government to take over charge of the duties of the Sessions Judge during a temporary vacancy of the officer, is not an officer appointed to act as a Sessions Judge, and has no jurisdiction to try any case even as Assistant Sessions Judge, unless it was made over to him by a general or special order under the last para of this section—*Q. E. v. Mahadhu*, Ratanlal 500

Power of Assistant Sessions Judge to hear appeal—The word 'case' used in sub-section (2) does not include an appeal or other matter, and a Sessions Judge has no power to transfer an appeal filed in his Court to the Court of the Assistant Sessions Judge—*Emp v Abdul Razzak*, 37 All 286. See Note 1110 under sec. 409

194. (1) The High Court may take cognizance of any offence upon a commitment made to it in manner hereinafter provided.

Cognizance of off-
ences by High Court.

Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to affect the provisions of any Letters Patent granted under the Indian High Courts Act, 1861, or the Government of India Act, 1915, or any other provisions of this Code.

(2) (a) Notwithstanding anything in this Code contained, the Advocate-General

Informations by Ad-
vocate-General.

may, with the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council or the Local Government, exhibit to the High Court, against persons subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court, informations for all purposes for which Her Majesty's Attorney-General may exhibit informations on behalf of the Crown in the High Court of Justice in England.

(b)* Such proceedings may be taken upon every such information as may lawfully be taken in the case of similar

such cases only as the Local Government by general or special order may direct them to try, or, in the case of Assistant Sessions Judges, as the Sessions Judge of the division, by general or special order, may make over to them for trial.

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Change :—The words "in the case of Assistant Sessions Judges" which occurred in subsection (2) after the words "may direct them to try" have been omitted by sec. 46 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act XVIII of 1923. "We propose to omit from section 193 (2) the words 'in the case of Assistant Sessions Judges' The section, as it stands at present (*i.e.* before the amendment) makes a distinction between Additional Sessions Judges and Assistant Sessions Judges, only allowing transfers by the Sessions Judge in the case of the latter. Considerable inconvenience has been felt owing to this limitation, which we propose to remedy by the omission of the words referred to above"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916* Under the present law, Sessions Judges will be able to make over the cases to Additional Sessions Judges as well as to Assistant Sessions Judges

607. Object of this section :—The object of the requirement of a commitment before trial is to secure, in the case of a person charged with a grave offence, a preliminary inquiry which would afford him the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the circumstances of the offence imputed to him and enable him to make his defence—*Ram Varma v. Q*, 3 Mad. 351 The law contemplates that in the serious cases of which a Court of Session may take cognizance, the accused should have some information of the case he has to answer—*Q v Chinna Vedagiri*, 4 Mad. 227.

608. Trial without commitment :—The trial in the Court of Session without a commitment is *ultra vires*—*Q. E. v. Ramatevan*, 15 Mad. 352; *Sharina v. Emp*, 1884 P.R. 42; *Q. E. v. Jagat*, 22 Cal. 50 The absence of commitment is a defect of substance and not merely of form, and is not cured by section 537—*Sharina v. Emp.*, 1884 P.R. 42 Even where a Sessions Judge holds that the approver who is giving evidence before him as a witness is not complying with the conditions of pardon, he cannot try him at once, but can do so only after a proper commitment by a competent Court—*Q. E. v. Ramatevan*, 15 Mad. 352; *Q. E. v. Jagat Chandra*, 22 Cal. 50.

609. Reference under sec. 123 :—*Power of Additional Sessions Judge*—It was formerly held that a reference to a Court of Session by a Magistrate of a case under section 123 was not a case 'committed'

for trial, and the Court of Session disposing of it did not 'try a case' within the meaning of this section. An Additional Sessions Judge empowered by the Government to try all cases which might be committed for trial by the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass an order on such reference—*In re Dayaram, Ratanlal*, 830. This decision is no longer good law, because the new sub-section (B) of sec. 123 added by the Amendment Act of 1923 expressly authorises the Sessions Judge to make over all references under sec. 123 to the Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge. In *Benode Behari v Emp.*, 50 Cal. 229, the word 'cases' under this section was held to include a reference under sec. 123; but such a laboured interpretation is no longer necessary.

610. Assistant Sessions Judge appointed temporarily:—An Assistant Sessions Judge who has been directed by the Government to take over charge of the duties of the Sessions Judge during a temporary vacancy of the officer, is not an officer appointed to act as a Sessions Judge, and has no jurisdiction to try any case even as Assistant Sessions Judge, unless it was made over to him by a general or special order under the last para of this section—*Q. E. v Mahadhu, Ratanlal* 500.

Power of Assistant Sessions Judge to hear appeal—The word 'case' used in sub-section (2) does not include an appeal or other matter, and a Sessions Judge has no power to transfer an appeal filed in his Court to the Court of the Assistant Sessions Judge—*Emp v Abdul Razzak*, 37 All. 286. See Note 1110 under sec. 409.

194. (1) The High Court may take cognizance of any offence upon a commitment made to it in manner hereinafter provided.

Cognizance of offences by High Court.

provided.

Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to affect the provisions of any Letters Patent granted under the Indian High Courts Act, 1861, or the Government of India Act, 1915, or any other provisions of this Code.

(2) (a) Notwithstanding anything in this Code contained, the Advocate-General may, with the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council or the Local Government, exhibit to the High Court, against persons subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court, informations for all purposes for which Her Majesty's Attorney-General may exhibit informations on behalf of the Crown in the High Court of Justice in England.

(b)* Such proceedings may be taken upon every such information as may lawfully be taken in the case of similar

informations filed by Her Majesty's Attorney-General so far as the circumstances of the case and the practice and procedure of the said High Court will admit.

(c) All fines, penalties, forfeitures, debts and sums of money recovered or levied under or by virtue of any such information shall belong to the Government of India.

(d) The High Court may make rules for carrying into effect the provisions of this section.

195. (1) No Court shall take cognizance—

(a) of any offence punishable under sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian

Penal Code, except with the previous sanction, or on the complaint, of the public servant concerned, or of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate;

(b) of any offence punishable under sections 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 or 228 of the same Code, when such offence is committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except with the previous sanction, or on the complaint, of such Court, or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate;

195. (1) No Court shall take cognizance—

(a) of any offence punishable under sections 172 to 188 of the Indian Penal Code, except

* * * on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate;

(b) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the same Code, namely, sections 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except * * * on the complaint in writing of such Court or of some

(c) of any offence described in section 463 or punishable under section 471, 475, or

476 of the same Code, when such offence has been committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, except with the previous sanction, or on the complaint, of such Court, or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate.

(2) In clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) the term "Court" means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court but does not include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration Act, 1877.

(3) See *infra*.

(4) The sanction referred to in this section may be expressed in

Nature of sanction necessary.

general terms, and need not name the accused persons; but it shall so far as practicable specify the Court or other place in which, and

other Court to which such Court is subordinate; or

(c) of any offence described in section 463 or punishable under section 471, section

475 or section 476 of the same Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, except * * * on the complaint in writing of such Court or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate.

(2) In clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) the term "Court" includes a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, but does not include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration jurisdiction shall be the

(omitted).

the occasion on which, the offence was committed.

(5) When sanction is given in respect of any offence referred to in this section, the Court taking cognizance of the case may frame a charge of any other offence so referred to which is disclosed by the facts.

(omitted).

(6) Any sanction given or refused under this section may be revoked or granted by any authority to which the authority giving or refusing it is subordinate; and no sanction shall remain in force for more than six months from the date on which it was given; provided that the High Court may, for good cause shown, extend the time.

(omitted).

(7) For the purposes of this section every Court shall be deemed to be subordinate only to the Court to which appeals from the former Court ordinarily lie, that is to say :—

(c) Where no appeal lies, such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the principal Court of original jurisdiction within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such first mentioned Court is situate.

(3) For the purposes of this section, a Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the *appealable decrees or sentences* of such former Court, or in the case of a *Civil Court* from whose decrees no appeal ordinarily lies, to the principal Court having ordinary original *civil* jurisdiction within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such *Civil Court* is situate :

(a) Where such appeals lie to more than one Court, the Appellate Court of inferior jurisdiction shall be the Court to which such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate.

(b) Where such appeals lie to a Civil and also to a Revenue Court, such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Civil or Revenue Court according to the nature of the case in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed.

(3) The provisions of sub-section (1), with reference to the offences named therein apply also to criminal conspiracies to commit such offences and to the abetment of such offences, and attempts to commit them.

(5) *Where a complaint has been made under sub-section (1) clause (a), by a public servant, any authority to which such public servant is subordinate may order the withdrawal of the complaint and, if it does so, it shall forward a copy of such order to the Court, and upon receipt thereof by the Court, no further proceedings shall be taken on the complaint.*

Change :—This section has been substantially amended by sec 47 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act XVIII of 1923.

The changes introduced by the present Amendment are the following :—

(i) The words "with the previous sanction" have been omitted from clauses (a) (b) and (c) of sub-section (1). Under the old law, a private

Provided that—

(a) where appeals lie to more than one Court, the Appellate Court of inferior jurisdiction shall be the Court to which such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate; and

(b) where appeals lie to a Civil and also to a Revenue Court, such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Civil or Revenue Court, according to the nature of the case or proceeding in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed.

(4) The provisions of sub-section (1), with reference to the offences named therein, apply also to criminal conspiracies to commit such offences and to the abetment of such offences, and attempts to commit them.

person could launch a prosecution for the offences referred to in this section, after obtaining the sanction of the Court. Under the present law, by *abolishing sanction altogether*, the right of private individuals to prosecute for the said offences has been taken away. Sub-sections (4), (5) and (6) which dealt with sanction have also been omitted.

(ii) The words "in writing" have been added after the word "complaint" in clauses (a) (b) and (c); and the words "is alleged to have been committed" have been substituted for the words "have been committed" in clauses (b) and (c). For reasons, see notes under those words.

(iii) In sub-section (2) the word 'includes' has been substituted for 'means.'

(iv) Sub-section (3) has been re-numbered as sub-section (4)

(v) Sub-section (7) has been re-numbered as sub-section (3), because that sub-section should come in more properly after the definition of the word 'Court' in sub-section (2). The old clause (c) of sub-section (7) has now been incorporated into the body of sub-section (3) with this restriction: that it is now confined to civil Courts only.

(vi) Sub-section (5) is entirely new.

Reasons for the change :—"The provisions of section 195 cause constant and great difficulty, and various amendments have been suggested which we have considered at length. We have no doubt that it will not be possible to remedy the evils which are connected with this section so long as private individuals are allowed to prosecute for offences connected with the administration of justice. In our opinion the only effective way of dealing with this section is to allow prosecutions to be launched only by the public servant or by the Court.

"We see no reason why the public servant or the Court should not file a complaint exactly in the same way as a private individual would do in other cases, and our proposals in this connection with this section and the enlargement of section 476 involve the adoption of this principle. In our view section 195 should bar the cognizance by any Court of offences of this nature except upon such complaint, while the procedure to be followed when the Court desires to prosecute should be prescribed by section 476.

"The adoption of this principle will at all events get rid of the objectionable practice of keeping a sanction, which has been granted to a private individual, hanging over the head of the accused person for a period of six months, which is frequently utilised for the various purposes of blackmail. In the case of a complaint by a Court or a public servant we do not think that it will be necessary to prescribe any limit of time.

"It will also, in our opinion, be a distinct advantage to get rid altogether of the term "sanction" in connection with these prosecutions, a result which will be effected by the amendments we propose.

"We recognise that clause (a) of sub-section (1) stands on a somewhat different footing from clauses (b) and (c), but we think there is no reason to retain even in it any reference to a sanction, as prosecution

under clause (a) can reasonably be launched in all cases on the direct complaint of a public servant"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916.*

The object of the amendment is to stop private persons from obtaining sanction as a means of wreaking vengeance and to give the Court concerned full discretion in deciding whether any prosecution is necessary or not—*Abdul Rahman v. Emp.*, 4 Bur.L.J. 213, 27 Cr.L.J. 669.

611. Sanction abolished—Effect of Amendment :—Since sanction has been abolished by the Amendment Act XVIII of 1923, a sanction granted after the 1st September, 1923 (the date on which the Amendment Act came into operation) is illegal—*In re Gafur*, 26 Bom. L.R. 1235, 26 Cr.L.J. 448. A sanction granted after 1st September 1923 is illegal, even though an application for sanction was made prior to that date. The order granting sanction cannot be treated even as a complaint—*Baldeo Misser v. D. I. G. of Police*, 51 Cal. 652 (655).

So also, where sanction was granted before the 1st September 1923, but no prosecution was launched by that time, further proceedings cannot be taken after that date on the strength of the sanction. A prosecution can then be started only on a complaint by the Court concerned—*Ani v. Ah Yone*, 2 Bur L.J. 289, *Jawahir v Jaggu*, ■ Lah 41, 26 P.L.R. 152, 26 Cr.L.J. 1163; *Ameraj v Emp.*, 23 A.L.J. 35, 26 Cr.L.J. 751.

But where a sanction was obtained and the Court had taken cognizance of the offence, before the Amendment Act came into operation, the subsequent amendment of the law did not take away the jurisdiction of the Court to proceed with the trial, and did not necessitate a fresh complaint under the amended provisions—*In re Appasamy*, 49 M.L.J. 276, 27 Cr.L.J. 84; *Muthia Goundan v. Chianna*, 1924 M.W.N. 358, 26 Cr.L.J. 142; *Emp. v. Akbar Ali*, 7 Lah 99, 27 P.L.R. 181, 27 Cr.L.J. 724; *Wasudeo v. Emp.*, 27 Cr.L.J. 181 (Nag); *Kewal Ram v Emp.*, 27 Cr.L.J. 560 (All)

An application under sub-section (6) of the old section to revoke a sanction granted before the Amendment Act of 1923 ■ maintainable even after the coming into operation of the Amendment Act of 1923, because the right conferred by sub-section (6) of the old section was not a mere matter of procedure but a substantive right, and such right could not be taken away by any amending Act—*Ramakrishna v Sithai Ammal*, 48 Mad. 620 (F.B.), 49 M.L.J. 223, 27 Cr.L.J. ■■ (practically overruling *Nataraja v. Rangaswamy*, 47 Mad 384, 46 M.L.J. 274, 25 Cr.L.J. 361, and *Sesha Ayyar v. Public Prosecutor*, 19 L.W. 463, 34 M.L.T. 353, 25 Cr.L.J. 702). Similarly, where proceedings under the old sec. 195 were commenced and the order of the subordinate Judge refusing to sanction a prosecution was passed under the old section, but during the pendency of an application to the District Judge against the order of refusal the new section came into operation, and the District Judge sanctioned the prosecution, held that the case was governed by sec. ■ (c) of the General Clauses Act, and the repeal of the old sec. 195 could not affect any pending investigation in respect ■ the right which had accrued to the complainant. The District Judge therefore did not act illegally in granting ■

sanction—*Kashmire Lal v Kishen Dei*, 26 Cr.L.J. 90, A I R 1924 All 563.

N. B.—It should be noted that many of the cases cited below are cases relating to *sanctions*, but the principle of those cases applies also to complaints, for under the old law no distinction was made between a sanction and a complaint. The cases noted below are therefore cited with certain verbal alterations.

612. Object of section :—The object of this section is to protect persons from being needlessly harassed by rash, baseless or vexatious prosecutions at the instance of private individuals for the offences specified—*Parameshwaran v Emp*, 39 Mad. 677; *Palaniappa v. Ramasamy*, 32 M.L.J. 54, to protect persons from criminal prosecution by persons actuated by personal malice or ill-will or frivolity of disposition—*Balwant v. Umed Singh*, 18 All 203; *Emp. v. Mahadeo*, 1887 A.W.N. 142; *Ram Prasad v Sooba*, 1 C.W.N. 400; to protect persons from criminal prosecutions upon insufficient grounds and to ensure prosecution only when the Court after due consideration is satisfied that there is a proper case to put a party on his trial—*Tuck Sew v Hain*, 4 L.B.R. 234; to insist on there being prosecution only when the public justice demands it and to prevent prosecution when public interest cannot be served—*Ram Prasad v. Sooba*, 1 C.W.N. 400; *Vasteva Puttaralya v. Lakshmi*, 2 Weir 178, *Q E v Girdharlal, Ratanlal* 374; *In re Chandra Kanta*, 3 C.W.N. 3; *Kishan v. Sheo Dial*, 1893 A.W.N. 104; and to save the time of Criminal Courts from being wasted by endless prosecutions without convictions—*Parameshwaran v Emp*, 39 Mad 677; *Ram Prasad v. Sooba Roy*, 1 C.W.N. 400

Section 195, though it forms a part of the Code of Procedure, in reality contains a provision of the substantive law of crimes. It does not deal with the competency of the Courts, nor lay down which of several Courts shall in any particular matter have jurisdiction to try the case. It in reality lays down that the offences therein referred to shall not be deemed to be any offence at all, except on the complaint of the persons or the Courts therein specified, it enhances the connotation of those offences and limits the scope of their definition—*Fakir Mahomed v. Emp*, 21 S.L.R. 1, 27 Cr.L.J. 1105 (1110)

613. Duty of Court :—A complaint ought not to be made under this section when there is no probability of conviction. It is necessary for the Court before making a complaint, to consider the evidence and to decide as to whether there is a *prima facie* case and any reasonable chance of conviction being obtained—*Abboo v Kuppasawmy*, 2 Weir, 188; *In re Paree Kunhammad*, 26 Mad. 116; *Chakrapani v. K. E.*, 12 M.L.J. 408; *Abboo Chetty v. Kuppasawmy*, 12 M.L.J. 302; *Munisami v. Rajaratnam*, 44 M.L.J. 774; *Kali Charan v. Basudeo*, 12 C.W.N. 3; *Kusum Sao v. Janak Lal*, 4 P.L.J. 374; *In re Raoji*, 7 Bom. L.R. 732 (per Russell J.); *Palaniappa v. Ramasami*, 32 M.L.J. 54; *Kidha Singh v. Emp.*, 13 A.L.J. 1111; *Mutayya v. Maung Shwe*, 3 Bur L.T. 152, 11 Cr.L.J. 749.

Khajumal v. Crown, 14 S.L.R. 69; *Bhagirathi v. Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1401; *Emp. v. Sheoshankarpuri*, 10 N.L.R. 177.

It would be an abuse of the powers vested in a Court of justice if complaints were made by it on the principle that though the conviction of the party complained against is a mere possibility, it is desirable that the matter should be thrashed out, so that it may be decided whether or not an offence has been committed—*Jadunandan v. Emp.*, 37 Cal. 250.

In making a complaint, the Court must act on its own independent judgment and should not be guided by the opinions of others. It should not act merely on the report of the Police—*Bapu v. Bapu*, 39 Mad. 750 (757); *Q. E. v. Sheikh Beari*, 10 Mad. 232 (239).

614. Sub-section (1)—Complaint—Under the present law, a Court must make a complaint and cannot directly order prosecution. The complaint must set forth the offence, the precise facts on which it is based and the evidence available for proving it—*Ram prasud v. Emp.*, 25 A.L.J. 639, 28 Cr.L.J. 543.

If a Court adopts the procedure laid down in sec. 476, and after making the necessary inquiry under that section, sends the case to a first class Magistrate, such action amounts to making a complaint—*Q. E. v. Rachappa*, 13 Bom. 109. In order to make a complaint under this section, the Judge or Munsiff will not have to appear before a Magistrate and make a complaint on oath like an ordinary complainant. If he adopts the procedure under sec. 476, that would be sufficient. Section 476 was enacted with the object of avoiding the inconvenience which might be caused if a Munsiff or Subordinate Judge or a Judge were obliged to appear before a Magistrate, like a private individual, and make a complaint on oath to lay the foundation of a prosecution—*Ishri Prosad v. Sham Lal*, 7 All. 871 (F.B.).

But it should be noted that sec. 476 refers only to offences 'when committed before the Court' and the ruling in 7 All. 871 must be applied to those cases only. But if the offence is committed before a public servant other than a Court, his proper course is to prepare an ordinary complaint. See *Nga Lu Po v. K. E. U R R* (1908) Cr.P.C. 13, 10 Cr.L.J. 12.

But even in the case of complaints by public servants, the law is not so stringent as in the case of complaints by ordinary persons. Thus, where a Sub-Inspector drew up what was virtually a complaint and sent it up along with a calendar of witnesses to his immediate superior praying that a case under sec. 182 I.P.C. be lodged against the accused, and then the superior officer got the documents presented to the Magistrate by the Court Inspector, it was held that there was a sufficient complaint by the Sub-Inspector, although it was not addressed to the Magistrate as required by sec. 4 (h) but to his superior officer—*Mehr Chiragh Din v. Crown*, 4 Lah. 359. So also, where a police officer made a report that a certain person had lodged a false information before him, and recommended that that person might be prosecuted, held that the report virtually amounted

to a complaint within the meaning of sec. 195—*Dulan Singh v. Emp*, 40 Cal. 360.

The words "in writing" have been inserted after the word "complaint" in order to remove the inconvenience which might be felt if it was made incumbent on the public servant to attend the Court and to appear before the Magistrate in order to lodge the complaint. It will be sufficient if he sends a written complaint to the Magistrate. It is for this reason that clause (aa) has been added to sec. 200, so that it is not incumbent on the Magistrate to examine the public servant (complainant) when taking cognizance of the offence—*Lachmi Singh v. K. E.*, 5 P.L.T. 505, A.I.R. 1924 Pat. 691, 25 Cr.L.J. 972.

If an offence under sec 173 I. P. C. is committed before a public servant, the Court shall not take cognizance of the offence without a complaint in writing from the public servant; and it is not open to a Magistrate to ignore the provisions of this clause by the device of instituting the case under another section of the I. P. Code. Hence the Magistrate cannot say that he took cognizance of an offence under sec. 225B of the Penal Code, and that having done so, he was entitled under sec. 238 of the Cr. P. Code to convict the accused under sec 173 I. P. Code which he regarded as a minor offence of the same character as that for which a penalty is provided under sec 225B I. P. Code—*Narain Singh v. K. E.*, 47 All 114, 22 A L J 1005, 26 Cr L J. 446, A.I.R. 1925 All. 129

Instances of complaints:—Where a Munsiff who heard a suit was of opinion that certain persons should be prosecuted for offences under Secs. 193, 463, 471 I. P. C and directed them to be sent to a Magistrate for inquiry, it was held that the Munsiff's order was a complaint within the meaning of this section—*Ishri Prosad v. Sham Lal*, 7 All 871 (F.B.) Where a Magistrate ordered the prosecution of a person, and sent the case to another Magistrate for inquiry, it was held that the order must be deemed to be a complaint under Sec 476—*Q. E. v. Yendava*, 7 Mad 189. Where a Civil Judge trying a rent suit was of opinion that a party to the suit had committed perjury, and sent the record to the Collector for starting a case under Sec. 193 I. P. C., it was held that the order was a complaint, though it was not an order under Sec 476—*Emp. v. Sundar Sarup*, 26 All. 514. Where a Judge passed an order to the following effect—"I complain that H filed two false and forged bonds in the Court of Small Causes etc" and sent the papers to the District Magistrate for taking action, it was held that the order of the Judge was a complaint—*Rajaram v. K E*, 12 A L-J. 881, 15 Cr.L J. 700. Where the accused removed the property which had been attached in execution of a decree, and on the report of the attaching officer the District Judge, being of opinion that the accused should be prosecuted, ordered the papers to be sent to the Deputy Commissioner, it was held that the order of the District Judge operated as a complaint—*Crown v. Nihala*, 1904 P.L.R. 3, 1 Cr.L.J 36. Where a Munsiff being of opinion that a document filed in a case before him had been tampered with, communicated his suspicions to the District Judge who thereupon wrote to the District Magistrate

requesting him to take action, it was held that the letter of the District Judge amounted to a complaint—*Debi Prasad v. K. E.*, 35 All. 8, 13 Cr.L.J. 829. Where the District Judge forwarded to the District Magistrate a copy of his judgment, with a letter in which he called attention to his remarks as regards the forgery of a will and requested the latter to take up the matter for judicial investigation, the letter was a sufficient complaint—*In re Aparoa*, 20 Bom.L.R. 1018. Where a Magistrate who had made a certain alteration in a document filed in Court and had thus committed an offence, the report amounted to a complaint—*Suraj Prasad v. Emp.*, 21 A.L.J. 825

614A. Want of Complaint :—Under clause (b) of section 537 before it was amended in 1923, the want of a sanction or any irregularity in the matter of, a sanction or in a proceeding under sec. 476 did not stand in the way of a conviction, if it was otherwise sound. This clause does not any longer find its place in sec 537. The inference is that want of a regular complaint by a public servant or a Court must be fatal to a prosecution—*Ameraj v. Emp.*, 23 A.L.J. 35, 26 Cr.L.J. 751; *Mohim Chandra v. Emp.*, 56 Cal. 824, 30 Cr.L.J. 658, 33 C.W.N. 285; *Girdhari Lal v. Emp.*, 29 O.C. 1, 26 Cr.L.J. 929, *Janki Prasad v. Emp.*, 27 Cr.L.J. 901 (All), *Ram Samujh v. Emp.*, 3 O.W.N. 614, 27 Cr.L.J. 969, 1 Luck. 523

615. Subordination of public servants :—The subordination of one public servant to another may arise either from express enactment or from the fact that both the public servants belong to the same department, one being superior in rank to another—*Narasimhaya v. Venkatasami*, 18 M.L.J. 584, 8 Cr.L.J. 400

A constable is subordinate to the Superintendent of Police—*Tarinee v. Bonomali*, 19 W.R. 33. The District Magistrate (in his executive capacity) is at the head of the Police, and the Police (e.g., the Superintendent of Police) is subordinate to him—*Emp. v. Ram Khilawan*, 1890 A.W.N. 167; *Emp. v. Shib Singh*, 27 All. 292, *Chhote Lal v. Chhedi Lal*, 45 All. 135; *Shibboo v. Crown*, 1910 P.R. 6, 11 Cr.L.J. 252; (Contra—*Ramasory Lal v. Q. E.*, 27 Cal. 452 and *Khazan Singh v. Kirpa Singh*, 4 Lah. 130. In these two cases it has been held that although the police officers in a district are generally subordinate to the District Magistrate, the subordination contemplated by sec 195 is not such subordination; and that sec 195 contemplates the subordination of the police officers to some superior officer of Police). If the District Magistrate makes the complaint at the request of the police, the complaint is not improper—*Emp. v. Saroda*, 32 Cal. 180

A sub-divisional Magistrate passing an order under sec 144 does so as a public servant and not as a Court. He is subordinate to the District Magistrate and not to the Sessions Judge (sec 17). Sub-section (3) of sec 195 does not apply to the case—*Maini Misser v. Emp.*, 6 Pat. 39, 28 Cr.L.J. 353. A commissioner appointed by the Court to examine

accounts is a public servant subordinate to the Court which appointed him—*Nana Khanderao*, 29 Bom. L.R. 1476, 28 Cr.L.J. 1021 (1022)

The Secretary of a Municipal Board is subordinate to the Chairman—*In re Sheo Prasad*, 1892 A.W.N. 31.

The Registrar of the Small Cause Court is subordinate to the Chief Judge of the Court—*In re Goverdhandas*, 27 Bom. 130

A Station House Officer is not subordinate to the Taluk Magistrate—*Q v. Velayudam*, 11 Mad. 146. The Police is not subordinate to the Honorary Magistrate—*Emp. v. Baldeo*, 1895 A.W.N. 152; *Tarinee v. Bonomali*, 19 W. 33, or to the Township Magistrate—*Crown v. Mizon*, 1 L.B.R. 101. Neither the Police nor the Sub-Magistrate is subordinate to the Sessions Judge—*Reddi Rama Reddi v. Pub. Prosecutor*, 27 M.L.J. 586, 15 Cr.L.J. 612. A village Munsiff or village Magistrate is not subordinate to a Sub-Magistrate—*Narasimhaya v. Venkatasami*, 18 M.L.J. 584 (dissenting from *Q v. Perianan*, 4 Mad. 241).

616. Clause (b) :—The power of a Court to complain in respect of offences mentioned in clause (b) is not restricted, as under clause (c), to the parties before it—*Emp. v. Syed Khan*, 3 Rang. 303 (F.B.), A.I.R. 1925 Rang. 321

Perjury—In making a complaint against a witness for perjury the Court should remember that the statement must be intentionally false in order to justify a prosecution—*Sheodahin v. Bandhan*, 2 A.L.J. 836. The essential ingredient of the offence is the intention of the person—*In re Muni Buksh*, 3 C.W.N. 81

Again, the statement alleged to be false must have a bearing upon the matter in issue. When the question is neither material to the issue in the case nor goes to the credit of the witness, he is not liable to prosecution—*Sheodahin v. Bandhan*, 2 A.L.J. 836; *Khajumal v. Crown*, 14 S.L.R. 69; *Maharaja Prasad v. Emp.*, 21 A.L.J. 673, 24 Cr.L.J. 779.

Prosecution for perjury ought not to be made in respect of a loose or inaccurate statement which is remotely relevant to the case and which is not pressed home to the witness in cross-examination—*Muquaddos v. Zahuruddin*, 20 Cr.L.J. 564 (All). A prosecution for perjury ought not to be made while the principal proceeding in respect of which the perjury is said to have been committed is pending. If such a prosecution is to be started, it ought to be started after the principal proceeding has terminated—*In re Vasudev*, 24 Bom. L.R. 1153. A complaint for perjury should not be made by the Court in cases where it will have to determine the question by merely weighing the evidence on both sides—*Padarath v. Rattan Singh*, 5 P.L.J. 23, 1 P.L.T. 458, 21 Cr.L.J. 145. A prosecution for perjury in respect of a piece of evidence should not generally be made where the trial Court and the Appellate Court have taken different views as to its credibility—*Hirulal v. Lala Mahton*, 3 P.L.T. 60.

A prosecution for offences under secs. 193, 467 and 471 I.P.C. in respect of a handnote sued upon may be made even though the suit

was compromised after it was heard in part—*Dulloo v. D. I. G. of Police*, 49 Cal. 551, 23 Cr.L.J. 138.

In considering the question whether a prosecution for perjury shall or shall not be made, it is a safe rule to give the witness a *locus penitentiae* and an opportunity to correct himself, and if he subsequently corrects his false statement, prosecution is inadvisable—*Hukum Chand v. Emp.*, 29 Cr.L.J. 679 (Lah.); *In re Pandu*, 19 Bom. L.R. 61, 18 Cr.L.J. 480 (481); *Maharaj Prosad v. Emp.*, 21 A.L.J. 673.

Where a Sessions Judge believes the evidence of a witness given before him, but disbelieves the evidence given by him before the committing Magistrate, he should not prosecute for perjury in the alternative but he may prosecute for giving false evidence before the Magistrate—*Public Prosecutor v. Nallan*, 2 Weir 166.

617. Contradictory statements :—Whether a prosecution should be made for giving false evidence on the ground that the witness made contradictory statements, depends upon the circumstances of each case—*Nga Lu Pe v. Emp.*, 4 Bur L.T. 262, 13 Cr.L.J. 56. The mere fact that a witness made contradictory statements in the course of a single deposition is not a ground of prosecution—*In re Chennamma*, 2 Weir 169, *Hari Churn v. Emp.*, 4 C.W.N. 249, in such a case the Court should take into consideration the whole deposition—*In re Sahib Bacha*, 2 Weir 168, and should consider if the contradiction may possibly be due to some confusion or mistake—*In re Mun Buksh*, 3 C.W.N. 81. Nor should the Court make a complaint on the mere fact that the witness made two contradictory statements, one before the committing Magistrate and another at the trial. The Court should consider how the contradiction has happened and why the witness in the trial has resiled from his statement made before the committing Magistrate. Where the witness had made false statements before the committing Magistrate but deposed truly at the trial, the High Court refused to prosecute—*Emp v. Tripura Shankar*, 37 Cal 618, 11 Cr.L.J. 360. Before making a complaint in respect of contradictory statements it would be necessary and proper to allow the person, against whom the complaint is made, an opportunity to explain the statements fully and to state the circumstances under which they came to be made—*Iqbal v. Wilayat*, 17 Cr.L.J. 93 (All.); *Fazal Din v. Crown*, 3 Lah. L.J. 442.

A Court should not prosecute merely where there is a discrepancy between a statement made on oath and a statement made under circumstances in which the witness is not bound to state the truth, e.g. where a person made two contradictory statements one in a petition in which he is not bound to state the truth, and another in a deposition—*In re Chennamma*, 2 Weir 169.

Where a person made two contradictory statements, one before a Magistrate and another before a Subordinate Judge, it is necessary that there should be a proper complaint for prosecution on each branch of the alternative, i.e. one complaint from the Magistrate and another from the Subordinate Judge. The Court to which both Courts are subordinate

may properly make the complaint where one Court is not subordinate to the other—*Emp. v. Purshottam*, 45 Bom. 834 (F.B.), 23 Bom. L.R. 1, 22 Cr.L.J. 241.

618. False Charge—Where a Magistrate dismisses a complaint as false, and is of opinion that the complainant ought to be proceeded against under sec. 211 I. P. Code, the proper procedure for him to follow is to make a complaint under sec. 195 Cr. P. Code, and not to hold an inquiry into the case himself under Ch. XVIII and commit the complainant to the Court of Session for trial under sec. 211 I. P. Code—*Ambika v. Emp.*, 5 Pat. 450, 7 P.L.T. 716, 27 Cr.L.J. 987.

A complaint for an offence under Sec. 211 I. P. C. can be made only when the case is deliberately false; but where the case brought is not false in substance but is bolstered up by false evidence, prosecution should be made for an offence not under sec. 211 but under sec. 196 I. P. C.—*Bholanath v. Harimohan*, 7 C.L.J. 169.

Mere acquittal of the person against whom the charge was made is not sufficient for a prosecution under Sec. 211 I. P. C. There must be more than a mere acquittal; there must be a reasonable belief in the mind of the prosecuting Court that there was no foundation whatever for the original charge; there must be a belief that in instituting the criminal proceedings the accused had acted knowingly without belief in the truth of the allegations made by himself and recklessly without caring whether the allegations were true or false—*Kusum v. Janaklal*, 4 P.L.J. 374.

The fact that the complainant fails to prove his case is by itself not sufficient to sanction a prosecution under sec. 211 I. P. Code. It must be established satisfactorily that the complaint was made with intent to cause injury or that it was a false complaint made with the knowledge that it was false—*Bhuan Kahar v. Emp.*, 6 P.L.T. 365, 26 Cr.L.J. 141.

Before making a complaint for bringing a false case, it is necessary that the case must be judicially determined; the original case must be disposed of according to law before proceedings can be taken for prosecution for false charge—*Gunamony v. Q. E.*, 3 C.W.N. 758; *In re Sahiram*, 5 C.W.N. 254; *Munshi Isser v. K. E.*, 14 C.W.N. 765, 11 Cr.L.J. 354; *Sheikh Kutub Ali v. Emp.*, 3 C.W.N. 490; *In re Ningappa*, 48 Bom. 360, 26 Bom L.R. 183. A Magistrate is not competent to order the prosecution of the complainant for making a false complaint unless that complaint is dismissed as false—*Gunamony v. Q. E.*, 3 C.W.N. 758; *Aly Mahomed v. Emp.*, 1912 P.R. 2. If the original case is neither tried out nor dismissed on evidence taken, the prosecution is invalid—*Ram Sarup v. K. E.*, 4 O.C. 127.

619. False Claim—Before prosecuting a person under sec. 219 I. P. C. for bringing a false claim, that person should be allowed an opportunity of proving his claim; a prosecution should not be made when that person has been thwarted in his attempt to establish the correctness of his claim by the unwarranted activities of the Police acting as the agent of the other party—*Khairati Ram v. Crown*, 3 Lah. L.J. 537.

620. False charges made before police :—A complaint by the Court is necessary when the offences referred to in this clause are committed in or in relation to any *proceeding in Court*; no complaint is necessary when the offence is committed in *police proceedings*, e.g. when a false charge is made to the *Police* and has not been followed by a judicial investigation thereof by a Court—*Tayaballah v. Emp.*, 43 Cal. 1152; *Ramasami v. Q. E.*, 7 Mad. 292; *Anon.*, 2 Weir 162, *Putiram v. Mahomed Kasim*, 3 C.W.N. 33; *Emp v. Irad Ally* 4 Cal. 869; *Karim Baksh v. Emp.*, 1905 P.R. 12; *Q. E. v. Ganpat*, Ratanlal 704; *Dhanka v. Umroo Singh*, 30 All. 58; *Bakshi v. Emp.*, 21 A.L.J. 805; *Q. E. v. Sheikh Beari*, 10 Mad. 232; *Bholu v. Punaji*, 23 N.L.R. 136, 28 Cr.L.J. 934. If, however, the information to the police was followed by a complaint to the Court based on the same allegations and on the same charges as those contained in the information to the Police, and the complaint was investigated by the Court and found to be false, a complaint of the Court would be necessary for prosecuting the false complainant because it was an offence committed in relation to a proceeding in Court—*Crown v. Ananda Lal*, 44 Cal. 650; *Jogendra v. Emp.*, 33 Cal. 1; *Q. E. v. Sham Lal*, 14 Cal. 707; *Jadunandan v. Emp.*, 37 Cal. 250, *Po Hlaing v. Ba E.*, 6 L.B.R. 50, 13 Cr.L.J. 565, *Nagapan v. Emp.*, 1 Bur. L.J. 258. Contra—*Prag Datt v. Emp.*, 51 All. 382, 27 A.L.J. 68 Where an information to the police is followed by a complaint to the Court based on the same allegations and the same charge, and the police investigates the case and reports that it is false, the complaint of the Court is necessary even in respect of the false charge made to the police, on the ground that it was an offence committed in relation to a proceeding in Court. The fact that the complaint was not investigated or proceeded with by the Court does not make any difference—*Md. Yasin v. Emp.*, 4 Pat. 323, 6 P.L.T. 457, A.I.R. 1925 Pat. 483, *Daroga Gope v. Emp.*, 5 Pat. 33, 6 P.L.T. 515, 26 Cr.L.J. 1269, *Chuhermal v. Emp.*, 23 S.L.R. 285, 30 Cr.L.J. 732 (734).

If a false charge is made by A before the police against three persons B, C and D, but the police takes criminal proceedings in Court against B and C but releases D from the charge, and B and C are acquitted by the Court, *held* that a complaint of the Court is necessary for the prosecution of A for making false charge against B and C, but no complaint is necessary for the prosecution of A for making false charge against D, because there was no *proceeding in Court against D*, he having been released by the police before the case came to Court—*Emp. v. Kashi Ram*, 46 All. 906 (910, 912), dissenting from *Emperor v. Hardwar*, 34 All. 522 in which it was held that, under similar circumstances, a complaint of the Court would be necessary for the prosecution of A for making false charge against D, because the charge against D led to the proceeding in Court although D was not charged in Court.

"Alleged to have been committed"—These words have been substituted for the simple word "committed" occurring in the old section. See Note 626 under clause (c) *infra*.

620. False charges made before police :—A complaint by the Court is necessary when the offences referred to in this clause are committed in or in relation to any *proceeding in Court*; no complaint is necessary when the offence is committed in *police proceedings*, e.g. when a false charge is made to the *Police* and has not been followed by a judicial investigation thereof by a *Court*—*Tayabullah v. Emp.*, 43 Cal. 1152; *Ramasami v. Q. E.*, 7 Mad. 292; *Anon.*, 2 Weir 162; *Putiram v. Mahomed Kasim*, 3 C.W.N. 33; *Emp. v. Irad Ally*, 4 Cal. 809; *Karim Baksh v. Emp.*, 1905 P.R. 12; *Q. E. v. Ganpat*, Ratanlal 704; *Dhanka v. Umroo Singh*, 30 All. 58; *Bakshi v. Emp.*, 21 A.L.J. 805, *Q. E. v. Sheikh Beari*, 10 Mad. 232; *Bholu v. Punaji*, 23 N.L.R. 136, 28 Cr.L.J. 934. If, however, the information to the police was followed by a complaint to the Court based on the same allegations and on the same charges as those contained in the information to the Police, and the complaint was investigated by the Court and found to be false, a complaint of the Court would be necessary for prosecuting the false complainant because it was an offence committed in relation to a proceeding in Court—*Crown v. Ananda Lal*, 44 Cal. 650; *Jogendra v. Emp.*, 33 Cal. 1, *Q. E. v. Sham Lal*, 14 Cal. 707; *Jadunandan v. Emp.*, 37 Cal. 250, *Po Hlaing v. Ba E.*, 11 L.B.R. 50, 13 Cr.L.J. 565, *Nagapan v. Emp.*, 1 Bur. L.J. 258. Contra—*Prag Datt v. Emp.*, 51 All. 382, 27 A.L.J. 68. Where an information to the police is followed by a complaint to the Court based on the same allegations and the same charge, and the police investigates the case and reports that it is false, the complaint of the Court is necessary even in respect of the false charge made to the police, on the ground that it was an offence committed in relation to a proceeding in Court. The fact that the complaint was not investigated or proceeded with by the Court does not make any difference—*Md. Yasin v. Emp.*, 4 Pat. 323, 6 P.L.T. 457, A.I.R. 1925 Pat. 483, *Daroga Gope v. Emp.*, 5 Pat. 33, 6 P.L.T. 515, 26 Cr.L.J. 1269, *Chuhermal v. Emp.*, 23 S.L.R. 285, 30 Cr.L.J. 732 (734).

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"Alleged to have been committed" :—These words have been substituted for the simple word "committed" occurring in the old section. See Note 626 under clause (c) *infra*

621. "In relation to":—The words "in relation to" in this clause are very general and are wide enough to cover a proceeding in contemplation before a Criminal Court, though the proceeding may not have begun when the offence was committed. Therefore, sanction (complaint) is necessary for the prosecution of a person for abetment of perjury, though the main case in which the false evidence was intended to be given was not then commenced but was in contemplation—*In re Vasudeo*, 24 Bom. L.R. 1153, 24 Cr.L.J. 171; *Chuhermal v. Emp.*, 23 S.L.R. 285, 30 Cr.L.J. 732 (734). But the Calcutta High Court is of opinion that the words "in relation to" mean that there must be some proceeding actually pending in a Court, in relation to which the offence (e.g. fabrication of false evidence) is alleged to have been committed. Where there was no such proceeding pending in any Court, but there was simply an investigation being held into the matter of a complaint during the course of which the offence was alleged to have been committed, no complaint is necessary under this section—*Jagat Chandra v. Q. E.*, 26 Cal. 786 (790).

This section does not apply where the fabrication of false evidence was made not with the intention of using that evidence in a Court, but only with the intention of influencing the Police in their investigation—*Emp v. Ismail*, 52 Bom. 385, 30 Bom.L.R. 330, 29 Cr.L.J. 403 (406).

Where there was no proceeding, pending or disposed of, in which or in relation to which, an offence under sec. 193 I. P. Code is said to have been committed, no complaint is necessary—*In re Govind Pandurang*, 45 Bom. 668 (671), 22 Bom. L.R. 1239, 22 Cr.L.J. 49.

622. Court:—The word "Court" in this section has a wider meaning than a Court of Justice as defined in the Penal Code. Having regard to the obvious purpose for which this section was enacted, the widest possible meaning should be given to this word, and it will include a tribunal empowered to deal with a particular matter and authorised to receive evidence on that matter in order to come to a determination (e.g. a tribunal formed under the Calcutta Improvement Act)—*Nunda Lal v. Kheira Mohan*, 45 Cal. 585, *Raghubans v. Kokil*, 17 Cal. 872; *Seadut Ali v. Emp.*, 11 C.W.N. 909.

The word "Court" cannot be so construed as to include a Court in a Native State, e.g. Baroda Court—*In re Muljibhai*, 49 Bom. 860, 27 Bom. L.R. 1063, 26 Cr.L.J. 1456.

The expression 'Court' in sec. 195 is of wider scope than the expression Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court in sec. 476. This is indicated by the word 'includes' occurring in sec. 195 (2). Section 476 speaks of a civil, revenue or criminal Court, it does not refer to any Court other than such Courts, whereas sec. 195 refers to Courts in general—*Kanhaiya Lal v. Bhagwan Das*, 48 All. 60, 23 A.L.J. 956, 26 Cr.L.J. 1485, A.L.R. 1926 All. 30; *Bilal Singh v. Emp.*, 47 All. 934, 23 A.L.J. 845, A.L.R. 1925 All. 737 (per Sulaiman J.; Daniels J. contra). But the Calcutta High Court holds that although the word used in sub-section (2) of this section is 'includes,' the Courts which can make a complaint under this

section are restricted to the Courts detailed in sec. 476. Reading sec. 476 together with sec. 195, it is difficult to see what would be the Court contemplated by sec. 195 other than Civil, Revenue or Criminal Courts—*Galstaun v. Banku Behari*, 31 C.W.N. 825 (827), 28 Cr.L.J. 809.

What are 'Courts':—A Collector acting in appraisal proceedings under Secs 69 and 70 of the Bengal Tenancy Act—*Raghubans v. Kokil*, 17 Cal. 872; a Certificate Officer acting under section III of Bengal Act I of 1895 (Public Demands Recovery Act)—*Sunder v. Sital*, 28 Cal. 217; a Tahsildar holding an enquiry as to whether a transfer of names in a land register should be made or not is a Court, since he is authorised under Madras Act III of 1869 to receive evidence and to come to a judicial determination as to whether the transfer should be made or not—*Q. E. v. Munda*, 24 Mad. 121; a village Munsiff trying a case under Regulation IV of 1816—*Q. E. v. Venkayya*, 11 Mad. 375; a Registrar of the Presidency Small Cause Court of Calcutta is a Court, since he is entitled to decide the question of service of summons, and is entitled to receive evidence in order to come to a finding on that matter—*Balchand v. Taraknath*, 18 C.W.N. 1323, 16 Cr.L.J. 151; a District Judge determining the validity of election under Sec 22 Bombay District Municipalities Act (III of 1911)—*In re Nanchand*, 37 Bom 365; an Income Tax Collector—*In re Punamchand*, 38 Bom 642; *Nataraja v. Emp.*, 36 Mad. 72; *K. E. v. Rup Singh*, 1905 P R 44, a tribunal constituted by the Calcutta Improvement Act (V of 1911)—*Nundo Lal v. Khetra Mohan*, 45 Cal. 585, a Deputy Commissioner acting under 5 (ii) or 5 (iii) of the Rules made under sec. 240 of the Punjab Municipal Act (III of 1911)—*Karimulla v. Emp.*, 22 Cr L J. 525 (Lah)

What are not Courts—A Collector or Deputy Collector acting under the Land Acquisition Act—*Durga Das v Q E*, 27 Cal 820; *Ezra v. Secretary of State*, 30 Cal. 36, 7 C.W.N. 249, *Galstaun v Banku Behary*, 31 C.W.N. 825; a Collector to whom an application is made to replace a damaged stamp—*Q. v. Gour Mohan*, 11 W R 48, a Commissioner appointed for the examination of a witness—*Seadut Ali v Emp.*, 11 C.W.N. 909; an arbitrator appointed by the Court—*Puttiah v Veerasami*, 17 M.L.J. 420, *Mula Mal v. Chiranjilal*, 1914 P R 3, 15 Cr.L.J. 358; a Registration officer—*Gopi Nath v. Kuldip*, 11 Cal. 566; *Mulfat v Emp.*, 10 C.W.N. 222, a Police officer examining a person under section 161 in the course of an investigation—*Q E v Ismal*, 11 Bom. 659; a Police patel—*Emp. v. Irbasapa*, 4 Bom 479, an Excise Collector—*Mahadeo v. Narayan*, 10 C.W.N. 220, an Assistant Collector holding a departmental inquiry under the Bombay Land Revenue Code into the misconduct of a subordinate—*In re Chotalal*, 22 Bom 936, a Collector in his administrative (and not judicial) capacity—*Emp v Santi Lal*, 42 All. 130; a certificate Officer acting under II & O Public Demands Recovery Act—*Jharu Lal v. Mohant Madan Das*, 2 Pat 257, (but see 28 Cal. 217 cited above), a Naeb Tahsildar acting in his administrative capacity as Revenue officer and not in his judicial capacity as a Revenue Court—*Crown v Lehna Singh*, 1915 P.R. 18; a District Judge in his capacity as District Registrar—*Dina Nath v. Nek Ram*, 21 A L.J. 88;

Magistrate passing order under section 144 of this Code does so as a public servant and not as a Court—*Natarajan v. Rangasami*, 44 M.L.J. 328.

623. What Court can make complaint :—The only Courts that can make complaints for prosecution for an offence are those before which the alleged offence was committed, or the Courts to which such Courts are subordinate—*Jaggut v. Kashi Chunder*, ■ Cal. 440. Where a plaintiff first instituted a suit in one Court and obtained a decree for a part of his claim, and then presented a fresh claim in another Court in respect of the item disallowed by the first Court, and fraudulently obtained an *ex parte* decree, whereupon the first Court took action under sec. 195 Cr P C. and made a complaint in writing under sec. 210 I. P. Code, held that the action could only be taken by the second Court, and not by the first Court, because the institution of the second suit and the obtaining of a decree by fraudulent means could not be held to be an offence committed in relation to proceedings in the first Court—*Wishnu v. Crown*, 6 Lah 445, 26 P L R. 717, 26 Cr L J. 1588.

As a general rule, complaints should be made by the Court before which the offence is alleged to have been committed and not by any other Court—*In re Raja of Venkatagiri*, 6 M H.C R 92; *Nga Aung v. K. E.*, 9 Bur. L.T. 202, 18 Cr.L.J. 97; *Karim Baksh v. Mulchand*, 1879 P.R. 29. But a complaint may be made in the first instance by the superior Court, even though no complaint was made by the subordinate Court before which the offence was committed—*Palaniappa v. Annamalai*, 27 Mad. 223; *Bhadeswar v. Kampta Prasad*, 35 All. 90, 11 A L J. 11. Thus, the High Court can make a complaint while exercising its powers of revision—*Ponnusami v. Chockalingam*, 25 M L J 593, 14 Cr.L.J. 624, *Gudala v. Jamal*, 16 Cr L J 740 (Mad), and consequently the High Court can direct that its order in the revision case should issue as a complaint to the Magistrate—*Syed Khan v. Nagoor*, 3 Bur. L J 141, 26 Cr.L.J. 262

The Court contemplated by this section is the Court before which the offence is committed. Where, therefore, the offence of perjury was committed before the Sessions Court of Ahmedabad, and subsequently a portion of the territory subject to its jurisdiction was placed under the newly constituted Sessions Court of Kaira, held that the new Sessions Judge, though having territorial jurisdiction over the accused, had no power to make a complaint regarding the offence which was committed before the Sessions Court of Ahmedabad—*In re Maneklal*, 28 Bom.L R. 1296, 28 Cr L.J 49.

Transfer of Judge :—As a matter of convenience and expediency, the complaint should be made by the Judge who tried the case, if he is present, if he is not present, it may be made by any other Judge of the same Court—*Emp. v. Molla Fuzla Karim*, 33 Cal. 193; *Yad Ram v. Risal*, 7 A.L.J. 50. The complaint may be made by the successor-in-office of the Judge who tried the case in which the offence was committed—*Begu Singh v. Emp.*, 34 Cal. 551; *In re Lalit Mohan*, ■ C.L.J. 176; *Dharamdas v. Sajore*, 11 C.W.N. 119; *Karim Buksh v. Mulchand*, 1879 P.R. 29. See sec. 559 as now amended. Under this clause, the complaint can be made

only by the Court in question before whom the offence is alleged to have been committed, and not the particular public servant concerned who made the inquiry. Therefore where a Deputy Magistrate dismissed a complaint as false, and was then transferred to another district, the complaint is to be made not by that particular Deputy Magistrate but by the successor of that person in the office of the Deputy Magistrate—*Ram Ajodhya v. Emp.*, 11 P.L.T. 674, 28 Cr.L.J. 643.

Where a Deputy Magistrate who had tried the case was transferred from the district, and the complaint was made by the District Magistrate, before whom all cases pending before the Deputy Magistrate were placed, it was held that although the cases pending in the Court of the transferred Magistrate were placed before the District Magistrate either for disposal or for re-distribution among his subordinate Magistrates, still he never became the presiding Judge of the Deputy Magistrate's Court and therefore was not competent to make the complaint—*Mofizuddin v. Basanta*, 16 Cr.L.J. 640 (Cal). Where there are several Deputy Magistrates at a subdivision and one of them is transferred, and another officer is appointed to the subdivision in general terms and not "in place of" the outgoing officer, the Deputy Magistrate who comes to fill the gap is not the successor-in-office of the outgoing Deputy Magistrate, and the former cannot make a complaint under this section in respect of an offence committed before the latter—*Girish Chandra v. Sarat Chandra*, 42 Cal 667 (669, 674), following *Mohesh Chandra v. Emp.*, 35 Cal. 457 (460). An abetment of perjury was committed in the course of an inquiry before a committing Magistrate (who was a first class Magistrate). While the proceedings were pending before him, the Magistrate was transferred and was succeeded by a second class Magistrate (who had no power to commit). The outgoing Magistrate therefore sent the proceedings to the District Magistrate. It was held that the District Magistrate had jurisdiction to make a complaint in respect of the offence, for he was 'such Court' referred to in clause (1) (b) of this section, and was the officer on whom devolved the disposal of committal of cases in the district—*In re Ram Rao* 42 Bom 190, 20 Bom. L. R. 117.

Transfer of case.—Where a case is transferred to another Court, it is the Court which tries the case on the merits that can make the complaint and not the Court which took cognizance of the case and issued process—*Jeeban Krista v. Benoy Kristo*, 6 C.W.N. 35, *Putram v. Mahomed Kasim*, 11 C.W.N. 33. Where a case was transferred by a Magistrate to another Magistrate for investigation, the Court which investigated the case was the proper Court to order the prosecution and not the Court which transferred the case, since the Court which transferred the case ceased to have jurisdiction in the matter, see *Emp. v. Bhiku*, 39 Cal 1041, 16 C.W.N. 885. But where a false complaint against a public servant made to a Deputy Commissioner, was simply referred (and not transferred) for inquiry and report under section 202 to a Subdivisional Magistrate, the latter could not make order for the prosecution of the complainant for bringing a false case—*Asmatulla v. Emp.* 4 C.W.N. 366. But in another Calcutta case, an opinion has been expressed that an order for prosecution for bringing a

false case can be made by the Magistrate investigating the case under sec. 202 and not by the Magistrate who sent the case to the former for investigation—*Maniruddin v. Abdul Ranj*, 40 Cal. 41 (44).

Commitment of case—In a case committed to the Sessions, it is the Sessions Court and not the committing Magistrate who can make a complaint for prosecution of a witness who made false statements before the committing Magistrate, because such statements are said to be made in relation to proceedings before the Sessions Court—*Narayana v. Palaniappa*, 5 L.W. 218, 18 Cr.L.J. 143, *Anonymous*, 2 Weir 160.

Court acting in a different capacity :—The Collector of a District in deciding a revenue appeal came to the conclusion that a receipt filed in the case was not genuine. He took no steps in this connection as Collector, but acting as the District Magistrate made a complaint. It was held that the act of the District Magistrate was *ultra vires*—*Emp v Ram Sahai*, 40 All. 144, 16 A.L.J. 68, 19 Cr.L.J. 201.

Temporary Court :—The Court of the City Magistrate not being a permanent one with a perpetual succession of Judges, only the Sessions Judge and not the successor of such Magistrate on his transfer is competent to make the necessary complaint for prosecution for an offence committed before such Magistrate—*Jia Lal v. Phogomal*, 1918 P.R. 22.

Court abolished and re-established :—Where by a notification in the Gazette, the Court of the Sub-Magistrate at ■ was abolished and two years afterwards the said Court was restored with its territorial limits somewhat curtailed, it was held that there was no such continuity as would enable the High Court to hold that the Court that was re-constituted was the same ■ the one that had ceased to exist; and consequently the new Court could not make a complaint in respect of an offence committed before the old Court—*In re Appa Atla*, 16 Cr.L.J. 787 (Mad.).

624. No delegation of power :—The power to make a complaint must be exercised by the Court before which the offence was committed. The Court cannot delegate that power even to the Public Prosecutor. The filing of a complaint by the Public Prosecutor, in the absence of a complaint by the Court, will not be treated as equivalent to a complaint by the Court—*Crown v Gurdita*, 1917 P.R. 19, 18 Cr.L.J. 548.

625. Clause (c) :—Offences under this clause :—**Offences described in sec 463 I. P. C.** :—The word 'forgery' is used as a general term in sec 463 I. P. C., and that section is referred to in a comprehensive sense in this clause, so as to embrace all species of forgery punishable under the Penal Code, including one under sec. 467 I. P. C.—*Q. E. v. Tulja*, 12 Bom. 36, *Teni Shah v. Bolai Shah*, 14 C. W. N 479; *Khairatu Ram v Malawa Ram*, 5 Lah. 550 (553), 26 Cr.L.J. 537, *Ram Samugh v. Emp*, 3 O.W.N 614, 27 Cr.L.J. 969; *Ismail Panja v. K. E.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1115, A.I.R. 1925 Nag. 337; or an offence under sec 469 I. P. C.—*Asst Sessions Judge v. Ramammal*, 36 Mad. 387; or under sec. 466 I. P. C.—*Anonymous*, Ratanlal 83; *Bachu Behary v. Emp.*, 20 Cr.L.J 630 (Pat.); or under sec. 465 I. P. C.—*Khairati Ram v.*

Malawa Ram, 5 Lah. 550. But II does not include an offence under sec. 474 I. P. C.—*Asrabuddin v. Kalidayal*, 19 C.W.N. 125.

Since an 'offence described in sec. 463' includes an offence under sec. 467 I. P. Code, it follows that where a prosecution of an accused is ordered only under sec. 471 I. P. Code, without referring to any other section, but he is tried and convicted under secs. 471 and 467 I. P. Code, the conviction under the latter section is not sustainable, as there was no complaint in respect of an offence under that section—*Ram Samujh v. Emp.*, 1 Luck. 523, 3 O.W.N. 614, 27 Cr L J 969 (970).

A complaint may be made by the Court for prosecuting the plaintiff for bringing a false claim on a forged document, even though the case in which the claim was held to be false was decided by consent of the parties—*Emp. v. Ram Narain*, 27 Cr.L.J. 1021 (All.). Cf. *Narain Das v. Emp.*, 25 A.L.J. 559, 28 Cr.L.J. 549

Where the original complaint made by the Court was in respect of abetment by conspiracy, and the Magistrate acting on the facts disclosed in the evidence for the prosecution added a second charge of abetment of forgery in an account book produced before the Insolvency Court in pursuance of the alleged conspiracy, held that a complaint of the Insolvency Court was not necessary, for the second charge was in respect of an act done in pursuance of the conspiracy mentioned in the original complaint. Sec 235 of the Code also permits a joinder of such charges—*Abdul Rahman v. Emp.*, 4 Bur. L.J. 213, 27 Cr L.J. 669.

626. "Alleged to have been committed" :—These words have been substituted by the Select Committee of 1916 for the word "committed" in deference to the remarks made by Piggott J. in *Emperor v. Bhawani Das*, 38 All. 169 at page 172. "With regard to the actual wording of the sub-section under consideration it does seem to me to be somewhat lacking in precision. To forbid a Court to take cognizance of an offence committed by a party is open to the criticism that no Court can decide whether an offence was 'committed' or not until after it has taken cognizance. It seems necessary, therefore, to read the word 'committed' as equivalent to the expression "alleged to have been committed." See also *Janardhan v. Baldeo Prasad*, 5 P L J 135

627. Document :—The word 'document' in this section means the original document. Where the original forged document was not produced or given in evidence, but only a registration copy of it was produced in the suit, no complaint by the Court was necessary for a prosecution under secs 465 and 467 I P C—*K E v Raja Mustafa*, 11 O.C. 313, 2 Cr.L.J. 653. The words 'produced or given in evidence' in this section refer only to the production of the original and not to the production of a copy, and this for the very reason that the Court before which a copy of the document is produced is not really in a position to express any opinion about the genuineness of the original—*Girdhari Lal v. Emp.*, 29 O C 1, 2 O.W.N. 174, 26 Cr L J 929

628. "Produced or given in evidence" :—Complaint by the Court is necessary if the document was produced in Court—*Arach*

uddin v. Kalidayal, 19 C.W.N. 125, 10 Cr.L.J. 309, even though it was not given in evidence—*Akhil Chandra v. Q. E.*, 22 Cal. 1004; *In re Gopal*, 11 Bom. L.R. 735. The word "or" which intervenes between the word "produced" and the words "given in evidence" shows that it is disjunctive, and that a complaint is necessary not only in cases where the document has been given in evidence, but also in cases where it has been produced—*Babu Jha*, 9 P.L.T. 800, 30 Cr.L.J. 236 (239). The word "produced" has been added in the Code of 1898, and did not exist in the old Codes, and therefore the decision in *Abdul Khadar v. Meera Sahib*, 15 Mad. 224, (in which it was held that no sanction was necessary unless the document was given in evidence) is no longer good law.

Complaint by the Court is necessary, if the document is 'produced' i.e. tendered in evidence, although it is not exhibited and marked nor considered by the Court—*Gura Charan v. Giriya*, 29 Cal. 887, *Emp. v. Bansī*, 51 Cal. 469, 26 Cr.L.J. 24 (26). The mere filing of the document is tantamount to production, and is sufficient to constitute the offence—*Rate Jha v. K. E.*, 39 Cal. 463; *Asrabuddin v. Kalidayal*, 19 C.W.N. 125; *Mobarak Ali v. Emp.*, 17 C.W.N. 94, 13 Cr.L.J. 449; *Tularam v. Emp.*, 28 Cr.L.J. 388 (Nag). Where a party to a proceeding hands up a document to the Judge who does not take the document on the file, but returns it to the party, the document is 'produced' all the same within the meaning of this clause—*Gulab Chand v. Emp.*, 49 Bom. 799, 27 Bom. L.R. 1039, 27 Cr.L.J. 251.

Where a certified copy of a forged entry in an account-book was accompanied with the plaint, and then under O. 7, r. 17, C. P. Code, the account-book was produced before the Court, and the munsarim then checked the copy and marked the account-book and returned it to the plaintiff, held that as the account-book was produced before the Court, any offence committed in respect of this account-book (viz. offence under secs 467 and 471 I P. Code) has certainly been committed in respect of a document produced in Court, although it may be that the book was never called to the Court after it had been shown to the munsarim (the case having been decided on the oath of the defendant)—*Rameshwar Lal v. Emp.*, 49 All. 898, 25 A.L.J. 555, 28 Cr.L.J. 668.

This clause is wide enough to cover a document produced or given in evidence in the course of a proceeding, whether produced or given in evidence by the party who is alleged to have committed the offence or by any one else—*In re Bhau Vyankatesh*, 49 Bom. 608, 27 Bom. L.R. 607, 27 Cr.L.J. 69. In other words, two things are necessary under clause (c), viz.—(1) the document must be produced or given in evidence in the proceeding, (2) the offence must be alleged to have been committed by a party to the proceeding, but it is not necessary that the person who produces the document in Court must be the offender himself.

Where a document was not produced in the suit but was disclosed in an affidavit filed therein, and inspection thereof was allowed to the other side, and it was filed in the office of the Translator of the High Court for translation, held that these actions did not amount to producing

the document in evidence, as it was not *actually produced* in Court, and therefore no complaint of the Court was necessary for prosecution under secs. 465, 467 and 474 I. P. C. in respect of that document—*Munisamy v. Rajaratnam*, 45 Mad. 928 (F.B.), 43 M.L.J. 375, A.I.R. 1922 Mad 495. Where in a proceeding under sec. 145 a document comes into Court attached to a police report, prior to the proceeding, the document is not said to be *produced* in Court, and even if it is, neither of the parties to the proceeding is a party to its production; consequently the complaint of the Court is not necessary as a condition precedent to the institution of criminal proceedings against the guilty party upon a charge under section 463 I. P. C.—*Janardhan v. Baldeo Prasad*, 5 P.L.J. 135

It is not using a forged document as genuine if the document is produced in obedience to a summons from the Court. An involuntary production of a document in Court cannot amount to any use of it—*Asst. Sessions Judge v. Ramammal*, 36 Mad. 387, 22 M.L.J. 141. *Ma Ain Lon v. Ma On Nu*, 3 Rang 36, 3 Bur L.J. 349

A document is said to be 'given in evidence' when it is handed over to the Court, although the Court may reject it for insufficiency of stamp or want of registration—*Q. E. v. Nagin Das, Ratanlal* 242

There is a conflict of opinion as to whether a complaint of the Court, is necessary in respect of an offence mentioned in clause (1) (c) when such offence has been committed *prior* to the production of the document in Court. The Bombay High Court holds that where an offence under sec. 471 I. P. C. (using as genuine a forged document) in respect of a document produced in Court has been committed *before* it comes into Court, no complaint of the Court is necessary, the use complained of being *prior* to its production in Court—*Noor Mahomed v. Kaikhosru*, 4 Bom. L.R. 268. The Allahabad High Court also holds that so long as the prosecution is confined to offences connected with a document prior to its production in Court no sanction is required. All that clause (c) prohibits is taking cognizance of an offence described in sec. 463 I. P. C. when such offence has been committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court with respect to a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding—*Lalla Prasad v. K. E.*, 34 All 654, 10 A.L.J. 294. So also, the Punjab Chief Court holds that no complaint by a Court is necessary where the offence of instigation of the fabrication of false evidence (under sec. 466 I. P. C.) appears to have been committed at a time when there were no proceedings whatsoever in any Court and the police were merely inquiring into the circumstances of the case—*Crown v. Ajaib Singh*, 1917 P.R. 34

But the Calcutta High Court is of opinion that a complaint of the Court is necessary under such circumstances, because the very fact that the document is produced in Court will bring the case within the purview of this section, and it is immaterial that the forgery is alleged to have been committed before the production of the document in Court—*Tariq Shah v. Bolai Shah* 14 C.W.N. 479. *Nalini Kanto v. Anukul*, 44 Cal. 1002. The same view has been taken in two Allahabad cases—*Erip.*

v. *Bhawani*, 38 All. 169, 14 A.L.J. 74; *Kanhaiya Lal v. Bhagwan Das*, 48 All. 60, 23 A.L.J. 956, 26 Cr.L.J. 1485. The Madras High Court also holds that this section is not limited to cases where the fabrication is committed *pendente lite*, but it extends to cases of fabrication of false evidence *in advance*—*In re Parameshwaran*, 39 Mad. 677, 18 M.L.T. 322. And recently the Lahore High Court has also expressed the view that where a document has been produced in Court by a party, the sanction (complaint) of such Court is necessary for his prosecution in respect of an *antecedent forgery*—*Khairati Ram v. Malawa Ram*, 5 Lah. 550 (552) following *Nalini Kanta v. Anukul*, 44 Cal. 1002 and *Teni Shah v. Bolai Shah*, 14 C.W.N. 479.

The Court making a complaint should specify the document in respect of which the forgery has been committed, as well as the particular act or acts of forgery—*In re Brindrabun*, 10 W.R. 41.

629. 'Party':—Complaint is necessary if the document is produced or given in evidence by a party to the proceeding. But no complaint is necessary to prosecute a witness in the proceeding since a witness is not a party—*John Martin Sequeira v. Lujya Bai*, 25 Mad. 671; *In re Eadara*, 3 Mad. 400; *Sessions Judge v. Kondeti*, 26 M.L.J. 220, 15 Cr.L.J. 242; *Crown v. Jiwan Mal*, 1917 P.R. 10, *Debilal v. Dhajadhari*, 15 C.W.N. 565; nor is a complaint necessary to prosecute the agent of a party—*Chand Mal v. Emp.*, 1879 P.R. 9; *Fatima v. Raman*, 3 Bur. L.T. 108, 12 Cr.L.J. 87; or an abettor if he is not a party—*Chaudhri Ghansham v. Emp.*, 32 All. 74. A claimant in insolvency proceedings is a party to the proceedings and a complaint is necessary for his prosecution in respect of statements contained in an affidavit filed by him before the Official Assignee in support of his claim—*In re Hajee Mohamed*, 36 M.L.J. 60. A complainant in a criminal proceeding is a party to the proceeding—*Kanhaiyalal v. Bhagwan*, 48 All. 60, 23 A.L.J. 956, 26 Cr.L.J. 1485.

When an offence of forgery is committed by more than one person, one of them only being a party to the proceedings in which the document is produced, no complaint of the Court is necessary for the prosecution of those participants in the forgery who are not parties to the proceedings—*In re Ponnuswami*, 33 L.W. 769, 30 Cr.L.J. 469; *Anna Ayyar v. Emp.*, 30 Mad. 226. Contra—*In re Narayan*, 12 Bom. L.R. 383, 11 Cr.L.J. 368.

This clause lays down that complaint of the Court is necessary to prosecute a party who produced a forged document in that Court. But there is nothing in this section forbidding the Court to make complaint against persons other than the party to the proceeding in the Court, who are alleged to have been concerned in the offence—*Emp. v. Balmuland*, 9 Lah. 678, 29 Cr.L.J. 652 (655).

630. Proceeding in Court:—No sanction or complaint is necessary if the offence is not committed in relation to any proceeding in a Court. Thus, where a mahal belonging to several co-sharers having been sold under the Public Demands Recovery Act, a surplus was lying in deposit with the certificate officer, and a mukhtar filed an application to withdraw that deposit, purporting to have been signed by all the co-

sharers, but the signatures of two of them were alleged to be forged, held that the surplus sale-proceeds not having been entrusted to the certificate officer in his capacity as a Court, no complaint by the Court was necessary for the prosecution of the alleged forgers—*Jharu Lal v. Mahant Madan Das*, 2 Pat. 257.

631. Subsection (3)—Subordination of Courts :—This sub-section applies only to subordination of Courts. Thus, where a Subordinate Magistrate acts as an executive officer, his subordination must be determined with reference to sec 17 (i.e. he is subordinate to the Subdivisional Magistrate or the District Magistrate as the case may be) and he cannot be deemed as subordinate to the Sessions Judge—*Sankaran v. Sakkarappa*, 2 Weir 155; *Maini Misser v Emp.*, 8 Pat. 39, 28 Cr.L J 353

But the word 'Court' in this sub-section is not confined to the Courts mentioned in clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1), but applies also to the public servant in clause (a) of that subsection when such public servant is acting as a Court and the offence is committed in connection with proceedings in which the public servant concerned is so acting—*Arunachalam v. Ponnusami*, 42 Mad 64, followed in *In re Budiuddin*, 47 Bom 102. Therefore, although a Sub-Magistrate is no doubt a public servant in his capacity of an administrative officer, still if he is acting in his judicial capacity, he must be deemed to be a 'Court' and is therefore subordinate to the Court to which an appeal from his order would lie, under the provisions of this sub-section—*Arunachalam v. Ponnusami*, 42 Mad. 64, 35 M.L.J. 454, 20 Cr.L J. 78. Similarly, a first class Magistrate is a public servant and as such subordinate to the District Magistrate, but if he acts as a Court, he must be taken to be subordinate to the Court to which appeals lie from his Court, viz., the Court of the Sessions Judge—*In re Budiuddin*, 47 Bom 102, 24 Bom. L.R. 810, 23 Cr L.J 578.

Every Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Court to which appeals from the former will ordinarily lie Thus—

The District Magistrate is subordinate to the Sessions Judge—*Jivan Mal v. Beli Ram*, 1917 P R. 11, *In re Panchlam*, 42 Mad. 96; *Shankar Dial v. Venables*, 19 All. 121, *Ram Kushen v. Mahram*, 1908 P W.R. 24. A first class Magistrate is subordinate to the Sessions Judge—*Mala Ram v. Emp.*, 1902 P.R. 7 (overruling *Soba Singh v. Lal Chand*, 1901 P R. 30); *Aly Md v. Emp.*, 1912 P R 2, 12 Cr L J. 539, as also in the Additional Sessions Judge (under the provisions of secs 408 and 409 read together) —*In re Sikandar*, 44 Bom 877, *Nishi Chandra v Ramesh Chandra*, 14 Cr.L J 195 (Cal.), *Kusum v. Janak Lal*, 4 P L J 374. A committing second class Magistrate is subordinate to the Sessions Judge—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 160. The Assistant Magistrate is subordinate to the Sessions Judge and not to the District Magistrate—*Shankar Dial v Venables*, 19 All 121.

A second or third class Magistrate is subordinate to the District Magistrate and not to any first class Magistrate—*Eroma v Emp.* 26 Mad. 656; *In re Subharnna*, 27 Mad 124, *Sadhu Lal v Ram Churn*, 30 Cal. 394; *Mohim Chandra v. Emp.*, 56 Cal. 824, 33 C W.N. 285; *Jiwani v. Emp.*

2 Lah L.J. 660; *Ramdayal v. Ram Prasad*, 3 N.L.R. 50; *Ram Deni v. Nand Lal*, 30 All. 109, *K. Anantaramayya v. Chikkatla*, 41 Mad 787, *Ahmad Husain v. Rahuman*, 26 O.C. 358; *Pallikudathan v. Buddu*, 47 Mad. 229, 45 M.L.J. 553, because an appeal from the 2nd or 3rd class Magistrate ordinarily lies under sec 407 (1) to the District Magistrate, and not to any other 1st class subordinate Magistrate to whom the District Magistrate has delegated under sec 407 (2) his power to hear appeals from 2nd or 3rd class Magistrates—Ibid.

A Sub-Judge is subordinate to the District Judge and not to the High Court—*Narayanan v. Kadisaya*, 44 M.L.J. 320; *Ganesh v. Jittan*, 17 A.L.J. 191, *Hubbar v. Sajjad Ali*, 22 O.C. 189

A Munsiff's Court is subordinate to the District Judge's Court—*Bure Khan v. Emp.*, 1898 P.R. 16, *Munshi v. Gandoomal*, 1900 P.R. 25, *Miran v. Belu Ram*, 1916 P.L.R. 67, *Sundar Singh v. Phuman*, 2 Lah L.J. 415; but not to the Subordinate Judge's Court, although appeals from the Munsiff's Court are generally transferred by the District Judge to the Subordinate Judge—*Ram Charan v. Taripulla*, 39 Cal. 774. But when under the law or by a notification certain appeals from the Munsiff's decrees lie to a first class Subordinate Judge, the Munsiff will be deemed as subordinate not to the District Judge but to the 1st class subordinate Judge—*Labhu Ram v. Nand Ram*, 1918 P.R. 29, 19 Cr.L.J. 975, *Ramayya v. Sukayya*, 28 M.L.J. 486, *Dina Nath v. Md. Abdulla*, 2 Lah 57, *Jwala Singh v. Madan Gopal*, 27 Cr.L.J. 75 (Lah.); *Ramchandra v. Emp.*, 8 Pat. 428, 30 Cr.L.J. 834

The Commissioner's Court at Santal Parganas is subordinate to the Court of the Commissioner of Bhagalpur, and not to the High Court—*Munna Lal v. Padman*, 30 Cal. 916.

A first class Magistrate is not subordinate to the District Magistrate but to the Sessions Judge—*Mihu Lal v. Lareti*, 5 A.L.J. 562; *Emp. v. Narotam*, 11 All. 98, *Malu Ram v. Emp.*, 1902 P.R. 7 (overruling *Soha Singh v. Lal Chand*, 1901 P.R. 30); *Aly Mohd. v. Emp.*, 1912 P.R. 2. *In re Budiuddin*, 47 Bom. 102, *Mofizuddin v. Basanta*, 16 Cr.L.J. 640 (Cal.); *Sant Ram v. Dewan Chand*, 24 Cr.L.J. 913.

A single Judge on the original side of the High Court is subordinate to the Divisional Bench on the Appellate side hearing appeals from the judgment of the single Judge—*Munisamy v. Rajaratnam*, 45 Mad. 928 (F.B.); *Abdul Latif v. Haji Tar Mahomed*, 47 Bom. 270.

Where no appeals lie, the original Civil Court will be deemed to be subordinate to the principal Court of original Civil jurisdiction. Thus, the Provincial Small Cause Court is subordinate to the District Court—*Chidda Lal v. Bhagan Lal*, 39 All. 657 (F.B.); *Lalzu v. K. E.*, 4 P.L.J. 609; *Nibaran v. Akshoy*, 21 C.W.N. 948; *Ram Dayal v. Duarka*, 20 O.C. 223, *Panchu v. Jumman*, 11 O.W.N. 848, 1929 Cr. C. 589; *Iyavoo v. Thayammal*, 18 Cr.L.J. 977 (Bur.), *In re Ram Prasad*, 37 Cal. 13; (Contra—*Sukhdco v. Dt. Magistrate*, 2 P.L.J. 1; *Ambika v. K. E.*, 1 P.L.J. 206). The Mamlatdar's Court is subordinate to the District Judge—*Gurunath v. Narasimha*, 5 Bom. L.R. 206; *Narayan v. Tularam*, 11

Bom. L.R. 896. The Presidency Small Cause Court is subordinate to the High Court in its Appellate side. The words "principal Court of original Civil jurisdiction," when applied to the High Court, do not mean only the original side of the High Court, but apply to the appellate side also—*Jamnadas v. Sabapathi*, 36 Mad 138, *Kalyanec v. Ram Deen*, 48 Mad. 395, 48 M.L.J. 290. The village Munsiff is subordinate to the District Judge—*Sundar Lal v. K E*, 6 A.L.J. 796, 10 Cr.L.J. 437. It should be noted that the latter part of subsection (3) is now restricted to civil Courts only, whereas under the old law, it applied to any Court and the words used were "the principal Court of original jurisdiction" which included a Criminal and Revenue Court, and therefore it was held that in respect of an execution proceeding in a Revenue Court under the Agra Tenancy Act, from which no appeal lay, the principal Court of original jurisdiction was the Collector—*Ajudhia v Ram Lal*, 34 All 197. The present law has made no provisions for such cases

632. Clause (a) :—Where appeals lie to more than one Court, the Appellate Court of inferior jurisdiction would be the Court to which the original Court must be deemed to be subordinate—*Ram Krishna v Mohan Lal*, 8 N.L.R. 57, 13 Cr.L.J. 498. Thus, the Subordinate Judge would be held to be inferior to the District Judge and not to the High Court, even though the appeal in the particular instance would lie to the High Court—*Imp. v. Lakshman*, 2 Bom 481, *In re Anant Ramchandra*, 11 Bom. 438. So also the Recorder's Court at Rangoon is subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of this section, though in the particular case the appeal may lie to the Privy Council—*Maduray v Elderton*, 22 Cal 487.

633. Clause (b) :—"or proceeding"—These words have been added in deference to the opinion expressed by the Judges in *Ajudhia Prosad v. Ram Lal*, 34 All. 197. In this case a suit was brought in the Court of the Assistant Collector for arrears of rent exceeding Rs 100, and in execution proceeding thereof certain false statements were made. The suit being one for rent exceeding Rs 100 was appealable, but the execution proceeding was not appealable according to the provisions of the Agra Tenancy Act. The question arose—to which Court was the Assistant Collector subordinate? and to determine this question it was necessary to decide whether clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (7) of the old section was applicable. It was contended that since the 'case' being one for rent exceeding Rs 100 was appealable (though the execution proceeding was not), clause (b) would apply, but the Judges held that the word 'case' in clause (b) included execution proceedings, and since the execution proceeding in the present case was not appealable, clause (b) could not apply, as that clause applies only where an appeal lies. The case was therefore governed by clause (c) of sub-section (7).

634. Subsection (4) —Abetment—A distinction has been drawn between the abetment of an offence mentioned in clause (b) of subsection (1) and the abetment of an offence mentioned in clause (c). Since clause (c) speaks only of offences committed by a party to the pro-

2 Lah L.J. 660; *Ramdayal v. Ram Prasad*, 3 N.L.R. 50; *Ram Deni v. Nand Lal*, 30 All. 109; *K. Anantaramayya v. Chikkatla*, 41 Mad 787, *Ahmad Husain v. Rahiman*, 26 O.C. 358; *Pallikudathan v. Buddu*, 47 Mad 229, 45 M.L.J. 553, because an appeal from the 2nd or 3rd class Magistrate ordinarily lies under sec. 407 (1) to the District Magistrate, and not to any other 1st class subordinate Magistrate to whom the District Magistrate has delegated under sec. 407 (2) his power to hear appeals from 2nd or 3rd class Magistrates—*Ibid.*

A Sub-Judge is subordinate to the District Judge and not to the High Court—*Narayanan v. Kadisaya*, 44 M.L.J. 320; *Ganesh v. Jittan*, 17 A.L.J. 191, *Hubbar v. Sajjad Ali*, 22 O.C. 189

A Munsiff's Court is subordinate to the District Judge's Court—*Bure Khan v. Emp.*, 1898 P.R. 16, *Munshi v. Gandomal*, 1900 P.R. 25, *Miran v. Beli Ram*, 1916 P.L.R. 67, *Sundar Singh v. Phuman*, 2 Lah L.J. 415; but not to the Subordinate Judge's Court, although appeals from the Munsiff's Court are generally transferred by the District Judge to the Subordinate Judge—*Ram Charan v. Taripulla*, 39 Cal. 774. But when under the law or by a notification certain appeals from the Munsiff's decrees lie to a first class Subordinate Judge, the Munsiff will be deemed as subordinate not to the District Judge but to the 1st class subordinate Judge—*Labhu Ram v. Nand Ram*, 1918 P.R. 29, 19 Cr.L.J. 975; *Ramayya v. Sukayya*, 28 M.L.J. 486, *Dina Nath v. Md. Abdulla*, 2 Lah. 57, *Jwala Singh v. Madan Gopal*, 27 Cr.L.J. 75 (Lah.); *Ramchandra v. Emp.*, 8 Pat 428, 30 Cr.L.J. 834

The Commissioner's Court at Santal Parganas is subordinate to the Court of the Commissioner of Bhagalpur, and not to the High Court—*Munna Lal v. Padman*, 30 Cal 916

A first class Magistrate is not subordinate to the District Magistrate but to the Sessions Judge—*Mihir Lal v. Lareti*, 5 A.L.J. 562, *Emp. v. Narotam*, 6 All 98, *Malu Ram v. Emp.*, 1902 P.R. 7 (overruling *Suba Singh v. Lal Chand*, 1901 P.R. 30); *Aly Mohd. v. Emp.*, 1912 P.R. 2. *In re Budiuddin*, 47 Bom 102, *Mofizuddin v. Basanta*, 16 Cr.L.J. 640 (Cal.); *Sant Ram v. Dewan Chand*, 24 Cr.L.J. 913

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Where no appeals lie, the original Civil Court will be deemed to be subordinate to the principal Court of original Civil jurisdiction. Thus, the Provincial Small Cause Court is subordinate to the District Court—*Chidda Lal v. Bhagan Lal*, 39 All 657 (P.B.); *Lalji v. K. E.*, 4 P.L.J. 609, *Nibaran v. Akshoy*, 21 C.W.N. 948; *Ram Dayal v. Duarka*, 20 O.C. 223, *Panchu v. Jamman*, 6 O.W.N. 848, 1929 Cr. C. 589; *Iyavoo v. Thayammal*, 18 Cr.L.J. 977 (Bur.); *In re Ram Prasad*, 37 Cal. 13, (Contra—*Sukhdeo v. Dt. Magistrate*, 2 P.L.J. 1; *Ambika v. K. E.*, 1 P.L.J. 206). The Mamlatdar's Court is subordinate to the District Judge—*Gurunath v. Narasimha*, 5 Bom. L.R. 206; *Narayan v. Tukaram*, 9

Bom. L R. 896. The Presidency Small Cause Court is subordinate to the High Court in its Appellate side. The words "principal Court of original Civil jurisdiction," when applied to the High Court, do not mean only the original side of the High Court, but apply to the appellate side also—*Jamnadas v. Sabapathi*, 36 Mad. 138, *Kalyanjee v. Ram Deen*, 48 Mad. 395, 48 M.L.J. 290. The village Munsiff is subordinate to the District Judge—*Sundar Lal v. K. E.*, 11 A.L.J. 796, 10 Cr.L.J. 437. It should be noted that the latter part of subsection (3) is now restricted to civil Courts only, whereas under the old law, it applied to any Court and the words used were "the principal Court of original jurisdiction" which included a Criminal and Revenue Court, and therefore it was held that in respect of an execution proceeding in a Revenue Court under the Agra Tenancy Act, from which no appeal lay, the principal Court of original jurisdiction was the Collector—*Ajudhia v. Ram Lal*, 34 All. 197. The present law has made no provisions for such cases.

632. Clause (a).—Where appeals lie to more than one Court, the Appellate Court of inferior jurisdiction would be the Court to which the original Court must be deemed to be subordinate—*Ram Krishna v. Mohan Lal*, 8 N.L.R. 57, 13 Cr.L.J. 498. Thus, the Subordinate Judge would be held to be inferior to the District Judge and not to the High Court, even though the appeal in the particular instance would lie to the High Court—*Imp v. Lakshman*, 2 Bom 481; *In re Anant Ramchandra*, 11 Bom 438. So also the Recorder's Court at Rangoon is subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of this section, though in the particular case the appeal may lie to the Privy Council—*Maduray v Elderion*, 22 Cal 487.

633. Clause (b).—"or proceeding".—These words have been added in deference to the opinion expressed by the Judges in *Ajudhia Prosad v Ram Lal*, 34 All 197. In this case a suit was brought in the Court of the Assistant Collector for arrears of rent exceeding Rs 100, and in execution proceeding thereof certain false statements were made. The suit being one for rent exceeding Rs 100 was appealable, but the execution proceeding was not appealable according to the provisions of the Agra Tenancy Act. The question arose—to which Court was the Assistant Collector subordinate? and to determine this question it was necessary to decide whether clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (7) of the old section was applicable. It was contended that since the 'case' being one for rent exceeding Rs 100 was appealable (though the execution proceeding was not), clause (b) would apply, but the Judges held that the word 'case' in clause (b) included execution proceedings, and since the execution proceeding in the present case was not appealable, clause (b) could not apply, as that clause applies only where an appeal lies. The case was therefore governed by clause (c) of sub-section (7).

634. Subsection (4)—Abetment.—A distinction has been drawn between the abetment of an offence mentioned in clause (b) of subsection (1) and the abetment of an offence mentioned in clause (c). Since clause (c) speaks only of offences committed by a party to the offence,

ceeding, it follows that no complaint by Court is necessary in respect of an abetment of an offence mentioned in clause (c), if the abettor was not a party to the proceeding—*Emp. v. Ghansham*, 32 All 74. But in the case of offences mentioned in clause (b), an abettor cannot be prosecuted without a previous complaint by the Court, even though he was not a party to the proceeding, because no mention is made of a 'party to the proceeding' in clause (b)—*Ram Bilas v. Lachmi Narain*, 45 All. 140.

634A. Sub-section (5)—Withdrawal of complaint :—

Subsection (5) applies only where a complaint has been made by a public servant, and not by a Court. Where a Magistrate has made a complaint in respect of an offence under sec. 211 I. P. Code, the complaint is deemed to have been made under sub-sec (1) clause (b), by a Court, and not by a public servant. Consequently, sub-section (5) does not apply, and the District Magistrate has no power to order the withdrawal of the complaint—*Ram Prasad v Emp.*, 49 All. 752, 25 A.L.J. 639, 28 Cr.L.J. 543

A Sub-Divisional Magistrate passing an order under sec. 144 Cr. P. Code and making a complaint for the prosecution of the accused under sec. 188 I P. Code for disobedience to that order, acts as a public servant under sub-sec. (1), clause (a) of this section, and not as a Court. Consequently sub-section (3) of this section does not apply. The D. Magistrate is subordinate to the District Magistrate and not to the Sessions Judge (see sec 17) An application for withdrawal of the complaint under sub-section (5) is to be made to the District Magistrate, and not to the Sessions Judge—*Maini Misser v Emp.*, 6 Pat. 39, 28 Cr L J. 353.

196. No Court shall take cognizance of any offence

punishable under Chapter VI or IXA of the Indian Penal Code (except Section 127), or punishable under Section 108A, or Section 153A, or Section 294A, or Section 295A, or Section 505 of the same Code, unless upon complaint made by order of, or under authority from, the Governor-General in Council, the Local Government, or some officer empowered by the Governor-General in Council in this behalf.

Amendments :—The words "or IXA" have been added by sec. 3 of Act XXXIX of 1920 (Election Offences and Inquiries Act).

The words "or section 295A" have been recently added by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1927 (XXV of 1927)

634B. A complaint of an offence under section 171E (falling under Chapter IXA) of the I. P. C requires a sanction under this section—*Ponnusamy v. Emp.*, 42 M.L.J. 139, 23 Cr.L.J. 148.

A Magistrate has no jurisdiction to inquire into a complaint in respect of a false return of election expenses, unless the complaint is made by

order of the Government—*Labh Singh v. Narinjan*, 11 Lah. 188, 26 P.L.R. 379, 26 Cr.L.J. 1234.

635. Object of section :—The object of this section is to prevent unauthorised persons from intruding in matters of State by instituting State prosecutions, and to secure that such prosecutions shall only be instituted under the authority of the Government—*Q E v Bal Gangadhar Tilak*, 22 Bom 112 (125)

636. Complaint :—A complaint which did not set forth the concrete facts relied on as constituting the offences but merely copied out the words of the sections of the Penal Code was held to be defective—*Pulla v. Emp*, 16 C.W.N. 1105, 13 Cr L J 609. But a complaint is not defective merely because it does not set out the speeches or the dates of the speeches, and the alleged seditious words which are the subject matter of the charge. Even if it were defective, this is at most an irregularity curable by sec 537—*Chidambaram v Emp*, 32 Mad. 3 (11). It is not necessary that the complaint must consist of allegations made on oath or reduced to writing—*Apurba v Emp*, 35 Cal 141 (151)

A letter of the Local Government according sanction for prosecution of a certain person under sec. 121 I. P. C. is not a complaint, though it may be taken as an authority to make a complaint—*Shamal Khan v. Emp.*, 1890 P R 16. The person who signs the letter of authority is not the complainant, and it is not necessary to take his examination under the law. The person who acted with the authority makes the application to the Court for the apprehension of the accused is the complainant and his examination is to be taken—*Apurba Krishna Bose v. Emp*, 35 Cal. 141 (*Bande Mataram case*.)

637. Order or authority :—The sanction of the Local Government must be strictly proved according to the provisions contained in sec 78, Evidence Act, and the prisoner named in the sanction must be identified—*Emp v Aung Do*, 1 Bur S. R. 389

Form and contents—This section does not prescribe any particular form of order and does not even require the order to be in writing. No special mode is laid down in the Code whereby the order or sanction of Government is to be conveyed to the officer who puts the law in motion—*Q. E. v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak*, 22 Bom. 112 (124). What the Court has to see is whether the complaint has been made by the order or under the authority of the Government—*Chidambaram v Emp*, 32 Mad. 3 (9); *In re Narayan Menon*, 25 Cr.L J. 701, A LR 1925 Mad. 106. A telegram sent by the Government expressly authorising the Public Prosecutor to file a complaint against the accused for an offence under section 124A I P. C. is a perfectly valid authority—*In re Varadarajulu Naidu*, 42 Mad 180

The sanction under this section need not be very particular about its contents, provided its meaning and intention are clear. Where the letter of authority sanctioning prosecution for sedition did not specify the name of the printer of the newspaper, but he was indicated from the first and his name was supplied at the commencement of the Police Court proceed-

ings, it was held that this was a sufficient compliance with the section—*Apurba v. Emp.*, 35 Cal. 141. A sanction for the prosecution of the accused in the alternative for offences under section 121 or under section 121A is not defective on the ground that it does not specify with sufficient clearness the section or the offence in respect of which it is given—*Puthen Veetil Kunhi v. Emp.*, 42 M.L.J. 108, 23 Cr.L.J. 203. Where the persons to be prosecuted were named, the offences and the period of their activity specified and the particular sections of the Penal Code set out, the mere circumstance that these persons were not described as the members of the Revolutionary society the existence of which was sought to be proved at the trial, did not affect the validity of the sanction—*Pulin Behary Das v. Emp.*, 16 C.W.N. 1105, 13 Cr.L.J. 609. In a prosecution for sedition, if the sanction contains the name of the printer, publisher, editor etc. of the newspaper, the name of the newspaper, the offence committed and the particular section of the Penal Code, and refers to "certain articles" appearing in the newspaper, the fact that the sanction does not specify the exact article complained of does not make the sanction insufficient or invalid—*Q. E. v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak*, 22 Bom. 112 (124, 150). The intention of the Legislature to ensure that no prosecution for an offence within sec. 196 should be launched except on a complaint authorised by the Government, and if this intention is given effect to, it is immaterial whether or not all the facts on which the complaint was to be based were stated in the authority with meticulous precision—*Nga Aung v. K. E.*, 2 Bur.L.J. 196, 25 Cr.L.J. 193, A.I.R. 1924 Rang. 65. Where the sanction contained a misdescription of the article on which the prosecution was based, and this was rectified by a subsequent sanction filed in the course of the trial, it was held that the petitioner was not prejudiced and the defect was cured by sec. 537—*Apurba v. Emp.*, 35 Cal. 141.

It is not necessary that the actual words of the complaint should be sanctioned—*In re Varadarajulu*, 42 Mad. 180; *Chidambaram v. Emp.*, 32 Mad. 3 (9). Where the order of the Government directing the prosecution (for sedition) states the sections under which the institution of the criminal proceedings is authorised, and, in general terms, the times when the seditious speeches were delivered, it is not necessary that the actual complaint must be expressly authorised by the Local Government—*Chidambaram* (supra).

Where the telegram sent by the Local Government expressly authorised the Public Prosecutor to file a complaint against V, under sec. 124A I. P. C. and to act immediately if the District Magistrate thought it advisable after consulting him, and formally enjoined the District Magistrate to submit the complaint prepared "for issue of supplemental sanction," held that the last sentence must be read apart from the first portion of the telegram and did not limit the authority given, and that a complaint filed in pursuance of that telegram but without any supplemental sanction was not illegal—*In re Varadarajulu Naidu*, 42 Mad. 180.

Where the authority to prosecute was not given to any determinate person, but the order sanctioning the prosecution was communicated to

the District Magistrate, the Public Prosecutor and the senior special Judge, and a prosecution was initiated by the Additional Public Prosecutor, held that the fact that the order of authorisation was not given to any determinate person did not affect the legality of the trial, and that the alleged defect in the order was curable by sec. 537 of the Code—*In re Kutty Moopan*, 44 M.L.J. 166; *Apurba v. Emp.*, 35 Cal. 141 (151)

Signature :—The authority under sec. 196 need not, in the case of a Local Government, be signed personally by the Lieutenant Governor; it is enough, if it is signed by one of his accredited or Gazetted officers (e.g. the Chief Secretary in this case)—*Apurba v. Emp.*, 35 Cal. 141. The sanction must be signed by the Chief Secretary to the Government. An order signed by the Deputy Secretary on behalf of the Chief Secretary is not legal—*Oziulla v. Beni Madhab*, 50 Cal. 135

Local Government :—The sanction must, in order to satisfy the section, have been the act of the Local Government, and not of a single member of such Government—*In re Varadarajulu Naidu*, 42 Mad. 885.

Where a sanction was duly given by the *de facto* Local Government under this section, and no objection was made thereto at the trial, it was not open to the person convicted at the trial to challenge the sanction, in appeal before the High Court, on the ground that the Local Government granting the sanction was not legally constituted and had no authority to sanction the prosecution—*Pulin Behari Das v. Emp.*, 16 C.W.N. 1105 (1113), 13 Cr.L.J. 609.

638. Want of sanction and complaint :—Absence of sanction under this section vitiates the whole proceedings, and the defect is not a mere irregularity curable by sec. 537. A trial without sanction under sec. 196 or 197 is illegal—*Perumalla v. Emp.*, 31 Mad. 80, *Swami Dayal v. K. E.*, 1908 P.R. 8, *Shamal Khan v. Emp.*, 1890 P.R. 16. A sanction given after the filing of the complaint does not fulfil the requirements of this section—*In Varadarajulu Naidu*, 42 Mad. 885, *Barindra v. Emp.*, 37 Cal. 467. Where there was no complaint or sanction of the Local Government, the whole proceedings in the trial were without jurisdiction, and the defect was not cured by the provision of sec. 537—*Barindra v. Emp.*, 37 Cal. 467. Where the law clearly says that it is a condition precedent to the prosecution that a sanction shall be obtained from the Local Government, it is not open to any subordinate authority to override the provision of the law by saying that the offence falls under another section of the Penal Code and that no sanction is necessary for the prosecution under that section—*Ram Nath v. K. E.*, 47 All. 268, 22 A.L.J. 1106, A.I.R. 1925 All. 230

But where the accused was prosecuted upon a sanction of the Local Government without a formal complaint, and no objection was taken to the absence or irregularity of the complaint at the trial the defect did not affect the trial, and the irregularity or insufficiency of the complaint was cured by sec. 537—*Swami Dayal v. K. E.*, 1908 P.R. 8, 7 Cr.L.J. 353; *Pulin Behari v. Emp.*, 16 C.W.N. 1105 (1112)

639. Prosecution for other offences not mentioned in sanction :—Where an order under section 196 authorised a particular Police officer to prefer a complaint of "offences under secs. 121A, 122 I. P. C. or under any other section of the said Code which may be found applicable to the case" and the Magistrate prosecuted the accused and committed him in respect of an offence under sec. 121 I. P. C., it was held that since the offence under sec. 121 required a sanction under this section, and it was not specifically mentioned in the sanction, the commitment in respect of an offence under sec. 121 was illegal—*Barindra Kumar Ghosh v. Emp.*, 37 Cal 467. The reason is, that the power and discretion of determining whether cognizance shall be taken in respect of an offence mentioned in this section cannot be delegated by the Local Government to any other body of persons, and if the Magistrate is allowed to prosecute a person for an offence referred to in this section when such offence was not specifically mentioned in the sanction, it means a delegation of power to the Magistrate which cannot be sustained. In the words of Jenkins C J. : "It would be opposed to the true intentment of sec 196 for the Local Government by its order to give its legal or other advisers a roving power to determine under what sections of the Chapter proceedings should be taken, and to abandon to them the discretion and responsibility that properly belongs to itself"—*Barindra v. Emp.*, 37 Cal. offence in respect of an act which is precisely defined in the order granting by the Local Government for the prosecution of certain persons for an offence in respect of an act which is precisely defined in the order granting the sanction, the order cannot be treated as an authority for a prosecution in respect of an offence which is absolutely distinct and is alleged to have been committed on an occasion different from that specified in the order—*U Pathada v. Emp*, 3 Bur L J. 178, 26 Cr.LJ 245 So also, where the Local Government gave sanction to prosecute a person for an offence under sec 121 I P. Code, the Court has no power to charge and convict him for an offence under sec. 124A I. P. Code—*U. Nyan v. Emp.*, 4 Rang 131, 27 Cr.L.J. 1075. But a sanction under sec. 124A authorises a prosecution under secs 124A and 114 I. P. C.—*Chidambaram v. Emp*, 32 Mad. 3

So also, it is not illegal to prosecute without a sanction a person for an offence for which no sanction is necessary; thus, where a person has committed an offence under sec. 122 I. P. C. and by the same act abetted the offence of dacoity, the fact that the Government refused sanction for the former offence would be no bar to his prosecution for the minor offence of abetting dacoity for which no sanction is necessary—*Q. E. v. Anant Puranik*, 25 Bom 90 (94)

196-A. No Court shall take cognizance of the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code—

Prosecution for certain classes of criminal conspiracy.

(1) in a case where the object of the conspiracy is to commit either an illegal act other than an

offence, or a legal act by illegal means, or an offence to which the provisions of Section 196 apply, unless upon complaint made by order of, or under authority from, the Governor-General in Council, the Local Government or some officer empowered by the Governor-General in Council in this behalf, or

- (2) in a case where the object of the conspiracy is to commit any non-cognizable offence, or a cognizable offence not punishable with death, transportation or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, unless the Local Government, or a Chief Presidency Magistrate or District Magistrate empowered in this behalf by the Local Government has, by order in writing, consented to the initiation of the proceedings.

Provided that where the criminal conspiracy is one to which the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 195 apply, no such consent shall be necessary.

640. Scope :—This section applies only to a prosecution for conspiracy punishable under section 120B of the Penal Code, and not for abetment by conspiracy punishable under section 109 of that Code—*Abdul Salim v. Emp.*, 49 Cal. 573; *Abdul Rahman v. Emp.*, 3 Rang 95, 26 Cr.L.J. 1329.

Where there is no allegation of criminal conspiracy in the complaint, nor does the complaint disclose any charge of criminal conspiracy, but the allegation in the plaint merely incidentally involves a charge of conspiracy, no sanction is necessary under this section—*Nune Panakalu v. Ravula*, 52 Mad 695, 30 Cr.L.J. 191 (198)

Initiating a prosecution under sec. 120B, I P C without the sanction of the authority referred to in section 196A Cr P. Code, is *ab initio* illegal, and the subsequent addition of charges which do not require such sanction does not cure the illegality; nor are the proceedings relating to such additional charges legal—*Abdul Rahman v. Emp.*, *supra*

The proviso lays down that a sanction under this section for prosecution for criminal conspiracy to commit a non-cognizable offence (e.g. fraudulently using as genuine a forged document or dishonestly making a false claim) is not necessary where the Court before which the forged document was used or false claim was made makes a complaint in respect of the offence under sub-section (4) of section 195—*Kali Singh v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 461, A.I.R. 1924 Cal 53, 24 Cr.L.J. 949

If the object of the conspiracy is to commit forgery, there can be no prosecution without the sanction of the Local Government. Where, however, the main charge is that of cheating, in which it is not necessary at all to mention forgery as the object of the conspiracy (the forgery being committed not for its own sake but in order to cheat a person and obtain money from him) the entire charge does not fail in consequence of the elimination of the head of forgery as an object of the conspiracy charged. Where the trial starts for an object of the conspiracy, which is beyond the cognizance of the Court, and other objects of the conspiracy are within the cognizance of the Court, the omission of one head which is beyond the cognizance of the Court cannot affect the jurisdiction as regards the rest of the charge. The matter would be different, if commitment is made on a charge of committing criminal conspiracy for the purpose of forging documents, and subsequently on discovering that such a charge required sanction, another object, that of cheating, is substituted—*Bishambar Nath v Emp.*, 2 O.W.N. 760, 26 Cr L J. 1602 (1604, 1606). If cheating is carried out by means of forgery, it does not follow that the provisions of sec 196A would apply—*Ibid*

If the sanction is obtained after the arrest of the accused, but before the examination of the witnesses and the framing of the charge, the requirements of this section are complied with—*Ali Mia v. Emp.*, 54 Cal. 155, 28 Cr L J 466

196-B. *In the case of any offence in respect of which the provisions of Section 196 or Section 196-A apply, a District Magistrate or Chief Presidency Magistrate may, notwithstanding anything contained in those sections or in any other part of this Code, order a preliminary investigation by a police-officer not being below the rank of Inspector, in which case such police-officer shall have the powers referred to in Section 155, sub-section (3).*

This section has been added by sec 49 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923)

"This new section is designed to meet the difficulty which arises from the fact that cases under sections 196 and 196A cannot be properly investigated by the Police before complaints are made. Doubts have arisen as to whether investigation can be ordered under section 155 (2) by a Magistrate without his taking cognizance of the case. The new section will provide for preliminary investigation. We recognise that it does not altogether meet the case where the desirability of adding a new charge arises in the Sessions Court. It has been suggested that this difficulty might be met to some extent by substituting the words 'proceed to the trial' for the words 'take cognizance' in sections 196 and 196A. But on

the whole, we prefer not to make this change and to leave the sections unaltered"—*Report of the Joint Committee* (1922).

197. (1) When any Judge or any public servant not removable from his office without the sanction of the Government of India or the Local Government, is accused as such Judge or public servant of any offence, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction of the Government having power to order his removal or of some officer empowered in this behalf by such Government or of some Court or other authority to which such Judge or public servant is subordinate, and whose power to give such sanction has not been limited by such Government.

197. (1) When any person who is a Judge with-
Prosecution of Judges and public servants. in the meaning of Section 19 of the Indian Penal Code, or when any Magistrate, or when any public servant who is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of a Local Government or some higher authority, is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction of the Local Government.

(2) Such Government may determine the person by whom, the manner in which, the offence or offences for which, the prosecution of such Judge, Magistrate or public servant is to be conducted, and may specify the Court before which the trial is to be held.

Change :—The whole of sub-section (1) has been re-drafted by sec 50 of the Crim Pro Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. "It has been pointed out to us that difficulties with regard to section 197 have recently come to light. There are certain public servants who are only removable from office by the Secretary of State, and it is unreasonable that they should obtain no protection under the section. Further, in view of section 2 (2) of the Code, the word "Judge" has to be interpreted according to the definition given in section 19 of the Indian Penal Code, with the result that Magistrates acting in certain capacities under the Code

yet constituted by Madras Act II of 1920 is a Judge—*Ponnusamy v. Emp.*, 42 M L J. 139, 23 Cr.L.J. 148.

642. Public Servant—Any person, whether receiving pay or not, who chooses to take upon himself the duties and responsibilities belonging to the position of a public servant and performs those duties and accepts those responsibilities, and is recognised as filling the position of a public servant, must be regarded as such. A volunteer in Tahsildar's office is a public servant—*Q. E. v. Parmeshar*, 8 All. 201. A member of the District Board is a public servant who is not removeable except with the sanction of the Local Government—*K. E. v. Krishna Kant*, 28 O.C. 155, 12 O L J 498, 26 Cr.L.J. 1157. The Chairman of a Municipality is a public servant—*In re Chairman of Municipal Council, Ellore*, 1 Weir 243. The President of a Municipal Committee is a public servant not removeable except by the Local Government—*Emp v. U. Maung Gale*, 4 Rang 128, 27 Cr.L.J 1088. So also a Chairman of a Union Panchayet—*Sk. Abdul Kadir v. Emp*, 1916 M W.N 384, 17 Cr.L.J. 168. The President of a Taluk Board is a public servant—*In re Sivasankaram*, 52 Mad 446, 30 Cr L J. 164 (166). A Municipal Commissioner is a public servant—*Bakshi Ram v. Divan*, 1890 P.R. 14, see also illustration to sec 21 I P. Code. But every Municipal Commissioner is not a public servant within the meaning of this section. The Court should not, without any reliable evidence on the record, assume that every Municipal Commissioner is not removable from his office without the sanction of the Local Government—*Nathu v. Md. Baksh*, 1916 P.W.R. 48, 18 Cr.L.J. 106. But a Municipal Corporation (e.g. the Calcutta Municipality) is not a public servant and may be prosecuted like a private person without a sanction—*Emp. v. Municipal Corporation, Calcutta*, 3 Cal. 758. So also, no sanction is necessary to prosecute a Municipal Chairman Delegate for acts done by him in that capacity, because the protection afforded by this section does not extend to a person to whom a public servant may delegate a portion of his powers—*Venkatesalu v. Heeraman*, 2 Weir 226. A Municipal Secretary is not a public servant and no sanction is necessary for his prosecution—*Kishen v. Girdhari*, 23 Cr.L.J. 750 (Lah.). If a Municipal Commissioner acts as the Honorary Secretary of the Municipality, and commits an offence in his capacity as Secretary, held that although a Municipal Commissioner cannot be prosecuted without the sanction of the Local Government, still when he was acting as secretary and committed the wrong in that capacity, no sanction is necessary—*Kishen Singh v. Girdhari*, A.L.R 1924 Lah. 310. A Receiver appointed by the High Court is not a public servant—*Khim Chand v. Devkaran*, 52 Bom. 898, 30 Cr.L.J. 465.

643. "Not removable from his office etc."—The words "not removable from his office" etc. have reference only to the expression "public servant" and not to "Judge." This is now made clear by the wording of the present section. So the sanction of the Government is necessary for the prosecution of any Judge, if a complaint is made against him as such Judge, whether he is or is not removable from

office without the sanction of the Government—*Anonymous*, 11 B.H.C.R. App. 21.

A Police Patel in Bombay is a public servant removable without the sanction of the Government, and no sanction is necessary in respect of his prosecution—*Imp. v. Bhagwan*, 4 Bom. 357; so also, a Sub-overseer in the Madras Presidency—*In re Reddy Venkayya*, 12 M.L.T. 331, 13 Cr.L.J. 770. A Forest Ranger in the C. P. is not a public servant not removable without of the sanction of the Local Government—*Kripa Singh v. Emp.*, 23 Cr.L.J. 397 (Nag). A Revenue Patel is a public servant not removable from his office without the sanction of the Local Government—*Emp. v. Kalu*, 29 Bom. L.R. 707, 28 Cr.L.J. 534.

The elected Chairman of a Municipality is a public servant not removable from his office except with the sanction of the Local Government, under the Bengal Municipal Act—*Ram Narayan v. Parsua Nath*, 56 Cal. 227, 32 C.W.N. 1035 (1037). A Chairman of a Union Committee who can, under certain circumstances, be removed by the Commissioner, is not a person removable from his office only by the Local Government, and no sanction of the Local Government is necessary for his prosecution—*Mahmad Yasin v. Emp.*, 52 Cal. 431, 29 C.W.N. 650, 26 Cr.L.J. 1178. The Chairman of a Union Panchayet is a public servant not removable from his office without the sanction of the Local Government, even though the power to remove him has been delegated by the Government to the President of the District Board. The delegation of the power of removal means only that the Local Government itself performs that act through the medium of a particular officer (President of the District Board) as the channel through which it is done. It is an ordinary case of *qui facit per alium facit per se*—*In re Abdul Kadir*, 1916 M.W.N. 384, 17 Cr.L.J. 109. But the Allahabad High Court is of opinion that where the Local Government has delegated the power of removal of a public servant to some other authority, as for instance, where the Government by a notification has delegated to the Excise Commissioner the power to suspend, remove or dismiss any Excise Inspector, held that the sanction of the Local Government is not necessary for the prosecution of an Excise Inspector—*Jalaluddin v. Emp.*, 48 All. 264, 24 A.L.J. 230, 27 Cr.L.J. 345 (dissenting from *In re Abdul Kadir*, supra). In a Lahore case, it has been held that where the accused, a public servant (*viz.* a Zilladar) was appointed at a time when the powers of appointment and removal of a Zilladar were vested in the Local Government alone, and subsequently the Local Government delegated the power of appointment, suspension and removal of the Zilladars to the Chief Engineer, held that the prosecution of the Zilladar instituted without the sanction of the Local Government but with the sanction of the Chief Engineer, was illegal. The sanction of the Local Government was necessary under sec. 197—*Crown v. Lal Khan Chand*, 24 Cr.L.J. 411, A.I.R. 1921 Lah. 337.

644. "Acting in the discharge of official duty":—

These words have been substituted for the words "as such Judge or public servant" occurring in the old section; and from a comparison of the old and the new sections it seems that the language of the present section

has been made simpler. Under the Code of 1872, the language used in the section (466) was "committed in his capacity of a public servant" i.e., the section applied only to those acts which could have no special significance except as acts done by a public servant—*Imp. v. Lakshman*, 2 Bom. 481. It applied only to those offences committed by a public servant which were peculiar to his position as a public servant (*per Pontifex J.*), the section was intended to apply to those cases in which the offence charged was an offence which could be committed by a public servant only; those cases in which the fact of his being a public servant was a necessary element in the offence (*per Field J.*)—*Sreemanta Chatterjee*, (unreported case of the Calcutta High Court, 9-12-1881) cited in 26 Cal. 852 at p. 860. Under the Codes of 1882 and 1898, the language of the section was "as such Judge or public servant" and it indicated that the offence charged must involve as one of its elements that it was committed by a person filling that character, and therefore where a Magistrate used insulting and defamatory language towards a pleader in the course of a trial, no sanction was held to be necessary for the prosecution of the Magistrate, as the position of his being a Magistrate was not a necessary element in the offence of defamation—*Nando Lal v. Mitter*, 26 Cal. 852. Where a Judge or Magistrate or public servant commits an offence which could be committed by anybody and which entails consequences neither in the way of penalty nor anything else in the least different from what it would entail if committed by anybody else, sanction is not required under this section for his prosecution. Therefore, where the Chairman of a Union Panchayet was prosecuted for the offence of criminal breach of trust in respect of Union funds, held that the offence was not one which was committed by him in his capacity of a public servant, and no sanction was necessary for his prosecution—*In re Abdul Kadir*, 1916 M.W.N. 384, 17 Cr.L.J. 168. Where a Magistrate used abusive language towards another Magistrate while both of them were trying a case as members of a Bench, it was held that no sanction was necessary to prosecute the former, because the offence was not committed as Magistrate, i.e., the fact of his being a Magistrate was not a necessary element of the offence—*In re Harlekar*, 2 Bom. L.R. 1079. So also, where the superintendent of the Gun Carriage Factory in Madras caused timber to be brought within the city of Madras without a license as required by section 341 of the Madras Act I of 1884 (City of Madras Municipal Act), held that no sanction was necessary to prosecute him as the offence was not one which could be committed by a public servant only, nor did it involve as one of its elements that it had been committed by a public servant—*Municipal Commissioners v. Major Bell*, 25 Mad. 15. Where a Union Chairman, while removing an obstruction to a public thoroughfare caused by the complainant, used insulting and abusive language towards the latter, no sanction was held to be necessary for the prosecution of the Chairman, as it could not be said to be a part of the functions of a Union Chairman to use abusive language in a public street—*In re Rahiman*, 4 L.W. 556, 17 Cr.L.J. 462. A Magistrate or a public servant who was holding a trial could not be said to be acting in a public

city, if he abused or defamed a witness or a legal practitioner appearing before him—*Baishnab Charan v. Sukhomoy*, 25 C.W.N. 957, 22 Cr.L.J. 585.

These cases, though correctly decided under the old Codes, would be of no authority now, as the language of the present section materially differs from the language of the old law. Under the present section it will not be necessary to decide whether the fact of the accused being a Judge or a public servant was a necessary element in the offence or whether the offence was one which could not have been equally committed by a private person. These nice questions would no longer arise; if it is found that the Judge, Magistrate or public servant has committed an act at a time when he was doing an official duty, this will be sufficient to attract the provisions of this section. In other words, the Legislature has now given a greater protection to the officers concerned than it did under the old section. This view has been endorsed by the Madras High Court in the very recent case of *Gangaraju v. Venki*, 52 Mad. 602, 30 Cr.L.J. 864 (865). This is also the view of Sir J. G. Woodroffe (*Criminal Procedure*, p. 229). But in two other Madras cases it has been held that the expression "offence alleged to have been committed while acting in the discharge of his official duty" does not mean any offence committed by him while he is in office; the 'acting' refers to the specific action which comprises the offence. An offence arising out of abuse of official position, by an act not purporting to be official does not necessitate sanction under sec. 197. And so, a complaint against the Chairman of a Municipal Council of having threatened a voter with injury to his property with intent to induce such voter to vote for any candidate or to abstain from voting, is not one in respect of which sanction is necessary under sec. 197, in as much as the act complained of is not committed in the discharge of his official duty, although the incident of his official position might have given him the opportunity to do it—*Kamisetty Rama Rao v. Ramaswamy*, 50 Mad. 754, 52 M.L.J. 647, 28 Cr.L.J. 539 (following 25 Mad. 15 and 1916 M.W.N. 384 cited above); *Nune Panakatu v. Ravula*, 52 Mad. 695, 30 Cr.L.J. 191 (194). A similar view has been taken recently by the Calcutta High Court, viz. that in order to make sec. 197 applicable it is essential that the act constituting the alleged offence should have itself taken place as an official act, or at least under the cloak of what purported to be an official act, i.e. something in the nature of an official character should have attached to the act itself; it is not enough that his capacity of a public servant put him in a position to commit the offence. Therefore, where certain moneys were paid to a Deputy Collector as *selami* for certain *khas mahal* lands, but no settlement was given, and the Deputy Collector misappropriated the moneys, held that this section did not apply—*Amanat v. K. E.*, 33 C.W.N. 1058 (1060), 1929 Cr.C. 360. In these three cases it has been remarked that the Amendment has not made any change in the policy of the Code nor given any greater protection to the public servants, but has simply altered the language to make the sense clear, which was formerly subject to misinterpretation.

- Where a village Magistrate uses his authority and position as a public

servant to constrain a person to give a bribe, sanction is necessary for his prosecution—*In re Mangapathu Naidu*, 2 Weir 221. Where a Judge used defamatory language to a witness during the trial of a suit, a complaint against the Judge could not be entertained without a sanction under this section, as the Judge was then acting in his official capacity—*In re Ghulam Muhammad*, ■ Mad. 439. Where the Administrator-General of Bengal was appointed administrator to the estate of a deceased person, and was charged with an offence under the Calcutta Municipal Act for not removing the privy on certain premises belonging to that estate, it was held that although he held the office of the Administrator-General, still the offence was committed in his private capacity as administrator to the estate of a private person and not in his public capacity as Administrator-General, and no sanction was necessary for his prosecution—*Corporation of Calcutta v Administrator-General of Bengal*, 30 Cal. 927. If a Magistrate or a judicial officer, in order to examine a witness, detains him until the time of his re-examination comes or until he makes inquiries as to the failure of the witness to appear before him, his acts are purely judicial, and if any offence is committed by the Magistrate exceeding his powers in doing those acts, it is necessary that there should be a sanction for his prosecution—*Baishnab Charan v Sukhomoy*, 25 C.W.N. 957, 22 Cr.L.J. 585. These cases though decided under the old law would still hold good.

The question whether a person committed an act while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, is a question of fact. Where it was alleged that a member of a Municipal Committee and a Sub-committee, by exercising undue influence on a sub-overseer stopped him from purchasing bricks of a certain person and compelled him to give his assent to the purchase of bricks from the accused himself, but there was no allegation in the complaint that the accused obtained this advantage to himself, acting or purporting to act as a member of the Municipal Committee, and in fact the suggestion in the complaint was that taking advantage of his position he went outside his official duty altogether to obtain the contract himself, held that the sanction of the Local Government was not necessary for his prosecution. The case would have been otherwise if the accused in obtaining the contract held himself out to be acting as a member of the Municipal Committee or Sub-committee—*Id. Ismail v. Emp.*, 8 Lah. 647, 29 Cr.L.J. 511 (512). If an officer conducting an auction sale himself purchases a thing in the name of his servant for his own benefit, it is an act done by him in the discharge of his official duty—*K. E. v. Krishna Kani*, 28 O.C. 155, 26 Cr.L.J. 1157. Where the President of a Municipal Committee received brokerage or commission on goods ordered by the Municipality, held that he could not be prosecuted for that offence without the sanction of the Local Government, as he was acting in the discharge of his duty as public servant—*Emp. v. U. Maung Gale*, 4 Rang. 128, 27 Cr.L.J. 1088.

Where a village Magistrate prepared a false record (in order to provide evidence for use in future) to the effect that a certain person was convicted of theft and sentenced by him to detention for 2 hours, where as a matter of fact such person was never convicted or sentenced for

such offence, and that person thereupon made a complaint for the prosecution of the village Magistrate for making the false record, it was held that as the village Magistrate was not bound to make a record, he was not acting "as a Judge" when he made a record; the act was merely purported to be done by him as Judge, and no sanction was therefore necessary—*Palaniandy v. Arunachellam*, 32 Mad. 255. But the case would now fall under the present section by reason of the words "purporting to act" occurring in the section. These words would include not only the cases where the official has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a matter and in professedly exercising that jurisdiction commits an offence or acts *ultra vires*, but also cases where the initial jurisdiction is wanting and a jurisdiction is assumed by an official who in such assumed capacity acts to the prejudice of a person. See *Subbia Pillai v. Emp.*, 1920 M.W.N. 7, 21 Cr.L.J. 223, in which the correct view of the law was taken, though it was decided under the old section. See the recent case of *Sivarama Krishna v. Seshappa*, 52 Mad. 347, 30 Cr.L.J. 396 (399), in which it is laid down that fabrication by a Judge of the records of a suit is an offence committed by him while acting or purporting to act in his official duty, and it makes no difference whether the record is wholly false or partly false and partly true, or whether the suit is wholly fictitious or fictitious only in part.

A Government officer, e.g. a Tahsildar, who is appointed by the Chairman of a Municipal Council as a Polling officer, does not, while he is acting as a Polling officer, act in the discharge of an official duty as Tahsildar. No sanction is necessary for his prosecution for an offence committed by him while acting as a Polling officer—*Jagannadhaswami v. Manikyam*, 51 Mad. 259, 28 Cr.L.J. 1038 (1039).

645. "Taking cognizance":—This section prohibits taking cognizance of an offence committed by the Judge or public servant in his public capacity, without a sanction. But the preliminary examination of the complainant is not such cognizance as is meant by this section; and therefore such examination is not invalid in the absence of sanction. In fact it is often necessary to examine the complainant before his complaint can be understood, and the complaint must be understood before sanction can be given—*Narayanasami, Petitioner*, 7 M.H.C.R. 182 (187), *Satya Charan v. Chairman*, 3 C.W.N. 17. The question as to whether section 197 applies to a complaint against a public servant must be postponed till after the examination of the complainant—*Satya Charan v. Chairman, Uttarpara Municipality* 3 C.W.N. 17 (18). But summoning the accused or taking any evidence against him amounts to taking cognizance, and this should not be done until the necessary sanction has been obtained—*Reg. v. Parshram*, 7 B.H.C.R. 61.

646. Sanction:—*Who can give sanction:*—Under the previous law (i.e. before the Amendment of 1923), sanction could be given by the Government or by the officers empowered by the Local Government, or by the Court or the authority to which the Judge or public servant was subordinate. Thus, sanction for prosecution of a Tahsildar could be given by the District Magistrate—*Indar Singh v. Crown*, 1919 P.R. 4. The

President of the Taluk Board could give sanction for the prosecution of the Chairman of a Union Panchayet—*In re Abdul Kadir*, 1916 M.W.N. 384, 17 Cr L J 168. These cases are no longer of any authority. Under the present law, sanction can be given only by the Local Government. Under the old law the Local Government could empower an officer (e.g. the District Magistrate or Additional District Magistrate), to give sanction. The present section, however, contemplates no such delegation.

Offence must be specified in sanction:—The authority empowered to grant sanction cannot delegate to another the task of determining which offence the sanction should relate to. Thus, an order passed by the Board of Revenue sanctioning the prosecution of a Deputy Tahsildar for "bribery or other charges as the District Magistrate thinks likely to stand investigation by a Criminal Court" was held to be invalid because the order ought to have specified what other offences the accused should be charged with, and to leave this matter to the District Magistrate means a delegation of power not intended by the Legislature—*Q. E. v. Savarier*, 16 Mad. 468. See also *Reg. v. Vinayak*, 8 B II C.R. 32 cited in Note 648 below. But where the order granted sanction for an "offence under sec. 161 I. P. C. or any other section of the Code that may be found applicable with respect to the offence briefly described in the schedules hereto annexed" it was held that the order was no delegation, because the order granting sanction had specified the acts committed by the accused, and had also specified the offence and the section of the I. P. C. and it merely left it open to the Court to convict the accused under any other section if in the opinion of the Court some other section of the I. P. C. was more relevant than section 161—*Girdhari Lal v. Emp.*, 1911 P.R. 11.

Sanction for abetment:—Where a sanction has been granted to prosecute a person for a substantive offence, no fresh sanction is necessary to prosecute him for abetting that offence, when the conviction for abetment is based on the same facts as those on which the charge for the substantive offence is founded—*Profulla v. Emp.*, 30 Cal. 905.

Form of sanction:—The Code does not prescribe any particular form of sanction under this section—*In re Kalagava*, 27 Mad. 54. A letter addressed to the Magistrate is a sufficient sanction—*Reg. v. Narayan Ramchandra*, Ratanlal 32; *Profulla v. Emp.*, 30 Cal. 905. Non-specification of the place in which and the occasion on which the offence was committed does not affect the validity of the sanction—*In re Kalagava*, 27 Mad. 54. The order granting sanction need not specify the offence with the same precision as is necessary in a charge—*Girwardhari Lal v. K. E.*, 13 C.W.N. 1062; *Emp. v. Jehangir*, 29 Bom. L.R. 996. Thus, where the Kulkarni and the Patel of a village were charged with cheating in as much as they conspired to levy extra amounts of money from three persons who came to pay the land assessment, and the sanction was given for prosecution for 'cheating or for such other offence with which it may be necessary to prosecute them in connection with obtaining money from the ryots'; It was held that the sanction was not invalid for vagueness, in as much as it had sufficiently designated the offence or offences

the power of granting or refusing sanction lies only with the *Local Government*, and the High Court will have no power to interfere even under the Charter Act.

Even under the old law, it was held in a Lahore case that the granting of sanction being an executive rather than a judicial act, the High Court had no power to interfere with the proceeding of a District Judge granting sanction for the prosecution of a Sub-Judge—*Ali Hussain Khan v. Harcharan*, 2 Lah. 305, 1922 P.L.R. 35, 23 Cr.L.J. 113.

198. No Court shall take cognizance of an offence falling under Chapter XIX or Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code or under Sections 493 to 496 (both inclusive) of the same Code, except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by such offence:

Provided that where the person so aggrieved is a woman who, according to the customs and manners of the country, ought not to be compelled to appear in public, or where such person is under the age of eighteen years or is an idiot or lunatic or is from sickness or infirmity unable to make a complaint, some other person may, with the leave of the Court, make a complaint on his or her behalf.

Chapter XIX (comprising sections 490-492) of the I. P. Code relates to criminal breach of contracts of service. Chapter XXI (comprising sections 499-502) relates to Defamation. Sections 493-496 deal with offences relating to marriage.

Change—The proviso has been added by section 51 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act XVIII of 1923.

650. Necessity of complaint:—A Magistrate acts without jurisdiction if he takes cognizance of a charge of defamation without complaint. So, where a postcard written by the accused to the complainant, containing a defamatory matter, was privately handed over by the latter to the Magistrate without a complaint, held that the Magistrate acted without jurisdiction in starting a criminal prosecution thereupon—*Abdulla v. Clarke*, 1909 P.W.R. 3, 9 Cr.L.J. 154.

Magistrate's power to add or alter charge:—When a complaint presented to the Magistrate contained only charges under sections 352 and 504 I. P. C. but did not contain a charge under section 500 I. P. C. (defamation), but that charge was subsequently added by the Magistrate on statements made by the complainant, it was held that the Magistrate could not add the charge of defamation or take cognizance of it, as there was no formal complaint in respect of it, such as is required by this sec-

tion—*Q. E. v. Deoki Nandan*, 10 All 39. So also, the Magistrate cannot alter a charge under section 501 I. P. C. to one under section 500 I. P. C. when there was no formal complaint by the person aggrieved in respect of the latter offence—*Crown v. Uma Shankar*, 1889 P R 18.

But a more liberal view has been taken in the cases noted below. Thus in a Punjab case, where a complaint was made to the Magistrate under sec 211 I. P. C. that the accused had made a false charge against him (complainant) of poisoning his daughter-in-law, with a view to injure his reputation, but the Magistrate treated the case as one under sec. 500 I. P. C. and tried it so, it was held that having regard to the substance of the complaint, the Magistrate was competent to alter the complaint under sec 211 I. P. C. to one under sec 500 I. P. C. when in fact the complaint was preferred by the aggrieved person—*Nur Aslam v. Emp*, 1884 P R. 24. The principle is that a complaint need not state precisely the section of the Penal Code under which the accused shall be charged; it is enough if the complainant lays before the Magistrate the facts which if proved would warrant a commitment under any of the sections referred to in this section—*Emp v. Ali*, 25 All 209. A complaint need not quote any section of the Indian Penal Code but must contain a statement of the facts relied on as constituting the offence, and it is for the Magistrate to determine on these facts what offence has *prima facie* been committed, the nature of the charge will be determined by him. All that is necessary for him to see is that the inquiry into the charge is within his competency, and that in the case of certain offences, the complaint has been made by the proper person. Therefore, though the complainant did not complain in so many words of having been defamed and did not mention sec. 500 I. P. Code, still if it contained a statement of the facts constituting the offence and he asked the Court to take action under that section or under any other section which the facts disclosed might justify, the Magistrate was competent to frame a charge of defamation and to try the offence—*Naurati v Emp*, 11 Lah 375, A.I.R. 1925 Lah. 631. Where the husband of a woman who had committed bigamy made a complaint to the Magistrate alleging facts which seemed to constitute an offence under sec. 498 I. P. C. but in the subsequent inquiry it appeared that an offence under sec 494 I. P. C. was committed, it was held that the Court could take cognizance of the offence under sec. 494 I. P. C. without a fresh complaint formally preferred under that section—*Emp. v. Ali*, 25 All 209; *In re Ujjala*, 1 C.L.R. 523. This section is clearly designed to prevent Magistrates from inquiring on their own motion into a case connected with marriage unless the husband or other person authorised moves them to do so, but when the case is once properly instituted before the Magistrate, he can proceed in respect of any other offence proved or against any other person implicated—*In re Ujjala*. 1 C.L.R. 523.

Power of Appellate Court to alter charge:—An appellate Court can under sec. 423 alter a conviction under one section into one under another section, and in doing so it is not bound by such restrictions as, for instan

tion—*Q. E. v. Deoki Nandan*, 10 All 39. So also, the Magistrate cannot alter a charge under section 501 I. P. C. to one under section 500 I. P. C. when there was no formal complaint by the person aggrieved in respect of the latter offence—*Crown v. Uma Shankar*, 1889 P.R. 18

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Power of Appellate Court to alter charge:—An appellate Court can under sec. 423 alter a conviction under one section into one under another section, and in doing so it is not bound by such restrictions as, for !

3 C.L.J. 38. (This is now expressly provided by the recent amendment). Where a Hindu lady is living with her father, brother or son, she is a member of that family and her reputation is bound up with the reputation of the person in whose house and under whose charge she is living, and any imputation as to her character will affect as much the relative with whom she is living as herself. Therefore the brother of a Hindu widow, with whom she has been living, is an aggrieved person in respect of an imputation of unchastity made against the woman—*Thakur Das v Adhar Chandra*, 32 Cal. 425. In *Masuria Din v. Jagannath*, 1893 A.W.N. 207, however, it was held that the son was not an aggrieved person in respect of a defamation of his mother. In a Bombay case also it was held that only the female herself, and not a male relative of hers, could make a complaint for defamation under this section—*Q. E. v. Kustantin*, Ratanlal 327. But under the proviso newly added by the Amendment Act of 1923, any friend or relative of the female will now be able to make the complaint with the leave of the Court.

Where certain allegations made in a newspaper against A and certain others were true as regards A but untrue as regards the others, it was held that A was not the person aggrieved by the publication of the allegations—*Subraya v. Kader Rowthen*, 1914 M.W.N. 351, 15 Cr.L.J. 357.

The complaint in respect of defamation must be made by the person aggrieved and cannot be preferred by his official superior. Thus, where a police officer has been defamed, a complaint by his official superior on the ground that the good name of the police force has been attacked, cannot be entertained—*Gaya v. K. E.*, 26 O.C. 44, 23 Cr.L.J. 641. Where a newspaper published statements, which were alleged to be defamatory, of specific acts of negligence on the part of the Health Officer and his subordinates, it was held that the President of the Municipality was not a person aggrieved within the meaning of this section merely because he had a control over those officers, and that by the imputation made against his subordinates, his own conduct and administration had not been impugned—*Beauchamp v. Moore*, 26 Mad. 43.

Death of complainant in defamation:—The death of the complainant, during the course of the criminal proceedings for defamation, necessarily terminates those proceedings—*Ishar Das v. K. E.*, 1903 P.R. 10.

Person aggrieved by bigamy:—In the case of an offence of bigamy committed by the wife, the husband is the only person aggrieved by such offence, and he alone can make the complaint. The father of the husband is not the "person aggrieved"—*K. E. v. Lala*, 32 All. 78; so also, the brother of the husband is not the person aggrieved—*Emp. v. Imtiazan*, 25 All. 132; *Q. E. v. Bai Rukshmoni*, 10 Bom. 340; *Hanuman v. K. E.*, 11 O.C. 148, 7 Cr.L.J. 457.

Prior to the present amendment, it was held that if the husband of the girl who committed bigamy was a minor, his mother was not competent to make a complaint, as she was not the person aggrieved—*In re Sessions Judge*, 2 Weir 231; it was also held that if the husband was a

lunatic, his brother could not make a complaint on his behalf—*Dy. Leg Rem. v. Sarna*, 26 Cal. 336 These two cases are now rendered obsolete by the proviso newly added in this section.

199. No Court shall take cognizance of an offence under Section 497 or Section 498 of the Indian Penal Code, except upon a complaint made by the husband of the woman, or in his absence, made with the leave of the Court by some person who had care of such woman on his behalf at the time when such offence was committed :

Provided that, where such husband is under the age of eighteen years, or is an idiot or lunatic, or is from sickness or infirmity unable to make a complaint, some other person may, with the leave of the Court, make a complaint on his behalf.

Sec. 497 I P C—Adultery : Section 498—Enticing or taking away or detaining with criminal intent a married woman.

Change—The italicised words have been added by sec 52 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923

Object of section—The restriction imposed in this section (empowering only the husband or the guardian to make the complaint) is not to afford immunity or protection to the offender, but to prevent a person unconnected with the woman from giving publicity to a matter which neither the husband nor the guardian is willing to agitate—*In re Rathna Padayachi*, 17 Cr L J 363 (Mad.).

653. Scope of section.—The only offences referred to in this section are offences under secs. 497 and 498 I P. C., but a charge of house trespass with intent to commit adultery is not contemplated by this section, and such an offence may be inquired into without complaint by the husband of the woman concerned, although a prosecution for the offence of adultery must be instituted by the husband alone—*Anonymous*, 1 Weir 531 Where the complainant charged the accused with house-trespass with intent to commit theft but it appeared that he committed house-trespass with intent to commit adultery with the complainant's wife, he could be convicted of the latter offence, although the complainant had not made a formal complaint for that offence—*Q. E. v. Kangla*, 23 All 82; *Emp. v. Dhauntia Lodhi*, 10 Cr.L.J. 881. So also, where the accused admitted that he had entered the house at night for the purpose of carrying on an intrigue with the complainant's wife, but the complainant refused to charge the accused with having entered the house with intent to commit the offence of adultery but founded his complaint solely on the entry having been with intent to commit theft, which was found to be false, it was held that the Magistrate had the power to convict the accused.

of house-trespass with intent to commit adultery even though the husband refused to make that charge—*Anonymous*, 5 M.H.C.R App. 5, 1 Weir 532

But in another Allahabad case, where the complainant charged the accused with house-trespass with intent to commit theft but the accused stated that he had gone there to have sexual intercourse with a woman, and the accused was convicted for house-trespass with intent to commit adultery, held that the conviction was injudicious, in the absence of a complaint by the husband of the woman—*Emp. v Harcharan*, 1886 A W N 42

654. Complaint.—The complaint referred to in this section means a complaint as defined in sec. 4 (h) A Magistrate is not competent to entertain a case under sec 498 I P C on the report of a police officer, and in the absence of a complaint by the husband or guardian of the woman alleged to have been enticed away by the accused—*Bhana v. Crown*, 1910 P.R 32 Information lodged by the complainant before the police is not a complaint sufficient to warrant a conviction under secs. 497 and 498 I. P. C.—*Tara Prosad v. Emp.*, 30 Cal 910, *Emp. v Khushal Singh*, 17 C.P.L.R. 105, *In re Chidambara*, 2 Weir 235, *Arumuga v. Gangabai*, 43 M.L.J 564, 23 Cr.L.J 592 But where on a charge under sec 366 I. P. C the Police took up the proceeding in which the husband appeared as a witness and he asked the Magistrate to drop the proceeding thereunder but said that he intended to prosecute the accused under sec. 498 I. P. C. and to get him punished, it was held that there was a complaint,—in as much as he made an allegation before the Magistrate that the offence should be inquired into—*Bhawani v. Emp.*, 38 All. 276, 14 A.L.J. 233, 17 Cr.L.J. 72.

If the husband brings a complaint of any other offence, and from certain statements in his deposition it appears that an offence mentioned in this section has been committed, no conviction for the latter offence can be sustained, because the husband has not made a formal complaint of that offence. Thus, where the husband preferred against the accused a complaint of rape on his wife, but not of adultery, and certain statements in his deposition disclosed an offence of adultery, a conviction for the latter offence was illegal, in as much the husband had not preferred a formal complaint of adultery; even the circumstance of the husband appearing as a witness in the case could not be regarded as amounting to the institution of a complaint for adultery—*Emp. v. Kali*, 8 All. 233; *Cheman v. Emp.*, 29 Cal. 415; *Rahmatulla v. Emp.*, 1883 P.R. 10. Similarly, where the accused was charged with offences under secs. 366 and 379 I. P. C., but from statements in the deposition of the husband of the woman concerned an offence under sec. 498 I. P. C. was made out, and the Judge convicted him of that offence, it was held that the conviction was illegal in the absence of a formal complaint by the husband in respect of that offence; and the statements made by the husband in his deposition could not be said to be a complaint under sec. 4 (h) of this Code—*Emp v. Iramkhan*, 14 Bom. L.R. 141, 13 Cr.L.J. 287. Even

the formal assent of the husband to a charge of adultery, added at the end of his deposition, would not probably be a formal compliance with this section—*Q v Lucky Narain*, 24 W R 18. Where a husband charged the accused persons with theft and theft only, they could not be convicted of an offence under sec 498 I P C, as there was no complaint preferred by the husband under this section in respect of the latter offence—*Roda Singh v Crown*, 1918 P R 2, 19 Cr.L.J. 300.

But a contrary view has been taken in several cases. Thus in *Sheikh Mahomed, Ratanlal* 584 (585), it was held that the word 'complaint' must be taken as including not only a written complaint but also the examination of the complainant, at any rate, prior to the issue of process; therefore where the written complaint specifically mentioned section 497 I P C only, but did not mention an offence under sec 498 I P C., but the complainant's examination made out such an offence, the Magistrate had jurisdiction to frame a charge under sec 498 I P C. and to try such offence. And in *Jutra Seikh v Reazet*, 20 Cal 483, it was laid down that upon a complaint in respect of an offence under section 366 I P C a conviction under sec 498 I P C could stand, even in the absence of a complaint by the husband, if his evidence was such as to justify the conviction for the latter offence. In a recent case the Madras High Court is also of opinion that for the purpose of ascertaining the 'complaint' under this section, the written complaint as well as the sworn statement may be read together—*In re Arunachalam*, 45 M L J 43, 24 Cr L J 337.

The complaint referred to in this section is a complaint of the specific offence mentioned in this section and not a complaint of any offence. Where a person was charged with kidnapping or with abduction, and the judge convicted the accused on the evidence, of an offence under sec. 498 I P C held that the conviction was wrong as there was no specific complaint of an offence under sec 498 I P C—*Banguru Asari v. Emp*, 27 Mad 61. Where the accused was charged only with the offence of kidnapping a minor girl and theft of jewels and there was no complaint that the accused's purpose was to have illicit intercourse with the girl, the Magistrate could not take cognizance of an offence under sec 498 I P C—*In re Arunachalam* supra. So also, where a complaint was made of an offence under secs 494 and 498 I P C., the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the accused for an offence under sec. 497 I P C—*Q. E v Nalja*, Ratanlal 531, *Emp v Badan*, 1881 A W N 112. Similarly, a Magistrate cannot convict a person of an offence under sec 498 I P C when the complaint was for an offence under sec 497 I P C.—*Korap Ali v Hadi Molla* 12 C W N cxvi. A committing Magistrate cannot alter a charge of rape into one of adultery on the representation of the accused, without any request on the part of the husband of the woman—*Emp v Ram Balsh* 1882 A W N 165. Where a charge of rape brought against the accused was found untrue, held that in the absence of a complaint by the husband the Court cannot on the same evidence take cognizance of the offence of adultery—*Nga Po v. K. E.*, U.B.R. (1912) 4th Qr. 155, 14 Cr L J 284. But the Punjab Chief

Court has laid down that though the offence charged in the complaint made by the husband is one under section 371 I. P. Code, still if the facts set forth in the complaint are sufficient to support a conviction under sec. 498 I. P. C., the Magistrate has jurisdiction to frame a charge under the latter section. If, in the opinion of the Magistrate, the offence disclosed falls under section 498 I. P. Code, the Magistrate is at liberty to proceed and frame a charge under that section, provided the complainant satisfies the conditions of sec. 199 Cr P Code, whatever may have been the section of the I. P. Code recited in the complaint—*Piran Ditta v Q E.*, 23 P.R. 1895.

It has also been laid down that the Court cannot add a charge of an offence referred to in this section without a formal complaint in respect of that charge by the person specified. Where the accused was committed to the Sessions on charges under secs 363 and 366 I. P. C., and at the conclusion of the evidence, to establish these charges the Sessions Court added a charge under sec. 498 I. P. C. and convicted the accused on all the three charges, held that the procedure was not regular, that the additional charge was prejudicial to the accused and that the conviction under section 498 I. P. C. must be set aside—*Emp. v. Isap Md*, 31 Bom 218.

655. Who can complain—The only person who can prefer a complaint of an offence referred to in this section is the husband of the woman. The husband is entitled to make the complaint even though the marriage has been dissolved before the complaint, if the offence was committed before the marriage was dissolved—*Dhanna Singh v. Crown*, 1922 P.W.R. 16, 23 Cr L.J. 462.

In the absence of the husband, the complaint may be made by any person having the care of the woman. Thus, the mother of the husband, who was in charge of the wife during the absence of the husband, is competent to prefer a complaint of an offence under sec. 498 I. P. C. against the person who abducts the wife—*Madhub Ali v. Emp.*, 24 Cr.L.J. 780 (Lah). Where at the time of the offence the wife was left under the care of her father, the fact that the husband stands by will not prevent the father from preferring the complaint—*In re Rathna*, 17 Cr.L.J. 363 (Mad); *Mir Alam v. Emp.*, 5 Lah. L.J. 183, 23 Cr.L.J. 690. The absence must be from the place, and therefore where the complaint was preferred by the nephew of the husband, when the latter was bed-ridden with paralysis, it was held that the Court could not take cognizance of the offence—*Crown v. Tikomal*, 3 S.L.R. 15. But this ruling is no longer correct in view of the words "sickness or infirmity" occurring in the proviso newly added.

The complaint may be preferred by any person having the care of the woman, during the absence of the husband, even though the absence be temporary, e.g. for two days. It may sometimes be absolutely necessary that when the husband is away, a complaint should be preferred, whether the absence be for two days or more, when there is a probability that unless prompt action is taken, the offence may be committed.

*Acquittal for want of proper complaint—Fresh complaint:—*Where the brother of the husband of the woman instituted a complaint under sec. 498 I. P. C. alleging that he had authority from the husband to prefer the complaint, but after taking evidence the Magistrate held that the complainant had no authority and acquitted the accused, and subsequently the husband himself instituted the complaint, it was held that the previous acquittal was no bar to a fresh trial—*Umeruddin v. Emp.*, 31 All. 317; *Emp. v. Tikaram*, 17 Bom. L. R. 678, 16 Cr. L. J. 657.

199A. *When in any case falling under Section 198*

Objection by lawful guardian to complaint by person other than person aggrieved.

or Section 199, the person on whose behalf the complaint is sought to be made is under the age of eighteen years or is a lunatic, and the person applying for leave has not been appointed or declared by competent authority to be the guardian of the person of the said minor or lunatic, and the Court is satisfied that there is a guardian so appointed or declared, notice shall be given to such guardian, and the Court shall, before granting the application, give him a reasonable opportunity of objecting to the granting thereof.

This section has been added by sec. 53 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923.

"We have added a new section 199A in order to safeguard the rights of a legally appointed guardian"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916.*

CHAPTER XVI.

OF COMPLAINTS TO MAGISTRATES.

It is most desirable that Magistrates should follow the procedure which is quite clearly laid down in this chapter dealing with complaints to Magistrates—*Balai Lal v. Pasupati*, 21 C.W.N. 127.

Magistrates should also be prompt in disposing of complaints under this chapter. They have no right whatever to keep complaints instituted before them without passing orders for several months. Such action is in the highest degree improper and shows want of proper understanding as to what their duties are—*Salimullah v. Birjhan*, 18 Cr. L. J. 271 (All.).

200. [* * *] A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall at once examine the complainant upon oath, and the substance of

Examination of complainant.

examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant, and also by the Magistrate:

Provided as follows:—

(a) when the complaint is made in writing, nothing herein contained shall be deemed to require a Magistrate to examine the complainant before transferring the case under Section 192;

(aa) when the complaint is made in writing, nothing herein contained shall be deemed to require the examination of a complainant in any case in which the complaint has been made by a Court or by a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties;

(b) where the Magistrate is a Presidency Magistrate such examination may be on oath or not as the Magistrate in each case thinks fit, and where the complaint is made in writing, need not be reduced to writing; but the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, before the matter of the complaint is brought before him, require it to be reduced to writing;

(c) when the case has been transferred under Section 192 and the Magistrate so transferring it has already examined the complainant, the Magistrate to whom it is so transferred shall not be bound to re-examine the complainant.

Change—This section has been amended by section 54 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. The words "subject to the provisions of section 476" which occurred at the very beginning of the old section have been omitted, and proviso (aa) has been newly added. "We would add to this clause a provision that in the case of a complaint under sec 476, the examination of the complainant shall be dispensed with"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*

The words "where the complaint is made in writing" have been inserted in proviso (b), by the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act II of 1926. The reason has been thus stated.—"At present a Presidency Magistrate need not record the substance of an examination even if the complaint is not in writing. It is desirable that where there is no complaint in writing the Magistrate should record the examination in writing".—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (Gazette of India, 1925, Part V, p. 214).

657. Taking cognizance :—A Magistrate is bound to take cognizance of an offence upon complaint; see Note 586 under sec. 190

ante. "A Magistrate is bound to receive all complaints, whether they may be preferred orally or in writing"—*Cal G R & C O*, p. 8.

If a *pardanashin* lady sends a complaint to a Magistrate, he is entitled to take cognizance of it, but before he takes cognizance he must be satisfied that it is her complaint. It is comparatively unimportant by what means the complaint reaches the Magistrate if it is really her complaint—*Abhoyeswari v. Kishori Mohan*, 42 Cal 19 (23), 18 C.W.N. 1020

658. Complaints.—See notes under sec. 4 (h)

It is clear from the wording of sections 200 and 201 that a complaint need not be *in writing*—*J. R. Das v. King Emp*, 1 Rang 549

Presentation of complaint—Since the complainant is to be examined "at once" it follows that ordinarily a complaint must be presented in person and a complaint shall not be accepted which is not signed by the complainant and is not preferred by a person duly authorised to prefer that specific complaint—*Abhoyeswari v. Kishori*, 42 Cal 19 (23), 15 Cr.L.J. 348. But a complaint not presented in person is not bad in law; and if a complaint is not so presented, the Magistrate may call upon the complainant to appear before him on a date to be fixed by him, and may examine him on that day—*Chuhermal v. Emp.*, 23 S L R. 285, 30 Cr.L.J. 732 (733)

659. Examination of complainant:—The object of requiring the Magistrate to examine the complainant possibly is that the facts constituting the offence may be ascertained when in a written complaint they are not given—*Sukumar v. Mofizuddin*, 25 C.W.N. 357, 22 Cr.L.J. 455. The object of the examination is further to see whether there is a *prima facie* case against the accused, and to prevent the issue of process in cases where the examination of the complainant would show that the complaint was false, frivolous and vexatious and intended merely to harass the accused—*Girdhari Lal v. Crown*, 1911 P R. 11. The object of the examination is to find out whether there is any matter which calls for investigation by a Criminal Court—*Bai; Nath v. Raja Ram*, 10 A L.J. 79, 13 Cr.L.J. 704.

The examination of the complainant is not to be a mere form but an intelligent inquiry into the subject-matter of the complaint, carried far enough to enable the Magistrate to exercise his judgment as to whether there is or there is not sufficient ground for proceeding—*Cal. G R. & C. O.*, p. 9

A Magistrate cannot refuse to take cognizance of an offence on receipt of a complaint, but he is bound to examine the complainant—*Umer Ali v. Safer Ali*, 13 Cal 334. Even if a Magistrate finds a complaint to be false and groundless, he cannot refuse to examine the complainant—*In re Ramchurn*, 3 N.W.P. 272. Although it is competent for him to dismiss the complaint, still he cannot dismiss it without examining the complainant—*Jalaluddin v. Md. Khalil*, 1884 A.W.N. 47; *Satya Charan v. Chairman*, 3 C.W.N. 17.

*Mode of examination:—*On presentation of a complaint the te
shall examine the complainant on oath; the substance of that on

signed by him is to make use of it, in case of need, as against the complainant's subsequent deposition as a witness, for starting against him a prosecution for perjury on the ground that the two statements contradict each other—*Bhagirathibai v Emp.* 26 Cr L J 1401 (Nag)

660. Omission to examine—Effect:—The examination of the complainant is not a mere matter of formality, and when a Magistrate dismisses a complaint without making such examination himself, the omission is a material one and cannot be cured by sec. 537—*Pangu Koeri v Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 346; *In re Ramasami*, 43 M.L.J. 710; *Moolchand v. Kessoomal*, 15 S.L.R. 200, *Loke Nath v. Sanyasi*, 30 Cal. 923; *Kartik v. Emp.*, 2 P.L.T. 142, *Fazlar Rahman v. Abidhar Rahman*, 23 C.W.N. 392; *Haladhar v. Sub-Inspector*, 9 C.W.N. 199; *Satya Charan v. Chairman*, 3 C.W.N. 17; *Jaliluddin v. Md Khalil*, 1884 A.W.N. 47; *Q. E. v. Harrak Chand*, 8 W.R. 12 No investigation can be ordered under sec. 202 without examining the complainant—20 Cr L.J. 552 (Pat.); *Jitan v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 564, *Mahadeo v. Q. E.* 27 Cal 921 (924); *In re Budh Nath*, 4 C.W.N. 305, *Virabhadrayya v. Vyricherla*, 2 Weir 244; *Ali Muhammad v. Crown*, 1912 P.R. 2. (This is now expressly provided in the proviso of sec 202) No process can be issued against the accused unless and until the Magistrate has examined the complainant—*Abhoyeswari v. Kishori Mohan*, 42 Cal. 19 (23)

But in several cases it has been held that the omission to examine the complainant on oath before issuing process is a mere irregularity and does not invalidate the conviction in the absence of any prejudice to the accused by reason of such irregularity—*Phagu Shahu v. K. E.*, 1 P.L.J. 592 (595); *Emp. v. Heman Gope*, 21 Cr.L.J. 779, 1 P.L.T. 349; *Sk Abdul Ali v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 446; *Bhairab v. Emp.*, 46 Cal 807 (818); *Q. E. v. Monu*, 11 Mad. 443; *In re Molanappa*, 55 M.L.J. 715, 30 Cr.L.J. 432; *Bateshar v. Emp.*, 37 All 628; *Gopichand v. Emp.*, 1 Rang. 517; *Muso v. Crown*, 8 S.L.R. 41, 15 Cr.L.J. 649. Thus, where the complainants made a complaint to the Police that the accused beat them causing grievous hurt, but the police did not send up the case, and the complainant applied to the Magistrate, who sent for the police papers and summoned the accused without examining the complainants, it was held that the irregularity did not vitiate the proceeding—*Bateshar v. Emp.*, 37 All. 628, 13 A.L.J. 840. The omission to examine the complainant under sec. 200 is a mere irregularity and not an illegality. The person prejudiced by such an irregularity is the complainant, and when the case ends in a conviction he has no grievance. The accused cannot in general complain of the irregularity, as the omission to take a sworn statement from the complainant cannot prejudice the accused—*Ambayara v. Pachamuthu*, 111 L.W. 461, 25 Cr.L.J. 730, A.I.R. 1924 Mad 587. In a recent Patna Full Bench case it has been held that omission to examine the complainant is an irregularity only, and not an illegality, and it is only where the Magistrate intends to take proceedings (e.g. to order investigation or issue process) that it is incumbent on him to examine the complainant, but not otherwise—*Bharat v. Judhistir*, 10 P.L.T. 779 (F.B.), 30 Cr.L.J. 1056 (1058).

661A. If a complaint in respect of an offence of murder is presented to a second-class Magistrate, the proper procedure is to return the complaint under sec. 201 for presentation in the proper Court with an endorsement to that effect—*Bengall Gope v. Emp.*, 5 Pat 447, 27 Cr.L.J. 704.

202. (1) If the Chief Presidency Magistrate or any other Presidency Magistrate whom the Local Government may from time to time authorize on this behalf or any Magistrate of the first or second class, is not satisfied as to the truth of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorized to take cognizance, he may, when the complainant has been examined, record his reasons, and may then postpone the issue of process for compelling the attendance of the person complained against, and either inquire into the case himself or direct a previous local investigation to be made by any officer subordinate to such Magistrate, or by a police-officer, or by such other person, not being a Magistrate or police-officer, as he thinks fit, for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint.

202. (1) *Any Magistrate on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take cognizance, or which has been transferred to him under Section 192, may, if he thinks fit, for reasons to be recorded in writing, postpone the issue of process for compelling the attendance of the person complained against, and either inquire into the case himself or, if he is a Magistrate other than a Magistrate of the third class, direct an inquiry or investigation to be made by any Magistrate subordinate to him, or by a police officer or by such other person * * * as he thinks fit, for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint : Provided that, save where the complaint has been made by a Court, no such direction shall be made unless the complainant has been examined on oath under the provisions of Section 200.*

(2) If such investigation

(2) If any inquiry or i

is made by some person not being a Magistrate or a police-officer, he shall exercise all the powers conferred by this Code on an officer in charge of a police-station, except that he shall not have power to arrest without warrant.

vestigation under this section is made by a person not being a Magistrate or a police officer, such person shall exercise all the powers conferred by this Code on an officer in charge of a police-station, except that he shall not have power to arrest without warrant.

(2A) *Any Magistrate inquiring into a case under this section, may, if he thinks fit, take evidence of witnesses on oath.*

(3) This section applies also to the police in the towns of Calcutta and Bombay.

(3) This section applies also to the police in the towns of Calcutta and Bombay.

Change :—This section has been amended by sec 55 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923

The main changes introduced are the following :—

"(1) Third class Magistrates have been given power to make preliminary inquiries personally. (2) Authority to make a preliminary inquiry has been given in any case in which the Magistrate thinks fit for reasons to be recorded in writing. The only ground contemplated by the old section was 'if the Magistrate is not satisfied as to the truth of the complaint.' This is thought to be undesirably narrow. (3) The words 'inquiry or investigation,' have been substituted for the expression 'previous local investigation,' and power is given to take evidence upon oath in the case of such a preliminary inquiry. (4) Presidency Magistrates are enabled to act under this section without special authorisation"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons (1914)*

'Or which has been transferred to him under section 192' :—"We have made a small amendment in sec. 202 (1) to cover cases which have been transferred to a Magistrate under sec. 192 as well as cases of which he has taken cognizance himself"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*. This amendment supersedes the ruling in 18 C.W.N. 95

The present proviso to subsection (1) has been substituted by the Cr. P. Code Amendment Act II of 1926 in place of the old proviso which was added by the Amendment Act of 1923, and which ran thus :—

"Provided that no such direction shall be made—(a) unless the com-

plainant has been examined on oath under the provisions of section 200, or (b) where the complaint has been made by a Court under the provisions of this Code "

Thus, this proviso laid down that a Magistrate receiving a complaint need not direct an inquiry or investigation if the complaint was made by a Court. "This has caused difficulties in the case of a Court complaining under sec 476 of the Code. Under that section, the Court has only to record a finding that it is expedient that an inquiry should be made into an offence which appears to have been committed, and it seems clear that cases will arise in which an inquiry or investigation should be made before a person is put on his trial. The difficulty was brought to light by the Bombay High Court, and the Local Government; and the other High Courts have all agreed that some provision is required. This clause gives effect to this proposal"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons*, (Gazette of India, 1925, Part V, p 214)

The present proviso lays down by implication that an inquiry or investigation may be directed in any case, including the case of a Court complaining under sec 476, but that in such a case the examination of the complainant is not necessary before the inquiry or investigation.

662. Scope and application of section—This chapter deals with the procedure to be followed by a Magistrate upon taking cognizance of an offence upon *complaint*, i.e., when he takes cognizance under sec. 190 clause (a), and not when he takes cognizance upon a Police report or other information mentioned in clauses (b) and (c) of sec. 190. See *Rangachari*, 2 Weir 241 (242). This section applies only to cases where there is a "*complaint*" as distinguished from a mere *information*. A Magistrate acting upon second-hand information cannot be said to be acting upon *complaint*—*Narain v. Emp.*, 1883 P.R. 24. So also, a Magistrate taking cognizance of a case upon a *police report* cannot proceed under this section and cannot therefore refer the case to a subordinate Magistrate for local investigation—*Abdulla v. Emp.*, 40 Cal. 854; *Imp. v. Shoukatmal*, 7 S.L.R. 75, *Sarba Mahton v. Emp.*, 17 C.W.N. 824; *Tiloki v. Emp.*, 2 P.L.T. 220, 22 Cr.L.J. 735.

Under the old section, the investigation could be ordered only in those cases where the Magistrate was not satisfied as to the truth of a complaint—*Jhumuck v. Pathuk*, 27 Cal. 798, *Ranga Chari*, 3 Weir 241 (242); *Mahadeo v. Q. E.*, 27 Cal. 921 (924), *Narain v. Emp.*, 1888 P.R. 24. Under the present section, the Magistrate can direct inquiry on any ground. See notes under "Change" above

If the complainant is not speaking from personal knowledge, a Magistrate taking cognizance would exercise a wise discretion in making the inquiry under this section—*Sukumar v. Mofizuddin*, 25 C.W.N. 357.

This section applies to a complaint of an *offence*. A petition for maintenance under Sec 488 is not a complaint of an offence; and therefore this section is inapplicable to proceedings in maintenance. The Magistrate to whom a maintenance petition is preferred has no power

refer it to a Subordinate Magistrate for inquiry and report, but must inquire into it himself—*Sardaran v. Amir Khan*, 1905 P.R. 29.

This section does not in terms authorise a Magistrate to refer a petition under sec. 107 to a police officer for investigation, as a petition under sec. 107 does not allege the commission of an offence and does not amount to a complaint. But as the Magistrates have control over the police whose assistance they can seek in the discharge of their duties, it is perfectly open to a Magistrate to avail himself of the help of the police, apart from sec. 202, and to refer the matter of the petition under sec. 107 to a police officer for investigation—*Sonjivi v. Koneri*, 49 Mad. 315, 50 M.L.J. 460, A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 521.

663. Recording reasons :—If the Magistrate on examining the complainant, distrusts the statement of the complainant, he is bound to record his reasons before directing a local investigation—*Baidyanath v. Muspratt*, 14 Cal. 141. If the Magistrate refers a case to the police for inquiry and report, without recording any reasons for distrusting the truth of the complaint, and then on receiving the report from the police, dismisses the complaint under sec. 203, held that the order of dismissal must be set aside—*Virabhadrayya v. Vyricherla*, 2 Weir 244; *Balai Lal v. Pasupati*, 21 C.W.N. 127, 17 Cr.L.J. 396. But in some cases it has been held that omission to record the reasons is at most an irregularity which will be cured by section 537 unless it has occasioned a failure of justice—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 244 (245); *K. E. v. Alagirisami*, 25 Mad 546; *In re Arula*, 10 M.L.T. 120, *Madho v. Rashid Ahmed*, 18 Cr.L.J. 765, 15 A.L.J. 642, *Ram Prasad v. Moti*, 11 A.L.J. 754, 14 Cr.L.J. 493; *Ram Saran v. Md Jan Khan* 26 Cr.L.J. 1394, A.I.R. 1926 Pat. 34; *Balai Lal v. Pasupati*, 21 C.W.N. 127, 17 Cr.L.J. 396.

664. "Postpone the issue of process" :—The process shall ordinarily issue after the examination of the complainant, unless the Magistrate has reason to doubt the truth of the complaint, when only he is authorised to postpone the issue of process and order an inquiry or local investigation—*Jhumuck v. Pathuk*, 27 Cal. 798.

The procedure prescribed by this section can be adopted when no process has been issued to compel the attendance of the accused. A Magistrate who after issue of process directs an inquiry and report acts in contravention of the procedure prescribed by law—*Q. E. v. Khurram*, 1896 A.W.N. 140. Once a process has been issued against the accused, the Magistrate cannot exercise his option of holding a preliminary inquiry. He must proceed with the trial—*Gan v. Jumanshah*, 6 S.L.R. 83, 13 Cr.L.J. 749; *Bishan Dial v. Ghaziuddin*, 1901 A.W.N. 44. Thus, it is illegal to order a preliminary inquiry after the accused has been brought before the Court under a warrant—*Ramkant v. Jadub*, 21 W.R. 44. When a Magistrate has accepted a complaint and issued process upon it and taken evidence for the complainant, he or his successor cannot refer the case to the Police for inquiry and report—*Sadappachariar v. Ragavachariar*, 9 Mad. 282. Where a subordinate Magistrate has taken cognizance of a case and has issued process, the District Magistrate has no power to inter-

here and order an inquiry—*Jhumuck v. Pathuk*, 27 Cal. 798, and it is doubtful whether he can make such order even after withdrawing the case to his own Court for trial—*Ibid.* On the other hand, if a Magistrate directs a local inquiry, he cannot issue process before he receives the report of the inquiry—*Krishna Bala v. Nirodabala*, 41 C.L.J. 170, A.I.R. 1925 Cal. 989. But where after the Magistrate had issued processes against two accused persons, one of them appeared and laid a cross-complaint, and then the Magistrate rescinded the order of issue of process and sent forth the cases to a subordinate Magistrate for local inquiry and report, held that the action of the Magistrate was right and proper—*Lalit Mohan v. Nan Lal*, 39 C.L.J. 329, 25 Cr.L.J. 464.

665. If the accused appears.—This section speaks of postponement of issue of process. If, however, the accused appears of his own accord without a summons he is entitled to require that the complaint shall be proceeded with or dismissed. If no evidence is offered against the accused, he must be formally discharged—*In re Lakshman*, 26 Bom. 552.

666. Inquiry.—Under the old section, the inquiry was to be conducted by the Magistrate himself who tried the case, he could not direct the inquiry to be held by a subordinate Magistrate or a police officer. These persons could only hold a local investigation. See *Haricharan v. Girish Chandra*, 38 Cal 68 (72), *Gangadhar v K E*, 43 Cal 173, 20 C.W.N. 63; *Md Imamuddin v Debendra*, 18 C W N 95, *Mohar Khan v Gayzuddin*, 18 C.W.N. 399. The present amendment now empowers these persons to hold an inquiry as well as an investigation. See also *Amrit Majhi v. K E.*, 46 Cal. 854, 23 C.W N 623, in which the order referring the complaint to a subordinate Magistrate for inquiry and report was held to be legal.

The inquiry contemplated by this section does not necessarily mean an inquiry by the Magistrate himself by examining witnesses or holding investigation into the case. It is open to the Magistrate to investigate into the matter in order to ascertain the truth or falsity of the complaint, in any way he thinks proper. Where an investigation has been made by the police and witnesses had been examined by the investigating police officer, there is nothing in law to prevent the Magistrate from looking into the police papers for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint. If upon looking into the police papers the Magistrate is satisfied that this is not a fit case in which process should issue, he can dismiss the complaint—*Ramanand v Ali Hassan*, 26 Cr L J 129 (Pat).

Before the present amendment, the only Magistrate who could make an inquiry under this section was the Magistrate taking cognizance of the case, a Magistrate to whom a case was transferred could not hold an inquiry under sec. 202. See *Md Imamuddin v Debendra* 18 C W N. 95. Under the present amendment, such Magistrate is empowered to hold the inquiry by reason of the addition of the words "or which has been transferred to him under section 192."

Under this section, the Magistrate has the option of only one of two alternatives, viz., either to *inquire* into the case himself or to direct a *local investigation*. He cannot have recourse to both the alternatives; and if he, after partially inquiring into the case himself, makes an order directing local investigation, the procedure is irregular—*Emp. v. Durga Prasad*, 44 All. 550, 20 A.L.J. 355, 23 Cr.L.J. 279.

The police inquiry contemplated by this section cannot take the place of such evidence as the complainant may desire to produce before an adjudication is made of his complaint. Such inquiry can be ordered, before evidence is recorded, to enable the Magistrate to determine how far the complaint was *prima facie* well-founded. When the Magistrate decides to record the evidence himself, he should complete the inquiry and determine upon the evidence adduced how far the complaint is borne out—*Mahadevi v. Ram Sahai*, 22 O.C. 321. The inquiry under this section cannot take the place of hearing, the Magistrate who takes cognizance of the case cannot refer the case under this section to a subordinate Magistrate for calling upon the accused to show cause against prosecution and for submitting a report thereon—*Bhairab v. K. E.*, 46 Cal. 807, 23 C.W.N. 484, ■ C.L.J. 318.

This section makes no provision for the manner in which the evidence in an inquiry should be recorded. The failure to take down the deposition of the witnesses by the Magistrate, in a case in which he had before him the final report of the police containing a detailed account of the statements of witnesses examined by the police, and the witnesses repeated the same statements before him, is not an error of law—*Tilakdhari v. Musri*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1346, A.I.R. 1925 Pat. 584.

Second inquiry—A Magistrate may hold an inquiry even after a local investigation has been made by a subordinate officer, if he is dissatisfied with the result of such investigation—*Haricharan v. Girish Chandra*, 38 Cal. 68. But in *Ram Prasad v. Moti*, 11 A.L.J. 754, it has been held that the Magistrate taking cognizance cannot hold a further inquiry after the holding of a local investigation.

667. Local investigation—The object of the local investigation is to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the complaint; a local investigation was not intended by the Legislature to supersede a regular trial. The object of this section is to prevent the issue of process where there is some initial ground for doubting the truth of the complaint and where on a local investigation there appears no evidence to support it. Where it is found that there is some evidence in support of the complainant's charge, the function of the officer making the local investigation is fulfilled. Process should then be issued and the truth or falsity of the complaint should be determined in a regular manner—*Nga Tha Pu v. K. E.*, U.B.R. (1910) 1st Qr. 73, 11 I.C. 249, 12 Cr.L.J. 385.

A local investigation can be ordered when there is a quarrel about boundaries or any matter of that kind. Otherwise, the Magistrate taking cognizance should make an inquiry himself—*Baij Nath v. Raja Ram*, 10 A.L.J. 79, 13 Cr.L.J. 704.

The words "local investigation" are not restricted to the investigation of the physical features only but they mean an inquiry into the truth or falsity of the allegations made in the complaint-petition. The word "local" is used with a view to hold the investigation in the locality for the convenience of the parties and their witnesses, and also it may in certain cases necessitate an inspection of the place of occurrence, but certainly it is not confined only to the inspection of the locality—*Munshi Mian v. Emp.*, 19 Cr.L.J. 126 (Pat.).

668. Who can investigate :—If the offence is one triable only by a Court of Session, the local investigation must be directed to some Magistrate who is competent to deal with a case triable by the Court of Session. It should not be directed to a second class Magistrate—*In re Budh Nath*, 4 C.W.N. 305. But see *Sarfya v. K. E.*, 6 C.W.N. 295, where it has been held that a Magistrate holding a local investigation under this section need not be competent to entertain the complaint which he is asked to investigate.

A local investigation can be directed to a subordinate Magistrate and not to a superior Magistrate—*Emp. v. Bhiku Hossein*, 39 Cal. 1041, 18 C.W.N. 885. This section does not contemplate the subordination of a first class Magistrate to a District Magistrate. Both are first class Magistrates, and the latter cannot direct the investigation to be held by the former—*Aly Mohd. v. Emp.*, 1912 P.R. 2. A Deputy Magistrate attached to the sub-division is subordinate to the Sub-Divisional officer—*Munshi Mian v. Emp.*, 19 Cr.L.J. 126 (Pat.)

The investigation may be made by any person subordinate to the Magistrate, even though he be a clerk—*Kanchun v. Ram Kishen*, 36 Cal. 72.

A Magistrate has no jurisdiction to order a local inquiry by a pleader in the nature of a commission in a civil case—*Mohan Khan v. Gayzuddin*, 11 C.W.N. 399.

Investigation by Police :—It is not a proper course to make indiscriminate use of police agency for investigating complaints. The object of law is to give persons who have been injured an access to justice independent of Police, and it is improper for the Magistrate, when a complaint is made to him, to refer the complaint to a Police officer. Such a course would foster abuses and defeat the purpose of the law—*In re Jankidas*, 12 Bom. 161. In petty cases of assault and the like, the Police ought not to be directed to make inquiries, because in petty matters the Police are under a strong temptation of making money out of the complaint. In such matters the proper course for the Magistrate is to take action at once upon the complaint—*Ganesha v. Q. E.*, 1894 P.R. 19. "Magistrates are cautioned against the indiscriminate use of Police agency for the purpose of ascertaining matters in which a Magistrate is bound to form his own opinion upon evidence given in his presence. This caution is specially needful in respect of all cases regarding offences not cognizable by the Police"—*Cal. G. R. & C. O.*, p. 9

Under this section, the Magistrate has the option of only one of two alternatives, viz., either to *inquire* into the case himself or to direct a *local investigation*. He cannot have recourse to both the alternatives, and if he, after partially inquiring into the case himself, makes an order directing local investigation, the procedure is irregular—*Emp. v. Durga Prasad*, 44 All 550, 20 A L J 355, 23 Cr L J. 279.

The police inquiry contemplated by this section cannot take the place of such evidence as the complainant may desire to produce before an adjudication is made of his complaint. Such inquiry can be ordered, before evidence is recorded, to enable the Magistrate to determine how far the complaint was *prima facie* well-founded. When the Magistrate decides to record the evidence himself, he should complete the inquiry and determine upon the evidence adduced how far the complaint is borne out—*Mahadei v. Ram Sahai*, 22 O C. 321. The inquiry under this section cannot take the place of hearing, the Magistrate who takes cognizance of the case cannot refer the case under this section to a subordinate Magistrate for calling upon the accused to show cause against prosecution and for submitting a report thereon—*Bhairab v. K. E.*, 46 Cal. 807, 23 C.W.N. 484, 29 C.L J. 318.

This section makes no provision for the manner in which the evidence in an inquiry should be recorded. The failure to take down the deposition of the witnesses by the Magistrate, in a case in which he had before him the final report of the police containing a detailed account of the statements of witnesses examined by the police, and the witnesses repeated the same statements before him, is not an error of law—*Tilakdhari v. Misri*, 26 Cr L.J. 1346, A I R 1925 Pat. 584.

Second inquiry —A Magistrate may hold an inquiry even after a local investigation has been made by a subordinate officer, if he is dissatisfied with the result of such investigation—*Haricharan v. Girish Chandra*, 38 Cal. 68. But in *Ram Prasad v. Moti*, 11 A L.J. 754, it has been held that the Magistrate taking cognizance cannot hold a further inquiry after the holding of a local investigation.

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A local investigation can be ordered when there is a quarrel about boundaries or any matter of that kind. Otherwise, the Magistrate taking cognizance should make an inquiry himself—*Baij Nath v. Raja Ram*, 10 A.L.J. 79, 13 Cr.L.J. 704.

be false—*Kanchan v. Ram Krishun*, 36 Cal. 72. *Contra* :—*Kachi Madar v. Emp*, 21 M.L.J. 795, 12 Cr.L.J. 323, where it was held that a preliminary investigation made by a Magistrate under this section was not a judicial proceeding and therefore a person could not be prosecuted for an offence brought to the notice of the Court during such investigation. This ruling is no longer correct.

The Magistrate holding the investigation is not disqualified thereby from afterwards trying the case, when there is nothing to indicate that he initiated or directed the proceedings or took any personal interest in the matter of the complaint presented before him—*Anand v. Basu Meah*, 24 Cal. 167. The fact that the investigating Magistrate expressed an opinion in submitting the report is no bar to his holding the trial—*Bani Madhab v. Rosaraj*, 4 C.W.N. 604. But where a Magistrate took an active part in forwarding the police inquiries and collecting evidence against the accused, he is disqualified from trying the accused—*Sudhama v. Q. E.*, 23 Cal. 328. So also, where a Magistrate, during a local investigation, himself discovered the evidence of crime, and collected or ascertained the evidence in support of it, and thereafter directed, recommended or invited the institution of criminal proceedings, it is undesirable that he should try the case—*Bhop Singh v. Kermoli*, 8 N.L.R. 1, 13 Cr.L.J. 236.

In a recent Patna case it has been held that if a Magistrate sends a cognizable case to the police to investigate under this section, the police officer making the investigation can arrest and sent up a charge sheet. The Magistrate's order under this section does not debar the police from exercising their general powers of arrest and investigation in regard to the same matter as formed the subject of the complaint "It is possible to conceive of cases where, although the Magistrate may distrust a complaint or delay in passing orders, (i.e., postpone the issue of process and order an investigation under this section), the police would be failing in their duty if they did not arrest an offender against whom a cognizable offence has been made out. Much more so would this be the case where the Magistrate after recording the complaint finds that regular police investigation would be more suitable and intentionally keeps the complaint pending in order that the police may exercise their powers of investigation and arrest independently of the Magistrate"—*K E v. Bhola Bhagat*, 2 Pat. 379 (382, 383), 4 P.L.T. 521, 24 Cr.L.J. 375.

671. Position of the accused—A Magistrate has no jurisdiction to require the presence of the accused at an inquiry or investigation, under sec. 202, into a complaint of which he is empowered to take cognizance under sec. 190 or which has been transferred to him under sec. 192—*Appa Rao v. Janakiammal*, 49 Mad. 918 (F.B.), 51 M.L.J. 605, 28 Cr.L.J. 129. Magistrates are in the habit of giving a person against whom a charge is formulated at least an option to come before him if he so desires at the earliest stage. Such a procedure is entirely unwarranted by the Code. The object of this section is to prevent accused persons being harassed at all or asked to appear if in the opinion of the Magistrate no *prima facie* case is made out, and the Code never contem-

plated that at that stage they should be either asked or permitted to state their cases—*Ibid*. An accused person is not to be called upon under sec. 202 to appear unless and until the Magistrate has satisfied himself from the complainant and his witnesses that there is a *prima facie* case against him. It is highly irregular for a Magistrate, when a complaint is put in and sworn to, without hearing the complainant's case or his witnesses, to issue notice to the accused to appear and show cause against the issue of process, hear what the accused has to say, examine any witnesses he wishes to have examined and then decide whether the complaint shall be received or not—*Varadarajulu v. Kuppusami*, 49 Mad 926, 51 M.L.J. 602, 28 Cr.L.J. 113; *Sheikh Meeran v. Ramavelu*, 37 Mad 181 (183).

A person complained against does not become an 'accused' person or a 'person against whom any proceedings have been instituted' within the meaning of sec. 340, until it has been decided to issue process against him under Chapter XVII, Sec. 340, therefore, does not entitle him to be represented by a pleader during the preliminary inquiry held under this section—*Shaikh Chand v. Mahomed Hanif*, 4 N.L.R. 81; *Golap Jan v. Bholanath*, 38 Cal. 880 (887), or during the proceeding when the Magistrate is considering the report of the local investigation ordered by him—*Bala Lal v. Pasupati*, 21 C.W.N. 127, 17 Cr.L.J. 396 (397). If he chooses to attend the proceedings he may do so like any other member of the public, but has no *locus standi* as a party, the purpose of the law being clearly to exclude him until sufficient ground for joining him has been made out by the complainant. Therefore the Magistrate can refuse him permission to cross-examine the complainant's witnesses—*Shaikh Chand v. Md. Hanif*, 4 N.L.R. 81. See also *Chandi Charan v. Manindra*, 27 C.W.N. 196, 24 Cr.L.J. 333. The accused has no right to be present when a Magistrate is holding an inquiry under sec. 202. Proceedings under this section are not *inter partes*, but merely to satisfy the Magistrate whether there is or is not any ground for issuing process. Allowing a legal practitioner to attend the proceedings is only a matter of grace and not of right—*Atmaram v. Topandas*, 20 S.L.R. 43, 27 Cr.L.J. 494. In a proceeding under this section the Magistrate acts illegally in sending for the accused person and calling for a report from him as to the truth or falsity of a charge preferred against him—*Harnarain v. Kariman*, 21 Cr.L.J. 621, 5 P.L.J. 61; *Baidyanath v. Muspratt*, 14 Cal. 141. A preliminary inquiry should not be held in the presence of the person complained against and he should not be allowed to cross-examine the complainant's witnesses—*Bhimlal v. Emp.*, 40 Cal. 444, 17 C.W.N. 290; *Ram Manihari v. Raj Kishore*, 19 Cr.L.J. 527 (Pat.). When a Magistrate holds an inquiry under this section, he should not hear arguments on behalf of the accused—*Bachoo Mia v. Anwar*, 30 C.W.N. 312, 26 Cr.L.J. 305. *Contra*—In *Ram Baran v. Mohd Jan*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1394, the Patna High Court did not object to the action of the Magistrate in calling the accused to the inquiry; and in *Sheikh Akbar v. Prance*, 12 Cr.L.J. 207 (Cal.) it was held that the accused should be permitted to watch the proceedings, and his pleader should be allowed to act as *amicus curiae*. In a recent Bombay case it

has been held that the Magistrate may, if he deems it desirable, give opportunity to the accused to appear in the inquiry and state what he has to say about the accusation, and the Magistrate may even accept and consider the documentary evidence which the accused produces—*In re Virbhan*, 52 Bom 448, 30 Bom.L.R. 642.

Statements made by the person complained against during an inquiry under this section cannot be regarded as having been recorded under sec. 164 or sec. 364. Such person does not stand in the position of an accused person during the inquiry, and such statements cannot be admitted in evidence against him—*Sat Narain v. Emp.*, 32 Cal. 1085

672. Evidence in the inquiry :—The Magistrate conducting the preliminary inquiry need not confine himself to the evidence of the complainant alone, but he may examine such witnesses as he thinks fit—*In re Kankuchand*, Ratanlal 669. There is nothing in section 202 to prevent the investigating officer from making a full inquiry by obtaining information from the complainant and his witnesses, and the defendant and his witnesses, if any—*Debi Bux v. Jutmal*, 33 Cal 1282

673. Submission of report :—The officer who conducted the investigation must submit the report of his investigation to the same Magistrate who had originally ordered him to investigate, he is not authorised to submit it to another Magistrate for the purpose of dismissing the complaint and declaring that no offence had in reality been committed—*Thakur Singh v. Kirpal*, 1918 P.L.R. 53, 19 Cr.L.J. 436.

674. Revision .—If an irregularity in procedure has not resulted in any miscarriage of justice, the High Court will not make an order which can result only in harassment and waste of public time. In a case in which a perfunctory inquiry has been made by the Police and the report considered in a perfunctory manner by the Magistrate, the High Court will interfere and insist on the provisions of this section being strictly enforced. But where the inquiry has been carefully made and carefully considered, the High Court will refuse to re-open the matter—*Sheonandan v. Emp.*, 4 P.L.W. 114, 19 Cr.L.J. 263.

203. The Magistrate before whom a complaint is made, or to whom it has been transferred, may dismiss the complaint, if after examining the complainant, and considering the result of the investigation (if any) made under Section 202, there is in his judgment no sufficient

203. The Magistrate before whom a complaint is made, or to whom it has been transferred, may dismiss the complaint, if after considering the statement on oath (if any) of the complainant and the result of the investigation or inquiry (if any) under Section 202, there is

ground for proceeding. In such case he shall briefly record his reasons for so doing.

in his judgment no sufficient ground for proceeding. In such case he shall briefly record his reasons for so doing.

This section has been amended by sec. 56 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. The word "the investigation or inquiry (if any)" have been substituted recently by the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act II of 1926, for the words 'any investigation or inquiry' occurring in the Amendment of 1923. See Note 677 below.

675. Dismissal of complaint :—Where on a complaint made against several persons the Magistrate proceeded against only one of them and convicted him, but refused to issue process against the others, *held* that the order of refusal was to all intents and purposes an order of dismissal of complaint against those persons under sec. 203—*Girish Chandra v. Emp.*, 29 Cal. 457; *Hari Lal v. Emp.*, 20 Cr.L.J. 835 (Pat.). Where, on a complaint being filed, the Magistrate called for a police report, and subsequently on a consideration of that report passed the order "Enter mistake of law" and refused to issue processes, *held* that the order must be regarded as an order dismissing a complaint—*Shaik Siddik v. Shaik Chakuri*, 17 C.W.N. 451, 14 Cr.L.J. 123, 17 C.L.J. 608. When a Magistrate passes an order under this section, he should say plainly that he dismisses the complaint. The practice of Magistrates passing an order "Notice ■ discharged" is to be deprecated—*In re Virbhan*, 52 Bom. 448, 30 Bom.L.R. 642.

An application under Sec. 107 does not fall within the definition of a 'complaint,' and therefore, sec. 202 does not apply to it; but every Magistrate has the inherent power of refusing an application which he finds to be groundless, and so, if he is satisfied after making an inquiry that the apprehension of a breach of the peace complained of does not exist, he can refuse the application under sec. 107, without taking any evidence which the applicant wanted to produce—*Shamsuddin v. Ram Dayal*, 25 Cr.L.J. 89, A.I.R. 1924 Lah. 630.

Dismissal when can be made —This section gives very large powers to the Magistrate to dismiss a complaint without issuing process, but certain conditions are laid down, and those conditions must be strictly fulfilled in making an order under this section. A Magistrate may dismiss a complaint (1) if upon the statement of the complainant reduced to writing under sec. 200 he finds that no offence has been committed, (2) if he distrusts the statement made by the complainant; (3) if he distrusts that statement, but his distrust not being strong enough to warrant him to act upon it, he directs further inquiry as provided by sec. 202 and after considering the result of the investigation he finds there is no sufficient ground for proceeding—*Baidyanath v. Muspratt*, 14 Cal. 141; *In re Ganesh Narain*, 13 Bom. 600, *Subul Chandra v. Ahadulla*, 53 Cal. 606, 30 C.W.N. 546, 27 Cr.L.J. 788.

There can be no dismissal of complaint under sec 203, after process has issued. This section refers to cases falling within Chapter XVI where there has been no issue of process. Where the accused has been summoned to answer a charge, there is a proceeding within the meaning of Chapter XVII and the complaint cannot be dismissed under sec. 203—*Q. E. v. Budhumbhai, Ratanlal* 544. Even an order directing withdrawal of process issued against the accused will not amount to an order of dismissal of complaint—*Panchoo v Khoosdel*, 12 C W N. 68.

Who can dismiss complaint—The complaint can be dismissed either by the Magistrate who took cognizance of it, or by the Magistrate to whom it was transferred for local investigation. The District Magistrate has no power to pass any order for dismissal of complaint, unless he first removes the case to his own file—*Mrinal Kanti Ghosh v. Emp.*, 6 C.W N. 843. When a case has been transferred to a subordinate Magistrate and is pending on his file, the District Magistrate has no power to pass an order of dismissal of complaint—*Sheikh Kutab Ali v Emp.*, 3 C.W N. 490. Unless he withdraws the case to his own file, the District Magistrate cannot pass any orders in the case, and the only person who can deal with the case is the subordinate Magistrate—*Q v Beluhas*, 12 W R 33. A complaint was originally made before a Deputy Magistrate. The Deputy Magistrate sent the case to the District Magistrate with a view to the Dt. Magistrate transferring it to another Court, but the Dt Magistrate instead of transferring the case to another Court, examined the record, and came to the conclusion that the complaint was wholly without foundation, and so he dismissed it; held that the District Magistrate was sufficiently seized of the case and the order passed by him was not without jurisdiction—*Govind v. Ram Das*, 25 Cr.L J 555, A I R 1924 All. 666.

The village Munsiff is not a recognised tribunal under this Code, and the dismissal of a complaint by a village Munsiff does not fall under this section—*Rama Naidu*, 53 M.L J. 102, 28 Cr L J 507.

Duty of Magistrate before dismissal—Before a Magistrate can dismiss a complaint, he must, according to the words of this section, examine the complainant and consider the result of the investigation (if any) made under sec. 202. In other words, a Magistrate cannot dismiss a complaint without complying with the provisions of law as laid down in sections 200 and 202. Where there was no previous local investigation ordered under sec. 202 nor any examination of the complainant as directed by sec 200, the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to dismiss the complaint under this section—*Lokanath v. Sanyasi*, 30 Cal. 923.

If a Magistrate holds an inquiry under sec. 202, he should not dismiss the complaint without giving the complainant an opportunity to adduce evidence in support of his case—*Dr Sandyal v Kunjswar*, 16 C W N 143. It is improper for a Magistrate to dismiss a complaint while sitting in his private room, and without giving the complainant or his pleader an opportunity of being heard—*Fani Bhushan v. Kemp*, 10 C W N 1086.

676. Examination of complainant—Before dismissing complaint, the Magistrate is bound to examine the complainant. Until

has at least examined the complainant, he is not in a position to exercise the discretionary power to issue process or to dismiss the complaint. Therefore, an order dismissing the complaint without examining the complainant is illegal—*In re Ningappa*, 48 Bom. 360; *In re Ganesh Narain*, 13 Bom 590. A complainant who challenges the police investigation must be examined on oath before the complaint is dismissed and the accused discharged—*Kartik Pathak v. Emp.*, 2 P L T. 142

When a deposition in the shape of a complaint is made orally or in writing and is sworn to, the requirements of this section as regards examination of complainant are fulfilled—*Q. E. v. Murphy*, 9 All 666, *Thakoor Das v. Bhagvan Das*, 4 Bom L R 609. But merely cross-examining the complainant or taking the deposition of certain witnesses in the preliminary inquiry held under sec. 159 is not a sufficient compliance with the requirements of this section—*Lokenath v. Sanyasi*, 30 Cal. 923

Where a Magistrate examined the complainant and only one of his witnesses, and without examining the rest of the witnesses dismissed the complaint, it was held that the entire evidence for the prosecution should have been received by the Magistrate unless for some very strong reasons he considered the evidence unnecessary—*Gokul Chand v. Mahabir*, 11 A.L.J. 451, 14 Cr.L.J. 412

In the case of a complaint of a serious offence like murder, the dismissal of the case without any judicial examination of the complainant or his witnesses is extremely illegal—*Fuzlar Rahman v. Abidhar*, 23 C W N 392, 20 Cr L J 175, 29 C.L.J. 50.

There is nothing in this section to show that the Magistrate must at once consider the complaint, and may not take time to consider the complaint-petition and the examination on oath—*Nawazi v. Jadu*, 19 Cr L.J. 228 (Pat.)

677. "Investigation or inquiry (if any)" :—This section empowers a Magistrate to dismiss the complaint without any investigation under sec. 202, if after examining the complainant he considers there is no sufficient ground for proceeding—*Nawazi v. Jadu Dhanuk*, 19 Cr.L.J. 228 (Pat.). The Amendment of 1923 contained the words "any investigation or inquiry" and the words 'if any' were omitted. This led to the view that an investigation or inquiry under sec. 202 was compulsory before dismissing a case under sec. 203. Hence the recent amendment made in 1926 in which the words 'if any' have been restored. "The Calcutta High Court in a recent decision (in the case of *Srish Chandra Bose v. Madan Lal Surena*) has held that under sec. 203 an investigation or an inquiry under sec. 202 is necessary in all cases, because the words 'if any' have been omitted from Sec. 203 after the words 'investigation or inquiry' No such change was intended by the amendment made by Act XVIII of 1923, and the proposed addition is to make this matter clear"—*Statement of objects and Reasons* (Gazette of India, 1925 Part V, p. 215). See also *Dukhiram v. Jamuna*, 6 P L T. 727, 26 Cr.L.J. 921, A I R. 1925 Pat. 704

Where an investigation has been ordered under sec. 202, the Magistrate is not bound, after receipt of the report of such investigation, to examine any witnesses or hold any inquiry before he dismisses the complaint. It is sufficient that he takes into consideration the result of the investigation arrived at by the subordinate officer—*Munshi Mian v. Emp.*, 19 Cr.L.J. 126 (Patna).

678. Grounds of dismissal—A complaint can be dismissed if the Magistrate thinks that there is not a sufficient ground for proceeding. The expression "sufficient ground" in this section points exclusively to the facts which the complainant brings to the knowledge of the Magistrate and to their establishing a *prima facie* case against the accused. In exercising his discretionary power of summary dismissal of complaint, the Magistrate should not allow himself to be influenced by considerations altogether apart from the facts adduced by the complainant in support of the charge nor by a consideration of the motive by which the complainant is actuated. What he has to consider is whether there is a *prima facie* evidence of a criminal offence which in his judgment calls upon the alleged offender to answer—*In re Ganesh*, 13 Bom 390. The decision whether there is sufficient ground must be reached by the exercise of discretion based upon judicial considerations. That the Magistrate considered the probable result of the proceeding undesirable or the motives and conduct of the complainant discreditable, are not relevant considerations—*Ganga v. Samarapathi*, 38 Mad. 512. In the absence of any finding that the complaint was false or unsustainable on the evidence likely to be available, the passing of an order of dismissal under this section constitutes an irregularity with which the High Court can interfere in revision—*Ganga Reddi v. Samarapathi*, 38 Mad 512, 25 M.L.J. 510, 14 Cr.L.J. 633.

The reasons for dismissing a complaint should be based on inference of facts arising from or disclosed by (1) the complaint, (2) the examination of the complainant, and (3) the investigation, if any, made under Sec. 202. This provides a wide field. Anything outside it is extra-judicial and must be discarded—*Mustafa v. Motilal*, 9 Bom L.R. 742.

A Magistrate ought to dismiss a complaint where the subordinate Magistrate to whom the case was made over for inquiry and report under sec. 202 held an elaborate inquiry, examined a number of witnesses and submitted a report that there was no case against the accused. In such a case the trying Magistrate acts wrongly in disregarding the report and ordering issue of summons against the accused—*Abdullah v. Emp.* 40 Cal. 854 (1857).

What are not proper grounds of dismissal—If the allegations contained in the complaint disclose a criminal offence, a Magistrate should not dismiss the complaint simply because the case is one in which a civil remedy is obtainable.—*Koshal Singh v. Toolshee*, 10 W.R. 40. A complaint cannot be dismissed on the ground that the entertainment of the complaint would encourage hundreds of such complaints and would stir up old religious feelings of animosity between the Hindus and Mussalmans.

—*Q. E. v. Ram Chandra*, Ratanlal 562, or on the ground that a more responsible person ought to have preferred the complaint—*Boodhoo v Ram Dayal*, 18 W.R. 55; or on the ground that the complainant is a man of low caste, and the alleged offence is theft of a goat which is merely a harm under sec 95 I. P. C. rather than an offence—*Q v. Pochun*, 2 W.R. 35; or on the ground that the complaint is actuated by a malicious feeling and that the alleged offence was committed six years ago, and that if the act of the accused was held criminal, a large part of the population would go to jail—*Q ■ v. Manji*, Ratanlal 549; or on the ground that the complainant had no personal knowledge of the facts alleged in the complaint (in such a case the Magistrate should allow the complainant to bring forward evidence to prove those facts)—*In re Kankuchand*, Ratanlal 669, or on the ground that the person complained against has been exonerated in a previous departmental inquiry into the facts alleged in the complaint—*Ralia v. Ahsan*, 1887 P.R. 33.

679. Recording reasons:—The Magistrate is bound to record his reasons for dismissing the complaint, for if that is not done, it would be impossible for the High Court to consider whether the discretion vested in the Magistrate under this section has been properly exercised or not—*Baidyanath v. Muspratt*, 14 Cal. 141; *Kartik Pathak v. Emp*, 2 P.L.T. 142; *Harnandan v. Atul*, 7 P.L.T. 481, 26 Cr.L.J. 1502. An order of a Magistrate dismissing a complaint under this section without recording any reasons for dismissal but merely stating that he agrees with the police report, is improper and will be set aside—*Ahmed v. Ameena*, 7 M.L.T. 175, 11 Cr.L.J. 331.

The words in this section are "he shall record"; i.e., the provisions of this section are imperative, and a failure to record reasons is a direct disobedience of law and not a mere irregularity—*Maniruddin v. Abdul Rauf*, 40 Cal. 41 (43). Where a Magistrate did not record reasons for dismissing a complaint, but directed that the complainant should be prosecuted under sec. 211 I. P. Code, held that the order of dismissal was without jurisdiction and altogether bad, that there must be a further inquiry, and that there cannot be any proceeding under sec 211 I. P. Code until such further inquiry has been made—*Maniruddin v. Abdul Rauf*, 40 Cal. 41 (44), 13 Cr.L.J. 482.

680. Effect of dismissal—A dismissal of a complaint after hearing the complainant and after considering the result of an investigation ordered under sec. 202 amounts to a legal determination of the complaint, and the complainant can be prosecuted for making a false charge under sec. 211 I. P. C.—*Surya v K E*, 6 C.W.N. 295. Until a complaint is dismissed under this section or is otherwise disposed of, no proceedings can be taken under sec. 211 I. P. C. against the complainant—*Gunamony v. Q E.*, 3 C.W.N. 758, followed in *Gati Mandal v. Emp*, 4 C.L.J. 88. Where a complaint has been illegally dismissed (e.g. without examining the complainant), the complainant cannot be prosecuted under sec. 182 or 211 I. P. C. for bring a false charge—*In re Ningappa*, 48 Bom. 360, 26 Bom.L.R. 183; *Mahadeo v. Q E.*, 27 Cal. 921; *Aly Mohd. v. Emp*, 1912 P.R. 2; *Ram Sarup v. K E*, 4 O.C. 127.

When a complaint has been dismissed under this section, before the issue of process to the accused, no compensation to the accused (sec. 250) can be awarded—*Azam v. Mir Abdulla*, 1897 P.R. 14; *Harphul v. Manku*, 1906 P.R. 3. It can be awarded only when the accused being summoned to attend Court is discharged or acquitted, and the complaint is found to be frivolous or vexatious—*Har Phul v. Manku*, 1906 P.R. 3.

So also, no suit for malicious prosecution will lie against the complainant when the complaint is dismissed under this section, because there has been no prosecution of the accused. Prosecution commences only after the issue of process, and not where the complaint has been dismissed without any issue of process—*Sheik Meeran Saib v. Rainavelu*, 25 M.L.J. 1, 21 I.C. 703.

681. Power to rehear complaint or hear fresh complaint :—A dismissal under this section is a dismissal without a trial; it is therefore open to a Magistrate to rehear a complaint which he has dismissed under sec. 203, or to hear a fresh complaint, though the order of dismissal has not been set aside by a higher Court—*Emp v. Chinna Kaliappa*, 29 Mad 126 (F.B.); *Subbareddi v. Kamal*, 16 Cr.L.J. 814 (Mad.); *Q. E. v. Dolegobind*, 28 Cal 211, *Q. E. v. Puran*, 11 All 85; *Jyotindra v. Hemchandra*, 36 Cal. 415, *Makhatambi v. Hassan Ali*, 1 N.L.R. 18, *Emp., v. Keyner*, 36 All. 53, *Bhagwan v. Dibba*, 5 A.L.J. 137, *Emp v. Mehrban*, 29 All 7, *Jai Kishen v. Kalla*, 21 Cr.L.J. 379 (All); *Uttam Chand v. Emp.*, 1902 P.R. 9, *Emp v. Kiru*, 1911 P.R. 10, 12 Cr.L.J. 364, 11 I.C. 132, *K. E. v. Nga Pu*, 2 L.B.R. 27 (F.B.). (Contra—*Kamal Chandra v. Gour Chand*, 24 Cal 286; *Niratan v. Jogesh*, 23 Cal. 983, *Mahomed Abdul v. Pandu*, 28 Mad. 255, where a fresh complaint was held to be barred). Where a Magistrate dismisses a complaint under this section, it is open to him at a later stage to issue summons and revive the proceedings. The fact that in the meanwhile the Sessions Judge has in revision refused to direct further inquiry is immaterial—*Janakdhari v. Emp.*, 8 Pat. 537, 1929 Cr.C. 353, *Jyotindra v. Hemchandra*, 36 Cal 415. In *Jaswa v. Emp.*, 21 A.L.J. 215, it has been held that the Magistrate cannot reopen the same case, but there is no bar to the entertainment of a second complaint on the same facts.

Where a first complaint has been dismissed under sec. 259, it is not a sufficient ground for refusing to entertain a second complaint and dismissing it again under sec. 203—*Bulchand v. Chandoomal*, 8 S.L.R. 196, 16 Cr.L.J. 174.

When a Magistrate has dismissed a complaint, his successor or any other Magistrate can entertain a fresh complaint on the same facts—*Ram Bharos v. Baban*, 36 All. 129, 15 Cr.L.J. 158; *Subbareddi v. Kamal*, 16 Cr.L.J. 814 (Mad.); *Bijoo v. K. E.*, 2 P.L.J. 34 (35), 18 Cr.L.J. 296; *Sheogovind v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 293; *In re Mahadeo*, 27 Bom. L.R. 352, 26 Cr.L.J. 991. But in *Q. E. v. Adam Khan*, 22 All 106, and *Tirathbai v. Sugribai*, 23 S.L.R. 43, 29 Cr.L.J. 1097 (1098), it has been held that a Magistrate of co-ordinate authority cannot entertain a fresh complaint on the same facts or re-open the old complaint as if it were an

appeal or matter of revision. In *Inderjit v. Thakur Sing*, 2 C.W.N. 290, it is laid down that a complaint once dismissed by a Magistrate cannot be revived by his successor-in-office.

But although a previous order dismissing the complaint or discharging the accused is no bar to the institution of a fresh case against the same accused, still a new complaint on the same facts should not be entertained, unless new facts, which could not with reasonable diligence have been brought forward in the previous proceedings, would be adduced, or unless there was some manifest error or manifest miscarriage of justice in the previous proceedings—*U Shwe v Ma Sein*, 26 Cr.L.J. 284, A L.R. 1925 Rang 114

682. Further inquiry.—Where a complaint has been dismissed under this section, the High Court or Sessions Judge may direct further inquiry. See sec 436. Where a further inquiry having been ordered under sec. 436, the Magistrate, after taking some evidence, again dismissed the complaint under sec. 203, and the Sessions Judge, being moved, was of opinion that the Magistrate could not dismiss the complaint under sec. 203 for the second time but was bound to issue process against the accused, held that the Sessions Judge's view was wrong and the second order of dismissal by the Magistrate was perfectly legal—*Nibaran Chandra v. Sital Chandra*, 25 C W N. 312 But see *Birj Kishore v Gopal Rai*, 11 C W.N. 316

It has been held in some Calcutta cases that if an order of dismissal of complaint or discharge of accused is passed by a Presidency Magistrate, the High Court has no power to direct further inquiry under any of the provisions of this Code. Sec 436 does not apply to orders of dismissal or discharge passed by a Presidency Magistrate; sec. 439 confers on a High Court all the powers of an Appellate Court under sec. 423 but that section does not enable a Court of Appeal to direct that further inquiry be made into a case in which an order of dismissal or discharge may have been passed, but it confers a power to direct further inquiry only in respect of a case of an appeal from an order of acquittal. Hence it follows that the High Court cannot order further inquiry under this Code after discharge or dismissal of complaint by a Presidency Magistrate; but the High Court can do so only under sec 15 of the Charter Act. And its powers of interference under the Charter Act are very limited. It cannot interfere on the ground of any error of law but only on a ground affecting jurisdiction i.e., where the subordinate Court refused or failed to exercise jurisdiction or erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction—*Charoobala v. Barendra*, 27 Cal. 126 (129); *Debi Bux v. Jutmal*, 33 Cal. 1282; *Kedar Nath v. Khetranath*, 6 C.L.J. 705 But in several other cases it has been laid down that secs 435 and 439 of this Code confer upon the High Court the power of sending for the records of Presidency Magistrates, and of reversing the order of the Magistrates and ordering a further inquiry in the case of dismissal of complaint or discharge of accused—*Colville v. Krishno Kishore*, 26 Cal. 746; *Dwarka Nath v. Beni Madhab*, 28 Cal. 652 (F.B.); *Malik Pratap v. Khan Mahomed*, 36 Cal. 994; and the High Court can direct further inquiry, if

there are good reasons for doing so, although no question of jurisdiction arises in the case—*Malik Pratap v. Khan Md*, 36 Cal. 994.

683. Death of complainant—Effect :—As there is no abatement of a criminal case on the death of the complainant, a fresh complaint on the same facts need not be made but the old complaint must be treated as pending and proceeded with to its disposal—*In re Ramasamier*, 16 Cr.L.J. 713 (Mad).

CHAPTER XVII.

OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE MAGISTRATES.

204. (1) If in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground for proceeding, and the case appears to be one in which, according to the fourth column of the second schedule, a summons should issue in the first instance, he shall issue his summons for the attendance of the accused. If the case appears to be one in which, according to that column, a warrant should issue in the first instance, he may issue a warrant, or, if he thinks fit, a summons, for causing the accused to be brought or to appear at a certain time before such Magistrate or (if he has not jurisdiction himself) some other Magistrate having jurisdiction.

(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the provisions of Section 90.

(3) When by any law for the time being in force any process-fees or other fees are payable, no process shall be issued until the fees are paid, and if such fees are not paid within a reasonable time, the Magistrate may dismiss the complaint.

685. Magistrate taking cognizance :—Where a joint Magistrate who took cognizance of a case made over the case to a Deputy Magistrate for disposal, the former ceased to have any control over the case. The case having been transferred to the Deputy Magistrate, that officer alone had jurisdiction to deal with an application for summons, until the case was withdrawn from his cognizance. Therefore if he refused to

issue process as unnecessary, the Joint Magistrate had no jurisdiction to order for its issue—*Ajab Lal v. Emp.*, 32 Cal 783; *Fani Bhusan v. Kemp*, 10 C.W.N. 1086

"Offence".—Process can issue only for an offence already committed. It is not competent for the Magistrate to issue process in anticipation of an offence, where there is no complaint against any one. Such a case is for the interference of the Police and not of the Magistrate—*In re Fateali, Ratanlal* 90 (91).

A neglect to maintain a wife is not an offence; therefore an application for maintenance under sec. 488 should not be dismissed under subsection (3) of this section owing to the applicant's failure to comply with an order for the payment of process fees—*In re Ponnammal*, 16 Mad. 234.

686. Sufficient ground.—The only condition requisite for the issue of process is that the complainant's deposition must show some sufficient ground for proceeding. Unless the Magistrate is satisfied that there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint or sufficient material to justify the issue of process, he should not issue process—*Jogesh v. Abdul*, 18 Cr.L.J. 626 (Cal.). Where the complainant who instituted the prosecution had no personal knowledge of the allegations made in the complaint, the Magistrate should satisfy himself upon proper materials that a case had been made out for the issue of process—*Thakur Prosad v. Emp.*, 10 C.W.N. 1090; *Chamroo v. Emp.*, 11 C.W.N. 170.

Under the Cr. P. Code, a wide discretion is given to Magistrates with respect to the grant or refusal of process against accused persons. This discretion should be exercised with caution, and an accused person ought not to be dragged into Court to answer a charge merely because a complaint has been lodged against him. In determining whether process ought to issue, a Magistrate must proceed according to the provisions of the Code, and if, after carrying out the instructions therein contained, he is of opinion upon the materials before him that a *prima facie* case has been made out, he ought to issue process, and in such circumstances he is not entitled to refuse to issue process merely because he thinks that it is unlikely that the proceedings will result in a conviction. If the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that the facts alleged by the complainant disclose an offence, and in his opinion there is no ground for distrusting the complainant, the Magistrate would not be justified in refusing the issue of process merely because some other person has been tried and acquitted upon the same charge and upon the same facts, for *inter alia* it may be that at the previous trial the Magistrate has not correctly appraised the value of evidence or for some other reason the order of acquittal cannot be supported—*Sabal Chandra v. Ahadulla*, 53 Cal. 606, 30 C.W.N. 546, 27 Cr.L.J. 788.

In exercising the discretion under this section as to whether a process should issue, the Magistrate must be guided by his own independent judgment and not by the judgment of others, e.g. an expression of opinion by the Police—*Rangasawmy v. Sabapathi*, 4 M.H.C.R. 162.

687. Issue of process :—Proceedings are said to commence under this chapter when processes are issued against the accused; after the issue of process, a complaint cannot be dismissed under sec. 203—*Q. E. v. Budhunbhai, Ratanlal* 544. See Note 675 under sec. 203.

If the Magistrate issues a warrant in a case in which he ought to have issued a summons, the error of the Magistrate is not a ground for questioning the proceedings—*Aneef v. Ramsundar*, 1 W.R. 16. Under such circumstances the Magistrate can cancel the warrant and issue summons instead—*Imp. v. Janat*, 1 B.L.R. 69, 8 Cr.L.J. 187, *Crown v. Zali Khan*, 7 S.L.R. 40, 14 Cr.L.J. 604.

An order directing issue of process is not a judgment within the meaning of sec. 369, and therefore a Magistrate making the order of issue of process can rescind the order on sufficient grounds—*Lalit Mohan v. Nani Lal*, 27 C.W.N. 651, A.I.R. 1923 Cal. 662.

Refusal to issue process—Where the Police report is true, and the Magistrate has directed the case to be entered as such, he cannot refuse to issue process simply because there is no chance of conviction and no useful purpose would be served by an inquiry, the complainant is entitled to a process against the accused and for the attendance of his witnesses—*Kuldip v. Budhan*, 29 Cal 410.

When from the examination of the complainant, it appears that there is reason for the issue of process against all the accused, the Magistrate exercises a wrong discretion in issuing process against some of the accused and in refusing to issue process against the others. He must issue process against all—*Bishan Dayal v. Chedi Khan*, 4 C.W.N. 560.

But where two counter complainants preferred complaints before a Magistrate, and he issued process in one case and postponed the issue of process in the counter case until after the disposal of the first case, held that the action of the Magistrate was not illegal—*Lalji v. Naurangli*, 3 P.L.T. 764, 24 Cr.L.J. 120, A.I.R. 1922 Pat 618.

688. Sub-sec. (3)—Process fee .—An application for maintenance under sec 488 cannot be dismissed for default to pay process-fee. See *In re Ponnammal*, 16 Mad 234 cited in Note 685 above.

If the case is adjourned, the witnesses should be told to appear on the adjourned date, and the party should not be required to repeatedly summon his witnesses on payment of fresh process-fees. A dismissal of complaint on failure to pay such fees, in such a case, is not proper—*Balmakund v. Nanak Chand*, 1912 P.L.R. 60, 13 Cr.L.J. 176.

205. (1) Whenever a Magistrate issues a summons, he may, if he sees reason so to do, dispense with the personal attendance of the accused, and permit him to appear by his pleader.

Magistrate may dispense with personal attendance of accused.

(2) But the Magistrate inquiring into or trying the case, may, in his discretion, at any stage of the proceedings, direct the personal attendance of the accused, and, if necessary, enforce such attendance in manner hereinbefore provided.

689. Scope of section :—Although this section speaks of issue of summons, it is not confined to summons cases only. If in a warrant case, the Magistrate issues a summons instead of a warrant to a *pardanashin* lady he can dispense with her personal attendance—*Rasumati v. Budhram*, 21 Cal. 588, *Prem Kuar v. Mai Sham*, 1908 P.W.R. 20, 8 Cr.L.J. 454.

Again, the section applies only where a *summons* has been issued to the accused, if however, a *warrant* is issued against him, his personal attendance cannot be dispensed with, unless he is too ill to attend the Court—*Sashi Mukhi v. Asutosh*, 13 C.W.N. cl. In a Patna case, where the accused had been arrested by warrant, the High Court held that it was illegal to dispense with his personal appearance and to allow him to be represented by a pleader even though he was ill—*Abdul Hamid v. K. E.*, 2 Pat. 793, 4 P.L.T. 648, 24 Cr.L.J. 872. Where the accused absconded after the charge had been framed against him, and he was convicted and sentenced in his absence, held that as in this case a warrant had been issued for his arrest in the first instance, the Magistrate could not dispense with his personal attendance—*Crown v. Sardar*, 1917 P.R. 36, 18 Cr.L.J. 975.

690. Pardanashin lady :—A *pardanashin* lady cannot as of right claim exemption from personal attendance in Court, and the Magistrate cannot dispense with her appearance simply because she is a *pardanashin* lady—*In re Faridunnissa*, 11 All. 92. But in a summons case, the Magistrate should use his discretion under this section by dispensing with her personal attendance and allowing her to appear by a pleader, until he has before him clear, direct and *prima facie* proof of an offence committed by her—*In re Rahim Bibi*, 6 All. 59; *Prem Kuar v. Maisham*, 1908 P.W.R. 20, 8 Cr.L.J. 454, *Habboo v. Crown*, 1909 P.W.R. 5; *Crown v. Bachal*, 7 S.L.R. 161, 15 Cr.L.J. 539, *Crown v. Zalikhan*, 7 S.L.R. 40, 14 Cr.L.J. 604. If a woman is admitted to be a *pardah* lady, the Magistrate should not refuse to excuse her personal attendance on the ground that other ladies belonging to the same class that observed *pardah* had appeared in Court out of their own free will—*Tirbeni v. Bhagwati*, 28 Cr.L.J. 94 (All). If he refuses, the High Court will interfere, although ordinarily such matters are left to the discretion of the Magistrate—*Ibid*. In a Sessions case she may be permitted to appear by a pleader before the committing Magistrate as well as before the Sessions Court, but she will have to appear before that Court to hear the sentence in case of conviction—*Raj Rajeswari v. K. E.*, 17 C.W.N. 1248; *In re Kandamani*, 45 Mad. 359, 42 M.L.J. 337, 23 Cr.L.J. 266.

691. Appearance by pleader:—On service of summons the accused need not personally attend but may appear by a pleader. Such appearance is a valid appearance, and the Magistrate cannot prosecute the accused under section 174 I. P. C. for non-appearance (disobedience to summons)—*Durga Das v. Umesh Chandra*, 27 Cal. 985; nor can the Magistrate proceed *ex parte* and decide the case—*Tarince Churn v. Municipal Commissioner*, 24 W.R. 25. If, however, the Magistrate requires personal attendance, he should direct such appearance on a fixed date, and in default, may issue a warrant—*Durga Das v. Umesh*, 27 Cal. 985. But the discretion under this section should be liberally exercised—*Emp. v. Mahomed*, 3 S.L.R. 167, 4 I.C. 1152.

Under sec. 205, whenever a Magistrate issues a summons, he may, if he sees reason to do so, dispense with the personal attendance of the accused, and permit him to appear by his pleader. A Magistrate can, therefore, at the time of issuing a summons direct that the personal attendance of the accused shall be dispensed with. He can also do this after the issue of summons, and if the person summoned takes the risk of not attending in person and sends a pleader to represent him, provided the Magistrate gives him the necessary permission under this section, the Code does allow representation of the accused by his pleader. In a case where the Court has allowed an accused person to appear by a pleader, it must be taken that such appearance involves the performance of all acts that devolve upon the accused in the course of the trial, unless the Magistrate thinks it necessary or desirable that the accused himself should be present for any particular purpose. Therefore, under secs. 242 and 243, the pleader of the accused may make the necessary answers and plead guilty or not guilty on his behalf—*Dorab Shah v. Emp.*, 50 Bom. 250, 28 Bom. L.R. 102, 27 Cr.L.J. 440. The pleader appearing for the accused may perform all the acts which devolve upon the accused in the course of the trial; thus, he can answer the questions put to him by the Court in his examination under sec. 342; he can plead or refuse to plead to a charge under sec. 255—*Crown v. Jamal Khatun*, 11 S.L.R. 206, 14 Cr.L.J. 272.

Although the Magistrate can, under sub-section (2), revoke the permission to appear by pleader and enforce the personal attendance of the accused, still the Magistrate ought not to do so in a trivial case (e.g. a case under the Income Tax Act) and on a trivial ground, e.g. merely on the ground that the accused objects to the case being tried by that Magistrate and wants it to be transferred to some other Magistrate—*Dwijendra v. Emp.*, 38 C.L.J. 9, 24 Cr.L.J. 902.

Appearance by other persons:—Where the accused was represented by her mother-in-law and the Magistrate proceeded with the case and convicted the accused, the conviction was set aside by the High Court, as there was no proper representation of the accused in the case—*Q. E. v. Vithi, Ratanlal* 205; but where in an extremely trivial case, the accused was represented by her father-in-law and convicted, the High Court refused to interfere—*Q. E. v. Chandrabhaga, Ratanlal* 206.

Where an accused person is permitted to appear by pleader, it is open to the accused to appoint a private person to appear in his stead, under sec. 4 (r), and it is equally open to the Court to permit such private person to represent the accused. Where this is allowed, there should be clearly on record something (e.g. power of attorney) to show that the private person who represents the accused has been duly appointed by him, just as an ordinary pleader has to file a *vakalatnama*. The Court should also note on the record that he has given the requisite permission to such person to represent the accused, and should not leave the matter to mere implication (The omission to record it is, however, a mere irregularity). Where there is no power of attorney or letter of authority to show that a person has been appointed by an accused person to appear and plead on his behalf, the Court is not entitled to accept a plea of guilty put forward by such person and to convict the accused upon such plea—*Dorabshah v. Emp.*, 50 Bom. 250, 28 Bom.L.R. 102, 27 Cr.L.J. 440.

CHAPTER XVIII.

OF INQUIRY INTO CASES TRIABLE BY THE COURT OF SESSION OR HIGH COURT.

692. Object of preliminary inquiry:—The object of the law in requiring an inquiry before a trial in the Court of Session is to prevent the commitment of cases in which there is no reasonable ground for conviction. This provision of law, while it saves the accused persons from detention in custody and prolonged anxiety of undergoing trials for offences not brought home to them, also saves the time of the Court of Session from being wasted over cases in which the charge is obviously not supported by such evidence as would support a conviction—*Lachman v. Juala*, 31 All. 161. A preliminary inquiry also affords the accused an opportunity of becoming acquainted with the circumstances of the offences imputed to him and enables him to make his defence—*Rama Varma v. Q.*, 3 Mad. 351.

No accused can be committed to the Sessions without a preliminary inquiry under this chapter—*Emp. v. Bai Mahalaxmi*, 17 Bom.L.R. 910, 16 Cr.L.J. 747.

206. (1) [***] Any Presidency Magistrate,**

District Magistrate, Sub-divisional Magistrate, or Magistrate of the first class, or any Magistrate (not being a Magistrate of the third class) empowered in this behalf by the Local Government may commit any person for

Power to commit for trial.

trial to the Court of Session or High Court for any offence triable by such Court.

(2) But, save as herein otherwise provided, no person triable by the Court of Session shall be committed for trial to the High Court.

Change :—The words "Subject to the provision of sec. 443" occurring in the old section at the very beginning have been omitted by section II of the Criminal Law Amendment Act (XII of 1923), because the old section 443 which specified the Magistrates competent to inquire into or try a charge against an European British subject has now been repealed and substituted by an entirely new section. See Chapter XXXIII.

The italicised words have been added by sec. 57 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923). "This amendment is on the same lines as that of section 144 (1) We do not think that the powers under this section should be granted to a Magistrate of the third class"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*

693. Committal by Magistrate without jurisdiction :—Where the committing Magistrate has authority to commit but has no territorial jurisdiction in the place where the offence is committed, the irregularity will be cured by sec. 531 unless it has occasioned a failure of justice—*Rayan Kuti v Emp*, 26 Mad. 640; *Q. E. v. Abbi Reddi*, 17 Mad 402. In *Emp v Alim Mandal*, 11 C.L.R. 55, *Emp. v. Tika Singh*, 3 All 251 and *Q. E. v. Lagma*, Ratanlal 922 (923) such a committal was held to be void.

Committal to wrong sessions —See Note 549 under sec. 177.

694. "Offence triable by such Court" :—The procedure to be adopted under this chapter is not confined to cases exclusively triable by the Court of Session, but is also applicable to cases which, in the opinion of the Magistrate concerned, ought to be tried by such Court—*Ramsundar v. Nirodam*, 6 All. 477, as, for instance, cases in which the Magistrate cannot inflict adequate punishment upon the accused—*Q E v. Kayemulla*, 24 Cal. 429; *K. E. v Pema Ranchod*, 4 Bom. L.R 85 In such cases the Magistrate must state his grounds in the order of commitment, so as to enable the High Court in revision to judge whether he has exercised a proper discretion—*Emp v. Mahamad Khan*, 11 Bom L.R. 18, 9 Cr.L.J. 163, 1 I.C. 104; *Diwani Chand v. Crown*, 8 S.L.R 23, 15 Cr.L.J. 664.

If the case is one which the Magistrate can try and in which he can inflict adequate punishment, he cannot commit it to the Sessions, but should try it himself—*Diwani Chand v. Crown*, 8 S.L.R 23, *Emp v. Asha Bhatli*, 15 Bom. L.R 998, *K E v Dharam Singh*. 3 A.L.J 14, *Emp v. Ram Jatan*, 21 A.L.J 420

If the offence is one triable exclusively by the Court of Session, the Magistrate is bound either to discharge the accused or commit him for trial, but he cannot make over the case for trial to a Deputy Commissioner

with special powers under sec. 30—*Amir Khan v. K. E.*, 7 C.W.N. 457; nor can he try it himself—*Q. E. v. Bhikhi*, *Ratanlal* 953.

Where a Magistrate is inquiring into a case which is triable both by the Court of Session and by himself, he has a discretion to commit the case to the Court of Session or to try it himself—*B. N. Ry. Co. v. Makhal*, 7 P.L.T. 343, 27 Cr.L.J. 313.

It is illegal to commit summons cases to the Sessions—*K. E. v. Dharam Singh*, 3 A.L.J. 14.

207. The following procedure shall be adopted in

Procedure in inquiries preparatory to commitment. inquiries before Magistrates where the case is triable exclusively by a Court of Session or High Court, or, in the opinion of the Magistrate, ought to be tried by such Court.

695. "Ought to be tried" :—The words "ought to be tried" in this section and sec. 347, must be read with sec. 254. A case which ought to be tried by the Court of Session is one which the Magistrate is not competent to try or one in which, in his opinion, adequate punishment cannot be inflicted by him—*K. E. v. Pema*, 4 Bom. L.R. 85; *Q. E. v. Abdul Rahiman*, 16 Bom. 580; *Emp. v. Behari*, 1886 A.W.N. 258; *Emp. v. Hanuman*, 20 Cr L J. 97 (Nag.); *Imp. v. Ismail*, 11 S.L.R. 79; *Diwanichand v. Crown*, 8 S.L.R. 23; *Q. E. v. Kayemulla*, 24 Cal. 429. See also *Emp. v. Jagmohan*, 6 A.L.J. 939, *Emp. v. Bindeshri*, 41 All. 454. If the case is one which he has jurisdiction to dispose of, i.e. if he can inflict adequate punishment, he should not send up the case for trial to the Court of Session—*Diwanichand v. Crown*, 8 S.L.R. 23, 15 Cr.L.J. 664, *K. E. v. Dharam Singh*, 3 A.L.J. 14; *Emp. v. Asha Bhatti*, 15 Bom. L.R. 998, 14 Cr L J. 657; if he can try it himself, he should not commit the case on the sole ground that the accused had been committed in another case—*Emp. v. Hanuman*, 20 Cr.L.J. 97 (Nag.). But in *Crown v. Ali*, 1917 P R 13 and *Crown v. Bhagavathi*, 42 Mad 83 (dissenting from the above cases) it has been held that the incompetency of the Magistrate to try the case or to pass adequate sentence is not the only ground for committal. The Magistrate may commit for any other sufficient reason. Thus, where the Magistrate committed certain persons to the Sessions on charges under sec. 147 I. P. C., not because he could not pass adequate punishment but because other persons on the other side have been committed to the Court of Session on charges under secs. 304, 325, 148 and 149 I P C., it was held that the committal was not illegal—*Crown v. Ali*, 1917 P.R. 13, 18 Cr.L.J. 524

208. (1) The Magistrate shall, when the accused

Taking of evidence produced. appears or is brought before him, proceed to hear the complainant (if any), and take in manner herein-after provided all such evidence as may be produced in

support of the prosecution or in behalf of the accused, or as may be called for by the Magistrate.

(2) The accused shall be at liberty to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, and in such case the prosecutor may re-examine them.

(3) If the complainant or officer conducting the prosecution, or the accused, applies to the Magistrate to issue process to compel the attendance of any witness or the production of any document or thing, the Magistrate shall issue such process unless, for reasons to be recorded, he deems it unnecessary to do so.

(4) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to require a Presidency Magistrate to record his reasons.

696. Remand of accused before taking evidence :—

A person arrested under a warrant should be brought promptly before the Magistrate, and the Magistrate has then no authority to further detain him in custody or remand him to prison, without sufficient cause—*Abdul Kadir v. Magistrate*, 20 W.R. 23 If from the absence of the witness or from any reasonable cause, it becomes necessary or advisable to defer the inquiry, the Magistrate instead of immediately examining the complainant and his witnesses, as required by this section, may remand the accused person. If there is some evidence available and further evidence is forthcoming, it may be desirable to postpone the inquiry for a short period in order that when commenced it may be continuous. But the fact that there is or may be a great body of evidence forthcoming against the accused, is not a ground of detention for an inordinate period—*Manikam v. Q.*, 11 Mad. 63. Similarly, where there is no evidence at all to begin with, a Magistrate will not be justified in remanding the prisoner, in the expectation that evidence might turn up—*Q v. Purna Chandra*, 4 B L R App 1.

697. Taking evidence produced :—

A commitment made without taking any evidence on a preliminary inquiry is illegal—*Reg. v. Sita, Ratanlal* 100 (101). Under this section it is the duty of the Magistrate to take all evidence tendered by both sides before framing a charge—*Crown v. Po Nyan*, 1 L B.R. 348 In every inquiry into a Sessions case, it is the duty of the committing Magistrate to make a full and careful inquiry and to record the whole evidence in the case. He should do so even when the accused has made a confession, as confessions are in many cases retracted at the trial—*Q. E. v. Mahadu, Ratanlal* 842 The Magistrate is bound to take all such evidence as may be produced (1) in support of the prosecution, (2) on behalf of the accused and (3) as may be called for by the Magistrate—*Durga Dutt v. K. E.*, 10 A.L.J. 144, 13 Cr.L.J. 443 A commitment or discharge without examination of all

the witnesses for the prosecution is illegal—*Q. v. Chinna Vedagiri*, 4 Mad. 227; *Q. v. Parasurama*, 4 Mad. 329. The prosecutor is bound to produce all evidence in his favour directly bearing on the charge, and to call those witnesses who prove their connection with the transaction in question and are able to give important information, unless there is reasonable belief that they will not speak the truth—*Emp. v. Dhunno*, 8 Cal. 121. The prosecutor should not refuse to call or put into the witness box any witness for the prosecution merely because the evidence of such witness might in some respects be favourable to the defence—*Q. E. v. Durga*, 16 All. 84 (F.B.). It is his duty to call all witnesses who can throw any light on the inquiry, whether they support the prosecution theory or the defence theory—1 P.L.T. 161. But if the prosecutor is of opinion that a witness is a false witness or is likely to give false testimony, he is not bound to call that witness—*Q. E. v. Durga*, 16 All. 84; *Q. E. v. Stanyon*, 14 All. 521; *Q. E. v. Bankhandi*, 15 All. 6.

If all the witnesses are not called for the prosecution without sufficient cause, the Court may properly draw an inference adverse to the prosecution—*Emp. v. Dhunno*, 8 Cal. 121. But no corresponding inference will be drawn against the accused for non-production of his witnesses. He may rely on the witnesses for the prosecution or call his own witnesses or meet the charge in any other way he chooses—*Emp. v. Dhunno*, 8 Cal. 121, *Ashraf Ali v. K. E.*, 21 C.W.N. 1152, 19 Cr.L.J. 81. In a recent Patna case it has been laid down that if the prosecution did not send up all the material witnesses, it is the duty of the committing Magistrate to call and examine them himself in order to determine which side was speaking the truth—*Pershad v. Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1589 (Pat.).

The Magistrate is competent to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses in order to consider whether the witnesses are credible or not—*Emp. v. Bai Mahalaxmi*, 17 Bom. L.R. 910, 16 Cr.L.J. 747.

Evidence for the accused:—The Magistrate is not empowered to frame a charge or make an order for commitment until he has taken all such evidence as the accused may produce or is prepared to produce before him for hearing—*Q. E. v. Ahmed*, 20 All. 264; *Emp. v. Muhammed Hadi*, 26 All. 177; *Jaswant Singh v. Emp.*, 46 All. 137, 21 A.L.J. 911. Where the committing Magistrate failed to examine the witnesses named by the accused, held that the commitment must be quashed—*Emp. v. Nga Khaing*, 11 Rang 531. The accused must be given an opportunity of adducing evidence on his behalf, and the Magistrate cannot refuse to do so without recording his reasons—*Reg. v. Sita, Ratanlal* 100.

698. Sub-section (2)—Right of cross-examination:—

Under this sub-section the accused has a right to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution. Refusal by a Magistrate to allow the accused to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses during the inquiry is arbitrary and improper. The depositions of the prosecution witnesses during the inquiry are not to be deemed as duly taken if the accused had not an opportunity to cross-examine them, and cannot be treated as evidence at the Sessions trial—*Q. E. v. Sagal*, 21 Cal. 642.

Under this section the accused has the right to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses before the proceedings have reached the stage in which it may be necessary to draw up a charge—*In re Surya Narain*, 5 C.W.N. 110, Q. E. v. *Sagal*, 21 Cal. 642; *Durga Dutt v. K. E.*, 10 A.L.J. 144; *Baldeo v. K. E.*, 19 O.C. 239, 18 Cr.L.J. 105. Where an application to cross-examine was made before the charge was framed and before the Magistrate had decided to commit the case to the Court of Session, he was bound to allow the accused to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses—*Jyotsna Nath v. Emp.*, 51 Cal 442 (445). The proper time for cross-examination of a witness in an inquiry under this chapter is in the ordinary course immediately after the examination-in-chief of that particular witness; and it is not a convenient procedure to allow cross-examination to be reserved until after the examination-in-chief of all the prosecution witnesses has been finished—*Durga Dutt v. K. E.*, 10 A.L.J. 144, 13 Cr.L.J. 443; *In re Mohamed Kasim*, 14 M.L.T. 532, 15 Cr.L.J. 29, *Emp. v. Arnold*, 6 L.B.R. 129, 5 Bur. L.T. 239, *Tambi v. Emp.*, 11 Bur.L.T. 144, 19 Cr.L.J. 327. A Magistrate does not act illegally if he asks the accused to cross-examine each prosecution witness after his examination-in-chief, and on the accused's refusal to do so, refuses the accused's prayer for cross-examination after the end of the examination-in-chief of all the prosecution witnesses—*Raman v. Emp.*, 33 C.W.N. 535 (dissenting from *Jogendra v. Motilal*, 39 Cal 885, 16 C.W.N. 1155, where it has been held that it is open to the Magistrate to allow cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses even after a charge is drawn up) See this last case cited under sec 213 (2).

The ordinary rule is that the witnesses will be examined-in-chief, cross-examined and re-examined, and not to postpone the cross-examination till all the prosecution witnesses are examined-in-chief. A special provision has been made under certain circumstances with respect to trials under warrant cases, entitling the accused to postpone the cross-examination of witnesses till a certain stage. No such provision has been made with respect to an inquiry under Chapter XVIII. The Magistrate, however, has the discretion to allow the accused to postpone the cross-examination of witnesses in suitable circumstances. He cannot, of course, throw any obstacle in the exercise of the liberty by an accused to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution. Thus, where the accused have applied for copies of statements made by prosecution-witnesses to the Police during the investigation, with a view to cross-examine the witnesses, and the Magistrate has ordered such copies to be furnished under the proviso to sec 162 (1), the Magistrate is bound to postpone the cross-examination of the witnesses until such copies are furnished to the accused and to afford the accused an opportunity to cross-examine after receiving such copies. Omission to do so constitutes a direct violation of the statutory provisions of sec. 208 (2) and vitiates the commitment—*Saadat Alian v. Emp.*, 6 Pat 329, 28 Cr.L.J. 709.

Where a case was at first begun as a warrant case and the accused had not cross-examined the witness, because in a warrant case he could reserve his rights to do so until after the framing of the charge, but after

hearing the prosecution evidence the Magistrate came to the conclusion that the case was a Sessions case, and thereupon converted the proceeding into one under this chapter, *held* that the accused had a right to have the witnesses recalled for cross-examination, as he had been prejudiced by the sudden change of procedure—*Dhamarcha v. Emp.*, 19 A.L.J. 463, 23 Cr.L.J. 496.

The procedure of this section is to be followed in cases under sec 347. See sec. 347 as now amended

699. Sub-section (3)—Summoning witnesses:—Before committing the accused to the Sessions, the Magistrate should, if so required by the accused, compel the attendance of witnesses for the defence. If he commits an accused to the Sessions without examining the witnesses applied for under this sub-section, the order of commitment is invalid—*Emp. v. Muhammad Hadi*, 26 All. 177. But the Magistrate has also a discretion to refuse to issue process, if he thinks it unnecessary to do so. He may refuse process where there has been an inordinate delay in asking for it, e.g., when the accused made the application for process not until the charge was about to be drawn up—*Sessions Judge v. Kangaya*, 36 Mad. 321, 23 M.L.J. 368. The Magistrate may reject the application for summoning witnesses if it is made on the date fixed for passing the order of commitment—*Emp. v. Sarath*, 42 Cal. 608, 19 C.W.N. 335.

If the Magistrate refuses to issue process he must record his reasons for so doing; if he rejects the application for process without recording reasons, he acts illegally, and the order that is passed subsequently is unsustainable in law—*Kanda Raja v. Sangaraja*, 24 L.W. 713; *In re Sat Narain*, 3 All 392. If he records his reasons for exercising his discretion in rejecting the application of the accused to summon the defence witnesses, the order of the Magistrate cannot be held to be illegal and therefore the order of commitment cannot be set aside under sec. 215, as no point of law arises—*Saadat Mian v. Emp.*, 6 Pat. 329, 11 Cr.L.J. 709.

But if the Magistrate issues process for the attendance of witnesses, he is bound to examine them and cannot refuse to do so. Therefore, where on the application of the accused the Magistrate summoned witnesses for the defence and consented to make a local inspection, but under a direction from the Sessions Judge committed the accused for trial without examining those witnesses and without making the local inspection, it was held that the commitment was illegal and should be set aside—*Emp. v. Mathura*, 1906 A.W.N. 306, 4 Cr.L.J. 451.

The provisions of this clause must be read subject to the provisions of sec. 204 (3). In a private prosecution the complainant is under a legal obligation to pay the process-fees before summons are issued, and the Court has a right to insist upon those fees being paid in advance before issue of process—*Ram Dulari v. Mushtaq*, 11 Luck. 363, 29 Cr.L.J. 664.

209. (1) When the evidence referred to in Section 208, sub-sections (1) and (3), has been taken, and he has (if necessary) examined the accused for the

When accused person to be discharged.

purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, such Magistrate shall, if he finds that there are not sufficient grounds for committing the accused person for trial, record his reasons and discharge him, unless it appears to the Magistrate that such person should be tried before himself or some other Magistrate, in which case he shall proceed accordingly.

(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent a Magistrate from discharging the accused at any previous stage of the case, if, for reasons to be recorded by such Magistrate, he considers the charge to be groundless.

700. Examination of the accused :—The object of examining the accused is to enable a Judge to ascertain from time to time, particularly if the accused is undefended, what explanation he may offer regarding any facts stated by a witness appearing against him, so that these facts should not stand unexplained—*Ex parte Virabudra*, 1 M.H.C.R. 199; *Hussein Buksh v. Emp.*, 6 Cal. 96. But the accused should not be examined for the purpose of making him confess his guilt or admit facts which may go to incriminate him—*Q. E. v. Bhairab*, 2 C.W.N. 702; *In re Chinibash*, 1 C.L.R. 436; *Q. E. v. Rangl*, 10 Mad. 295; *Behari Lal*, 6 C.L.R. 431. See Note 974, under sec. 342.

Moreover, the accused should not be examined for the purpose of filling up gaps in the evidence for the prosecution—*Basanta Kumar v. Q. E.* 26 Cal. 49, nor for the purpose of supplementing the evidence where it is deficient—*In re Chinibash*, 1 C.L.R. 436. The accused must be examined as an *accused* and not as a *witness*. Where on a complaint against two persons for an offence, the committing Magistrate inquired into the case against one of them and examined the other as a *witness*, the second accused could not be committed to the Sessions in the absence of a preliminary inquiry into his case and without examining him as an *accused*—*Emp. v. Bai Mahalaxmi*, 17 Bom. L.R. 910, 16 Cr.L.J. 747.

It is not left to the discretion of the committing Magistrate as to whether he should examine the accused or not, he is *bound* to examine. It is the duty of the Magistrate, before committing the accused, to examine him for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. If the Magistrate commits the accused without examination, the commitment should be quashed if it has occasioned a failure of justice—*Q. E. v. Pandara*, 23 Mad. 636.

The accused should not be ordered to file any written statement—*Chinnasami v. Veeriah*, 2 Weir 255, but if he chooses to make any statement the Court should not refuse to allow him to do so—*In re Abdul Guffoor*, 10 C.L.R. 54.

701. Duty of Magistrate—'sufficient grounds':——The words "sufficient grounds of commitment" are ambiguous, and have led to a difference of opinion among the High Courts as to whether the Magistrate should *weigh the evidence* and decide whether the conviction of the accused is *certain*, or whether the Magistrate should merely see if a *prima facie* case has been made out and there is a *possibility* of conviction.

On the one hand, it has been laid down that in deciding whether there are sufficient grounds for commitment, the Magistrate is to see whether there are credible witnesses to facts which, if believed by a jury, would justify the conviction of the accused, but it is not the duty of the Magistrate to *weigh the evidence*. If he proceeds to weigh the evidence, to accept some statements and reject others, to deal with probabilities or to draw inferences as to knowledge or intention, and to decide whether the guilt of the accused has or has not been conclusively proved, he is in reality dealing with the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused and is usurping the functions of the trial Court. He must not in any way encroach upon the functions of the jury—*National Bank v. Kothandarama*, 14 M.L.T. 200, 14 Cr.L.J. 529; *Akbar Ali v. Raja Bahadur*, 24 A.L.J. 133, 27 Cr.L.J. 2 (4); *Chinnammal v. Konda Reddi*, 28 Cr.L.J. 120, 38 M.L.T. 135. The Magistrate has not to pronounce a definite judgment on the question whether the accused is guilty or innocent. The only question he has to decide is whether there are sufficient grounds for committing the accused for trial, i.e. whether there is or is not sufficient legal evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion—*Fattu v. Fattu*, 26 All 564. The words 'sufficient grounds of commitment' do not mean sufficient grounds of conviction, but evidence which is sufficient to put the accused on his trial, and such a case arises when credible witnesses make statements which if believed would sustain a conviction. The weighing of their testimony with regard to improbabilities and apparent discrepancies is more properly a function of the Court which is to try the case than that of the committing Magistrate—*Q. E. v. Namdev*, 11 Bom 372, *Emp v. Varivandas*, 27 Bom. 84; *Hazara Singh v. Bishen Singh*, 1908 P.R. 14. When the Legislature speaks of sufficient grounds for committing for trial, it should not be supposed to have spoken of sufficient grounds of conviction. The intention of the legislature is to make a distinction between grounds of commitment and grounds for conviction. Satisfactory proof of the guilt of the accused is the ground for conviction. Satisfactory evidence to go to trial must be regarded as the ground for committing for trial. What the inquiring Magistrate has got to try and determine is not whether the case has been made out by the prosecution but only whether there is a case for trial. There is always a case for trial when the evidence is of such a nature that the guilt of the accused can be held to be proved or disproved only as the result of the valuing and the weighing of evidence. But if the evidence be of such a nature that no reasonable person and no tribunal, Judge, or jury would ever on the evidence hold the accused guilty, it follows that there is no case for trial, and it is then a case for the enquiring Magistrate.

to discharge—*In re Mania Manicka*, 48 Mad. 874, 49 M L.J. 155, 26 Cr.L.J. 1570, A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 1061. What the Magistrate has to consider is not whether the conviction of the accused is reasonably *certain*, but whether there is evidence on which a conviction is *possible* in law—*Emp. v. Varjivandas*, 27 Bom. 84. Where the prosecution produced a good deal of direct evidence, it is no function of the Magistrate to weigh the evidence, but he should commit the accused person for trial. It is the duty of the Magistrate to commit when the evidence for the prosecution is sufficient to make out a *prima facie* case against the accused—*Maulu v. Crown*, 4 Lah. 69, 5 Lah L.J. 276

On the other hand, there are some cases in which it has been laid down that a Magistrate is competent to weigh the evidence and to decide whether it is credible or not. Thus, in an earlier Allahabad case it has been held that the power given to Magistrates under this section extends to weighing of evidence, and the expression "sufficient grounds" must be understood in a wide sense, so as to indicate such evidence as would justify a conviction—*Lachman v. Juala*, 5 All 161. Notwithstanding direct evidence adduced against the accused, it is not incompetent to a Magistrate to examine the credibility of the evidence to see whether the prosecution case is improbable and the evidence unreliable—*Rash Behari v. Emp.*, 12 C.W.N. 117, *In re Bai Parbati*, 35 Bom 163, *Munshi Mander v. Karu*, 6 P.L.T. 146, 25 Cr L.J. 1089, *Tinkowru v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 153, 21 Cr L.J. 328, *In re Naramban*, 15 L.W. 552, A.I.R. 1922 Mad. 195; *Sultani v. Crown*, 1909 P.R. 10, *Mir Abdulla v. Crown*, 1910 P.L.R. 215, 11 Cr.L.J. 751. The Magistrate has discretion and power to weigh the evidence in order to see whether the case is a fit one for the jury to decide or whether there is no *prima facie* case for the accused to meet—*Thiru Vandaya Trevar v. Emp.*, 42 M L.J. 49, 23 Cr L.J. 209, A.I.R. 1922 Mad. 43. It is open to the committing Magistrate to form his opinion with regard to the credibility of the witnesses called before him; but of course it is not his duty to closely criticize their evidence—*Tarapada v. Kalipada*, 51 Cal 849 (852), 28 C.W.N. 587. Where charges exclusively triable by a Court of Session are brought before a Magistrate and some evidence is offered in support thereof, it is not his duty in all cases to commit the accused to the Sessions. The Magistrate should exercise his discretion, and after weighing the evidence decide whether or not he should try the case himself—*Emp. v. Hari Das*, 37 C.L.J. 34, 24 Cr L.J. 674, A.I.R. 1923 Cal. 108; *In re Kalyan Singh*, 21 All. 265

In a recent case the Rangoon High Court has considered all the above cases and has laid down the following propositions: that a Magistrate is competent to consider the credibility and weigh the probabilities of the evidence; that in this consideration his discretion is limited; that in a matter of reasonable doubt, he must not rely upon his own opinion, in fact he must not encroach upon the functions of a Court of trial. Further more, he must keep before him the question whether there are fair grounds for concluding that the accused is guilty upon the evidence. In other words, where there is a *prima facie* case, upon evidence reasonably credible by a Court of trial, he should commit—*Maung Htin v. J*

Maung Po, 4 Rang. 471, 28 Cr.L.J. 219 (221, 223). The Rangoon High Court has also expressed the opinion that it is impossible to lay down any general rule or rules which must be applied in every case and that it is extremely difficult to arrive at a formula which will be of assistance in all circumstances. Each case must be decided upon its own particular facts—*Ibid*.

702. When Magistrate should commit :—(1) Where there is credible evidence which if believed shows that there is a *prima facie* case which ought to be tried at the Sessions, the Magistrate should commit the case to the Sessions and not try it himself—*Q. E. v. Manisami*, 15 Mad. 39; *Tarapada v. Kalipada*, 51 Cal. 849 (852); *Hazara v. Bishen Singh*, 1908 P.R. 14; *National Bank v. Kothandarama*, 14 M.L.T. 200, 14 Cr.L.J. 529; *Jamal Mahomed v. Moideen*, 9 M.L.T. 71, 12 Cr.L.J. 20; *Anonymous*, 2 Weir 652 (653); *Q. E. v. Namdev*, 11 Bom. 372; *Makhni v. Farzand Ali*, 18 A.L.J. 232, 21 Cr.L.J. 318

(2) Where the question of discharge or commitment turns on probabilities, the Magistrate ought rather to leave the decision to the Sessions Court, than to order a discharge on the improbabilities of the case by giving the benefit of doubt to the accused—*Fattu v. Fattu*, 26 All. 564; *Chiranjil Lal v. Ram Lal*, 1904 A.W.N. 5; *Akbar Ali v. Raja Bahadur*, 24 A.L.J. 133, 27 Cr.L.J. 2; *Emp. v. Allah Mahr*, 49 All. 443, 25 A.L.J. 191, 28 Cr.L.J. 281, *Makhni v. Farzand Ali*, 18 A.L.J. 232; *In re Bai Parvati*, 35 Bom. 163, *Q. E. v. Namdev*, 11 Bom. 372; *Emp. v. Burjorji*, 30 Bom. L.R. 639; *Q. v. Kisto Doba*, 14 W.R. 16; *Nga Hmyin v. K. E.*, 19 Cr.L.J. 102; *Aidas Tekchand v. Saban*, 15 S.L.R. 1, 22 Cr.L.J. 570.

(3) Where a person is charged with an offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session and there is some evidence to support the story of the complainant, it is the duty of the Magistrate to commit the accused for trial by that Court, and not to disregard the graver charge, merely because he considers the prosecution story to be an exaggeration, and to convict the accused of other minor offences immediately connected with the graver offence—*Mir Moze Ali v. K. E.*, 23 C.W.N. 1031, 21 Cr.L.J. 10.

(4) Where the evidence discloses a circumstance of aggravation which makes the offence one cognizable by a higher Court, it becomes the duty of the Magistrate to use the proper procedure for sending the case to the higher Court and not to try it himself. It is an evasion of law to treat an aggravated offence as an ordinary offence, and thus to introduce a different jurisdiction or a lower scale of punishment—*Q. E. v. Gundaya*, 13 Bom. 502; *Jamal Mahomed v. Moideen*, 9 M.L.T. 71, 12 Cr.L.J. 20; *Emp. v. Paramananda*, 10 Cal. 85, *K. E. v. Ayyan*, 22 Mad. 675

703. When Magistrate should not commit :—(1) Where no *prima facie* case has been made out—*Q. E. v. Munisami*, 15 Mad. 39; *Chinnasami v. Veeriah*, 2 Weir 255.

(2) When the Magistrate is clearly of opinion that the evidence for the prosecution is on the whole untrustworthy and that there is no reasonable probability of the case ending in a conviction—*Harbans v. Fakir Das*, 7

C.W.N. 77; *Tarapada v. Kalipada*, 51 Cal. 849; *Fattu v. Fattu*, 26 All. 564; *In re Bai Parvati*, 35 Bom. 163; *Lachman v. Juala*, 5 All. 161; *Thirumalai v. Emp.*, 42 M.L.J. 49; *In re Naramban*, 1922 M.W.N. 326; *Maulu v. Crown*, 4 Lah. 69; *Dharam Singh v. Jyoti Prosad*, 37 All. 355; *Md. Abdul v. Baldeo*, 44 All. 57; *Akbar Ali v. Raja Bahadur*, 24 A.L.J. 133, 27 Cr.L.J. 2; *Emp. v. Ganpat*, 46 All. 537 (538), 22 A.L.J. 411; *Tinkowri v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 153; *Aidas Tikchand v. Saban*, 15 S.L.R. 1; *Nga Hmyin v. K. E.*, 1917 U.B.R. 3rd. Qr. 29, 19 Cr L.J. 102. If the Magistrate is satisfied that the charge is without foundation he is entitled, and indeed it is his duty, to discharge the accused, even though the statements of the prosecution if accepted at their face value might make out a *prima facie* case against the accused—*Emp. v. Ganpat Lal*, 46 All. 537 (dissenting from *Chiranjil Lal v. Ram Lal*, 1904 A.W.N. 5). Though in case of doubt the Magistrate may be justified in leaving the case for the jury to decide, still if he is convinced that the evidence is false, it is his duty to discharge the accused—*Kasim Ali v. Sarada*, 30 C.W.N. 336. But the Magistrate must exercise a proper discretion in ordering the discharge of any person charged with a sessions offence. It is not enough for the Magistrate merely to doubt some portions of the prosecution evidence. He must be satisfied that the prosecution will fail and rightly fail in the sessions Court—*Chheda v. Emp.*, 1 O.W.N. 402, 11 O.L.J. 664, 25 Cr L.J. 1189.

(3) Where no evidence is forthcoming against the accused, owing to the absence of the prosecutor and his witnesses, and the case is not one in which the Magistrate ought to adjourn the inquiry—*Tuki Mahomed v. Kisto Lal*, 15 W.R. 53.

In all the above cases the Magistrate should discharge the accused.

(4) When the charge is not so serious as to justify a committal, the Magistrate should not shirk the responsibility of trying the case by committing it to the Sessions—*Crown v. Ahmed Shah*, 1 S.L.R. 103.

704. Recording reasons :—A Magistrate discharging an accused person under this section should record his reasons for so doing. But if he omits to record reasons, it cannot be said that the order of discharge is illegal—*Aung Min v. K. E.*, 4 L.B.R. 362. In all cases where a Magistrate discharges or commits, he should give his reasons for so doing, and it will be proper for the High Court to consider these reasons when deciding whether he has exercised his discretion correctly—*Maung Htin v. Maung Po*, 4 Rang. 471, 28 Cr.L.J. 219 (223). But the Magistrate is not authorised to write a judgment. All that he is empowered to do is to record reasons for a discharge, if he makes such an order, and to pass the order of discharge—*Hait Ram v. Ganga Sahai*, 40 All. 615, 16 A.L.J. 486, 19 Cr.L.J. 706.

705. Effect of discharge—fresh proceedings :—An order of discharge does not amount to an acquittal. The discharge of a person accused of an offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session is no bar to his being apprehended and brought before a Magistrate with a view to his commitment—*Q. v. Telkoo*, 8 W.R. 61, *Q. E. v. Krishnabhat*,

10 Bom. 319. See sec. 437. Even if the Magistrate purports to acquit the accused, such an acquittal is really a *discharge*, and is no bar to fresh commitment. Thus, where a complaint was made of an offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session, and the Magistrate took evidence and framed a charge for a minor offence and acquitted the accused, the order of acquittal was in effect an order of discharge in respect of the original offence complained of, and the Sessions Judge in revision could order the commitment of the accused on the original charge under sec. 436 (now sec. 437)—*Krishna Reddi v. Subbamma*, 24 Mad. 136, followed in *Khanu v. Emp.*, 19 S.L.R. 353, 25 Cr.L.J. 1368. *Contra*—*Balnath v. Gouri Kanta*, 20 Cal. 633, *Q. E. v. Hanumantha*, 23 Mad. 225. See these cases cited in Note 1190 under sec. 437.

The District Magistrate or Sessions Judge directing further inquiry or commitment under sec. 437 is bound to consider all the grounds upon which the order of discharge has been passed, including a consideration of the evidence which has been disbelieved or held to be insufficient to establish a *prima facie* case—*Harbans Singh v. Fakir Das*, 7 C.W.N. 77.

Compensation:—No compensation should be awarded to the accused person discharged under this section, on the ground that the charge is vexatious, if the case is one triable exclusively by the Court of Session—*Q. E. v. Lalbu*, Ratanlal 961. See sec. 250.

706. Sub-section (2)—Discharge at early stage:—Sub-section (2) relieves a Magistrate from the necessity of going on with an inquiry or trial when he is reasonably convinced on what has been already deposed to, that a criminal charge cannot be sustained—*Dhanubhai v. Pyarji*, Ratanlal 201, *Thirumalai Vandaya v. Emp.*, 42 M.L.J. 49, 22 Cr L.J. 209

707. Revision of order of discharge:—See secs 436, 437. An order of discharge under this section is not a final order, and the offence against an accused person who has been discharged may be further inquired into by a Magistrate upon further evidence if it be forthcoming—*Maung Htin v. Mg. Po*, 4 Rang. 471, 28 Cr L.J. 219 (221). If an order of discharge is passed by a Presidency Magistrate, the High Court can interfere and direct a committal not merely by virtue of the power given by sec. 15 of the Charter Act but also by the powers conferred by sec. 439 of this Code—*Emp. v. Varyvandas*, 27 Bom. 84 (following *Colville v. Kristo Kishore*, 26 Cal. 746 and dissenting from *Charoobala v. Barendra*, 27 Cal. 126). See Note 682 under sec. 203.

210. (1) When, upon such evidence being taken and such examination (if any) being made, the Magistrate is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for committing the accused for trial, he shall frame a charge under his hand, declaring with what offence the accused is charged.

When charge is to be framed.

(2) As soon as *such* charge has been framed, it shall be read and explained to the accused, and a copy thereof shall, if he so requires, be given to him free of cost.

Charge to be explained, and copy furnished to accused.

Change :—The words "such charge" have been substituted for the words "the charge" by section 58 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act XVIII of 1923 "We have made this verbal amendment to meet a suggestion of the Bengal Government"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916.*

708. "Upon such evidence".—See section 208. It is illegal to commit an accused without taking any evidence in the preliminary inquiry—*Reg v. Sita, Ratanlal 100.* So also, it is illegal to frame a charge or order commitment without taking all the evidence produced by the accused—*Q. E. v. Ahmadi, 20 All 264* If the case is transferred from the Court of one Magistrate to another, the latter can commit the case to the Sessions, acting upon the evidence recorded by the former—*K E v. Nanhua, 36 All. 315, 12 A L.J. 467, 15 Cr L.J. 354*

709. Sufficient grounds .—See Note 701 under section 209. A commitment can be made only when there are sufficient grounds for committing, that is to say, not merely sufficient allegations as to the offence which may or may not be credible, but such grounds as satisfy the Magistrate as being sufficient to support a charge. A District Magistrate cannot therefore order a Subordinate Magistrate to commit a case unless it appears that the latter had no good reason to discredit the prosecution witnesses and that their evidence was sufficient in law to form the basis of a conviction—*Emp. v. Rawji, 11 Bom L.R. 225, 5 Cr.L.J. 213.*

The discretion given to Magistrates to decide whether there are sufficient grounds for commitment is a judicial discretion and must be exercised with care and on some proper ground. It is an improper exercise of discretion to add a grave charge, without sufficient evidence, for the mere purpose of committing the case to the Sessions—*Emp. v. Mahomed Khan, 11 Bom L.R. 18, 11 Cr L.J. 163*

710. Commitment of case triable by Magistrate :—A Magistrate is competent to commit a case not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, if he cannot inflict adequate punishment in the case. See Notes under sections 206 and 207

But a Magistrate going on leave does not exercise proper discretion if he commits a case triable by himself to the Sessions simply because the witnesses for the accused are not in attendance and it would be inconvenient for his successor to begin the trial afresh—*Anonymous, Ratanlal 110*; so also, a Magistrate ought not to commit the accused in a case of theft merely because the case was connected with another case which he was bound by law to commit—*Emp v Asha Bhatti, 15 Bom L.R. 998, 14 Cr.L.J. 657.*

When two or more persons are jointly indicted and the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is ousted in the case of one of them by reason of the offence committed by him being one triable only by the Court of Session, the proper course is to commit all of them to the Sessions, and not to try the others himself and commit that one person to the Sessions—*Anonymous*, 1 Weir 448; *Probodh Kumar v. Mohini*, 22 Cr.L.J. 480 (Cal.).

711. Frame of charge :—See section 226 as to the procedure in case of commitment without any charge or with an erroneous or imperfect charge.

When a Magistrate has given his reasons for committing the case for trial, the Sessions Judge must either accept the charge as framed or frame others himself. But the Code does not authorise him to insist on a re-drawing of the charge by the Magistrate, unless he specifies the charge which he wishes to be sent up—*In re Ramdhane*, 25 W.R. 17.

The framing of a charge does not amount to an order of commitment, and after the charge is framed the Magistrate does not become *functus officio* in respect of the case. He can amend the charge or can proceed with the case himself, he can consider whether he ought to commit or not—*Emp. v. Venkatesh*, 12 Bom.L.R. 521, 11 Cr.L.J. 486. He can even discharge the accused. See sec. 213 (2) and notes thereunder. But once an order of commitment is passed under sec. 213, the Magistrate has no power to proceed any further with the case—*Emp. v. Venkatesh*, 12 Bom.L.R. 521.

211. (1) The accused shall be required at once to give in, orally or in writing, a list of the persons (if any) whom he wishes to be summoned to give evidence on his trial.

List of witnesses for defence on trial.

(2) The Magistrate may, in his discretion, allow the accused to give in any further list of witnesses at a subsequent time; and, where the accused is committed for trial before the High Court, nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude the accused from giving, at any time before his trial, to the Clerk of the Crown a further list of the persons whom he wishes to be summoned to give evidence on such trial.

Further list.

712. Magistrate's duty to require list :—The Magistrate is bound under this section to require the accused to give a list of the witnesses he desires to call. It is not enough to put him the question: "Have you any evidence?"; such a question is ambiguous, and might suggest to the accused only an inquiry as to whether he had witnesses ready in Court—*Emp. v. Kondi*, 7 Bom.L.R. 723, 11 Cr.L.J. 601.

Refusal of accused to give list of names of witnesses.—If an accused person, on being called upon under sec. 211, declines to give the list, he cannot compel the Magistrate, after committal, to issue any summons for witnesses on his behalf. He is of course entitled to call any witnesses in the Sessions Court, whom he may have in Court, whether or not he has caused such witnesses to be summoned. The Sessions Judge may in his discretion cause any witnesses to be summoned on the application of the accused, and is bound to summon them if he considers that their evidence may be material—*Q. E v. Shakir Ali*, 19 All 502.

The accused is entitled before the committing Magistrate to refuse to disclose the names of the witnesses he wishes to call at the trial, and the Magistrate cannot force him to disclose their names or the nature of the evidence they would be called upon to give—*Q E v Hargovind*, 14 All 242.

Refusal of Magistrate to summon and examine witnesses.—On receipt of the list of witnesses, the Magistrate is bound to exercise his discretion and state distinctly whether he would summon the witnesses or not. If he is of opinion that the witnesses were included in the list for the purpose of vexation, delay or of defeating the ends of justice, he ought to proceed under the second proviso of section 216—*Q v. Rajeswar*, 16 W R, 14

But a Magistrate should not refuse an application for summons on the ground that the witnesses are implicated in the offence with which the accused is charged—*Ram Sahai v. Sankar*, 15 W.R. 7; or on the ground that the number of witnesses is very large—*Hurendra v. Bhabani*, 11 Cal. 762; or on the ground that he entertains doubts as to the value of their evidence—*In re Mohima Chunder*, 15 W.R. 15.

212. The Magistrate may, in his discretion, summon and examine any witness named in any list given in to him under Section 211.

Power of Magistrate to examine such witnesses.

713. Discretion of Magistrate.—This section gives the Magistrate the widest possible discretion to summon and examine any of the witnesses named in any list given under sec. 211, even in cases where the accused has reserved his defence for the Sessions trial. The Magistrate is not bound to record reasons before exercising his powers—*In re Rudra Singh*, 111 All. 380 The Magistrate is not bound to examine any witness named in the list—*Sessions Judge v Kangaya*, 36 Mad 321, 23 M.L.J. 368, 13 Cr.L.J. 778, *Saadat Mian v Emp*, 6 Pat 329, 23 Cr.L.J. 709

The discretion of the Magistrate ought not to be interfered with by the Sessions Judge. Therefore where the Magistrate intended to summon some witnesses for the accused and to make a local inspection, but had to commit the case to the Sessions at the direction of the Sessions Judge, it was held that the Sessions Judge's direction was *ultra vires* as it unduly

interfered with the discretion of the Magistrate, and the committal was bad in law—*Emp. v. Mathura*, 1906 A.W.N. 306, 4 Cr.L.J. 451.

213. (1) When the accused, on being required to give in a list under Section 211, has declined to do so, or when he has given in such list and the witnesses (if any) included therein whom the Magistrate desires to examine have been summoned and examined under Section 212, the Magistrate may make an order committing the accused for trial by the High Court or the Court of Session (as the case may be), and (unless the Magistrate is a Presidency Magistrate) shall also record briefly the reasons for such commitment.

(2) If the Magistrate, after hearing the witnesses for the defence, is satisfied that there are not sufficient grounds for committing the accused, he may cancel the charge and discharge the accused.

714. Commitment:—As to when the Magistrate should or should not commit, see Notes 702 and 703 under sec. 209.

A commitment made in the absence of the accused is illegal—*In re Surya Narain*, 5 C W N. 110; but where the accused was allowed to appear by an agent under section 205, a commitment made in the absence of the accused, but in the presence of the agent, is not illegal—*Q v. Hurnath*, 2 W R 50.

Commitment after discharge—Where a Magistrate, after examining four witnesses for the prosecution, discharged the accused, but subsequently becoming aware that there was a fifth witness, he cancelled his order of discharge, examined the witness and committed the accused in the Sessions, it was held that the commitment was not illegal—*Anonymous*, 7 M.H.C.R. App. 40, 2 Weir 258.

Commitment to wrong Sessions:—See Note 549 under section 177.

Signature of Magistrate:—The signature of the Magistrate to the warrant of commitment should not be impressed with a stamp. But such a signature is only an irregularity and does not vitiate the proceedings—*Subramanya v Queen*, 6 Mad. 396.

Reasons for commitment:—The Magistrate shall briefly record the reasons for commitment. If a Magistrate commits a case triable by himself, he is bound to record his reasons for commitment, so as to enable the High Court to judge whether the committal is a sound exercise of discretionary power—*Emp. v. Md Khan*, 11 Bom. L.R. 18, 9 Cr L.J. 163; *Emp. v. Nanji*, 38 Bom. 114; he must state why the case was not disposed of by himself—*Diwani Chand v Crown*, 8 S.L.R. 23, 15 Cr L.J. 664. The High Court has jurisdiction to quash the commitment, if the

Magistrate gives no reasons whatever for the commitment—*Emp. v. Nanji*, 38 Bom 114; or gives reasons which are bad in law—*Emp. v. Achaldas*, 28 Bom.L.R. 293, 27 Cr.L.J. 479; *Emp. v. Bhiman*, 42 Bom. 172, 10 Cr.L.J. 342.

The Magistrate in his grounds of commitment should specify exactly and precisely the proof against each particular prisoner and the manner in which it is supported—*Q. v. Kodai Kahar*, 5 W.R. 6.

Commitment of some, trial of others:—Where several persons are jointly charged with the same offences, and it is considered necessary to commit one of them to the Sessions, the most convenient course is that all the prisoners should be committed, and not that one person should be committed and the others tried by the Magistrate himself. If however the Magistrate adopts the latter course, he does not act illegally—*In re Kathu Chanchugadu*, 2 Weir 258; *Anonymous*, 1 Weir 448.

Joint commitment.—Where several persons are jointly charged with having committed an offence, especially in cases of rioting etc., where there are two hostile parties, each person should be committed for trial separately and not all together, and the trial should also be separate—*Q. v. Sheikh Bazoo*, 8 W R 47, but a commitment is not to be set aside as illegal, because all the accused were jointly committed. The sections of the Code relating to joinder of charges, and the Privy Council ruling in *Subramania Aiyar v K E.*, 25 Mad 61 refer to trials only and not to commitments—*In re Govindu*, 26 Mad 592, *Q. E. v Ahmed Khan*, 1900 A.W.N. 206; *Emp v. Sita*, 7 Bom L.R. 457, 2 Cr.L.J. 432. In such cases of joint commitment, the Sessions Judge should frame separate charges and try the accused separately, as if there had been separate commitments—*In re Govindu*, 26 Mad. 592; *Q. E v. Ahmed Khan*, 1900 A.W.N. 206.

715. Sub-section (2)—Scope:—Subsection (2) is intended to provide for cases where the evidence recorded after the charge so changes the aspect of the case as to leave no reasonable doubt that a conviction is not sustainable, but it does not apply where the evidence for the defence merely casts some doubts on the case—*Crown v Po Nyan*, 1 L.B.R. 348. Under this section, the Magistrate has a discretion even after he has framed a charge, of cancelling it, if after hearing the evidence for the defence he considers that there are no longer sufficient grounds to put the accused on his trial—*Nga Hmyin v K E.*, U B R (1917) 3rd Qr. 29, 10 Cr.L.J. 102. If the Magistrate after hearing the defence witnesses comes to the conclusion that their evidence rebuts the evidence produced for the prosecution or renders it so incredible or unreliable that a conviction will not follow, he may act upon his opinion and pass an order of discharge under this subsection. He is not bound to commit merely because there was some *prima facie* evidence—*Md Abdul v. Baldeo*, 44 All 57, 19 A.L.J. 831, 22 Cr.L.J. 703, *Albar Ali v Raja Bahadur*, 24 A.L.J. 133, 27 Cr.L.J. 2. This discretion must, however, be carefully exercised, and whenever there is a possibility that different Courts might take different views of the evidence, the Magistrate, even though he may

himself not think the evidence sufficient for a conviction, should leave it to the Sessions Court to pronounce finally upon the matter—*Akbar Ali v. Raja Bahadur* (supra).

The words "witnesses for the defence" in subsection (2) are wide enough to cover evidence extracted by cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses; and therefore it is open to a Magistrate, after he has drawn up a charge, to allow the accused to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, and, as a result, to cancel the charge—*Jogendra v. Matulal*, 39 Cal. 885, 16 C.W.N. 1155, 13 Cr.L.J. 774. This case has been disapproved of in *Raman v. Emp.*, 33 C.W.N. 535, 1929 Cr.C. 222.

214.

This section has been omitted by section 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act (XII of 1923). It provided that if an European British subject and an Indian subject were jointly accused of an offence triable by a Court of Session, the Magistrate must commit the case to the High Court and not to the Sessions Judge.

215. A commitment

once made
under Section
213 or Section
214 by a com-

petent Magistrate or by a Court of Session under Section 477 or by a Civil or Revenue Court under Section 478, can be quashed by the High Court only, and only on a point of law.

215. A commitment

once made
under Section
213 * * by

a competent
Magistrate * * or by a
Civil or Revenue Court
under Section 478 can be
quashed by the High Court
only, and only on a point
of law.

Change :—The words "or section 214" occurring in the old section have been omitted by sec. 11 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, XII of 1923. This is consequential to the repeal of sec. 214.

The words "or by a Court . 477" have been omitted by sec. 59 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act XVIII of 1923. This is consequential to the repeal of section 477.

716. Scope of section :—This section applies only to commitments made under the two sections specified; therefore an order of commitment under sec. 436 (now section 437) cannot be quashed under this section—*Emp. v. Jogeshwar*, 31 Cal. 1; *In re Kalagava*, 27 Mad. 54; but can be quashed under the revisional powers of the High Court—*Pirthi Chand v. Sampatia*, 7 C.W.N. 327; and in that case the High Court can quash the commitment on points of law and of fact—*Tambi v. Emp.*, 12 Bur. L.T. 62, 9 L.B.R. 208, 19 Cr.L.J. 801. Similarly, an order of commitment made by the Sessions Judge under sec. 423 cannot be quashed under this section, but can be dealt with by the High Court under

its revisionary powers—*K. E. v. Nga Thet She*, 1 Bur. L.J. 250. But an order under sec. 526 clause (iv) can neither be quashed under this section nor under the High Court's revisional powers—*In re Kalagaya*, 27 Mad. 54.

This section does not apply to a commitment which is *ab initio* void e.g. a commitment made by a Magistrate having no territorial jurisdiction over the offence. No reference to the High Court is necessary to set aside such a commitment—*Emp. v. Alim Mundle*, 11 C.L.R. 55.

717. Quashing commitment—This section refers only to a commitment *actually made*. Where a Sessions Judge under sec. 436 (now 437) set aside a Magistrate's order of discharge, and *directed* a commitment to be made, the High Court could interfere in its revisional powers, and could consider the *facts* as well as the question of law involved—*Muthia Chetty v. Emp.*, 30 Mad 224, 16 M.L.J. 529

A commitment once made stands, unless quashed by the High Court, and if the High Court is not moved to quash the commitment, the trial of the persons must take place in pursuance thereof. If a trial has already taken place, it serves no purpose to impugn the commitment, and it is futile to contend in appeal or in revision that the commitment was illegal—*Nazir v. Emp.*, 7 Lah L.J. 428, 26 P.L.R. 767, 27 Cr.L.J. 134.

When commitment cannot be quashed.—A commitment cannot be quashed *after the accused has been put on his trial* and has pleaded to the charge before the Sessions Judge—*Emp. v. Sagambar*, 12 C.L.R. 120; *Crown v. Haji*, 1 S.L.R. 6, 9 Cr.L.J. 250; *Sessions Judge v. Arokia Padayachi*, 2 Weir 262; *Kasim Molla v. Emp.*, 42 C.L.J. 114, 26 Cr.L.J. 1560. In such a case, the Judge should proceed according to law and dispose of the case, or the Public Prosecutor may with the consent of the Court withdraw the prosecution under sec. 494—*Sessions Judge v. Arokia*, 2 Weir 262. In *Emp. v. Shibo Behara*, 6 Cal. 584, however, it has been held that the High Court can quash a commitment at any stage of a criminal proceeding.

'Only by the High Court'.—A commitment can be quashed only by the High Court. A Magistrate cannot quash the commitment and discharge the accused even though the complainant wishes to compound the case—*Emp. v. Jangbir*, 4 All. 150; *Q. v. Salim Sheikh*, 2 W.R. 57. A Sessions Judge cannot set aside the commitment and direct the Magistrate to try the case himself—*In re Bheema*, 16 M.L.J. 525, 3 Cr.L.J. 99.

The Judicial Commissioner when sitting in the Sessions division is not divested of his capacity as a High Court Judge, and he has full power to make an order under sec. 215 even when sitting as a Sessions Judge—*Utlilai v. Crown*, 17 S.L.R. 188, 26 Cr.L.J. 148

Where the commitment is *made to the High Court* (original criminal jurisdiction), the Appellate Criminal Bench of the High Court cannot quash the commitment. In such a case the practice is to apply to the Judge exercising original criminal jurisdiction in the High Court—*Phanin-*

dra v. Emp., 36 Cal. 48. That is, the Judge of the High Court sitting in Sessions has power to quash a commitment made to him by a Magistrate—*Emp. v. Girish Chandra*, 34 C.W.N. 13 (28) (F.B.), 1929 Cr. C. 468; *Emp. v. Girish*, 56 Cal. 785, 1929 Cr. C. 521. But in *Crown Prosecutor v. Bhagavathi*, 42 Mad. 88 (84) the Madras High Court held that an application to quash such a commitment should be made to the Appellate side of the High Court and not to a Judge exercising original criminal jurisdiction. A similar opinion was expressed in *Colin M. Mackey v. Emp.*, 53 Cal. 350 (F.B.), 30 C.W.N. 276, 27 Cr.L.J. 385. If an order of commitment is made by the original civil side of the High Court under sec. 478, an appeal against the order of commitment may be preferred to the Appellate side of the High Court—*Venkatagiri v. N. M. Firm*, 43 Mad. 361.

Effect of order quashing commitment:—The primary effect of an order quashing the commitment is to supersede any action taken by the Magistrate under sec. 210 and his proceedings subsequent thereto; and it is necessary for the Magistrate to go back to the point at which he took cognizance of the complaint. There is no need for a fresh complaint, but it is necessary for the Magistrate to treat the case as a warrant case and not as a subject matter of an inquiry under Ch. XVIII. The Magistrate is to begin the trial afresh under sec. 252—*Emp. v. Girish Chandra*, 34 C.W.N. 13 (30) (F.B.).

The Magistrate cannot question the legality of the order of the High Court quashing the commitment.—*Emp. v. Girish Chandra*, supra

718. Point of law:—The High Court cannot quash a commitment made under sections 213 and 478 except upon a point of law—*Emp. v. Goda Ram*, 15 A.L.J. 756, 19 Cr.L.J. 224. Though an appeal lies under clause 15 of the Letters Patent from an order of commitment made under section 478 by a Judge of the High Court in the original civil side, the order cannot be set aside except on a point of law—*Venkatagiri v. N. M. Firm*, 43 Mad. 361

The High Court can quash a commitment on the following points of law:—

(1) Where the Magistrate who committed the case was competent to try it himself and to inflict adequate punishment in the case—*K. E. v. Dharam Singh*, 3 A.L.J. 14, *K. E. v. Jagmohan*, 6 A.L.J. 999; *Emp. v. Asha Bhatti*, 15 Bom. L.R. 998; *Uttibai v. Crown*, 17 S.L.R. 188.

(2) Where the order of commitment rests upon a misapprehension and there is no evidence upon which it can be supported—*In re Jagathambal*, 2 Weir 262.

(3) Where the case was triable exclusively by the Magistrate, and the Sessions Court had no jurisdiction over it, e.g. a commitment for an offence under the Opium Act (Act I of 1878)—*Q. E. v. Schade*, 19 All 465; or under Madras Act I of 1866—*Reg. v. Donoghua*, 5 M H C.R. 277; or under sec. 29 of Police Act V of 1861—*In re Indrabee,* 1 W R 5.

(4) When there is absolutely no evidence sufficient to warrant a commitment—*Emp. v. Chandra Kumar*, 2 C.L.J. 46; *Emp. v. Jagannath*, 3 O.W.N. 308 (Sup.), 28 Cr.L.J. 137; *Nga Hmyin v. K. E.*, 1917 U.B.R. 3rd Qr. 29, 19 Cr.L.J. 102; *Tambi v. Emp.*, 9 L.B.R. 208, 19 Cr.L.J. 801, 12 Bur. L.T. 62; *Jogeshwar v. K. E.*, 5 C.W.N. 411; *Emp. v. Narotam*, 6 All. 98; but see 13 Bom. L.R. 201 and 27 M.L.J. 593 cited in Note 719 below.

(5) Where the commitment was made in the absence of the accused—*In re Surya Narain*, 5 C.W.N. 110.

(6) Where the commitment was based on evidence recorded in the absence of the accused (i.e., while the accused was not arrested on the charge at all)—*Chinnappan*, 2 Weir 259

(7) Where the commitment was made by the Magistrate not in the exercise of his own discretion but at the suggestion of the District Magistrate, and without examining the witnesses for the defence—*Emp. v. Mathura*, 1906 A.W.N. 306, *Q. E. v. Munisami*, 15 Mad 39

(8) Where the commitment was made without examining the witnesses for the prosecution—*Q. E. v. Chinna*, 4 Mad 227, or without examining the witnesses for the defence—*Emp. v. Md Hadi*, 26 All 177, *Emp. v. Mathura*, 1906 A.W.N. 306, *Q. E. v. Ahmadi*, 20 All 264

(9) Where the Magistrate committed the approver who had broken the conditions of pardon tendered to him, along with the other co-accused—*Q. E. v. Bhan*, 23 Bom 493; *Q. E. v. Brij Narain*, 20 All. 529; or where such approver was committed before the trial of the other accused was finished—*Q. E. v. Sudra*, 14 All. 336

(10) Where the Magistrate gave no reasons whatever for the commitment, or gave reasons which are bad in law—*Emp. v. Achaldas*, 38 Bom. L.R. 293, 27 Cr.L.J. 479; *Emp. v. Nanji*, 38 Bom 114, 14 Cr.L.J. 609, *Emp. v. Bhimaji*, 42 Bom. 172.

(11) Where the committing Magistrate had no territorial jurisdiction over the offence—*K. E. v. Nga Taung*, 7 Bur L.T. 26, 15 Cr.L.J. 270.

(12) Where the committing Magistrate held the inquiry without the certificate of the Political Agent which was necessary in the case—*Ram Charan v. Crown*, 5 Lah. 416, see this case and other cases cited in Note 581 under sec. 188

719. What are not proper grounds for setting aside commitment :—(1) The High Court cannot set aside a committal merely because the Magistrate made a joint commitment of several accused—*In re Govinda*, 26 Mad 592, *Q. E. v. Ahmad Khan*, 1900 A.W.N. 206; *Emp. v. Sita*, 7 Bom. L.R. 457, 2 Cr.L.J. 432

(2) A commitment can be quashed only on a point of law and cannot be quashed on the ground that there was no evidence on the committing Magistrate's record to sustain the charge—*Emp. v. Saleman*, 13 Bom. L.R. 201, 12 Cr.L.J. 256; *Ismail v. Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1045 (1047) (Nag); *In re Sessions Judge*, 27 M.L.J. 593, 15 Cr.L.J. 665 (dissenting from 6

All. 98); so also, a commitment cannot be quashed because of doubts as to the credibility of the evidence for the prosecution, if there is in fact some evidence which would justify the Sessions Judge in leaving the question of guilt or innocence to the jury—*Mahomed Moideen v. K. E.* 1 Rang 526, 25 Cr.L.J. 261. A commitment cannot be quashed merely on the ground that the evidence was doubtful. The proper course in such a case would be for the District Magistrate to instruct the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution under sec. 494—*K. E. v. Nga Taung*, 7 Bur. L.T. 26, 15 Cr.L.J. 270.

(3) Where a Magistrate going on leave committed to the Sessions a case triable by himself, on the ground that the witnesses were not in attendance and that his successor would find it inconvenient to try the case afresh, it was held that the commitment was merely irregular and not illegal so as to justify the High Court to quash it—*Anonymous*, Ratanlal 110.

(4) A commitment is not illegal because it is made to the same Sessions Judge who gave the direction for the prosecution of an accused for an offence (giving false evidence) committed before him—*Reg v. Gazi*, 1 Bom. 311

(5) A commitment for false complaint (sec. 211 I. P. C.) is not illegal merely because the Magistrate has proceeded on the report of a police officer and has not made a judicial inquiry into the complaint—*Emp v. Salek Roy*, 6 Cal 582

(6) The fact that some of the accused were committed while other persons who were concerned in the offence had not yet been arrested is not a ground for setting aside the commitment—*In re Ramasami*, 7 M.L.T. 187, 11 Cr.L.J. 333

(7) A commitment ought not to be quashed on the ground that a civil suit is pending in respect of the subject matter of the offence—*In re Devji*, 18 Bom 581, but the trial of the case may be postponed until the determination of the civil suit—*Sankaraya v. Kerala Subba*, 2 Weir 260

(8) Where the Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction over the place of offence but the objection taken on this point was overruled by the Sessions Judge, the High Court held that there was no sufficient ground for questioning the commitment—*Q E v. Abbi Reddi*, 17 Mad 402.

(9) The High Court cannot interfere when the Magistrate, being of opinion that he cannot adequately punish the accused, exercises his discretion by committing the case to the Sessions—*King Emp. v. Baldeo*, 11 A.L.J. 439, 14 Cr.L.J. 304

(10) The High Court cannot quash a commitment where the Magistrate, though he can inflict the maximum sentence provided for the offence, commits the case, being of opinion that it should for other reasons be tried by a Court of Session—*Crown Prosecutor v. Bhagvathi*, 35 M.L.J. 559, 19 Cr.L.J. 997; *Ghani v. Crown*, 14 S.L.R. 85, 21 Cr.L.J. 791.

(11) A commitment will not be quashed on the ground that the committing Magistrate has failed to observe the provisions of sec 360 in

respect of some of the witnesses; in such a case, the trial Court will be directed to recall the witnesses in respect of whom sec. 360 was not complied with, and to comply with those provisions so far as these witnesses are concerned—*Abdur Rahim v. Emp* 29 C.W.N. 698, 26 Cr.L.J. 1276.

(12) Where there has been a commitment for the trial of charges some of which are triable by a Session Court and others triable by a Magistrate, the fact that during the trial the charges for the Sessions offences are withdrawn is not a ground for setting aside the order of commitment and taking away the accused's right to a trial by jury—*Emp v. Monmotha*, 31 C.W.N. 144, 28 Cr.L.J. 141

216. When the accused has given in any list of witnesses under Section 211 and has been committed for trial, the Magistrate shall summon such of the witnesses included in the list, as have not appeared before himself, to appear before the Court to which the accused has been committed:

Summons to witnesses for defence when accused is committed.

Provided that, where the accused has been committed to the High Court, the Magistrate may, in his discretion, leave such witnesses to be summoned by the Clerk of the Crown, and such witnesses may be summoned accordingly:

Provided also, that if the Magistrate thinks that any witness is included in the list for the purpose of vexation or delay or of defeating the ends of justice, the Magistrate may require the accused to satisfy him that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the evidence of such witness is material, and if he is not so satisfied, may refuse to summon the witness (recording his reasons for such refusal), or may, before summoning him, require such sum to be deposited as such Magistrate thinks necessary to defray the expense of obtaining the attendance of the witness and all other proper expenses.

Refusal to summon unnecessary witness unless deposit made.

719A. "Shall summon" —Where the accused has made an application for summoning witnesses, the Magistrate must deal with the application and pass an order either granting the prayer of the petition or refusing it. He should not simply order the application to be filed—*Bhomas v. Digambar*, 6 C.W. 548. Where a witness once summoned failed to appear, there being some delay in the service of summons, the Magistrate is bound to make a second attempt (the first attempt being a

All. 98); so also, a commitment cannot be quashed because of doubts as to the credibility of the evidence for the prosecution, if there is in fact some evidence which would justify the Sessions Judge in leaving the question of guilt or innocence to the jury—*Mahomed Moideen v. K. E.*, 1 Rang. 526, 25 Cr.L.J. 261. A commitment cannot be quashed merely on the ground that the evidence was doubtful. The proper course in such a case would be for the District Magistrate to instruct the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution under sec. 494—*K. E. v. Nga Taung*, 7 Bur. L.T. 26, 15 Cr L.J. 270

(3) Where a Magistrate going on leave committed to the Sessions a case triable by himself, on the ground that the witnesses were not in attendance and that his successor would find it inconvenient to try the case afresh, it was held that the commitment was merely irregular and not illegal so as to justify the High Court to quash it—*Anonymous*, Ratanlal 110.

(4) A commitment is not illegal because it is made to the same Sessions Judge who gave the direction for the prosecution of an accused for an offence (giving false evidence) committed before him—*Reg v. Gazi*, 1 Bom. 311.

(5) A commitment for false complaint (sec. 211 I. P. C.) is not illegal merely because the Magistrate has proceeded on the report of a police officer and has not made a judicial inquiry into the complaint—*Emp. v. Salek Roy*, 6 Cal 582.

(6) The fact that some of the accused were committed while other persons who were concerned in the offence had not yet been arrested is not a ground for setting aside the commitment—*In re Ramasami*, 7 M L T. 187, 11 Cr.L.J. 333

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Summons to witnesses for defence when accused is committed.

Provided that, where the accused has been committed to the High Court, the Magistrate may, in his discretion, leave such witnesses to be summoned by the Clerk of the Crown, and such witnesses may be summoned accordingly:

Provided also, that if the Magistrate thinks that any witness is included in the list for the purpose of vexation or delay or of defeating the ends of justice, the Magistrate may require the accused to satisfy him that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the evidence of such witness is material, and if he is not so satisfied, may refuse to summon the witness (recording his reasons for such refusal), or may, before summoning him, require such sum to be deposited as such Magistrate thinks necessary to defray the expense of obtaining the attendance of the witness and all other proper expenses.

Refusal to summon unnecessary witness unless deposit made.

719A. "Shall summon"—Where the accused has made an application for summoning witnesses, the Magistrate must deal with the application and pass an order either granting the prayer of the petition or refusing it. He should not simply order the application to be filed—*Bhomar v. Digambar*, 6 C.W.N. 543. Where a witness once summoned failed to appear, there being some delay in the service of summons, the Magistrate is bound to make a second attempt (the first attempt being a

nominal one) to secure the attendance of the absence witness—*Emp. v. Ruknuddin*, 4 All 53.

720. Second proviso :—The second proviso is not intended to enable the Magistrate to inquire generally into what the defence of the accused is to be, and to consider whether on learning the nature of the defence he is absolutely to abstain from summoning the whole of the witnesses cited by the accused. The meaning of this proviso is that if among the persons named by the accused as witnesses the Magistrate considers that any particular witness is included for the purpose of vexation and delay, he is to exercise his judgment and inquire whether such witness is material—*Emp v. Rajcoomar*, 3 Cal 573. And he can require the accused person to satisfy him that the evidence of the witnesses to be summoned is material only when he thinks that the witnesses were included in the list for the purpose of vexation etc.; otherwise not—*In re Raja of Kantis*, 8 All. 668.

Refusal to summon witnesses :—The accused is entitled to have the witnesses mentioned in the list summoned and examined; and the only ground on which a Magistrate can refuse summons is when the Magistrate thinks that the witnesses have been included in the list for the purpose of vexation and delay. The Magistrate should not refuse to summon the witnesses named in the list merely because he thinks that their evidence would not be reliable or material—*In re Marinagi Reddi*, 2 Weir 263. Indeed, he cannot decide beforehand on the credit to be attached to the evidence of a particular witness, unless he has an opportunity of hearing him. By this prejudging he exceeds the discretion given by this section—*Q. E. v. Virasami*, 19 Mad. 375. Again, the fact that the accused declined to examine witnesses at the close of the case would be no reason for refusing to summon them to meet fresh evidence taken by the Magistrate subsequent to the close of the defence—*Deela Mahlon v Sheo Dyal*, 6 Cal. 714.

Recording reasons for refusal :—When a Magistrate refuses to summon witnesses, he must record his reasons for such refusal; and the reasons must show that the evidence of such witnesses is not material. The fact that the Magistrate thought that the reasons assigned by the accused for summoning a witness were not sufficient, is not a good ground for refusing to summon him—*In re Raja of Kantis*. 8 All 668.

Order to deposit expenses :—Though the Magistrate is competent to refuse to summon witnesses, still he should fix the amount which he considers necessary to defray the cost of the attendance of persons named in the list and intimate his readiness to issue summons on that amount being deposited—*In re Subbaraya*, 4 M.H.C.R. 81. An order refusing to issue summons should be sparingly passed; and such an order is improper in a case where the accused is unable or unwilling to deposit money and in consequence is convicted without his witnesses being heard, especially if the case is one in which a severe sentence is inflicted—*Qadu v. Emp.*, 1898 P.R 7.

217. (1) Complainants and witnesses for the prosecution and defence, whose attendance before the Court of Session or High Court is necessary and who appear before the Magistrate, shall execute before him bonds binding themselves to be in attendance when called upon at the Court of Session or High Court to prosecute or to give evidence, as the case may be.

(2) If any complainant or witness refuses to attend before the Court of Session or High Court, or to execute the bond above directed, the Magistrate may detain him in custody until he executes such bond, or until his attendance at the Court of Session or High Court is required, when the Magistrate shall send him in custody to the Court of Session or High Court, as the case may be.

721. "Whose attendance is necessary" —There is no law which obliges the committing Magistrate to cause the attendance at the Sessions Court of every one of the witnesses examined by him, irrespective of their evidence being material for the prosecution. It is for the Magistrate to judge as to the necessity of the attendance of those witnesses—*Emp. v. Naik Lal*, 1883 A W.N. 37.

218. (1) When the accused is committed for trial, the Magistrate shall issue an order to such person as may be appointed by the Local Government in this behalf, notifying the commitment and stating the offence in the same form as the charge, unless the Magistrate is satisfied that such person is already aware of the commitment and the form of the charge;

and shall send the charge, the record of the inquiry and any weapon or other thing which is to be produced in evidence, to the Court of Session or (where the commitment is made to the High Court) to the Clerk of the Crown or other officer appointed in this behalf by the High Court.

(2) When the commitment is made to the High Court and any part of the record is not in English, an English translation of such part shall be forwarded with the record.

English translation to be forwarded to High Court.

219. (1) The Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, summon and examine supplementary witnesses after the commitment and before the commencement of the trial, and bind them over in manner hereinbefore provided to appear and give evidence.

Power to summon supplementary witnesses.

219. (1) *The committing Magistrate or, in the absence of such Magistrate, any other Magistrate empowered by or under Section 206* may, if he thinks fit, summon and examine supplementary witnesses after the commitment and before the commencement of the trial, and bind them over in manner hereinbefore provided to appear and give evidence.

Power to summon supplementary witnesses.

(2) Such examination shall, if possible, be taken in the presence of the accused, and where the Magistrate is not a Presidency Magistrate, a copy of the evidence of such witnesses shall, if the accused so require, be given to him free of cost.

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Change .—The italicised words in subsection (1) have been substituted for the words 'The Magistrate' by section 60 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. This amendment provides that the supplementary witnesses may be examined not only by the committing Magistrate, but by any other Magistrate in his absence who is empowered to commit for trial.

The words "if the accused so require" occurring in subsection (2) of the old section have been omitted by the same Amendment Act. The accused is now given an absolute right to a copy of the evidence.

722. Scope :—This section provides for cases in which there may be an accidental gap in the evidence. In such a case, the Sessions Judge may call additional evidence at the trial under sec. 540 or the committing Magistrate may himself take steps, before the trial, under sec 219 to supplement the evidence—*Mahabir v. Emp.*, 23 Cr L.J. 79 (Oudh).

The power of the committing Magistrate to call and examine supplementary witnesses ceases with the commencement of the trial. After the trial has commenced, the Sessions Judge can cause witnesses to be summoned before himself or under certain circumstances have them examined by commission. But he cannot direct the committing Magistrate to call additional witnesses and hold an inquiry—*Hassan v Emp*, 1888 P R. 29. If, after receiving the order of commitment, the Sessions Judge, in view of the Magistrate's recorded opinion, thinks that further evidence should be taken, the proper course is to point out to the committing Magistrate that he should summon and examine any supplementary witnesses who can give evidence and bind them over to appear at the trial, and not to send the case to the Magistrate after the conclusion of the trial and after the opinions of the assessors have been taken—*Awalkhan v. Emp.*, 1892 P.R. 4.

220. Until and during the trial, the Magistrate shall, subject to the provisions of this Code regarding the taking of bail, commit the accused, by warrant, to custody.

CHAPTER XIX.

OF THE CHARGE.

221. (1) Every charge under this Code shall state the offence with which the accused is charged.

(2) If the law which creates the offence gives it any specific name, the offence may be described in the charge by that name only.

(3) If the law which creates the offence does not give it any specific name, so much of the definition of the offence must be stated as to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged.

(4) The law and section of the law against which the offence is said to have been committed shall be mentioned in the charge.

(5) The fact that the charge is made is equivalent to
What implied in a statement that every legal condition required by law to constitute the offence charged was fulfilled in the particular case.

(6) In the presidency-towns the charge shall be
Language of charge. written in English; elsewhere it shall be written either in English or in the language of the Court.

(7) If the accused has
Previous conviction when to be set out. been previously convicted of any offence, and it is intended to prove such previous conviction for the purpose of affecting the punishment which the Court is competent to award, the fact, date and place of the previous conviction shall be stated in the charge. If such statement is omitted, the Court may add it at any time before sentence is passed.

(7) If the accused, having
Previous conviction when to be set out. been previously convicted of any offence, is liable, by reason of such previous conviction, to enhanced punishment or to punishment of a different kind, for a subsequent offence, and it is intended to prove such previous conviction for the purpose of affecting the punishment which the Court may think fit to award for the subsequent offence, the fact, date and place of the previous conviction shall be stated in the charge. If such statement has been omitted, the Court may add it at any time before sentence is passed.

Illustrations.

(a) A is charged with the murder of B. This is equivalent to a statement that A's act fell within the definition of murder given in Sections 299 and 300 of the Indian Penal Code; that

it did not fall within any of the general exceptions of the same Code ; and that it did not fall within any of the five exceptions to Section 300 ; or that, if it did fall within Exception I, one or other of the three provisos to that exception applied to it.

(b) A is charged, under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code, with voluntarily causing grievous hurt to B by means of an instrument for shooting. This is equivalent to a statement that the case was not provided for by Section 335 of the Indian Penal Code, and that the general exceptions did not apply to it.

(c) A is accused of murder, cheating, theft, extortion, adultery or criminal intimidation, or using a false property mark. The charge may state that A committed murder, or cheating, or theft, or extortion, or adultery, or criminal intimidation, or that he used a false property mark, without reference to the definitions of those crimes contained in the Indian Penal Code ; but the sections under which the offence is punishable must, in each instance, be referred to in the charge.

(d) A is charged, under Section 184 of the Indian Penal Code with intentionally obstructing a sale of property offered for sale by the lawful authority of a public servant. The charge should be in those words

Change.—Subsection (7) has been amended by sec. 61 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. "There is some doubt whether under section 221 it is permissible to prove a previous conviction if the enhanced punishment which it is sought to award is not beyond the competence of the Court; and the amendment directs that in such a case evidence of the previous conviction may be given"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914). This amendment supersedes the ruling in *Ramanjulu*, 2 Weir 264 where it was held that if the sentence passed was within the Magistrate's competency, the details of the previous conviction need not be given

723. Particulars to be stated in the charge :—The object of these sections is to enable the accused to know the substantive charges which he will have to meet and to be ready for them before the evidence is given—*Ram Chandar v Emp.*, 17 Cr.L.J. 411 (All). An accused is entitled to know with accuracy and certainty the exact nature of the charge brought against him. Unless he has this knowledge, he will be prejudiced in his defence, especially in cases where it is sought to implicate him for acts not committed by himself but by others with whom he is in company—*Behari Mahton v. Q E* 11 Cal 106, *Amritalal v. K. E.*, 42 Cal. 957; *Chhakari v. Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 567 (Cal); *Kedar Nath v. K. E.*, 29 C.W.N. 408, 26 Cr.L.J. 849. An accused is entitled to be informed with the greatest precision what acts he is said to have committed, and under what section of the Penal Code these acts fall—*Sheo Sankar v. K. E.*, 2 O.W.N. 862, 27 Cr.L.J. 62. Failure to state in any

substantial form the nature and particulars of the offence alleged against the accused would in some cases be a fatal defect which would vitiate the whole proceedings. Where an offence charged involves consequences which may be stated in a general form, such as may arise in a case of arson where a man may by one act of arson set fire and destroy several stacks of hays of several persons, no particular is required, the nature of the offence being sufficiently stated by the date, time and place of the setting of fire, but extortion or obtaining money from persons by unlawful means involves stating with some approach to accuracy the approximate amounts alleged to have been obtained from each person and the nature of the extortion used against each person—*Ram Chandar v. Emp.*, 17 Cr.L.J. 411 (All.).

In a charge of rioting, the common object of the unlawful assembly should be specified—*Buddhu v. Lachminia*, 11 C.W.N. 599, *Behari v. Q. E.*, 11 Cal. 106, *Poresk Nath v. Emp.*, 33 Cal. 295. Where the object of the unlawful assembly is to take possession of some property, the property must be specified in the charge—*Poresk Nath v. Emp.*, 33 Cal. 295. Where there are two objects of an unlawful assembly, both the objects must be specified and not one—*Sabir v. Q. E.*, 22 Cal. 276. For a charge of conspiracy, only an agreement is sufficient, so it is sufficient to include in the charge the agreement which is alleged to have been arrived at between the conspirators—*Bishambhar v. K. E.*, 2 O.W.N. 760, 26 Cr.L.J. 1602. Where the accused are charged with having conspired to do or cause to be done a series of illegal acts, it is not necessary that the charge should state in all its details the actual specific acts which the conspirators are alleged to have agreed to do or cause to be done. It is sufficient to say that the accused have agreed to do or cause to be done an illegal act—*Htin Gyaw*, 6 Rang 6, 29 Cr.L.J. 555 (560). Where a conspirator is present at the commission of the offence, he may under the provisions of sec 114 I P. C. be deemed to have committed the offence, but if that is the way in which the accused is to be made responsible for the offence, he should be specially charged with such offence as read with the provisions of sec 114 I P. Code—*Alimuddi v. K. E.*, 52 Cal. 253, 29 C.W.N. 173, 40 C.L.J. 541.

Where a particular intention is an important element in the offence, the intention must be specified—*Balmukund v. Ghanshamram*, 12 Cal. 391.

In a charge of sedition, the actual seditious words need not be set out in the charge if the substance of the words is given—*Crown v. Ahmed*, 1 S.L.R. 14, 9 Cr.L.J. 256.

The existence of aggravating circumstances which go to enhance the punishment must be set out in the charge—*Reg. v. Mukta*, Ratanlal 55.

Specific name :—Thus, rioting is an offence with a specific name, and under sub-section (2), it is sufficient to describe the offence by that name only. It is not necessary to set out that there were five or more persons engaged in a riot and actuated by a common object. Where a person is charged with rioting, it means that the prosecution alleges that all the necessary ingredients constituting the offence of rioting are present;

it is not necessary to set out what these ingredients are—*Emp. v. Ram Chandra*, 55 Cal. 879, 29 Cr.L.J. 823 (825)

Subject matter of offence.—Where the law and the section as well as the words of the section are mentioned in the charge, the subject matter of the offence need not be specified. Thus, where the illegal act charged is the unlawful and malicious possession of explosive substances within the meaning of sec. 4 of the Explosive Substances Act, it is not essential to specify in the charge the explosive substance which the accused had in their possession—*Amrita Lal v. K E*, 42 Cal 957, 19 C.W.N 676, 10 Cr.L.J 497.

Liability of whipping.—Where the accused is liable to be punished under the Whipping Act, the charge must state the liability—*Baidya v. Queen*, 5 Mad 158

"Law and section of the law".—In framing a charge the Court should adhere to the language of the section, as far as practicable—*Amritlal v. K. E.*, 42 Cal. 957; *Chhakari v Emp*, 26 Cr L J 567 (Cal) Where the law and section were mentioned in the charge, and the accused fully understood the nature of the offence with which they were charged, the omission of the words "unlawfully" and "maliciously" and "in British India" occurring in the section was held not so material as to prejudice the accused—*Amritlal v K E*, 42 Cal 957

724. Sub-section (7)—Previous conviction.—The prosecution is bound to prove the previous conviction, and the identity of the accused with the person previously convicted—*Yippaka Daligadu*, 2 Weir 266. Where the fact of previous conviction is not mentioned in the charge, it cannot be used for the purpose of enhancing the sentence—*Reg v Annaji*, Ratanlal 70; e.g. for the purpose of adding the sentence of whipping to imprisonment—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 265, and 267. In *In re Abbulu*, 7 M L.T. 77 and *Baisakhi v. Crown*, 1917 P R. 29, 18 Cr.L.J 875, however, it is held that the omission to set out the previous conviction is not a sufficient reason for interfering with the enhanced sentence in appeal or revision, unless there has been a failure of justice by reason of such omission. See sec. 225, see also *Nga Hia v K E*, 8 L B R 461, 18 Cr.L.J. 79, where it has been held that the omission to state the fact, date and place of previous conviction is not material where the previous conviction was put to the accused and admitted by him before judgment was passed

The previous conviction must be entered in the charge and the accused should be called on to plead thereto, the mere admission by the accused that he had once been in jail is insufficient to show that he pleaded guilty to a previous conviction—*K E v Govind Sakharam* 4 Bom L R 177

Fact, date, place of previous conviction.—When a person is charged with previous convictions, it is not sufficient to state that the accused is an 'old offender', as that does not sufficiently bring home to the accused person the particular offence or class of offences which renders him liable to a more severe sentence than would otherwise be imposed—*In re Yip pokka*, 2 Weir 266. If the fact, date and place of the previous conviction

are not stated, no enhanced sentence can be passed on the accused—*Emp v. Haidar*, 1883 A.W.N. 110. But where the accused was at the time lying under sentence of the previous conviction referred to, the omission to mention the particulars of the previous conviction would in no way prejudice the accused and would afford no ground for interfering with the enhanced sentence—*Emp v. Raghub Ali*, 1881 A.W.N. 32.

In passing an order under sec. 565 it is not necessary that the details of the previous conviction should be mentioned in the charge—*Emp. v Jagru*, 11 N.L.R. 88, 14 Cr.L.J. 390 (cited under sec. 565).

222. (1) The charge shall contain such particulars as to the time and place of the alleged offence, and the person (if any) against whom, or the thing (if any) in respect of which, it was committed, as are reasonably sufficient to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged.

(2) When the accused is charged with criminal breach of trust or dishonest misappropriation of money, it shall be sufficient to specify the gross sum in respect of which the offence is alleged to have been committed, and the dates between which the offence is alleged to have been committed, without specifying particular items or exact dates, and the charge so framed shall be deemed to be a charge of one offence within the meaning of Section 234 :

Provided that the time included between the first and last of such dates shall not exceed one year.

725. Particulars as to time, place etc. :—The charge must contain sufficient particulars as to time, place, person and circumstance, so that the accused may have notice of the matter with which he is charged—*Q. E. v Fakirappa*, 15 Bom 491; *Oates v. Emp.*, 38 C.L.J. 163. A charge for house-breaking and theft is bad for vagueness if it does not specify the articles stolen or the name of the person whose house was broken into, and omits to mention one of the places where the offences were committed—*Subbadu v K E.*, 28 M.L.J. 381, 16 Cr.L.J. 298. A charge of defamation is defective if it does not set forth the particular occasion on which it was committed—*Bishwanath v. Keshab*, 30 Cal 402. Where a charge of dacoity under secs 395 and 397 I. P. C. did not specify the dates on which the looting took place, held that the conviction must be quashed, as the charge did not give the accused sufficient notice and particulars of what they had to meet—*In re Gam Mallu*, 49 Mad 74. 26 Cr.L.J. 1513. A conviction under sec 377 I P C. is illegal on a charge which does not set forth the time, place or the person with whom the

offence was committed, but only states that the accused habitually wore women's clothes and exhibited physical signs of having committed that offence—*Q. E. v. Khairati*, 6 All. 204. In charge of adultery it is sometimes impossible to specify the particular date or dates on which the sexual intercourse took place; it is sufficient to specify two dates between which the offence is alleged to have been committed—*Bhola Nath v. Emp.*, 51 Cal. 488 (492), 28 C.W.N. 323, 25 Cr.L.J. 997.

726. Subsection (2).—This sub-section did not exist in the Code of 1882. The ruling in *Ekram Ali v. Q. E.*, 2 C.W.N. 341 and *Q. E. v. Pursotam*, 24 Cal. 193 to the effect that particular items and exact dates of the misappropriation must be mentioned is no longer good law. As the law stood before, there was great difficulty in convicting where there was a running account and where the prosecution were unable to put their hands on a specified item out of which the particular sum was embezzled; also, there was the difficulty of joinder of charges under sec. 234. These difficulties have been removed after 1898—*Khurod Kumar v. Emp.*, 29 C.W.N. 54, 40 C.L.J. 555

This sub-section applies only to a charge of criminal breach of trust or misappropriation; it does not apply to a charge under sec. 477A I.P.C.—*Kalka Prosad v. Emp.*, 38 All. 42; *Q. E. v. Matilal*, 26 Cal. 560; *Raman Behari v. Emp.*, 41 Cal. 722, or to a charge of cheating—*Raja Khan v. K. E.* 1 A.L.J. 599

Again, it applies only to misappropriation of money, and not to misappropriation in respect of a number of trees—*Raghavendra v. Emp.*, (1911) 2 M.W.N. 467, 12 Cr.L.J. 567

727. Gross sum only should be mentioned:—This is an enabling section and it enacts that it is sufficient to specify the aggregate sum without going into details. It dispenses with the necessity of enumeration of various items, but it does not prohibit such enumeration—*Emp. v. Datto Hanmant*, 30 Bom. 49. It is optional with the complainant either to mention the gross sum or to specify all the items misappropriated. And this section does not make compulsory either the one or the other. The complainant may choose to specify all the particular items instead of mentioning the gross sum, and this will be treated as a mere superfluity but not an illegality—*Samiruddin v. Nibaran*, 31 Cal. 928; or the complainant may mention only the gross amount even where the particular items can be specified—*Thomas v. Emp.*, 29 Mad. 558

But although it is sufficient to frame a general charge of the gross amount, the Magistrate should also see that the charge does not become so general as to be vague, and the accused is not prejudiced thereby—*Mahammad Shah v. Crown*, 1907 P.W. 16. Though it is sufficient to mention only the gross sum and not necessarily the particular items, still the prosecution must prove what total sum the accused has unlawfully expended or failed to account for, in such a way as to leave no doubt that he has been engaged in a criminal misappropriation and how that total sum is made up. There must be a definite finding of a certain definite sum traced to the accused and clearly shown to have been wilfully

are not stated, no enhanced sentence can be passed on the accused—*Emp v. Haidar*, 1883 A.W.N. 110. But where the accused was at the time lying under sentence of the previous conviction referred to, the omission to mention the particulars of the previous conviction would in no way prejudice the accused and would afford no ground for interfering with the enhanced sentence—*Emp v. Raghib Ali*, 1881 A.W.N. 32.

In passing an order under sec. 565 it is not necessary that the details of the previous conviction should be mentioned in the charge—*Emp. v. Jhagru*, 9 N.L.R. 88, 14 Cr.L.J. 390 (cited under sec. 565).

222. (1) The charge shall contain such particulars as to the time and place of the alleged offence, and the person (if any) against whom, or the thing (if any) in respect of which, it was committed, as are reasonably sufficient to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged.

(2) When the accused is charged with criminal breach of trust or dishonest misappropriation of money, it shall be sufficient to specify the gross sum in respect of which the offence is alleged to have been committed, and the dates between which the offence is alleged to have been committed, without specifying particular items or exact dates, and the charge so framed shall be deemed to be a charge of one offence within the meaning of Section 234:

Provided that the time included between the first and last of such dates shall not exceed one year.

725. Particulars as to time, place etc.—The charge must contain sufficient particulars as to time, place, person and circumstance, so that the accused may have notice of the matter with which he is charged—*Q E v. Fakirappa*, 15 Bom. 491; *Oates v. Emp.*, 33 C.L.J. 163. A charge for house-breaking and theft is bad for vagueness if it does not specify the articles stolen or the name of the person whose house was broken into, and omits to mention one of the places where the offences were committed—*Subbodu v. K E.*, 28 M.L.J. 381, 16 Cr.L.J. 293. A charge of defamation is defective if it does not set forth the particular occasion on which it was committed—*Bishwanath v. Keshab*, 30 Cal. 402. Where a charge of dacoity under secs 395 and 397 I.P.C. did not specify the dates on which the looting took place, held that the conviction must be quashed, as the charge did not give the accused sufficient notice and particulars of what they had to meet—*In re Gam Mallu*, 49 Mad 74, 26 Cr.L.J. 1513. A conviction under sec. 377 I.P.C. is illegal on a charge which does not set forth the time, place or the person with whom the

offence was committed, but only states that the accused habitually wore women's clothes and exhibited physical signs of having committed that offence—*Q. E. v. Khairati*, 6 All. 204. In charge of adultery it is sometimes impossible to specify the particular date or dates on which the sexual intercourse took place; it is sufficient to specify two dates between which the offence is alleged to have been committed—*Bhola Nath v. Emp.*, 51 Cal. 488 (492), 28 C.W.N. 323, 25 Cr.L.J. 997.

726. Subsection (2)—This sub-section did not exist in the Code of 1882. The ruling in *Ekram Ali v. Q. E.*, 2 C.W.N. 341 and *Q. E. v. Pursotam*, 24 Cal. 193 to the effect that particular items and exact dates of the misappropriation must be mentioned is no longer good law. As the law stood before, there was great difficulty in convicting where there was a running account and where the prosecution were unable to put their hands on a specified item out of which the particular sum was embezzled; also, there was the difficulty of joinder of charges under sec. 234. These difficulties have been removed after 1898—*Khirod Kumar v. Emp.*, 29 C.W.N. 54, 40 C.L.J. 555.

This sub-section applies only to a charge of criminal breach of trust or misappropriation; it does not apply to a charge under sec. 477A I.P.C.—*Kalka Prosad v. Emp.*, 38 All. 42, *Q. E. v. Matilal*, 26 Cal. 560; *Raman Behari v. Emp.*, 41 Cal. 722, or to a charge of cheating—*Raja Khan v. K. E.* 1 A.L.J. 599.

Again, it applies only to misappropriation of money, and not to misappropriation in respect of a number of trees—*Raghavendra v. Emp.*, (1911) 2 M.W.N. 467, 12 Cr.L.J. 567.

727. Gross sum only should be mentioned :—This is an enabling section and it enacts that it is sufficient to specify the aggregate sum without going into details. It dispenses with the necessity of enumeration of various items, but it does not prohibit such enumeration—*Emp. v. Datto Hanmant*, 30 Bom. 49. It is optional with the complainant either to mention the gross sum or to specify all the items misappropriated. And this section does not make compulsory either the one or the other. The complainant may choose to specify all the particular items instead of mentioning the gross sum, and this will be treated as a mere superfluity but not an illegality—*Samiruddin v. Nibaran*, 31 Cal. 928; or the complainant may mention only the gross amount even where the particular items can be specified—*Thomas v. Emp.*, 29 Mad. 558.

But although it is sufficient to frame a general charge of the gross amount, the Magistrate should also see that the charge does not become so general as to be vague, and the accused is not prejudiced thereby—*Mahammad Shah v. Crown*, 1907 P.W.R. 16. Though it is sufficient to mention only the gross sum and not necessarily the particular items, the prosecution must prove what total sum the accused has unlawfully expended or failed to account for, in such a way as to leave no doubt that he has been engaged in a criminal misappropriation, and that the total sum is made up. There must be a definite finding of a definite sum traced to the accused and clearly shown to have been

and unlawfully appropriated to his own use. It is not sufficient to fling into the charge an alleged balance or net profit which the accused, an agent of the complainant, is supposed to have earned, and say that in respect of that net profit he is guilty of misappropriation of every rupee which he cannot produce or explain—*Mohan Singh v. Emp.*, 42 All. 522.

If the particular items are specified, the charge will not be illegal by reason of the fact that the items exceed three in number—*Emp. v. Gulzari Lal*, 24 All 254. This section is not controlled by sec 234 but rather modifies it.

728. "Charge so framed.....charge of one offence"
—This section clearly admits of the trial of any number of acts of breach of trust committed within the year as amounting only to one offence—*Emp. v. Datto Hanmant*, 30 Bom. 49. A charge in respect of a gross sum without specifying several items is a charge of one offence and not of several offences—*Emp. v. Ibrahim*, 33 All 36, 7 A.L.J. 897, 11 Cr L.J. 442. Where an accused person is tried on charges of criminal breach of trust in respect of two cheques and also on another charge in respect of a gross sum made up of three distinct items which might have been but were not specified, the trial is in fact not on five distinct charges but is only for three offences (2 cheques plus gross sum) and is therefore legal under sec. 234—*Thomas v. Emp.*, 29 Mad 558; see also *Emp. v. Ishaq*, 27 All. 69; *Sat Narain v. Emp.*, 32 Cal 1085.

This sub-section enacts that the charge in respect of a gross sum shall be treated as a charge for *one offence* within the meaning of sec. 234, but it does not provide that the several acts of misappropriation will be treated as forming *one transaction* within the meaning of sec. 235—*Kasi Viswanathan v. Emp.*, 30 Mad. 328.

'One year':—The time covered by the several acts must not be more than one year, where the charges related to items misappropriated in the course of two years, the conviction was quashed—*Dhanjibhoy v. Kaim Khan*, 1905 P.R 14. Thus, where the accused was charged with committing criminal breach of trust in respect of eight necklaces, and it was found that the breach of trust in respect of one necklace happened in February 1922, and with regard to another in January 1924, held that the trial was vitiated. Sec 235 did not apply, as the act of breach of trust in respect of each necklace was a separate transaction—*Raman Lal v. Emp.*, 49 All 312, 25 A.L.J. 317, 28 Cr L.J 171.

223. When the nature of the case is such that the

When manner of committing offence must be stated. particulars mentioned in Sections 221 and 222 do not give the accused sufficient notice of the matter with which he is charged, the charge shall also contain such particulars of the manner in which the alleged offence was committed as will be sufficient for that purpose.

Illustrations.

(a) A is accused of the theft of a certain article at a certain time and place. The charge need not set out the manner in which the theft was effected.

(b) A is accused of cheating B at a given time and place. The charge must set out the manner in which A cheated B.

(c) A is accused of giving false evidence at a given time and place. The charge must set out that portion of the evidence given by A which is alleged to be false.

(d) A is accused of obstructing B, a public servant, in the discharge of his public functions at a given time and place. The charge must set out the manner in which A obstructed B in the discharge of his functions.

(e) A is accused of the murder of B at a given time and place. The charge need not state the manner in which A murdered B.

(f) A is accused of disobeying a direction of the law with intent to save B from punishment. The charge must set out the disobedience charged and the law infringed.

729. The question as to whether further particulars are necessary under this section is a question of discretion in each case—*Kudrutula v Emp*, 39 Cal 781 In a case of cheating, the charge must set out the manner in which the offence was committed. Whether the words of the charge are reasonably sufficient to give the accused notice of the accusation which he has got to meet, depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. The omission to state the manner of cheating is regarded as material or not according as the accused has or has not in fact been misled by the omission and the omission has or has not occasioned a failure of justice (sec 225 III. b and c)—*Kedar Nath v. Emp.*, 29 C.W.N. 408, 41 C.L.J 172, 26 Cr L.J 849 Where the manner of the cheating was set out as follows.—“By deceiving with false representations and promises as well as by conduct,” held that the expression used was too vague and indefinite to give the accused proper notice of the manner of deceit—*Kedar Nath v. Emp.*, (*supra*)

A charge of an attempt to cheat must specify the person attempted to be cheated and the manner in which the attempt was made—*Emp. v Imam Ali*, 8 C.W.N 278

224. In every charge words used in describing an offence shall be deemed to have been used in the sense attached to them respectively by the law under which such offence is punishable.

Words in charge taken in sense of law under which offence is punishable.

225. No error in stating either the offence or the particulars required to be stated in the charge, and no omission to state

Effect of errors

the offence or those particulars, shall be regarded at any stage of the case as material, unless the accused was in fact misled by such error or omission, and it has occasioned a failure of justice.

Illustrations.

(a) A is charged, under section 242 of the Indian Penal Code, with "having been in possession of counterfeit coin, having known at the time when he became possessed thereof that such coin was counterfeit," the word "fraudulently" being omitted in the charge. Unless it appears that A was in fact misled by this omission, the error shall not be regarded as material.

"A is charged with cheating B, and the manner in which he cheated B is not set out in the charge. There were many transactions between A and B, and A had no means of knowing as to which of them the charge referred, and offered no defence. The Court may infer from such facts that the omission to set out the manner of the cheating was, in the case, a material error."

(c) A is charged with cheating B, and the manner in which he cheated B is not set out in the charge. There were many transactions between A and B, and A had no means of knowing as to which of them the charge referred, and offered no defence. The Court may infer from such facts that the omission to set out the manner of the cheating was, in the case, a material error.

(d) A is charged with the murder of Khoda Baksh on the 21st January 1882. In fact the murdered person's name was Haidar Baksh, and the date of the murder was the 20th January 1882. A was never charged with any murder but one and had heard the inquiry before the Magistrate, which referred exclusively to the case of Haider Baksh. The Court may infer from these facts that A was not misled, and that the error in the charge was immaterial.

(e) A was charged with murdering Haidar Baksh on the 20th January 1882 and Khoda Baksh (who tried to arrest him for that murder) on the 21st January 1882. When charged for the murder of Haider Baksh, he was tried for the murder of Khoda Baksh. The witnesses present in his defence were witnesses in the case of Haidar Baksh. The Court may infer from this that A was misled and that the error was material.

730. Error or omission:—When the common objects of an unlawful assembly were to steal mangoes and to cause the death of a person, and the Judge in summing up the case to the jury spoke of the two objects, but the charge mentioned only the latter object, it was held that the omission to specify both the objects in the charge was material, in as much as it is difficult to say which of the two common objects

had been accepted by the jury; and if the jury had accepted that object which was not mentioned in the charge, there had been a failure of justice—*Sabir v. Q. E.*, 22 Cal. 276. When the charge against the accused was that he embezzled some deeds but he was convicted of embezzling some amounts obtained by dealing with those deeds, it was held that the charge was materially defective and the conviction must be set aside—*Bipru Das v. Nirodamani*, 12 C.W.N. 577.

Where the common object of the unlawful assembly was set out in the complaint and was found by the Magistrate, but was not mentioned in the charge, but it appeared that the accused had been in no way prejudiced by the omission in the charge, held that sec. 225 applied and the omission did not vitiate the trial—*Emp v. Jeshwant*, 28 Bom L.R. 497, 27 Cr.L.J. 744, following *Basiruddi v. Q. E.*, 21 Cal 827. Where the charge did not mention the common object of the unlawful assembly but there was ample material in the evidence on the record to show that the accused were members of an unlawful assembly and to show what their common object was, held that the omission was not a ground for setting aside the conviction—*Basiruddi v. Q. E.*, (*supra*). A charge of sedition is not defective if it omits to state the particular passages or particular words used by the accused; it is sufficient if the substance of the words is set out. Even if it is defective, it will be cured by this section—*Emp. v. Tribhuvan*, 33 Bom 77; *In re Mylapore Krishnasami*, 32 Mad. 384; *Chidambaram v. Emp*, 32 Mad. 3 (12). In a charge under sec 420 I P. C. It is proper to state the exact date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed, but when the time of the alleged offence is approximately indicated and there is nothing to show that the omission to give the exact date has materially prejudiced the accused at his trial, the omission does not affect the legality of the trial—*Farzand v. Emp*, 27 Cr.L.J. 909 (Pat.). The omission of words such as "dishonestly" or "unlawfully," or "in British India" is not material, and is cured by this section—*Reg. v. Rakhma*, 10 B.H.C.R. 373; *Amritlal v. Emp.*, 42 Cal. 957.

If the charge is drawn up clumsily or in a somewhat informal manner, but is sufficiently explicit as to give the accused notice of the charge, the irregularity will be cured by this section—*Emp v. Tribhuvan*, 33 Bom 77; *Bachchu v Piyara*, 2 Luck. 430, 4 O.W.N. 341, 28 Cr.L.J. 469.

Test to determine whether error is material :—In determining whether the error or omission has occasioned a failure of justice the Court should have regard to the manner in which the accused has conducted his defence and to the nature of the objection—*Reg v. Rakhma*, 10 B.H.C.R. 373; *Q. E. v. Ramji*, 10 Bom 124. Where the charge did not correctly set out the facts of the case for the prosecution upon which it was founded, but it was clear from the answer which the accused gave to the Court when examined under the provisions of sec. 342 that he understood exactly what the case against him was, held that the defect in the framing of the charge did not prejudice the accused in any way—*Gokul v. Emp.*, 29 C.W.N. 493, 26 Cr.L.J. 906. Where the accused did not make any objection to the defect in the form of charge, at the earliest possible occasion, and as a matter of fact no protest was made either in the Appellate

Court or in the Revisional Court below, and they know perfectly well what offences they were charged with, held that the irregularity had not occasioned any failure of justice—*Bachchu v. Piyara*, 2 Luck 430, 4 O.W.N. 341, 28 Cr.L.J. 409; see also *Chidambaram v Emp.*, 32 Mad 3 (12, 13).

Duty of Magistrate :—Where a charge is erroneous as to the intention with which the offence was committed, it is the duty of the Magistrate, before convicting the accused for committing the offence with a different intention, to amend the charge to that effect so as to give notice to the accused of what he is charged with. Thus, where the charge was house-breaking with intention to commit theft, but it was found that the intention was criminal intrigue with a woman in the complainant's house, the Magistrate, before convicting the accused of house-breaking with the latter intention, should clearly draw up a charge to that effect—*Mahomed Hosam v Emp* 41 Cal. 743; *Hajari v. K. E.*, 26 C.W.N. 344. But see *Karali Prasad v. K. E.*, 44 Cal 358 in which it has been held under the identical circumstances that it is not necessary for the Magistrate to amend the charge; the accused having been charged with criminal trespass with a guilty intention, it is competent to the Court to convict him with criminal trespass with some other guilty intention, and in such a case the accused is not in fact prejudiced by the conviction.

226. When any person is committed for trial

Procedure on commitment without charge or with imperfect charge.

without a charge or with an imperfect or erroneous charge, the Court, or, in the case of a High Court, the Clerk of the Crown, may frame a charge or add to or otherwise alter the charge, as the case may be, having regard to the rules contained in this Code as to the form of charges.

Illustrations.

1. A is charged with the murder of C. A charge of abetting the murder of C may be added or substituted.

2. A is charged with forging a valuable security under Section 467 of the Indian Penal Code. A charge of fabricating false evidence under Section 193 may be added.

3. A is charged with receiving stolen property knowing it to be stolen. During the trial it incidentally appears that he has in his possession instruments for the purpose of counterfeiting coin. A charge under section 235 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be added.

731. "Charge" :—Throughout this Code, the word 'charge' is generally used as the statement of a specific offence and not as indicating the entire series of offences of which a prisoner is accused, and it is in the

former sense that the word is used in this and the following sections—*Q. E. v. Appa Subhana*, 8 Bom 200

'Without charge'.—These words apply not only to the cases where there is no charge at all, but also to cases in which there is no charge in respect of such offence as the Sessions Judge or Clerk of the Crown may think the accused ought to be tried for—*Q. E. v. Appa*, 8 Bom 200.

'Frame a charge'.—At the beginning of the trial, if the Judge finds that the Magistrate has omitted to frame a charge, he may supply the omission and frame the charge that is made out on the evidence recorded by the Magistrate—*Dodo v. Emp.*, 9 S.L.R. 37, 16 Cr.L.J. 573

732. Addition of charge—If the charge framed by the Magistrate is imperfect or erroneous, the Sessions Judge may alter or add to the charge, having regard to the offences disclosed in the evidence recorded by the Magistrate. But the Sessions Judge cannot go beyond the evidence recorded by the Magistrate, in adding to or altering the charge. He cannot add or alter a charge upon the evidence recorded by *himself* at the trial. If he does so, the effect is that he takes cognizance of an offence without any preliminary inquiry in respect of it by the Magistrate and the provisions of sec. 193 of this Code are rendered nugatory. Thus, where the charge drawn up by the Magistrate was under sec. 202 I.P.C., and the Sessions Judge, on the application of the Public Prosecutor, added a charge for an offence under secs 109 and 201 I. P. C. upon the evidence of a person who was examined as a witness for the first time by the Sessions Judge, it was held that the action of the Judge was *ultra vires*, and the addition of the charge was not merely an error of procedure but an improper assumption of jurisdiction—*Rama Varma v. Q.*, 3 Mad. 351. It is doubtful even if section 227 intended to confer jurisdiction on a Sessions Judge to add or substitute a new charge on fresh evidence led or to be led in the Sessions Court for the first time—*Emp v. Stewart*, 21 S.L.R. 55, 27 Cr L.J. 1217 (1224).

Again, the Sessions Court can add or alter a charge with reference to the immediate subject of the prosecution and committal, and not with regard to a matter not covered by the indictment. Thus, where a prosecution was instituted by A on a charge under sec 417 I. P. C and the Sessions Judge altered the charge into one for an offence under sec. 420 I. P. C for cheating B, it was held that the procedure was illegal inasmuch as there was no complaint by B, and the prosecution was instituted by a person in respect of a matter with which B was not concerned, and the Magistrate did not commit the accused with respect to any offence committed against B—*Birendra v. Emp.*, 32 Cal 22. Similarly, where the accused was committed to the Sessions for the murder of A, the Sessions Judge could not add a charge for causing grievous hurt to B—*Shah Din v. Crown*, 1909 P.W.R. 20, 11 Cr L.J. 131. (In 8 All. 665, however, such a procedure was not treated as an illegality but a mere irregularity, and the High Court refused to interfere because no prejudice was caused to the accused) But where the committing Magistrate committed the accused for the murder of A and for causing grievous hurt,

B, the Sessions Judge could add a charge for the murder of B—*Hussenulla v Emp.*, 28 C.W.N. 561, 26 Cr.L.J. 5.

The Sessions Judge's power to add a charge is not fettered by the fact that a complaint in respect of it had been previously preferred before the Magistrate and dismissed by him—*Q. E. v. Vajiram*, 16 Bom. 414

Power to expunge a charge.—The Sessions Judge has power to frame, add or alter a charge, but he has no power to expunge a charge duly framed by the committing Magistrate—*Emp. v. Poreskollah*, 7 C.L.R. 143.

Charge when can be added or altered.—Though the Sessions Judge has power to add a charge at any stage of the proceedings before judgment, still he should exercise a sound and wise discretion, and he does not exercise such a discretion when he adds a new and grave charge after the close of the defence—*K. E. v. Mathura*, 6 C.W.N. 72. A charge cannot be altered after delivery of verdict—*Shek Ali*, 5 B.H.C.R. 9.

733. Alteration of charge.—The Sessions Judge can substitute a charge of abetment for a charge of the substantive offence—*Reg v. Govind*, 11 B.H.C.R. 278. If the committing Magistrate does not frame a charge with separate heads for each distinct offence, the defect may be remedied by the Sessions Judge—*In re Kalaram*, 7 W.R. 8. In a case in which the accused was charged with 45 offences and committed to the Sessions, the proper procedure is to amend the charge and to hold separate trials and not to confine the prosecution to three heads of charges, acquitting the accused of all the rest—*Emp v Sreenath*, 8 Cal. 450

Altering a charge includes the withdrawal of a charge which has been added by the Sessions Judge after commitment—*Dwarka Lal v. Mahadeo*, 12 All 551

227. (1) Any Court may alter or add to any charge
Court may alter charge. at any time before judgment is pronounced, or in the case of trials before the Court of Session or High Court, before the verdict of the jury is returned or the opinions of the assessors are expressed.

(2) Every such alteration or addition shall be read and explained to the accused.

734. Addition or amendment of charge.—Where a Magistrate summoned the accused under a certain section of the Penal Code, but the evidence disclosed an offence under another section, he can amend the charge—*Buroo Sardar v. Ariff*, 26 Cr.L.J. 302 (Cal.). When facts are proved constituting an aggravated offence, the Magistrate must either alter the charge under this section, or refer the case under sec. 347—*Kuftava v. Suppan*, 25 L.W. 86, 28 Cr.L.J. 164 (166)

In amending a charge, the Magistrate should not write over the original charge but should leave it on the file for reference and should

write the new charge separately—*Nga Pan v. Emp.*, 8 Bur. L.T. 17, 16 Cr L.J. 2.

The Court in substituting one charge for another cannot ignore the preliminary requisites of a charge; thus a charge for rape cannot be altered into a charge for adultery, because the complaint of the husband is a preliminary requisite in the latter offence—*Chemion v. Emp.*, 29 Cal. 415; nor can the Court alter a charge of rape into a charge for rape and adultery in the alternative—*Emp v Kalla*, 5 All 233. See notes under sec. 199.

But the power to add a charge is not limited by the terms of the certificate under section 188. Once a certificate has been obtained, the Court has power to add any charge for any offence disclosed by the facts though not specified in the certificate—*Emp v Krishna Nath*, 33 All. 514. See Note 581 under sec. 188.

Where a prisoner has been extradited for dacoity, the Court may alter the charge of dacoity into theft—*Q E v Khoda*, 17 Bom. 369.

Power of Sessions Court:—It is doubtful if section 227 intended to confer jurisdiction on a Sessions Court to add or substitute a new charge on fresh evidence led or to be led in the Sessions Court for the first time. The object of preliminary inquiry and commitment by a Magistrate would be frustrated if a fresh charge is substituted or added in the Sessions Court on which the prosecution have not led evidence even in the Sessions Court but intend to lead evidence—*Emp. v. Stewart*, 21 S.L.R. 55, 27 Cr.L.J. 1217 (1224), *Rama Varma v. Q*, 3 Mad 351. A Court of Session, though vested with large powers of amending and adding to charges, can only do so with reference to the immediate subject of the prosecution and committal, and not with regard to a matter not covered by the indictment—*Muthu Goundan v Emp.*, 27 M.L.T. 231, 21 Cr.L.J. 57.

Amendment must not prejudice accused—Although this section gives power to the Court to add to or alter a charge, still this power should be exercised with discretion, and it is the duty of the Court to see that the accused is not prejudiced by the addition or alteration of the charges—*Dodo v. Emp.*, 11 S.L.R. 37; *Reg v Govindas*, 8 B.H.C.R. 76. Thus, an addition of a grave charge or alteration of a charge at a late stage of the proceedings would prejudice the accused in his defence and would be illegal. See *K. E. v. Madara*, 6 C.W.N. 72; *Emp. v. Isaf Mahomed*, 31 Bom. 218. Where during the trial of an accused person upon specific charges in a Court of Session, it is found at the conclusion of the trial that the charges as framed disclose no offence against the accused, it is illegal and prejudicial to the accused to alter or amend the charges and to convict him thereon without affording him an opportunity of meeting the amended or altered charges. The fact that the accused cross-examined the prosecution witnesses to prove the unsustainability of the charges as originally framed, is no ground for holding that by substantially altering the charges the accused was not prejudiced—*Muthu Goundan v. Emp.*, 27 M.L.T. 231, 21 Cr L.J. 57. It is open to a Sessions Judge to add an

alternative charge, but it is not a proper exercise of discretion to withdraw the charge (of an offence triable by jury) which the committing Magistrate thought to be proved, and to put the accused under a disadvantage by substituting another charge (of offences triable with assessors) so that he might be deprived of the right of trial by jury—*Ramsundar v. Emp.* 5 Pat. 238, 7 P.L.T. 178, 27 Cr.L.J. 512.

Amendment cannot cure illegality.—An illegal charge cannot be amended or altered, and such amendment will not cure the illegality. Thus, where a charge is drawn up of 4 offences, it is wholly illegal under sec 234, and the illegality cannot be cured by striking out one of the offences, and convicting the accused for the remaining three—*Manavala Chetty v. Empress*, 29 Mad. 569, *Chetty v. Emp.*, 49 Cal. 555. So also, where a Magistrate at first framed a charge under secs 352 and 504 I. P. Code, but finding that the two distinct offences which were in no way connected with one another could not be tried together, he struck out the charge framed and framed a charge under sec. 504 alone, held that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal—*Krishna Marthi v. Narayanaswami*, 49 M.L.J. 93, 26 Cr.L.J. 1618.

735. Addition or alteration when to be made :—A charge must be amended before the judgment is pronounced. If a charge is defective e.g. if more than three offences are included in one charge, which is invalid under section 234, the Magistrate cannot remedy the defect by saying in his judgment that he would proceed on only three charges. If he wishes to strike out any of the charges he should do so before concluding the trial, and should give the accused an opportunity of making such defence as he thinks fit; otherwise the trial is vitiated—*Chetty v. Emp.*, 49 Cal. 555, 24 Cr.L.J. 86.

Although a charge may be added or altered at any time before the judgment is pronounced, still it is illegal to do so at a late stage of the proceedings, e.g., after the prosecution case has been closed and the defence evidence has been recorded—*Emp. v. Isaf Mahomed*, 31 Bom. 218; *K. E. v. Madura*, 6 C.W.N. 72.

¶ If the complainant compounds the offence, the Court should acquit the accused upon the presentation of the petition of composition, and has no power to alter the charge already drawn up—*Hasta v. Crown*, 1914 P.R. 29, 16 Cr.L.J. 81.

In a trial by jury or assessors, the Sessions Court has no power to alter the charge after the delivery of the verdict of the jury or the opinion of the assessors—*Reg. v. Shek Ali*, 5 H.C.R. 9; *Harbans v. Crown*, 1916 P.R. 33, 17 Cr.L.J. 454. The words "return of verdict" mean the return of the final verdict which the Judge is bound to record—*Q. E. v. Appa Subhana*, 8 Bom. 200.

*Application for alteration of charge :—*An application for alteration of charge must be made immediately after the original charge has been read and explained by the Magistrate—*In re Abdul Rahman*, 27 Cal. 839; and the Magistrate should consider the application at once and not postpone passing his order on the application—*Q. E. v. Vajram*, 16 Bom. 414.

736. Sub-section (2) :—An alteration of charge must be read over and explained to the accused. It is not the intention of the legislature to empower a Court to convict an accused person of an offence of which he has not been told anything. Where a person was summoned to answer a charge under sec. 34 Police Act, but the Magistrate finding that the facts did not prove such offence, convicted him under sec. 279 I. P. C. without his being informed of the alteration of the charge, held that the conviction was illegal—*Dhum Singh v. Emp.*, 23 A.L.J. 436, 26 Cr.L.J. 1057, *Raghunath v. Emp.*, 24 A.L.J. 168, 27 Cr.L.J. 152. When a new charge was read aloud to the jury but was not specially explained to the prisoner, and he was not called upon to plead to that charge, but his counsel on being asked did not require a new trial (under sec. 229), it was held that the accused was not prejudiced by the addition of the new charge, and the omission did not affect the trial—*Q. E. v. Appasubhana*, 8 Bom. 200.

228. If the charge framed or alteration or addition

When trial may proceed immediately after alteration. made under section 226 or section 227 is such that proceeding immediately with the trial is not likely, in the opinion of the Court, to prejudice the accused in his defence or the prosecutor in the conduct of the case, the Court may, in its discretion, after such charge or alteration or addition has been framed or made, proceed with the trial as if the new or altered charge had been the original charge.

737. The addition or alteration of a charge does not open up the trial from the beginning, and the Court may immediately proceed with the trial if it is of opinion that there will be no prejudice to the accused. If the accused has already been examined under sec. 342, before the amendment of the charge and before he has been called upon to enter on his defence, it is not incumbent on the Court to re-examine the accused after the amendment of the charge—*Shamial v. K. E.*, 1 Pat. 54, 3 P.L.T. 91, 23 Cr.L.J. 146.

229. If the new or altered or added charge is such

When new trial may be directed, or trial suspended. that proceeding immediately with the trial is likely, in the opinion of the Court, to prejudice the accused or the prosecutor as aforesaid, the Court may either direct a new trial or adjourn the trial for such period as may be necessary.

738. New trial :—See *Q. E. v. Appa Subhana*, 8 Bom. 200 (cited in Note 736 under sec. 227) where the right to a new trial was waived.

Where the original and the altered charges are nearly related to each other (the original charge being one of murder, and the altered charge being one of abetment of murder), and the accused did not object to the amendment, it was held that there was no such material prejudice as would have necessitated a new trial under this section—*Reg v. Govind*, 11 B.H.C.R. 278. If, however, the amendment of charge would raise different questions of law and would admit of a different line of defence, the accused would be prejudiced and a new trial would be necessary—*Reg v. Govindas*, 8 B.H.C.R. 76.

In a new trial, the Court would not be justified in referring to the record of the former trial as a whole, but he may refer to such depositions as are especially put in evidence—*In re Devi Dutt*, 7 C.L.R. 193

230. If the offence stated in the new or altered or added charge is one for the prosecution of which previous sanction is necessary, the case shall not be proceeded with until such sanction is obtained, unless sanction has been

Stay of proceedings if prosecution of offence in altered charge require previous sanction.

already obtained for a prosecution on the same facts as those on which the new or altered charge is founded.

739. Sanction for one offence, conviction for another :—The mere fact that the sanctioning authority is of opinion that the facts constitute an offence under one section of the Act is in itself no bar to a conviction of the accused person for another offence under another section, provided of course that the facts stated in the order giving sanction are the same as those upon which the conviction is based. In such a case it is not necessary that fresh consent to the trial upon such altered charge would have to be given by the sanctioning authority. Section 230 makes full provision for a case of this kind—*Amar Singh v. Crown*, 1919 P.R. 31, 21 Cr L J 230

Where sanction has been obtained in respect of a substantive offence, it will avail in respect of abetment of such offence, and no fresh sanction is necessary. Therefore where sanction was obtained for the prosecution of a Sub-Registrar for an offence under sec. 468 I. P. C., the trial of the Sub-Registrar for the abetment of that offence required no further sanction—*Prafulla v. Emp*, 30 Cal. 905

231. Whenever a charge is altered or added to by the Court after the commencement of the trial, the prosecutor and the accused shall be allowed to recall or

Recall of witnesses when charge altered.

re-summon, and examine with reference to such alteration or addition, any witness who may have been examined, and also to call any further witness whom the Court may think to be material.

740. Recall of witnesses :—Under this section, it is imperative on a Court, when it alters or adds to a charge after the commencement of a trial, to allow the prosecutor and the accused to recall or resummon and examine, with reference to such alteration or addition, any witness who may have been examined and also to call any further witness whom it may deem material. If the Court adds or alters a charge after the commencement of the trial, without allowing the accused to recall and re-examine the witnesses, and the accused has been misled thereby, the High Court will order a new trial to be had upon a charge framed in the proper manner—*Harbans v. Crown*, 1916 P R. 33, 17 Cr.L.J. 454. The provisions of sec. 231 are peremptory, and therefore when a charge is altered, the Court is bound to recall any witnesses which the prosecution or the accused desires, and the Judge cannot refuse to call them because the accused cannot show on what points further cross-examination is necessary—*Chhanka v. Emp.*, ■ Pat. 832, 28 Cr.L.J. 769 (771). Under this section the accused has the right to recall the prosecution witnesses after the alteration of the charge, even if that alteration does not affect his defence. The Magistrate has no discretion in the matter; he is bound to recall those witnesses whom the accused wishes to recall—*In re Ramalinga*, 52 Mad. 346, 30 Cr L J. 223 (224). Where the committing Magistrate at first framed a charge and then at a late stage of the commitment proceedings, altered the charge without giving the accused an opportunity of re-examining the witnesses for the prosecution and producing his defence in regard thereto, and committed the accused to the Sessions on the charge so altered, held that the procedure of the Magistrate was entirely illegal and likely to prejudice the accused in his trial before the Court of Session—*Mohan Lal v Emp.* 22 A L J 239, 25 Cr. L.J. 798

When a charge is amended, the accused has a right to recall and cross-examine all the prosecution witnesses. The right is not restricted to the recalling of those witnesses only who have deposed to the subject matter of the amendment in the charge—*Hazara Singh v Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1497 (Lah)

232. (1) If any Appellate Court, or the High Court in the exercise of its powers of revision or of its powers under Chapter XXVII, is of opinion that any person convicted of an offence was misled in his defence by the absence of a charge or by an error in the charge, it shall direct a new trial to be had upon a charge framed in whatever manner it thinks fit.

(2) If the Court is of opinion that the facts of the case are such that no valid charge could be preferred against the accused in respect of the facts proved, it shall quash the conviction.

Illustration.

A is convicted of an offence under section 196 of the Indian Penal Code upon a charge which omits to state that he knew the evidence, which he corruptly used or attempted to use as true or genuine, was false or fabricated. If the Court thinks it probable that A had such knowledge, and that he was misled in his defence by the omission from the charge of the statement that he had it, it shall direct a new trial upon an amended charge; but if it appears probable from the proceedings that A had no such knowledge, it shall quash the conviction.

741. Scope :—This section lays down that if any person convicted of an offence has been misled in his defence by the absence of a charge or by an error in the charge, a retrial is to be ordered; and this rule applies as well to cases in which the conviction was in compliance with the terms of the law as to cases in which the conviction was irregular—*Mallu Gope v. Emp.*, 10 P.L.T. 875, 30 Cr.L.J. 891 (893), 1929 Cr. C. 584.

Errors in the charge :—If the High Court thinks that in consequence of material errors in a charge, the accused has been misled, it is bound to direct a new trial to be had upon a charge framed in the proper manner—*Harbans v. Crown*, 1916 P.R. 33, 17 Cr.L.J. 454. Where the owners of land were charged under sec 154 I P C for omission to give information of the riot to the thana, but they were convicted for the omission on the part of their agents, and not of themselves, it was held that the error in the charge prejudiced the accused, and a new trial was ordered by the Appellate Court—*Sarat Chandra v. Emp.*, 7 C.W.N. 201. Where the charge framed against the accused was to the effect that they caused hurt under sec 324 I. P. C. to a certain person by means of a *dao* (a cutting instrument), but they were convicted under sec. 354 I. P. C. for assault with a *lathi*, it was held that the accused might have been prejudiced in his defence by this error in the charge and a retrial was ordered—*Sital Chandra v. Emp.*, 17 C.W.N. 419, 14 Cr.L.J. 212.

742. Absence of charge :—Charge for one offence, conviction for another :—Where an accused person was summoned for offences under secs 143 and 379 I P. C., and the trying Magistrate drew up a charge only for the offence under sec 379 but convicted the accused only for the offence under sec 143 I P. C., held that the conviction must be set aside. The accused was summoned for two offences, and when the Magistrate framed a charge under sec 379, the accused had good reason to suppose that the other offence had been dropped by the Magistrate. Under such circumstance the accused was misled in his defence by the absence of a charge under sec 143 I. P. Code, and his conviction for that offence was therefore illegal—*Hossein v. Kalu*, 29 Cal. 481 (482). Where the accused were charged with and convicted of rioting

and on appeal the Sessions Judge set aside the conviction for rioting, but convicted them for house-trespass and hurt, it was held that the latter offences, being distinct and separate offences from rioting, should have formed the subject of separate charges, and the accused had been prejudiced within the meaning of this section by the omission of charges for the latter offences—*Yakub Ali v. Lethu*, 30 Cal. 288. See also, *Har Narain v. Emp.*, 18 C.W.N. 1274 and *Genu Manjhi v. K. E.*, 18 C.W.N. 1276, where the conviction was quashed on similar grounds.

Where the accused was charged for dishonestly using as genuine a forged instrument, but was convicted for defamation, it was held that not only should the conviction be set aside, but also as there was nothing to show that any valid charge could be preferred against the accused for the offence of defamation, no trial could be held (see sub-sec. 2)—*Gobinda Pershad v. Garth*, 28 Cal. 63.

Joinder of Charges.

233. For every distinct offence of which any person is accused there shall be a separate charge, and every such charge shall be tried separately, except in the cases mentioned in sections 234, 235, 236 and 239.

Separate charges for distinct offences.

Illustration

A is accused of a theft on one occasion, and of causing grievous hurt on another occasion. A must be separately charged and separately tried for the theft and causing grievous hurt.

743. Object of section :—The object of this section is to see that the accused is not bewildered in his defence by having to meet several charges in no way connected with one another—*Ram Subheg v. K. E.*, 19 C.W.N. 972. Another object is that the mind of the Court might be prejudiced against the prisoner if he were tried in one trial upon different charges resting upon different evidence. It might be difficult for the Court trying him on one of the charges not to be unduly influenced by the evidence against him on the other charges—*Q. E. v. Juala Prasad*, 7 All. 174. If in any case the accused are likely to be bewildered in their defence by having to meet many disconnected charges, or the prospect of a fair trial is likely to be endangered by the production of a mass of evidence directed to many matters and tending by its mere accumulation to induce an undue suspicion against the accused, then the propriety of combining the charges may be questioned—*Q. E. v. Fakirapa*, 15 Bom. 491; *Rasul v. Emp.*, 3 Luck. 664, 5 O.W.N. 612, 29 Cr.L.J. 801 (802).

The general law as to the trial of accused persons is embodied in this section which provides for separate trial of each accused person for every distinct offence, and the exceptions are laid down in sections 234, 235,

236 and 239 which must be strictly construed, so as not to defeat the right of independent trial conferred by the general law—*Tepanidhi v. K. E.*, 5 P.L.J. 11, 1 P.L.T. 180, 21 Cr.L.J. 161.

744. Scope of section—These sections (233-239) relating to joinder of charges refer to the trial of the accused. The ruling in *Subrahmaniya Aiyar's case*, 25 Mad. 61 (cited below) cannot be extended to preliminary inquiries held by Magistrates committing a case to the Sessions, so as to render the commitment itself illegal on the ground of misjoinder of offences or offenders at the preliminary inquiry—*In re Govinda*, 26 Mad. 592, *In re Sessions Judge*, 35 M.L.J. 259, 20 Cr.L.J. 514. See notes under sec. 215. In a warrant case the trial proper does not begin until the accused is charged and called upon to answer. The stage up to then is only an inquiry and not a trial; and therefore where the accused are discharged under sec. 253 (i.e. before frame of charge), no question of illegality of joint trial arises—*Manbodh v. Jhaboolal*, 30 Cr.L.J. 404 (Nag.), 1929 Cr. C. 261.

This section applies not only to warrant cases, but also to summons cases, although it is not necessary to frame a charge in the latter cases. Therefore a joint trial and conviction for several distinct offences in summons cases is illegal—*K. E. v. San Dun*, 3 L.B.R. 52, 2 Cr.L.J. 739. In summons cases, the intimation prescribed by sec. 242 takes the place of a formal charge, and each such charge has to be separately tried—*Manna v. Emp.*, 1 N.L.R. 42, 14 Cr.L.J. 230 (231). This section also applies where the accused is charged with a summons case and a warrant case—*K. E. v. Maung Gale*, 3 L.B.R. 113, 3 Cr.L.J. 350.

It also applies to trials under the Bengal Excise Act, and the fact that the trial has taken place as in a summons case does not exclude the operation of this section—*U. N. Biswas v. K. E.*, 41 Cal. 694, 18 C.W.N. 486.

Not only does this section apply to original trials, but the Appellate Court is also bound by it, thus, an Appellate Court acting under section 423 (1) (b) and altering the finding cannot act in contravention of the provisions of section 233—*Sahib Singh v. K. E.*, 1905 P.R. 38.

Distinct offences :—When two offences are committed and each of these two offences has no connection with the other, they are distinct offences—*Ram Subheg v. K. E.*, 19 C.W.N. 972.

745. What are distinct offences :—(1) *Offences falling under different sections of the I. P. C.*, e.g., theft and escape from lawful custody—*K. E. v. Po Hla*, 3 L.B.R. 221; kidnapping a boy and assaulting the mother who demanded the boy—*Chekutty v. Emp.*, 26 Mad. 454; theft and receiving stolen property—*Karu Kalai v. Ram Charan*, 28 Cal. 10; *Bishnu v. Emp.*, 1 C.W.N. 35; receiving stolen property, and habitually dealing in stolen property—*Emp. v. Uttom*, 8 Cal. 634; criminal misappropriation and cheating—*Parameshwar v. Emp.*, 13 C.W.N. 1089; offences under secs. 167 and 466 I. P. C.—*Emp. v. Sreenath*, 8 Cal. 450; offences under secs. 411 and 489C I. P. C.—*Mohendra v. Emp.*, 29 Cal. 387; offences under secs. 454 and 325 I. P. C.—*Nga Ta Pu v. K. E.*,

2 L.B.R. 19; offences under secs. 182 and 500 I. P. C.—*Ram Sebak v. Emp.*, 37 Cal. 604; offences under sec. 352 and sec. 504 I. P. Code—*Krishnamurthi v. Narayanaswami*, 49 M.L.J. 93, 26 Cr.L.J. 1618; theft in a dwelling house and abetment of criminal breach of trust—*Nikunja v. Q. E.*, 5 C.W.N. 294; abetment of falsification of document, and fraudulent destruction of document—*Krishnasami v. Emp.*, 26 Mad. 125; theft and receiving illegal gratification for the restoration of stolen property—*Nga Tivet v. K. E.*, 14 Bur. L.R. 67, offences under secs. 330 and 348 I. P. C.—*K. E. v. Kumaramuthu*, 25 M.L.T. 379, 20 Cr.L.J. 354; offence of belonging to a wandering gang of dacoits and the offence of committing dacoity—*Emp. v. Lalji*, 1882 A.W.N. 178; offences under secs. 411 and 458 I. P. C.—*Jagga v. K. E.*, 1905 P.R. 51; simple hurt under sec. 323 I. P. C. and grievous hurt under section 325 I. P. C.—*Radha Nath v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 94; embezzlement of money (sec. 409 I. P. C.) and falsification of accounts (477A I. P. C.) covering items other than those embezzled—*Emp. v. Kalka Prasad*, 38 All. 42, 13 A.L.J. 1059.

(2) Offences committed on different occasions, even though the offences be of the same kind (i.e. falling under the same section of the I. P. C.); e.g. two attempts to cheat committed on two different dates—*Johan v. K. E.*, 2 C.L.J. 618; or wrongful confinement and torture committed at several distinct times and places—*K. E. v. Kumaramuthu*, 20 Cr.L.J. 354, 25 M.L.T. 379, receiving stolen articles on different occasions, though the articles were the proceeds of a single burglary—*Padmanabha v. Emp.*, 2 P.L.T. 47, 21 Cr.L.J. 619.

Offences of giving false evidence by making two false statements on two different subjects, although in the course of one and the same deposition, must be tried separately as they are two distinct offences—*Emp. v. Sejmaj Punamchand*, 51 Bom. 310, 29 Bom. L.R. 170, 28 Cr.L.J. 373. See Note 775 under sec. 239.

(3) Offences committed against different persons—*Moharuddi v. Jadunath*, 11 C.W.N. 54, 4 Cr.L.J. 415, e.g. misappropriation of three sums of money from three distinct persons—*Tilakdhari v. Emp.*, 11 C.L.J. 757; or cheating three persons—*Musai Singh v. K. E.*, 41 Cal. 66, or hurt caused to two persons—*Ram Subheg v. K. E.*, 19 C.W.N. 972; wrongful confinement of several persons on several occasions—*K. E. v. Kumaramuthu*, 25 M.L.T. 379, 20 Cr.L.J. 354; cheating ten different persons on different occasions—*Girjadayal v. Emp.*, 25 O.C. 151.

(4) Offences in respect of distinct sums of money e.g., misappropriation of two sums of money collected on different dates—*Asgar Ali v. K. E.*, 40 Cal. 846; misappropriation by the accused of three sums of money collected in accordance with their duty as tax-collectors from three persons—*Tilakdhari v. Emp.*, 11 C.L.J. 757.

746. What are not distinct offences :—Offences of the same kind committed on one occasion though consisting of parts are not different offences but are to be treated as constituting one offence; e.g. the making of any number of false statements in the same deposition in one aggregate case of perjury, and charges need not be multiplied according

to the number of false statements—*Rakhal Chandra v. K. E.*, 36 Cal 808, 10 Cr.L.J. 150 Theft of two articles belonging to two different persons, committed at one and the same time, constitutes only one offence of theft and not two; and hence two convictions and sentences are not legal—*Bhura v. Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1495 (Nag). If a person is found in possession of a number of stolen articles, the offence committed by the accused (receiving stolen property) is a single offence and not a number of offences, and it makes no difference whether the articles belong to a single owner or to different owners. But if there were evidence that the accused received the articles at different times or from different thieves, the case would be different—*Emp. v. Sheo Charan*, 45 All. 485 (486). The mere fact that property stolen on two different occasions is found at one and the same time in the possession of an accused is not of itself sufficient to prove that the accused has committed two different offences under sec. 411 I. P. C. (retaining stolen property), as it is quite possible that the property though stolen on two different occasions may have been received from the same thief at the same time—*Q. E. v. Makhan*, 15 All 317. So also, the mere fact that the goods stolen from two different persons are found in the possession of the accused will not be sufficient to try the accused on two separate charges under sec. 411 I. P. Code (receiving stolen property) and to sentence him for each of the charges, unless there is proof that he received them at different times or from different thieves. All the goods in the possession of the accused may have been stolen by the same thief and may have been delivered to the accused by him at the same time though stolen on different occasions. If the accused received all these goods at the same time, that would constitute only one offence—*Ishan Muchi v. Q. E.*, 15 Cal. 511. In the absence of proof that a person accused of receiving stolen property received the stolen goods on different occasions, it is not permissible to charge, try and convict him in respect of each of them—*Nga Kywet v. Q. E.*, 1 L.B.R. 39 Where several items of stolen property were found in the possession of the accused on the same date, held that the accused committed only one offence and in the absence of evidence that the different articles were received at different times, he could not be charged separately for each item of stolen property. consequently the trial of the accused in respect of some of the stolen articles barred a second trial in respect of the remaining articles—*Ganesh Shaha v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 594; *K. E. v. Bishun Singh*, 3 Pat 503 (519), 5 P.L.T. 319, 25 Cr.L.J. 738 Receiving on one occasion various items of stolen property, the result of various thefts, is only one offence—*K. E. v. Irappa*, 3 Bom L.R. 187. So also, the stealing of several bullocks from the same man at the same time is but one offence, and there need not be as many charges as the number of bullocks stolen—*Emp. v. Raghu*, 1881 A.W.N. 154. So also, misappropriation of several books of account in respect of the same estate though on different occasions is but one offence, the several books of account forming one set of books—*Promothanath v. K. E.*, 17 C.W.N. 479, 14 Cr.L.J. 219. So also, misappropriation of several sums of money on several occasions in regard to one individual is one offence—*In re Luchmi-*

narain, 14 Cal. 128. Receiving a bribe partly on one day and partly on another is one offence—*Jagat Chandra v. Lal Chand*, 5 C.W.N. 332. Theft of a box and a bicycle from one person committed at the same time is one offence—*Bijoy v. Satish*, 21 Cr.L.J. 682 (Cal.).

747. Separate charge :—For every distinct offence there shall be a separate charge. Even though the offences have been committed in the same transaction, there should be a distinct charge for each distinct offence, though they can be tried together under sec. 235—*Gul Mahomed v. Cheharu*, 10 C.W.N. 53, *Emp. v. Fathu*, 26 All. 195. See also the cases cited under heading 'what are distinct offences' above. In almost all these cases, it has been held that the framing of one charge in respect of several distinct offences is not merely an irregularity but an illegality, and the conviction on such a charge must be set aside. But in *Moharuddi v. Jadunath*, 11 C.W.N. 54, *Musai v. K. E.*, 41 Cal. 66; *Ram Subheg v. K. E.*, 19 C.W.N. 972; *Radhanath v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 94; *Aigar v. K. E.*, 32 C.W.N. 839 (842); and *Tamez Khan v. Rajabali*, 31 C.W.N. 337, 28 Cr.L.J. 347, it was held that the error in framing one charge was an error in form rather than of substance, and did not amount to an illegality, but a mere irregularity curable by sec. 537. In a petty case, the irregularity of the Magistrate in specifying three distinct offences (committed in the same transaction) in one head of charge, instead of framing three separate charges, may be excused under sec. 537, where the accused has not been prejudiced—*Bachhu v. Pyara*, 2 Luck. 430, 28 Cr.L.J. 409.

Alternative charges for contradictory statements :—Where a person was charged in the alternative with having made two contradictory statements, one to a public servant, and another, contradicting the first, on oath before a Magistrate, and was convicted in the alternative either under sec. 182 or under sec. 193 I. P. C., the Magistrate being unable to find which of them was false, it was held that the charge was not made in accordance with this section, there were two distinct offences of which two separate charges were necessary—*Q. E. v. Ramji*, 10 Bom. 124. But now see section 236, and illustration (b) to that section.

748. Joint trial illegal :—The accused was charged and tried at one trial for several distinct offences extending over more than one year, and the Full Bench held that this was an irregularity curable by sec. 537. But the Privy Council has laid down that the disobedience of an express provision of law is not a mere irregularity curable by sec. 537, but an illegality, and that such illegality cannot be made good even if there is enough left upon the indictment upon which a conviction might have been supported—*Subrahmania Aiyar*, 25 Mad. 61 (P.C.). This decision overrules 28 Cal. 7, 12 Mad. 273, 27 Cal. 839, and 11 Mad. 441, in which it was held that such a joint trial was a mere irregularity which could be cured by sec. 537.

Persons charged with offences committed in the course of separate transactions are entitled to separate trials. A joint trial is illegal and must be set aside—*Paw Tha v. K. E.*, 3 L.B.R. 250; *Shankar v. K.*

11 A.L.J. 188; *Krishnasami v. Emp.*, 26 Mad. 125. The joint trial of several persons charged with rioting together with other persons charged with criminal trespass is absolutely illegal—*Q. E. v. Chandi Singh*, 14 Cal. 395

Where the Magistrate heard the prosecution against several persons (charged with distinct offences) together and afterwards called upon them to plead separately in defence, it was held that such a trial was in substance a joint trial of all the prisoners, and therefore illegal, and a retrial was ordered—*Paw Tha v. K. E.*, 3 L.B.R. 280, 11 Cr.L.J. 417. So also, where the Magistrate framed distinct charges and numbered them as distinct cases, but when the witnesses came to be cross-examined, he lost sight of the necessity of keeping the two trials separate, and allowed the witnesses to be cross-examined promiscuously in respect of both the charges, it was held that the joint trial offended against the provisions of this section and the illegality could not be cured by sec. 537—*Public Prosecutor v. Kadiri Koya*, 39 Mad. 527, 29 M.L.J. 101, 16 Cr.L.J. 593

"Except .. Sections 234" etc. :—The broad rule enunciated in sec. 233 (*viz.* that for every distinct offence there should be a separate charge, and every charge should be tried separately) is made subject to four exceptions. But a Court cannot and ought not to treat a case as an exception to the general rule, unless it is satisfied that in the case before it the charge should be within one of the four exceptions; and it would be safer if the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge recorded in his charge-sheet or judgment his reasons for treating the case as falling under one of the exceptions—*Shankar v. K. E.*, 11 A.L.J. 188, 14 Cr.L.J. 116.

749. Counter cases.—It is illegal to try two counter cases between the same parties at one and the same trial, and a conviction at such a trial must be set aside, even though the cross cases were so tried together with the consent of the parties—*Mamsa v. Emp.*, 13 Bur. L.T. 245, 22 Cr.L.J. 707. But a simultaneous trial of two counter cases is not the same thing as a joint trial, and is not prohibited by this section or by section 239. In certain cases and under certain circumstances a simultaneous trial may be irregular and improper, but that will not entitle the accused to have the whole trial set aside unless it is clearly shown that the procedure adopted has prejudiced him in his defence—*Dhako v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 498, 21 Cr.L.J. 739. The proper course is to try the one case after the other. But both the cases must be tried by one and the same Magistrate. The simultaneous trial of two counter cases in two different Courts over one and the same occurrence is undesirable and unsatisfactory—*Sheikh Samir v. Beni Madhab*, 37 C.L.J. 410; *Judhisthir v. Sheik Samir*, 27 C.W.N. 700.

234. (1) When a person is accused of more offences than one of the same kind committed within the space of twelve months from the first to the last of such offences, *whether in respect of*

Three offences of same kind within year may be charged together.

the same person or not, he may be charged with and tried at one trial for any number of them not exceeding three.

(2) Offences are of the same kind when they are punishable with the same amount of punishment under the same section of the Indian Penal Code or any special or local law :

Provided that, for the purpose of this section an offence punishable under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code shall be deemed to be an offence of the same kind as an offence punishable under Section 380 of the said Code, and that an offence punishable under any section of the Indian Penal Code, or of any special or local law, shall be deemed to be an offence of the same kind as an attempt to commit such offence, when such an attempt is an offence.

Change .—The italicised words have been added by sec. 62 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. The reasons are stated below

750. Object of section .—Secs. 234, 235 etc., are exceptions to the broad and general rule enunciated in sec. 233. The object of these exceptions is to avoid the necessity of the same witnesses giving the same evidence two or three times over in different trials, and to join in one trial those offences with regard to which the evidence would overlap. But even when several criminal acts can be included in the same transaction (sec. 235), no joinder of trials should be permitted which will result in bewildering the accused in his defence—*Crown v. Gulam*, 1 S L R. 73, ■ Cr.L.J. 191 (195). "The reason of the provision (i.e. the provision contained in sec. 234) is obviously in order that the jury may not be prejudiced by the multitude of charges, and the inconvenience of the hearing together of a large number of instances of culpability and the consequent embarrassment both to Judges and accused"—*Subrahmanya Ayyar v. K E*, 25 Mad 61 (P C).

The provisions of sec. 234, Cr. P. Code, limiting the number of charges to three are particularly wise and salutary. The object of those provisions is to prevent any risk of the Court being satisfied by anything less than complete proof of the offences charged, and if the attention of the Court is limited to three offences, it is not very likely that it will be satisfied with anything less than full proof. But where a great number of charges are brought against an accused person, it might very often happen (particularly in cases tried by Judges) that the accused may be convicted not on actual proof of a particular offence, but more on suspicion and reputation owing to the fact that in a great number of cases offences are half proved against him. It is therefore very important that the Magistrates framing charges particularly in offences relating to criminal mis-

appropriation and receiving stolen property should pay attention to this provision of the law. They should be very careful to see that only three specific offences are charged against the accused if it is to be decided to bring the charge against him in such a manner and under such a section that it is necessary to specify the specific offences—*Hyder v. Emp.*, 20 S.L.R. 3, 27 Cr.L.J. 32.

751. Scope of section :—This section says that the trial must be limited to three offences, it does not say that the trial must be limited to three charges. The same offence may be charged under different sections of the I P C and any number of such charges can be tried in one and the same trial—*Emp v Tribhuvan*, 33 Bom. 71.

Again, this section simply limits the number of offences that can be tried in one trial. But this does not mean that the prisoner cannot be tried separately in one day for more than three distinct offences of the same kind committed during the year—*Emp. v. Dhanonjoy*, 3 Cal 540. So where the prosecution chooses under sec. 222 (2) and the proviso thereof to prosecute for some out of the different amounts misappropriated during the year, they are not estopped by sec. 403 from instituting any further prosecution in respect of any fresh items misappropriated during the same period—*Emp. v. Kashinath*, 12 Bom.L.R. 226; *Nagendra Nath v Emp.*, 50 Cal. 632, 27 C.W.N. 578, 38 C.L.J. 286.

Moreover, this section refers to trial and not to commitment. Where the Magistrate committed the accused to the Sessions on six charges of criminal breach of trust, and three of falsification of accounts, all the offences having been committed within a year, it was held that the order of committal was not illegal but merely irregular, and the irregularity could be cured by the Sessions Judge trying the charges separately—*Krishna Murthi v. Emp.*, (1916) 2 M.W.N. 179, 17 Cr.L.J. 369.

This section contemplates a joint trial for offences committed within one year; if the offences extend over a period exceeding one year, the joinder of charges is illegal—*Dhanjibhoy v Karim Khan*, 1905 P.R. 14.

This section applies where a person is accused of more offences than one; it does not apply where a person is charged for one offence only e.g. an offence under sec. 401 I P. C. (belonging to a gang of persons associated for the purpose of habitually committing theft) and the trial is not therefore illegal if the period over which the association extends exceeds one year—*Kasem Ali v Emp.*, 47 Cal 154, 31 C.L.J. 192, 21 Cr.L.J. 386.

And lastly, this section refers to offences and not to transactions. It does not provide that all offences committed in a year in three different transactions may be tried in one trial—*Gehimal v. Crown*, 10 S.L.R. 192, 18 Cr.L.J. 664; *Kasi Viswanathan v. Emp.*, 30 Mad 328. The operation of the two sections 234 and 235 cannot be combined; and therefore a joint trial in respect of two sets of separate and independent transactions in which different offences have been committed, is not permissible. Thus where two girls were kidnapped on different occasions, and were taken off as girls belonging to a high caste and married to persons who

gave money in return, the offences of kidnapping and cheating with respect to each of the girls should not be tried jointly with the other—*Faujdar v. K. E.*, 48 All. 236, 24 A.L.J. 239, 27 Cr.L.J. 143.

752. Offences committed by several persons :—This section does not apply where several persons committing offences of the same kind are jointly charged; to such a case sec. 239 clause (c) will apply. The present section applies to the trial of one accused only—*Budhai v. Emp.*, 33 Cal. 292, *Tulsi v. Crown*, 1917 P.R. 17, 18 Cr.L.J. 282; *Sayad Lal v. Emp.*, 20 Cr.L.J. 7 (Nag.); *Nga San v. Emp.*, 21 Cr.L.J. 794 (Bur.); *Ram Prasad v. K. E.*, 19 A.L.J. 796, 22 Cr.L.J. 657. In *Kailash v. Emp.*, 3 P.L.J. 124, 111 Cr.L.J. 673, however it has been held that the word 'person' is to have its ordinary and natural meaning as defined by the General Clauses Act, and is not to be restricted to the singular number. Such a laboured interpretation would no longer be necessary because clause (c) of section 239 now expressly makes provision for the joint trial of several persons committing offences of the same kind within the period of one year.

753. Offences of the same kind :—See subsection (2) for the definition of this expression. Where a person is found in possession of several items of stolen property, he has committed 'offences of the same kind' under sec. 411 I.P.C., and they do not cease to be so merely because the stolen articles are of very diverse character (e.g. stamps, carpets, buckets, padlocks)—*K. E. v. Bishun Singh*, 3 Pat 503 (519), 5 P.L.T. 319, 25 Cr.L.J. 738.

The following are not offences of the same kind—Adultery and bigamy—*Reg. v. Vilhaye*, *Ratanlal 4*, Falsification of accounts and criminal breach of trust—*Kasi Viswanathan v. Emp.*, 30 Mad. 328, Murder and hurt—*Shankar v. K. E.*, 11 A.L.J. 188; Forgery and giving false evidence—*Gehmal v. Crown*, 10 S.L.R. 192. For other examples, see Note 745 in sec. 233, under heading "Distinct offences."

754. Not exceeding three :—An accused can only be charged and tried at one trial for any number of offences of the same kind not exceeding three, committed within the space of a year. Every act of falsification of a book of account would amount to an offence under this section, and not more than three of such offences can be tried together—*Q. E. v. Mati*, 26 Cal. 560; *Emp. v. Salimullah*, 32 All. 57, *Raman Behari v. Emp.*, 41 Cal. 722; *In re Chakrakodi*, 44 M.L.J. 67, 24 Cr.L.J. 462; *Fitzmaurice v. Emp.*, 27 Cr.L.J. 793, 41 R. 1926 Lah. 193. One charge under sec. 124A I.P.C. in respect of one article in a newspaper, one charge under sec. 124A I.P.C. in respect of the same article, and a third charge under sec. 124A I.P.C. in respect of another article, can be tried together—*In re Bal Gangadhar Tilak*, 33 Bom. 221.

The joinder, at one trial, of 41 charges of extortion committed during a period of 2 years, contravenes the provisions of sec. 234, and is an illegality not curable by sec. 537—*Subrahmanya Ayyar v. K. E.* 25 Mad. 61 (P.C.) Where an accused was charged at one trial with criminal breach of trust with respect to seventeen sums of money and also under

sec. 477A in respect of distinct offences in excess of three, it was held that the course adopted was illegal—*Emp. v. Nathulal*, 4 Bom.L.R. 433. The joinder of charges of three offences under section 411 I. P. C. and three offences under sec. 414 I. P. C. is bad—*Chetto Kalwar v. Emp.*, 49 Cal 555. A charge under sec. 411 I. P. C. of having received six specific animals belonging to five specific persons and stolen by five different acts of theft, is illegal and wholly vitiates the trial—*Hyder v. Emp.*, 20 S L R 3, 27 Cr.L.J. 32. Three offences of forgery under sec. 477A and three offences of criminal breach of trust under sec. 408 I. P. C. committed in the course of similar but separate transactions cannot all be lumped together in one charge and jointly tried—*Sheo Saran Lal v. K. E.*, 32 All 219. If a man is charged with three alternative charges of embezzlement or abetment thereof, the charge is really for six offences and entirely illegal—*Janeshar v. Emp.*, 51 All. 544, 30 Cr.L.J. 687 (689). Six distinct and separate charges of falsification of six separate and distinct accounts cannot be tried together—*Krishna Lal v. Emp.*, 45 C.L.J. 1, 28 Cr.L.J. 291. Three distinct offences of criminal breach of trust and three distinct offences of falsification of accounts though in respect of the same items cannot be tried together—*Emp. v. Manant*, 49 Bom 892, 27 Bom L R 1343, 27 Cr L.J. 305; *Kasi Viswanthan v. Emp.*, 30 Mad. 328. Such a joint trial cannot be justified even under sec. 235, because there are three defalcations committed on different occasions, and the false entries connected with one defalcation cannot be said to form part of the same transaction with the other defalcations and falsifications—*Emp. v. Manant (supra)*. Three charges of criminal breach of trust in respect of three items of money and a charge of falsification of accounts in order to conceal the defalcations cannot be legally tried at one and the same trial—*Emp. v. Shujaiddin*, 44 All. 540 (following 32 All 219). Three charges of criminal misappropriation (sec. 409 I. P. C.) and a charge under sec. 210 I. P. C. cannot be tried together—*K. E. v. Rajendra*, 22 C.W N 596, 19 Cr L.J. 868. Where the accused was tried under secs 211, 409 and 466 I. P. C. on eight counts, the trial was held to be illegal—*Avadh Behari v. Emp.*, 20 Cr.L.J. 784 (All.).

Illegality cannot be cured by striking off a charge—A trial of the accused for four offences is altogether illegal, and the illegality cannot be cured by the Judge striking out one of the charges after the trial has closed—*Manavala v. Emp.*, 29 Mad 569, *Chetto v. Emp.*, 49 Cal 555; *Fitzmaurice v. Emp.*, 27 Cr L.J. 793 (Lah.). Although the Judge has power under sec. 227 to alter a charge before judgment is pronounced, still he cannot cure an illegality—*Manavala, supra*. But the Judge can strike off a charge *before the trial begins*, as was done in the case of *Bal Gangadhar Tilak*, 33 Bom 221, where in the trial before the High Court Sessions, four charges were at first framed against the accused, but the Advocate General withdrew one of the charges, and then the trial proceeded on three charges.

755. Offences against several persons :—There was a conflict of opinion as to whether this section applied where the offences were committed against several persons. In the following cases it was

held that the words 'offences of the same kind' were not limited to offences against the same person; an accused could be charged with and tried in the same trial for offences of the same kind though committed against different persons—*Chhatradhari v. Emp.*, 43 Cal 13, 19 C.W.N. 557; *Babu Lal v. K. E.*, 2 P.L.J. 209; *Manu Miya v. Emp.*, 9 Cal 371; *In re Raja Rao*, 20 M.L.T. 234, 17 Cr L.J. 479; *Emp. v. Bechan*, 38 All. 457; *Emp. v. Jagardeo*, 38 All 458 (Note), *Shri Bhagwan v Emp*, 13 C.W.N. 507, *Q E v. Dhondi*, Ratanlal 331, *Krishnayya v. Emp.*, 20 Cr L.J. 71 (Nag.), *Nga Po v K. E.*, 11 L.B.R. 45. But the contrary view was taken in some other cases. Thus, it was held in a Madras case that the offences of extorting bribes from three different persons could not be charged and tried together—*Venkata*, 2 Weir 299. So also in a Calcutta case the joint trial of three complaints by three complainants alleging against the accused three offences of the same kind was held to be illegal—*Nanda Kumar v Emp*, 11 C.W.N. 1128. See also *Asghar Ali v. Emp.*, 40 Cal 846.

In order to remove this conflict of opinion, the words "whether in respect of the same person or not" have been added in sub-section (1) "We have inserted words in section 234 (1) which will at all events make it clear that an accused person may be charged at one trial with three offences of the same kind though committed against different persons. The addition will, we think, cover the difficulty which has been referred to in most cases"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*. Thus, where an accused person was charged with having deceitfully induced three separate persons on three different occasions in the same month to deliver property to him under circumstances which amounted to offences under sec 420 I. P. Code, held that having regard to the amended provisions of sec. 234, there was no misjoinder of charges, and that the joint trial was perfectly legal—*Farzand Ali v. Emp*, 27 Cr L.J. 909 (Pat.)

Proviso :—"We have also added a proviso to section 234 (2); which, we think, is required. Sections 379 and 380, Indian Penal Code, refer to theft and theft in a building which should clearly be treated as offences of the same kind; and we think that it should also be provided specifically that an attempt to commit an offence, where such an attempt is penalized by any law, is of the same kind as the actual offence"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*.

This proviso overrules *Rahiman v Mobarak*, 20 C.W.N. 672 and *Hari Singh v. Emp.*, 20 Cr.L.J. 751 (Nag) where it was held that theft in a building (sec 380 I. P. C.) and theft of paddy in a field (sec 379 I. P. C.) were not offences of the same kind

235. (1) If, in one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction, more offences than one are committed by the same person, he

Trial for more than one offence.

may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, every such offence.

(2) If the acts alleged constitute an offence falling within two or more separate definitions of any law in force for the time being by which offences are defined or punished, the person accused of them may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, each of such offences.

(3) If several acts, of which one or more than one would by itself or themselves constitute an offence, constitute when combined a different offence, the person accused of them may be charged with and tried at one trial for the offence constituted by such acts when combined, and for any offence constituted by any one, or more, of such acts.

(4) Nothing contained in this section shall affect the Indian Penal Code, Section 71.

Illustrations.

to sub-section (1)—

(a) A rescues B, a person in lawful custody and in so doing causes grievous hurt to C, a constable in whose custody B was. A may be charged with and convicted of offences under Sections 225 and 333 of the Indian Penal Code.

(b) A commits house-breaking by day with intent to commit adultery, and commits in the house so entered adultery with B's wife. A may be separately charged with, and convicted of, offences under Sections 454 and 497 of the Indian Penal Code.

(c) A entices B, the wife of C, away from C, with intent to commit adultery with B, and then commits adultery with her. A may be separately charged with, and convicted of, offences under Sections 498 and 497 of the Indian Penal Code.

(d) A has in his possession several seals, knowing them to be counterfeit and intending to use them for the purpose of committing several forgeries punishable under Section 466 of the Indian Penal Code. A may be separately charged with, and convicted of, the possession of each seal under Section 473 of the Indian Penal Code.

(e) With intent to cause injury to B, A institutes a criminal proceeding against him, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding; and also falsely accuses B of

having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such charges. A may be separately charged with, and convicted of, two offences under section 211 of the Indian Penal Code.

(f) A, with intent to cause injury to B, falsely accuses him of having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such charge. On the trial A gives false evidence against B, intending thereby to cause B to be convicted of a capital offence. A may be separately charged with, and convicted of, offences under sections 211 and 194 of the Indian Penal Code.

(g) A, with six others, commits the offences of rioting, grievous hurt and assaulting a public servant endeavouring in the discharge of his duty as such to suppress the riot. A may be separately charged with, and convicted of, offences under sections 147, 325 and 152 of the Indian Penal Code

(h) A threatens B, C and D at the same time with injury to their persons with intent to cause alarm to them. A may be separately charged with, and convicted of, each of the three offences under section 506 of the Indian Penal Code

The separate charges referred to in Illustrations (a) to (h) respectively may be tried at the same time.

to sub-section (2)—

(i) A wrongfully strikes B with a cane. A may be separately charged with, and convicted of, offences under sections 352 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code.

(j) Several stolen sacks of corn are made over to A and B, who know they are stolen property, for the purpose of concealing them. A and B thereupon voluntarily assist each other to conceal the sacks at the bottom of a grain pit. A and B may be separately charged with, and convicted of, offences under sections 411 and 414 of the Indian Penal Code.

(k) A exposes her child with the knowledge that she is thereby likely to cause its death. The child dies in consequence of such exposure. A may be separately charged with, and convicted of, offences under sections 317 and 304 of the Indian Penal Code.

(l) A dishonestly uses a forged document as genuine evidence, in order to convict B, a public servant, of an offence under section 167 of the Indian Penal Code. A may be separately charged with, and convicted of, offences under sections 471 (read with 466) and 196 of the same Code

to sub-section (3)—

(m) A commits robbery on B, and in doing so voluntarily causes hurt to him. A may be separately charged with, and

convicted of, offences under sections 323, 392 and 394 of the Indian Penal Code.

755A. Scope :—This section must not be taken as controlled by the words "not exceeding three" occurring in sec. 234; there is nothing in this section to warrant the rule that not more than three offences can be combined even if those offences have been committed in the same transaction—*Sanuman v. Emp.*, 10 A.L.J. 392, 22 Cr.L.J. 641. If the offences are committed in the course of the same transaction, a charge is not illegal by reason of containing more than three offences spread over a period longer than a year—*In re Gam Mallu*, 49 Mad. 74, 48 M.L.J. 308, A.I.R. 1925 Mad 690, 26 Cr.L.J. 1513.

This section permits a joinder of charges in respect of offences arising out of the same transaction. If two distinct offences are lumped together in one charge, instead of framing two charges, it is a mere irregularity curable by sec. 537—*Abdul Rahman v. K. E.*, 4 Bur.L.J. 213, 27 Cr.L.J. 669; *Ram Subheg v. K. E.*, 19 C.W.N. 972, 16 Cr.L.J. 641; *Bachcha v. Piyara*, 2 Luck. 430, 4 O.W.N. 341, 28 Cr.L.J. 409.

The joinder of a charge under sec. 504 I. P. Code with a charge under sec. 20, Cattle Trespass Act is not illegal, where the two offences form parts of the same transaction—*Deenadayalu v. Ratna*, 50 Mad. 841, 52 M.L.J. 251, 28 Cr.L.J. 301.

756. Same transaction :—"The expression 'same transaction' used in secs. 235 and 239 is an expression which from its very nature is incapable of exact definition, and must have been advisedly used because it had this quality. That during the years since the expression first appeared in the Statute Book, the combined wisdom of all the High Courts in India has failed to definitely fix its meaning, is sufficiently convincing that the task is impossible. The illustrations, however, make sufficiently clear the intention of the legislature"—*per Crouch A.J.C. in Crown v. Ghulam*, 1 S.L.R. 73, 11 Cr.L.J. 191 (195). "We think it would be dangerous, if not impossible, to attempt any definition of the phrase 'in the course of the same transaction.' An exhaustive definition is not feasible, and if the phraseology is altered, the Courts would be deprived of the guidance which they now have from a long series of rulings on the point. We do not find that there has been any pronounced conflict of opinion, the reason being that the Courts, instead of attempting to lay down general principles, as a rule discuss each case on its merits."—*Report of the Joint Committee (1922).*

The question whether the acts are so connected together as to form part of the same transaction is a question of fact in each particular case—*Tamez Khan v. Rajabali*, 31 C.W.N. 337; and the area of facts covered by the expression 'same transaction' varies with the circumstances of each case—*Crown v. Ghulam*, 1 S.L.R. 73, 11 Cr.L.J. 191 (200); *Woodward v. Emp.*, 18 S.L.R. 199, 27 Cr.L.J. 257. No comprehensive formula of universal application can be stated to determine whether two or more acts constitute the same transaction, but circumstances which must bear on the determination of the question in an individual case can be indicated;

they are : proximity of time, unity or proximity of place, continuity of action and community of purpose or design—*Amrita Lal v. K. E.*, 42 Cal. 957; *Emp. v. Madhab Laxman*, 43 Bom. 147, 20 Bom.L.R. 607; *Kushai Mallik v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 1004 (1008); *Banga Chandra v. Anando*, 35 C.L.J. 527; *Tamez Khan v. Rajabali*, 31 C.W.N. 337. Those criminal acts which are in English and Indian law regarded as subsidiary to an offence are included in the 'same transaction' as the offence. If a series of acts are connected together by proximity of time, community of criminal intention, continuity of action and purpose and such subsidiary acts as would make the co-accused *perceptus criminis* or an accessory after the fact, or by the relation of cause and effect, as to constitute, in the opinion of the Court, one transaction, then the accused may be tried at one trial for every offence committed in such series of acts—*Crown v. Ghulam*, 1 S.L.R. 73, 8 Cr.L.J. 191 (195, 196). *Emp. v. Lukman*, 21 S.L.R. 107, 27 Cr.L.J. 1233 (1239). The most essential tests are continuity of action and community of purpose—*In re Choragudi Venkatadri*, 33 Mad. 502; *Virupana v. Emp.*, 28 M.L.J. 397, *Ram Subheg v. K. E.*, 19 C.W.N. 972, *Emp. v. Datto Hanmant*, 30 Bom. 49, *Pahlad v. Emp.*, 1 Lah. 562; *Tepanidhi v. K. E.*, 5 P.L.J. 11, *In re Lockley*, 43 Mad. 411. The real and substantial test for determining whether several offences are so connected together as to form one and the same transaction depends upon whether they are related together in point of purpose, or as cause and effect, or as principal and subsidiary acts, as to constitute one continuous action—*Emp. v. Sherufalli*, 27 Bom. 135, *Sanuman v. Emp.*, 19 A.L.J. 392, 22 Cr.L.J. 641; *Krishna Aiyar v. Emp.*, 8 L.W. 225, 1918 M.W.N. 525; *Hari Raot*, 2 N.L.R. 147, 4 Cr.L.J. 420; *Gunwant v. Emp.*, 13 N.L.R. 35, 18 Cr.L.J. 339 (342); *Emp. v. Nga Lu*, 19 Cr.L.J. 34 (Bur.); *Woodward v. Emp.*, 18 S.L.R. 199, 27 Cr.L.J. 257, *Husainbibi v. Emp.*, 20 S.L.R. 74, 27 Cr.L.J. 456.

When a proposal for a boycott is made by the President of an Association, and shortly afterwards the secretary and a member of that Association take joint action to boycott the person against whom the resolution is directed, the inference is that they are acting in furtherance of a common purpose, or in other words, that they are taking part in a conspiracy. Acts done in pursuance of such a conspiracy must be deemed to be parts of the same transaction—*K. E. v. Maung Aung*, 1 Rang. 604, 2 Bur.L.J. 224.

Mere proximity of time between two acts does not necessarily constitute them as parts of the same transaction—*Son Daik v. Crown*, 1 L.B.R. 361, *Nga Tha v. Emp.*, 1 Bur.L.T. 101, 13 Cr.L.J. 485. The test to be applied to find out whether a series of acts form part of the same transaction is not so much the proximity of time as the community of purpose or progressive action towards a single object—*Legal Remembrancer v. Monmohan*, 19 C.W.N. 672; *Kushai v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 1004, *Pahlad v. Emp.*, 1 Lah. 562, 21 Cr.L.J. 626, *Emp. v. Hari Raot*, 2 N.L.R. 147, 4 Cr.L.J. 420; *Gunwant v. Emp.*, 13 N.L.R. 35, 18 Cr.L.J. 339 (342); *In re Gam Malla*, 49 Mad. 74, 48 M.L.J. 308, 26 Cr.L.J. 1513, *Patit Paban v. Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 369 (Cal.); and a mere interval of time between the

commission of one offence and another does not necessarily import want of continuity, though the length of the interval may be an important element in determining the question of the connection between the two—*Emp. v. Sherufali*, 27 Bom. 135, 4 Bom.L.R. 930; *Pahlad v. Emp.*, 1 Lah. 562; *Kushal v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 1004; *Virupana v. Emp.*, 28 M.L.J. 397. A series of acts separated by intervals are not excluded from the 'same transaction,' if the accused started together for the same goal—*Emp. v. Datto Hanmant*, 30 Bom. 49; *Emp. v. Ganesh Narain*, 14 Bom. L.R. 972, 13 Cr.L.J. 833.

Where two acts were committed on different dates, and there was no connection between the two so as to make them the same transaction, a joint trial is illegal—*Shafi v. Emp.*, 21 A.L.J. 859, 25 Cr.L.J. 964, A.I.R. 1924 All. 211.

757. Instances of 'same transaction':—(1) Theft of a cart from one house, and theft of two bullocks from another house in order to remove the cart—*Emp. v. Hari Rao*, 2 N.L.R. 147, 4 Cr.L.J. 420

(2) Cheating by false personation, forging a letter to support the false personation, and further cheating on the strength of that forged letter—*Emp. v. Sri Narain*, 11 C.W.N. 715.

(3) Receiving stolen property, and assisting to conceal that property—*Emp. v. Mian Jan*, 28 All. 313.

(4) Criminal breach of trust, and giving false evidence to screen the breach of trust—*Nga Po Ke v. Emp.*, U.B.R. (1897-1901) 31.

(5) Theft at the same time of two bullocks belonging to two owners tied at the yoke of a cart—*Q. E. v. Krishna Shahaji*, Ratanlal 927.

(6) Rioting, and causing hurt in the riot—*Q. E. v. Dungan Singh*, 7 All. 29.

(7) Conspiracy to wage war, and concealing the existence of such conspiracy from the authorities—*Barindra v. Emp.*, 37 Cal. 467, 14 C.W.N. 1114.

(8) Dacoity in one place, and murder of a person in another place who had found out the dacoits—*Emp. v. Punya*, 4 Bom.L.R. 789.

(9) Extortion, and false personation of a public servant in order to commit that extortion—*Q. E. v. Wazir Jan*, 10 All. 58.

(10) Wrongful confinement of several persons on two occasions for the same purpose, viz for extortion of money—*Dy. Supdt. and Legal Remembrancer v. Kailash*, 42 Cal. 760, 19 C.W.N. 181.

(11) Forgery, abetment of forgery, and use of the forged document in a Civil Court—*Emp. v. Jivram*, 40 Bom. 97, 17 Bom.L.R. 881, 16 Cr.L.J. 761.

(12) Causing grievous hurt to a person (for extorting confession) who died of the injuries, and making false entries in the official records attributing another cause for the death of that person—*Emp. v. Balwant*, 14 Bom.L.R. 41, 13 Cr.L.J. 137.

(13) Conspiracy to commit an offence, and the commission of that offence in pursuance of the conspiracy—*Amrita Lal v. Emp.*, 42 Cal. 957.

19 C.W.N. 676, *Legal Remembrancer v. Monmohan*, 19 C.W.N. 672, 16 Cr.L.J. 3; *Abdul Rahman v. K. E.*, 4 Bur.L.J. 213, 27 Cr.L.J. 669.

(14) Criminal misappropriation or breach of trust, and falsification of accounts in order to screen the misappropriation—*Emp. v. Jiban Krishna*, 40 Cal. 318; *Mangal Sein v. Emp.*, 11 Lah.L.J. 384, 30 Cr.L.J. 958. Thus where a police officer, who took charge of certain ornaments of a deceased lady, misappropriated those ornaments and altered the entries in the police diary regarding the ornaments and substituted some fresh pages to show that the ornaments were never placed in his charge, held that he could be tried for offences under secs. 218, 409 and 477A I. P. C. as they were committed in the same transaction—*Bilas Chandra v. Emp.*, 27 C.W.N. 626

(15) Rioting, causing hurt to one person in the riot, and causing hurt to another person in the same riot—*Katwari v. Emp.*, 39 All. 623, 15 A.L.J. 594, 18 Cr.L.J. 788

(16) Criminal breach of trust, and falsification of accounts made to conceal the breach of trust—*Emp. v. Jagatram*, 19 Cr.L.J. 987 (Pun.).

(17) Illegal possession of opium, and illegal possession of cocaine for the purpose of carrying on business of selling contraband—*Emp. v. Nga Lu*, 19 Cr.L.J. 34 (Bur.).

(18) A charge of receiving stolen property can be joined with a charge of cheating, if a common purpose ran through these acts—*In re Lockley*, 43 Mad. 411, 38 M.L.J. 209.

(19) Possession of stencil plates for the purpose of counterfeiting trade-marks (sec. 485 I.P.C.), selling goods to which a counterfeited trade-mark was affixed (sec. 486 I. P. C.), and possession of such goods for the purpose of selling them (sec. 486 I. P. C.)—*Emp. v. Sherufalli*, 27 Bom. 135

(20) Kidnapping a minor girl with intent to marry her to somebody (Sec 366 I P C), and cheating somebody by false representation and inducing him to take the girl in marriage and to part with money in consideration of marriage with the girl (Sec 420 I P C)—*Husainbibi v. Emp.*, 20 M.L.R. 74, 27 Cr.L.J. 456

758. Acts not forming same transaction—(1) Kidnapping a boy, and after a day or two, assaulting the boy's mother who came to demand of the boy—*Chakutty v. Emp.*, 26 Mad 454

(2) Misappropriation of money payable to a Railway Company for goods to be taken delivery of, and on a different day inducing the Railway Company to deliver the goods—*Parmeshwar v. Emp.*, 13 C.W.N. 1089

(3) Criminal trespass into the house of the complainant, and assault on the complainant on a subsequent day while he was going to inform the Police of the criminal trespass—*Nga Tha v. Emp.*, 5 Bur.L.T. 101, 13 Cr.L.J. 485; see also *Virupana v. Emp.*, 28 M.L.J. 397, 16 Cr.L.J. 323.

(14) Mischief and insult caused on two different days—*K. E. v. Maung Gale*, 3 L.B.R. 113

(5) Murder and causing evidence of murder to disappear—*Savara Sankadu*, 2 Weir 301.

(6) Dishonest receipt of each stolen article on each occasion is a separate offence, and such receipts of more than three of such articles (sec. 234) cannot be tried together, unless the dishonest receipts were so connected as to form one transaction—*Ram Sarup v. Emp.*, 9 C.W.N. 1027. See Note 746 under sec. 233.

(7) Criminal misappropriation, and falsification of accounts relating to another distinct act of misappropriation—*Emp v. Jagatram*, 19 Cr L.J. 987 (Lah.)

(8) Four distinct offences committed at different times at different places and against different persons—*Ghasi Ram v. Sukra*, 18 Cr L.J. 739 (Pat.). Theft of eight necklaces at different periods extending over two years, though from the same person—*Raman Lal v. Emp.*, 49 All 312, 28 Cr L.J. 171

(9) Forgery and giving false evidence in respect of service of summons, and false evidence in respect of service of another summons on a different occasion—*Gehimal v. Crown*, 10 S.L.R. 192, 18 Cr.L.J. 684

(10) Five murders committed in one day, three in one village in the forenoon, and two in another village in the afternoon, are not so connected together as to represent a series of acts forming the same transaction, and cannot be tried together—*K. E. v. Fauja*, 17 A.L.J. 614, 20 Cr.L.J. 353.

(11) Preparation of false balance-sheet by a Company for the year 1912, and preparation of another false balance-sheet for the year 1913 are quite distinct and separate acts, and according to no possible meaning of the word 'transaction' can it be said that the two acts form parts of the same transaction—*Emp v. Ram Narayan*, 21 Bom.L.R. 732, 20 Cr L.J. 657,

759. Separate trial not illegal :—This is an enabling section, and not imperative. Though it provides for a joint trial of offences committed in the same transaction, yet a separate trial for each of the offences is not illegal—*Ameruddin v. Farid Sarkar*, 8 Cal. 481; *Abdul Hamid v. Emp.*, 6 Pat 208, 27 Cr.L.J. 1100; *Emp. v. Rama Deol*, 30 Bom. L.R. 636, 29 Cr L.J. 981 (1982), *Q. E. v. Ugra*, Ratanlal 307. And a conviction or acquittal in respect of one of the offences is no bar to the trial of another—*Emp. v Baldeo*, 3 A.L.J. 2; *Emp v. Kashinath*, 12 Bom. L.R. 226, 11 Cr.L.J. 337 Where it is likely that the joinder of charges will result in bewildering the accused, such joinder should not be permitted even though the offences were committed in the same transaction—*Crown v. Gulam*, 1 S.L.R. 73, 11 Cr L.J. 191; *Alimuddin v. K. E.*, 52 Cal. 253, 40 C.L.J. 541. Thus, in a recent Calcutta case, where several offences were committed in the same transaction, and a joint trial of several charges was held in the lower court, the High Court, to be on the safe side, upheld the conviction and sentence on only one of the charges, setting aside the conviction on the other charges—*Radha Nath v. Emp.*, 50 Cal 94.

760. Offences requiring sanction :—If, during the course of the same transaction, several offences are committed, some requiring sanction and others not, the accused can be tried for the offences not

requiring sanction, when no sanction has been given for the offences which require sanction—*Krishna Pillai v. Krishna Konun*, 31 Mad. 43.

760A. Subsection (2) :—A person who has dishonestly received stolen property (sec. 411 I. P. C.) can be charged and convicted of voluntarily concealing or disposing of that property (see 414 I. P. C.)—*Emp. v. Abdul Ghani*, 49 Bom. 878, 27 Bom. L R 1373, 27 Cr. L J. 114.

Subsection (3) :—One of the counts in the charge against the accused under trial for waging war (sec. 121 I. P. C.) was that they had committed dacoity under secs. 395 and 397 I P Code. This count failed as being too vague. *Held* that the validity of the conviction under sec. 121 I. P. C. was not affected by the striking off of the conviction for other offences forming component parts of the offence of waging war, and the accused cannot be said to have been prejudiced in their defence on the charge for waging war, as the acts of dacoity were all merely some of a series of incidents which went to make up the continuing offence of waging war within the meaning of sec. 235 (3) Cr P. Code—*In re Gam Mallu*, 49 Mad 74, 26 Cr L J. 1513

761. Section to be read subject to sec. 71 I. P. C. :—(For the text of section 71 I. P. C. see notes under sec. 35 *ante*)—Although in cases falling under sec. 235, a joint trial of several offences may be held, still in awarding punishment, Courts are to be guided by the provisions contained in sec. 71 I P. C. Therefore, where an offence comes within two sections of the I. P. C., the accused may be charged with and tried at one trial for two offences (sub-section 2) but the punishment cannot be cumulative—*Q. E. v. Francis Xavier, Ratanlal* 506; *Reg. v. Dod Basaya*, 11 M H.C.R. 13. So also, where several acts, each of which would by itself constitute an offence, constitute when combined a different offence, the person accused of them may be charged with and tried at one trial for the comprehensive offence or for any one of the offences

But it should be noted that sec. 71 I P C. refers only to cases falling under subsections (2) and (3) of this section and does not provide for cases under sub-section (1). Therefore, where offences are committed in the course of the same transaction but do not fall under sub-section (2) or (3), the Court is not precluded from passing sentence on every such offence—*Q. E. v. Pakura, Ratanlal* 369, *Q. E. v. Wazir Jan*, 10 All 58; *Q. E. v. Nurichan*, 12 Mad 36, *Q. E. v. Pershad*, 7 All. 414, *Loke Nath v. Q. E.*, 11 Cal. 349; *Chandra Kant v. Q. E.* 12 Cal 495, but the principle of sec. 71 I P. C. is to be followed, and the whole punishment should not be more severe than the punishment for the gravest offence provided—*Emp. v. Budh Singh* 2 All 101, *Emp. v. Jubdar*, 6 Cal. 718, *Emp. v. Ajadhas* 2 All 644. Where two offences are so compounded together that one substantive offence can be said to have been committed, there should be only one sentence, viz. for the gravest offence proved, e.g. in cases of abduction of a child with intention to steal from its person, and theft—*In re Noujan*, 7 M H.C.R. 375; house-breaking by night in order to commit theft, and theft—*Reg. v. Tulaya*,

1 Bom. 214; *Q. E. v. Malu*, 23 Bom. 706; *Emp. v. Ajudhia*, 2 All 644; rioting and causing grievous hurt (constructively)—*Q. v. Dina Sheikh*, 10 W.R. 63; *Q. E. v. Bana Punja*, 17 Bom. 260; rioting and murder—*Q. E. v. Muse*, Ratanlal 493; riding a horse furiously and causing hurt to a bystander—*Q. E. v. Lattu*, Ratanlal 159; house trespass with intent to commit assault, and grievous hurt—*Q. v. Basoo*, 2 W.R. 29. In all these cases the whole punishment will be the same as that provided for the graver offence.

236. If a single act or series of acts is of such a

Where it is doubtful nature that it is doubtful which of what offence has been committed several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute, the accused may be charged with having committed all or any of such offences, and any number of such charges may be tried at once; or he may be charged in the alternative with having committed some one of the said offences.

Illustrations.

(a) A is accused of an act which may amount to theft or receiving stolen property or criminal breach of trust or cheating. He may be charged with theft, receiving stolen property, criminal breach of trust and cheating, or he may be charged with having committed theft, or receiving stolen property or criminal breach of trust or cheating.

(b) A states on oath before the Magistrate that he saw B hit C with a club. Before the Sessions Court A states on oath that B never hit C. A may be charged in the alternative and convicted of intentionally giving false evidence, although it cannot be proved which of these contradictory statements was false.

762. Application of section :—This section contemplates a state of facts which constitute a single offence, but where it is doubtful whether the act or acts involved may amount to one or other of several cognate offences—*Q. E. v. Croft*, 23 Cal. 174 (177); *Danodur v. Emp.*, ■ Pat 731, 1929 Cr C 413, *Ganesh v. Emp.*, 5 S.L.R. 16, 12 Cr.L.J. 224 (per Pratt J C). Where it is not at all doubtful which of several offences the facts found would constitute, (e.g. where the facts as disclosed in the proceedings clearly amounted to the commission of acts which would constitute offences under the Excise Act and also offences under the Merchandise Marks Act) this section does not apply—*Croft*, supra; *Akram Ali v. Emp.*, 18 C.L.J. 574. Moreover, this section does not relate to distinct acts, but to a single act or series of acts, where the facts being ascertained it is doubtful which of several sections is applicable—*Sher Shah v. Emp.*, 1887 P.R. 43.

Sec. 236 does not apply where there is any doubt as to the *facts*, but applies where there is a doubt as to the law applicable to certain set of facts which have been proved—*Emp. v. Po Thun*, 7 Rang 96, 30 Cr.L.J. 750, 1929 Cr. C. 356; *Emp. v. Nga Po*, 6 Bur. L.J. 83, A.I.R. 1927 Rang. 254. An alternative charge under this section can be framed only in those cases in which the prosecution cannot establish exclusively any one offence but are able on the facts to exclude the innocence of the accused and to show that the accused must have committed one of two or more offences—*Emp. v. Ganesh*, 55 L.R. 16, 12 Cr.L.J. 224. This section applies where the law applicable to a certain set of facts is doubtful by reason of the nature of the single act or series of acts done, and in which it is charged or found proved that the act or series of acts constitute one or more of several offences, the doubt being on a matter of law only—*Khan Mahamad v. Emp.*, 1887 P.R. 11. The Code only contemplates an alternative finding when the facts are ascertained and it would follow beyond doubt that the facts proved constitute one of two offences under one section of the Penal Code, or when the evidence proves the commission of an offence falling within one of two sections of the Penal Code, and it is doubtful which of such sections is applicable—*Reg v. Dewi*, Ratanlal 20; *Sher Shah v Emp.*, 1887 P.R. 43. This section does not apply where the facts proved raise a doubt as to whether the accused is guilty of any of the charges at all—*Emp v. Khudiram*, 12 C.W.N. 530. Sections 236 and 237 are merely provisions against the defeat of justice on technical grounds. Where an offence is proved by the evidence, but its legal definition is doubtful or has been incorrectly given in the charge, then sec. 236 or sec. 237 may be resorted to. They really deal with instances which the language of sec. 235 might fail to cover—*Mahadeo Gir v. Emp.*, 9 M.L.R. 26, 14 Cr. L.J. 135.

Therefore, this section does not apply where the doubt in the mind of the Judge was not whether on the facts proved the accused's act fell within the purview of sec. 302 or sec. 201 I.P.C. but whether there was sufficient proof that the accused had in fact committed the murder of the deceased or had merely caused evidence of murder to disappear, such a doubt being a doubt as to facts—*Partapa v Crown*, 1913 P.R. 11, 14 Cr.L.J. 664. So also, the section is inapplicable where the doubt exists as to whether the accused had committed murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder, such a doubt being based on facts only—*Khan Mahd. v Emp.*, 1887 P.R. 11. So again, where the accused was charged under two heads of charge with committing dacoity in each of two adjoining houses, and it was doubtful as to which house he entered, an alternative charge that the accused committed dacoity either in A's house or in B's house is illegal—*Reg v Dewi*, Ratanlal 20. Even though the Magistrate frames alternative charges in a case where the facts are in doubt, still he is not entitled, at the conclusion of the trial, to compromise his doubts as to the true facts of the case by convicting in the alternative. He is bound to come to a distinct finding as to the facts, and then only if the law applicable to the facts which he considers to have

been proved is doubtful, he may convict in the alternative—*Emp. v. Po Thin*, 7 Rang. 96, 30 Cr.L.J. 750, 1929 Cr. C. 356

This section only authorises a charge in the alternative when it is doubtful which of the several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute, and not where there may be a doubt as to the facts which constitute *one of the elements* of the offence—*Wafader v. Q E.*, 21 Cal 955; *Nayanulla v. Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 594 (Cal.); *Ganesh v. Emp.*, 5 S.L.R. 16, 12 Cr.L.J. 224 (per Pratt J. C.).

This section does not apply where the two offences are distinct and separate, the one offence being committed subsequent to the other, e.g. the offence of abetment of forgery and the offence of using the forged document. In such a case, the offence of abetment of forgery is complete when the document is written and signed; the use of the forged document is a subsequent act, and is a distinct and separate offence for which the accused is entitled to be separately charged—*Harun Rashid v. Emp.*, 53 Cal. 466, 30 C.W.N. 432, 27 Cr.L.J. 606.

Where the offences are of a cognate nature, e.g. theft and receiving stolen property, charges may be framed alternatively—*Sant Singh v. Emp.*, 1889 P.R. 26. So also, a charge of murder may be joined in the alternative with a charge of causing evidence of murder to disappear—*Begu v. Emp.*, 6 Lah. 226 (P.C.), 30 C.W.N. 581, 26 Cr.L.J. 1059; *Emp. v. Hanmappa*, 25 Bom. L.R. 231, 25 Cr.L.J. 1349; *Andal v. Emp.*, 18 S.L.R. 185, 26 Cr.L.J. 909; *Crown v. Bawa Maghindas*, 4 S.L.R. 474, 11 Cr.L.J. 731. (The contrary view expressed in *Tarap Ali v. Q E.*, 11 Cal. 638, and *Samanta v. Emp.*, 20 C.W.N. 166 is overruled by the Privy Council case of *Begu v. Emp.*, supra). On charges under sec. 489A (counterfeiting a currency note) and sec. 410 (cheating) the High Court directed the conviction to be in the alternative—*Hira v. Emp.*, 15 A.L.J. 587, 18 Cr.L.J. 790.

This section refers to *cognate* offences, such as theft and criminal breach of trust, and does not relate to offences of so distinct a character as murder and theft—*Emp. v. Narottam*, 1888 A.W.N. 85. An alternative charge should not be framed in respect of such distinct offences as offences under secs. 182 and 211 P.C.—*Thakur Singh v. Chattar*, 1910 P.R. 20, 11 Cr.L.J. 420. An alternative charge cannot be framed in respect of distinct offences, nor even in respect of cognate offences when the difference is one of degree, i.e., as to the intention imputed to the accused or as to some circumstances of aggravation. The criminal intention imputed to the accused must be specifically determined and not allowed to remain a subject of doubt in an alternative charge—*Ganesh v. Emp.*, 5 S.L.R. 16, 12 Cr.L.J. 224.

When it is doubtful as to whether the offence was under a certain section of the Penal Code or under a section of any other law (e.g. Post Office Act), the charge should be cumulative. An alternative charge cannot be framed in respect of an offence under the Penal Code and an offence under a special law—*Ganesh v. Emp.*, 5 S.L.R. 16, 12 Cr.L.J. 224. See also *Emp. v. Nga Shwe*, 4 Rang. 355, 27 Cr.L.J. 1360. But

see *Manhari v. K. E.*, 45 Cal. 727 and *Talsi Tehni v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 564, 24 Cr.L.J. 372, where it has been held that a charge under sec. 380 I. P. C. may be framed alternatively with a charge under sec. 54A of the Calcutta Police Act. The Patna High Court also holds that a charge under sec. 16 of the Motor Vehicles Act may be framed alternatively with a charge under sec. 338 I. P. C.—*Maksuddan v. Emp.*, 2 P.L.T. 31.

Where the accused may be charged alternatively under two sections, it is not illegal to charge him under those sections cumulatively. Compare Illustration (a)—*Damodar v. Emp.*, 8 Pat. 731, 1929 Cr. C. 413. Thus it is not illegal to charge an accused both under secs. 380 and 414 I. P. C.—*Damodar*, *supra*.

If charges are framed cumulatively, and such framing of charge is illegal, the illegality cannot be cured by saying that if the charges had been framed alternatively it would have been valid. Thus, a joinder of charges of three offences under section 411 I. P. C. with a charge of three offences under sec. 414 I. P. C. is illegal, because sec. 234 does not allow a joinder of charges of more than three offences, but this illegality cannot be corrected by the argument that if the charges had been framed in the alternative under sec. 236 there would have been no defect in the trial—*Chetto v. Emp.*, 49 Cal. 555, 24 Cr.L.J. 86.

Charges must be separate.—Alternative charges under two sections cannot be combined together in one head of charge. If the Magistrate desires to charge the accused in the alternative, he must frame two separate alternative charges—*Emp. v. Po Thin*, 7 Rang. 96, 30 Cr.L.J. 750, 1929 Cr. C. 356. Thus a charge in the alternative, of embezzlement and abetment thereof, must not be considered as one charge, the provisions of sec. 236 designate them as different charges in the alternation—*Janeshar v. Emp.*, 51 All. 544, 30 Cr.L.J. 687 (689).

763. Contradictory statements.—Illustration (b) shows that contradictory statements constitute the offence of giving false evidence, although it cannot be proved which of the two statements is false.

An alternative charge in respect of two contradictory statements can be framed only when the prosecution is unable to prove which of the two statements is false—*Harnam v. Emp.*, 1890 P.R. 27; *Pub Pro v. Muthu Vannan*, 2 Weir 300. Otherwise two separate charges ought to be framed, one relating to each statement, and such evidence as is procurable should be adduced to prove the falsity of one or other of the two statements—*Pub Pro v. Kali Vannan*, 2 Weir 299.

To attract the applicability of this section and justify a charge in the alternative in respect of contradictory statements, it is essential to remember that it is only when the statements constitute a series of acts that an alternative charge can be framed under this section. Thus, there is a common relation between a police investigation, an inquiry by the Magistrate preliminary to commitment, and a final trial in the Sessions Court; the words 'series of acts' would be applicable to the statements made at these different stages, and an alternative charge can be framed in respect of the statements—*Saleh Shah v. Crown*, 16 S.L.R. 285, 25

Cr.L.J. 1195, A.I.R. 1924 Sind. 1; *Patraji v. Emp.*, 12 O.L.J. 644, 2 O.W.N. 637, 26 Cr.L.J. 1457.

764. Sentence :—When the conviction is in the alternative, the Court should pass the maximum sentence provided for the lesser of the two alternative charges—*Hira v. Emp.*, 15 A.L.J. 587, 18 Cr.L.J. 799; *Sobha Singh v. K. E.*, 1903 P.L.R. 63.

237. (1) If, in the case mentioned in section 236, the accused is charged with one offence and it appears in evidence that he committed a different offence for which he might have been charged under the provisions of that section, he may be convicted of the offence which he is shown to have committed, although he was not charged with it.

(2) (Omitted.)

Illustration.

A is charged with theft; it appears that he committed the offence of criminal breach of trust or that of receiving stolen goods. He may be convicted of criminal breach of trust or of receiving stolen goods (as the case may be), though he was not charged with such offence.

Change —Sub-section (2) has been omitted from this section but has been re-enacted as sub-section (2A) of section 238, as it should be more appropriately placed under that section.

765. Scope of section :—Section 237 has to be read with section 236. It applies to cases where sec. 236 applies. If the facts of the case do not fall under sec. 236, sec. 237 has got no application—*Genu Manji v. K. E.*, 18 C.W.N. 1276, *Harun Rashid v. Emp.*, 53 Cal. 466, 30 C.W.N. 432, 27 Cr.L.J. 606, *Akram Ali v. Emp.*, 15 C.L.J. 574; *Raghunath v. Emp.*, 24 A.L.J. 168, 27 Cr.L.J. 152. It is an enabling section which empowers the Court to convict the accused of offences for which no charge has been framed but for which a charge could have been framed under sec. 236—*Bhowanath v. Emp.*, 4 P.L.W. 40, 19 Cr.L.J. 202.

766. Conviction for different offence :—If on the facts found, of which the accused may be taken to have notice, another offence appears to have been committed by him, and if on those facts it seems doubtful as to which offence the accused has committed, he may be convicted under secs. 236 and 237 of the other offence—*Dibakar v. Saktidhar*, 54 Cal. 476, 31 C.W.N. 527, 28 Cr.L.J. 404. Thus, a person charged with and tried under sec. 411 I. P. C. (receiving stolen property) may be convicted of an offence under sec. 379 I. P. C. (theft)—*Q. E. v. Karim Baksh*, 1888 A.W.N. 116. Similarly, a person charged

with theft may be convicted of receiving stolen property—*In re Kuppam Ambalam*, 17 M.L.J. 219 A person charged with criminal breach of trust (sec. 405 I. P. C.) may be convicted of the offence of criminal misappropriation (sec. 403 I. P. C.)—*Dwarkadas v. Emp.*, 30 Bom. L.R. 1270, 30 Cr.L.J. 329 (330). A person charged under sec. 278 I. P. Code may be convicted under sec. 290 I. P. C.—*Emp. v. Shiva Dat*, 3 Luck. 680, 5 O.W.N. 641, 29 Cr.L.J. 893 (894). A person charged with criminal breach of trust may be convicted of attempting to cheat—*Reg. v. Ramajiraw*, 12 II H.C.R. 1 A person charged under sec. 380 I. P. C. may be convicted under sec. 54A of the Calcutta Police Act, although he was not charged with the latter offence—*Tulsi Telini v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 564. Where the circumstances of a case were such that it was open to the Crown to have charged the accused under secs. 457, 395 or 392 of the I. P. Code, and the accused were charged under sec. 395 but convicted under sec. 457 I. P. C., although there was no fresh charge under the latter section, held that the conviction was not illegal in view of the provisions of secs. 236 and 237 Cr. P. Code—*Mathura v. Emp.*, 2 Luck. 444, 28 Cr.L.J. 460.

But the two offences (i.e. the offence charged and the offence of which the accused is convicted) must be *cognate* offences. Secs. 236 and 237 refer to cognate offences such as theft and criminal breach of trust, and do not relate to offences of so distinct a nature as murder and theft—*Q. E. v. Narotam*, 1888 A.W.N. 95, *Wallu v. Crown*, 4 Lah. 373, 25 Cr.L.J. 385; *Gulabchand*, 28 Cr.L.J. 189 (Nag.). In other words, the alteration of finding must not be such as to prejudice the accused by making him answer a charge of an entirely different character, necessitating a distinct defence altogether. Thus, where the accused was charged with theft of a tree, he could not be convicted under sec. 143 I. P. C. on the ground that he had gone with his men to the spot armed with lathis, as the defence for the two charges must be distinct, and the accused must be held to have been prejudiced by the alteration of charge—*Dibakar v. Saktidhar*, 54 Cal. 476, 31 C.W.N. 527, 28 Cr.L.J. 404. A person charged with rape cannot be convicted of kidnapping, since the two offences involve different elements and different questions of fact—*Emp. v. Sakharam*, 8 Bom. L.R. 120. Persons charged with dacoity cannot be convicted of receiving stolen property—*Reg. v. Gopala*, Ratanlal 34. A person charged with dacoity cannot be convicted of grievous hurt—*Rameshwar*, 5 O.W.N. 601, 29 Cr.L.J. 763; or of house trespass—*Q. v. Salamut*, 23 W.R. 59. A person charged with the offence of abetment of forgery cannot be convicted of the offence of using a forged document, because the latter offence is a distinct and different offence from the former, and was committed subsequent to it. The abetment of forgery was complete when the document was written and signed; the use of the forged document was a subsequent act, and was a different offence for which the accused should be separately charged—*Harua v. Emp.* 53 Cal. 466, 27 Cr.L.J. 606. But a person charged with murder (sec. 302 I. P. C.) may be convicted of causing evidence of murder to disappear (sec. 201 I. P. C.) without any charge

in respect of the latter offence, because the accused might have been charged with the two offences in the alternative, under sec. 236—*Begu v. Emp.*, 11 Lah. 226 (P.C.), 30 C.W.N. 581, 27 Bom. L.R. 707, 23 A.L.J. 636, 48 M.L.J. 643, 26 Cr.L.J. 1059; *Rannu v. K. E.*, 7 Lah. 84, A.I.R. 1926 Lah. 88, 27 Cr.L.J. 709; *Umed Sheikh v. Emp.*, 30 C.W.N. 816, 27 Cr.L.J. 1011; *Dal Singh v. Emp.*, 29 Cr.L.J. 457 (458) (Lah.) A person charged with murder (sec. 302 I. P. C.) can be convicted under sec. 193 I. P. C. of fabricating false evidence in respect of the murder in order to throw off suspicion from himself—*Emp. v. Ismail*, 52 Bom. 385, 29 Cr.L.J. 403 (405).

A person charged under sec. 452 I. P. Code cannot be convicted of an offence under sec. 19 Arms Act, because the latter offence is an offence under a *special Act* and the accused was not charged with it and had no opportunity of meeting it—*Emp. v. Nga Shue*, 4 Rang. 355, 27 Cr.L.J. 1360.

A person who is charged under secs. 149 and 325 I. P. C. with having constructively committed the offence of causing grievous hurt, by being a member of an unlawful assembly, cannot be convicted under sec. 325 I. P. C. of causing grievous hurt with his own hands—*Panchu Das v. Emp.*, 34 Cal. 698; *K. E. v. Madan Mandal*, 41 Cal. 662. But the Madras High Court is of opinion that if a person is being charged with being a member of an unlawful assembly, one of the members of which caused grievous hurt in pursuance of the common object, there is no necessary implication that that particular member (who caused the grievous hurt) is not himself. Consequently if he is charged under secs. 326 and 149 I. P. C. with causing grievous hurt by implication by reason of his being a member of an unlawful assembly, and it is found that he himself caused the grievous hurt, he may be convicted under sec. 326 I. P. C. alone of the substantive offence of causing grievous hurt himself—*Theethumalai v. K. E.*, 47 Mad. 746 (F.B.), 47 M.L.J. 221, 35 M.L.T. 21.

The accused were convicted by a Magistrate under secs. 326 and 149 I. P. Code. The Sessions Judge on appeal found that the element of unlawful common *object* in the assembly as a whole, which is required to convict the accused under sec. 326 read with sec. 149 was wanting, but as the petitioners had the common *intention* to cause grievous hurt, he convicted them under sec. 326 read with sec. 34 I. P. Code, without framing a specific charge under those sections. *Held*, that the conviction was not bad—*Bhundu Das v. Emp.*, 7 Pat. 758, 30 Cr.L.J. 205 (208). In this case it was further held that the contrary view taken in *Razuddi v. Emp.*, 16 C.W.N. 1071, 13 Cr.L.J. 502 must be deemed as overruled by the Privy Council case of *Barendra v. Emp.*, 53 Cal. 197, 29 C.W.N. 181.

Alteration of charge necessary—When a person is charged with one offence and is convicted of a different offence, the Court should alter the charge under sec. 227 of this Code before conviction. Sec. 237 does not imply that a person charged under one section of the I. P. C. may

be convicted under another section, without altering the charge—*Q. E. v. Karim Baksh*, 1888 A.W.N. 116. When the charge is altered, the altered charge must be read and explained to the accused as provided in clause (2) of sec. 227—*Dhum Singh v. Emp.*, 23 A.L.J. 436; *Raghu-nath v. Emp.*, 24 A.L.J. 168, 27 Cr.L.J. 152. Unless this is done, the conviction under the altered charge will be set aside—*Raghu-nath v. Emp.* (supra).

767. Power of Appellate Court :—An Appellate Court has power to convict the accused for an offence, though he was not charged with and tried for that offence in the original Court—*Lala Ojha v. Q. E.*, 26 Cal. 863, *Kalicharan v. Emp.*, 41 Cal. 537, 18 C.W.N. 309; *Jawad Husain v. Emp.*, 2 Luck 503, 28 Cr.L.J. 673, *Emp. v. Ismail*, 52 Bom. 385, 29 Cr.L.J. 403 (405). And the Appellate Court can do so not only under this section but also under sec. 423 (b) (2)—*Krishnan v. Emp.*, (1916) 2 M.W.N. 267, 17 Cr.L.J. 384.

But in so altering the conviction the Appellate Court must consider in each particular case as to whether the procedure followed by it, although it may be strictly correct in law, is one which should be adopted in the case. If the prosecution establishes certain acts constituting an offence, and the Court misapplies the law by charging and convicting an accused person for an offence other than that for which he should have been properly charged, and if notwithstanding such error the accused has by his defence endeavoured to meet the accusation of the commission of these acts, then the Appellate Court may alter the charge or finding and convict him for an offence which those acts properly constitute, *provided the accused be not prejudiced by the alteration in the finding*. Such an error is one of form rather than of substance—*Lala Ojha v. Q. E.*, 26 Cal. 863, 3 C.W.N. 653. Thus, the accused was convicted by the trial Court for theft of a tree, under sec. 379 I.P.C. The lower Appellate Court found that the accused *bona fide* believed the tree to be his own, and set aside the conviction for theft but convicted the accused under sec. 143 I.P.C. on the ground that he had gone with his men to the spot armed with *lathis*, held that the conviction by the Appellate Court was illegal, inasmuch as the defence in the two charges must be distinct and the accused must be held to have been prejudiced by the alteration of conviction into one under sec. 143 I.P. Code—*Dibakar v. Saktidhar*, 54 Cal. 476, 31 C.W.N. 527, 28 Cr.L.J. 404.

238. (1) When a person is charged with an offence

When offence proved consisting of several particulars, a
included in offence combination of some only of which
charged. constitutes a complete minor
offence, and such combination is proved, but the remain-
ing particulars are not proved, he may be convicted of
the minor offence, though he was not charged with it.

(2) When a person is charged with an offence, and
facts are proved which reduce it to a minor offence, he

may be convicted of the minor offence, although he is not charged with it.

(2A) *When a person is charged with an offence, he may be convicted of an attempt to commit such offence, although the attempt is not separately charged.*

(3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorize a conviction of any offence referred to in Section 198 or Section 199 when no complaint has been made as required by that section.

Illustrations.

(a) A is charged, under Section 407 of the Indian Penal Code, with criminal breach of trust in respect of property entrusted to him as a carrier. It appears that he did commit criminal breach of trust under Section 406 in respect of the property, but that it was not entrusted to him as a carrier. He may be convicted of criminal breach of trust under Section 406.

(b) A is charged, under Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code, with causing grievous hurt. He proves that he acted on grave and sudden provocation. He may be convicted under Section 335 of the Code.

Change.—By section 64 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923) sub-section (2) of section 237 has been transferred to the present section and re-enacted as sub-section (2A), it being more appropriate under this section than under section 237.

768. Principle of section :—Where an offence consists of several particulars, a combination of some only of which constitutes a complete minor offence, the graver charge gives notice to the accused of all the circumstances going to constitute the minor offence of which he may be convicted. The latter is arrived at by mere subtraction from the former. But when the circumstances constituting the major charge do not necessarily and according to the definition of the offence imputed by that charge constitute the minor offence also, the principle no longer applies, because notice of the former does not necessarily involve notice of all that constitutes the latter—*Reg. v. Chand Nur*, 11 B.H.C.R. 240.

Though a Magistrate has power under this section to convict the accused of a different offence from what he was originally accused of, still this must be done only in cases where the accused is not in any way prejudiced by the conviction on the new charge. The accused person is entitled to know with certainty and accuracy the exact nature of the charge brought against him, and unless he has this knowledge, he must be seriously prejudiced in his defence—*Balkeshwar v. Emp.*, 3 P.L.T. 322, 23 Cr.L.J. 114. But where the accused is charged under sec 457 I. P. C. for criminal trespass with intent to commit theft, it is open to the

Magistrate to convict him under sec 456 I. P. C. for criminal trespass with intent to carry on an intrigue with a woman, and the accused is not in any way prejudiced by such conviction, because to sustain a conviction under sec 456 I. P. C. it is not necessary to specify the criminal intention, it is sufficient if a guilty intention is proved such as is contemplated in sec. 441 I. P. C.—*Karali v Emp.*, 44 Cal. 358, 17 Cr.L.J. 424.

But the Patna High Court holds in a similar case that on a charge of criminal trespass with intent to commit theft the accused cannot be convicted of criminal trespass with intent to commit adultery, because he will be prejudiced by such a conviction—*Balkeshwar v Emp.*, 3 P L T 322, 23 Cr.L.J. 114.

"Minor offence"—Minor offence is not defined anywhere in the Code and should be understood in its ordinary and not in any technical sense—*Q. E. v. Sitanath*, 22 Cal 1006. It means an offence deserving a lesser degree of punishment.

This section enables a Court to convict a person of a minor offence, although he was charged with a major offence, but it does not enable a Court to do the contrary, i.e. to convict on a major offence when the accused was charged with a minor one—*Q. E. v. Durgya*, 1 Bom. L R 513.

769. Cases under this section :—An offence under section 365 I. P. C. can be said to be a minor offence as compared with secs. 366 and 376 I. P. C. and a person charged under the latter sections can be convicted of the offence under the former section (365 I. P. C.) even though he was not charged with it—*Q. E. v. Sitanath*, 22 Cal. 1006. A person charged with dacoity may be convicted of theft, though he was charged with dacoity and not with theft—*Q. E. v. Khoda*, 17 Bom. 369. A person charged with an offence under sec. 457 can be convicted of an offence under sec. 414 I. P. C., since the latter offence is included in the former—*Q. E. v. Balu, Ratanlal* 293.

Where the graver offence of rioting was not proved, the Magistrate was competent to try the accused for the lesser offence of assault—*Q. E. v. Papadu*, 7 Mad. 454. Where the accused is charged with offences under secs. 304 and 325 I. P. C., he may be convicted under sec. 323 I. P. C.—*Dasarath v. Emp.*, 34 Cal. 325. An offence under sec. 211 I. P. C. includes an offence under sec. 182 I. P. C. and therefore it is competent for the Magistrate to convict under sec 182, though the accused may be charged under sec. 211 I. P. C.—*Crown v. Khubomal*, 8 S L R. 179, 16 Cr.L.J. 104. A person charged under section 457 I. P. C. for criminal trespass with intent to commit theft can be convicted of an offence under sec. 456 I. P. C. for criminal trespass with intent to carry on intrigue with a woman—*Karali v. Emp.*, 44 Cal. 358, 20 C.W.N. 1075. Where the common object of an unlawful assembly is to commit criminal trespass, a person charged under section 147 I. P. C. for being a member of an unlawful assembly can be convicted under sec. 447 I. P. C. (criminal trespass), because the latter offence is a minor one and included in the

former—*Ariff v Emp.*, 18 C.W.N. 992. Where the charge is under sec. 430 I. P. Code (mischief by cutting the embankment of a reservoir), the conviction can be under sec. 426 I. P. C. (mischief)—*Banamali v K. E.*, 11 P.L.T., 39, 26 Cr.L.J. 682.

In the trial of an accused by a Sessions Judge with the aid of assessors for an offence so triable, it is competent to the Judge to convict the accused of a minor offence though that offence is triable only by a jury—*Emp v. Changauda*, 45 Bom 619. Similarly, an accused charged under sec 412 I. P. C. (triable by jury) can be convicted under sec. 411 I. P. C (triable with the aid of assessors) though not separately charged with the latter offence—*Emp. v. Gulabchand*, 27 Bom. L.R. 1416, 27 Cr.L.J. 650.

770. Cases not under this section:—A charge under sec. 376 I. P. C cannot be altered into a conviction under sec 366 I. P. C because the two sections involve different elements and different questions of fact, and the latter cannot be said to be minor to or included in the former—*Emp. v. Sakharam*, 8 Bom. L.R. 120; *G. C. Sircar v. Emp.*, 3 Rang 68, 4 Bur. L.J. 29. Similarly, where the accused was charged with murder but the evidence disclosed an offence of kidnapping from lawful guardianship, a conviction for the latter offence could not be sustained since it was neither minor to nor included in the former offence—*Savari Ayce*, 2 Weir 302. An offence under sec 202 I. P. C. is not a minor offence included in the offence under sec. 201 I. P. C. and therefore a conviction for the former offence cannot be had where the charge was under the latter section only—*Imp v Rino*, 5 S L R. 123, 13 Cr.L.J. 18. A person charged with dacoity and riot cannot be convicted for house trespass, the latter offence not being a part of the former—*Q. v. Salamut Ali*, 23 W R 59. A person charged with dacoity or house-breaking by night cannot be convicted of dishonestly receiving stolen property; because none of the particulars which go to make up the offence of dacoity or house-breaking constitute by themselves the offence of receiving stolen property; and hence the latter offence cannot be considered as a minor offence included in the dacoity or house-breaking—*Achpal v. Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1361 (Lah). A person charged with robbery cannot be convicted of house-breaking by night and theft in a dwelling house, because all the particulars constituting the latter offences are not included in the definition of robbery with which the accused was charged—*Q. E. v. Dala*, Ratanlal 211. A person charged with murder cannot be convicted of robbery—*Walla v Crown*, 4 Lah. 373, 25 Cr.L.J. 385.

Rioting and hurt etc —Where the accused were charged with rioting, they could not be convicted of criminal trespass and hurt, because none of the latter offences was a necessary ingredient of the offence of rioting and it was not proved that the common object of rioting was criminal trespass or hurt—*In re Mongalu*, 18 Cr.L.J. 860 (Mad). A charge of rioting under sec. 149 I. P. Code does not include as a minor offence any specific act of violence by an individual accused so as to authorise a conviction under sec. 352 I. P. Code—*Malla Gope v. Emp.*, 10 P.L.T. 875, 30 Cr.L.J. 891 (892); *Kanta v. Emp.*, 12 Cr.L.J. 82 (Cal).

Where the accused is charged with being a member of an unlawful assembly and with committing grievous hurt by implication (secs 149 and 325 I. P. C.) he cannot be convicted of the substantive offence of causing grievous hurt under sec. 325 by his individual act; because under no reasonable construction of this section can the substantive offence of causing grievous hurt individually be regarded as minor to or included in the charge under secs 325 and 149 I. P. C of causing grievous hurt by implication—*Panchu v Emp.*, 34 Cal. 608; *Emp. v. Madan Mandal*, 41 Cal 662; *Dasarath v. Emp.*, 34 Cal. 325; *Reazuddi v. K. E.*, 16 C.W.N. 1077 *Contra—Theethumalai v. K. E.*, 47 Mad. 746 (F.B.) cited in Note 766 under sec. 237.

771. Sub-section (2A)—Attempt.—Under this sub-section, when an accused is charged with an offence he may be convicted of having attempted to commit that offence, although the attempt was not separately charged—*Sadho Lal v K. E.*, 1 P L J 391, 17 Cr.L.J. 272; *Bilinghurst v. Blackburn*, 27 C W N 821; *In re Doraiswami*, 48 Mad. 774, 48 M L J 190, 26 Cr L.J 755

Abetment—There is a conflict of opinion as to whether a person charged with a substantive offence can be convicted of abetment of that offence. In *Padmanabha*, 33 Mad 264, *Sheoratin v Emp.*, 21 Cr L.J. 44 (Pat.), *Darbari v Emp.*, 22 Cr L J 311, *Muthu Karakku v Emp.*, 1922 M.W.N 182, 23 Cr L J 206, *Emp v. Raghya*, 26 Bom. L R. 323, 25 Cr.L.J. 1135, *Hulas v. Emp.*, 44 C.L.J 216, 28 Cr L J 2, *Mahabir v. Emp.*, 49 All. 120, 27 Cr.L.J. 1118, and *Reg. v. Chand Nur*, 11 B.H.C.R. 240, it has been held that it is improper for a Court to find a man guilty of the abetment of an offence, on a charge of the substantive offence only; because when a man is accused of a substantive offence, he may not be conscious that he will have to meet an imputation of collateral circumstances constituting an abetment of it, which may be quite distinct from the circumstances constituting the substantive offence itself. A charge for the substantive offence as such gives no intimation of a trial to be held for the abetment. But in *Yeditha v Emp.*, 23 M.L.J. 772, 13 Cr.L.J 453, and *Kehr Singh v Crown*, 1921 P.W R 11, 22 Cr.L.J. 161, it has been said that if on the facts proved two charges can be framed, viz., the commission of the principal offence and the abetment thereof, the accused can be convicted of the offence of abetment, though it was not separately charged against him. It cannot be laid down as a universal rule that a person charged with a substantive offence only cannot be convicted of abetment thereof, the answer depends on the facts of each case, and it must be seen in each case whether prejudice has been caused to the accused by such conviction—*Kadira v. Emp.*, 29 Cr L.J. 1093 (1095) (Cal); *Jnanada Charan v. Emp.*, 50 C L.J. 472, 1929 Cr C 595 (596), *Indar Chand v Emp.*, 42 Cal. 1094 (1133).

An accused may be convicted of a substantive offence though he was charged only with abetment of that offence, see *Lal Chand v. Crown*, 1912 P.W.R. 17, 13 Cr.L.J 252.

772. Sub-section (3)—*When minor offence requires complaint* :— See sub-section (3). A person charged with one offence cannot be convicted of a minor offence, if the latter offence requires a complaint by a particular person mentioned in secs. 198 and 199. Thus, the offence of adultery requires complaint by the husband, and therefore a person charged with rape cannot be convicted of adultery in the absence of a complaint by the husband. Even the husband's giving evidence in the case will not amount to a complaint—*Emp v. Kallu*, 5 All 233. See Notes 650 and 654 under secs. 198 and 199.

773. Power of Appellate Court and High Court :— The powers under this section may be exercised by Appellate Courts, an Appellate Court can alter a conviction for a major offence into a conviction for a minor offence—*Hauman v. Emp.*, 20 A.L.J. 213, 23 Cr.L.J. 198.

Where the jury acquitted the prisoners of certain offences and found some other facts upon which the jury could have convicted them of some other offence, but did not convict, the High Court has power to convict the prisoners of the latter offence—*Emp v. Haras Miraha*, 3 Cal. 189.

239. When more persons than one are accused of the same offence or of different offences committed in the same transaction, or when one person is accused of committing any offence and another of abetment of, or attempt to commit, such offence, they may be charged and tried together or separately as the Court thinks fit, and the provisions contained in the former part of this Chapter shall apply to all such charges.

What persons may be charged jointly.

239. The following persons may be charged and tried together, namely :—

What persons may be charged jointly.

(a) persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction;

(b) persons accused of an offence and persons accused of abetment or of an attempt to commit such offence;

(c) persons accused of more than one offence of the same kind within the meaning of section 234 committed by them jointly within the period of twelve months;

(d) persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction;

(e) persons accused of an offence which includes theft, extortion or criminal misappropriation, and persons accused of receiving or retaining or assist-

in the disposal or concealment of property possession of which is alleged to have been transferred by any such offence committed by the first named persons, or of abetment of or attempting to commit any such last named offence;

(f) persons accused of offences under sections 411 and 414 of the Indian Penal Code or either of those sections in respect of stolen property the possession of which has been transferred by one offence; and

(g) persons accused of any offence under Chapter XII of the Indian Penal Code relating to counterfeit coin, and persons accused of any other offence under the said Chapter relating to the same coin, or of abetment of or attempting to commit any such offence;

and the provisions contained in the former part of this Chapter shall, so far as may be, apply to all such charges.

Illustrations.

(a) A and B are accused of the same murder A and B may be charged and tried together for the murder.

(b) A and B are accused of robbery, in the course of which A commits a murder with which B has nothing to do. A and B may be tried together on a charge, charging both of them with the robbery, and A alone with the murder.

(c) A and B are both charged with a theft and B is charged with two other thefts committed by him in the course of the same transaction A and B may be both tried together on a charge, charging both with the one theft, and B alone with the two other thefts

772. Sub-section (3)—*When minor offence requires complaint*—See sub-section (3). A person charged with one offence cannot be convicted of a minor offence, if the latter offence requires a complaint by a particular person mentioned in secs. 198 and 199. Thus, the offence of adultery requires complaint by the husband, and therefore a person charged with rape cannot be convicted of adultery in the absence of a complaint by the husband. Even the husband's giving evidence in the case will not amount to a complaint—*Emp. v. Kallu*, 5 All. 233. See Notes 650 and 654 under secs. 198 and 199.

773. Power of Appellate Court and High Court :—The powers under this section may be exercised by Appellate Courts; an Appellate Court can alter a conviction for a major offence into a conviction for a minor offence—*Hanuman v. Emp.*, 20 A.L.J. 213, 23 Cr L.J. 198

Where the jury acquitted the prisoners of certain offences and found some other facts upon which the jury could have convicted them of some other offence, but did not convict, the High Court has power to convict the prisoners of the latter offence—*Emp. v. Harai Mirdha*, 3 Cal 189.

239. When more persons than one are accused of the same offence or of different offences committed in the same transaction, or when one person is accused of committing any offence and another of abetment of, or attempt to commit, such offence, they may be charged and tried together or separately as the Court thinks fit, and the provisions contained in the former part of this Chapter shall apply to all such charges.

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(b) persons accused of an offence and persons accused of abetment or of an attempt to commit such offence;

(c) persons accused of more than one offence of the same kind within the meaning of section 234 committed by them jointly within the period of twelve months;

(d) persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction;

(e) persons accused of an offence which includes theft, extortion or criminal misappropriation, and persons accused of receiving or retaining or assist-

in the disposal or concealment of property possession of which is alleged to have been transferred by any such offence committed by the first named persons, or of abetment of or attempting to commit any such last named offence;

(f) persons accused of offences under sections 411 and 414 of the Indian Penal Code or either of those sections in respect of stolen property the possession of which has been transferred by one offence; and

(g) persons accused of any offence under Chapter XII of the Indian Penal Code relating to counterfeit coin, and persons accused of any other offence under the said Chapter relating to the same coin, or of abetment of or attempting to commit any such offence;

and the provisions contained in the former part of this Chapter shall, so far as may be, apply to all such charges.

Illustrations.

(a) A and B are accused of the same murder : A and B may be charged and tried together for the murder.

(b) A and B are accused of robbery, in the course of which A commits a murder with which B has nothing to do. A and B may be tried together on a charge, charging both of them with the robbery, and A alone with the murder

(c) A and B are both charged with a theft and B is charged with two other thefts committed by him in the course of the same transaction. A and B may be both tried together on a charge, charging both with the one theft, and B alone with the two other thefts.

Change:—This section has been redrafted by sec 65 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923.

The actual change brought about by this amendment is the addition of clauses (c), (e), (f) and (g). "It is provided that when two or more persons are accused of offences of the same kind committed by them jointly during the space of one year, they may be tried for the same at one trial. *Secondly*, it is directed that when one person is accused of any offence which includes theft, etc., and another of receiving, or retaining or disposing of the stolen property, they may be tried jointly. *Thirdly*, provision is made for the joint trial of one person accused of counterfeiting coin and another of fraudulently possessing or uttering it"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914) *Fourthly*, another clause i.e., clause (f), has been added by the Select Committee of 1916 allowing the joint trial of persons accused of offences under secs 411 and 414 of the Indian Penal Code.

774. Scope and Application:—This section lays down certain general principles for the combination of charges in a joint trial of several persons. The object of these principles is to avoid the likelihood of bewildering the accused in their defence by having to meet many disconnected charges and of endangering the prospect of a fair trial by the production of a mass of evidence directed to many matters and tending by its mere accumulation to induce an undue suspicion against the accused persons—*Sanuman v Emp*, 19 A.L.J. 392, 22 Cr.L.J. 641.

This is the last exception to sec. 233 which lays down the general principle that every offence must be charged and tried separately. This is the only section which authorises a joint trial of several persons under the circumstances specified in this section. Except in cases falling under this section, a joint trial of several accused renders the trial invalid—*Emp v Balwant Singh*, 4 N.L.R. 71, and a misjoinder thus taking place is not a mere irregularity which can be cured by the provisions of sec. 537—*Lachchu v. Emp* 1 O.L.J. 141, 15 Cr.L.J. 420, or by any waiver or consent of parties or their pleaders—*Hussein Baksh v Emp.*, 11 Cal 98.

This section applies to trials and not to inquiries. The sections of the Cr. P. C. relating to joinder of charges viz., 233 to 239 refer to trial of the accused and cannot be extended to preliminary inquiries held by Magistrates prior to commitment to the Sessions—*In re Govinda*, 26 Mad. 592. Therefore in a joint commitment of several accused it is not necessary that the conditions of this section should be fulfilled—*Nelluru Chenchia v. Rex*, 42 Mad 561, 36 M.L.J. 296, 20 Cr.L.J. 379.

But this section is applicable to inquiries under Chapter VIII. The main principles applicable to a criminal trial regarding joinder of charges and the joint trial of accused persons are also applicable to inquiries under Chapter VIII—*Pran Krishna v Emp*, 8 C.W.N. 180; *Bachu Molla v. Sia Ram*, 14 Cal 358; *Q. E. v. Abdul Kadir*, 9 All 452; *Q. E. v. Natha*, 6 All. 214; *Q. E. v. Garba*, Ratanlal 585, *Q. E. v. Bapu*, Ratanlal 556.

Again, this section does not apply to trials of cross-cases. The trial

of the accused in the two cross-cases ought to be separate. But a simultaneous trial is not altogether invalid but somewhat irregular—*Sahadeb v. Emp.*, 11 C.W.N. 344; *Chokowri v. Mati*, 13 C.L.R. 275. See Note 749.

775. Clause (a)—“Persons accused of the same offence”

—The words ‘same offence’ imply that both the accused should have acted in concert or association; and therefore where the allegation was that either one or the other committed the crime, this section does not apply and the two accused must be tried separately according to sec. 233—*Azimuddin v. Emp.*, 6 Bur.L.T. 191, 7 L.R. 68, 14 Cr.L.J. 563. Where it is merely shown that part of the stolen property was found in the possession of one person, and another part was found in the possession of another, it would probably be illegal to try the two men together, but if the two men were acting in concert and were in joint control of the stolen property, their joint trial would not be illegal—*Jadunandan v. K. E.*, 1 P.L.J. 64, 17 Cr.L.J. 234; *Musai Khamat v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 431, 21 Cr.L.J. 757. Two persons found in possession of stolen properties cannot be tried together on a charge under sec 411 I P C where there was no connecting link between the two, and there was no suggestion that either or both of them were the original thieves, and the only connecting link between them was that each of them retained some property stolen from the same complainant—*Moosan v. Emp.*, 20 A.L.J. 563, A.I.R. 1922 All 459. Unless the receiving of stolen property is joint, persons cannot be tried jointly under this section for receiving stolen property, merely because the goods were stolen in one theft—*Emp. v. Balgovind*, 17 Cr.L.J. 477 (All); *Jiwan v. Emp.*, 19 A.L.J. 815, 23 Cr.L.J. 409. But see 6 Pat. 583, cited in Note 781 under clause (f) below.

Where two persons were charged with criminal misappropriation with respect to a certain sum of money, held that there was a misjoinder of charges because it is impossible to hold that two persons can be guilty of misappropriation of the same parcel of money. The charges against them must be of misappropriation by one accused and abetment by the other. It is also open to the Court to frame the charges against each of them in the alternative, i.e., of misappropriation or of abetment—*Gurwar v. K. E.*, 16 C.W.N. 600, 13 Cr.L.J. 506 (507).

Same transaction.—See Note 756 under sec 235. The joint trial of four prostitutes for breach of the notice issued under sec. 153 of the Punjab Municipal Act is illegal, the four prostitutes lived in four different houses, although the houses were adjoining, and their failure to obey the notice could not be regarded as one transaction—*Aisha v. Emp.*, 7 Lah. 168, 27 P.L.R. 188, 27 Cr.L.J. 465.

Persons guilty of the offence of giving false evidence in a case can be tried jointly. Thus, where certain persons were witnesses on the same side in a criminal case and all gave evidence on the same point and to the same effect, to prove the same fact, held that the evidence in the case of all the witnesses were given in the same transaction, so as to make a joint trial of such persons for perjury legal. There was the most obvious identity of purpose, and that is sufficient to constitute the same transaction

—*Rafuzzaman v. Chholey Lal*, 48 All. 325, 24 A.L.J. 472, 27 Cr.L.J. 445, *Emp. v. Ganesh*, 14 Bom.L.R. 972, 13 Cr.L.J. 833; *Emp. v. Sejmal*, 51 Bom. 310, 29 Bom.L.R. 170, 28 Cr.L.J. 373. But in the following cases of the Allahabad, Madras, Bombay and Calcutta High Courts, it has been held that where several persons are charged with having given false evidence in the same proceeding, each of them should be separately tried—*Emp. v. Anant Ram*, 4 All. 293; *Q. E. v. Nathu*, 10 Cal. 405, *Q. E. v. Kotha Subha Chetti*, 6 Mad 252; *Emp. v. Krishnarao*, 4 Bom L R 53. The Sind Court also holds that the joint trial of two or more persons charged with giving false evidence in the same judicial proceeding is not permissible under sec. 239. The false evidence given by one witness is a *transaction complete in itself* and not connected with false evidence given by another witness, even though on the same case and on the same point—*Imp. v. Alu*, 5 S.L.R. 129, 13 Cr.L.J. 23. The same view has been taken by the Nagpur Court in *Gunvant v. Emp.*, 13 N.L.R. 35, 18 Cr L J. 339 (342).

The word "transaction" must not be interpreted in any special or artificial or conventional or technical way, but as it is ordinarily used by men of education and common sense. If you cannot speak of a series of events as a transaction in the ordinary sense in which that word is used, you cannot try a number of persons together in respect of those events by attributing a special and unusual meaning to the word—*In re Gam Mallu*, 49 Mad 74, 26 Cr.L.J. 1513 (1521). The usual tests applied to decide whether different acts are parts of the same transaction are proximity of time, unity of place, unity of purpose or design and continuity of action. It is not necessary that all of them should be present to make the several incidents parts of the same transaction. Unity of place and proximity of time are not important tests at all; but the main test is unity of purpose. If the various acts are done in pursuance of a particular end in view and as accessory thereto, they may be treated as parts of the same transaction—*Gam Mallu*, supra, *C. Venkatadri v. Emp.*, 33 Mad. 502, 11 Cr.L.J. 258. The expression "same transaction" must be understood as including both the immediate cause and effect of an act or event, and also its collocation, or relevant circumstances, the other necessary antecedents of its occurrence, connected with it, at a reasonable distance of time, space, cause and effect—*Emp. v. Ring*, 53 Bom. 479, 1929 Cr. C. 114 (121). For a joint trial under sec. 239, identity of purpose is sufficient. Community of purpose in the sense of *conspiracy* is not in any way necessary, though if it is present, its presence will be a further element supporting a finding that the offences were committed in the same transaction—*Rafuzzaman v Chholey Lal*, (supra). Six persons were accused of waging war against the King under sec. 121 I P. Code. The sixth accused joined the party after the 1st and the 2nd accused had been arrested. But the party to which the accused belonged continued under the leadership of the same man and *actuated by the same purpose*. Held that the joint trial of the 6th accused with the 1st and the 2nd accused was legal—*In re Gam Mallu*, 49 Mad. 74, 48 M L.J. 308, 26 Cr.L.J. 1513.

The printer and the publisher of a pamphlet alleged to be seditious

can be tried jointly for an offence under sec. 124A, I. P. Code, because the printer and publisher are concerned in the same transaction in regard to the publication of the pamphlet. Even the author, the printer and the publisher may all be tried together, or at any rate the author and the publisher—*Emp. v. Shantaram*, 30 Bom.L.R. 320, 29 Cr.L.J. 683 (684).

Where there was no evidence of prior consultation or of identity of purpose, but the accused were separately engaged in the offence (stealing fish in a tank), they should not be tried jointly merely because they were gathered at the same time and in the same place—*Samiullah v. Emp.*, 51 M.L.J. 692, 27 Cr.L.J. 1381.

776. Clause (b)—Abetment:—Where some of the accused are principal offenders, and the others accomplices, clause (b) of this section permits these all to be tried together in one trial—*Sugalmuthu v. Emp.*, 50 Mad 274, 27 Cr L.J. 394. Thus, where a person who had a license for the sale of opium allowed another, who had no such license, to sell it, they could be jointly tried, the offence of the former being an abetment of the offence of the latter—*Crown v Chhail Behari*, 1906 P.L.R. 113. A licensed vendor is punishable under sec. 50 of the Bengal Excise Act for the acts of the servant, in such a case, the master is said to be an abettor of the servant by implication, and both may be tried together—*Priya Nath v K. E.*, 15 C L J 692, 13 Cr L J. 255. When a person is charged with kidnapping, and three others with having abetted that offence at different places, all the four persons can be tried jointly at the place where the principal offence was committed—*Q. E. v. Ramdei*, 18 All. 350.

If A induces B to cheat, and B attempts to cheat in consequence, A and B may clearly be tried together for abetment of and attempt at cheating—*Kali Das v. Emp.*, 38 Cal 453, 15 C W.N 463, 12 Cr.L J 106

777. Clause (c)—Offences of the same kind:—Section 234 applies only in the case of one accused committing several offences of the same kind within a year. But where several persons committed several offences of the same kind, there was no provision under the old law for the joint trial of those persons, and consequently separate trial was necessary—*Budhai v Tarap*, 10 C W N 32. Thus it was held that where three dacoities were committed by several dacoits on three different dates and at separate places, the dacoits must be separately charged and tried for each dacoity as the offences were not committed in the same transaction—*Ram Prosad v. K E.*, III A L J 796, 22 Cr L J 657. Where several persons looted the linseed crop of the complainant on one day and his tobacco crop on another day, the offences had to be tried separately as they were not parts of the same transaction—*Budhai v Emp.*, 33 Cal. 292. These cases are now overruled by this clause. Under the present law, the offences can be tried together, provided that each offence is committed by the accused persons jointly, and it is not necessary that all the sets of offences must be committed in the same transaction. If the offences are not joint, this section cannot apply; thus, where three persons were found to be in possession of stolen articles but none of the articles were in their

joint possession, they could not be tried jointly even though the articles were the proceeds of one burglary—*Jiwan v. Emp.*, 19 A.L.J. 815, 23 Cr L.J. 409; *Moosan v. Emp.*, 20 A.L.J. 563. Where a woman was abducted by K and B, and then rape was committed on the woman at a place D by the two accused persons, and subsequently the woman was taken either by force or by fraud by one of the accused alone to different places, and where he alone committed rape on her, held that a joint charge of abduction against both the accused K and B under sec. 366 I. P. C. was justified, that a joint charge under sec. 376 I. P. C. against both of them in respect of the rape which took place at D was also justified, but a joint charge against both the accused of having committed rape at different places was improper and embarrassing—*Keramat v. K. E.*, 42 C L J 524, 27 Cr L J 263.

The joint trial of two persons for passing counterfeit coins on three different occasions to three persons on the same date is valid under this subsection—*In re Kovaganti*, 44 M.L.J. 130, 23 Cr.L.J. 719, A I.R. 1923 Mad. 181.

778. Clause (d)—Distinct offences committed in the same transaction—For the meaning of the words 'same transaction' see Note 756 under section 235. If more persons than one are accused of different offences committed in a series of acts so connected as to form one transaction, they may be tried together. Whether or not the series of acts be so closely connected as to form the same transaction necessarily rests with the Court to decide. The limits are wide, but no joinder of charges or trials should be permitted which will result in bewildering any of the accused in his defence or in causing undue prejudice against him—*Crown v Ghulam*, 1 S L.R. 73, 11 Cr L.J. 191 (195).

To enable the Court to try at one trial several persons for several distinct offences, the offences must form part of the same transaction—*Po Mya v Emp.*, 7 L B R 272, 16 Cr L J 44; this clause does not apply to charges against several persons accused of several offences unless the acts constituting these offences form the same transaction—*Budhai v Emp.*, 33 Cal 292, *Ram Sarup v Emp.*, 11 C.W.N. 1027; *Gunwant v. Emp.*, 13 N.L.R 35, 18 Cr.L J 339, *Sayad Lal v. Emp.*, 20 Cr.L.J. 7; *Karam Singh v. Crown*, 1911 P.L.R 122, *Nur Khan v. Emp.*, 7 Lah L.J. 64, 26 Cr.L J. 1167.

Where the accused were charged with the offences of murder, hurt and grievous hurt, under secs. 302, 323 and 325 I. P. C. and all the criminal acts were found to be the outcome of a conspiracy to kill on one day as many members of the deceased's family as could be found, held that the acts were so closely connected by continuity of purpose and progressive action towards a common object that they formed one transaction, and the joint trial of the accused in respect of all the charges was legal—*Bahadur v. Crown*, 7 Lah 264, 27 P.L.R. 379, 27 Cr.L.J. 803.

The expression 'same transaction' would imply oneness of purpose. If, in the course of some quarrel, arising accidentally among persons who have collected to witness a festival, there happens to be a fight and if

some persons inflict injury on others, without any common object, they would be committing different offences of hurt. And if they do not act with any common intention, it cannot be said that they have caused hurt in the course of the 'same transaction' although all the persons committing the offences are there at one and the same place and at the same time. In such a case the joint trial of these persons would be improper—*Tufail Ahmed v. Emp.*, 23 A.L.J 5, 26 Cr.L.J 731 Two festivals fell on the same day and on the same evening. An arrangement was agreed upon to the effect that the firing of fire-works should be stopped till the procession of *dulendi* passed off. But this arrangement was not adhered to by some people and they fired off fireworks at random and thereby caused damage and injury to the person and property of the public. Held that these persons could not be tried together, because the offences were not committed in the same transaction, there being no oneness of purpose among the accused—*Tufail Ahmed*, *supra*

It is also necessary that the accused must be associated together in the perpetration of the acts forming the same transaction from start to finish—*Emp. v. Jethalal*, 29 Bom 449, *Emp v Datto Hanmant*, 30 Bom. 49; *Kushal v. Emp.*, 50 Cal 1004 (1009), *Tulsi v Crown*, 1917 P R 17, 18 Cr L J 282 But it is not necessary that all the persons must be charged with all the offences. See illustrations (b) and (c). In such cases, it is immaterial whether all the members of the party took an active part in each offence—*Ram Prasad v Emp.*, 20 A L J 926 If the accused started together for the same goal, this suffices to justify the joint trial, even if incidentally some of them have done an act for which the others may not be responsible—*Emp v. Datta Hanmant*, 30 Bom 49; *Gopal Raghunath v. Emp.*, 53 Bom 344, 30 Cr L J 588 (589), *Kushal v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 1004 (1010); *Kalidas v. Emp.*, 38 Cal. 453; *Tepanidhi v. K. E.*, 1 P.L.T. 180, 5 P.L.J 11; *In re Loganathiyar*, ■ M L T 17, 11 Cr L J. 30, *Prag v K. E.*, 11 O L J 693, 25 Cr L J 1169 If the accused started together for the same goal, and in the process committed a series of acts, they could be jointly tried for those offences, although the acts were separated by intervals of time—*Ashutosh v Purna Chandra*, 50 Cal 159 (164). The foundation for the procedure laid down in this section is the association of two persons concurring from start to finish to attain the same end. Community of purpose or design and continuity of action are the essential elements of the connection necessary to link together different acts into one and the same transaction. In such cases the acts alleged to be connected with each other must have been done in pursuance of a particular end in view and as necessary thereto—*Tepanidhi v. K. E.*, ■ P.L.J 11, 1 P.L.T 180, *Jitan v Emp.*, 1 P.L.T 564 Where the accusation against all the accused persons is that they carried out a single scheme by successive acts done at intervals, and there was a complete unity of project, and the whole series of acts were so linked together by one motive and design as to constitute one transaction, a joint trial is not only valid but is demanded in the interest of public time and convenience—*Kushal Mallik v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 1004, *Emp v Ganesh*, 14 Bom L.R. 972, 13 Cr L J 833 Thus, where a girl is abducted on a

certain night, and thereafter various people concealed her, the offence being a continuing offence, all the persons can be tried together—*Kushai Mallik*, 50 Cal. 1004, 25 Cr.L.J. 1082. In a trial for a charge under sec. 147 I. P. Code, it is not illegal to frame charges under secs. 324 and 325 I. P. C. against particular accused persons, although these offences were committed by them outside the scope of the common object mentioned in the charge under sec. 147, if all the acts with which the accused are charged form one transaction—*Rasul v. Emp.*, 3 Luck. 664, 5 O W N 612, 29 Cr.L.J. 801 (802).

It is sufficient for the purposes of this clause that the offences were committed in the course of the same transaction. It is immaterial whether the charge is an alternative one or is a distinct charge, or whether the offences are substantive offences or abetment thereof—*Kalikumar v. Nawabali*, 30 Cr.L.J. 610 (Cal).

Charged need not specify same transaction:—It suffices for the purpose of a joint trial that the accusation alleges the offences committed by each accused to have been committed in the same transaction within the meaning of this section. It is not necessary that the charge should contain a statement as to the transaction being one and the same. It is the tenor of the accusation and not the wording of the charge that must be considered as the test—*Emp v Datto Hanmant*, 30 Bom. 49.

Examples of offences committed in the same transaction:—

(1) Criminal breach of trust by one person, and receipt by another of the stolen property (the proceeds of the breach of trust) knowing it to be so—*Emp v Balabhai*, 6 Bom L.R. 517. In such a case it is not necessary that the offence of receiving should take place simultaneously with the offence of criminal breach of trust—*Ibid.*

(2) Where one set of accused were members of an unlawful assembly with the common object of setting fire to municipal buildings, and another accused was a member of that assembly with the object of forcibly closing a college, it was held that the proceedings of the mob consisting of several transactions from first to last showed such a continuity of purpose and action as to form one transaction, and all the rioters could be tried at one trial—*In re Loganathayyar*, B M L T 17, 11 Cr.L.J. 30.

(3) The offence of keeping a gaming house and the offence of playing therein arise out of facts so inseparably connected together as to form one transaction, and therefore the keeper and the players are clearly within the purview of this section as persons accused of different offences committed in the same transaction, and can be tried jointly—*Khilinda Ram v. Crown*, 3 Lah 359, 23 Cr.L.J. 621; *Sheikh Moti v. Emp.*, 9 N.L.R. 63, 14 Cr.L.J. 293, *Darab v. Emp.*, 50 All 412, 28 Cr.L.J. 1001 (1002); *Bhana v. Crown*, 1919 P.R. 6, 20 Cr.L.J. 219; *Nathu Thakur v. Emp.*, 20 Cr.L.J. 768 (Pat); *Ganeshi Lal v. Emp.*, 20 A.L.J. 967. *Contra*—*Crown v Fazel Din*, 1914 P.R. 35, 16 Cr.L.J. 220, and *Makhan v. Crown*, 1910 P.W.R. 5, 11 Cr.L.J. 211, 5 I.C. 720, where it has been held that the two offences cannot be said to be parts of the same transaction.

(4) If several accused carry out a systematic scheme of criminal breach of trust, by successive acts done at intervals, each accused alternately taking the benefits, the unity of the project constitutes the acts as parts of one transaction, and all the accused can therefore be jointly tried—*Emp. v. Datto Hanmant*, 30 Bom. 49.

(5) Charges of murder against three accused, and an alternative charge against one of them for murder or causing disappearance of evidence of murder can be jointly tried—*Crown v. Ghulam*, 1 S L.R. 73, 8 Cr.L.J. 191; *Emp. v. Hanmappa*, 25 Bom. L.R. 231, A.I.R. 1923 Bom. 262 *Contra*—*Q. E. v. Dungar*, 8 All 252.

(6) Where several persons were members of a secret society and conspired to wage war to deprive the King of the sovereignty of British India and collected arms and ammunitions for that purpose and actually waged war, it was held that the joint trial of all the accused for offences under sections 121, 121A, 122, 123 I P. C was legal—*Barindra v Emp.*, 37 Cal. 467; and so long as the conspiracy continues, the transaction which began with the forming of the common intention continues—*Khagendra v Emp.*, 19 C W N 706, 16 Cr L J 9.

(7) Where illegal gratification is paid to a person through another, the joint trial of both persons for offences under secs 161 and 162 I. P. C. is valid—*In re Shrinivas*, 7 Bom L R 637, 2 Cr L.J. 582

(8) Where several persons were entrusted with a sum of money and those persons in collusion committed criminal breach of trust or dishonestly misappropriated the amount, they could be jointly tried—*In re Appadurai*, 17 Cr.L.J. 30 (Mad).

(9) Cheating by A in respect of a certain sum collected from several persons on a certain date, and cheating by B in respect of another sum collected from some other persons at the same time, at the same place and in pursuance of the same conspiracy, are parts of the same transaction, and A and B may be tried together—*Kailash v K E*, 46 Cal 712, 29 C.L.J. 31. So also, conspiracy and acts of cheating in pursuance of that conspiracy can be tried together—*Abdul Salim v K E*, 49 Cal 573, 26 C W.N. 680, 35 C L J 279

(10) Where a gang of dacoits assembled on a highway for robbing passers-by, and in the course of the dacoity several offences were committed by them, held that all these offences were committed in the course of the same transaction. It is immaterial whether all the members of the gang took an active part in each offence—*Ram Prosad v Emp*, 20 A L J 926

(11) The offence of dacoity, the offence of dishonest possession of stolen property knowing it to have been stolen in the commission of a dacoity, and dishonest reception of such property, knowing it to be stolen, from a known dacoit can be tried together, as all the offences can be said to have been committed in the same transaction—*Emp v. Durga Prosad*, 45 All 223, 20 A.L.J. 981, 24 Cr L J 149 It will now fall under clause (c)

(12) The offence of fabricating false evidence in order to procure the conviction of an innocent person, the offence of instituting a false prosecution against that person, and the offence of giving false evidence in that prosecution in order to secure his conviction,—all these offences can be tried together, as there was one sustained and continuous plot for procuring conviction of an innocent person—*Emp. v. Ganesh*, 14 Bom. L.R. 972, 13 Cr.L.J. 833.

(13) Criminal conspiracy to commit the offences of importing arms and ammunition, murder, attempt to commit murder, grievous hurt, robbery, dacoity, and the commission of those offences, in pursuance of the conspiracy (secs. 19 and 20, Arms Act, secs. 302, 307, 326, 392, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398 I. P. C., and secs. 120-B and 109 I. P. C.)—*Maland Singh v Emp.*, 8 Lah. 230 (P.C.), A.I.R. 1927 P.C. 215, 29 Cr.L.J. 673. Offences under sec. 121A I. P. Code (conspiring to deprive His Majesty of the sovereignty of British India, conspiring to wage war against the Government, and conspiring to overawe the Government by means of criminal force) and offences under sec. 120B I. P. Code (conspiracy to commit dacoities either accompanied by murder or not accompanied by murder)—*Ram Prasad v Emp.*, 2 Luck. 631, 29 Cr.L.J. 129 (136).

(14) Where two persons were charged under two separate Acts (sec. 72 Provincial Insolvency Act and sec. 102 Pres. Town Insolv. Act), but the facts alleged against them were the same, viz. that the two accused carried on a joint business and each obtained credit concealing the fact that he was an undischarged insolvent, held that the two accused could be tried jointly—*Ganguly v Watson*, 53 Cal. 929, 27 Cr.L.J. 1269 (1272).

779. Offences not in the same transaction:—(1) In case of rioting, the two opposite factions cannot be said to commit the offence of rioting in the same transaction, the action of each side forming a separate transaction, the two parties must be tried separately—*Hussain Baksh v Emp.*, 6 Cal. 96, *Q. E. v Chandra Bhuiya*, 20 Cal. 537, *Ala Dya v. K. E.*, 1906 P.R. 5; *Emp v Bandho Singh*, 1881 A.W.N. 28. *Contra—Emp. v Mangat*, 18 A.L.J. 744.

(2) Murder and robbery on one occasion and another act of robbery committed a few hours after in another place though close to the scene of the former offences, do not form parts of the same transaction—*Q. E. v Mulua*, 14 All. 502. So also, murder by four men, and grievous hurt by three of them caused upon a person who tried to prevent them from carrying off the dead body some time after the murder, are not offences committed in the same transaction—*Nawab Singh v. Crown*, 1906 P.R. 10, 4 Cr.L.J. 285.

(3) Dacoities committed on different dates do not form part of the same transaction—*Emp. v. Datta*, 1882 A.W.N. 180; *Shanmuga v. Emp.*, 8 M.L.T. 286, 11 Cr.L.J. 477. So also, offences under secs. 147 and 325 I. P. C. committed on one date and offences under secs. 147, 323 and 342 I. P. C. committed on another date, cannot be tried together, as they were committed in different transactions—*Puttoo Lal v. Emp.*, 21 A.L.J. 820, 25 Cr.L.J. 446.

(4) Where a person obtained a promissory note by cheating and on a subsequent date he went with another person and both cashed the note, the two persons could not be charged and tried together for both the offences, since the occurrence of each date formed a distinct transaction by itself—*Hira Lal v. Emp.*, 31 Cal. 1053

(5) A charge of theft against one person and a charge against another person for rescuing the former from lawful custody cannot be tried together—*Tilukdhari v. Emp.*, 13 C.W.N. 804, *Q. E. v. Kutti*, 11 Mad. 441. Similarly, one person committing an offence punishable under the Railways Act, and other persons rescuing the former from the custody of the Police while he was arrested, cannot be tried jointly—*Gobind Kocri v. Emp.*, 29 Cal. 395.

(6) The offences of rioting and murder committed by five persons, and the offence of concealing the dead body (of a person killed in the riot) committed by the 5th accused, cannot be tried jointly. The offence of the 5th accused (concealing the dead body) should be tried separately—*Surendra v. Emp.*, 40 C.L.J. 559, 26 Cr L.J. 467

(7) A charge against five men of having committed a riot, and a charge against four of them of having committed criminal trespass on a different occasion cannot be tried together in the same trial—*Q. E. v. Chandi Singh*, 14 Cal. 395

(8) A person charged under secs. 414 and 411 I. P. C. cannot be tried jointly with four others charged under section 454 I. P. C.—*Sahib Singh v. Emp.*, 1905 P.R. 38, 1905 P.L.R. 115

(9) Two persons fabricating a *kubuliyat*, and two other persons fabricating another *kubuliyat*, the two sets of persons not having any community of interest, cannot be tried together—*Kazi Safiuddin v. Fazl Sheikh*, 21 C.W.N. 756, 18 Cr L.J. 833

(10) Two acts of abduction separate and distinct, though of the same girl, committed by two sets of persons at different dates cannot be tried together—*Emp. v. Esua*, 1 C.L.J. 475

(11) Where several dacoities were committed by several persons, but the persons implicated in one dacoity were not the same as those implicated in the other or others, the dacoities were not committed in the same transaction and could not be tried jointly—*Ram Sahai v. Emp.*, 19 A.L.J. 610, 22 Cr L.J. 397

(12) The author of a defamatory article, who is charged under sec. 500 I. P. C., and the printer of the article, who is charged under sec. 501 I. P. C. cannot be tried together when there is no evidence of conspiracy between them—*Asutosh v. Purna Chandra*, 50 Cal. 159, 36 C.L.J. 287, 24 Cr.L.J. 206 (*Bhawal Defamation Case*)

(13) Murder by one person, and intentional omission by another person who discovered the murder to give information in respect of the murder, cannot be said to be offences committed in the same transaction—*Ratan Singh v. Emp.*, 19 A.L.J. 915, 23 Cr.L.J. 8.

(14) The offence of receiving stolen property (sec. 413 I. P. C.) and the offence of belonging to a gang of thieves (sec. 401 I. P. C.) relate to different transactions and cannot be tried together—*Chhajju v. Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1097 (Lah.).

780. Clause (e) :—Under the old law it was held that where A and B were charged with house-breaking by night with intent to commit theft, and C with having received some of the stolen articles on a certain day, and D with having received some other stolen articles on another day, the joint trial of these persons would be illegal—*Emp. v. Girdhari*, 1882 A W N. 215. This ruling is now superseded by the new clause (e) of this section.

Where one person has committed *theft* and another person *received the stolen property* knowing it to be stolen, they can be tried jointly—*In re A David*, 6 C L R 245; *Emp v. Bhima*, 38 All. 311, 14 A.L.J. 344; *Emp v. Keshav Krishna*, 6 Bom L.R. 361; *Anwar v. Emp.*, 44 All 276, 20 A.L.J. 96, *Bishnu*, 1 C W N 35; *Karu v. Ram Charan*, 28 Cal 10; *Nga Po v Emp*, 4 Bur L.T. 263, 13 Cr.L.J. 59; and it is not necessary that the receiving should take place simultaneously with the theft—*Anwar v. Emp*, 44 All. 276. Even an appreciable interval of time between the two acts which are otherwise connected does not always prevent them from being parts of the same series of connected events and from being tried together—*Nga Nyo v K. E.*, 14 Bur.L.R. 38, 6 Cr.L.J. 28, *Nga Ton Pu v. K E*, 2 L B R 19. *In Emp. v. Jethalal*, 29 Bom 449 and *Ramratan v Emp*, 21 C W N. 1111, 19 Cr.L.J. 17, however, it is held that theft and receipt of stolen goods cannot be said to be acts committed in the same transaction, because the thief and the receiver of goods are not associated in the series of acts which form the same transaction from the very start, the one offence takes place after the other is completed. In another Calcutta case also it was held that unless the theft and subsequent receipt were committed in pursuance of the same conspiracy, the two offences could not be said to be parts of the same transaction and the offenders could not be tried together—*Ohi Bhusan v. Emp*, 46 Cal 741, 23 C W N 463, 29 C L.J. 212. Under the present clause, however, it is not necessary that the two offences must be committed in the same transaction or in pursuance of the same conspiracy; all that is now required is that one offender should commit theft and the other offender should receive the stolen property.

Dacoity, and receiving the property stolen in the dacoity may be tried together under this clause—*Durga Prosad v. Emp.*, 45 All. 223, 20 A.L.J. 981.

The offence of belonging to a gang of thieves (sec. 401 I. P. C.) is not an 'offence which includes theft' within the meaning of this clause, because the former offence is committed as soon as a gang of persons associated for the purpose of habitually committing theft is formed, and before any theft is actually committed by them. Therefore, an offence of belonging to a gang of thieves and an offence of receiving stolen property cannot be tried together, under this clause—*Chhajju v. Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1097 (Lah.).

Offences described in secs. 457 and 436 I. P. C. with which a person is charged cannot be tried along with offences under secs 411 and 414 I. P. C. with which other persons are charged, because sec. 436 does not include theft or extortion, though sec 457 does—*Sultan Ahmad v. Emp.*, 29 Cr.L.J. 1080 (Lah.).

781. Clause (f) :—The object of this clause and the meaning of the words "possession of which has been transferred by one offence" have been thus explained by Mr. Tonkinson during the debate in the Legislative Assembly: "Take a concrete example. A is a cattle-thief, two cattle are stolen; B is the dishonest receiver to whom A has passed on one of the cattle; C is the dishonest butcher who knows the cattle to have been stolen and assists in their concealment by slaughtering the other. Well, if A is present, A, B and C can all be tried together under clause (e). If A has disappeared, then this is not possible and the provisions of clause (f) are required. The possession of these cattle has been transferred by one offence, the original offence of theft. One person has later committed an offence under sec 411 I P C and another person has committed an offence under section 414 I. P. C. The two cattle were stolen at the same time, that is one offence"—*Legislative Assembly Debates*, 6th February 1923, page 1992. By this clause, the ruling in 28 Cal. 104 is rendered obsolete.

The only offences mentioned in this clause are offences under secs. 411 and 414 I. P. C.; and the provisions of this clause cannot be extended by analogy to a trial of persons accused of offences other than those specifically mentioned herein. Therefore, the joint trial of two accused, both charged under sec. 412 I. P. C., is illegal—*Behari v. K. E.*, 12 O.L.J. 339, 26 Cr.L.J. 1291, A.I.R. 1925 Oudh 452.

Receivers of stolen property stolen at one theft can be tried jointly, even though the stolen articles were received by them at different times—*Guljan v. Emp.*, 6 Pat. 583, 28 Cr L.J. 962. "The following cases may arise when stolen property is found in the possession of different receivers : (a) there may be one theft and the several receivers may have received the property jointly i.e., at one and the same time, (b) there may be one theft and the several receivers may have received the property at different times (as in the present case), (c) there may be two or more thefts and the several receivers may have received the property jointly, (d) there may be two or more thefts and the several receivers may have received the property in different times. Now, in cases (a) and (c) a joint trial is clearly permissible, because the property was received jointly, whether there was one or more than one theft. In case (d), a joint trial is illegal, because there is no community of purpose between the receivers. In case (b) a joint trial is permitted by clause (f) of sec 239. This clause practically declares that the different acts of receipts are one and the same transaction, if the transfer of possession from the owner to the thief was made by one and the same act (i.e. if the articles were stolen at one theft). The fact that the articles were received by the receivers at different times is immaterial; the words "possession of which has been transferred by one"

offence" refer to the transfer of possession from the true owner to the thief and not to the transfer of possession from the thief to the receivers"—per Mullic J in *Guljania v. Emp.*, supra

782. Clause (g):—A person who passes counterfeit coins and another who is in possession of them can be tried jointly—*Emp v. Prasanna*, 31 Cal 1007

783. Separate trial:—A joint trial is not compulsory under this section, the Magistrate has a discretion to proceed jointly or separately against the accused persons—*Govinda v. Emp.*, 16 N.L.R. 9, 21 Cr L.J. 769 Though the offences are committed in the same transaction, still it is a question for the Court in the exercise of its discretion to say whether the accused should be tried together or separately—*Emp. v. Charu Chandra*, 38 C L J 309, 25 Cr.L.J. 294 This section gives a judicial discretion to the Court to try the accused persons jointly or separately, and the manner in which the discretion should be exercised must depend upon the facts of each case—*Dwarka v K. E.*, 19 C.W.N. 121, 16 Cr L.J. 348 Although a joint trial is allowed under the circumstances specified in this section, still it is the duty of the Magistrate to see that the accused are not prejudiced thereby. No joinder of charges should be allowed if it bewilders any of the accused in his defence or unduly prejudices him—*Crown v. Ghulam*, 1 S L R. 73, 8 Cr.L.J. 191; *Pulisanki v. Q*, 5 Mad 20; *Alimuddi v K. E*, 52 Cal 253, 29 C.W.N. 173. Thus, a number of murders and an offence of arson were committed. Though all the accused were present, there was evidence against some of them only as regards those offences. There was evidence against all the accused together only of conspiracy to commit murder. All the accused were charged with conspiracy, murder and arson, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty against all the accused on all the charges. Held that the jury were embarrassed and the accused were prejudiced in their defence—*Alimuddi v K E.* (supra). If the accused appear to have acted independently and have separate defences, the joint trial is illegal—*Porasu Nayaka*, 2 Weir 303

Whenever the applicability of sec 239 is doubtful, it is better that the accused should be tried separately—*Samuallah v. Emp.*, 51 M L J 692, 27 Cr.L.J 1381

A separate trial is the rule, and joint trial is the exception, and it is for the prosecution to justify a joint trial—*Emp. v Durga Prasad*, 45 All. 223 (224), 20 A L.J 981

783A. Applicability of sec. 234 to sec. 239:—In Burma and Oudh it has been held that the words "the former part of this chapter" occurring at the end of this section mean the part prior to the part headed "joinder of charges" i.e., the part under the heading "form of charge"; therefore sec 234 will not control the provisions of sec 239—*Bishambhar v. K. E.*, 2 O.W.N. 760, 26 Cr L.J. 1602; *Po Mya v Emp*, 7 L.B.R 272, 16 Cr.L.J. 44 But in *Shanilar v. K. E.*, 11 A L.J. 188, 14 Cr.L.J. 116, it has been held that the words mean that secs 234 and 235 shall also apply to this section and that sec. 239 is

governed by secs. 234 and 235. But see *Janeshar v. Emp.*, 51 All. 544, 30 Cr L.J. 687 (688).

784. Misjoinder:—Where a case is not covered by the provisions of this section, e.g. where several persons are tried together for different offences but there is no alleged conspiracy between them nor are they accused of committing the same offence in the course of the same transaction, held that the joint trial is illegal, and not a mere irregularity curable by sec 537—*Sewak v. Emp.*, 26 A.L.J. 623, A.I.R. 1928 All. 417. Where several persons were charged with and tried at one trial for dacoity, and one of these persons was also tried for an offence under sec 20, Arms Act, for being in possession of arms and ammunitions at a time subsequent to the dacoity and after the transaction in which the dacoity was committed, it was held that the trial was illegal, and the fact that the Sessions Court acquitted him of the offence under the Arms Act, observing that the accused could not be legally convicted at the same trial of the offence under the Arms Act, could not cure the illegality—*Jaisingh v Crown*, 1917 P R 44, 19 Cr L.J. 100

240. When a charge containing* more heads than one is framed against the same person, and when a conviction has been had on one or more of them, the complainant, or the officer conducting the prosecution, may, with the consent of the Court, withdraw the remaining charge or charges, or the Court of its own accord may stay the inquiry into, or trial of, such charge or charges. Such withdrawal shall have the effect of an acquittal on such charge or charges, unless the conviction be set aside, in which case the said Court (subject to the order of the Court setting aside the conviction) may proceed with the inquiry into or trial of the charge or charges so withdrawn.

785. Scope of section:—This section applies where the accused is charged with several distinct offences and not where formal charges are drawn up against him—*Amir Chand v Emp.*, 1889 P R 24. Where the offence is one, but the charges are several because the offence falls under several sections of the I P C or because there is doubt as to which offence was committed, this section does not apply, and the conviction of the accused on one of the charges necessarily makes the other charges nugatory

If however the accused has committed several offences, and several charges are therefore drawn up, the conviction on one of the charges does not make the other charges nugatory, but it is open to a Court to convict the accused on the other charges or to withdraw the charges under this section—*Amir Chand v. Emp.*, 1889 P R. 24 This is an enabling section

offence" refer to the transfer of possession from the true owner to the thief and not to the transfer of possession from the thief to the receivers—per *Mullic J* in *Guljanias v. Emp.*, *supra*.

782. Clause (g):—A person who passes counterfeit coins and another who is in possession of them can be tried jointly—*Emp v Prasanna*, 31 Cal. 1007

783. Separate trial:—A joint trial is not compulsory under this section, the Magistrate has a discretion to proceed jointly or separately against the accused persons—*Govinda v. Emp.*, 16 N.L.R. 9, 21 Cr.L.J. 769. Though the offences are committed in the same transaction, still it is a question for the Court in the exercise of its discretion to say whether the accused should be tried together or separately—*Emp. v. Charu Chandra*, 38 C.L.J. 309, 25 Cr.L.J. 294. This section gives a judicial discretion to the Court to try the accused persons jointly or separately, and the manner in which the discretion should be exercised must depend upon the facts of each case—*Dwarka v. K. E.*, 19 C.W.N. 121, 16 Cr.L.J. 349. Although a joint trial is allowed under the circumstances specified in this section, still it is the duty of the Magistrate to see that the accused are not prejudiced thereby. No joinder of charges should be allowed if it bewilders any of the accused in his defence or unduly prejudices him—*Crown v. Ghulam*, 1 S.L.R. 73, 8 Cr.L.J. 191; *Pulisanki v. Q.*, 5 Mad 20; *Alimuddi v. K. E.*, 52 Cal 253, 29 C.W.N. 173. Thus, a number of murders and an offence of arson were committed. Though all the accused were present, there was evidence against some of them only as regards those offences. There was evidence against all the accused together only of conspiracy to commit murder. All the accused were charged with conspiracy, murder and arson, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty against all the accused on all the charges. Held that the jury were embarrassed and the accused were prejudiced in their defence—*Alimuddi v. K. E.* (*supra*). If the accused appear to have acted independently and have separate defences, the joint trial is illegal—*Porasu Nayaka*, 2 Weir 303.

Whenever the applicability of sec. 239 is doubtful, it is better that the accused should be tried separately—*Samiullah v. Emp.*, 51 M.L.J. 692, 27 Cr.L.J. 1381

A separate trial is the rule, and joint trial is the exception, and it is for the prosecution to justify a joint trial—*Emp v Durga Prosad*, 45 All 223 (224), 20 A.L.J. 981.

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as in a warrant case—*Raj Narain v. Lala Zamoli*, 11 Cal. 91; *In re Sobhanaran*, 39 Mad. 503; *Raghavalu v. Singaram*, 41 Mad. 727. But in such a case if the warrant case is not proved, the Magistrate may proceed with the summons-case according to the procedure laid down in this chapter and not under chapter XXI—*Q. E. v. Papadu*, 7 Mad. 454

241. The following procedure shall be observed by Magistrates in the trial of summons-cases.

Procedure in summons-cases.

242. When the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate, the particulars of the offence of which he is accused shall be stated to him, and he shall be asked if he has any cause to show why he should not be convicted; but it shall not be necessary to frame a formal charge.

Substance of accusation to be stated.

243. Particulars to be stated to accused :—It is necessary that the accused should have a clear statement made to him (a) that he is about to be put on his trial and (b) as to the offence or facts constituting the offence of the commission of which he is accused. If these particulars are not made known to him, the conviction will be set aside—*In re Acharjee Lal*, 3 C L 87. Omission to state to the accused the particulars of the offence with which he is charged amounts to an illegality vitiating the trial, and not a mere irregularity curable by sec 537—*Gopal Krishna v. Mohi Lal*, 54 Cal 359, 31 C W N. 167, 28 Cr.L.J. 155. Where the Magistrate did not explain to the accused the particulars of the offence of which he was accused, but merely told him that he was accused of an offence under sec. 19 of the Burma Village Act, the trial was illegal—*K. E v Nga Sein*, (1922) 4 U.B.R. 127.

244. Charge :—Although it is not necessary to frame a formal charge in a summons-case, still the provisions of section 233 as to joinder of charges apply to summons cases as well, because a charge is an essential element in any trial—*K. E. v San Dun*, 3 L B R 52. See also *U. N. Biswas v. K. E.*, 41 Cal 694 cited under sec 233.

When a summons-case is tried jointly with a warrant case, the procedure of a warrant case has to be followed, and a charge has to be drawn up not only for the warrant case but for the summons case also. Where therefore the accused was summoned for offences under secs 143 and 379 I. P. C. but only a charge for an offence under sec 379 I. P. C. was drawn up, a conviction under section 143 was set aside for the absence of a charge under that section—*Hossein v Kalu*, 29 Cal 481 (482).

245. If the accused admits that he has committed the offence of which he is accused, his admission shall be recorded as nearly as possible in the words

Conviction on admission of truth of accusation.

used by him; and, if he shows no sufficient cause why he should not be convicted, the Magistrate may convict him accordingly.

789. Change:—The word 'may' has been substituted for the word 'shall', by sec 66 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. Under the old law the Magistrate was bound to convict the accused if the latter pleaded guilty and there was nothing to show that the plea was not unreserved or voluntary—*Crown v. Aslam*, 8 S L R 213, 16 Cr L J 238. If the accused pleaded guilty, the Magistrate was bound to convict him; he had no power to discharge the accused on the ground that his criminal intention was wanting (In such a case, the Magistrate had to inflict a nominal penalty)—*Emp. v Nataraja*, 2 Cr L J. 468, U.B.R. 1905 Cr.P.C. 37.

Under the present amendment, the Magistrate is no longer bound to convict the accused on his own plea. "This amendment gives the Magistrate a discretion, which he does not now possess, as to convicting an accused who pleads guilty in a summons case, and the Court is thus able to refuse to accept a plea of guilty which it believes to be untrue."—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914). By making this amendment, the Legislature has reverted to the wording of the 1872 Code.

790. Admission of accused:—Where in a prosecution for obstructing the road with a bullock cart, the accused on being questioned whether he drove the cart on the particular road without permission, answered that he drove the cart without permission on account of ignorance and begged to be excused, held that this did not amount to an admission that he had committed the offence, and a conviction based thereon was wrong—*Emp v Gulam Raza*, 25 Cr.L J 707, A I.R. 1925 Lah 153.

Where permission has been given to the accused under sec 205 to appear by pleader, the latter can, under secs. 242 and 243, make the necessary answers and plead guilty or not guilty on behalf of the accused—*Dorabshah v Emp*, 50 Bom 250, 27 Cr.L.J. 440 (see this case cited in Note 691 under sec 205). But the Oudh Chief Court holds that it is an incorrect procedure to convict an accused on an admission made by his counsel, without examining the accused or recording any evidence—*Municipal Board v Tulshi Ram*, 1 O W.N. 495, 26 Cr.L J. 179.

The Legislature requires that the admission shall be recorded as nearly as possible in the words used by the accused, because the right of appeal depends upon whether he really pleaded guilty or not—*Q. E. v. Md Hanif*, 1889 A W.N. 81, and an omission to comply with the law in this respect cannot be countenanced, as it invariably leads to complications—*Lalji Ram*, A I.R. 1928 Cal. 243 (244). When an accused person makes an exculpatory statement before the framing of a charge, the Magistrate should take down the plea in the form of question and answer, and in the exact words used by the accused in answer to the charge—*Emp. v Abdul Hossein*, 5 Bom.L R. 999.

The admission of the accused should be recorded at once, at the time of the trial, and not afterwards from the rough notes nor from the Magistrate's memory—*Q. E. v. Erugadu*, 15 Mad. 83.

If a warrant case is tried under the summons case procedure, the Magistrate cannot convict the accused on his own admission without recording evidence and without framing a formal charge—*Natabar v. K. E.*, 27 C.W.N. 923.

244. (1) If the Magistrate does not convict the accused under the preceding section, or if the accused does not

Procedure when no such admission is made.

make such admission, the Magistrate shall proceed to hear the complainant (if any), and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution, and also to hear the accused and take all such evidence as he produces in his defence :

Provided that the Magistrate shall not be bound to hear any person as complainant in any case in which the complaint has been made by a Court.

(2) The Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, on the application of the complainant or accused, issue process to compel the attendance of any witness or the production of any document or other thing.

(2) The Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, on the application of the complainant or accused, issue a summons to any witness directing him to attend or to produce any document or other thing.

(3) The Magistrate may, before summoning any witness on such application, require that his reasonable expenses, incurred in attending for the purposes of the trial, be deposited in Court.

Change —This section has been amended by section 67 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923

The italicised words at the beginning of the section have been added as consequential to the amendment made in sec 243. The proviso has been introduced "to provide for the case where a complaint has been made by a Court, and we have made a similar amendment in section 252"—*Report of the Joint Committee (1922)* In sub-sec (2) the word 'summons' has been substituted for "process", for reasons see Note 792 below

791. Magistrate's duty to examine complainant, witnesses, etc. —If a Magistrate adopts the procedure prescribed by this section on the footing that there was no admission of guilt on the part of the accused person, the Magistrate is not competent to take a further

plea of guilty from the accused person, and relieve himself of the duty of examining the prosecution witnesses—*Lalji Ram*, A.I.R. 1928 Cal. 243 (244)

The Magistrate is not at liberty to stop a case whenever he likes. If the accused does not make the admission under sec. 243, the Magistrate is bound to hear the complainant and his witnesses; and he is not competent to acquit the accused without examining them—*Q. E. v. Toulman*, Ratanlal 539, *Kesri v. Md. Baksh*, 18 All. 221; *In re Ahlad Monee*, 6 W.R. 75. It is not sufficient to examine the complainant alone; if the complainant has any witnesses, they must also be examined—*Korapula v. Monapa*, 5 Mad. 160; and the Magistrate is not entitled to acquit the accused on a consideration of the complainant's statement alone—*Q. E. v. Sinnai*, 20 Mad. 388.

If the complainant declines to be examined, it is the duty of the Magistrate to proceed to take the evidence of his other witnesses before dismissing the complaint, although, in any event, a strong preliminary presumption against the truth of the complainant's case would arise from his contumacious refusal to allow himself to be examined. An order of acquittal passed under sec. 245 (1) without so examining the other witnesses is a wrong order—*Damduo v. Harba*, 28 Cr.L.J. 511 (Nag)

Again, it is *prima facie* the duty of the prosecution to call the witnesses who proves their connection with the transaction in question and who from the connection must be able to give important information—*Emp v. Dhunno*, 8 Cal. 121; *Q. E. v. Ram Sahai*, 10 Cal. 1070. All persons said to have witnessed the offence should be produced before the Magistrate—*Kaimi v. Crown*, 1916 P.R. 12, 17 Cr.L.J. 267. If such witnesses are not called, an adverse inference against the prosecution may be drawn—*Emp v. Dhunno*, 8 Cal. 121.

Moreover, the Magistrate is bound to examine the accused and his witnesses—*In re Ahlad Monee*, 6 W.R. 75. He is bound to examine all the witnesses that are produced by the accused, and has no discretion in this matter—*In re Ameer Chand*, 13 W.R. 63. The Magistrate has no power to arbitrarily limit the number of witnesses to be examined, though he has undoubted jurisdiction to curtail the number of unnecessary witnesses on the ground that their examination will delay and probably defeat the ends of justice—*Biswanath v. Shivanand*, 2 P.L.T. 330. It is also the duty of the Magistrate to enquire of the accused as to whether he has any witness to produce. Where no such enquiry is made, the conviction is liable to be set aside—*Emp v. Jivan*, 1884 P.R. 7. If the accused does not produce any witness, no unfavourable inference will be drawn against him—*Emp. v. Dhunno*, 8 Cal. 121.

The Magistrate must base his decision on the evidence produced on either side in Court, he cannot rely on statements made to him out of Court—*Q. E. v. Sahadeb*, 14 Bom. 572.

Cross-examination:—In summons cases the accused has no right to postpone the cross-examination of any prosecution witness, as in the case of trial of a warrant case. But if the cross-examination was postponed in

accordance with the direction of the Magistrate, he is bound to give further opportunity to the accused to cross-examine the witness. Otherwise the evidence of such witness will not be legally admissible—*Parmeshwar v. Emp.*, 3 P.L.T. 347.

792. Issue of summons :—If the complainant or the accused thinks that any witness is not likely to appear without summons, he should apply beforehand to the Magistrate for summons to enforce his attendance—*In re Chedee Koongra*, 14 W.R. 76. When such application is made, the Magistrate must either grant or refuse the application; he cannot simply 'file' it—*Bhomar v. Digambar*, 6 C.W.N. 548.

The Magistrate has a discretion as to whether he will issue summons or not—*In re Chedee*, 14 W.R. 76, *Jhabbu v. Emp.*, 21 Cr.L.J. 385 (All.). Where a complainant mentioned the name of several witnesses but could only produce two of them, the Magistrate could decide the case on the evidence of the two witnesses alone—*In re Notobur*, 15 W.R. 87, and was not bound to issue summons to the other witnesses—*Anonymous*, 4 M.H.C.R. App. 29.

But where a summons had already been issued to a witness and he did not appear in obedience to the summons, it was held under the old law that the Magistrate was bound to issue further process against that witness and had no discretion to refuse to issue further process—*Daulat v. Brinda*, 30 Cal. 121. The party at whose instance the process was originally issued had a right to call upon the Court to compel the attendance of his witness—*Bhomar v. Digambar*, 6 C.W.N. 548. But by virtue of the present amendment of sub-section (2), this section read with section 90 will give a discretion to the Magistrate to issue further process (warrant) or not. This amendment has been made on the recommendation of the *Select Committee of 1916* who observed "The difficulty intended to be dealt with by this clause rests upon the words 'process to compel the attendance,' as seems clear from the Calcutta decisions. We think that the only alteration really required is to substitute for the words referred to above the simpler expression 'a summons to any witness directing him to attend, etc.' This we think will make section 90 clearly applicable, which is, in our opinion, all that is required."

If a witness summoned by the Magistrate does not care to appear, the Magistrate is not bound to re-issue the summons, it is in his discretion to issue fresh summons if he likes, but this section does not compel him to issue fresh summons to the witness—*Selvamuthu v. Chinnappan*, 27 Cr.L.J. 76, A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 361. Under the old section, there was the phrase "compel the attendance of any witness" but in the present section the words used are "summon any witness directing him to attend." Under the present section, evidently the Magistrate cannot compel a witness to appear before him, if the witness refuses to appear. If the witness refuses to appear, he may be liable for disobedience of the summons, but the complainant or accused is not entitled to ask the Court as a matter of right to compel the attendance of any witness who does

not care to attend in obedience to the summons—*Selvarimuthu v. Chinnappan* (supra).

793. Sub-section (3)—Payment of process fee :—If the complainant fails to deposit fees for summoning witnesses, the Magistrate must deal with the case on such evidence as he may have before him, but should not dismiss the complaint—*Korapulu v. Monappa*, 5 Mad 160.

If the accused fails to deposit process fees, the Magistrate may refuse to issue process, but this order of refusal must be sparingly passed, and such order would be improper in a case where the accused is unable or unwilling to deposit the money, and the result is that he is convicted without his witnesses being heard, especially if the case is one in which a severe sentence is passed—*Qadu v. Q. E.*, 1898 P.R. 7.

245. (1) If the Magistrate upon taking the evidence

Acquittal.

referred to in Section 244 and such further evidence (if any) as he may, of his own motion, cause to be produced, and (if he thinks fit) examining the accused, finds the accused not guilty, he shall record an order of acquittal.

(2) Where the Magistrate does not proceed in accordance with the provisions of Section

Sentence.

349 or Section 562, he shall, if he finds the accused guilty, pass sentence upon him according to law.

Change —The italicised words in Sub-section (2) have been added by sec. 68 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act XVIII of 1923. This amendment is merely one of drafting. A similar amendment has been made in sec. 258 (2) and sec. 306 (2).

794. Acquittal—Discharge :—A Magistrate who does not find the accused guilty, must record an order of acquittal. No order of discharge can be passed under this section—*Amir Khan v. Emp.*, 1900 P.R. 19. Even if he styles his order as an order of discharge, the discharge will amount to an acquittal, for no other order is contemplated in summons cases. That being so, the Sessions Judge has no power to take action under sec. 437 (now 436) against a person alleged to be discharged—*Sessions Judge v. Venkataramaiyer*, 8 M L T. 78, 11 Cr L.J. 350.

If, on the contrary, the Magistrate tried a warrant case as a summons case without framing a charge and passed an order of acquittal, the so called acquittal would operate as a discharge under sec. 253 of the Code—*Emp. v. Jadu*, 1886 A.W.N. 260. If, however, the Magistrate framed a charge in a summons case, the acquittal should be under sec. 253 and not under this section—*Radanath v. Wooma Churn*, 22 W.R. 12.

Compensation to accused —When the Magistrate acquits an accused under this section on the ground that the complaint was vexatious, he

can under sec. 250 direct the complainant to pay compensation to the accused—*Q. E. v. Pandu*, 10 Bom. 199; *Number v. Ambu*, 5 Mad. 381. Even if the Magistrate tries a warrant case as a summons case and acquits the accused, he can award compensation.

'*Shall pass sentence*':—If the Magistrate convicts the accused, he is bound to pass some sentence, at least a nominal one—*Anonymous*, 4 M.H.C.R. App. 66; *Q. E. v. Hanmant*, 2 Bom L.R. 611, *Emp. v. Nataraja*, U B R (1905) Cr.P.C. 37, 2 Cr L J. 468

246. A Magistrate may, under Section 243 or 245, convict the accused of any offence triable under this Chapter which from the facts admitted or proved he appears to have committed, whatever may be the nature of the complaint or summons.

795. Scope of section.—This section enables the Magistrate to proceed in regard to any other offence *prima facie* established by the evidence for the prosecution. It is not necessary that the case started by the complainant must be the one which the Court should find proved, before it arrives at a conclusion of the guilt of the accused. The Court is not bound by all the statements of the complainant. Its duty is to find out the truth in the midst of the conflicting evidence—*Emp. v. Somnath*, 14 Bom L.R. 135. The rule is, that a Magistrate is not bound to adhere to any particular section which may happen to be mentioned by the complainant in his complaint, but may apply any section of the law which he thinks applicable to the case, so long as the parties are not misled and the proper procedure is observed—*Kalidass v. Mohendro*, 12 W.R. 40 (41). But it is not necessary, when the Magistrate thinks that other offences have been committed, to reopen the trial or to follow the procedure of secs 243 and 244. Such a procedure would involve the rehearing of all the evidence in the same trial and is clearly opposed to the intention of the Legislature—*Dasarath v. Emp.*, 36 Cal 869.

This section applies even in the absence of a formal complaint in the first instance. The evidence of the complainant which evinces a desire on his part that the accused should be proceeded against may be treated as a complaint—*Framji v. Emp.*, 28 Bom L.R. 291, 27 Cr.L.J. 496. This section does not mean that the accused in a summons case can be convicted of an offence alleged to have been committed on a date to which no reference has been made in the complaint or summons—*Sarkar v. Howrah Municipality*, 22 Cr L J 559 (Cal).

247. If the summons has been issued on complaint, and upon the day appointed for the appearance of the accused, or any day subsequent thereto to which the hearing may be adjourned, the complainant does not

Non-appearance of complainant.

appear, the Magistrate shall, notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, acquit the accused, unless for some reason he thinks proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day :

Provided that, where the complainant is a public servant and his personal attendance is not required, the Magistrate may dispense with his attendance, and proceed with the case

795A. Scope—This section does not apply to cases instituted under section 195, and the Magistrate cannot dismiss the complaint for default of the complainant to appear—*Q. E v Ramchandra, Ratanlal* 137 (139) See proviso

This section does not apply unless the case is instituted upon a complaint. Under sec 47 of the U P. Act II of 1916, it is the Magistrate who takes cognizance of the offence upon information received. So the case is not one instituted on a complaint, and sec 247 of this Code has no application. In spite of non-appearance of the complainant, the proceeding must continue—*Basanti v. Maqsud*, 26 Cr.L.J. 170 (All).

This section does not apply to proceedings under sec 107, because those proceedings do not amount to a trial of an accused for any offence. Consequently the non-appearance of the complainant does not enable the Magistrate to acquit the person proceeded against. The proper order to be passed is an order of discharge under sec. 119 on the ground that in the absence of any evidence on behalf of the complainant, it is not proved that the person proceeded against should execute a bond—*Asrafali v. Nasu Sarkar*, 31 C.W.N. 388, 28 Cr.L.J. 479 (480)

796. 'Does not appear'.—The appearance of the complainant's Vakil is not appearance of the complainant within the meaning of this section, unless the Court has dispensed with his personal attendance and has specially allowed him to appear by a pleader—*Ponnaganti v. Kotajjan*, 2 Weir 309; *Nagarambili v. Matta Jagannath*, 49 Mad. 883, 27 Cr.L.J. 998

If the complainant does not appear at the time of hearing, the Court is not bound to wait for the complainant till the Court closes for the day—*Kuttial v. Pari Mahai*, 7 Mad 356. The Magistrate is empowered to dismiss the complaint if the complainant does not appear when the case is called on for hearing, even though he appears soon after—*Rangasami v. Narasimhulu*, 7 Mad 213; *Nagarambili v. M. Jagannatha*, (supra).

Although a Magistrate has power to dismiss the complaint for default of the complainant's appearance, he should exercise his power with a reasonable discretion. He should not dismiss the complaint where the non-appearance of the complainant was due to circumstances beyond his control, e.g. a heavy flood which cut off all communications—*Tazoonissa v. Wassil*, 24 W.R. 64; *Q. v. Madhoo*, 5 W.R. 51; or when the case was transferred from one Magistrate to another, and the complainant was

present in the Court premises, but not having had notice of the transfer did not appear before the particular Magistrate who had charge of the case, but appeared in the previous Court—*In re Ramanath*, 13 C.L.R. 303; *Gunpat v. Good*, 47 Cal. 147; *Etim Haji v. Hamid*, 24 C.L.J. 444, 18 Cr L.J. 104; or where the complainant had been kept out of the way by the action of the accused in getting a constable to arrest him on a false charge—*In re Sinna Goundan*, 38 Mad. 1028; or where the case was called on for hearing on a date not fixed for hearing and the complainant was necessarily absent—*Achambit v. Mahatap*, 42 Cal. 365, 18 C.W.N. 1180, 16 Cr L.J. 148, or where the complainant was in jail and could not therefore appear—*Reg. v. Virbhadra*, Ratanlal 59. If the complainant is ordered to appear at 11 A.M. and he appears, but the Court does not sit till 2 P.M., and he does not wait, it cannot be said that the complainant has failed to appear—*Ahmed Meera v. Meeran*, 25 L.W. 358, 28 Cr.L.J. 208.

Non-appearance on adjourned hearing—A Magistrate can dismiss a complaint and acquit the accused, not only where the complainant does not appear on the first day of hearing but also where he fails to appear on the date of adjourned hearing—*Latchamana*, 2 Weir 308; *Mudoo-soodun v. Hari Dass*, 22 W.R. 40, *Ramjiwan v. Abilakh*, 18 C.W.N. 584. But this power to dismiss a complaint must be exercised with discretion. Where the complainant has done all that is necessary for him to do to establish his case, a complaint ought not to be dismissed for his non-appearance on an adjourned date, unless his attendance is in the opinion of the Magistrate specially required on that day—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 306; *Nagayya*, 2 Weir 306; *Girish Chandra v. Bhushan Das*, 46 Cal. 867, 23 C.W.N. 959, 20 Cr.L.J. 492.

Again, a Magistrate cannot dismiss a complaint for non-appearance of the complainant on the adjourned date, if the order of adjournment was not made in the presence and hearing of parties—*Anonymous*, 8 M.H.C. R App 5, or where the complainant had no knowledge or notice of the date to which the case had stood adjourned—*Nune Panakalu v. Ravula*, 52 Mad. 695, 30 Cr L.J. 191 (196), or where the Magistrate did not specify the place where the case was to be taken up, but ordered the parties to appear 'either at Aligarh or at Talibnagar'—*In re Bansidhar*, 1882 A.W.N. 229.

Non-appearance on date of judgment—This section applies to a case of absence of the complainant on the date fixed for his appearance or on the date of adjourned hearing, and does not apply to a case where the complainant is absent on the date fixed for delivery of the judgment. If on such a date the complainant is absent (and the attendance of the complainant on that date was not specially directed by the Magistrate) an order of acquittal of the accused on the ground of absence of the complainant is erroneous—*Girish Chandra v. Bhushan*, 46 Cal 867, *Emp. v. Jangusingh*, 19 N.L.R. 48.

797. Order of acquittal :—In a summons case, if the complainant is absent on the day of hearing, the proper order to be passed by

the Magistrate under sec. 247 is one of acquittal and not one 'striking off' the complaint—*In re Dubash*, 10 Bom. L.R. 628.

The accused is entitled to acquittal if the complainant is absent, and unless the Court thinks proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day. In other words, the right to an order of acquittal accrues to the accused upon two conditions, and is dependent *firstly* on the absence of the complainant, and *secondly* on the Court not adjourning the case. But if on the date of hearing the case is not taken up at all, it cannot be said that the second condition is fulfilled, and the accused is not entitled to acquittal owing to the absence of the complainant on that date—*Rash Behary v. Corporation of Calcutta*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1050 (Cal.)

Warrant case—If a warrant case is tried by the Magistrate as a summons case, the procedure is bad, and he cannot pass an order under this section dismissing the complaint for non-appearance of the complainant—*Ram Coomar v. Ramji*, 4 C.W.N. 26

Where two charges, one a summons case and another on a warrant case, are jointly tried in one trial and the complainant is absent on the adjourned hearing, the Magistrate ought to make an order of discharge under sec. 259 and not one of acquittal under this section—*Raghavulu v. Singaram*, 41 Mad 727, *Rajnarain v. Lala Zamoli*, 11 Cal 91

If a summons case is tried under the warrant case procedure, and eventually the Magistrate acquits the accused under sec. 247 on account of the absence of the complainant on an adjourned date of hearing, held that the acquittal is legal and proper. Section 247 lays down a general principle that a person charged with a summons-case offence is entitled to an acquittal if the complainant is absent, and there is no reason why this right should be denied to him simply because the Magistrate has adopted a different procedure for the trial of the case—*Venkatarama v. Sundaram*, 44 M.L.J. 119.

Further inquiry—Since an order under this section is one of acquittal and not one of discharge, no further inquiry can be directed under sec. 436—*Bindra v. Bhagwantra*, 25 Cr.L.J. 359 (Oudh).

Absence of accused—This section has nothing to do with the presence or absence of the accused. If the complainant is absent, the case will be dismissed and the accused acquitted, whether the latter is present or not—17 C.W.N. clix. If the complainant is absent, the accused must be acquitted and it is immaterial that the summons to the accused had not been served and that the accused was not present when he was acquitted—*Kiran Sarkar v. Emp.*, 5 P.L.T. 15, 24 Cr.L.J. 815; *Shankar v. Dattatraya*, 53 Bom 693, 1929 Cr.C. 436 (437). (Contra—*Kandappa Chetty*, 2 Weir 307). If there are several accused, and one is present and the others absent, the order acquitting the accused who is present will put an end to the case also against the other accused who are not before the Court—*Panchu Singh v. Umar Mahomed*, 4 C.W.N. 346

Appeal to District Magistrate—If an order of dismissal is passed under this section, the District Magistrate has no power to set aside the

order of acquittal on appeal, because under sec. 417 an appeal against an order of acquittal must be directed by the Government and presented to the High Court—*Rangasami v. Narasimhulu*, 7 Mad. 213; *Nityananda v. Rakhahari*, 38 C.L.J. 196, 24 Cr.L.J. 716

798. Revival of complaint—Retrial :—The Code contains no provision empowering a Magistrate to revive a case after an order of dismissal is passed under this section—*Ram Coomar v. Ramji*, 4 C.W.N. 26. The Magistrate has no jurisdiction to restore a case after it has been dismissed for default of appearance of the complainant and the accused has been acquitted, even though good cause is shown for the complainant's non-appearance. An acquittal under this section does not stand on any different footing from an acquittal passed under any other circumstances, and the Magistrate cannot set aside his own order of acquittal—*Lakshminarasimham v. Nalluri Bapanna*, 52 M.L.J. 173, 28 Cr.L.J. 270. The dismissal of a complaint under this section amounts to an acquittal and bars a subsequent trial on a fresh complaint on the same facts (section 403) even if good cause is shown for non-appearance of the complainant—*Emp v. Dulla*, 45 All 58, *Shankar v. Dattatraya*, 53 Bom. 693, 1929 Cr.C. 436 (437), *In re Sinnu Goundan*, 38 Mad 1028, 26 M.L.J. 160, *In re Guggilappu*, 34 Mad 253, 12 Cr.L.J. 41, *Panchu v. Umar*, 4 C.W.N. 346, *Emp v. Bhawan Prasad*, 1885 A.W.N. 43, *Ram Mahato v. Emp.*, 2 P.L.T. 170, *Kiran Sarkar v. Emp.*, 5 P.L.T. 15; *Nityananda v. Rakhahari*, 38 C.L.J. 196. Even the District Magistrate has no power to order the entertainment of a complaint which was dismissed for default of appearance—*Narayanasami v. Janaki*, 2 Weir 308. He cannot order the entertainment of a fresh complaint for a different offence on the same facts—*Fazar v. K. E.*, 37 C.L.J. 253, 25 Cr.L.J. 149. But if the proceedings are so irregular as not to amount to a trial, the dismissal will not amount to an acquittal and the complaint may be revived—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 307; *Reg. v. Virbhadra*, Ratanlal 59. In *Ram Mahato v. Emp.*, 2 P.L.T. 170 it has been held that even if the order of acquittal is passed under a misapprehension, still the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of a fresh complaint, if the order is wrong, the complainant can take proper steps by way of revision, but he cannot file a fresh complaint.

In a Madras case it has been pointed out that the accused who is acquitted under this section owing to the absence of the complainant on the date fixed for hearing is acquitted without trial on the merits, he cannot be said to have been 'tried' within the meaning of sec. 403, and therefore an acquittal under this section is not a bar to a second complaint of the offence on the same facts—*Kotayya v. Venkayya*, 40 Mad 977 (Note), 19 Cr.L.J. 497, dissenting from *In re Guggilappu*, 34 Mad 253. But the other High Courts are of opinion that an acquittal under section 247 acts as a bar to further proceedings in the same way as an acquittal after trial on the merits—See *Emp. v. Dulla* 45 All 58, *Panchu v. Umar*, 4 C.W.N. 346; *In re Guggilappu Paddy*, 34 Mad 253 and the other cases cited above.

*Fresh process for other offences including the previous one :—*Where a Magistrate issued process against and summoned the accused persons for one of several offences alleged against them, and acquitted them under this section for default of complainant's appearance, no fresh process could in view of sec 403 (1) be issued against them in respect of all the offences alleged against them on the previous occasion, including the one in respect of which they were summoned and acquitted—*Suresh v. Banku*, 2 C.L.J. 622.

799. Order of adjournment :—On default of the complainant's appearance the Magistrate has a discretion either to dismiss the complaint and acquit the accused or to adjourn the hearing or he can even proceed to examine the witnesses in the absence of the complainant. Such a procedure is not illegal if the accused is not prejudiced—*Sarafji v. K. E.*, 24 C.W.N. 199.

The Magistrate cannot adjourn the hearing unless there are sufficient and proper grounds for doing so. The fact that the accused has been guilty of contempt of the processes of the Court is no good reason for proceeding with the case—17 C.W.N. cliv. But a Magistrate can adjourn the hearing for the purpose of allowing the accused time to secure the attendance of his witnesses—*In re Dinno Roy*, 16 W.R. 21.

This section merely authorises the Magistrate to adjourn the case to enable the complainant to appear, but it does not authorise him to dispense with the presence of the complainant, except when he is a public servant—*Manja Baksh v. Marshall*, 27 Cr.L.J. 1022 (Lah.).

800. Death of complainant :—It is open to doubt whether this section applies where the non-appearance of the complainant is due to his death. But if on the day fixed for hearing the son of the deceased complainant appears and asks the Magistrate to proceed with the case, the Magistrate ought to proceed and should not acquit the accused under this section—*Jitan v. Domoo*, 1 P.L.J. 264, 18 Cr.L.J. 151; *Madhu Chowdhury v. Torab*, 18 C.W.N. 1211. *In re Mahomed Azam*, 28 Bom. L.R. 288, 27 Cr.L.J. 491. But see *Purna Chandra v. Dengar*, 19 C.W.N. 334 (335), 16 Cr.L.J. 322 and *In re Appala Naidu*, 51 Mad. 339, 29 Cr.L.J. 257 (258), where it has been held that if the complainant dies pending the trial, the Magistrate should acquit the accused and should not proceed further with the trial, he should not adjourn the case in order to enable the complainant's son to come on the record.

801. Revision :—An acquittal under this section does not stand on any different footing from an acquittal ordered in any other circumstances, and the High Court will not set aside an acquittal in revision except under very rare circumstances—*Lakshminarasimham v. Nallart*, 52 M.L.J. 173, 28 Cr.L.J. 270. A somewhat contrary view has been taken by the Oudh Court, under certain special circumstances, in the case of *Ram Nidk v. Ram Saran*, 26 O.C. 283, A.I.R. 1924 Oudh 64, 25 Cr.L.J. 794.

Where an order is passed by the Magistrate acquitting an accused under sec. 247, the order can only be set aside by the High Court. The Magistrate or his successor has no power to revive the proceedings by setting aside the order—*Nityananda v. Rakhari*, 38 C.L.J. 196, 24 Cr.L.J. 716

248. If a complainant, at any time before a final order is passed in any case under this Chapter, satisfies the Magistrate that there are sufficient grounds for permitting him to withdraw his complaint, the Magistrate may permit him to withdraw the same, and shall thereupon acquit the accused.

Withdrawal of complaint.

802. Scope of section.—This section applies only to summons cases. A withdrawal of complaint is permissible only in summons cases—*Murray v. Q. E.*, 21 Cal. 103, *Sambasivanna v. Bhogappa*, 5 Mad. 378; *Q. E. v. Lilladhar*, Ratanlal 461. If the offence charged in a warrant case (and is non-compoundable), the Magistrate must proceed with the inquiry or trial in spite of the withdrawal of the complaint, if he finds the elements of the offence set forth in the complaint—*In re Ganesh Narayan*, 13 Bom 600; *Emp. v. Ranchhod*, 37 Bom 369; *Maung Thu v. U Po*, 5 Rang. 136, 28 Cr.L.J. 649

This section is limited in its operation to cases instituted upon complaints in the strict sense. If A gave information to the Police, and the Magistrate took cognizance of the case upon the Police report, there was no complaint within the meaning of sec. 4 (h.), and A could not be permitted to withdraw—*Q. E. v. Chenchayya*, 23 Mad 626

Sec. 537 of the Calcutta Municipal Act (Act III of 1923 B C) which authorises the Corporation to withdraw from legal proceedings, must be read subject to the provisions of sec. 248 Cr. P. Code, which permit the complainant to withdraw his complaint "if he can satisfy the Magistrate that there are sufficient grounds for permitting him to withdraw his complaint." It follows, therefore, that before a withdrawal can be permitted under sec. 537 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, there must be sufficient grounds for the withdrawal to the satisfaction of the Magistrate—*Sisir Kumar v. Corporation of Calcutta*, 53 Cal 631, 30 C.W.N. 598, 27 Cr.L.J. 984.

This section contemplates a withdrawal of the complaint as a whole. Where a complaint against several accused persons is withdrawn as against one of them, this amounts to a withdrawal of the whole complaint in respect of all the accused—*Shyam Behari v. Sagar Singh*, 1 P.L.T. 32. The withdrawal of the case absolves not only the accused present but also all the accused—*Amar Ali v. Emp.* 2 P.L.T. 584, 22 Cr.L.J. 675. Contra—*Rohti Singh v. Makdam*, 9 O.L.J. 54, 23 Cr.L.J. 271 and *Anantia v. Crown*, 5 Lah 239 (*per Le Rossignol J*) where it is held that the withdrawal against some does not amount to a withdrawal against

all It should be noted that this latter view is in consonance with the provisions of sec. 345 (as now amended) under which the composition of an offence with one of the accused does not amount to a composition with all the accused.

803. Withdrawal of complaint:—*Withdrawal and Compromise:—*There is a well-marked distinction between a withdrawal of a case under this section and a compromise under sec. 345. Compromise contemplates an arrangement between two parties; withdrawal has no such meaning. A case is said to be compromised if it is withdrawn with the consent of the accused, whereas a case is withdrawn under this section without the consent of the accused. Therefore when a petition is filed by the complainant praying for striking off the case, the Magistrate should satisfy himself under what section the petition is made. If the case is not being compromised but is being withdrawn without the consent of the accused, the petition is not a petition under sec. 345 but under this section, and the Magistrate may, in spite of the petition, proceed with the trial and convict the accused—*Bayan Ali v. K. E.*, 20 C.W.N. 1209, 18 Cr.L.J. 107. See also Note 992 under sec. 345

Who can withdraw.—Only the complainant can withdraw the case. In cases of contempt of the lawful authority of a public servant, the complainant is the public servant whose authority has been resisted, and not the person injured by such resistance; and the former alone can withdraw—*In re Muse Ali*, 2 Bom. 653. Where a Municipal Secretary instituted a complaint, the Municipal Council was not competent to withdraw—*Paramananda v. Karunakara*, 27 M.L.J. 617, 15 Cr.L.J. 299

When to withdraw.—The complainant can withdraw at any time 'before a final order is passed.' But these words do not refer to a time so early as when no process has been issued to the accused. An order of acquittal passed on an application for withdrawal preferred before issue of process is unmeaning and of no avail—*In re Muthia Moopan*, 36 Mad. 315, 14 Cr.L.J. 559

*Magistrate alone can permit withdrawal:—*This section does not empower a Police officer to entertain an application for withdrawal of a complaint. The permission for withdrawal is a judicial act, and the Magistrate alone can do it—*Anonymous*, Ratanlal 91

A petition for withdrawal of a case should be judicially determined by the Magistrate himself, and it is wholly improper for him to refer the matter to the Police for report, and then to act on the report in refusing or allowing withdrawal. The Magistrate should not allow himself to be guided by what the Police thought about the matter—*Azizur Rahman v. Emp.*, 43 C.L.J. 214, 27 Cr.L.J. 394

May permit.—It is discretionary with the Magistrate to permit the complainant to withdraw. The Magistrate can, in spite of the application for withdrawal, proceed with the trial and convict the accused—*Bayan Ali v. K. E.*, 20 C.W.N. 1209 (Pat.)

*Revival of withdrawn complaint:—*Where a Deputy Magistrate allowed a complaint to be withdrawn and discharged the accused, the District

Magistrate could not revive the case against the accused—*Q. v. Zuhoorul*, 25 W R. 64.

But where the complaint was withdrawn, because there was no sanction (the case being one in which a sanction was necessary), and the accused was discharged, the complainant was competent to lodge a fresh complaint after obtaining the necessary sanction—*In re Samsuddin*, 22 Bom 711.

249. In any case instituted otherwise than upon complaint, a Presidency Magistrate, a Magistrate of the first class, or with the previous sanction of the District Magistrate, any other Magistrate, may, for reasons to be recorded by him, stop the proceedings at any stage without pronouncing any judgment either of acquittal or conviction, and may thereupon release the accused.

Power to stop proceeding when no complaint.

804. Scope :—This section deals only with *summons* cases instituted otherwise than upon complaints, and is inapplicable to *warrant* cases. Therefore, an order by a Magistrate stopping a warrant case and releasing the accused under this section is illegal, the case will be treated as still on the pending file of the Magistrate, and can be reopened either by an application by the Crown or *suo motu* by the Magistrate, but it cannot be started *de novo* upon a *private* complaint, the police case being already on the pending file of the Magistrate—*Firangi v. Durga*, 5 Pat 243, 7 P.L.T 449, 27 Cr.L.J. 698.

Where upon a report of the Police that one J. had given false information to the Police against certain persons, a Magistrate ordered the prosecution of J. under sec. 182 I. P. C. but subsequently upon receipt of another report in another case that the information given by J was true, he ordered the summons issued for the attendance of J to be cancelled, it was held that the Magistrate had full power to cancel the summons under this section—*Nathu v. Emp*, 1 P.L.T 28.

An order under this section neither amounts to an acquittal nor to a discharge. Since it does not amount to an acquittal (see Explanation to sec 403) it does not bar further proceedings in accordance with law—*Achhru v Crown*, 1913 P R 9. And since it does not amount to an order of dismissal of complaint, no order can be passed under sec 437 (now 436) directing further inquiry—*Ibid*.

Frivolous Accusations in Summons and Warrant Cases.

<p>250. (1) If, in any case instituted by complaint as defined in this Code, or upon informa-</p>	<p>250. (1) If, in any case instituted upon complaint * * * or upon information given to a</p>
<p>Frivolous or vexatious accusations.</p>	<p>False, frivolous or vexatious accusations.</p>

tion given to a police-officer or to a Magistrate, a person is accused before a Magistrate of any offence triable by a Magistrate, and the Magistrate by whom the case is heard discharges or acquits the accused and is satisfied that the accusation against him was frivolous or vexatious, the Magistrate may, in his discretion, by his order of discharge or acquittal, direct the person upon whose complaint or information the accusation was made, to pay to the accused, or each of the accused where there are more than one, such compensation, not exceeding fifty rupees, as the Magistrate thinks fit:

Provided that, before making any such direction, the Magistrate shall—

- (a) record and consider any objection which the complainant or informant may urge against the making of the direction, and
- (b) if the Magistrate directs any compensation to be paid, state in writing, in his order of discharge or acquittal, his reasons for awarding the compensation.

police officer or to a Magistrate, one or more persons is or are accused before a Magistrate of any offence triable by a Magistrate, and the Magistrate by whom the case is heard discharges or acquits all or any of the accused, and is of opinion that the accusation against them or any of them was false and either frivolous or vexatious, the Magistrate may, by his order of discharge or acquittal, if the person upon whose complaint or information the accusation was made is present, call upon him forthwith to show cause why he should not pay compensation to such accused or to each or any of such accused when there are more than one, or, if such person is not present, direct the issue of a summons to him to appear and show cause as aforesaid.

(2) The Magistrate shall record and consider any cause which such complainant or informant may show, and if he is satisfied that the accusation was false and either frivolous or vexatious, may, for reasons to be recorded, direct that compensation to such amount not exceeding one hundred

(2) Compensation of which a Magistrate has ordered payment under sub-section (1) shall be recoverable as if it were a fine:

Provided that, if it cannot be recovered, the imprisonment to be awarded shall be simple, and for such term not exceeding thirty days, as the Magistrate directs.

rupees or, if the Magistrate is a Magistrate of the third class, not exceeding fifty rupees, as he may determine, be paid by such complainant or informant to the accused or to each or any of them.

(2A) The Magistrate may by the order directing payment of the compensation under sub-section (2) further order that, in default of payment, the person ordered to pay such compensation shall suffer simple imprisonment for a period not exceeding thirty days.

(2B) When any person is imprisoned under sub-section (2A), the provisions of Sections 68 and 69 of the Indian Penal Code shall, so far as may be, apply.

(2C) No person who has been directed to pay compensation under this section shall, by reason of such order, be exempted from any civil or criminal liability in respect of the complaint made or information given by him:

Provided that any amount paid to an accused person under this section shall be taken into account in awarding compensation to such person in any subsequent civil suit relating to the same matter.

(3) A complainant or informant who has been ordered under sub-section (2) by a Magistrate of the second or third class to pay compensation, or has been so ordered by any other Magistrate to pay compensation exceeding fifty rupees, may appeal from the order in so far as the order relates to the payment of the compensation, as if such complainant or informant had been convicted on a trial held by such Magistrate.

(4) Where an order for payment of compensation to an accused person is made in a case which is subject to

compensation) but was instituted upon 'complaint', the report of the Excise officer to the Magistrate being treated as a complaint; and that officer, being deemed to be the complainant, was liable to pay compensation. Even if the report be not treated as a complaint, it was information given to a Magistrate by the Excise officer, and in that view also he was liable to pay compensation—*Radhika v. Hamid*, 54 Cal. 371, 28 Cr.L.J. 316.

When a Police officer makes a report in a non-cognizable case, the report amounts to a complaint (because a Police officer has no power to make a report in a non-cognizable case) and the Magistrate can award compensation if the complaint is false—*K. E. v. Sada*, 26 Bom. 150.

If a report is given to the police with the intention that action should be taken against the accused persons, the report amounts to 'an information given to a Police officer' within the meaning of this section—*Jairaj v. Bansi*, (supra).

Complaint under Cattle Trespass Act:—This section applies to a case in which a false and frivolous complaint has been made under the Cattle Trespass Act. Under section 4 (o) of the C. P. Code, the word "offence" includes an act in respect of which a complaint may be made under sec. 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act. If such complaint is false and frivolous or vexatious, compensation may be awarded—*In re Ponnusawmi*, 100 Mad. 517. The rulings in 18 All. 353, 13 Cal. 304, 22 Cal. 139, 23 Cal. 248, 9 Mad. 102, and 9 Mad. 374, decided under the Code of 1882, are no longer good law.

Complaint to a Village Magistrate:—A complaint of a non-bailable offence to a village headman who is bound to report the substance of the information to the Police under sec. 45 (c) is an "information to a Police Officer" within the meaning of this section; and if on such information the Police charges the accused, and the Magistrate finds the charge to be false and vexatious he can order compensation under this section—*Nachimuthu v. Muthusami*, 39 Mad. 1006, 27 M.L.J. 37, 15 Cr.L.J. 431; *Kaliyaperumal v. Bavaji*, 45 M.L.J. 255; *Thanikadavath v. Ammlan*, 4 L.W. 73, 17 Cr.L.J. 503; *Nadiabba v. Rayachitty*, 32 M.L.T. 78, 18 Cr.L.J. 11; (Contra—*In re Arulanandham*, 22 M.L.J. 138, 13 Cr.L.J. 29). If however the information preferred to the village Magistrate is one which he is not bound to report to the Police, the preferring of such information does not amount to information to the Police within the meaning of this section, and no compensation is awardable if the information proves to be false—*K. E. v. Thammana*, 25 Mad. 667.

Case instituted under sec. 476:—Where a case is instituted under sec. 476, at the instance of a person, it cannot be said to have been instituted either upon complaint of that person, or upon information given to a Police Officer or to a Magistrate—*In re Kisandas*, 14 Bom.L.R. 1166, 14 Cr.L.J. 1.

806. 'Accused of an offence':—An institution of proceedings under Chapter VIII is not an accusation of an offence, and this section does not apply if the accusation proves to be false—*In re Govind*, 25 Bom.

48; *Q. E. v. Lakhpat*, 15 All. 365; *Bindhachal v. Lal Behari*, 36 All. 382; *Ram Sukh v. Mahadeo*, 7 A.L.J. 743, *Natha Singh v. Pala Singh*, 1896 P.R. 4, *Emp. v. Kaura*, 1902 P.R. 33, *Mannu Khan v. Chandu*, 20 A.L.J. 624, 23 Cr.L.J. 474, *Ram Badan v. Janki*, 45 All. 363, 22 A.L.J. 207, *Baij Nath v. Kali Charan*, 49 All. 750, 25 A.L.J. 493, 28 Cr.L.J. 604.

Similarly, an application for maintenance under sec. 488 is not a complaint of an offence (the refusal to maintain wife not being an "offence") and no compensation can be awarded if the application proves to be false—*Ambu v. Baboo*, 6 M.L.T. 261.

The use of a house as a brothel is not an offence under sec. 41, Bombay District Police Act, and a complaint as to such use of a house is not a complaint of an offence. No compensation can therefore be awarded if the complaint is frivolous or vexatious—*Imp. v. Khairi*, 6 S.L.R. 254, 14 Cr.L.J. 320.

An order for compensation cannot be made in regard to a complaint under sec. 2 of the Workman's Breach of Contract Act (XIII of 1859), because neglect or refusal to perform work is not an offence—*In re Ram Sarup*, 4 C.W.N. 253; *Q. E. v. Namdeo*, Ratanlal 617, *Pollard v. Mothial*, 4 Mad. 234. See also *Jamil v. Md. Isaq*, 41 All. 322, 20 Cr.L.J. 570.

Section 28 of the Bombay Public Conveyance Act provides a summary remedy for the recovery of the legal fare of a public conveyance, and a complaint under that section is not a complaint in respect of an offence within the meaning of this section. A Magistrate has therefore no power to make an order awarding compensation under this section in respect of such a complaint if it is false—*In re Valli Mutha*, 44 Bom. 463 (465).

807. "Triable by a Magistrate":—This section applies only where the offence is triable by a Magistrate and not where the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, but is actually tried by a Magistrate—*Poligadu*, 2 Weir 315, *Emp. v. Kadu*, 1902 P.R. 26, *Q. E. v. Bavabhai*, Ratanlal 961; *Emp. v. Chhaba*, 19 Bom. L.R. 60, *Ma E. v. Mg*, 1 Bur. L.J. 38, 23 Cr.L.J. 289; *Sarupsonar v. Ram Sundar*, 20 A.L.J. 433, *Het Ram v. Ganga*, 40 All. 615, 16 A.L.J. 486, 19 Cr.L.J. 706, *Bansidhar v. Chunnai*, 25 A.L.J. 818, 28 Cr.L.J. 983; *Shankar v. Crown*, 1919 P.R. 15, 20 Cr.L.J. 495, *Md. Hazat v. Bhola*, 1919 P.R. 1, 20 Cr.L.J. 141. Even if the Magistrate tries an offence triable by the Court of Session, by virtue of his powers specially conferred upon him under sec. 30 and discharges the accused on account of the charge being vexatious, he cannot award compensation to the accused—*Emp. v. Kadu*, 1902 P.R. 26; *Md. Hazat v. Bhola*, supra, *Shankar v. Crown*, supra. But where the facts in a case showed that the offence was triable by a Court of Session only, but the Magistrate regarding it as falling under a different head of offences triable by him, tried the case and in dismissing the same awarded compensation to the accused, held that the procedure was not illegal—*M. Venkatraya v. Kadi Venkatrayar*, 45 Mad. 29, 23 Cr.L.J. 232, *Hemandas v. Ahmed*, 16 S.L.R. 205, 26 Cr.L.J. 265. But when a complaint has been filed against an accused person for offences some of which are triable exclusively by the Magistrate and some by the

Court of Session, and the accused after trial is discharged in respect of all the offences, an order for compensation against the complainant can not be passed—*Harihar v. Maksud Ali*, 48 All. 166, 23 A.L.J. 1056, 27 Cr. L.J. 6. See also *Het Ram v. Ganga*, supra, where one offence was triable exclusively by the Sessions Court and two other offences by the Magistrate.

It is immaterial whether the case is triable as a summons case or as a warrant case. This section makes no distinction between either—*Paighambar v. Emp.*, 4 O.W.N. 392, 28 Cr.L.J. 450 (451).

Summary cases—Compensation may be awarded even if the case is triable summarily—*Q. E. v. Basava*, 11 Mad. 142.

808. Who can award compensation:—Compensation is to be awarded by the Magistrate who has heard the substantive case and passed the order of acquittal or discharge. The Legislature never intended that one Magistrate should deal with the substantive case and make the order calling upon the complainant to shew cause, and that another Magistrate may pass the order for compensation—*Rajaram v. Panchanan*, 33 C.W.N. 861 (865), 1929 Cr. C. 474. Where part of the evidence was heard by one Magistrate and then the case was made over to another Magistrate under section 346, and the latter Magistrate heard the rest of the evidence and decided the case, held that the latter Magistrate was competent to order compensation—*Ram Devi v. Govind*, 19 A.L.J. 651, 22 Cr.L.J. 406. But a Magistrate who has heard nothing of the case except the complainant's plea against the order cannot make an order under this section—*In re Mahadeo*, 1892 A.W.N. 58.

'The Magistrate by whom the case is heard' does not include an Appellate Court. Such a Court in setting aside a conviction cannot order the complainant to pay compensation—*Mehi Singh v. Mongal*, 39 Cal 157 F.B. (overruling *Kari Singh v. Tufani*, 14 C.W.N. 212); *Harichand v. Fakir*, 3 Bom. L.R. 841, *In re Pilambar*, 7 Bom. L.R. 998; *Chedi v. Ram Lal*, 21 A.L.J. 834; *Notified Area v. Karta Ram*, 7 Lah. 152, 27 Cr. L.J. 570.

It is doubtful whether the High Court has jurisdiction to pass an order for compensation when the matter comes up in revision—*Aminullah v. Emp.*, 26 A.L.J. 328, 29 Cr.L.J. 274 (275).

809. "Discharges or acquits the accused":—The word 'heard' shows that the case must proceed as far as hearing. If a complaint is summarily dismissed under sec. 203, without issue of process to the accused, such a dismissal is not an order of discharge or acquittal within the meaning of this section—*Bhagwan v. Harmukh*, 29 All. 137, *Atam v. Mir Abdulla*, 1897 P.R. 14, even though the accused was present at the enquiry under sec. 202, without issue of process, compensation cannot be awarded where the case is dismissed under sec. 203—*Harphul v. Manika*, 1906 P.R. 3. Where after the filing of a complaint, the statement of one of the prosecution witnesses was taken and it disclosed that the complaint was false, and thereupon the Magistrate passed an order under this section, held that the order could not be passed without discharging or acquitting

the accused—*Ram Labhaya v Jagannath*, 30 P.L.R. 361, 30 Cr.L.J. 854 (855).

An order for compensation may be passed where the accused is acquitted under sec 245—*Emp. v Salik Roy*, 6 Cal 581; *Number v Ambu*, 11 Mad. 381, Q E v *Pandu*, 10 Bom 199, or under sec. 247—*Emp v. Lal*, 1888 P.R. 14; *In re Munshi*, 1884 A W N. 115, *Emp v Hardeo*, 1891 A W N. 120, or under sec 248—*Himmat v. Bakhtawar*, 1883 P.R. 24 But compensation cannot be awarded when the case is compounded (sec 345) because there is neither a discharge nor an acquittal. Even though the accused is acquitted after composition, such an acquittal is not one contemplated by this section—*Sangappa, Ratanlal* 957, *In re Harkisan*, 10 Bom L R 1056, *Raoji, Ratanlal* 700, *Emp v Khushali*, 1888 P R. 19; *Crown v Sunder Singh*, 1910 P R. 30, 11 Cr L J. 638

In order that compensation may be granted, it is necessary that there must be a complete discharge or acquittal. If the accused is charged with more offences than one, he must be discharged or acquitted of *all the offences*; a discharge or acquittal in respect of one of the offences is a partial discharge and cannot entitle the accused to compensation—*Muktl v. Jhotu*, 24 Cal 53; *Ma Ali Khan v Raja Ram*, 40 All. 610, 19 Cr.L.J. 670, *Emp v. Nadar*, 12 S L R 87, 20 Cr L J 106. If there are several accused, and some only of them are acquitted or discharged, the complainant may be ordered to pay compensation only to those who have been discharged or acquitted, but not to the others—*Number v Ambu*, 5 Mad 381; *Gohra v Amira*, 1877 P R 15

Moreover, the provisions of this section as to compensation can only apply to cases where the order of discharge or acquittal is legal—*Q. E. v. Maung Tun*, 1 L B R. 44.

810. False and frivolous or vexatious.—Under the old law, if the charge was frivolous or vexatious, this was sufficient to entitle the accused to compensation, if the charge was false, the accused was equally entitled to the compensation, because a false charge was held to be a vexatious charge—*Benimadhab v Kumud*, 30 Cal 123 (F 11); *Emp. v. Bai Asha*, 11 Bom. L R. 128; *Ponnammal*, 2 Weir 313 (314); *Adikkan v Alagan*, 21 Mad. 237, *Emp v Bindeshri*, 26 All 512, *In re Gopal*, 37 Bom 376, 15 Bom L R 49, 14 Cr L J 75, *Crown v Ismail*, 1903 P R. 18; *Nga Myo v Nga Kym*, 1914 U B R 3rd Qr 31, 16 Cr L.J. 92 Under the present law, the charge must be false besides being frivolous or vexatious The rulings in *Ram Singh v Mathura*, 34 All 354 and *Emp v. Asha*, 4 Bom L R 645 (where it was held that this section did not apply if the charge was false) are now overruled

In a Burma case it was held that it was sufficient to make the complainant liable to pay compensation if the charge was false, even though it was neither frivolous nor vexatious—*Shaik Dawood v Ma Ibrahim*, 11 Bur L T 201, 19 Cr L J 172 This is incorrect "We do not think that the procedure of sec 250 should be used in every false case unless the case is also either frivolous or vexatious In more serious cases it is desirable that the Magistrate should act under section 476 with a view

to the institution of a prosecution"—*Report of the Joint Committee* (1922) If a Magistrate orders the complainant to pay compensation to the accused on the ground that he has preferred a false complaint, it practically amounts to convicting, in a summary proceeding, the complainant under sec. 211 I. P. Code without a proper trial, which is altogether improper and open to serious objection—*Parsi v. Bendhi*, 28 Cal. 251.

The mere fact that a complaint is frivolous or vexatious does not necessarily mean that it must be false. Compensation can be awarded only if the complaint is false and also frivolous or vexatious—*Assanmal v. Dulbar*, 19 S L R 66, 26 Cr L J 1295

The word 'vexatious' indicates an accusation merely for the purpose of annoyance—*Benimadhab v. Kumud*, 30 Cal 123, 11 C.W.N. 799, *Parsi v. Bendhi*, 28 Cal. 251. An accusation cannot be said to be vexatious unless the main intention of the complainant be to cause annoyance to the person accused—*Crown v. Kouroud*, 11 S L R 55, 18 Cr L J 1005 The idea conveyed by the word 'vexatious' is that the object of the person making the accusation should be primarily to harass the persons accused—*Bakaji v. Mukund Singh*, 21 Cr L J. 226 (Nag.); *Bhan v. Syed Chand*, 26 Cr L J. 1033 (Nag.). If a prosecution is found to be malicious i.e. brought on account of enmity, it is necessarily a vexatious one—*Kashi Prosad v. Emp.*, 24 A.L.J. 161, 27 Cr.L.J. 300; *Sheikh Faiz v. Crown*, 14 S L R 168, 22 Cr.L.J. 120.

The word 'frivolous' means 'trifling,' 'silly,' or 'without due foundation'—*Jaina v. Santuk*, 21 Cr L J. 41 (Nag.) Whether the charge is frivolous or vexatious is a question of fact to be decided by the Magistrate investigating the complaint—*Munisami Mudali*, 2 Weir 319 (320). But the knowledge and intention of the complainant must be looked into Compensation should not be granted to the accused where the complainant did not know that the complaint was false and it is clear that the intention of the complainant was not to vex or harass the accused—*Crown v. Kouroud*, 11 S L R 55, 18 Cr L J 1005

Where the complainant believed his case to be true at first, but subsequently after enquiries found that his belief had been proved to be untrue, it would be his duty frankly to tell the Court that he had made a mistake, and if he omits to do so it would show unwarrantable malice on his part and he would be liable to pay compensation—*Shaik Dawood v. Md. Ibrahim*, 11 Bur. L.T. 201, 19 Cr.L.J. 172.

Where a person was charged with theft, but he was proved to have committed the act in the assertion of a bona fide claim of right, the accusation of theft is false, within the scope of sec 250 In law, no distinction can be properly made between a false accusation as to the motive or intention which prompts a man in doing a certain act, and a false accusation as to his act—*Ravishankar v. Savailal*, 28 Bom. L R. 89, 27 Cr L J. 448.

811. 'By his order' :—Under the old section, the order awarding compensation had to be passed in the order of discharge or acquittal of the accused, and was a part of the order of discharge or acquittal.

Under the present section, the Magistrate is not bound to award compensation at the time of passing the order of discharge or acquittal, the latter order should only contain an order calling on the complainant to show cause why he should not be ordered to pay compensation.

The order calling upon the complainant to show cause must be made in the same order by which the Magistrate acquits or discharges the accused. Thus, where the accused was discharged, and in the order of discharge a conditional order for compensation was passed subject to the complainant showing cause, and the order of compensation was made absolute on the very day or on a subsequent day to which the case was adjourned for the complainant to show cause, *held* that the order was rightly passed—*Ghubin v Khalil*, 36 All. 132, *Jairaj v. Bansil*, 23 A L J 1054, 27 Cr L J 35, *Lalit Mohan v Kunja Behari*, 18 C W N 702, *Ghanumal v. Crown*, 7 S.L.R. 123, 15 Cr L.J. 504, *Jugal Kishore v Abdul*, ■ Cr.L.J. 523, 1905 A.W.N. 214, *Dhanu Kadi v. Muthusami*, 17 Cr L J 314, (1916) 2 M.W.N. 159; *Emp. v. Saudagar*, 1917 P R 31, *In re Nagindas*, 22 Bom. L.R. 184, *Emp. v. Punamchand*, ■ Bom L.R. 847. Under the old law the order of discharge and the order directing compensation had to be made in one continuous proceeding, and not in two separate proceedings, therefore where the Magistrate at the time of discharging the accused made no order as to compensation, but on a subsequent day ordered that the complainant should pay compensation, the order was held to be illegal, because it was not passed in the same proceeding in which the accused was discharged—*In re Sadur Husain*, 25 All. 315, *Ram Singh v Mathura*, 34 All 354; *Narpat Rai v. K. E.*, 1905 P R. 57; *Haru Tanti v Satish*, 38 Cal 302, 12 Cr.L.J. 6, *Nanheylal v Ranibahu*, 10 N L.R. 8, *Imamdin v. Emp.*, 1913 P.L.R. 99. These cases are no longer relevant. Under the present Code, it is not necessary that the order for compensation should be embodied in the order of discharge. The two orders may be passed in separate proceedings. It is only the order calling upon the complainant to show cause which is to be contained in the order of discharge or acquittal. The actual order for compensation is necessarily a subsequent order—*Achhru Mal v Emp.*, 7 Lah. 121, 27 Cr.L.J. 752; *Saudagar v. Aroor*, 29 Cr.L.J. 680 (Lah.).

Where there were two accused, and one of them was discharged, and the case against the other was adjourned to a later date when he was acquitted, and on the latter date the Magistrate required the complainant to show cause and then ordered him to pay compensation to each of the accused, *held* that the procedure followed was illegal. When the order of discharge was made against the first accused, the case against him was at an end, and in so far as payment of compensation to him was concerned, the order to show cause should have been made along with the order of discharge. The defect was not curable under sec 537—*Suresh v. Abdul Jabbar*, 29 C W N. 127, 26 Cr L.J. 449. But where several charges are brought against the same accused, and he is at first discharged on one charge and is subsequently acquitted in respect of the other charges, it is not illegal to pass an order of compensation at the time of the acquittal in respect of the latter charges. In fact, in such a case it is better for the

Magistrate to take action under sec. 250 not at an intermediate stage of the trial but at the end—*Ravishankar v. Savailal*, 28 Bom. L.R. 89, 27 Cr L J. 448.

Notice to show cause.—Under the old law, there was a difference of opinion as to whether the Magistrate should issue a formal notice to the complainant to show cause why he should not be ordered to pay compensation. In some cases it was held that since the proviso laid down "that before making any direction for payment of compensation the Magistrate shall record and consider any objection which the complainant or informant may urge against the making of the direction," it necessarily implied that the Magistrate should give the complainant an opportunity to show cause and raise any objection which he might urge—*Q. E. v. Manik*, Ratanlal 725, *In re Mahadev*, 24 Bom.L.R. 805, *Pandurang v. Longman*, 3 Bom L.R. 777, *Akloo v. Nowbat*, 21 Cr L J. 751, 1 P.L.T. 558; *In re Appalanarasayya*, 44 Mad 51, *Lalit Mohan v. Kuma Behari*, 18 C.W.N. 702, *Gulzari Lal v. Ganga Rao*, 9 A.L.J. 170, 13 Cr.L.J. 268. But it was held in a later Allahabad case that the proviso only related to objections voluntarily urged, that this section was not intended to multiply the proceeding but to be applied in a summary manner and that in a small matter of the kind contemplated by this section it would be an unnecessary and burdensome procedure to issue a formal notice—*Emp v. Pancham*, 45 All. 474. Under the present amendment, the Magistrate must call upon the complainant to show cause, if the complainant is present, the Magistrate must call upon him directly, if he is not present, the Magistrate must direct the issue of a summons to show cause.

It is imperative on the Magistrate to give the complainant an opportunity to show cause, and he cannot make the order absolute owing to the absence of the complainant—*Ghafur v. Lattu*, 1891 A.W.N. 63, *Subans v. Mahabir*, 18 C.W.N. 1277, *Gulzari Lal v. Ganga Ram*, 9 A.L.J. 170. Under the present law, if the complainant is absent, summons to show cause must be issued to him. If this is not done, the order of compensation must be set aside, and the Magistrate should be directed to summon the complainant and give him an opportunity of showing cause before passing the order—*Kalka v. Ranjit*, 24 A.L.J. 170, 27 Cr.L.J. 128. If the complainant is present, he may be directed forthwith to show cause, and in the absence of any special reason, he is not entitled as a matter of right to an adjournment to enable him to consult a pleader and to give a written reply—*In re Ishwarlal*, 28 Bom L.R. 98, 27 Cr L J. 430.

812. Who can be ordered to pay compensation :—

The Magistrate can pass an order under this section against the person upon whose complaint or information an accusation was made. Therefore, it is open to a Magistrate to direct the person, upon whose information the proceedings were started, to pay compensation to the accused, even though that person was a mere informer and not the real complainant—*Fariduddin v. Emp*, 24 A.L.J. 221, 27 Cr.L.J. 702. Where a certain person J gave information to S to the effect that a certain constable had committed extortion, intending that a complaint should be made on his

behalf to a Magistrate, and the complaint was subsequently dismissed as frivolous and the accused was acquitted, *held* that J was liable to give compensation to the accused. Although the information was conveyed to the Magistrate through S, still as J gave the information with the intention that it should be conveyed to a Magistrate, then clearly J was the person upon whose information the accusation was made within the meaning of sec 250. The mere fact that he utilized S for conveying the information was immaterial—*Emp v Bahawal Singh*, 40 All 79 (81), 19 Cr L J 76. If on the other hand, he had merely in conversation told S about the case without any desire for or view to a prosecution or to the conveyance of the information to the Magistrate, then he would have been hardly liable for the intervention of S who took it upon himself to make a complaint to the Magistrate. In this latter circumstance, it would be S who would be liable to pay compensation—*Ibid*. In a Sind case, where A gave information of an offence to the Police at the instigation of B, and the accusation was found to be false, it was held that B was not liable to pay compensation, because he did not himself give the information to the Police, although he was the instigator—*Emp v Sumar*, 12 S L R 76, 20 Cr L J. 100, 48 I.C. 980. Where certain persons gave information as witnesses of an offence to a constable, and upon the constable's information to the Sub-Inspector a case was instituted which was afterwards found to be false, *held* that those persons could not be ordered to pay compensation, because they were not the "persons upon whose information the accusation was made" within the meaning of this section. It was the police constable upon whose information to the Sub-Inspector the case was instituted. This section is a penal one and should be construed strictly. There is no authority for introducing into it words which would extend the liability to pay compensation to individuals other than the actual complainant or person who gives the information on which the case is instituted—*Wali Mahomed v. Crown*, 13 S L.R. 166, 21 Cr L J 49, 54 I.C. 401. These two Sind cases appear to be in conflict with 40 All. 79 cited above.

An order under sec. 250 cannot be passed against the complainant, unless the complainant knew that his information was false. Where a false charge was lodged by the complainant on information supplied to him by another person, but there was no suggestion of any collusion between the complainant and that person, and there was no finding that the complainant knew that the information was false, *held* that the complainant could not be ordered to pay compensation under this section. The object of this section is that compensation should be recoverable from the person responsible for the false accusation—*Crown v Kouroud*, 11 S L.R. 55, 18 Cr.L J. 1005.

Public officers are not exempted from the liability to pay compensation for frivolous and vexatious complaints—*Narasayya v. Ramadas*, 2 Weir 317 (318). Where a Municipal peon, under sanction of the Municipality, charged a certain person of an offence which was found to be false, the order of the Magistrate directing the peon to pay compensation to the accused was held to be legal—*Q E v Bhima*, Ratanlal 309.

Where a process-server of a Civil Court merely reported to the Court that he was obstructed by the accused in executing a writ of attachment, and a report was thereupon made by the Court to a Magistrate, and the Magistrate found the case to be false and directed the process-server to pay compensation to the accused, it was held that the order of the Magistrate was wrong, because the process-peon was not a complainant within the meaning of this section. It was the Civil Court which actually made the complaint—*In re Keshav Lakshman*, 1 Bom. 175; *In re Ram Padarath*, 26 All 183 (184), *Bharut v Javed Ali*, 20 Cal 481 (482); See also *In re Krishandas*, 14 Bom. L R 1166, 14 Cr.L.J. 1.

A person preferring a complaint on behalf of another is not liable to pay compensation. A master preferring a complaint on behalf of his servant cannot be ordered to pay compensation—*Chorbyn v. Ameer Khan*, 1869 P R 24. The question whether a servant can be held responsible for an information lodged on behalf of his master is a question of fact and depends on the question whether the servant is merely the mouthpiece of his master and is merely giving expression of his master's accusation, or whether he joins personally in the accusation himself. In the former case no order of compensation should be made against the servant—*Jagdani v Mahadeo*, 14 C W N 326. A guardian or next friend of a minor complainant is not liable to pay compensation—*Isa v. Ranon*, 1912 P L R 83, 13 Cr L J. 136.

Where a written complaint prepared by the Police Officer was sent through a constable to the Magistrate, the constable who was merely a bearer of the complaint, and acting under the order of his superior officer, could not be ordered to pay compensation—*Subramaniya v. Pakia*, 21 M.L.J. 844, 12 Cr L J 482. But in another Madras case, in which the complainant did not make the complaint of his own motion but under the order of his superior officer, and had no personal knowledge of the offence, but was merely the instrument of his superior officer in making the complaint, it was held that the complainant himself (and not his superior officer) must be ordered to pay compensation. If he chose to make a complaint as to a matter of which he had no personal knowledge, he must take the consequence, and look to his superiors to indemnify him if he acted under their orders—*Narasayya v Ramadas*, 2 Weir 317 (318).

The word 'person' includes also a juristic person; according to sec. 3 (59) of the General Clauses Act it includes any company or association, or body of individuals whether incorporated or not. Therefore a Municipal Committee can be ordered to pay compensation—*Municipal Committee v. Rattan Chand*, 24 Cr.L.J. 463 (Lah.).

813. To whom compensation can be awarded :—Compensation is awardable only to the person who has suffered from the accusation and not to his relatives—*Abdool Rahim v. Mehrab*, 1866 P R 89, *Crown v. Sadoola*, 1866 P.R. 97; *Crown v. Debi Buksh*, 1868 P R 25.

Where there are several accused and one of the accused is discharged on the ground that the complaint against him is vexatious, he can be

awarded compensation but not the others—*Gohra v Amira*, 1877 P R. 15; *Number v. Ambu*, 5 Mad. 391.

814. Sub-section (2)—Record of objections, reasons, etc.—The Magistrate before passing an order for compensation must comply with the provisions of sub-section (2) of this section, he cannot pass an order for compensation, without recording and considering any objection which the complainant may urge—*Q E v Manik*, Ratanlal 725; *Narayanasami v. Bukey*, 2 Weir 310, *In re Mahadev Ram Krishna*, 23 Cr.L.J. 574, 24 Bom L.R. 805, *Pandurang v Laxman*, 3 Bom L.R. 777, *Emp. v. Nga Pwe*, 1906 U B R (Cr P C) 51, *Alloo v. Nawbat*, 1 P.L.T. 558, 21 Cr L J 751, *Emp v Chunni*, 24 O C. 261; *Deonarain v. Chhatoo*, 3 P.L.T. 203, 23 Cr L J. 261, *Minhomal v. Crown*, 8 S.L R 25, 15 Cr.L J. 666; if he omits to record the objections, it is more than an irregularity and cannot be cured by sec 537—*Emp v. Nga Pwe*, supra

The Magistrate is bound to consider the objections raised by the complainant and to record a judgment with reasons. A mere statement that the cause shown is not reasonable is insufficient—*Deonarain v Chhatoo*, 3 P.L.T. 203, 23 Cr.L.J. 261

Moreover, a Magistrate should, in his order awarding compensation, state his reasons why he deems the complaint to be vexatious, and should also state in his judgment the facts of the case with a criticism of the incidents involved in it—*Amjad Ali v. Ashruf Ali*, 10 C W.N. 544 When the accused are discharged, the recording of the reasons for ordering compensation to be paid is almost a condition precedent to the proper exercise of that power, the recording of reasons is in addition to the finding by the Magistrate that the accusation was either frivolous or vexatious. The policy of the Legislature in requiring that in such a case reasons should be recorded is obviously to afford an opportunity to an appellate or revising tribunal to consider the sufficiency of the reasons so recorded. In the absence of such a recording of reasons there is no proper compliance with the provisions of this section and the order is wrong—*Thadiappan v Veeraperumal*, 21 L W 646, 26 Cr L J 1501

The complainant may show cause with reference to the evidence already recorded, but he cannot adduce further evidence. This section does not require that separate proceedings should be held and fresh evidence taken—*Q E v Chiraj Ali*, 1898 A W N 108. But where the Magistrate had discharged the accused in the main case after hearing only some of the witnesses produced by the complainant, the Magistrate, before awarding compensation, ought to hear the remaining witnesses of the complainant—*In re Appalaratnayya*, 41 Mad 51, *Sya Kyaw v. K. E.*, 3 Bur. L J. 26, 25 Cr.L.J. 1280. It is only after examination of all the evidence the complainant wants to adduce that a Magistrate can come to the conclusion that the case is false and vexatious. Though the Magistrate can discharge the accused at any stage, he is not entitled to order compensation without examining all the complainant's witnesses—*Parthasarathi v Krishnaswami*, 31 Mad. 337, 29 Cr.L.J. 114, 1A M.L.J. 641. Though compensation can be awarded in exceptional cases before

818. Sub-section (3)—Appeal:—Under the old law, no appeal could lie against an order of compensation passed by a 1st class Magistrate.—*Q. E. v. Biru*, 1 Bom L.R. 350; *In re Pitambar*, 7 Bom L.R. 998; under the present law, an appeal is allowed from an order of such Magistrate if the compensation awarded exceeds rupees fifty.

Whenever a complainant has been ordered to pay compensation exceeding rupees fifty, he has a right of appeal, whether the amount is awarded to one accused, or is ordered to be distributed among a number of accused persons in sums not exceeding fifty rupees—*Augustin v. Durning Demello*, 49 Bom. 440, 26 Cr.L.J. 480, 26 Bom L.R. 1243. This clause does not limit the right of appeal to cases where the compensation awarded to each accused exceeds rupees fifty. Where the total amount directed to be paid to several accused persons exceeds Rs. 50, a right of appeal exists—*Assanmal v. Dilbar*, 19 S.L.R. 66, 26 Cr.L.J. 1293; *Sumaria v. Emp.*, 24 A.L.J. 167, 27 Cr.L.J. 146. There is nothing in this section to show that an appeal will lie only where the compensation directed to be paid to each individual accused is more than Rs. 50. A complainant who has been ordered to pay compensation exceeding Rs. 50 has the right of appeal. It is the total amount of compensation directed to be paid by the complainant which must form the basis of the decision whether an appeal lies or not—*Sobhit v. Emp.*, 7 P.L.T. 552, 26 Cr.L.J. 1504.

Notice to accused.—Though there is no express provision that notice should go to the accused, still it is desirable that the accused should have notice of the appeal in order that he may have an opportunity of supporting the order passed in his favour—*Emp. v. Palaniappa*, 29 Mad 187; *Venkatarama v. Krishna*, 38 Mad 1091, *Ram Chand v. Jesa Ram*, 25 Cr.L.J. 209 (Lah), *Momoon v. Ibrahim*, 20 S.L.R. 41, 27 Cr.L.J. 249. But absence of notice to the accused will not vitiate the appellate proceedings and will not make the appellate order liable to be set aside—*Nagi Reddi v. Bapappa*, 33 Mad 89; *Krishna v. Narayana*, 41 M.L.J. 172, 22 Cr.L.J. 583, *Rashid Muhammad*, 8 Lah. 568, 28 Cr.L.J. 410.

Notice to Crown:—It is not imperative that notice of the appeal should be given to the Crown under sec. 422, because it is a matter in which the accused is really interested and the Crown is very little interested—*Emp. v. Palaniappa*, 29 Mad. 187; *Krishna v. Narayana*, supra. Notice to the Crown is a mere formality in an appeal of this description, for there can be very few cases in which the Crown would deem it necessary to oppose the appeal. Omission to send notice to the Crown is not a ground of interference with the Appellate Court's order—*Guruswami v. Tirumurthi*, 1 L.W. 908, 15 Cr.L.J. 648.

819. Revision:—The High Court in revision can set aside an order of compensation passed by a Magistrate, and can order repayment of the money paid—*Crown v. Hiranand*, 1903 P.R. 29; *Ali Ahmad v. Nathu*, 1884 P.R. 14; *Howanna v. Jasu*, 1885 P.R. 12. A superior Criminal Court has jurisdiction under sec. 435 to examine an order under sec. 250 in the exercise of its ordinary revisional jurisdiction—*As v. Peal*, 17 A.L.J. 896.

Death of party :—If, pending the revision, the complainant (i.e. the party who has been ordered to pay compensation) dies, the revision-petition does not abate but may be continued by his legal representatives—*Prem Singh v. Bhola*, 1908 P.R. 24

Where after the passing of the Magistrate's order the accused died, and the complainant applied to the High Court for revision, the High Court refused to pass any order because the accused could not be served with notice—*Govinda v. Keshavrao, Ratanlal* 634

CHAPTER XXI.

OF THE TRIAL OF WARRANT-CASES BY MAGISTRATES.

820. Change of procedure :—If a warrant case is tried as a summons case, the procedure is illegal and the conviction is liable to be set aside—*Emp v. Chinnappayan*, 29 Mad 372. If in such trial the accused is acquitted under sec 245, the order of acquittal will in best operate as an order of discharge under sec 253—*Emp. v. Jadu*, 1886 A W N 260, *Q E v. Lalji*, 1888 A W N 96

The fact that a summons instead of a warrant has been issued in a warrant case does not justify the procedure to be as in a summons case—*Nand Lal v. Bhagiratty*, 10 W R. 31.

If a trial is commenced as a warrant case, it must be ended as a warrant case and not as a summons case, a sudden change of procedure in the midst of a trial is illegal. Therefore where a complaint alleged the commission of certain offences which were triable as warrant cases, and the processes issued to the accused as well as the commencement of the proceeding showed that the accused were being tried for those offences, but the Magistrate after taking the evidence of some of the witnesses for the complainant recorded an order that the offences as disclosed were triable as summons cases, and then he proceeded with the trial as in a summons case, without framing a charge, held that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was highly illegal and the trial should be set aside—*Ganga Saran v. Emp.* 19 A L J 6, 22 Cr.L J. 146.

The question whether a case is triable as a summons case or as a warrant case is to be decided by reference to the complaint and the notices issued to the accused and also to the commencement of the case under certain sections of the Penal Code, and not by reference to the particular sections under which the conviction takes place—*Ganga Saran v. Emp.*, *supra*

If two charges arising out of the same facts under the same circumstances are framed, one of a summons case and another of a warrant case, the procedure should be as laid down for a warrant case—*Raj*

Narain v. Lala Zamoli, 11 Cal. 91; *In re Sobhanadri*, 39 Mad. 503; *Raghavulu v. Singaram*, 41 Mad. 727.

Procedure in warrant-cases.

251. The following procedure shall be observed by Magistrates in the trial of warrant cases.

821. Procedure must be followed :—In trying warrant cases, the procedure of this chapter must be strictly followed. The Magistrate cannot follow a procedure which had grown up by usage in the course of years, and which materially differs from that laid down in this chapter; such a procedure is more than an irregularity and is not curable by sec. 537—*Emp v. Dosabhai*, 17 Bom.L.R. 490, 16 Cr.L.J. 538. The Magistrate cannot follow an arbitrary procedure of his own. See *Taba v. Hira*, 1893 P.R. 29. A Presidency Magistrate must follow the procedure laid down in this chapter, subject to the special provisions of sec. 362 as to the mode of taking down the evidence—*Q. E. v. Abdul Ratanial* 539.

During the pendency of the trial of an author of a book before a Magistrate under sec. 153A, I. P. Code, after the evidence of the prosecution witnesses was recorded, the Government proscribed the book under sec. 99A Cr. P. Code and the accused then applied under sec. 99B to the High Court, but the application was dismissed on the ground that the book contained the matter falling under sec. 153A I. P. Code. Thereupon the Magistrate shut out all cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses and the production of defence witnesses, and convicted the accused under sec. 153A, who thereupon applied in revision on the ground that the conviction was illegal as the Magistrate by shutting out all evidence had disregarded the procedure of warrant cases. Held that in view of the order of the High Court passed on an application under sec. 99B, the Magistrate was bound to treat that order as conclusive and binding, and was not bound to allow or record any further evidence in the case, and was therefore justified in shutting out all evidence and convicting the accused—*Kalicharan v. Emp.*, 25 A.L.J. 846, 28 Cr.L.J. 785 (786).

252. (1) When the accused appears or is brought before a Magistrate, such Magistrate shall proceed to hear the complainant (if any) and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution:

Provided that the Magistrate shall not be bound to hear any person as complainant in any case in which the complaint has been made by a Court.

(2) The Magistrate shall ascertain, from the complainant or otherwise, the names of any persons likely to be acquainted with the facts of the case and to be able to give evidence for the prosecution, and shall summon to

give evidence before himself such of them as he thinks necessary.

Change :—The proviso has been newly added by sec. 70 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. A similar change has been made in section 244, q. v. This amendment follows clause (aa) of section 200.

822. "Is brought before the Court" :—It is immaterial if the accused is brought before the Court by illegal arrest. Where a subject of a Native State committing an offence in British territory fled to his own country, and the British Police, without the intervention of the State authorities, persued him and arrested him in that State, it was held that his illegal arrest would not vitiate his subsequent trial and conviction in British India—*Sobha v Emp.*, 1889 P R 6; *Emp. v. Nga Po*, 7 Bur.L R 66

'Hear the complainant' :—Hearing a complainant within the meaning of this section does not involve his *examination on oath*, and a trial of a warrant case is not vitiated merely because it did not begin with an examination of the complainant by the Court—*Puthen Veetil Kunhi v Emp.*, 42 M L J 108, 23 Cr L J 203

823. Taking evidence for the prosecution :—As soon as the accused is brought before the Magistrate he has a right to have the evidence against him recorded at as early a period as possible; and the fact that there is or may be a great body of evidence forthcoming against him is not a good ground for his detention for an inordinate period—*Manikam v. Q.*, 6 Mad. 63

It is the duty of the prosecution to bring before the Court all the persons who are alleged or are known to have knowledge of the facts or are likely to give important information—*Q E v Ram Sahai*, 10 Cal. 1070, *Emp. v. Dhunno*, 8 Cal. 121; *Q E. v Santon*, 14 All 521; *Q E. v. Bankhandi*, 15 All. 6; *Emp v Kaliprosanna*, 14 Cal. 245 If such witnesses are not called, without sufficient cause being shown, the Court may properly draw an inference adverse to the prosecution—*Emp. v Dhunno*, 8 Cal. 121.

The Magistrate is bound to examine every one of the witnesses called by the complainant—*Q. v Parasurama*, 4 Mad 329; *Begum Bibi v. Ghulam*, 1908 P.W.R. 3; he cannot say beforehand whether the evidence of a certain witness will be material or not—*Reg v. Daya. Ratanlal* 21 (22). He cannot refuse to examine any witnesses simply because their evidence will be a mere repetition of what has been already given by the other witnesses—*Emp. v Hematulla*, 3 Cal. 389; *Emp v. Kashi*, 2 All 447 But if the Magistrate considers the charge to be groundless, he can discharge the accused without examining all the witnesses (sec 253)—*Navanna v Suresetti*, 9 M L T. 302, 12 Cr.L.J. 158; *Dhanubhai v. Pyarji. Ratanlal* 201. See Note 828 under sec. 253.

The witnesses must be examined orally Where the witnesses common to three cases were first examined-in-chief in only one case, and their deposition was recorded by a typewriter in triplicate, one copy

being made part of the record in each case, held that the procedure in the other two cases was illegal—*Mazahar Ali v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 223 (226).

An accused should be given, if he so desires, an opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses, even though a charge is not framed—*Ashirbad v. Maju*, 8 C.W.N. 838. But the prosecution is not bound to tender the witness for cross-examination; the prosecution is not bound to do anything more than make a witness appear in Court, so that the accused may call him or not as he likes—*Emp. v. Kaliprosanna*, 14 Cal. 245. Moreover, the prosecution is not bound to put such of those as he does not examine into the witness box to be cross-examined. But he should not refuse to put into the box for cross-examination a truthful witness, merely because his evidence may be favourable to the defence—*Q. E. v. Durga*, 16 All. 84 (F B).

If a prosecution witness is examined after the whole of the defence evidence has been taken, the procedure is illegal and vitiates the trial, so that the trial should commence anew from the stage where the prosecution witness should have been examined—*Karam Chand v. Emp.*, 29 P.L.R. 613, 29 Cr.L.J. 844.

824. Summoning witnesses:—Sub-section (1) lays down that the Magistrate shall take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution. This means that the complainant should first of all himself produce what evidence he can in support of the prosecution, and the Magistrate shall proceed to hear it. The Court is apparently not bound to issue process for such witnesses or to grant time for the production of such witnesses, but if produced, he must record their evidence. Next, when the complainant has done all he can without the assistance of the process of the Court, it is then for the Magistrate to ascertain, under sub-section (2), from the complainant or otherwise, the names of other persons likely or able to give evidence, and he must summon such of those as he thinks necessary i.e. such of those as he thinks will be of value in assisting the prosecution case—*Menon v. Krishna Nayar*, 49 Mad. 978, 51 M.L.J. 328, 27 Cr.L.J. 1123. The Magistrate has a discretion in summoning witnesses, and he is not bound to summon every person named as a witness for the complainant—*Chulan v. Sukedad*, 23 W.R. 9. The Magistrate can use his discretion in selecting, out of the list of witnesses, those who seem to be necessary and those who seem to be unnecessary. But the power is to be exercised with caution and the Magistrate must see that there be no miscarriage of justice by excluding an important witness—*Sitab Singh v. Dalganjan*, 12 A.L.J. 15, 14 Cr.L.J. 682. The duty of seeing that all evidence essential to the prosecution case is before the Court is thrown upon the Magistrate himself. So it is not open to a Magistrate to acquit on the ground that the prosecution has failed to produce a necessary witness—*Emp. v. Maiku Lal*, 12 O.L.J. 632, 2 O.W.N. 584, 26 Cr.L.J. 1266.

The Magistrate cannot arbitrarily refuse to summon the witnesses named by the complainant; it is his duty to assist and not to hamper the prosecution, and for that purpose he must issue summons to persons of whom the complainant has informed him and who, he considers, are

likely to give useful evidence. The Magistrate is not bound to or expected to exercise this duty of ascertaining more than once, and the proper time is when the evidence 'produced' in support of the prosecution has been taken, and that ordinarily includes the cross-examination, if any, and re-examination, if any, before the charge. In order to ascertain the names of necessary witnesses, the Magistrate should put questions to the complainant in proper form. The question to be asked is not whether the complainant has any more witnesses whom he can produce without summons, but whether he can inform the Court of any witnesses who will have to be brought by process—*Menon v. Krishna Nayar*, 49 Mad. 978, 51 M L J. 328, 27 Cr. L. J. 1123

After the witnesses in support of the prosecution are heard, it is the duty of the Magistrate to see that the prosecutor is not allowed to set the Court on to a roaming inquiry, summoning persons in the hope that something might be elicited which may help his case. The prosecutor must come with his case fully prepared and there is no section in the Code which authorises him to file a fresh list of prosecution witnesses—*Sitab Singh v. Dalganjan*, 12 A. L. J. 15, 14 Cr. L. J. 682

Where witnesses do not obey the summons, the prosecution has a right to call upon the Court to compel their attendance—*Bhomar v. Digambar*, 6 C. W. N. 548

It is not proper for the Magistrate to issue a warrant in the first instance, it is only when the summons is disobeyed that serious measures may be taken—*Kala Singh v. K. E.*, 1907 P. W. R. 22.

Process fee.—There is nothing in this Code which enables a Magistrate to demand from even the complainant the expenses to be incurred by his witnesses, though such a power is conferred by sec. 244 (3) in a summons case—*Bridhichand v. Lakhmichand*, 8 N. L. R. 65, 13 Cr. L. J. 554. The dismissal of a complaint in a warrant case for non-payment of process fee is illegal—*Palannagari Pitchivadu*, 2 Weir 323.

Inspection of documents.—The accused is entitled to inspect all the documents produced by the complainant as evidence against the accused and filed as exhibits, and not merely to get certified copies thereof—*In re Francis*, 1 Bom. L. R. 433. But so long as the documents are not filed, but merely in the possession of the prosecution, the accused has no right to call for their production or to inspect the same, until after a charge has been framed—*Tahilram v. Pitambardas*, 11 S. L. R. 267, 14 Cr. L. J. 245 (cited in Note 847 under sec. 257)

253. (1) If upon taking all the evidence referred to

Discharge of accused.

in Section 252, and making examination (if any) of the evidence as the Magistrate thinks necessary, he finds that the evidence against the accused has been made out which is not rebutted, would warrant his conviction, the Magistrate shall discharge him.

(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent a Magistrate from discharging the accused at any previous stage of the case, if, for reasons to be recorded by such Magistrate, he considers the charge to be groundless.

825. Procedure :—The procedure prescribed by these sections should be strictly followed. The Magistrate should first take the evidence of the complainant and his witnesses (sec. 252) and if necessary examine the accused (sec. 253) and then apply the law to the criminal acts to find whether there is *prima facie* evidence, then frame charges (sec. 254) and call upon the accused to plead thereto (sec. 255) and enter upon his defence (sec. 256)—*Goonath v. Troylocko*, 9 W.R. 15. If the Magistrate after examining the prosecution witnesses (sec. 252), examined the accused and the witnesses for the defence (sec. 256), without having drawn up a charge, and then discharged the accused under sec. 253, the procedure was contrary to law and the accused should be treated as acquitted under sec. 258—*Taba v. Hirba*, 1883 P.R. 29. In *Orlul v. Kala*, 18 Cr.L.J. 1006 (Bur.) however, where the Magistrate followed the same procedure as in the Punjab case, it was held that although the procedure adopted was highly irregular and unwarranted, still as the procedure was in substance that laid down in this chapter, the omission to frame a charge and record a plea would not invalidate the order of discharge, and that sec. 535 (1) would cure the irregularity.

"Taking all the evidence" etc.—A Magistrate is not competent to discharge an accused person until the evidence of all the witnesses named for the prosecution has been taken—*Q. v. Parasurama*, 4 Mad. 329; *In re Gangoo*, 2 C.L.R. 389, *Q. v. Japit*, 22 W.R. 25; *Reg. v. Daya*, Ratanlal 21; *Begam Bibi v. Ghulam*, 1908 P.W.R. 3. Although he has a discretion to summon or not every person named as a witness by the complainant, *Chulan v. Sukedad*, 23 W.R. 9, still he is not justified in discharging an accused person without examining all the witnesses who are present in Court—*Rakhal v. Monmotha*, 11 C.W.N. 1xxxiii. If, however, upon examination of some of the witnesses, the Magistrate considers the charge to be groundless, he can discharge the accused under sub-section (2) without examining the other witnesses—*Navanna Chinna v. Suresetti*, 9 M.L.T. 302, 12 Cr.L.J. 158.

Where a case was transferred from a Bench of Magistrates, who had already recorded some evidence, to a Deputy Magistrate, the latter is bound to examine the evidence already recorded, and cannot discharge the accused without considering the evidence—*Amodini v. Darsan*, 38 Cal. 829.

826. Discharge :—Orders which amount to discharge.—Where a warrant case which cannot be compounded, is compounded and the case dismissed, such dismissal amounts only to a discharge—*Reg. v. Devama*, 1 Bom. 64; *Q. E. v. Motidas*, Ratanlal 391. When after the issue of process, the Magistrate does not think it proper to proceed any further, the termination of the proceedings amounts to an order of discharge—*Moul Singh v. Mahabir*, 4 C.W.N. 242. Where no charge was drawn up, and the accused was not called upon to plead or enter on his

defence, the release of the accused did not amount to an acquittal but to a discharge under this section—*Q. v. Purna Chandra*, 4 B.L.R. App 1

Order of discharge when improper—A Magistrate ought not to discharge the accused merely because he was illegally arrested e.g. where the Police arrested him without warrant in a non-cognizable case—*Reg v Sangapa*, Ratanlal 73. So also, a Magistrate ought not to discharge a person merely because he has no jurisdiction to try the case; in such a case he ought to proceed under section 346—*Munisami*, 2 Weir 323

A Magistrate cannot discharge or acquit the accused upon withdrawal of complaint in a non-cognizable case. Such a procedure is allowed in summons cases (sec 248) and not in warrant cases. The Magistrate has to proceed with the inquiry in spite of the withdrawal of complaint—*In re Ganesh*, 13 Bom. 600, *Emp. v Ranchhod*, 37 Bom 369, *Maung Thu v. U Po*, 5 Rang 136, 28 Cr L.J. 649 (650). A Magistrate cannot dismiss the complaint and discharge the accused under this section if the complainant is absent, and the offence is a warrant case and a non-compoundable one. Such a dismissal amounts to an application to a warrant case of the procedure prescribed by sec 247 in respect of a summons case—*Govinda v Dalal*, 10 Cal. 67, *Ram Coomar v. Ramji*, 4 C.W.N. 26, *Alexander v Connors*, 20 C.W.N 698; *Q. E. v Nanaji*, Ratanlal 524; *Niratan v. Jogesh*, 1 C.W.N 57. But under section 259, as now amended, the Magistrate can discharge the accused owing to the absence of the complainant, if the offence is non-cognizable, even though it is non-compoundable.

An order of discharge can be made when according to the words of this section, no case has been made out which if unrebutted would warrant the conviction of the accused; but when there is a body of evidence which if believed would justify a conviction, it is better to draw up a charge and dispose of the case finally, than to discharge the accused—*Radhi v. Phulchand*, 1909 P.W.R. 18, 11 Cr L.J. 110

An order of discharge cannot be made after a charge has been framed; such an order is erroneous and would amount to an acquittal under section 258—*Crown v. Nathu*, 1903 P.R. 14.

827. Rehearing :—The discharge of an accused person does not bar a fresh complaint being entertained either by the same Magistrate who passed the order of discharge or by another Magistrate, and it is not necessary that the previous order of discharge must be set aside before fresh proceedings can be taken—*Dwarka v Beni Madhab*, 28 Cal. 652 (F.B.), *Q. E. v. Dolegobind*, 28 Cal. 211; *Emp. v. Maheswara*, 31 Mad. 543; *Harj Dass v. Saritulla*, 15 Cal. 608 (F.B.).

This power of revival of proceedings is vested in all Magistrates including the Magistrate who discharged the accused. But Magistrates are bound to exercise due discretion, to take that discharge into account, and to avoid any such oppressive proceedings as may either expose them to punishment under section 219 or 220 I. P. C. or to a civil action on the part of the accused—*Q. E. v. Bapuda*, Ratanlal 350. No rehearing should be made of a case which has been disposed of by an order of discharge by a Magistrate of co-ordinate jurisdiction, except where there

has been a manifest error or miscarriage of justice—*Emp. v Chinn Kaliappa*, 29 Mad. 126 (F.B.). An order of discharge passed under this section cannot be set aside and prosecution started afresh, unless there are new materials before the Magistrate which were not before him formerly, and unless upon those materials there is a probability of the conviction of the accused persons—*Biso Ram v. Emp.*, 23 Cr L.J. 236 (Pat)

II an order of discharge is passed by a *Presidency Magistrate*, the High Court can interfere under sec. 439 of this Code (and not merely under sec. 15 of the Charter Act) and direct a further inquiry—*Malik Protap v Khan Mahomed*, 36 Cal. 994. See this case and other cases cited in Note 682 under sec 203

Power of District Magistrate :—Where an accused person has been discharged under this section, the District Magistrate can himself hold a further inquiry or can direct such inquiry to be held by a Subordinate Magistrate (sec. 436)—*Parbhu Lal v Janki*, 18 Cr.L.J. 706 (All); *Q E v Chotu*, 9 All 52, *Q E. v. Balasinnathambi*, 14 Mad 334; *Narayana-swami v. Emp.*, 32 Mad. 220; *Hari Singh v. Danesh*, 20 W.R 46; *Kistoram v. Anis*, 20 W.R. 47.

828. Sub-section (2) :—When a Magistrate is reasonably convinced, on what has been already deposed, that a criminal charge cannot be sustained, he is relieved from the necessity of going on with the trial and can discharge the accused—*Dhanjibhai v. Pyari*, Ratanlal 201; *Navanna v. Suresetti*, 9 M.L.T 302. The Magistrate can discharge the accused even before the date fixed for hearing, if upon the materials then before him he is satisfied that the offence could not have been committed—*Watson v Metcalfe*, 25 Cr L.J. 696 (Pat.). A Magistrate has power to discharge an accused, under sub-sec (2), even if no witnesses are examined under sec. 252—*Kunj Behari v. Emp.*, 24 A.L.J. 512, 27 Cr L.J 541 (542) The Magistrate can discharge the accused before all the complainant's witnesses have been examined—*Kashinatha v. Shanmugam*, 52 Mad. 987, 31 Cr.L.J 275 (277) The word 'groundless' in this sub-section is not capable of any precise definition. The amount of evidence which would enable a Magistrate to say that a particular charge is groundless is so entirely dependent on circumstances that no general rule or direction is likely to be of any use, except that the Magistrate is required to arrive at his conclusion judiciously and not capriciously. If acting judicially a Magistrate has come to the conclusion that the charge must fail either because the allegations are false or because they disclose a dispute of a civil nature distorted into a criminal case, or for any other reason, then there is nothing to prevent the Magistrate from discharging the accused before all the prosecution witnesses have been examined—*Kasinatha v. Shanmugam*, supra But where a complaint *prima facie* discloses an offence, a Magistrate can hold the charge to be groundless and discharge the accused under sub-section (2), only when he has at least ascertained from the complainant the nature of the evidence his witnesses are going to give; and he cannot refuse to examine all the witnesses cited by the complainant and discharge the accused, without ascertaining from the complainant the nature of the evidence the remaining witnesses are

expected to give. If he so ascertains, and then finds that even if that evidence was given the charge would be groundless, it is open to him to discharge the accused on that ground—*Muhammad Sheriff v. Abdul Karim*, 51 Mad. 185, 53 M.L.J. 757, 28 Cr.L.J. 995

If the evidence recorded does not raise any presumption that the accused has committed any offence but merely leads to a doubt, the proper course would be to discharge the accused and not to proceed to frame a charge—*Mul Chand v. K E*, 1906 P.R. 2.

Under this section, the Magistrate can discharge, but not *acquit* the accused—*Q. v. Robert*, 6 W.R. 13.

Recording reasons.—The Legislature does not render the writing of reasons necessary when the Magistrate discharges the accused person after he has heard all the evidence for the prosecution. It is only when he discharges under sub-section (2) without hearing all the evidence that he is bound to record reasons. But even in the former case the Magistrate should record his reasons, having regard to the fact that the order is not final—*Emp. v. Nabi Fakira*, 9 Bom L.R. 250.

254. If, when such evidence and examination have

Charge to be framed when offence appears proved. been taken and made, or at any previous stage of the case, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this Chapter, which such Magistrate is competent to try, and which in his opinion could be adequately punished by him, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused.

"Evidence and examination"—It is not necessary for a Magistrate to examine more witnesses than are sufficient to convince him of the truth of the charge, and with that view he can put questions to the accused. The answers given to such questions will have a great effect upon the question as to the witnesses to be examined for the prosecution. And if on questions put to the accused, answers which leave no doubt as to the commission of the offence are elicited, the Magistrate may frame a charge and call upon the accused to plead—*Anonymous*, 3 M.H.C.R. App. 2

829. Charge when to be framed.—It is not necessary that the Magistrate should wait till the whole of the evidence for the prosecution has been taken. Cf. the words "or at any previous stage", the moment the stage is reached when there is ground for presuming that the accused person has committed an offence, the examination of the accused should be taken up and the charge sheet drawn up; and the remaining witnesses for the prosecution should be examined—*Mulaa v. Sheoraj*, 8 A.L.J. 707, 12 Cr.L.J. 471

Charge to be framed when offence appears proved—It is only when the prosecution has proved all the facts necessary to constitute

has been a manifest error or miscarriage of justice—*Emp v. Chinnai Kaliappa*, 29 Mad. 126 (F.B.). An order of discharge passed under this section cannot be set aside and prosecution started afresh, unless there are new materials before the Magistrate which were not before him formerly, and unless upon those materials there is a probability of the conviction of the accused persons—*Biso Ram v. Emp.*, 23 Cr.L.J. 236 (Pat.)

If an order of discharge is passed by a *Presidency* Magistrate, the High Court can interfere under sec. 439 of this Code (and not merely under sec. 15 of the Charter Act) and direct a further inquiry—*Malik Protap v. Khan Mahomed*, 36 Cal 994. See this case and other cases cited in Note 682 under sec. 203.

Power of District Magistrate:—Where an accused person has been discharged under this section, the District Magistrate can himself hold a further inquiry or can direct such inquiry to be held by a Subordinate Magistrate (sec. 436)—*Parbhu Lal v. Janki*, 11 Cr.L.J. 706 (All.), *Q. E. v. Chotu*, 9 All. 52; *Q. E. v. Balasinnathambal*, 14 Mad. 334; *Narayana-swami v. Emp.*, 32 Mad 220; *Hari Singh v. Danesh*, 20 W.R 46; *Kistoram v. Anis*, 20 W.R. 47.

828. Sub-section (2):—When a Magistrate is reasonably convinced, on what has been already deposed, that a criminal charge cannot be sustained, he is relieved from the necessity of going on with the trial and can discharge the accused—*Dhanjibhai v. Pyari*, *Ratanlal* 201; *Navanna v. Suresetti*, 9 M.L.T. 302. The Magistrate can discharge the accused even before the date fixed for hearing, if upon the materials then before him he is satisfied that the offence could not have been committed—*Watson v. Metcalfe*, 25 Cr.L.J. 696 (Pat.). A Magistrate has power to discharge an accused, under sub-sec (2), even if no witnesses are examined under sec. 252—*Kunj Behari v. Emp.*, 24 A.L.J. 512, 27 Cr.L.J. 541 (542). The Magistrate can discharge the accused before all the complainant's witnesses have been examined—*Kashinatha v. Shanmugam*, 52 Mad 987, 31 Cr.L.J. 275 (277). The word 'groundless' in this sub-section is not capable of any precise definition. The amount of evidence which would enable a Magistrate to say that a particular charge is groundless is so entirely dependent on circumstances that no general rule or direction is likely to be of any use, except that the Magistrate is required to arrive at his conclusion judiciously and not capriciously. If acting judicially a Magistrate has come to the conclusion that the charge must fail either because the allegations are false or because they disclose a dispute of a civil nature distorted into a criminal case, or for any other reason, then there is nothing to prevent the Magistrate from discharging the accused before all the prosecution witnesses have been examined—*Kashinatha v. Shanmugam*, *supra*. But where a complaint *prima facie* discloses an offence, a Magistrate can hold the charge to be groundless and discharge the accused under sub-section (2), only when he has at least ascertained from the complainant the nature of the evidence his witnesses are going to give; and he cannot refuse to examine all the witnesses cited by the complainant and discharge the accused, without ascertaining from the complainant the nature of the evidence the remaining witnesses are

which the allegation in a positive form is not justified by the materials before the Court—*Sant Singh v. Emp.*, 1889 P.R. 26.

Effect of framing charge :—Proceedings before a Magistrate in a warrant case under this chapter are only an inquiry until a charge is framed, and on a charge being framed, become a trial—*Sriramulu v. Nalan Krishna Rao*, 38 Mad. 585; *Manna v. Emp.*, 9 N L R. 42, 14 Cr L J. 230 (231).

When a Magistrate frames a charge under this section, he indicates thereby that a *prima facie* case exists against the accused, and he cannot acquit the accused or dismiss the case without hearing the prosecution and the defence evidence; he is bound to proceed with the case—*Bellow v. Parker*, 7 C.W.N. 521

But the mere fact that a charge has been framed against the accused does not justify the view that the Magistrate is bound to convict the accused. If after carefully considering all the evidence adduced in the case he comes to the conclusion that the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is bound to acquit him under sec 258 although he may have framed a charge against him in the first instance—*Damodar v. Juharsingh*, 26 Cr L J 1348 (Nag)

Omission to frame charge —It is imperative on the Magistrate to frame a charge, and an omission to do so vitiates the trial—*Md. Rafique v. K. E.*, 43 C L J. 100 The Allahabad High Court holds that an omission to frame a charge according to this section would not invalidate an order of acquittal nor would render the acquittal equivalent to a discharge—*Emp v. Gurdu*, 3 All. 129.

255. (1) The charge shall then be read and explained to the accused, and he shall be asked whether he is guilty or

Plea.

has any defence to make.

(2) If the accused pleads guilty, the Magistrate shall record the plea, and may in his discretion convict him thereon.

831. Security cases :—Sec. 117 lays down that proceedings under sec 110 shall be conducted as nearly as possible in the manner of conducting trials of warrant cases, except that no charge need be framed. Therefore, secs. 254 and 255 apply to an enquiry under sec 110 except in so far as the framing of the charge and the reading of it to the accused is concerned; in other words, at any stage of the inquiry the Magistrate, if he is *prima facie* satisfied that there is a case against the accused, may ask him whether he pleads guilty or whether he has any defence to make—*Tirlok v. Emp.*, 50 All 71, 25 A L J 742.

‘Explained’ .—The charge must be read out and explained to the accused, and the record must show that the Magistrate has done so. Where all that is found on the record is only a narrative of what occurred and of the statements made by the parties, it cannot be inferred from the record that the charge has been explained to the accused.

accused as required by this section—*Emp v. Gopal Dhanuk*, 7 Cal. 96. The charge should be so explained to the accused that the Magistrate is sure that the accused has understood the nature of it thoroughly, and it is then that his plea should be received—*Emp. v. Vaimbilec*, 5 Cal. 826. If there are any aggravating circumstances of the offence, those circumstances should be set forth in the charge, so that the accused person may know what it is to which he pleads guilty and the full effect of such plea, or in case he pleads not guilty, he may know what material facts he is called upon to rebut—*Reg. v. Mukta, Ratanlal* 55.

Where the charge was not explained to the accused, the High Court set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial—*Anayau v. Q E*, 9 Mad 61.

832. Plea : An admission which does not admit all the elements of a charge is not a plea of 'guilty' to a charge. Therefore, where, on a charge of murder, the prisoner pleaded that he struck his wife with a dao but he did not intend to kill her, it was held that the acknowledgment could not be treated as a plea of guilty, since the intention to murder was denied—*Q v Sonaula*, 25 W.R. 23.

Where certain facts are stated in the charge, and also an offence punishable under a particular section, but the facts mentioned in the charge do not disclose an offence under the section quoted, the plea of the accused cannot amount to an admission of guilt under that section. An accused person does not plead to a section of a criminal statute. He pleads guilty or not guilty to the facts alleged in the charge, and a plea of guilty amounts only to an admission that he occupied the position stated in the charge and committed the acts therein specified; but unless the facts averred in the charge amount in law to an offence under a particular section, a plea of guilty cannot amount to an admission of guilt under that section—*Basant v. Emp.*, 7 Lah. 359, 27 Cr.L.J. 907.

When an accused person does not formally plead guilty, the fact that he throws himself at the mercy of the Court should not prejudice him—*Dy. Leg. Rem v. Upendra*, 12 C.W.N. 140.

Plea of Pleader —Where the accused is present in Court, his pleader cannot be called upon to plead under this section on behalf of his client, and it is improper for a Magistrate to act upon such plea, though made in the presence and hearing of the accused. It would be more regular in form for the Magistrate to call upon the accused to say with his own lips whether he denies the truth of the complaint—*Emp v. Surung*, 6 Bom.L.R. 861, 1 Cr.L.J. 939. But when the accused has been permitted under sec. 205 to appear by a pleader, the latter may perform all acts which devolve upon the accused in the course of the trial, and he can plead guilty or not guilty under this section—*Crown v. Jamal*, 6 S.L.R. 206, 14 Cr.L.J. 272; *Dorabshah v. Emp.*, 50 Bom. 250, 27 Cr.L.J. 410.

Record of plea :—If the plea is not recorded, the conviction is liable to be set aside—*Emp v. Gopal Dhanuk*, 7 Cal. 96. The Court must record the actual words used; a narrative of what occurred and of the statements made by the prisoners is not a proper record of the plea—

Gopal Dhanuk, 7 Cal. 96. If the statement of the accused is in a foreign language, the Magistrate need not record it in the language in which it is made, but the record must be in the language in which it is interpreted—*Emp. v. Vaimbilee*, 5 Cal. 826

833. Conviction on plea—If after a charge is framed the accused pleads guilty, the Magistrate can refuse to convict on the plea, and can proceed to take further evidence—*Emp v. Rashi Behari*, 25 C. W.N. 212 In a warrant case, although an accused can be convicted on his own plea of guilty, still a conviction should not be made unless there is evidence on the record to support the conviction It is highly improper in a warrant case to convict an accused on his own admission alone without recording any evidence for the prosecution and without framing a formal charge—*Emp v Chinnappayan*, 29 Mad 372.

Again, in order that a conviction on a plea of the accused may be sustained, it is necessary that the accused should admit in his plea all the elements of the offence If he admits that he killed the deceased but he denies that he had any intention of killing her, the Magistrate cannot convict him on such statement Such a confession does not amount to a plea of guilty—*Q v Sonaulah*, 25 W R 23 If the accused pleads guilty to one offence, the Judge cannot convict the accused for another offence; e.g if the accused pleads guilty to a charge of murder, he cannot be convicted for culpable homicide not amounting to murder—*Q. v. Gobadur*, 13 W.R 55 (56)

If the accused person admits some or all of the facts alleged by the prosecution, but pleads "not guilty," the proper procedure for the Magistrate is to proceed to trial according to law, and not to convict him on the admission without taking evidence—*Emp v Sonabhai*, 11 Bom.L R 1346, 6 Cr.L.J 424

255A. *In a case where a previous conviction is charged under the provisions of Section 221, subsection (7), and the accused does not admit that he has been previously convicted as alleged in the charge, the Magistrate may, after he has convicted the said accused under Section 255, sub-section (2), or Section 258, take evidence in respect of the alleged previous conviction and shall record a finding thereon.*

834. This new section has been added by section 71 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923

"We think that this addition is necessary after section 255, to provide for a case where previous conviction is also charged Definite provision is made for this in the case of trials before a Court of Session (see section 310), but it does not seem to have been provided for by the Code in the case of a Magistrate's trial."—*Report of the Select Committee of 1*
 "It was suggested to us that the new section 255A is unnecessary on

does not deprive him of the right given him by this section of recalling and cross-examining those witnesses after the charge is framed—*Zamunia v. Ram Tahal*, 27 Cal. 370; *Inder v. Emp.*, 37 Cal. 236; *Nilkanta v. Q. E.*, 20 Cal. 469, *Q. E. v. Sagal*, 21 Cal. 642; *Nga Pya v. Emp.*, 14 Cr.L.J. 388, 6 Bur.L.T. 67; *Q. E. v. Nasarvanji*, 2 Bom.L.R. 542. Even when the prosecution witnesses were cross-examined by the accused before frame of charge on the understanding that the accused would not require those witnesses to be recalled for further cross-examination after the charge, still the Magistrate cannot refuse the application of the accused to recall and cross-examine those witnesses after the charge is framed—*Kokil Ghose v. Kasimuddi*, 6 C.W.N. 424. Where the witnesses for the prosecution were cross-examined by the pleader for the accused before the frame of charge, and the pleader then stated that he no longer required their attendance, but after the framing of the charge the pleader for the accused wanted to further cross-examine the witnesses, held that under sec 256, the accused was entitled to the same—*Ramchandra v. Emp.*, 5 Pat 110, 7 P.L.T. 304, 27 Cr.L.J. 499.

837. According to the plain language of this section, the accused has a right to have the witnesses for the prosecution recalled and cross-examined after frame of charge—*Gopal Sheikh v. Emp.*, 7 C.L.J. 240, *Talluri Venkayya v. Q.*, 4 Mad 130; *Titu Sahu v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 852, *Mahan Singh v. Emp.*, 24 Cr.L.J. 371, 1923 P.W.R. 9; and it is not necessary for the accused to show that he has a reasonable ground for exercising the right of recalling and cross-examining the prosecution witnesses. He is, as a matter of right, entitled to cross-examine—*Q v. Amiruddin*, 21 W.R. 29; *In re Nobin Chand*, 25 W.R. 32, and the Magistrate is not justified in refusing to recall the prosecution witnesses for cross-examination, specially when the accused had not cross-examined any witnesses before the frame of charge—*Ramyad v. K. E.*, 5 P.L.J. 94, 21 Cr.L.J. 814. Where there are several accused, each of the accused should be given an opportunity to cross-examine. A Magistrate cannot refuse to allow the further cross-examination of the witnesses for the prosecution by one of the accused, on the ground that they had been cross-examined by another—*Lala Ram v. Emp.*, 11 C.W.N. cxl.

The right referred to in this section is absolute and unqualified and is intended to apply only where the witnesses are still before the Court and before they have been discharged from further attendance. Under sec 257, however, there is a discretion vested in the Court to resubmit the prosecution witnesses already examined; and where a witness has been allowed to depart under sec 256 on the representation of the accused that he is not required, any further application to re-examine him must be deemed to fall under sec 257—*In re Lockley*, 43 Mad 411, 38 M.L.J. 209, 21 Cr.L.J. 297.

Magistrate's duty to ask:—Under this section, it is the duty of the Magistrate, after a charge has been framed, to require the accused to state whether he desires to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses already examined—*Zamunia v. Ram Tahal*, 27 Cal. 370. Omission on the part of the Magistrate to ask the accused whether he wishes to recall

any witnesses for cross-examination will invalidate the conviction, and the case will be retried from the point of framing the charge—*Moola v. Crown*, 1914 P.R. 11, 16 Cr.L.J. 146; *Mahan Singh v Emp.*, 24 Cr.L.J. 371, A.I.R. 1924 Lah. 215. Omission to so ask the accused, and the rejection of the accused's application on the ground that it was too late, would prejudice the accused in his trial—*Q E v Henry Kaps*, 1902 A.W.N. 5. In *Munian Chetty v Emp.*, 16 Cr.L.J. 5 (Mad.) however it has been held that such omission is a mere irregularity and the conviction is not thereby vitiated. If the case is tried summarily, the omission on the part of the Magistrate to ask the accused whether he wishes to recall the witnesses for further cross-examination, does not vitiate the trial—*Umaji v Emp.*, 28 Bom L R 95, 27 Cr.L.J. 431.

Adjournment—A Magistrate cannot insist on the prosecution witnesses being cross-examined by the accused immediately, whether they wish it or not—*Tirlok v Emp.*, 50 All 71, 25 A L J 749, 28 Cr L.J. 792. An accused, against whom a charge was framed without any previous intimation, when required by the Magistrate to state whether he wished to cross-examine, said that he had no question to put at present but that time should be granted him for engaging a pleader and for cross-examining witnesses, it was held that the application for adjournment was reasonable under the circumstances, and ought to be granted—*Arumugam v Emp.*, (1911) 2 M.W.N. 192, 12 Cr L.J. 548. Where the charges are complicated and the accused are ignorant persons, they should not be called upon to cross-examine the witnesses immediately after the charge is framed, but a reasonable time should be given to them to get proper legal advice and to engage a pleader before they are called upon to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses—*In re Rangasami*, 18 Cr L.J. 786. This is now made clear by the addition of the words "at the commencement of the next hearing of the case." The provision that the accused should be asked whether they wish to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses on a date subsequent to that upon which they are called upon to plead to the charge, is a new proposition deliberately introduced into the Code by the Amendment Act of 1923, and the only possible reason for the change is that the Legislature has intended to give the accused persons against whom charges are framed an interval of time to think out the lines of their defence before they are called upon to inform the Court how they intend to proceed. Omission of this new procedure is an irregularity which vitiates the whole trial—*Phuman v Emp.*, 7 Lah L.J. 114, 26 P L J 460, 26 Cr L.J. 1158. The words inserted by the Amending Act of 1923 indicate the intention of the Legislature that sufficient time should be given to the accused to consider whether he wishes to cross-examine any of the prosecution witnesses after the framing of the charge, and it is only in special cases that the Magistrate can require him to state forthwith if he so wishes—*Ram Chandra v K. E.*, 5 Pat 110, 27 Cr.L.J. 499. Where the accused stated that his pleader was absent as he was engaged in another Court, and the accused applied to the Magistrate to adjourn the hearing, but the Magistrate refused the application on the ground that it was his usual

practice to proceed forthwith with the cross-examination, held that it was not a cogent or adequate reason for not adjourning the hearing, and the Magistrate committed an illegality which vitiated the trial—*Emp. v. Lakshman*, 53 Bom. 578, 1929 Cr. C. 130 (132)

Recording reasons—Where the accused is represented by a pleader from the outset, he may generally be asked under this section if he wishes to cross-examine forthwith, for the simple reason that the accused will not be prejudiced, and it is convenient to arrange a date for the subsequent attendance of the prosecution witnesses before they disperse. If, however, he is asked forthwith, with a view to recalling the witnesses forthwith, fuller reasons will be required, because it is usually convenient for the accused to have an interval in which to study the deposition already on record, and discover material for the cross-examination of the witnesses. If an accused is not represented by a pleader, reason must be shown for not postponing the question to the next hearing by which time he can have consulted a pleader. Where the accused who was not represented by a pleader was required forthwith to state if he wished to cross-examine, and the Magistrate did not record his reasons, held that this was an illegality vitiating the trial, and not a mere irregularity curable by sec. 537—*In re Raju Achari*, 50 Mad. 740, 51 M.L.J. 687, 28 Cr.L.J. 12. The Allahabad High Court, however, holds that the failure of the Magistrate to follow these provisions strictly amounts to no more than irregularity in procedure, and where the irregularity does not result in a failure of justice, it does not affect the legality of the trial. Thus, the witnesses for the prosecution were examined on the 10th May, and cross-examined on the same day, and the accused also made their statements on the same day. On that day the accused were not represented by counsel. The Magistrate did not record any reasons for requiring the accused to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses on the same day. There was a subsequent hearing on 19th May, on which the accused were represented by counsel, but no application was made on behalf of the accused to resubmit the prosecution witness. Held that this showed that the accused had not been prejudiced by having being required by the Magistrate to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses on the 10th May; consequently the trial was not illegal, although the Magistrate did not record reasons—*Chhajju v. Emp.*, 49 All. 316, 25 A.L.J. 111, 28 Cr.L.J. 229. The Lahore High Court is also of opinion that although this section (as amended in 1923) lays down that the Magistrate shall record his reasons for requiring the accused to state forthwith whether they wish to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses, still the omission to record the reasons does not render the trial illegal, if it has not caused any prejudice to the accused—*Ghasiti v. K. E.*, 6 Lah. 554, 27 Cr.L.J. 408.

If summons-case tried as a warrant case—Where an inquiry commenced as a warrant case and the accused curtailed their cross-examination of prosecution witnesses under the impression that they would have a further opportunity of cross-examining them, but no offence triable as a warrant case having been disclosed, the Magistrate closed the case and convicted the accused as in a summons case, it was held that it was the

duty of the Magistrate to allow the accused an opportunity of completing the cross-examination before proceeding with the case—*In re Appavu*, 16 Cr.L.J. 250 (Mad.).

Similarly, where a Magistrate while trying a summons case and a warrant case in one trial under the warrant-case procedure, dismissed the complaint in respect of the warrant case and proceeded with the complaint in respect of the summons case, and, on being requested by the accused to recall the prosecution-witnesses for their further cross-examination, refused to do so, it was held that the refusal was illegal and the accused must certainly have been prejudiced by the same. The privilege conferred by this section is a substantial one, and when denied it is for the prosecution to shew that there was no prejudice—*In re Sobhanadri*, 39 Mad. 503, 16 Cr L.J. 540.

838. Time of cross-examination:—If an accused person desires to recall and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, the time at which he should express such desire is when the charge is read over to him—*Faiz Ali v Koromdi*, 7 Cal 28 See also Note 837 *supra*. The accused should cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution before he enters upon his defence. But of course it is open to the Magistrate to allow cross-examination at any subsequent stage, before the case has been closed—*Inder v. Emp*, 37 Cal 236 The accused may, after the charge has been drawn up and the witnesses for the defence have been examined, recall and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution—*Venkayya v. Q*, 4 Mad. 130 See sec 257. But although it is in the discretion of the Magistrate to recall the witnesses at a subsequent stage of the case, the accused has no right to insist upon the witnesses being recalled—*Faiz Ali v Koromdi*, 7 Cal. 28

'Any remaining witnesses':—The words "any remaining witnesses" do not refer only to those witnesses who have been named by the complainant under sec. 252 (2); these words are wide enough to include any witness who according to the prosecution is able to support its case though he has not been summoned, provided he is not sprung upon the defence all on a sudden and sufficient opportunity is given to the accused to prepare for the cross-examination of such witness—*Emp. v. Percy Burn*, 11 Bom.L R. 1153, 10 Cr.L J. 530.

839. Discharge of prosecution witnesses:—A Magistrate ought not of his own motion to discharge the witnesses for the prosecution until the accused person has exercised or waived his right of cross-examination—*Q. v. Lall Mahomed*, 6 N.W.P 284, *Q. v. Ram Kishan*, 25 W.R. 48 Witnesses for the prosecution should not be discharged until the Court has ascertained whether their cross-examination after the charge will be desired—*Bridhuchand v Lakhmichand*, 8 N.L.R. 65, 13 Cr.L.J 554. Where it becomes necessary to adjourn the hearing, the Magistrate should inquire of the accused if he desires to exercise his right of recalling the witnesses for the prosecution or consents to the discharge of all or any of them If the accused consents to their discharge, he is not entitled to have them re-summoned as a matter of right—*Lall Mahomed*, 6 N.W.P.

Adjournment for defence :—According to the provisions of secs. 256 and 257, the accused is entitled as a matter of right to ask for an adjournment, after a charge has been framed against him, to enable him to adduce evidence in support of his defence—*Sh. Emtaz Ali v Jagat*, 1 C.W.N 313. Where a trial is commenced as a warrant case, it should be concluded by the procedure laid down in this chapter for warrant cases; and the Magistrate acts illegally in concluding the trial as a summons case and convicting the accused, without giving him an opportunity to have his witnesses produced by giving him the adjournment asked for—*Munshi Teli v. Emp*, 2 P.L.T. 482.

842. Subsection (2)—Written Statement :—Where certain legal practitioners were convicted under sec 17 (1) of the Cr Law Amendment Act, XIV of 1908, for being members of an Association called the "National Volunteers' Association" which was declared by the Government to be an unlawful association under sec 15 (2) (b) of that Act, and were removed or suspended from practice under clause 8 of the Letters Patent, whereupon one of them proposed to file a written statement, held that the proceedings under clause 8 of the Letters Patent were not of a criminal nature, in this sense that the rules of procedure of a criminal trial such as the filing of a written statement under sec 256 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code were not applicable to them, and the respondent's written statement could not therefore be received—*In re Abdul Rashid*, 4 Lah 271.

A written statement filed by the accused cannot take the place of the examination of the accused which is imperative under sec. 342. See notes under that section under heading "Written statement."

257. (1) If the accused, after he has entered upon

Process for compelling production of evidence at instance of accused.

his defence, applies to the Magistrate to issue any process for compelling the attendance of any witness for the purpose of examination or cross-examination, or the production of any document or other thing, the Magistrate shall issue such process unless he considers that such application should be refused on the ground that it is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice. Such ground shall be recorded by him in writing :

Provided that when the accused has cross-examined or had the opportunity of cross-examining any witness after the charge is framed, the attendance of such witness shall not be compelled under this section unless the Magistrate is satisfied that it is necessary for the purposes of justice.

(2) The Magistrate may, before summoning any

witness on such application, require that his reasonable expenses incurred in attending for the purposes of the trial be deposited in Court.

The procedure of this section applies to summary trials, and the accused is entitled to have processes issued for compelling the attendance of prosecution witnesses for cross-examination, when he is called upon to enter on his defence, if they have not been cross-examined before—*Nepal v. Emp.*, 22 Cr.L.J. 271 (Cal).

843. Issue of process :—The language of this section is imperative. A Magistrate has no discretion to refuse to issue process to compel the attendance of any witness unless he considers that the application should be refused on the ground specified in this section—*Emp v. Purshottam*, 26 Bom. 418. The Magistrate must summon every witness named in the list. He cannot arbitrarily limit the number of witnesses to be examined—*Purshottam*, 26 Bom. 418. Thus, where the accused put in a list of 72 witnesses, and the Magistrate ordered him to cite only 12 of them, it was held that the Magistrate's order was arbitrary and illegal—*Narayana v. Emp.*, 31 Mad. 131.

Once the Magistrate has issued summons, he is bound to assist the accused in enforcing the attendance of the witnesses. If the witnesses do not obey the summons, the Magistrate cannot refuse to issue a second summons—*Q. E v. Dhananjoy*, 10 Cal. 931; *Gohar v. Emp.*, 1884 P R 28, *Sohara v. Emp.*, 1922 P.L.R. 5, 22 Cr.L.J. 501; *Md. Din v. Emp.*, 1922 P.L.R. 6, 22 Cr L.J. 497; *Bhomar v. Digambar*, 6 C.W.N. 548; *Q. E v. Shamsherka*, Ratanlal 594; *Emp. v. Ruknuddin*, 4 All 53; *Muhammad Din v. Emp.*, 9 C.W.N. cccxix; *Amrit mondal v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 490. It is the duty of the Court to see that the summonses or warrants are duly executed. If the witnesses do not attend, the accused can insist upon the Court to issue further process. Where the witnesses cited by the accused failed to attend, and it appeared that the summonses were not duly executed, but the Magistrate proceeded to give judgment remarking that it was the business of the accused to take suitable steps for bringing his witnesses before the Court, held, that the conviction of the accused was illegal and must be set aside—*Byoy v. Emp.*, 19 A.L.J. 945. When once a Court has issued a summons to a witness under this section and the witness fails to appear, it is not justified in dispensing with the evidence of the witness on the ground that at the most he would merely support the accused in his statement—*Sohara v. Emp.*, 1922 P L R 5, 22 Cr L.J. 501.

844. Refusal to summon prosecution witnesses :—An absolute right of cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses is not conferred by this section. The Magistrate can refuse to allow the accused to recall such witnesses for cross-examination, if he considers that it is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice. But it lies upon the party who thinks himself aggrieved to show that the ends of justice have been frustrated in consequence of the refusal

to recall the prosecution witnesses for cross-examination—*Nilkanta v. Q. E.*, 20 Cal. 469.

Where the accused was given an opportunity under section 256 to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses, but he refused to do so, leaving no option for the Magistrate but to close the case, and after the case was closed the accused applied to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses, held that the accused's attitude was deliberately designed to harass the Court and that the Magistrate would be justified in refusing the application—*Vyasa Rao v. K. E.*, 21 M L J 283 (F B) Where the witnesses for the prosecution were subjected to a very lengthy and strict cross-examination before the framing of charge, the Magistrate was right in declining to re-summon those witnesses, if he was of opinion that the application to re-summon the witnesses was made for vexation etc.—*Q. E. v. Govind, Ratanlal* 930; *Nilkanta v Q. E.*, 20 Cal 469, *Ramsakal v Emp.*, 26 Cr.L J 1627 (Cal.), but unless the Magistrate considers that the application to re-summon the witnesses is made for the purpose of vexation or delay, the accused is entitled to have the prosecution witnesses summoned for cross-examination—*Monmohan v. Bankim*, 51 Cal 1044 (1047), 26 Cr.L.J 384, and the Magistrate cannot refuse to summon the witnesses merely on the ground that they were fully cross-examined before—*Sreenath v Emp.*, 4 C W N 241, *Mauli v Naurangi.* 4 C W N 351

The proviso to sub-section (1) is to the effect that when an accused has cross-examined or had the opportunity of cross-examining any witness after the charge has been framed, the attendance of such witness shall not be compelled under this section, unless the Magistrate is satisfied that it is necessary for the ends of justice. The mere fact that it might have been possible from a cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses to have extracted from them something which might have been of advantage to the accused is not a sufficient ground to enable the Magistrate to recall those witnesses; it must appear that there was to be obtained from the witnesses sought to be cross-examined something which would have materially affected the result of the trial—*Ajo Mian v K E.*, ■ P L.T. 626, 27 Cr L J 353.

The mere fact that the accused's lawyers had previously declined to cross-examine such witnesses or the mere fact that such witnesses were not cross-examined before does not compel a Court to summon them; for to do so would be to render the proviso meaningless—*Ajo Mian*, supra.

"After he has entered upon his defence"—It is only after the accused has entered upon his defence that the Magistrate can in his discretion refuse the application of the accused on the ground that it is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice—*Zamunia v Ram Tahal* 27 Cal 370

845. Examination of defence witnesses :—A Magistrate cannot refuse to examine a defence witness who is present in Court, if he is requested by the accused to do so—*Emp. v. Nagar.* 4 Bom L.R. 461. Though it is competent for a Magistrate to decline to summon witnesses for the defence under this section, it is not competent for him to refuse to

examine the defence witnesses, on the ground that their evidence is unnecessary—*Emp. v. Nanbasappa*, 14 Bom.L.R. 360 Where in a trial involving a capital charge the accused is denied his right to have his defence witnesses examined in Court, it must be held that it has resulted in a failure of justice, and the conviction ought to be set aside and a retrial ordered—*Ayarvali v. Emp.*, 45 M.L.J. 305, 24 Cr.L.J. 840 If a witness is unable to attend the Court owing to illness, and he appears to be an important witness, the Magistrate should ascertain whether it will be possible for that witness to attend the Court within a reasonable time, and if not, then his evidence should be taken on commission—*Jamuna Singh v. K. E.*, 3 Pat 591 (594), 25 Cr.L.J. 1255. A Magistrate cannot refuse to summon witnesses cited by the accused on the ground that they are implicated in the charge—*Ram Sahie v. Sanker*, 15 W.R 7; or on the ground that the accused is unable or refuses to pay the costs of the witnesses—*Debi Singh v. Emp.*, 24 Cr.L.J. 831 (Pat.); or on the ground that the Magistrate is of opinion that they will not be able to give any reliable evidence one way or the other (without giving any reason for holding such opinion)—*Aramugam v. Emp.*, 12 Cr.L.J. 548, (1911) 2 M.W.N. 192, or on the ground that they are living at a great distance—*Ayarvali v. Emp.*, 45 M.L.J. 305, 24 Cr.L.J. 840 The Magistrate cannot refuse process to a defence witness merely because he thinks that no useful purpose will be served by summoning that witness—*Ganpat v. Emp.*, 24 Cr.L.J. 686 (Lah) Where after a case on both sides having been closed, the Magistrate summoned a witness to give evidence, whereupon the accused prayed to have certain witnesses summoned to rebut the evidence of the Court witness, held that the Magistrate was bound to summon such witnesses, and could not refuse to do so on the ground that the accused had stated at the close of his case that he did not wish to examine any more witnesses—*Deela Mahton v. Sheo Dayal*, 6 Cal 714.

If a Magistrate rejects the application for summoning the witnesses, he should specify his reasons for such refusal. If he fails to record the reasons, the conviction and sentence will be set aside—*Sreenath v. Emp.*, 4 C.W.N. 241, *Manmohan v. Bankim*, 51 Cal 1044 (1047), *In re Sat Narain*, 3 All. 392, *Debi Singh v. Emp.*, 24 Cr.L.J. 831 (Pat.); *Abdul Jabbar v. Emp.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 310, A.I.R. 1925 Cal 80

It is a sufficient compliance with the requirements of this section, if the Magistrate states facts which led him irresistibly to the conclusion that the application was for no other purpose than that of vexation or delay or defeating the ends of justice, although he does not say expressly that the application was made for that purpose—*Wahid Ali v. Emp.*, 11 C.W.N. 789 Where a Magistrate rejects an application after recording on it "too late", this is a sufficient compliance with this section—*Kudrutulla v. Emp.*, 39 Cal. 781, 13 Cr.L.J. 218

846. Cross-examination :—The accused in a warrant case has three opportunities of cross-examining the prosecution witnesses; once, under sec. 252, before the charge is framed; secondly, under section 256 after the charge is framed; and under section 257, the accused is given

the third opportunity of cross-examining the prosecution witnesses, unless the Magistrate decides that the application for cross-examination is vexatious—*Ramyad v. K. E.*, 5 P.L.J. 94, 21 Cr.L.J. 814; *Varisai v. K. E.*, 46 Mad. 449 (463).

Where on a refusal by the Magistrate to resubmit the prosecution witnesses for cross-examination, the accused cited those witnesses on their own behalf as defence witnesses, and then proceeded to cross-examine them, but were disallowed by the Magistrate, it was held that the mere fact that the accused had been compelled to treat the witnesses for the prosecution as their own witnesses did not change their character, and that although the accused were compelled to obtain their attendance as witnesses for the defence, they were really prosecution witnesses and summoned under sec 257 for the purpose of cross-examination, and the Magistrate was wrong in refusing to allow their cross-examination—*Sheo Prakash v. Rawlins*, 28 Cal. 594, *Moula Bux v. Derasatulla*, 1 C.W.N. 19, *Venku Reddi v. Emp.*, 1922 M.W.N. 120, 23 Cr.L.J. 192.

Where an accused first obtained process for the attendance of a witness, but subsequently declined to examine him, whereupon the Court examined him as a Court-witness under section 540, it was held that the witness could not be treated as a defence witness, and that the accused had the right to cross-examine him—*Mohendra v. Emp.*, 29 Cal. 387.

An accused may be allowed to cross-examine the witnesses called by his co-accused, when the case of the co-accused is adverse to his case—*Ram Chand v. Hanif*, 21 Cal. 401.

847. Inspection of documents :—In a warrant case the accused has no right to call for the production of documents in the possession of the prosecution and to inspect the same, until after a charge has been framed and read out to him under secs 254 and 255. This right is given by section 257, after a charge has been framed. But the Magistrate should satisfy himself that the documents called for have some bearing on the issues in the case and are relevant, before granting a summons for their production—*Tahilram v. Pitamberdas*, 11 S.L.R. 267, 16 Cr.L.J. 245.

848. Expenses :—It has been held in some cases that the inability or even refusal to pay the expenses would not be an adequate ground for refusing to summon the defence witnesses—*Debi Singh v. Emp.*, 24 Cr.L.J. 831 (Pat), *Qadu v. Q. E.*, 1898 P.R. 7. But the Lahore High Court recently holds that if the rule laid down in 1898 P.R. 7 is to be literally followed, then sub-section (2) of this section would become an entirely dead letter, because one can hardly conceive of a case where an accused person would willingly deposit the expenses of his witnesses if he knew that he had only to express his unwillingness to entitle him to get his witnesses summoned at the expenses of the Government. Sub-section (2) fully empowers a Magistrate to order that the reasonable expenses of a witness shall be deposited by the accused before the witness is summoned. But the Magistrate should only summon so many witnesses at one hearing as he thinks he will be able to examine on that hearing, to save the expense of parties—*Ganpat v. Crown*, 24 Cr.L.J. 686 (Lah.).

If the accused, after the framing of the charge, applies for recall of prosecution witnesses for further cross-examination, it is he who should pay the expenses and not the complainant. The Magistrate should call those witnesses either at the expense of the Government or at the expense of the accused, but he cannot demand the expenses from the complainant—*Faiz Mohd. v. Nabu*, 29 Cr.L.J. 20 (Lah.); *Abdul Majid v. Mehr*, 30 Cr.L.J. 664 (Lah.).

As regards the expenses of causing the attendance of the accused's witnesses the general rule in warrant cases is that such costs are usually borne by the Crown (and not by the accused). Any departure from the usual rule must be supported by adequate and cogent reasons—*Habib v. Mehdi Husain*, 29 Cr.L.J. 459 (460) (Lah.); *Sayed Habib v. Emp.*, 30 Cr.L.J. 814.

Although the Magistrate can under this sub-section require the accused to deposit in Court the expenses for the attendance of his witnesses, still if the Magistrate has once allowed the witnesses to be summoned without demanding expenses from the accused, and if by any chance the witnesses summoned for a particular date have not been examined on that date, the Magistrate has no power afterwards to say that on the next date of hearing the witnesses shall not be summoned except on payment of their expenses by the accused—*Kishan Lal v. Emp.*, 22 Cr.L.J. 711 (Lah.), 63 I.C. 871 (872).

A Court ordering a party to deposit the travelling allowance of a witness should state the amount of the travelling allowance to be deposited—*Gourishankar v. Collector*, 6 P.L.T. 215, 26 Cr.L.J. 965.

258. (1) If in any case under this Chapter in which a charge has been framed the Magistrate finds the accused not guilty, he shall record an order of acquittal.

(2) Where in any case under this Chapter the Magistrate does not proceed in accordance with the provisions of section 349 or section 562, he shall, if he finds the accused guilty, pass sentence upon him according to law.

Change :—Sub-section (2) has been amended by section 73 of the Cr.P.C. Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. A similar amendment has been made in sec. 245 (2) and sec. 306 (2).

849. Acquittal :—An order of acquittal can be recorded only after a charge has been drawn up, and not before—*Q. v. Jupit*, 22 W.R. 25; *Emp. v. Ranchhod*, 37 Bom. 369. But an omission to prepare a charge does not invalidate an order of acquittal—*Hanuman v. Ahmad Ali*, 1881 A.W.N. 142. If, however, a warrant case is tried as a summons case, and no charge is framed, the acquittal amounts to a discharge under sec. 253—*Emp. v. Isha*, 1886 A.W.N. 260.

After a charge is framed, the Magistrate can pass no other order except that of acquittal or conviction. He cannot pass an order of discharge. Even if he discharges the accused, the discharge would amount to an acquittal—*Taha v. Hirba*, 1893 P.R. 29, *Sreeramah v. Veerasalingam*, 38 Mad 585, *Bishambar v. Emp.* 1 O W N 705. So also, an order of dismissal of complaint would amount to an acquittal—*In re Jadubar*, 5 C.L.R. 359.

Where a Magistrate passes an order of acquittal under this section, the Sessions Judge cannot treat it as an order of discharge and direct a commitment of the accused under sec. 436 (now 437)—*Apparazu v. Emp.*, 43 Mad. 330, 21 Cr L J. 91.

An order of acquittal can be passed in a warrant case only where after the frame of a charge the Magistrate is of opinion that the evidence is insufficient to justify a conviction. It is not competent to a Magistrate to enter an order of acquittal in a warrant case on a private complainant's offering to withdraw from the prosecution in a non-compoundable case—*Emp v Ranchhod*, 37 Bom 369, 14 Cr L J 77. The acquittal must be based on the finding that the accused is not guilty, the Magistrate cannot acquit the accused merely because the complainant is absent. Where a charge has been framed against the accused and the latter have entered upon their defence and produced some defence witnesses, they cannot be acquitted on account of the absence of the complainant—*Ram Baksh v. Jairam*, 27 O C 316, 26 Cr.L.J. 264, 1 O W.N. 613. But where after a charge is framed, the complainant is absent, and it is obvious that the complainant has no desire to proceed with his complaint, the Magistrate should acquit the accused, and not merely discharge him—*Emp. v. Godhan*, 1 O W N 586, 26 Cr.L.J. 400. See also Note 852 under sec. 259.

850. Conviction:—An accused must be convicted on the strength of the case made against him, and not in consequence of his inability to put forward proof of his innocence—*Reg. v. Jenkoo*, Ratanlal 5. Although a Magistrate has thought fit to frame a charge, he is not bound to convict the accused person merely because the latter does not produce any rebutting evidence. If he feels reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, he is bound to acquit him—*Q. E. v. Chanbasapa*, Ratanlal 854.

It is not necessary that the conviction or acquittal should be by the same Magistrate who drew up the charge—*Emp v Kudrutulla*, 3 Cal. 495.

Sentence.—See notes under sec. 245.

259. When the proceedings have been instituted upon complaint, and upon any day fixed for the hearing of the case the complainant is absent, and the offence may be lawfully compounded, or is not a compoundable offence, the Magistrate may, in his discretion, withstanding anything hereinbefore contained, at

Absence of complainant.

If the accused, after the framing of the charge, applies for recall of prosecution witnesses for further cross-examination, it is he who should pay the expenses and not the complainant. The Magistrate should call those witnesses either at the expense of the Government or at the expense of the accused, but he cannot demand the expenses from the complainant—*Faiz Mohd. v. Nabu*, 29 Cr.L.J. 20 (Lah.); *Abdul Majid v. Mehr*, 30 Cr.L.J. 664 (Lah.).

As regards the expenses of causing the attendance of the accused's witnesses the general rule in warrant cases is that such costs are usually borne by the Crown (and not by the accused). Any departure from the usual rule must be supported by adequate and cogent reasons—*Habib v. Mehdi Husain*, 29 Cr.L.J. 459 (460) (Lah.); *Sayed Habib v. Emp.*, 30 Cr.L.J. 814.

Although the Magistrate can under this sub-section require the accused to deposit in Court the expenses for the attendance of his witnesses, still if the Magistrate has once allowed the witnesses to be summoned without demanding expenses from the accused, and if by any chance the witnesses summoned for a particular date have not been examined on that date, the Magistrate has no power afterwards to say that on the next date of hearing the witnesses shall not be summoned except on payment of their expenses by the accused—*Kishan Lal v. Emp.*, 22 Cr.L.J. 711 (Lah.), 63 I.C. 871 (872).

A Court ordering a party to deposit the travelling allowance of a witness should state the amount of the travelling allowance to be deposited—*Gourishankar v. Collector*, 6 P.L.T. 215, 26 Cr.L.J. 965.

258. (1) If in any case under this Chapter in which a charge has been framed the Magistrate finds the accused not guilty, he shall record an order of acquittal.

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marily, it was held that the Magistrate had acted *bona fide* in the interests of justice, and the High Court refused to interfere—*Q. E. v. Rangamani*, 22 Mad 459. But in *Gosta Behari v. Balstam*, 20 C.W.N. 831, 37 C.L.J. 105, 24 Cr.L.J. 157, it was held that such a change of procedure in the midst of the trial was prejudicial to the accused, and that there should be a retrial.

Power to try summarily.

260. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code,—

- (a) the District Magistrate,
- (b) any Magistrate of the first class specially empowered in this behalf by the Local Government, and
- (c) any Bench of Magistrates invested with the powers of a Magistrate of the first class and specially empowered in this behalf by the Local Government,

may, if he or they think fit, try in a summary way all or any of the following offences:—

- (a) offences not punishable with death, transportation or imprisonment for a term exceeding six months;
- (b) offences relating to weights and measures under sections 264, 265 and 266 of the Indian Penal Code;
- (c) hurt, under section 323 of the same Code;
- (d) theft, under sections 379, 380 or 381 of the same Code, where the value of the property stolen does not exceed fifty rupees;
- (e) dishonest misappropriation of property under section 403 of the same Code, where the value of the property misappropriated does not exceed fifty rupees;
- (f) receiving or retaining stolen property under section 411 of the same Code, where value of such property does not exceed fifty rupees;
- (g) assisting in the concealment or receiving of stolen property, under section 411;

- same Code, where the value of such property does not exceed fifty rupees;
- (h) mischief, under section 427 of the same Code;
 - (i) house-trespass, under section 448, and offences under sections 451, 453, 454, 456 and 457 of the same Code;
 - (j) insult with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, under section 504, and criminal intimidation, under section 506, of the same Code;
 - (k) abetment of any of the foregoing offences;
 - (l) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences, when such attempt is an offence;
 - (m) offences under section 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act, 1871:

Provided that no case in which a Magistrate exercises the special powers conferred by section 34 shall be tried in a summary way.

(2) When in the course of a summary trial it appears to the Magistrate or Bench that the case is one which is of a character which renders it undesirable that it should be tried summarily, the Magistrate or Bench shall recall any witnesses who may have been examined and proceed to re-hear the case in manner provided by this Code.

856. Magistrates empowered :—The District Magistrate of Bangalore has no power to try European British subjects summarily under this section, as his powers are confined to those conferred on him by the Declarations of the G. G. in Council, and the power to try European British subjects summarily under this section is not included in such powers—*In re Jeremiah*, 39 Mad. 942, 16 Cr.L.J. 773. Under the present law however all such restrictions have been removed.

Where an Assistant Commissioner of a district who was, before his going to England on furlough, authorised to exercise summary powers in a certain local area, was on his return from furlough posted to another local area as a first class Magistrate, it was held that he had no jurisdiction to exercise summary powers in the latter area—*In re Pursooram*, 2 Cal. 117. But see sec. 40 as now amended.

Presidency Magistrates :—The provisions of this chapter do not apply to trials before Presidency Magistrates—*Q. E. v. Abdul, Ratanlal* 539.

Responsibility of Magistrates :—The responsibility thrown on Magistrates entrusted with summary powers is very great, and the responsibility of those who have to entrust them with such powers is equally great. Magistrates who are sufficiently alive to the responsibility entrusted to them will take care that the procedure or the record is not made more summary than what the law has laid down—*Q E v Mukundi*, 21 All. 189.

857. Offences triable summarily .—Whether an offence is to be tried summarily or not is to be determined by the facts stated in the complaint as well as the sworn testimony of the complainant—*Fanindra v. Emp.*, 36 Cal 67 *Chandra Mohan v. K. E.*, 27 C.W.N 148. The Magistrate is competent to dispose of a case summarily where the facts reported disclose an offence triable summarily, without reference to the particular charge pressed—*In re Mewa* 6 N.W.P 254, *Golap Pandey v. Boddam*, 16 Cal. 715, *Q E v Vallabh*, 1 Bom L II 683.

Where a person is charged with a graver offence, the Magistrate ought not to cut down the offence to a less serious one at his own will, in order to give himself jurisdiction to try it summarily—*Emeral v. Mohammadi*, 24 W.R 48, *Mewa Lal*, 51 All 540, 30 Cr L J 686. *Sheo Bhajan v. Mosawi*, 27 Cal 983, *Bishu Shaik v. Saber*, 29 Cal 409, *Ramanund v. Koylash*, 11 Cal 236, *Chandra Mohan v K E.*, 27 C.W.N. 148, *In re Chunder Seekor* 1 C.L.R 434, *Ghamman v Emp.*, 1888 P.R. 5. Thus, a charge of dacoity cannot be treated as one of unlawful assembly for the purpose of trying it summarily—*Dwarkanath v. Nalu Das*, 21 W.R. 89; see also, *Q. E v. Lakshman*, Ratanlal 670, *Barkat Khan v. Crown*, 1907 P.L.R 21, *Sharma v. Emp.*, 6 Bur L.T 137, 14 Cr L J 462. So also, no Magistrate is entitled to split up an offence into its component parts for the purpose of giving himself summary jurisdiction, thereby depriving the prisoner of his right of appeal—*Emp v. Abdool Karim*, 4 Cal 18. Where the value of the property stolen exceeded Rs. 50, the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to reduce it to Rs. 50, in order to give himself jurisdiction to try it summarily—*Q v. Buzleh Ali*, 22 W.R. 65

Where neither the complaint nor the evidence adduced in a case of criminal trespass (sec 457 I P Code, which is triable summarily) shows the actual offence which the accused intended to commit, and the only finding which could be arrived at is that the accused intended to commit an offence punishable with imprisonment, the conviction of the accused in a summary trial cannot be held to be illegal on the ground that the intention of the accused *might have been* to commit an offence which cannot be tried summarily—*Madhab Chandra v Emp.*, 53 Cal 738, 27 Cr.L.J. 1295. A Magistrate can try a person summarily for offences under secs 143 and 427 I P C, and the fact that there are major offences suggested against the accused in the complaint does not debar the Magistrate from taking recourse to the summary procedure—*Naubat v. Emp.*, 28 Cr.L.J. 140 (All.).

Joint charge of summary and non-summary offences :—Where an accused person is charged with offences not triable summarily along with offences triable summarily, the Magistrate cannot disregard the former offences, and proceed to try the case summarily—*Ramanand v. Koy*

11 Cal. 236; *Ghamman v. Emp.*, 1888 P.R. 5 *Contra—Q. E. v. Jagjivan*, 10 All. 55, where it has been held that the mere fact of the complainant charging the accused with summary offences along with non-summary ones will not oust the summary jurisdiction of the Magistrate.

Where the accused was charged with summary as well as non-summary offences, but the Magistrate tried the accused summarily for the offence triable summarily, and ignored the non-summary offence, held that it would have been preferable had the Magistrate proceeded regularly and tried the accused upon both the charges; but as there was no miscarriage of justice in the present case, a retrial need not be ordered—*Govt v. Kantila*, 31 C.W.N. 583, 28 Cr L.J. 697.

Summary trial of non-summary offences—Effect:—Where a Magistrate deliberately disregards the offence complained of, which is an offence not triable summarily, and tries it summarily, his proceedings are absolutely void under sec. 530 (g) Where a complaint is made for an offence not triable summarily, and process is issued in respect of that offence, a summary trial is illegal and void even though the accused is ultimately convicted of an offence triable summarily—*Ganu v. Emp.*, 52 Bom 254, 29 Cr.L.J. 492 (493), *Chandra Mohan v. K. E.*, 27 C.W.N. 148, 25 Cr.L.J. 528; *Kailash v. Joynuddi*, 31 C.W.N. 252, *Emp v. Ram Narain*, 46 All. 446.

858. Instances of summary offences:—(i) Offences under sec 121, Indian Railways Act—*K. E. v. Bindeshri*, 1902 A.W.N. 24;

(ii) offences under sec. 65 (a), Stamp Act, for failure to give a receipt—*Navoo Routhen*, 1 Weir 906;

(iii) proceedings under sec. 84, Bombay Act VI of 1873, for recovery of Municipal Taxes—*Municipality of Ahmedabad v. Jumna*, 17 Bom. 731;

(iv) offences under the Companies Act for not filing the balance sheet with the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies—*Dina Nath v. Emp.*, 35 All 173, 14 Cr.L.J. 105;

(v) offences under sec. 49, Bengal Abkari Act XXI of 1856, the confiscation provided in that section being merely a consequence of the conviction and not part of the punishment—*Emp. v. Baidanath*, 3 Cal. 366.

(vi) violation of rule 8, div. (c) cl (b) framed under the Criminal Tribes Act (XXVII of 1871) is punishable with a maximum sentence of 6 months rigorous imprisonment and is triable summarily—*Bihari*, 50 All. 718, 30 Cr L.J. 214 (215).

Property of value not exceeding fifty rupees:—Where a box containing fifty Rupees was stolen and the price of the box was annas eight, the theft was of property exceeding Rs 50 in value (i.e. Rs 50-8 annas) and could not be tried summarily—*Q. v. Buzleh Ali*, 22 W.R. 65 Since a tenant is entitled to the exclusive possession of the whole produce until it is divided under sec. 71 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, his complaint against the landlord for theft for having cut and carried away paddy worth Rs. 88 of which the latter was entitled to one-half, cannot be summarily tried by a Magistrate, as the value of the property in this case must be

regarded as Rs. 88 and not Rs. 44 only—*Shaikh Haboo v. Sk. Hariman*, 1 P.L.J. 230, 20 C.W.N. 1212, 17 Cr.L.J. 473.

859. Offences not triable summarily :—(i) Offences which are punishable with imprisonment for more than 12 months, e.g. an offence under sec. 60 of the U. P. Excise Act (IV of 1910) which is punishable with imprisonment for one year—*Bhikha v. Emp.*, 28 O.C. 123, 26 Cr.L.J. 800;

(ii) offences under sec. 2 of the Workmen's Breach of Contract Act—*Emp. v. Dhondu*, 11 Bom L.R. 255; *K. E v Periaswamy*, 2 L.B.R. 163; *Pollard v Mothial*, 4 Mad. 234, *Q. E. v. Kattayan*, 20 Mad. 235; *Q. E. v. Rajab*, 16 Bom 368; *Aviram v. Abdool*, 27 Cal 131; *Emp. v. Dhondu*, 33 Bom. 22; *Crown v Sohrab*, 11 S.L.R. 165, 14 Cr.L.J. 256, *Emp. v. Har Lal*, 1912 P.W. 3, 13 Cr.L.J. 194; (*Contra—Q. E. v. Indarjit*, 11 All. 262 and *Abdus Samad v Yusuf*, 43 All 281),

(iii) offences under sec. 11 of Act VII of 1851, for illegal demand of toll—*Uttam Chunder v Isser Chunder*, 22 W.R. 76,

(iv) offences under the Press Act, e.g. omission to make a declaration—*Bava Narain v Emp.*, 1889 P.W. 9,

(v) maintenance proceedings under sec. 488—*Kali Dasi v. Durga*, 20 Cal 351, *Hur Kishore v Bharati*, 24 W.R. 61,

(vi) offence under sec. 60 of the U. P. Excise Act (IV of 1900) in respect of exciseable articles other than cocaine (punishable with one year's imprisonment)—*Emp. v. Ram Narain*, 46 All. 446;

(vii) offences under sec. 9 Opium Act (punishable with one year's imprisonment)—*Emp. v. Nga Sit*, 4 Bur L.T. 271, 13 Cr.L.J. 58;

(viii) cattle-lifting—*Crown v. Allahrakho*, 6 S.L.R. 101, 13 Cr.L.J. 780 (781), in Sind, the offence of cattle-theft is so prevalent and so often goes unpunished that deterrent sentences should be passed, and the offence should not be tried summarily—*Emp. v. Amir Bux*, 28 Cr.L.J. 959 (Sind).

(ix) offences under sec. 224 I. P. C.—*Q. E. v. Hassan Ali*, 1894 A.W.N. 176,

(x) offences under sec. 452 I. P. C.—*R. S. Sharma v. Emp.*, 6 Bur. L.T. 137,

(xi) theft of property of value more than Rs. 50—*Buzleh Ali*, 22 W.R. 65, *Dipchand v Emp.*, 14 N.L.R. 190; *Sk. Haboo v. Sk. Kariman*, 1 P.L.J. 230; under clause (i) of this section, an offence under sec. 457 I. P. C. (house breaking by night in order to commit theft) is triable summarily, but if the property stolen is worth more than Rs. 50, a summary trial would be improper—*Dipchand v Emp.*, 14 N.L.R. 190,

(xii) a summary offence combined with a charge of previous conviction—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 324, *Emp. v. Bashir*, 30 Cr.L.J. 505 (All.)

860. When summary trial undesirable or improper :—A summary trial is undesirable in a case where a large number of correspondences has to be gone into and the case is by no means of a simple character—*Dina Nath*, 35 All 173; or in a case in which from the nature of the dispute and the plea taken by the accused it is apparent

that complicated questions of right and title and production of documentary evidence are involved—*Bhim Bahadur v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 121, 21 Cr.L.J. 374, 55 I.C. 854; *Parmeshwar v. Emp.*, 3 P.L.T. 347, *Maung Shewe v. Emp.*, 2 Bur. L.J. 55, 24 Cr.L.J. 929; *Emp. v. Tirithdas*, 6 S.L.R. 120, 13 Cr.L.J. 771. A summary procedure is also undesirable where the accused is a deaf and dumb person—*In re a deaf and dumb man*, 8 Bom. L.R. 849. A summary trial is also improper where the Magistrate takes cognizance of the case from his own knowledge or suspicion, and holds the trial on inadequate materials—*Emp. v. Hamed*, 3 C.W.N. cccxxx; *Kanhaiya Lal v. K. E.*, 1905 P.L.R. 31. It is also undesirable in offences of a very serious nature—*Crown v. Allahrakho*, 11 S.L.R. 101, 13 Cr.L.J. 780, *Dipchand v. Emp.*, 14 N.L.R. 190. It is improper where the charge is a serious or complicated one, and the trial goes on for a considerable time and a local inquiry has to be made or a large number of witnesses and accused persons are examined—*Emp. v. Rustomji*, 23 Bom. L.R. 984, 23 Cr.L.J. 21, *Ghasila Mal v. Crown*, 3 Lah.L.J. 346, 22 Cr.L.J. 145, 59 I.C. 849; *In re Isser Chunder*, 25 W.R. 65; *Rahimtulla v. Emp.*, 19 S.L.R. 136, 26 Cr.L.J. 1026. But a summary trial is not improper merely because there is a large number of accused in the case—*Naubat v. Emp.*, 28 Cr.L.J. 140 (All).

A summary trial is also improper in a case where the conviction of the accused may entail further serious consequences (e.g. dismissal from service). Thus, where a Police officer of many years' standing was charged with criminal intimidation with a view to prevent a person from giving evidence against certain grave offenders, and was tried summarily and convicted, held that the Magistrate did not exercise a sound discretion in trying the case summarily and depriving the accused of the privilege of an appeal—*Subramanya Ayyar v. Q.*, 6 Mad. 396. So also, where a village Kulkarni is charged with offences under secs. 176 and 202 I.P.C. (intentional omission to give information of offences to a public servant) the Magistrate should not try the accused summarily, in as much as cases under sec. 202 are complicated and the conviction of the accused may entail further serious consequences (dismissal from service)—*Q. E. v. Hari Gopal, Ratanlal* 778; *Q. E. v. Vaman, Ratanlal* 784.

261. The Local Government may confer, on any

Power to invest
Bench of Magistrates
invested with less
power.

Bench of Magistrates invested with the powers of a Magistrate of the second or third class, power to try summarily all or any of the following offences:—

(a) offences under the Indian Penal Code, sections 277, 278, 279, 285, 286, 289, 290, 292, 293, 294, 323, 334, 336, 341, 352, 426, 447 and 504;

(b) offences against Municipal Acts, and the conservancy clauses of Police Acts which are punishable

only with fine or with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month *with or without fine*;

(c) abetment of any of the foregoing offences;

(d) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences, when such attempt is an offence.

The italicised words at the end of clauses (a) and (b) have been added by section 75 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923.

A Bench of Magistrates cannot try summarily any other offence except those mentioned in sec. 260 and this section—*Q. v. Bishela*, 21 W. R. 12, *Havaldar v. Jagu Man*, 9 Cal. 45.

262. (1) In trials under this Chapter, the procedure prescribed for summons-cases shall be followed in summons-cases, and the procedure prescribed for warrant-cases shall be followed in warrant-cases, except as hereinafter mentioned.

(2) No sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding three months shall be passed in the case of any conviction under this Chapter.

861. Procedure:—The scanty procedure laid down in this Chapter should be strictly followed—*Q. v. Johree*, 22 W. R. 28; *Q. E. v. Erugadu*, 15 Mad. 83. Magistrates should take care that the procedure and the record are not made more summary than what the law has laid down—*Q. E. v. Mukundi*, 21 All. 189, *Damodar v. Emp.* 3 P. L. T. 499. Thus, where the Magistrate without issuing process or making a record of the proceedings and without dismounting from the horse on which he was riding, convicted and fined a man summarily for causing obstruction in a public way, it was held that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was illegal—*Q. E. v. Erugadu*, 15 Mad. 83.

In a summary trial of a warrant case, the Magistrate must adopt the procedure laid down in Chapter XXI (except that he has not to frame a charge and is not bound to record the evidence of the witnesses). Therefore the provision of section 256 which gives the accused an absolute right of cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses after they have been examined-in-chief must apply to a summary trial of warrant cases—*Tittu Sahu v. Emp.*, 1 P. L. T. 652, 21 Cr. L. J. 630, *In re Raju*, 50 Mad. 740, 28 Cr. L. J. 12. The accused is entitled to have processes issued for compelling the attendance of the prosecution witnesses for cross-examination—*Nepal v. Emp.*, 22 Cr. L. J. 271 (Cal.).

In a summary trial of a warrant case, though a charge need not be framed, the accused person cannot be called dilatory, if he delays to

that complicated questions of right and title and production of documentary evidence are involved—*Bhim Bahadur v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 121, 21 Cr.L.J. 374, 55 I.C. 854; *Parmeshwar v. Emp.*, 3 P.L.T. 347; *Maung Shewe v. Emp.*, 2 Bur. L.J. 55, 24 Cr.L.J. 929; *Emp. v. Tirithdas*, 6 S.L.R. 120, 13 Cr.L.J. 771. A summary procedure is also undesirable where the accused is a deaf and dumb person—*In re a deaf and dumb man*, 8 Bom. L.R. 849. A summary trial is also improper where the Magistrate takes cognizance of the case from his own knowledge or suspicion, and holds the trial on inadequate materials—*Emp. v. Hamed*, 3 C.W.N. cccxxx; *Kanhaya Lal v. K. E.*, 1905 P.L.R. 31. It is also undesirable in offences of a very serious nature—*Crown v. Allahrakho*, 6 S.L.R. 101, 13 Cr.L.J. 780, *Dipchand v. Emp.*, 14 N.L.R. 190. It is improper where the charge is a serious or complicated one, and the trial goes on for a considerable time and a local inquiry has to be made or a large number of witnesses and accused persons are examined—*Emp. v. Rustomji*, 23 Bom. L.R. 984, 23 Cr.L.J. 21, *Ghesita Mal v. Crown*, 3 Lah.L.J. 346, 22 Cr.L.J. 145, 59 I.C. 849, *In re Isser Chunder*, 25 W.R. 65, *Rahimtulla v. Emp.*, 19 S.L.R. 136, 26 Cr.L.J. 1026. But a summary trial is not improper merely because there is a large number of accused in the case—*Naubat v. Emp.*, 28 Cr.L.J. 140 (All).

A summary trial is also improper in a case where the conviction of the accused may entail further serious consequences (e.g. dismissal from service). Thus, where a Police officer of many years' standing was charged with criminal intimidation with a view to prevent a person from giving evidence against certain grave offenders, and was tried summarily and convicted, *held* that the Magistrate did not exercise a sound discretion in trying the case summarily and depriving the accused of the privilege of an appeal—*Subramanya Ayyar v. Q.*, 6 Mad. 396. So also, where a village Kulkarni is charged with offences under secs. 176 and 202 I.P.C. (intentional omission to give information of offences to a public servant) the Magistrate should not try the accused summarily, in as much as cases under sec. 202 are complicated and the conviction of the accused may entail further serious consequences (dismissal from service)—*Q. E. v. Hari Gopal, Ratanlal* 778; *Q. E. v. Waman, Ratanlal* 784.

261. The Local Government may confer, on any Bench of Magistrates invested with the powers of a Magistrate of the second or third class, power to try summarily all or any of the following offences:—

Power to invest
Bench of Magistrates
invested with less
power.

(a) offences under the Indian Penal Code, sections 277, 278, 279, 285, 286, 289, 290, 292, 293, 294, 323, 334, 336, 341, 352, 426, 447 and 504;

(b) offences against Municipal Acts, and the conservancy clauses of Police Acts which are punishable

- (f) the offence complained of and the offence (if any) proved, and in cases coming under clause (d), clause (e), clause (f) or clause (g) of sub-section (1) of section 260, the value of the property in respect of which the offence has been committed;
- (g) the plea of the accused and his examination (if any);
- (h) the finding, and, in the case of a conviction, a brief statement of the reasons therefor;
- (i) the sentence or other final order; and
- (j) the date on which the proceedings terminated.

863. Record—Although the object of a summary procedure is to shorten the course of trial, it is nevertheless incumbent on the Magistrate to put on record sufficient evidence to justify his order—*Ainuddi v. Q. E.*, 27 Cal 450; *Kath Md. v. Emp.*, 10 C.W.N. 79, *Q. E. v. Gopal, Ratanlal* 778 If the particulars required by this section are not clearly given in a judgment in a summary trial convicting the accused, the judgment is defective and the conviction cannot stand—*Ghulam v. Emp.*, 23 Cr L.J. 161.

The record should be written by the Magistrate himself; there is no provision enabling him to delegate this duty to a clerk—*Subramaniya Ayyar v. Q.*, 6 Mad. 396 The record should be made at the time of the trial, and not afterwards The admission of the accused should also be recorded at once—*Q. E. v. Erugadu*, 15 Mad. 83 "District Magistrates should satisfy themselves from time to time by examination of the records of summary trials that the law regarding such trials is properly observed and especially that Magistrates do not exceed their jurisdiction in this regard"—*Cal G R & C O.*, p 16.

864. Evidence—In a summary trial of a non-appealable case the Magistrate need not record the evidence of witnesses in writing—*Emp. v. Shomeshar*, 2 Cr L.J. 336, 1905 A.W.N. 143, *Howard v. Rustomji, Ratanlal* 334 But this does not mean that this section excuses a Magistrate from hearing the evidence of witnesses. If the accused denies the charge, the complainant and his witnesses must be examined, and the case must be decided upon the effect of their evidence, though the evidence need not be recorded—*Jabbar v. Tomiz*, 39 Cal 931, 16 C.W.N. 984.

Notes of evidence—If at the commencement of the trial, the Magistrate is unable to determine whether the proper sentence to be passed should be an appealable one or not, he must make a memorandum of the substance of the evidence of each witness as his examination proceeds But if he can, at this stage, determine that the sentence will be, in any event, non-appealable, he need not record the evidence. If, however, he actually does so, the notes of the evidence form part of the record

The Magistrate is not required to record a full statement of this examination of the accused. A brief note of the examination is sufficient—*Bhawani v. Emp.*, 3 O.W.N. 946, 28 Cr.L.J. 76

868. Finding—In summary trials, it is very important that there should be clear findings on questions of fact, because it is only through such findings that the Court of Revision can form its own judgment with regard to the legality or otherwise of the proceedings of the trial Court—*Emp. v. Jagmohan*, 24 Cr.L.J. 916 (Oudh).

869. Reasons for conviction :—The Magistrate, in a summary trial must, in recording the reasons for the conviction, state them in such a manner that the High Court may in revision judge whether there were sufficient materials before the Magistrate to justify the conviction—*Murat Singh v. Emp.*, 26 A.L.J. 109, 29 Cr.L.J. 265; *Lalit v. Chunder*, 3 C.W.N. 281; *Jagan Nath v. Emp.*, 16 O.C. 357, 14 Cr.L.J. 594; *Emp. v. Punjab Singh*, 6 Cal 579, *Mc Da Li v. Crown*, 1 L.B.R. 208; *Damodar v. Emp.*, 3 P.L.T. 499, 23 Cr.L.J. 94, *Janaki v. Raghunath*, 19 Cr.L.J. 719 (Pat). Magistrates should set out so much of the reasons that have influenced them, as to satisfy the accused that the Magistrate has considered each of the ingredients of the offence necessary in law for the conviction to which the Magistrate has proceeded—*Q. E. v. Mukundi*, 21 All 189; *Brijbasi v. K. E.*, 10 A.L.J. 251, 13 Cr.L.J. 708; *Ram Harakh v. Crown*, 11 S.L.R. 89, 16 Cr.L.J. 713; and while this should be recorded with brevity, the brevity should not be such as to tend to obscurity—*Q. E. v. Mukundi*, 21 All. 189. Thus, a judgment in a single line is not a judgment according to law—*Jankey v. Emp.*, 20 Cr.L.J. 431 (Pat).

Failure to record a brief statement of reasons is fatal, and the whole proceedings are illegal and liable to be set aside—*Dina Nath v. Jogendra*, 11 C.W.N. 40, *Emp. v. Panjab Singh*, 6 Cal 579, *Q. E. v. Shidgauda*, 18 Bom. 97; *In re Dervish*, 46 Mad. 253; *Maqsd v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 716; *K. E. v. Mianjan*, 24 O.C. 293; *Nisarali*, 28 Cr.L.J. 495 (Nag). Even the defect could not be cured by the Magistrate (Presidency) subsequently submitting the reasons to the High Court when the record was called for under section 441—*In re Dervish Hossain*, 46 Mad 253. *K. E. v. Haladhar*, 11 C.W.N. lxxv. But if the record submitted under section 441 disclosed sufficient grounds for the Magistrate's decision, the High Court condoned the irregularity, if no failure of justice had occurred—*Dervish*, 46 Mad 253 (256). The Bombay High Court holds that the omission to record reasons for conviction on the part of the Bench Magistrate is only an irregularity which can be cured by sec. 537, where there is clear evidence justifying the conviction. It is an omission which does not occasion failure of justice—*Emp. v. Namdeo*, 26 Bom.L.R. 1236. See also *In re Thurman*, 20 L.W. 330, 25 Cr.L.J. 1084

264. (1) In every case tried summarily by a Magistrate or Bench in which an appeal lies, such Magistrate or Bench shall, before passing sentence, record a

Record in appealable cases.

judgment embodying the substance of the evidence and also the particulars mentioned in section 263.

(2) Such judgment shall be the only record in cases coming within this section.

870. Record—The record of the trial must be made at the time of the trial, and not subsequently prepared, after the close of the trial, from memory or from rough notes—*Q E v Erugadu*, 15 Mad 83 The judgment, which is the only record in appealable cases, must be written by the Magistrate himself (see sec 265) He cannot delegate that duty to a clerk, nor can affix his signature to the record or judgment by a stamp—*Subramanya v Q*, 11 Mad 396

Where a Magistrate passes an appealable sentence he can not make his record in the manner prescribed by sec 263, but must record the evidence and frame a charge. Whereas in non-appealable cases it is stated in so many words in sec 263 that no charge need be framed, but in sec. 264 which deals with appealable cases there are no words to this effect, this omission when coupled with sec 262 is tantamount to a clear direction that the ordinary procedure in warrant cases is to be followed and a formal charge is to be framed—*Natabar v K E*, 27 C W N 923 But in a more recent case the same High Court has expressed the opinion that there is no provision requiring the framing of a charge in a summary trial, whether in appealable or non-appealable cases. Sec. 264 states what the record shall consist of, viz a judgment embodying the substance of the evidence, and the particulars set out in sec. 263; and in sec. 263 it is not necessary to frame a formal charge In any case, the omission to frame a formal charge under sec. 264 would be cured by sec 535—*Madhab Chandra v. Emp.*, 53 Cal 738, 27 Cr L.J. 1295 In *Kallu v Emp*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1334 (Oudh) and *Emp v Salig Ram*, 7 Lah, 303, 27 Cr L J 639, it is laid down that even in appealable cases it is not necessary to frame a charge, and a similar view has been taken in *Q E v Kara*, Ratania 768, and *Titu v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 652, 21 Cr.L.J. 630.

871. Substance of evidence :—The Magistrate is not bound to record the substance of every separate deposition, but he is to state generally what is the substance of the witnesses' evidence—*Jamna Prasad v Emp*, 6 O W N 45, 30 Cr.L.J. 557; *Kristodhone v. Chairman*, 25 W R 6 The substance of the evidence should be recorded in such a way as to enable the Appellate Court to form an opinion whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction—*Po Ka v. K. E.*, 11 Cr L J 23, 4 L B R 338; *Emp v Karam Singh*, 1 All. 680 Where the judgment convicting the accused did not embody the substance of the evidence but the Magistrate merely recorded that the prosecution witnesses supported the complainant and that the evidence of the defence witnesses was conflicting and unreliable, held that the judgment was defective and the conviction could not stand—*Salim v. Emp.*, 24 Cr L.J. 484, A I.R. 1924 Oudh 167; *Emp. v. Nurudin*, 30 Bom. L.R. 954, 29 Cr.L.J. (1006)

The Magistrate is not required to record a full statement of this examination of the accused. A brief note of the examination is sufficient—*Bhawani v. Emp.*, 3 O.W.N. 946, 28 Cr.L.J. 76

868. Finding.—In summary trials, it is very important that there should be clear findings on questions of fact, because it is only through such findings that the Court of Revision can form its own judgment with regard to the legality or otherwise of the proceedings of the trial Court—*Emp. v. Jagmohan*, 24 Cr.L.J. 916 (Oudh)

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Failure to record a brief statement of reasons is fatal, and the whole proceedings are illegal and liable to be set aside—*Dina Nath v. Jogendra*, 6 C.W.N. 40, *Emp. v. Panjab Singh*, 6 Cal 579; *Q. E. v. Shridgauda*, 18 Bom. 97, *In re Dervish*, 46 Mad 253, *Maqsood v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 716; *K. E. v. Mianjan*, 24 O.C. 293; *Nisarali*, 28 Cr.L.J. 495 (Nag). Even the defect could not be cured by the Magistrate (Presidency) subsequently submitting the reasons to the High Court when the record was called for under section 441—*In re Dervish Hossain*, 46 Mad. 253 *K. E. v. Haladhar*, 9 C.W.N. 1xxv. But if the record submitted under section 441 disclosed sufficient grounds for the Magistrate's decision, the High Court condoned the irregularity, if no failure of justice had occurred—*Dervish*, 46 Mad. 253 (256). The Bombay High Court holds that the omission to record reasons for conviction on the part of the Bench Magistrate is only an irregularity which can be cured by sec 537, where there is clear evidence justifying the conviction. It is an omission which does not occasion failure of justice—*Emp. v. Namdeo*, 26 Bom.L.R. 1236. See also *In re Thurman*, 20 L.W. 330, 25 Cr.L.J. 1084

264. (1) In every case tried summarily by a Magistrate or Bench in which an appeal lies, such Magistrate or Bench shall, before passing sentence, record a

Record in appealable cases.

871A. Cl (3)—Sub-section (3) lays down that if the record is prepared by a *member* of the Bench, it shall have to be signed by each member taking part in the proceedings. This clause does not apply to the case of preparation of record or judgment by the *presiding officer* of the Court. If the presiding officer himself prepares the record or judgment, it is not necessary that the other members of the Bench should sign the record or judgment. Sec 367 requires the presiding officer of the Court to write the judgment, and it shall be dated and signed by him in open Court at the time of pronouncing it. That being so, when the judgment of a Bench is prepared by the presiding officer, it is sufficient if he alone signs it, and it is not necessary that the other members should sign—*Ramakottiah v Subba Rao* 52 Mad. 237, 55 M L J 576, 29 Cr L J 973 (1974). But the other members must be aware of the contents of the judgment and must approve of the judgment. So, where after the other members of the Bench had left the Court premises, the presiding officer prepared the judgment and delivered it so that those members had no opportunity either to express assent or dissent, held that the judgment was not a proper judgment—*Ramakottiah*, *supra*.

CHAPTER XXIII.

OF TRIALS BEFORE HIGH COURTS AND COURTS OF SESSION.

A.—Preliminary.

266. In this Chapter, except in sections 276 and 307, and in Chapter XVIII, the expression “High Court” means a High Court of Judicature established under the Indian High Courts Act, 1861, or the Government of India Act, 1915, and includes the *Chief Court of Oudh*, the *Courts of the Judicial Commissioners of the Central Provinces and Sind* and such other Courts as the Governor-General in Council may, by notification in the Gazette of India, declare to be High Courts for the purposes of this Chapter and of Chapter XVIII.

The words “Chief Court of Oudh” have been added by the Oudh Courts Act (XXXII of 1925); and the other italicised words in the middle of the section have been added by sec 12 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act XII of 1922. The words “and of Ch. XVIII” at the end of the section have been added by sec 12 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act XII of 1922.

the section were accidentally omitted when the Act of 1898 was framed, and have now been added by sec. 76 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923).

871B. The Judicial Commissioner (e.g. of Sind) is a High Court only for the purposes of Chapters 18 and 23, but not for the purpose of Ch. 31 (Appeal). A Judicial Commissioner holding a sessions trial on the Original Side is to be deemed a Sessions Judge and not a High Court for the purpose of Ch 31, so that an appeal will lie from his decision to the Bench of the Judicial Commissioner's Court—*Khudabux v. Emp.*, 19 S L R 309, 26 Cr L J 562, A.L.R. 1925 Sind. 249

267. All trials under this Chapter before a High Court shall be by jury; and notwithstanding anything herein contained, in all criminal cases transferred to a High Court under this Code or under the Letters Patent of any High Court established under the Indian High Courts Act, 1861, or the Government of India Act, 1915, the trial may, if the High Court so directs, be by jury.

Trial before High Court to be by jury.

Trials before Courts of Session to be by jury or with assessors.

268. All trials before a Court of Session shall be either by jury, or with the aid of assessors.

Trial ordinary with assessors—In the absence of any Notification under sec 269, a trial in the Court of Session must be with the aid of assessors—*Skilling v Emp*, 1888 P.R 18

872. Trial by jury and trial with assessors—Difference :—In a trial by jury, the jury is the real tribunal and is aided by the Judge, and in certain matters directed by the Judge; but in a trial with the aid of assessors, the Judge is the sole tribunal and judge of law and fact, and the responsibility of the decision rests solely with him, though in the decision of the case he is expected to take into consideration the opinion of each assessor. In a trial by jury, the jury form a tribunal or body with a foreman, and the verdict is the verdict of the body, and when there is no unanimity among the members of the body, the opinion of the majority prevails as the verdict of the body. But in the case of a trial with the aid of assessors, the assessors do not form a body but each acts and expresses his opinion individually and the Judge is to invite the opinion of each separately and record it—*K. E. v. Thirumalai*, 24 Mad 523; *Q. E. v. Jadub Das*, 27 Cal 295; *Emp v Shanker*, 14 Bom.L.R 710, 13 Cr L.J. 677; *Jaisukh v. Emp.*, 43 All. 125, 19 A.L.J. 1; *Jairam v. Emp*, 20 N.L.R. 129, 25 Cr.L.J. 459. In a trial held with the aid of assessors, the individual opinion of each assessor is taken, but in a trial by jury, the individual opinions of the members of the jury are never intended to be disclosed—*Pub. Pro v. Abdul Hamid*, 36

Mad 585, 15 Cr.L.J. 197. But the law makes no distinction as to the procedure between a trial by jury and a trial with the aid of assessors, except as to the summing up of the case in the former and the manner in which the verdict in the former and the opinions of the assessors in the latter are respectively taken—*Emp v. Mansing*, 33 Bom. 423

As regards *appeal*, the considerations governing the appeal from the trial held with aid of assessors differ greatly from those governing an appeal from the trial by a jury. In the latter case, the appeal is restricted by the provisions of sec. 423 (2) whereas in the former case the whole case is before the Appellate Court—*Champa v Emp.*, 29 Cr.L.J. 325 (329)

Trial when begins.—A trial by jury or with assessors begins only when the charge has been read and the accused claims to be tried—*Q E. v Silva*, 15 Bom 514

269. (1) The Local Government may, * * by order in the official Gazette, direct that the trial of all offences, or of any particular class of offences before any Court of Session, shall be by jury in any district, and may, * * * revoke or alter such order.

(2) The Local Government, by like order, may also declare that, in the case of any district in which the trial of any offence is to be by jury, the trial of such offence shall, if the Judge on application made to him or of his own motion so directs, be by jurors summoned from a special jury list, and may revoke or alter such order.

(3) When the accused is charged at the same trial with several offences of which some are and some are not triable by jury, he shall be tried by jury for such of those offences as are triable by jury, and by the Court of Session, with the aid of the jurors as assessors, for such of them as are not triable by jury.

The words "with the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council" which occurred in the first line of sub-section (1) have been omitted by the Devolution Act XXXVIII of 1920. The words "with the like sanction" occurring near the end of that subsection have been deleted by the Repealing and Amending Act X of 1927.

873. 'Class of offences':—The classes of offences referred to in this section are not restricted in the classification found in the Penal Code, e.g., offences against the State, offences against public tranquillity etc., or to the classification found in this Code, e.g., bailable cognizable offences, etc. Offences may be classified according to

persons who commit them, or according to the person or property against whom or which they are committed, or in regard to the particular occasion in connection with which they are committed—*Q E. v. Ganapathi*, 23 Mad 632.

Where by a Notification the Government directed that in a particular district an offence under sec 436 I P. C. was to be tried by jury and not with the aid of assessors, *held* that an offence under sec. 436 read with sec. 149 I P. C should also be tried by jury and not with the aid of assessors, because an offence under sec. 436-149 I. P. C is not a different offence from an offence under sec. 436 I P. C.—*Ramsundar v Emp.*, 11 Pat. 238, 7 P L T. 178, 27 Cr.L J 512.

874. Trial of jury-case with assessors and vice versa :—If a jury-case is tried with the aid of assessors, and no objection is taken at the trial, the trial will stand good by virtue of sec 536 (2)—*Q E v Ganapathi*, 23 Mad 632.

So also, the trial by jury of a case properly triable with assessors is not invalid on that ground—*Emp v Mohim Chander*, 3 Cal 765 And unless the accused objects to such procedure before the verdict is delivered, he cannot be allowed to object with regard to it subsequently in appeal—*Emp v. Mansingh*, 33 Bom 423, 11 Bom. L.R. 350, *Gulab Chand v Emp*, 27 Bom.L.R 1416, 27 Cr L J 650 The accused were charged under sec 412 I P. Code, which was an offence triable by jury, and were tried by jury The jury however brought in a verdict of guilty under sec 411 I P Code which was an offence triable with the aid of assessors It was contended that the jury was wrong in convicting the accused for an offence triable with assessors and that the trial ought to have been held with the jurors as assessors, under sec 269 (3). *Held* that sec 269 (3) did not apply, as no charge was framed for an offence under sec 411 I P Code. The conviction of the accused under sec. 411 I. P. C was not illegal, vide sec 238 Cr P. Code—*Gulab Chand v Emp*, (supra) Where an assessor-case is tried by jury, the Judge cannot treat the verdict of the jury as the opinion of assessors so as to be able to concur with the opinion of the minority, if he disagrees with the opinion of the majority If the Judge disagrees with the opinion of the majority, he must submit the case to the High Court under sec. 307—*Surja v. Q E.*, 25 Cal 555.

875. Joint trial of jury case and assessor-case :—Under sub-section (3) an accused may be tried simultaneously at one trial by the jury for offences triable by jury, and by the Judge with the aid of the same jurors as assessors for offences triable with the aid of assessors—*In re Sennimalai*, 2 L.W. 933, 11 Cr L J 717 But in such a trial, the Judge must always preserve a distinction between the two cases (the jury-case and the assessor-case) and must not treat the whole case as a jury-case. He must separately record the verdict of the jury in the jury-case, and must separately record the opinions of the jurors as assessors in the assessor-case If he disagrees with the verdict of the jury, he must not send the whole case to the High Court but must send only the jury-case

under sec. 307, and pass judgment with reference to the assessor-case under sec. 309—*Emp. v Vyankatsingh*, 9 Bom L.R. 1057, 7 Cr.L.J. 236; *Q. E. v Devu*, Ratanlal 600. In such cases it is desirable that the Judge should explain clearly to the jurors and assessors the double capacity in which they were acting—*Sivaga*, 2 Weir 334. If in the course of such trial it appears that only one offence was committed, viz an offence triable with assessors, and the Judge tries the case with the jury and disagrees with the verdict of the jury, he cannot send the case to the High Court under sec. 307, but should pass judgment under sec. 309, because he must treat the case as one triable with the aid of assessors, and he must treat the jurors as assessors—*Q. E. v Anga Valayan*, 22 Mad 15.

Again, in such joint trial of two cases (a jury-case and an assessor-case) all persons who would serve as jurors in the jury-case must serve as assessors in the assessor-case. Where the Judge after taking the verdict of the jurors in the jury-case, took only the opinion of two of them in the assessor-case, it was held that the Judge's procedure was illegal, he should have taken the opinion of all the jurors as assessors—*Ramkrishna v Emp.*, 26 Mad. 598. Similarly, where in such joint trial the Judge selected five gentlemen as jurors in the jury case, and two of them only as assessors in the assessor-case, it was held that the Judge acted illegally, he ought to have taken all the five jurors as assessors in the assessor-case—*Pingal v K. E.*, 21 M.L.J. 520, 12 Cr.L.J. 239, 10 I.C. 281.

876. Transfer of case from jury-district to non-jury-district and vice versa—The words "trial shall be by jury in any district" mean that the trial shall be by jury if the case is tried in a district in which the notification is in force, they do not mean that the case shall be tried by jury even if it is transferred from a jury-district to a district where jury trial does not prevail. The High Court has power under sec. 526 to transfer a sessions case from a jury-district to a non-jury-district, and section 269 does not in any way limit that power; but in such a case the trial in the latter district will be with the aid of assessors—*Emp. v Jumo*, 10 S.L.R. 154, 18 Cr.L.J. 51.

Similarly, the High Court has power to transfer a case from a non-jury-district to a jury-district under section 526 (d) on the ground of convenience of parties, and the High Court cannot refuse to do so on the ground that by such a transfer the accused will get the benefit of a jury trial where previously he had none—*Durga Charan v Emp.*, 11 C.L.J. 59, 8 Cr.L.J. 121.

Trial before Court of Session to be conducted by Public Prosecutor.

270. In every trial before a Court of Session, the prosecution shall be conducted by a Public Prosecutor.

877. The prosecution shall be conducted by the Public Prosecutor; if the complainant engages a counsel, the Public Prosecutor may always avail himself of the services of such counsel and in doing so he does not

C.R. 102. An Advocate of the High Court may appear on behalf of the prosecution in the Court of Session and may conduct the prosecution without being specially empowered by the District Magistrate for that purpose—*In re Gungadhar*, 23 W.R. 14. But it is highly undesirable that the prosecution should be conducted by Police Officers—*Q E v. Ram Chander*, 13 W.R. 18

The provisions of this section are merely directory, and therefore the omission to appoint a Public Prosecutor is merely an irregularity curable by sec. 537—*Q E v. Ismail*, 1887 P R 35

B—Commencement of Proceedings.

271. (1) When the Court is ready to commence the trial, the accused shall appear or be brought before it, and the charge shall be read out in Court and explained to him, and he shall be asked whether he is guilty of the offence charged, or claims to be tried.

(2) If the accused pleads guilty, the plea shall be recorded, and he may be convicted thereon.

878. Charge shall be read and explained :—Where the charge is merely read out to the accused but not explained, the conviction will be quashed, especially in a case of trial for murder—*Aiyaru v Q E*, ■ Mad 61; *K. E v Trimbaka*, 3 Bom L R 489 The charge should be read out and so explained to the accused that the Court is sure that he has understood the nature of the charge thoroughly and it is then only that he should be called upon to plead—*Emp. v. Vaimbilee*, 5 Cal. 826; *Gurrapu*, 2 Weir 336; *Jinga*, 2 Weir 339; and the Judge ought to satisfy himself by interrogation of the accused, if necessary, that he fully understands the responsibility which he assumes in making a plea of guilty—*Kesho Singh v. K. E*, 20 O C. 136, 18 Cr.L.J. 742.

The charge sheet to which the accused is called upon to plead is a very important document. It should be drawn up and considered with extreme care and caution, so that the accused may have no doubt whatever as to the offences to which he is called upon to answer, and the Judge of the Appellate Court also may have no doubt upon the matter. Every addition and alteration made in the charge has to be read over and explained to the accused—*Jagdeo v Emp*, 18 A.L J 442, 21 Cr.L J 410, 56 I C 58

Record of charge :—On the record of a trial in a Court of Session there should be the charge, which under sec 271 has been read over and explained to the accused, and when this is not so, the record should contain an explanation of its absence The fact that this is an omission covered by sec. 537 is not a sufficient answer—*Jagdeo v. Emp*, supra

879. Plea :—If there are two heads of a charge (e.g. if the accused is charged with the offence of culpable homicide or in the alternative with the offence of grievous hurt) the accused should not be called upon to plead in the alternative but in each of the heads of the charge separately. Where in such a case he pleaded guilty to the second charge only (grievous hurt) and the Judge convicted him on that plea, the conviction was set aside—*Q E v Lakshman, Ratanlal* 327.

The accused must plead guilty or not guilty by his own mouth, and not through his counsel or pleader—*Obhoy*, 15 W R 42; *Emp. v. Sur Singh*, 11 Bom L R 861, 1 Cr L J 939. Admission by a pleader, especially by a pleader engaged by the Court for the accused and not by the accused himself, is not binding on him—*Q E v Sangaya*, 2 Bom. L R 751.

After the accused has claimed to be tried, any confessional statement made by him should be laid before the jury, such an admission should not be taken as a plea of guilty upon which a Judge may record a finding without taking the verdict of the jury—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 334, *Emp. v. Bai Nani*, 7 Bom. L R 731, 2 Cr L J 609.

880. What is a sufficient plea .—The accused must distinctly and unequivocally admit the guilt, otherwise it is not sufficient. Where the accused instead of pleading guilty made a long rambling statement more or less admitting the guilt, it would be much safer if the Judge recorded a formal plea of 'not guilty' and proceeded to try the accused in the ordinary way—*Deoki v. Emp.*, 5 A.L J 157. The plea must distinctly admit every fact necessary to constitute the offence. Thus, where the accused merely admitted that he beat his wife and she died but he did not say whether he had any intention of causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death, it was held that this was not a sufficient plea of guilty to a charge of culpable homicide, because the intention was absent—*Gurrapu*, 2 Weir 336; *Emp. v. Chinia*, 8 Bom L.R. 240, 3 Cr L J 337, *Q v Sonaoollah*, 25 W R 23. If the prisoner pleads guilty, but goes on to say that he did not commit the offence with which he is charged, this is tantamount to a denial of the guilt and does not amount to a plea of guilty—*Q. v Mutun*, 11 W R 53. Where the prisoner admitted that he had accompanied the dacoits for some distance, but returned back almost immediately and had nothing to do with the dacoity afterwards committed, it was held that such a statement did not amount to a plea of guilty—*Q. v Greedhary*, 7 W R. 39. Where the plea of guilty is accompanied by qualifying statements, such a plea is not, properly speaking a plea of guilty. Thus, where the accused said that he killed his wife, but that he did so under grave provocations (e.g. in consequence of discovering her in an act of adultery), such a statement was not a plea of guilty to murder—*Natal v. Q E.*, 11 Cal. 410. So also, where the prisoner admitted the guilt, but said that he had committed the offence under the influence of certain persons mentioned, it was held that the plea was not one of guilty—*Emp v Sundar*, 1886 A W.N. 66. Where the prisoner pleaded guilty but stated further that he committed the offence because he was subject to epileptic fits, it was held that this was

not a plea of guilty on which the accused could be properly convicted—*Q. v. Mhatarya*, Ratanlal 698. Where the prisoner admitted that he killed his wife, but stated that he was not in his right mind at the time, it was held that this was not a plea of guilty—*Q v Chett Ram*, 3 N.W.P. 110.

Partial plea of guilty.—Where the accused is charged with having made two contradictory statements and he pleads guilty to one charge, that does not show that he pleads not guilty in respect of the other charge. It may be that both statements may be false. In such a case the prisoner ought not to be allowed to elect which statement he shall admit to be false—*Q v. Gaub*, 8 W R. (Cr. Let) 6.

Plea of 'not guilty'—The accused can plead "guilty" under sec. 271 or he can claim to be tried under sec. 272, or he can refuse to plead which is taken to be the same as claiming to be tried. The plea of "not guilty" is not recognized by this Code—*Emp. v Nirmal Kanta*, 41 Cal. 1072 A plea of 'not guilty' amounts to a claim to be tried.

Record of plea.—If the accused pleads guilty, the plea should be recorded. Where no such plea appears on the record, the conviction is bad and must be set aside—*Emp. v. Gopal*, 7 Cal 96; *Emp v. Deoki*, 5 A.L.J. 157, 7 Cr L.J. 295

If the statement is made by the accused in a foreign language, it is not necessary that the plea must be recorded in the words of that language. It should be recorded in the language in which it is conveyed to the Court by the interpreter—*Emp v. Vaumbilee*, 5 Cal. 826

881. Conviction on plea—The word 'thereon' shows that the conviction must be upon the plea recorded before the Sessions Judge, and not on a confession made before the committing Magistrate. If the prisoner before the Court of Session has pleaded what in effect amounts to a plea of not guilty, the Judge is not justified in convicting him upon a confession made by him before the committing Magistrate—*Q v. Hursook*, 2 N.W.P. 479. Some corroborative evidence is necessary to warrant a Court of Session in acting upon a confession made before the committing Magistrate but retracted at the trial—*Q E. v. Ram Sarup*, 1898 A.W.N. 22; *Q E. v. Gangia*, 23 Bom. 316.

Where an accused person pleads guilty to the specific offence with which he is charged, he cannot on such plea be convicted of an offence other than that specifically charged—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 335. Thus, where the prisoner has pleaded guilty to the offence of murder, he can not be convicted of culpable homicide not amounting to murder—*Crown v Watu*, 3 S.L.R. 58; *Anonymous*, 2 Weir 335. Where the accused has pleaded guilty to a charge of culpable homicide, he cannot be convicted of the offence of grievous hurt for which he was not tried—*Q E. v. Raghu*, Ratanlal 413

Conviction discretionary.—It is discretionary with the Sessions Judge to accept or not the plea of guilty of the accused. He may or may not convict the accused on such plea. It is open to the Judge to go into

the evidence and leave the case to the jury, despite a plea of guilty—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 335; *Keso Singh v K E.*, 20 O.C. 136, 18 Cr.L.J. 742; *Shanker v Emp.*, 24 A.L.J. 318, 27 Cr L J 449. If the Judge does not think fit to convict the prisoner on the charge to which he has pleaded guilty, he should proceed to try him as if the plea has been one of 'not guilty,' and he will have to take all the evidence in order to determine whether the prisoner has committed the offence to which he has pleaded guilty, or any other offence with which he is charged—*Q v. Gobadur*, 13 W R. 55 (56), *Q E v. Chinna*, 23 Mad 151. Where there are several co-accused who are to be tried jointly, and one accused has pleaded guilty, the Judge has a discretion to decide either that the accused be convicted on such plea or that he should be put on his trial in spite of his plea of guilty. The proper procedure to follow in such a case is, that if the Judge convicts the accused on the plea of guilty, he should be removed from the dock, in which case he can be called as a witness against the other accused, or that the Judge should put it on his record that he decides to put the accused on his trial in spite of his plea of guilty—*Kesho Singh v K E.*, 20 O C 136, 18 Cr L J. 742; *Q E v. Chinna*, 23 Mad 151.

Where the Judge ought not to convict on plea—Where the accused has pleaded guilty to one offence, but there is clear *prima facie* evidence of a different offence, the Judge ought not to convict the accused on his plea, but should proceed to try the case. Thus, where there is clear *prima facie* evidence of the offence of murder but the prisoner has pleaded guilty to a charge of culpable homicide not amounting to murder on grave and sudden provocation, the Judge ought not to convict him for the latter offence, but should proceed to try him for the former offence—*Q. E. v. Malhari*, Ratanlal 410.

A plea of guilty should not be accepted in capital offences—*Pala Singh v. K E.*, 1905 P.R. 54; *Emp v Larmya*, 19 Bom L.R. 356. In a case of murder, it has long been the practice of the Court not to accept the plea of guilty, for murder is a mixed question of fact and law. Unless the Court is perfectly satisfied that the accused knew exactly what was implied by his plea of guilty, the case should be tried, especially where the accused is an illiterate person—*Dallu v Emp.*, 20 A L J. 326, 23 Cr L J. 283, *Sukha v. Emp.*, 20 A L J. 669. In capital cases, where there is doubt whether the persons who pleaded guilty to the charge of murder fully understood the meaning and effect of such plea, the Judge should proceed with the trial and take evidence—*Q E. v Bhadu*, 19 All 119. A person may plead that he hit somebody who thereby died, without necessarily admitting that he committed murder, for murder under the I. P. C. requires a certain intention or a certain knowledge. In such cases it is advisable not to convict solely upon the plea of the accused but to proceed to trial—*Emp v. Chinia*, 8 Bom. L.R. 240, 3 Cr.L.J. 337. The Nagpur Court holds that it is not illegal to convict in a murder case on a plea of guilty, and in each case the circumstances must be examined to see whether the plea of guilty is one which should have been acted on. Where the accused is represented by

a pleader, and a trial is not claimed, and the accused's answer amounts to a plea of guilty, it is quite legal to convict him on that plea—*Manjoo v. Emp.*, 24 Cr.L.J. 570 (Nag.).

882. Charge for one offence, conviction on plea for another :—It is illegal to convict a person of an offence upon his own plea, when there is no formal charge in respect of that offence. Thus, where an accused person was charged with the offence of murder, and the charge was not proved, but the Court convicted her of the offence of concealment of birth which, it considered, was admitted by her in her examination by the Court, it was held that such conviction was illegal. A charge of concealment of birth should have been framed and the accused tried thereon—*Q. E. v. Sarvel, Ratanlal* 386.

Postponement of conviction :—Where an accused person pleads guilty, the Court should record his confession and forthwith convict him thereon. If there are other persons being tried with him for the same offence, the Court should not postpone his conviction merely for the purpose of allowing the statements he may have made to be considered against the co-accused. It is against the spirit of the law to postpone his conviction so that he may technically be said to be tried jointly for the same offence with the other co-accused, and any statement in the nature of a confession he may make may be used against them—*Emp. v. Kheraj*, 30 All. 540; *Surjan v. K. E.*, 12 A.L.J. 1239, 16 Cr.L.J. 103; *Sukdeb v. K. E.*, 13 C.W.N. 552. After a plea of guilty, a trial may be continued when it is thought necessary to ascertain the part taken by the accused in order to assess the punishment, but it is unfair to defer the conviction of the accused solely with the view of having his confession considered against his co-accused who have pleaded not guilty—*Q. E. v. Paltua*, 23 All. 53.

Trial ends, if plea accepted :—If the Court accepts the plea of guilty and convicts the accused, his trial is at an end and he may be called as a witness against or for any person who has been accused along with him—*Q. E. v. Chinna*, 23 Mad 151. Where in a joint trial of several persons, one of the accused pleads guilty, his statement affecting himself and the other accused is not entitled to be considered under sec. 30 of the Evidence Act, for the statement following the plea of guilty ceases to be the statement of a person jointly 'tried,' because the trial ends, so far as he is concerned, with his plea—*Q. E. v. Lakhshmayya*, 22 Mad 491; *Kanhaiya v. Crown*, 1911 P.R. 15; *Q. E. v. Khandia*, 15 Bom. 66; *Q. E. v. Pahuji*, 19 Bom. 195; *Venkatasami v. Q.* 7 Mad 102; *Emp. v. Asootosh*, 4 Cal 483; *Manki v. Amir*, 2 C.W.N. 749; *Q. E. v. Pirbhu*, 17 All 524, *Q. E. v. Nirmal*, 22 All 445; *Q. E. v. Kallu*, 7 All 160.

272. If the accused refuses to, or does not, plead or if he claims to be tried, the Court shall proceed to choose jurors or assessors as hereinafter directed

Refusal to plead or claim to be tried.

and to try the case :

Provided that, subject to the right of objection hereinafter mentioned, the same jury may try, or the same assessors may aid in the trial of, as many accused persons successively as the Court thinks fit.

883. 'If the accused refuses to or does not plead':—The accused cannot be called upon to plead 'not guilty'; such a plea is not recognised in the Code. The accused may either claim to be tried, or refuse to plead which is taken to be the same as claiming to be tried—*Emp. v Nirmal Kanta*, 41 Cal 1072. If he pleads 'not guilty' the Judge will proceed to try him.

In a case where the prisoner pleads not guilty and the Public Prosecutor does not offer evidence in support of the charge, the Judge ought to instruct the assessors that they are bound to find the prisoner not guilty—*Anonymous*, 4 M H C.R App 39. Where there is nothing which can, if believed, amount to proof, the case should not be put to the jury at all, as a verdict of guilty (if the jury pronounces such a verdict) cannot under such circumstances be sustained—*Q v Rutton Dass*, 16 W R. 19.

If the accused makes no answer to the inquiry whether he is guilty or has any defence to make, it should be ascertained whether he is obstinately mute or dumb *ex visitatione Dei*. If he be found to be obstinately mute, the plea of 'not guilty' should be recorded, and the trial should proceed. If he is found to be dumb, an inquiry should be made whether he is sane or insane or incapable of being tried. If he is found to be sane, a plea of 'not guilty' should be recorded, and the trial should proceed; but if he is found to be insane, the procedure laid down in Chapter XXXIV should be followed—*Reg v. Sattya, Ratanlal* 19.

Claims to be tried.—The actual trial does not begin until the charge has been read and the accused claims to be tried—*Q. E v. Silva*, 15 Bom. 514; *K. E v Jayram*, 25 Bom. 694.

"Same jury may try several persons successively":—By the term 'successively' is understood that one trial is to follow the other i.e. on the conclusion of one trial the same jury may proceed to try the accused in the next case. The law does not contemplate that the two trials shall be conducted piecemeal in such a manner that at their conclusion the jury shall be called upon to decide at one and the same time upon two distinct classes of evidence, which, though they may have points in common, require careful discrimination as bearing upon the guilt or innocence of two sets of accused—*Hussain v. Emp.*, 8 Cal. 96.

Where the law requires the trial of two accused to be separate, the accused must be tried separately, but it is not necessary that the two trials should be held by separate juries. The accused in the second case is not entitled as of right to be tried by a separate jury; there is nothing illegal in the Judge hearing the second case with the same jury.

has tried the first case. Such a procedure is provided by the proviso of sec. 272. No doubt the accused in the second case can ask for a second jury, and it would be in the discretion of the Judge to grant or refuse such application. *Prima facie* there would seem to be no more reason why a jury should not try a second case than there is reason why a Sessions Judge should not try two cross-cases of riot—*Rafuzzaman v. Chhotey Lal*, 48 All. 325, 24 A.L.J. 472, 27 Cr L.J. 445.

273. (1) In trials before the High Court, when it appears to the High Court, at any time before the commencement of the trial of the person charged, that any charge or any portion thereof is clearly unsustainable, the Judge may make on the charge an entry to that effect.

Entry on unsustainable charges.

(2) Such entry shall have the effect of staying proceedings upon the charge or portion of the charge, as the case may be.

Effect of entry.

884. If the Court is clearly of opinion that no offence has been made out, it is the duty of the Court to stay the proceedings by making an entry as contemplated by this section—*Q. E. v. Sukee*, 21 Cal 97.

Applications under this section should be disposed of by the High Court in its original criminal jurisdiction—*Charoo Chander v. Emp*, 9 Cal. 397.

C.—Choosing a Jury.

274. In trials before the High Court the jury shall consist of nine persons.

Number of jury.

(2) In trials by jury before the Court of Session the jury shall consist of such uneven number, not being less than five or more than nine, as the Local Government, by order applicable to any particular district or to any particular class of offences in that district, may direct :

Provided that where any accused person is charged with an offence punishable with death, the jury shall consist of not less than seven persons and, if practicable, of nine persons.

The word 'five' has been substituted for 'three' and the proviso has been added, by sec 13 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act XII of 1923 "In the Sessions Court the number should be any uneven number from five to nine which the Local Government may select. Thus, five should

he substituted for three in section 274, as the minimum number of jury in a Sessions Court. In murder cases, before the Sessions Court, we are of opinion that the number of jury should if practicable be nine"—*Report of the Racial Distinctions Committee, Para 25*

884A. The number fixed by the Local Government must be strictly adhered to. Where the Local Government has fixed the number at five, a trial by a jury consisting of seven members is *ultra vires*—*Emp. v Booth*, 26 All 211. But where no objection as to the number of jurors was raised at the trial, but was raised for the first time at the hearing of the appeal before the High Court, and there was no allegation that the accused were prejudiced in any way, the High Court refused to entertain the objection—*Supdt of Legal Affairs v Bhajoo*, 34 C.W.N. 106 (110).

Secs 274 and 326 —The proviso to sec 274 lays down that if in the Court of Session the accused is charged with an offence punishable with death, the jury shall consist of not less than seven persons, and if practicable, of nine persons. In sec 326 it is provided that the number of persons summoned to serve on the jury must not be less than double the number required for the trial. A large number of cases have recently cropped up in the Calcutta High Court as to the effect of these two sections read together, and the result of these decisions may be summed up as follows —

(1) According to the proviso to sec. 274, in a trial of an offence punishable with death, the jury must consist of 9 persons, and before the case can be tried with a jury of 7 persons, it must be shewn that it was not practicable to have a jury of 9 persons—*Amir Khan v. K. E.*, 33 C.W.N. 1053 (1054). But it cannot be said that it was impracticable to have a jury of 9 if an insufficient number of persons have been summoned (under sec. 326) from the jury list. Thus, where only 12 persons were summoned under sec 326, of whom 8 persons appeared, and consequently 9 persons could not be chosen, and so 7 persons were chosen as jurors, *held* that the jury was not properly constituted, and the trial was illegal—*Serajul Islam v Emp*, 55 Cal 794, 29 Cr.L.J. 927.

(2) If it is practicable to empanel a jury of 9 persons, it is illegal to choose only 7. Thus, where 14 persons were summoned under sec 326, of whom 11 attended, so that the Judge could have a jury of 9 persons, but he chose only 7, the jury was illegally constituted, and the trial must be set aside—*Dwarika v Emp*, 33 C.W.N. 692 (693). So also, where 14 persons were summoned, of whom 9 attended, but the Judge empanelled a jury of 7, the jury was not properly constituted and the trial was illegal—*Amir Khan v K E.*, 33 C.W.N. 1053 (1054).

(3) The provision in sec. 326 which speaks of summoning not less than double the number required is *not mandatory*. Therefore, in a trial of a murder case, which is to be tried by a jury of 9 persons, if 14 persons are summoned, and 9 attend, and the 9 persons are chosen as jurors, the trial is not vitiated. It is not necessary that 18 persons should be summoned under sec. 326—*Emp. v Eman Ali*, 34 C.W.N. 296 (F.B.)

overruling *Emp. v. Munshi Tamizuddin*, 33 C.W.N. 1054, where it was held that it was compulsory to summon 18 persons for the constitution of the jury. The Full Bench decision also overrules *Amir Khan*, 33 C.W.N. 1053, and *Dwarika*, 33 C.W.N. 692 so far as they lay down that 18 persons must be summoned under sec. 326.

275. (1) *In a trial by jury before the High Court or Court of Session of a person who has been found under the provisions of this Code to be an European or Indian British subject, a majority of the jury shall, if such person before the first juror is called and accepted so requires, consist, in the case of an European British subject, of persons who are Europeans or Americans and, in the case of an Indian British subject, of Indians.*

(2) *In any such trial by jury of a person who has been found under the provisions of this Code to be an European (other than an European British subject) or an American, a majority of the jury shall, if practicable and if such European or American before the first juror is called and accepted so requires, consist of persons who are Europeans or Americans.*

This section has been redrafted by sec. 14 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, XII of 1923. Prior to the amendment, it stood as follows :—

"In a trial by jury before the Court of Session of a person not being an European or an American, a majority of the jury shall, if he so desires, consist of persons who are neither Europeans nor Americans "

The reason of the amendment has been thus stated :—"The most difficult question for the Committee to decide is that of trial by the jury of European British subjects. This is the point on which non-official European opinion is most emphatic, namely that it is essential that a mixed jury should remain both in the High Court and in the Sessions Court in all cases which are to be tried by jury under our proposals, subject however to certain provisions and safeguards, namely :—The same law as to the composition of the jury shall apply to Indians as to Europeans, that is to say, the majority of the jury, if an Indian accused so desires, shall consist of persons who are not Europeans or Americans. This is already the law in Sessions Court, and section 275 should be so amended as to make it apply to the High Court also"

—*Report of the Racial Distinctions Committee*, Para. 25.

885. This section must be read as controlled by the provisions of section 528B. That section lays down that if a person does not claim

to be dealt with as an Indian subject before the committing Magistrate, he shall not assert the claim in any subsequent stage of the case. It follows, therefore, that if an Indian subject does not claim to be dealt with as such before the committing Presidency Magistrate, he will not be entitled to claim, before the High Court, to be tried by a jury the majority of which must be Indians, according to the provisions of section 275—*Emperor v. Harendra*, 51 Cal 980 (1911), 29 C W N 384, 26 Cr L J 385. The same result will happen if the claim to be dealt with as an Indian subject is made before the Presidency Magistrate but is rejected by him—*Ibid* (at p. 990).

A Native Christian is not entitled to say that he must be tried by a Christian jury. But he can, like any other accused, object to the jurors individually—*Bharat Chunder Christian*, 1 W.R. 2.

276. The jurors shall be chosen by lot from the persons summoned to act as such, in such manner as the High Court may from time to time by rule direct:

Jurors to be chosen by lot.

Provided that—

first, pending the issue under this section of rules for any Court, the practice now prevailing in such Court in respect to the choosing of jurors shall be followed;

Existing practice maintained.

secondly, in case of a deficiency of persons summoned, the number of jurors required may, with the leave of the Court, be chosen from such other persons as may be present;

Persons not summoned when eligible.

thirdly, in a trial before any High Court in the town which is the usual place of sitting of such High Court,

Trial before special jurors.

(a) if the accused person is charged with having committed an offence punishable with death, or

(b) if in any other case a Judge of the High Court so directs, the jurors shall be chosen from the special jury list hereinafter prescribed; and

fourthly, in any district for which the Local Government has declared that the trial of certain offences may

be by special jury, the jurors shall, in any case in which the Judge so directs, be chosen from the special jury list prescribed in section 325.

Change.—In the *third* proviso, the words “in a trial.....sitting of such High Court” have been substituted for the words “in the presidency towns,” by sec. 77 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. The object of this amendment is to include those High Courts which are not situated in Presidency Towns, *e.g.*, the High Courts at Allahabad, Lahore, Patna, Rangoon. Similar amendments have been made in sections 315 and 316.

886. ‘Chosen by lot’ :—The object of the Legislature in choosing a jury by lot is to render impossible any intentional selection of jurors to try a particular case, and the accused is entitled to a strict observance of the provisions contained in this section and sec. 279. Irregularities in choosing the jury by lot affect the constitution of the Court, and cannot be cured by sec. 537—*Brojendra v. K. E.*, 7 C.W.N. 188; *Bradshaw v. Emp.*, 33 All. 385, 12 Cr.L.J. 46. In *Emp. v. Jhubboo*, 8 Cal. 739 and *Anipe Pelladu*, 1917 M.W.N. 1, 18 Cr.L.J. 15 (16), however, where the Judge himself selected the jurors instead of choosing them by lot, it was held that such a procedure was merely irregular and the verdict would not be interfered with if no prejudice was caused to the accused, and no objection was taken by him to such a procedure at the trial.

The persons who are to be chosen by lot ought to be selected from the entire number of persons summoned to act as jurors, and the selection ought to be made from one box—*Reg. v. Vithaldas*, 1 Bom. 462.

“In order to nominate a jury for the trial of any prisoner or other person to be tried by a jury, a Sessions Judge shall cause to be put together in one box, cards or pieces of paper containing the names of all the persons summoned to attend, except such of the said persons as shall have been excused by the Sessions Judge from serving on that day in consequence of their having served as jurors on the previous day or for any other cause. Such cards or pieces of paper shall be, as nearly as may be, of equal size, and shall bear the name of one person summoned to attend. The Sessions Judge shall then, in open Court, draw or cause to be drawn, out of the said box, one after another as many of the said cards or pieces of paper as may represent the number of jurors required to try the case, and if any of the jurors whose names shall be so drawn shall not appear or if any be objected to, and the objection be allowed, then such further number shall be drawn as may be necessary to complete the number of jurors required for the case”—*Cal. G. R. & C. O.*
p. 19

Second proviso :—The second proviso provides that in case of a deficiency of persons summoned, the number of the jurors required may, with the leave of the Court, be chosen from such other persons as may be present. Where the Judge acts under this proviso and chooses some jurors from the persons present in Court, it is not necessary for him to

choose them by lot. The method of choosing by lot applies only to persons summoned as jurymen and not to persons chosen under the second proviso. This is evident from sec. 279 (2)—*In re Anise Pelladu*, 1917 M.W.N. 1, 18 Cr L J 15 (16). The words "the jurors shall be chosen by lot" occurring in the first para are not applicable to the second proviso. This proviso does not require that in case of deficiency in the number of persons summoned to act as jurors, the deficient jurors (chosen from bystanders) should be chosen by lot or from among persons who are on the jury list—*Gout of Bengal v. Mucha Khan*, 29 C.W.N. 652, 26 Cr L J 819. If the Judge is unable to obtain a panel in the manner provided by the second proviso, his duty is to postpone the trial and to summon jurors under the provisions of sec. 326 (2) *Brijendra v. K. E.* 7 C.W.N. 188.

The second proviso distinctly lays down that in case of deficiency of persons summoned, other persons must be added to fill up the deficiency. When out of 12 jurors summoned in a case only five attended and those five persons were empanelled as jurors and the Court proceeded to hear and decide the case, held that the provisions of sec. 276 were not complied with and the trial was vitiated. The proper course for the Judge to follow was to choose some other persons, who were present, as jurors, to add their names to those of the jurors who attended, and from the whole body to choose the necessary quorum by lot to act as the jury in the case—*Bholanath v. Emp.*, 44 C.L.J., 541, 28 Cr L J. 191, *Roshan Ali v. K. E.*, 31 C.W.N. 1102 (1107), 28 Cr L J 859, *Emp. v. Bradshaw*, 33 All 385, *Tajali v. Emp.*, 7 Pat 50, 28 Cr L J 843 (846). The word 'required' in the second proviso does not mean required to constitute the quorum for a jury, but it means 'required to make up the minimum number of jurors summoned under sec. 326 to attend'—*Roshan Ali v. K. E.*, (supra).

But a contrary view has been taken in the following cases. Thus, where of the persons summoned to act as jurors only five persons appeared and those five persons were appointed jurors, it was held that the procedure followed was not illegal and the trial was not vitiated. It was further held that the provision of choosing jurors by lot in the first para of this section is applicable only when the persons summoned to act as jurors are present in such number as to make it possible to choose them by lot, but when such number is not present, the Judge is to take the help of the persons present in Court to form the jury, according to the second proviso, without any further drawing of lots. The words "deficiency" and "number of jurors required" in the second proviso mean deficiency in the number of jurors required to make up the jury and not to make up a sufficient number for the purpose of selection by lot—*Rahamat v. K. E.*, 54 Cal 1026, 31 C.W.N. 711 (715) (dissenting from *Bholanath*, 44 C.L.J. 541). The same view has been taken by the Patna High Court in *Alkar Ali v. Emp.*, 7 Pat 61, 8 P.L.T. 800, 28 Cr.L.J. 881 (882) (following *Mucha Khan*, 29 C.W.N. 652, and dissenting from *Bholanath*, 44 C.L.J. 541).

In the Full Bench case of *Kedar Nath Mahato v. K. E.* 55 Cal. 371, 32 C.W.N. 221, 29 Cr.L.J. 437, the view taken in *Rahamat v. K. E.*, (supra) has been approved, and the contrary view taken in *Bholanath*, 44 C.L.J. 541 and *Roshan Ali*, 31 C.W.N. 1102 disapproved.

277. (1) As each juror is chosen, his name shall be called aloud, and, upon his appearance, the accused shall be asked if he objects to be tried by such juror.

Names of jurors to be called.

(2) Objection may then be taken to such juror by the accused or by the prosecutor, and the grounds of objection shall be stated:

Objection to jurors.

Provided that, in the High Court, objections without grounds stated shall be allowed to the number of eight on behalf of the Crown and eight on behalf of the person or all the persons charged.

Objection without grounds stated.

Where the Judge, instead of hearing and deciding objections, proceeded to exempt some of the persons present merely on their own representations, the procedure was irregular and the irregularity could not be cured by sec 537—*Brojendra v. K. E.*, 7 C.W.N. 188.

278. Any objection taken to a juror on any of the following grounds, if made out to the satisfaction of the Court, shall be allowed:—

Grounds of objection.

- (a) some presumed or actual partiality in the juror;
- (b) some personal grounds, such as alienage, deficiency in the qualification required by any law or rule having the force of law for the time being in force, or being under the age of twenty-one or above the age of sixty years;
- (c) his having by habit or religious vows relinquished all care of worldly affairs;
- (d) his holding any office in or under the Court;
- (e) his executing any duties of police or being entrusted with police duties;

- (f) his having been convicted of any offence which, in the opinion of the Court, renders him unfit to serve on the jury;
- (g) his inability to understand the language in which the evidence is given, or, when such evidence is interpreted, the language in which it is interpreted;
- (h) any other circumstance which, in the opinion of the Court, renders him improper as a juror.

886A. Clause (a) :—An objection to a juror on the ground that there was a litigation pending between the accused's master and the juror's principal, must be allowed—*Tajali v Emp* 7 Pat 50, 28 Cr L.J. 843 (844)

Clause (d).—The fact that a person is a clerk in the office of the Magistrate of the district is not sufficient to disqualify him from sitting as a juror—*Emp v Rocha* 7 Cal 42

279. (1) Every objection taken to a juror shall be decided by the Court, and such decision shall be recorded and be final.

Decision of objection.

(2) If the objection is allowed, the place of such juror shall be supplied by any other juror attending in obedience to a summons and chosen in manner provided by section 276, or if there is no such other juror present, then by any other person present in the Court whose name is on the list of jurors, or whom the Court considers a proper person to serve on the jury :

Supply of place of juror against whom objection allowed.

Provided that no objection to such juror or other person is taken under section 278 and allowed.

887. Under subsection (1) the trial Judge has a wide discretion in the matter of accepting or overruling objections to jurors, and his decision is final—*Govt of Bengal v Muchu*, 29 C.W.N 652, 26 Cr.L.J. 819

It is provided in clause (2) that the place of a juror may be taken by any other person present in Court whose name is on the list of jurors or whom the Court considers a proper person to serve on the jury. This shows that the legislature contemplated the possibility of a person not in the jury list being chosen to serve on the jury in the case of emergency—*Govt. of Bengal v. Muchu Khan*, (supra). Under clause (2) the Court may allow some non-summoned persons present in Court to

serve on the jury, where by reason of challenges or other causes such as some of them being excused, no summoned jury is left to take the place of the last challenged juror. In such an eventuality some other person present in Court may be empanelled. But this is to take place only in the exceptional conditions stated and in emergent circumstances—*Roshan Ali v. K. E.*, 31 C W N. 1102 (1107), 28 Cr.L.J. 889. This clause lays down that the place of a juror against whom objection has been allowed may be supplied by a juror attending in obedience to a summons and chosen in the manner provided by sec. 276, and failing him, by any other person *present in Court* whose name is on the list of jurors or whom the Court considers a proper person to serve on the jury. But the vacancy cannot be filled up by a person who is then *not present* in Court, by requisitioning him from outside the Court, even though his name is on the special jurors' list—*Abedali v. Emp.*, 56 Cal 835, 33 C W.N. 722, 1929 Cr. C 364.

280. (1) When the jurors have been chosen, they shall appoint one of their number to be foreman.

Foreman of jury.

(2) The foreman shall preside in the debates of the jury, deliver the verdict of the jury, and ask any information from the Court that is required by the jury or any of the jurors.

(3) If a majority of the jury do not, within such time as the Judge thinks reasonable, agree in the appointment of a foreman, he shall be appointed by the Court.

281. When the foreman has been appointed, the jurors shall be sworn under the Indian Oaths Act, 1873.

Swearing of jurors.

282. (1) If, in the course of a trial by jury, at any time before the return of the verdict, any juror, from any sufficient cause, is prevented from

Procedure when juror ceases to attend, etc.

attending throughout the trial, or if any juror absents himself and it is not practicable to enforce his attendance, or if it appears that any juror is unable to understand the language in which the evidence is given or, when such evidence is interpreted, the language in which it is interpreted, a new juror shall be added, or the jury shall be discharged and a new jury chosen.

(2) In each of such cases the trial shall commence anew.

888. 'Unable to understand language':—Where a juror was deaf and blind, he was held to be 'unable to understand the language' of the trial, and was discharged, and the case was tried *de novo*—*Q. E. v. Virasami*, 10 Mad. 375.

Illness of juror:—Where a juror is prevented from attending throughout the trial by illness, the Judge has a discretion, under this section, either to postpone the trial to a date on which the juror would be able to attend, or to discharge the jury, or to have another juror. If a juror is going to be able to attend in a very short time, it is a wrong exercise of discretion to discharge the jury—*Emp v Monmoth* 28 Cr L.J. 141 (143) (Cal.)

Absence of witness—The Judge can discharge the jury owing to the absence of a juror but he cannot do so owing to the absence of a witness—*In re Putaswamy*, 4 Bom. L.R. 939.

Trial shall commence anew.—Where a juror was discharged and replaced by another, and the trial was not commenced anew, but the Judge called the witnesses who had been examined, read out their statements to them which they admitted to be correct and the trial proceeded, it was held that there was no valid trial—*K. E. v. Narain*, 36 All. 481, 15 Cr.L.J. 538. But the trial which becomes null and void owing to the incompetence of a juror under this section is not null and void for all purposes. Thus, if a witness has given false evidence during such trial, he can be prosecuted under sec 193 I. P. C. The nullity of the trial will not affect the liability of the witness for prosecution for perjury—*Q. E. v. Virasami*, 19 Mad 375.

889. Discharge of jury for misconduct:—After the close of the prosecution case, and before the counsel for the accused called his witnesses, the foreman of the jury informed the Court that they had arrived at an unanimous verdict (which was unfavourable to the prisoner) and did not desire to hear anything more. The Court remarked that the conduct of the jury in arriving at such a verdict before hearing the defence evidence was unfair to the accused and against all principles of justice. The counsel for the accused thereupon pressed for the discharge of the jury for such misconduct and for empanelling a fresh jury. But the Standing Counsel remarked that the case was not covered by sec. 282 or 283 (which were the only sections relating to discharge of the jury during the trial) and the jury could not therefore be discharged; but under instructions from the Advocate-General he entered a *nolle prosequi*—*Emp v Olu Muhammad*, 7 C.W.N. xxxi. The point was therefore left undecided in that case, but in another case of the same High Court the question arose again, and it has been decided that although section 282 or 283 does not provide for the discharge of the jury for improper conduct during the trial, (as for instance where some of the jury were seen one day associating with the man who was looking after the case for the accused), nor is it specifically provided by any other section, still the Sessions Judge has an *inherent power* to discharge the jury for misconduct. But such power is not to be exercised lightly, nor until the Judge has satisfied himself, by some such inquiry, as in the circumstances

he can adopt, that reasonable grounds for exercising such a power exist—*Rahim Sheikh v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 872, *Rebati Mohan v. K. E.*, 32 C.W.N. 945 (947), 56 Cal. 150, 30 Cr.L.J. 435; *Abdur Rashid v. Emp.*, 56 Cal. 1032, 33 C.W.N. 425. In England also, the Judge has the power to discharge the jury for improper conduct, *e.g.*, where one of the jurors had left the box without leave—*Reg v. Ward*, (1867) 10 Cox, C.C. 573

The discharge of the jury for misconduct is not equivalent to a verdict of acquittal, but the prisoner can be remanded for a fresh trial and a new jury should be empanelled—*Reg. v. Davison*, (1860) 8 Cox, C.C. 360; *Rahim Sheikh v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 872. If the jury have misconducted themselves, they may be discharged and a new trial directed with a new jury; but no such action can be taken unless the misconduct has been established by what is regarded as evidence in the eye of the law—*Atamfru v. Emp.*, 51 Cal 418 (430, 431)

If a juror is discharged for misconduct before any hearing of the case takes place at all, it is not necessary for the Judge to discharge the whole jury and empanel a new jury, but he can select another juror from the persons present in Court (sec. 276, second proviso)—*Rebati Mohan v. K. E.*, 32 C.W.N. 945 (947), 56 Cal. 150

283. The Judge may also discharge the jury whenever the prisoner becomes incapable of remaining at the bar.

Discharge of jury in case of sickness of prisoner.

D.—Choosing Assessors.

284. When the trial is to be held with the aid of assessors, not less than three and, if practicable, four shall be chosen from the persons summoned to act as such.

Assessors how chosen.

Change.—The italicised words have been substituted for the words "two or more" by sec. 15 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act XII of 1923 "We add the further recommendation that in all cases triable with the aid of assessors, there shall be, if possible, four, and in any case, not less than three, assessors"—*Report of the Racial Distinctions Committee*, Para 26

890. Choosing assessors:—The choice of jurors is by lot, but the choice of assessors is entirely with the Judge, who in the exercise of this power should pay every consideration to any reasonable objection raised, although the law does not, as in the case of jurors, provide for objections being taken to an assessor. In the selection of assessors, regard must be had to the nature of the case, to the person tried, and to the public feeling excited. They ought not to be pleaders nor young men fresh from the College and devoid of experience. They ought to be persons of independent conditions in life, men of judgment and experience—*Q. v. Ram Dutt*, 23 W.R. 35.

Though there is no express provision for objecting to the selection of an assessor, still there is no reason why an objection of presumed or actual partiality should not be allowed, particularly when it is urged at the time of selection of the assessor. The opinions of assessors are of great value both to the Judge who tries the case and to the Superior Courts. It is therefore necessary as an elementary principle that they should be above suspicion. The relationship of landlord and tenant or of master and servant creates an incapacity in a person to sit as an assessor in a case. An objection to an assessor that he is a tenant of the person interested in the prosecution is a valid objection—*Shivdhan v Emp.*, 3 P.L.T. 32, 22 Cr.L.J. 362, 60 I C 662.

'From the persons summoned'—The assessors must be chosen from the persons summoned to act as such. The Judge is not competent to select any one to act as an assessor who has not been summoned under sec. 326 or 327. Where out of several persons summoned the Judge selected only one, and he selected two other persons at random from the practically conducted with one assessor only—*Q E v Badri* 1894 persons present in Court, it was held that the trial was bad, as it was A.W.N. 207; *Man Singh v Emp* 35 All 570, *Balak Singh v K E*, 3 P.L.J. 141, 19 Cr.L.J. 363. Where in the absence of assessors duly summoned, the Judge appointed the Nazir of the Court to act as an assessor, the trial was held to be illegal, as the Nazir was not duly summoned, and in choosing assessors there is no provision corresponding to the second proviso to sec. 276 (in choosing jurors)—*Khub Singh v. K E.*, 13 O C 337, 11 Cr.L.J. 724. But where a person was summoned to serve as an assessor on a particular date in a particular case and he failed to appear in Court on that date but appeared on a subsequent day when another trial had to commence, and he was selected to act as an assessor in that trial, his selection would not be improper—*Chutla v Emp.*, 17 Cr.L.J. 17 (All.).

Number of assessors.—Under this section as now amended, there must be at least three assessors. A trial held with less than the required number of assessors is null and void, and the illegality cannot be cured by sec. 537—*Jairam v. Emp.*, 20 N.L.R. 129, 25 Cr.L.J. 459, *Pragi v Emp.*, 11 O.L.J. 245; *Ram Narain v. Emp.*, 27 O C 213, 26 Cr.L.J. 359. A trial commencing with the aid of one assessor is not a legal trial, and sec. 537 cannot cure the defect—*K E. v Jairam*, 25 Bom. 694, *Q E v Silva*, 15 Bom 514. If there were two assessors (which was the required number prior to the present amendment) but one of them was deaf and blind, there was properly speaking only one assessor and the trial was invalid—*Q E. v Babu Lal*, 21 All 106, *Anonymous*, 2 Weir 340.

This section lays down that the number of assessors should be not less than three, and if practicable four. Where four assessors are not chosen, it is right that the Court should give reasons in the order-sheet to explain the impracticability of choosing four. But the trial with three assessors, without the record of these reasons, is not irregular but is still according to law—*Jamal v. Emp.*, 7 P.L.T. 14, 26 Cr.L.J. 713.

Trial without assessors—The trial will be invalid if a portion of the

trial which consists in the taking of additional evidence takes place after the discharge of the assessors—*Q. E. v. Ram Lal*, 15 All. 136.

284A. (1) *In a trial with the aid of assessors of a*

Assessors for trial of
European and Indian
British subjects and
others.

person who has been found under the provisions of this Code to be an European or Indian British subject,

if the European or Indian British subject accused, or where there are several European British subjects accused or several Indian British subjects accused, all of them jointly, before the first assessor is chosen, so require, all the assessors shall, in the case of European British subjects, be persons who are Europeans or Americans, or, in the case of Indian British subjects, be Indians.

(2) *In a trial with the aid of assessors of a person who has been found under the provisions of this Code to be an European (other than an European British subject) or an American, all the assessors shall, if practicable and if such European or American before the first assessor is chosen so requires, be persons who are Europeans or Americans.*

This section has been added by sec 16 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, XII of 1923. Under this section, Indians and Europeans can claim to be tried before their own countrymen as assessors. "In any district in which for any class of offences Indians are normally triable in a Court of Session with the aid of assessors, and in which no racial considerations are involved, the accused, whether Indian or European, shall be tried with assessors, who, if the accused so claims, shall all be of the nationality of the accused"—*Report of the Racial Distinctions Committee*, Para 26

Sub-section (2) embodies the old section 460 with certain modifications.

891. The accused, if he intends to avail himself of the provisions of this section, must make a claim to the privilege conferred by it; failure to make a claim will amount to waiver—*Ruffe v. Emp.*, 1912 P.R. 6, 13 Cr.L.J. 197.

285. (1) *If in the course of a trial with the aid of*

Procedure when assessor is unable to attend.

assessors, at any time before the finding, any assessor is, from any sufficient cause, prevented from

attending throughout the trial, or absents himself, and it is not practicable to enforce his attendance, the trial shall proceed with the aid of the other assessor or assessors.

(2) If all the assessors are prevented from attending, or absent themselves, the proceedings shall be stayed and a new trial shall be held with the aid of fresh assessors.

892. Absence of assessors :—This section contemplates that at least one assessor must attend continuously throughout the trial—*K. E. v. Messuruddin*, 6 C.W.N. 715; *K. E. v. Thurumalai*, 24 Mad. 523. Therefore, where in a Sessions trial beginning with three assessors, one of the assessors died at an early stage of the proceedings and later on another assessor became too ill to be present, and the third was absent before the pleader for the defence addressed the Court, it was held that the trial was a nullity—*Q. E. v. Md. Mahomed Khan*, 13 All. 337.

An assessor who is absent during a part of the trial cannot be allowed to resume his seat as assessor, once he is absent he ceases to occupy the position of an assessor. Where such an assessor was allowed to resume his seat, and the evidence recorded in his absence was read over to him and he gave his opinion just like the other assessors, it was held that the procedure was not in accordance with law. His opinion ought not to have been taken—*K. E. v. Messuruddin* 6 C.W.N. 715, *Q. E. v. Piso*, Ratanlal 695. In a Madras case, however, it has been held that such a procedure is merely irregular but not illegal. Though the proper course would have been to proceed with the trial with the aid of the other assessor alone, and to accept his opinion only, still the fact that the absent assessor was allowed to resume his seat and take part in the trial and give his opinion would not vitiate the opinion of another assessor which was validly given. The assessors merely assist the Court but do not form part of the tribunal which decides the case, and the assessors unlike the jury give their opinions separately and not as members of a body. And the invalidity of the opinion of one does not affect the validity of the opinion of the other—*K. E. v. Thurumalai*, 24 Mad. 523.

If assessor is an interested person.—Where in the course of a trial it is found that one of the assessors is interested in the trial, and is unfit to sit as an assessor, there is no provision of law to meet such a contingency. In such a case, the proper course is to refer the case to the High Court to set aside the order appointing the incompetent assessor and all subsequent proceedings in the trial. Then the Sessions Judge will be asked by the High Court to choose another assessor and proceed with the trial *de novo*—*Sessions Judge v. Thiagaraja*, 1912 M.W.N. 378, 13 Cr.L.J. 473.

DD.—Joint Trials.

285A. *In any case in which an European or American is accused jointly with a person not being an European or American, or an Indian British subject is accused jointly with a*

Trial of European or Indian British subject or European or American jointly accused with others.

person not being an Indian, and such European, Indian British Subject or American is committed for trial before a Court of Session, he and such other person may be tried together, but if he requires to be tried in accordance with the provisions of Section 275 or Section 284A and is so tried, and the other person accused requires to be tried separately, such other person shall be tried separately in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.

This section has been newly added by sec. 17 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, XII of 1923. It provides that in cases in which Indians and Europeans are sought to be tried jointly, they can claim to be tried separately before jurors or assessors who are their own countrymen.

E.—Trial to close of cases for Prosecution and Defence.

286. (1) When the jurors or assessors have been chosen, the prosecutor shall open

Opening case for prosecution.

his case by reading from the Indian Penal Code or other law the description of the offence charged, and stating shortly by what evidence he expects to prove the guilt of the accused.

(2) The prosecutor shall then examine his witnesses.

Trial cannot be postponed :—After the jurors have been chosen, the prosecutor shall open his case, and the trial cannot be postponed to enable the prosecutor to examine a witness by commission—*Q. E. v. Jacob*, 19 Cal. 113.

893. - Examination of witnesses :—The object of a prosecution is not to secure a conviction but to see that justice be done. The prosecutor is bound to call all the witnesses who prove their connection with the transaction in question, and who also must be able to give important information. If such witnesses are not produced without sufficient reason being shown, the Court may properly draw an inference adverse to the prosecution—*Emp. v. Dhunno*, 8 Cal. 121 (124); *Muhammad Yunus v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 318 (326); *Nayan Mandal v. Emp.*, 34 C.W.N. 170 (173), *Q. E. v. Tulla*, 7 All. 904, *Brahamdeo v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 161, 21 Cr.L.J. 33, 54 L.C. 241, *Imp. v. Jumo*, 3 S.L.R. 200, 11 Cr.L.J. 410. The duty of the prosecution is not to secure a conviction but to assist the Court in arriving at the truth, and for that purpose to place before the Court all the material evidence at its disposal—*Emp. v. Fateh Chand*, 44 Cal. 477 (F.B.), 21 C.W.N. 33; *Amrita Lal v. Emp.*, 42 Cal. 957. All the persons alleged or known to have knowledge of the facts ought to be brought before the Court and examined. The fact that certain witnesses were examined by the committing Magistrate against

the express desire of the police officer conducting the prosecution is not a ground for not calling them—*Q. E. v. Ram Sahai*, 10 Cal. 1070 (1072). All the witnesses who were present at the scene of the crime must be called by the prosecution even if they give contradictory versions, so that the jury may draw their own conclusions from their depositions—*Q. E. v. Dhamba*, Ratanlal 591; and it is not a sufficient reason not to call such a witness, simply because the opinion he has formed shows an unconscious bias on his part—*Munni v Emp.*, 9 C.W.N. 438. It is the duty of the prosecution to examine important witnesses who are personally eye-witnesses of the occurrence, and the failure of the Public Prosecutor to do so requires explanation—*Keshwar Gope v Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 491, 21 Cr.L.J. 743, 58 I.C. 247; *Ram Ranjan v K. E.* 42 Cal. 422. All important eye-witnesses of the scene of occurrence should be examined by the prosecution as to the several facts known to them which are relevant to the case, though other witnesses might have spoken to the same facts. Merely tendering them for cross-examination without examining them, is a practice which should not be encouraged—*Veera Koravan*, 53 Mad 69, 30 L.W. 701, 1929 Cr C 685 (688). The purpose of a criminal trial is not to support, at all costs, a theory, but to investigate the offence and to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused, and the duty of the Public Prosecutor is to represent not the police but the Crown, and this duty should be discharged by him fairly and fearlessly and with a full sense of the responsibility that attaches to his position. The guilt or innocence of the accused is to be determined by the tribunals appointed by law and not according to the tastes of any one else—*Ram Ranjan v Emp.*, 42 Cal 422, 19 C.W.N. 28, 16 Cr.L.J. 170. The prosecutor is not free to choose how much evidence he will bring before the Court; he is bound to produce all the evidence in his power directly bearing upon the charge. It is his duty to call all witnesses who can throw any light on the case, whether they support the prosecution theory or the defence theory—*Brahmdeo v Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 161, 54 I.C. 241, 21 Cr.L.J. 33; *Emp v Dhunno*, 8 Cal 121 (124), *Kunja v Emp.*, 8 Pat 289, 1929 Cr. C. 62, 30 Cr.L.J. 675, *Mathura v. Emp.*, 8 Pat. 625, 1929 Cr C 155, and the prosecutor should not refuse to call and examine any witnesses for the prosecution merely because his evidence may in some respects be favourable to the defence—*Q. E. v. Durga*, 16 All. 84 (F.B.)

But the prosecution is not bound to call, or put into the witness box for cross-examination, any witness whom he believes to be false or whose evidence is unnecessary for the trial—*Ramjit v K. E.*, 2 Pat. 309 (315); *Emp v. Reed*, 49 Cal. 277; *Muhammad Yunus v Emp.*, 50 Cal. 318; *Q. E. v. Durga*, 16 All. 84; *Emp. v. Balaram*, 49 Cal 358 (367), *Q. E. v. Stanton*, 14 All 521, *Q. E. v. Bankhandi*, 15 All 6, *Emp v Dhunno*, 8 Cal. 121, *Kami v Crown*, 1916 P R 12; *Doraisami v. Emp.*, 45 M L J. 846; or who will misrepresent facts or will misstate what has happened—*Munnisonar v. Emp.*, 9 C.W.N. 438. The prosecution is not bound to call any particular witness when there is reasonable ground for believing that he will not, if called, speak the truth—*Emp v Dhunno*, 8 Cal.

121 (124); *Mathura v. Emp.*, 8 Pat. 625, 1929 Cr. C 155; *Nayan Mandal v. Emp.*, 34 C.W.N. 170 (171). It is usual in such case to tender the witness for cross-examination—*Nayan Mandal*, supra, *Tulla*, 7 All. 904. Although the Court is entitled to draw an inference adverse to the prosecution on the ground that independent eye-witnesses have not been called, still if the witnesses who have been called by the prosecution are worthy of credit, the Court is not entitled to disbelieve them simply because other persons who could have thrown light on the case have not been put before the Court by the prosecution. If the police or Public Prosecutor is of opinion that a witness is likely to give false testimony or that his evidence is unnecessary, he is justified in not sending up or producing that witness, and his absence at the trial ought not to be a reason for disbelieving the other prosecution witnesses if they are otherwise worthy of credit—*Ramji v. K E*, 2 Pat. 309 (314, 315). 24 Cr.L.J. 801, A.I.R. 1923 Pat. 413

All the witnesses who can speak to material facts and who were bound over to appear at the Sessions should be examined. It is not within the province of the Judge to dispense with their evidence, and if the Public Prosecutor does so, he commits an error of judgment—*Eruva Perayya*, 2 Weir. 379 (380). All the witnesses sent up by the committing Magistrate must be examined, and the Sessions Judge is not competent to pick and choose among them. It is the duty of the Court to examine all such witnesses unless it has good and sufficient reason to believe that the witnesses came to the Court-house with a pre-determined intention of giving false evidence—*Q E v Bankhandi*, 15 All 6; *Emp v. Kaliprosanna*, 14 Cal 245, *Q E v Tulla*, 7 All 904. The prosecution is not bound as a matter of procedure to produce at the trial all the witnesses who have been examined before the committing Magistrate, when there is reason to believe that the evidence of such witnesses is not true, although it would be proper for the committing Magistrate to send up those witnesses to the Sessions Judge, so that the credit due to them may be determined by the Judge himself—*Rariasami*, 2 Weir 378 (379). In *Q E. v. Stanton*, 14 All. 521, however it has been held that the prosecution is not bound to examine a witness examined before the committing Magistrate except when the committing Magistrate has stated in his order of commitment that he has been influenced by that particular witness in ordering the committal. No further duty is imposed on the prosecution than that of having in attendance every witness examined before the committing Magistrate, so that the witness may be cross-examined or not by the defence counsel as he chooses.

Where there is no ground for disbelieving the witnesses, all the witnesses must be examined; and the trial cannot be stopped, and no final opinion as to the falsehood or insufficiency of the prosecution evidence ought to be arrived at, until all the witnesses have been examined. Thus, where after the examination of some of the witnesses the Judge asked the jury whether they wished to hear any more evidence and they stated that they did not believe the evidence and wished to stop the case,

Where a Judge is succeeded by another, and the latter decides to hold the trial *de novo*, he must examine the witnesses orally again. If the witnesses' depositions in the previous trial are merely exhibited in the second trial, without actually examining them *de novo*, the procedure is illegal; even the fact that the accused consented to such a course in order to save cross-examination, will not cure the illegality—*Umar Hajeer v. K. E.*, 46 Mad. 117.

The evidence must be taken *in the presence of the accused*. It is an irregular procedure to examine witnesses in the absence of the accused and then to read over to the accused the evidence recorded in his absence, the accused being allowed to cross-examine the witnesses. Such a procedure prejudices the accused in his cross-examination and defence—*Emp. v. Ram Piri*, 5 C.P.L.R. 33.

The prosecution must give positive evidence of the guilt of the accused, and cannot depend upon the weakness of his adversary's case. The Court is concerned not so much with the truth or otherwise of the theory suggested by the accused as with the case for the prosecution. The proof of the case against the prisoners must depend for its support not upon the absence or weakness of explanation on their part, but upon the positive and affirmative evidence of their guilt that is given by the Crown—*Mamfru v. Emp.*, 51 Cal. 418 (425-426).

Witnesses not examined before the committing Magistrate:—The prosecution cannot demand, as of right, that any witness not examined in the preliminary inquiry should be called and examined at the trial. But the Court, if it considers necessary, may call and examine him—*Q. E. v. Hayfield*, 14 All 212. But the mere fact that a witness has not been examined before a committing Magistrate is no ground for refusing to take the evidence of such witness. There is nothing in the Code which restricts the examination at the trial only to the witnesses examined before the committing Magistrate. But the prosecutor should, as a matter of justice and fairness to the accused, state in his opening address the name of such witness—*Q. E. v. Khan Md.*, 1889 P R. 1.

894. Cross-examination:—As a rule, the cross-examination of a witness should take place after his examination-in-chief, and cannot be postponed. There is no provision of law which authorises the Judge to allow all the prosecution witnesses to be examined at once, and to permit the cross-examination to be reserved to a subsequent date—*Gothuri Venkatappa*, 2 Weir 381. But though the accused is not entitled to such postponement as of right, still there is no reason why the Sessions Judge should refuse an application for such postponement where the application was a reasonable one under the circumstances of the case—*Sadasiv v. Emp.*, 41 Cal. 299, 15 Cr.L.J. 596.

A Sessions Judge is not justified in stopping the cross-examination and turning the witness out of Court because he is of opinion that the witness is not speaking the truth—*Meharban*, 1900 A W.N. 149.

Cross-examination of a witness not examined-in-chief:—The ordinary practice in properly constituted Courts is, that where a witness for the

prosecution is not examined by the Crown, he is placed in the witness-box in order that the defence may have an opportunity of cross-examining him—*Emp. v. Girish Chunder*, 5 Cal 614, *Emp v Mavsang*, 11 Bom. L.R. 1162, 10 Cr.L.J. 538; *Q. E. v. Stanton*, 14 All 521, *Emp v. Kaliprosanna*, 14 Cal 245. But there is no provision in the Code analogous to English practice, entitling the prisoner, as a matter of right, to have a witness for the prosecution who is not called, put into the box for cross-examination; and the disallowing of it is no error in law—*Reg. v. Fattechand*, 5 B.H.C.R. 85; *Emp v. Kaliprosanna*, 14 Cal 245. *Q. E. v. Stanton*, 14 All 521.

287. The examination of the accused duly recorded

by or before the committing Magistrate shall be tendered by the prosecutor and read as evidence.

Examination of accused before Magistrate to be evidence.

895. "*The examination of the accused*":—This section contemplates an examination of the accused, although sec. 209 does not make it imperative on the committing Magistrate to examine the accused—*Reg. v. Sita*, Ratanlal 100. The examination of the accused recorded by the Magistrate should be put in as part of the case for the prosecution, before the accused is called on to enter on his defence—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 361; *Cal. G.R. & C.O.* p. 23.

The whole of the examination should be read out—*Anonymous*, 5 M H C.R. App. 4; *In re Kamakka*, 12 Cr.L.J. 142, 1911 M.W.N. 199. Where the prisoner had made two statements before the Magistrate, the one amounting to a confession of the guilt, and the other to a denial thereof, the trial Court ought to consider both the statements and their relative credibility—*Q. v. Soobjan*, 10 B L.R. 332; *Q. E. v. Mahabir*, 18 All. 78.

If in an examination of the accused some objectionable questions have been asked by the committing Magistrate, such questions and the answers thereto must be omitted, but the whole examination should not be excluded from evidence—*Khudiram v. Emp.*, 11 C.L.J. 55, 3 I.C. 625.

This section permits a previous statement of the accused to be read as a part of the case for the prosecution only so far as such statement refers to the offence (i.e. the present offence) for which the accused is being tried, and not so far as it relates to a previous conviction. The portion as to previous conviction cannot be read out to the jury or assessors under sec. 310 until they have given their verdict or opinion—*Taka Ahir v. K. E.*, 11 P.L.J. 706.

Where the accused was examined about a confession which was not admissible in evidence, the questions and answers to them could not be said to be 'duly recorded' as the questions were not such as were allowed by the law to be put; and the these questions were not admissible in evidence against the
Gye v. K. E., 4 L P 244, 8 Cr.L.J. 62.

"Committing Magistrate"—The phrase 'committing Magistrate' in secs. 287 and 288 is merely a compendious way of referring to the Magistrate or Magistrates who held the preliminary inquiry on which the committal was made. Where a subordinate Magistrate inquired into a case and discharged the accused, and the District Magistrate acting under sec 436 (now 437) committed the accused for trial, the examination recorded by the subordinate Magistrate would be the examination recorded by the 'committing Magistrate' within the meaning of this section—*Sessions Judge v Malunga*, 31 Mad 40.

The examination of the accused before the committing Magistrate must be given in evidence at the trial. It is not optional with the prosecution to put in such statement or not. If it is not tendered by the prosecution, the Judge is bound to call for it—*Q E v Rama Tewari*, 15 Mad 352, *In re Ameer Chand*, 13 W R 63.

This section requires that the statements made by the accused before the committing Magistrate must be read out to the prisoners at the trial, but it is not necessary for the Judge to ask them specifically if they have any objection to the reception of these confessions—*Q v Misser Sheikh*, 14 W.R. 9.

288. The evidence of a witness duly recorded in the presence of the accused under Chapter XVIII may, in the discretion of the presiding Judge, if such witness is produced and examined, be treated as evidence in the case for all purposes subject to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

895A. Change :—The word 'recorded' has been substituted for 'taken', the words "under Chapter XVIII" have been substituted for the words "before the committing Magistrate," and the italicised words at the end of the section have been newly added, by section 78 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. "The words 'under Chapter XVIII' have been used in place of 'the committing Magistrate' to cover the case of evidence recorded by a Magistrate, other than the committing Magistrate, under sec 219"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*, *Abdul Gani v Emp.*, 53 Cal. 181, 42 C.L.J. 205, 26 Cr.L.J. 1577. Besides, there is no special procedure laid down in Ch XVIII for recording evidence, and any evidence recorded by a Magistrate before commitment, whether recorded with a view to commitment or in the ordinary course of trial, is evidence 'recorded in the presence of the accused under Ch XVIII'—*Abdul Gani v. Emp.*, (supra).

896. Object and scope of section—This section is intended to provide for the contingency that may arise when a witness who is produced before the Court of Session holds back information and evidence, and tells a different story from that which he gave before the Magistrate in the preliminary inquiry—*Emp. v. Alulu*, 2 All. 646.

This section refers only to the evidence of witnesses recorded under Chap. XVIII. Statements made by witnesses before a Police officer or to an investigating Magistrate are not contemplated by this section—*In re Sankappa*, 31 Mad 127, 7 Cr.L.J. 325. A statement made by a witness at a search does not come under this section—*Venkat Row v. Emp.*, 36 Mad. 159. A statement given by a witness before a monigar cannot be used under this section—*Malaya v. Emp.*, 42 M.L.J. 278, 23 Cr.L.J. 262, A I R 1922 Mad. 303.

Evidence of approver:—If an accomplice, to whom a conditional pardon has been tendered, is examined as a witness in the trial, his deposition made before the committing Magistrate may be used as evidence—*Q E v. Manna*, 1894 P.R. 14; *Q. E. v. Soneju*, 21 All 175; *Q E v Rama Tevan*, 15 Mad 352. It may be used as evidence against the accused even if it is retracted at the Sessions trial—*Q E v Soneju*, 21 All. 175. The reliability of such statement is no doubt injuriously affected by the fact of its being retracted before the Sessions Court, but it does not follow that it is not entitled to any weight or credibility—*Punhu v Crown*, 8 S.L.R. 203, 16 Cr L J 233.

'*Duly taken in the presence of accused*'—A statement made in the absence of the accused cannot be treated as evidence against him under this section—*Pathana v K E*, 1904 P.R. 3; *Ahmuddin v Q E*, 23 Cal 361, *Emp. v Gulabu*, 35 All. 260, 14 Cr.L.J. 211. So also, where the accused was merely allowed to be present but was not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses before the committing Magistrate, the evidence of such witnesses cannot be said to be duly taken, and cannot be treated as evidence under this section—*Q E. v. Sagal*, 21 Cal 642. Such *ex parte* statements by witnesses without the accused being allowed to rebut them by cross-examination is not evidence at all under this section—*Ibid.*

897. 'Produced and examined'—The evidence of witnesses given before the committing Magistrate may be used as evidence if the witnesses have been *produced* and *examined* at the trial, a statement made before the committing Magistrate by a person who has since disappeared is inadmissible in evidence, because the witness is not produced and examined before the Sessions Judge—*Ajodhi v Emp.*, 16 N L R 30, 21 Cr.L.J. 486. Mere producing of the witnesses is not sufficient, they must be *examined*, where a witness who had been examined by the Committing Magistrate was not examined before the Sessions Judge but was merely *tendered for cross-examination* by the accused, the procedure was held to be illegal—*Subha v Q E*, 9 Mad 83, *Kottaiyadu v Emp.*, 1915 M.W.N. 544, 16 Cr L J 615. Moreover, the deposition given before the committing Magistrate may be treated as evidence, *after* the witnesses are examined at the trial. The Sessions Judge is not justified in convicting the prisoner solely upon the evidence of the witnesses given before the committing Magistrate without examining them afresh—*Q v. Majohar*, 24 W.R. 11; *Shibdayal v. Emp.*, 1883 P R 23. This section does not allow the use of the deposition as a substitute for

at the trial. This section is not an exception to sec. 286; it does not dispense with the examination of the witnesses directed by sec. 286—*Subha v. Q. E.*, 11 Mad. 83; *Q v. Radhy*, 1 W.R. 14. Without examining the witness it is improper to read his deposition given before the Magistrate and to ask him if it is true. Such a procedure amounts to putting a leading question to the witness, and it is an implied intimation that the same story is expected from him again—*Emp. v. Ram Piare*, 5 C.P.L.R. 33. Further, the statements made by a witness before the committing Magistrate should not be read out to the witness in the trial before the defence has had an opportunity of cross-examining him—*Narain Das v Crown*, 3 Lah 144 (154), 23 Cr L.J. 513.

Moreover, the deposition of the witness before the committing Magistrate can be used as evidence if the witness is examined at the trial as a witness. Where the witness before the committing Magistrate, being found concerned in the offence, was committed to take his trial along with the accused in the case, the deposition in the Magistrate's Court could not be treated as evidence against the accused under this section, he not being a witness in the trial—*Shibdayal v Crown*, 1883 P R 23.

898. Use of the deposition :—Where a deposition of a witness given before the committing Magistrate is tendered in evidence at the Sessions trial, the Sessions Judge should then and there determine the question of its admissibility and record his reasons for its admission as evidence—*Q E. v Vithu*, 1 Bom L R 156.

Where the witnesses made certain statements implicating the accused, before the committing Magistrate, but at the trial before the Sessions Judge they resiled from those statements and told an altogether different story, held that the statements made before the committing Magistrate were not merely relevant for the purpose of contradicting or negating the statements made before the Court of Session under sec. 155 Evidence Act, but that under sec. 288 could also be treated as "evidence in the case" i.e. as substantive evidence of all the facts therein deposed to—*Maruti v Emp.*, 46 Bom 97, 68 I.C. 332, 22 Cr.L.J. 636; *Amir Zaman v. Crown*, 6 Lah. 199, 26 P.L.R. 361, 26 Cr.L.J. 1245; *Abdul Gani v. Emp.*, 53 Cal. 181, 42 C.L.J. 205, 26 Cr.L.J. 1577; *Tulli v. Emp.*, 47 All 276, 26 CrL J 450; *Rakka v. Emp.*, 6 Lah. 171, 27 Cr.L.J. 438; *Bahadur v. Emp.*, 19 S L R. 71, 26 Cr.L.J. 1063. A certain witness made a statement before the committing Magistrate, but resiled from that statement before the Sessions Judge, whereupon his statement made before the committing Magistrate was put in evidence under sec. 288, and in order to corroborate this statement, a statement made by that witness before the Police was proved and put in evidence. Held that the statement made before the committing Magistrate was 'testimony' within the meaning of sec 157 of the Evidence Act, and therefore the prior statement made before the Police was admissible in evidence to corroborate the statement made before the committing Magistrate—*Mam Chand v. Crown*, 5 Lah 324 (328), 25 Cr L J 1201. Where a Sessions Judge, being of opinion that certain

prosecution witnesses had been gained over by the accused, allowed their depositions given before the committing Magistrate to be received in evidence, held that this section enabled the Court to treat such depositions as substantive evidence in the case at the trial. Such evidence may be used as much in favour of the defence as of the prosecution, and not merely for the purpose of contradicting the witnesses at the Sessions trial—*Q. E. v. Dorai Sami*, 24 Mad. 414; *Gansa Oraon v. K. E.*, 11 Pat. 517, 24 Cr.L.J. 641. Depositions of witnesses taken before the committing Magistrate, and subsequently retracted before the Sessions Judge, may, in the discretion of the Judge, be admitted in evidence at the trial in the Sessions Court, and when so admitted, they are on the same footing as any other evidence on the record—*Emp. v. Dwarka*, 28 All 683; *Mamchand v. Emp.*, 5 Lah. 324 (328), 25 Cr.L.J. 1201; *In re Velliah*, 45 Mad 766, 43 M.L.J. 222. That is, the evidence recorded by the committing Magistrate, even though retracted in the Sessions Court, may be considered by the jury or by the assessors and the Judge, as part of the material or as substantive evidence upon which the verdict or the finding has to be given—*Umar v. Emp.*, 1887 P.R. 51, *Abdul Gani v. Emp.*, 42 C.L.J. 205; *Fazaruddin v. Emp.*, 42 C.L.J. 111, 26 Cr.L.J. 1553, *Emp. v. Basappa*, 27 Bom.L.R. 113. But there is nothing in this section which prescribes the value or weight to be attached to the evidence. Whether any portion or the whole of the evidence given before the committing Magistrate is entitled to credit, and if so, to such a degree that a conviction may be based upon it wholly or in part, are very important questions for the jury and the assessors, but they are in no way affected by this section—*Umar v. Crown*, 1887 P.R. 51. It is a matter for the discretion of the Judge whether such evidence should be used in the interests of justice. In many cases it would be extremely dangerous to rely upon such evidence where the witnesses have proved themselves in the Sessions Court altogether unworthy of credit—*Gansa Oraon v. K. E.*, 2 Pat. 517, 24 Cr.L.J. 641. A Court of Session may admit in evidence the statements made by witnesses before the committing Magistrate, when such evidence is to a certain extent corroborated by independent testimony before itself. If there is no such corroborative evidence, it is not proper to base a conviction solely upon the deposition made before the Magistrate—*Q. E. v. Jlochi*, 21 All 111; *Q. E. v. Jadub Das*, 27 Cal 295, *Mamchand v. Crown*, 5 Lah. 324 (328), 25 Cr.L.J. 1201, *Q. E. v. Bharmappa*, 12 Mad 123, *Q. E. v. Nirmal Das*, 22 All 445, *Somadu*, 47 Mad 232, 25 Cr.L.J. 715; *Purllu v. Crown*, 1917 P.R. 37, 18 Cr.L.J. 703; *Q. E. v. Subraya Ratanlal*, 894. A conviction based solely on evidence given by the witnesses before the committing Magistrate and retracted by them at the trial is unsustainable—*Sher Dil v. Crown*, 1919 P.R. 17, 20 Cr.L.J. 792, 53 I.C. 696. If it were permissible to convict an accused person, relying solely upon the evidence given by a witness before the committing Magistrate, the logical consequence would be the taking of evidence before the Sessions Court might be altogether dispensed with—*Q. v. Amanullah*, 21 W.R. 49. Evidence given before a committing Magistrate cannot be effectually utilised in support of a con-

viction unless it is shown by other corroborative evidence that the evidence given before the committing Magistrate should be preferred to and substituted for the evidence given at the trial—*K E v. Jehal Teli*, 3 Pat. 781 (794), 6 P.L.T. 53, 26 Cr.L.J. 270; *Q E. v. Jadub Das*, 27 Cal. 295. Where a witness was not examined in the Sessions Court with regard to the particular statements made by him before the committing Magistrate and he did not repeat those statements before the Sessions Court, it was held that the Sessions Judge could not properly admit such statements in evidence under this section, as they were not corroborated—*Bajrangi v. Emp.*, 4 C.W.N. 49. A conviction cannot be based upon statements of witnesses made before the committing Magistrate, when they afterwards came forward before the Sessions Judge and gave only circumstantial evidence insufficient to connect the accused with the commission of the crime—*Ghanwara v. Crown*, 1915 P.W.R. 15, 16 Cr.L.J. 612.

A Sessions Judge does not show a proper discretion in allowing a statement made before the committing Magistrate by a witness to be used as evidence under this section, when the witness repudiates it at the Sessions and attributes it to improper influence in the course of the investigation, and when the circumstances are such that the Judge cannot rely on it—*K E v. Bhut Nath*, 7 C.W.N. 345. Where a witness, who in the Sessions trial resiles from his deposition given before the Magistrate, states that the latter deposition was made under the influence of the Police, the Judge should exercise a proper discretion in making some inquiry by examining the Inspector of Police regarding the restraint and pressure put upon the witness, before admitting such statement as evidence—*Bajrangi v. Emp.*, 4 C.W.N. 49.

899. "Subject to the provisions of the Evidence Act" :—These words do not mean that evidence duly taken before a Magistrate can only be utilized at a trial in a case where the Evidence Act specifically authorises its use. Such a construction is erroneous, because there are only certain sections in the Evidence Act (secs. 32, 33, 145, 155, 157) which can in any way be regarded as even remotely dealing with this subject, but none have any direct bearing. There is indeed in the Evidence Act nothing at all which permits or specifically provides for the use of evidence taken before a Magistrate as evidence at a trial. What is really meant by the words is that evidence duly taken before a Magistrate can be used for all purposes in a trial Court so long as the evidence is evidence within the meaning of the Evidence Act. I.e., if the matter contained therein is, according to the rules laid down in the Evidence Act of evidential value. For instance, hearsay evidence taken before a Magistrate would not be capable of being utilized by a Sessions Judge as of evidential value at the trial. These words may also probably mean that the evidence taken before a Magistrate can only be used at the trial subject to the procedure laid down in the Evidence Act—*K. E. v. Jehal Teli*, 3 Pat. 781 (788-790), 6 P.L.T. 53, 26 Cr.L.J. 270; *Bahadur v. Emp.*, 19 S.L.R. 71, 26 Cr.L.J. 1063.

The words 'for all purposes subject to the provisions of the Evidence Act' do not mean that the evidence given before the committing Magistrate can be used in the Court of Session only for the purpose of corroboration and contradiction in accordance with sections 155 and 157 of the Evidence Act. Such evidence may be acted upon by the Sessions Court precisely as if that evidence has been deposed to before the Sessions Judge. The words merely mean that the law of evidence enacted in the Evidence Act must be complied with. For instance, evidence which had been wrongly admitted by the committing Magistrate, in violation of the provisions of the Evidence Act, cannot be transferred to the file of the Sessions Judge and used at the trial. The amendment is obviously introduced for the purpose of removing any doubts as to the right of the Court to treat the evidence given before the committing Magistrate as *sustantive evidence* in the trial, when such evidence has in the discretion of the trial Court been properly brought on that Court's record—*Amir Zaman v Crown*, 11 Lah 199, 26 P L R. 361, 26 Cr.L.J. 1245; *Abdul Gani v Emp.*, 53 Cal 181, 42 C L J 205, 26 Cr.L.J 1577; *Emp. v Basappa*, 27 Bom L R. 113, 26 Cr L J 705, *Behari v. Emp.*, 49 All 251, 27 Cr.L J 1365 (1367). The words "subject Evidence Act" mean nothing more than that such statements should not contain matters which would be irrelevant or inadmissible under the Evidence Act—*Behari v. Emp.*, *supra*

900. Practice and procedure :—The counsel for the prisoner is not entitled to refer to the deposition for the purpose of contradicting the witness without having drawn the attention of the witness to the alleged contradiction in his deposition, and without having given him an opportunity of explaining it—*Emp. v. Zawar*, 31 Cal. 142, *Lachmi Lal v. K. E.*, 3 P.L.T. 398, 23 Cr.L.J. 218, A I.R 1922 Pat. 40. Before a Judge can use as evidence the deposition given before the Magistrate, he is bound to let his intention, or the possibility that he may do so, be known to the accused and to the prosecution, in order to afford the accused and the prosecution an opportunity for testing such statement by cross-examination or otherwise dealing with such statement as part of the case which may be taken into consideration by the Judge. Otherwise it is impossible for the prosecution or the defence to deal with the matters which may influence the Judge's mind in coming to a decision—*Emp. v Behari*, 1886 A.W.N. 256; *Musa v Emp.*, 30 Cr L J 333 (Nag.).

It is improper for the Judge trying a case to take a witness's deposition bodily from the committing Magistrate's record, and to treat it as evidence before the Court itself—*Q E v Dan Sahai*, 7 All 862, *Q E v Jochi*, 21 All. 111. The Judge is bound to put to the witnesses, whom he proposes to contradict by their previous statements, the whole or such portion of their depositions as he intends to rely upon, so as to afford them an opportunity of explaining their meaning or denying that they had made any such statements and so forth—*Q E v Dan Sahai* 7 All 862; *Sadar Din v Emp.*, 10 Lah L.J. 460, 29 Cr L J 1047 (1048)

When a counsel or pleader cross-examines a witness with reference to a previous deposition, the parts thereof to which the cross-examination

viction unless it is shown by other corroborative evidence that the evidence given before the committing Magistrate should be preferred to and substituted for the evidence given at the trial—*K. E. v. Jehal Teli*, 3 Pat. 781 (794), 6 P L T 53, 26 Cr.L.J. 270; *Q. E. v. Jadub Das*, 27 Cal. 295. Where a witness was not examined in the Sessions Court with regard to the particular statements made by him before the committing Magistrate and he did not repeat those statements before the Sessions Court, it was held that the Sessions Judge could not properly admit such statements in evidence under this section, as they were not corroborated—*Bajrangi v Emp.*, 4 C.W.N. 49. A conviction cannot be based upon statements of witnesses made before the committing Magistrate, when they afterwards came forward before the Sessions Judge and gave only circumstantial evidence insufficient to connect the accused with the commission of the crime—*Ghanwara v. Crown*, 1915 P.W.R. 15, 16 Cr.L.J. 612.

A Sessions Judge does not show a proper discretion in allowing a statement made before the committing Magistrate by a witness to be used as evidence under this section, when the witness repudiates it at the Sessions and attributes it to improper influence in the course of the investigation, and when the circumstances are such that the Judge cannot rely on it—*K. E. v. Bhut Nath*, 7 C.W.N. 345. Where a witness, who in the Sessions trial resiles from his deposition given before the Magistrate, states that the latter deposition was made under the influence of the Police, the Judge should exercise a proper discretion in making some inquiry by examining the Inspector of Police regarding the restraint and pressure put upon the witness, before admitting such statement as evidence—*Bajrangi v Emp.*, 4 C.W.N. 49.

899. "Subject to the provisions of the Evidence Act" :—These words do not mean that evidence duly taken before a Magistrate can only be utilized at a trial in a case where the Evidence Act specifically authorises its use. Such a construction is erroneous, because there are only certain sections in the Evidence Act (secs. 32, 33, 145, 155, 157) which can in any way be regarded as even remotely dealing with this subject, but none have any direct-bearing. There is indeed in the Evidence Act nothing at all which permits or specifically provides for the use of evidence taken before a Magistrate as evidence at a trial. What is really meant by the words is that evidence duly taken before a Magistrate can be used for all purposes in a trial Court so long as the evidence is evidence within the meaning of the Evidence Act, i.e., if the matter contained therein is, according to the rules laid down in the Evidence Act of evidential value. For instance, hearsay evidence taken before a Magistrate would not be capable of being utilized by a Sessions Judge as of evidential value at the trial. These words may also probably mean that the evidence taken before a Magistrate can only be used at the trial subject to the procedure laid down in the Evidence Act—*K. E. v. Jehal Teli*, 3 Pat. 781 (789-790), ■ P L T. 53, 20 Cr.L.J. 270; *Bahadur v Emp.*, 19 S L R. 71, 26 Cr.L.J. 1063.

The words 'for all purposes subject to the provisions of the Evidence Act' do not mean that the evidence given before the committing Magistrate can be used in the Court of Session only for the purpose of corroboration and contradiction in accordance with sections 155 and 157 of the Evidence Act. Such evidence may be acted upon by the Sessions Court precisely as if that evidence has been deposed to before the Sessions Judge. The words merely mean that the law of evidence enacted in the Evidence Act must be complied with. For instance, evidence which had been wrongly admitted by the committing Magistrate, in violation of the provisions of the Evidence Act, cannot be transferred to the file of the Sessions Judge and used at the trial. The amendment is obviously introduced for the purpose of removing any doubts as to the right of the Court to treat the evidence given before the committing Magistrate as *sustantive evidence* in the trial, when such evidence has in the discretion of the trial Court been properly brought on that Court's record—*Amir Zaman v. Crown*, 5 Lah 199, 26 P.L.R. 361, 26 Cr.L.J. 1245; *Abdul Ganu v. Emp.*, 53 Cal 181, 42 C.L.J. 205, 26 Cr.L.J. 1577; *Emp. v. Basappa*, 27 Bom L.R. 113, 26 Cr.L.J. 705, *Behari v. Emp.*, 49 All. 251, 27 Cr.L.J. 1365 (1367). The words "subject Evidence Act" mean nothing more than that such statements should not contain matters which would be irrelevant or inadmissible under the Evidence Act—*Behari v. Emp.*, *supra*

900. Practice and procedure—The counsel for the prisoner is not entitled to refer to the deposition for the purpose of contradicting the witness without having drawn the attention of the witness to the alleged contradiction in his deposition, and without having given him an opportunity of explaining it—*Emp. v. Zawar*, 31 Cal 142; *Lachmi Lal v. K. E.*, 3 P.L.T. 398, 23 Cr.L.J. 218, A.I.R. 1922 Pat. 40. Before a Judge can use as evidence the deposition given before the Magistrate, he is bound to let his intention, or the possibility that he may do so, be known to the accused and to the prosecution, in order to afford the accused and the prosecution an opportunity for testing such statement by cross-examination or otherwise dealing with such statement as part of the case which may be taken into consideration by the Judge. Otherwise it is impossible for the prosecution or the defence to deal with the matters which may influence the Judge's mind in coming to a decision—*Emp. v. Behari*, 1886 A.W.N. 256, *Musa v. Emp.*, 30 Cr.L.J. 333 (Nag.).

It is improper for the Judge trying a case to take a witness's deposition bodily from the committing Magistrate's record, and to treat it as evidence before the Court itself—*Q. E. v. Dan Sahai*, 7 All 862, *Q. E. v. Jeochi*, 21 All. 111. The Judge is bound to put to the witnesses, whom he proposes to contradict by their previous statements, the whole or such portion of their depositions as he intends to rely upon, so as to afford them an opportunity of explaining their meaning or denying that they had made any such statements and so forth—*Q. E. v. Dan Sahai*, 7 All. 862; *Sadar Din v. Emp.*, 10 Lah L.J. 460, 29 Cr.L.J. 1047 (1048).

When a counsel or pleader cross-examines a witness with reference to a previous deposition, the parts thereof to which the cross-examination

is directed should be set out in the Judge's minute of the proceedings; the depositions must also be numbered and translated in the minute of the proceedings—*Q. E. v. Govardhan, Ratanlal* 343

Power of High Court :—Where, in an appeal, the High Court was of opinion that the statements made before the committing Magistrate by certain witnesses who were also examined before the Sessions Judge, should have been brought upon the record by the exercise of the powers conferred by section 288, it directed the Sessions Judge to take proceedings for the purpose, after giving notice to the accused persons that it was proposed to use those statements against them—*Nagina v. Emp.*, 19 A.L.J. 947, 27 Cr.L.J. 813, 95 I.C. 477.

289. (1) When the examination of the witnesses for the prosecution and the examination (if any) of the accused are concluded, the accused shall be asked whether he means to adduce evidence.

Procedure after examination of witnesses for prosecution

(2) If he says that he does not, the prosecutor may sum up his case; and if the Court considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence, it may then, in a case tried with the aid of assessors, record a finding, or in a case tried by a jury, direct the jury to return a verdict, of not guilty.

(3) If the accused, or any one of several accused, says that he means to adduce evidence and the Court considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence, the Court may then, in a case tried with the aid of assessors, record a finding, or in a case tried by a jury, direct the jury to return a verdict, of not guilty.

(4) If the accused, or any one of several accused, says that he means to adduce evidence, and the Court considers that there is evidence that he committed the offence, or if, on his saying that he does not mean to adduce evidence, the prosecutor sums up his case and the Court considers that there is evidence that the accused committed the offence, the Court shall call on the accused to enter on his defence.

901. Examination of the accused :—The words "if any" in this section show that although under sec 342 it is imperative on the Judge to examine the accused, still the examination may be dispensed with

in some cases, *e.g.* where the accused has admitted his guilt and had been examined by the committing Magistrate—*Khudiram Bose v. Emp.*, 9 C.L.J. 55, 3 I.C. 625.

Sum up :—The prosecution has a right to sum up under sub-section (2) when all the accused say that they do not mean to adduce evidence—*Q. E. v. Sadanand*, 11 Bom. 364.

902. 'No evidence' :—Sub-section (2) or (3) applies only where there is no evidence, and would not cover cases where the Court considers that the charge is itself improper—*Dwarka Lal v. Mahadeo*, 12 All. 551.

When there is no evidence, the jury should be directed to find a verdict of not guilty; and it is wrong to leave it to the jury to say whether the accused is guilty or not guilty—*Q. v. Greedhary*, 7 W.R. 39. When there is no evidence which can, if believed, amount to proof, the case should not be put to the jury at all, as a verdict of guilty, if the jury returns such a verdict, cannot under such circumstances be sustained—*Q. v. Rutton Das*, 16 W.R. 19.

The words 'no evidence' do not mean "no satisfactory, trustworthy or conclusive evidence." If the Court is satisfied that there is not upon the record any evidence which, even if it were perfectly true, would amount to legal proof of the offence charged against the accused, then the Court has power, without consulting the assessors, to record a finding of not guilty, but the Sessions Judge has no such power merely because he considers the evidence *untrustworthy*, or *unsatisfactory* or *inconclusive*. It is not the intention of the Legislature that the assessors or the jury should give their opinion or verdict in those cases only where the Judge is inclined to believe the evidence for the prosecution—*Q. E. v. Munna Lal*, 10 All. 414; *Q. E. v. Vajram*, 16 Bom. 414. A court can acquit the accused under sec. 289 only in a case in which there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence. So, if there is any direct evidence which, if believed, would establish the offence, the accused must be called upon to enter upon his defence, and the trial should be completely gone through, even though the Sessions Judge himself did not believe the evidence—*Pub Pro v. Nalli Goundan*, 2 Weir 382. The case can be withdrawn from the jury only on the ground that there is no evidence at all, and not on the ground that the Judge disbelieved the evidence for the prosecution on the strength of the medical evidence—*Hurroo Shaha*, 10 W.R. 20.

The accused must be acquitted under this section if there is no evidence on the prosecution side and he cannot be convicted on the evidence given against him by the witnesses called by the co-accused in his defence—*In re Raghova*, 5 M.L.T. 75, 10 Cr.L.J. 68.

When a judgment of acquittal is recorded under this section, the opinions of the assessors need not be recorded—*Reg v. Parvati*, 7 B.H.C.R. 82.

Finding of "not proven" :—The Code does not provide for a finding of "not proven." The proper course is to record a finding of "not guilty"—*Koradi Gummanna*, 11 Weir 391.

903. Defence :—A criminal case ought not to be adjudged on mere probabilities. The burden of proof is always on the Crown and not to any extent on the accused; and unless the evidence is of such a nature as to enable the Court to judge rather than conjecture, the accused should not be called upon to make his defence—*Q. E. v. Ganesh, Ratanlal 712*; *Q. E. v. Narayan, Ratanlal 719*

It is not a mere formality, but an essential part of the criminal trial, to call upon the accused to enter on his defence; and omission to do so is not a mere irregularity curable by Sec. 537—*Q. E. v. Imam Ali, 23 Cal. 252*. In *Premgir v. Emp.*, 16 A.L.J. 41, 19 Cr.L.J. 209, 43 I C 785, however, the omission to call upon the accused to enter on his defence was held to be a mere irregularity cured by Sec. 537, unless the accused was prejudiced thereby.

The accused shall be called upon to adduce evidence after the prosecution witnesses are examined, for it is only when sufficient evidence has been produced that he can be called on to enter upon his defence. It is extremely irregular to examine the defence witnesses before the close of the prosecution evidence; but the conviction will not be set aside if this irregularity has not prejudiced the accused—*In re Taribulloh*, 4 C.L.R. 338.

If the accused has not his witnesses present, the Judge may postpone the case—*In re Koli Prosunno*, 23 W.R. 58.

290. The accused or his pleader may then open his case, stating the facts or law on which he intends to rely, and making such comments as he thinks necessary on the evidence for the prosecution. He may then examine his witnesses (if any) and after their cross-examination and re-examination (if any) may sum up his case.

904. Examination of defence witnesses :—The accused is at liberty to meet the case in any way he likes. He can, as to the whole or any part of the case against him, rely on the witnesses for the prosecution, or may call fresh evidence himself. No adverse inference will be drawn against him, if he does not produce or examine any witnesses—*Emp. v. Dhunno*, 8 Cal. 121; *Hurry Churn v. Emp.*, 10 Cal. 140; *Ashraf Ali v. K. E.*, 21 C.W.N. 1152 (per Huda J.). But where a *prima facie* case of circumstances making out or tending to support the charge against the accused is established, and he withholds evidence in disproof or explanation available to him and not accessible to the prosecution, an inference unfavourable to the accused may legitimately be drawn—*Ashraf Ali v. K. E.*, 21 C.W.N. 1152 (per Teunon J.).

When the accused are being tried separately, each would be a competent witness at the trial of the other—*Emp. v. Durant*, 23 Bom 213; *v. Puna*, 16 Bom. 661.

The burden lies on the prosecution to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the offence was committed by the accused. If the prosecution cannot prove the guilt of the accused beyond all doubt, the accused is under no obligation to explain how the offence was committed or who committed the offence or by what means—*Q E v Jethmal*, Ratanlal 686. When there is no *prima facie* evidence sufficient to convict the accused, he is not under any obligation to explain to the Court his movements at the time of the offence—*Q E v Bepin*, 10 Cal. 970.

The record is not complete unless it shows the nature of the defence set up. If the accused makes any statement, it must be recorded. If he makes no statement or refuses to answer when called upon to enter upon his defence, a note should be made accordingly, and when there is nothing to show the nature of the defence, a note of the address to the Court (if any) should be recorded—*In re Gopal Hajaga*, 15 W.R. 16.

905. Cross-examination.—An accused person must be allowed to cross-examine the witnesses called by another co-accused for his defence, if the case of the latter is adverse to that of the former—*Ram Chand v Hanif*, 21 Cal. 491. But the accused cannot cross-examine his own witnesses. Thus, where a prosecution witness was examined before the committing Magistrate but was not called in the Sessions Court, and thereupon the counsel for the defence examined him, he would be treated as a witness for the defence, and the defence counsel was not entitled to cross-examine him, unless it appeared that the witness was suppressing the truth or was lying or refusing to give information—*Q E. v. Zawar Husen*, 20 All. 155.

291. The accused shall be allowed to examine any witness not previously named by him, if such witness is in attendance; but he shall not, except as provided in sections 211 and 231, be entitled of right to have any witness summoned, other than the witnesses named in the list delivered to the Magistrate by whom he was committed for trial.

Right of accused as to examination and summoning of witnesses.

906. Summoning witnesses :—The accused is entitled as a matter of right to secure the attendance of all witnesses named in the list delivered to the Magistrate—*Q v. Bhoolun*, 11 W.R. 6; *Q. v. Islam*, 15 W.R. 34; *Q. v. Prosunno*, 23 W.R. 56; and a conviction without summoning and examining the defence witnesses is liable to be set aside—*Q. v. Mookun*, 12 W.R. 22; *Fazuddin v. K. E.*, 47 Cal. 753.

If some of the witnesses whose names have been entered in the list given to the committing Magistrate (under sec. 211) fail to appear in the Sessions Court, the Judge ought to summon them, and he cannot refuse to do so on the ground that the application for summons has been made at a late stage of the trial (*viz.* at a time when the examination of the

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If some of the witnesses whose names have been entered in the list given to the committing Magistrate (under sec. 211) fail to appear in the Sessions Court, the Judge ought to summon them, and he cannot refuse to do so on the ground that the application for summons has been made at a late stage of the trial (*viz.* at a time when the examination of the

other defence witnesses has been ended and the case is ready for arguments)—*Faizuddin v. K. E.*, 47 Cal. 758, 24 C.W.N. 527, 21 Cr.L.J. 842

The accused person cannot however require the Sessions Judge, as of right, to summon and examine witnesses *other than those named in the list*—*Q. v. Boidnath*, 3 W.R. 29. And the Judge's refusal to grant an adjournment to summon a witness not named in the list is not illegal—*Nazir Singh v. Emp.*, 7 Lah.L.J. 428, 26 P.L.R. 767. But the Sessions Judge has an inherent power, if he thinks proper to exercise it, to summon those witnesses—*In re Raja of Kantil*, 8 All. 668.

A Sessions Judge should not refuse to enforce the attendance of certain witnesses for the defence, on the ground that there is ample evidence on the record about the matter; it is for the accused person and not for the Judge to say what amount of evidence it would be proper to place before the jury in order to establish the case for the defence—*Brojendra v. K. E.*, 7 C.W.N. 188.

Prosecutor's right of reply. **292.** *The prosecutor shall be entitled to reply—*

- (a) *if the accused or any of the accused adduces any oral evidence; or*
- (b) *with the permission of the Court, on a point of law; or*
- (c) *with the permission of the Court, when any document which does not need to be proved is produced by any accused person after he enters on his defence;*

Provided that in the case referred to in clause (c) the reply shall, unless the Court otherwise permits, be restricted to comment on the document so produced.

Change :—This section has been redrafted by section 79 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. Prior to this amendment, the section stood as follows :—

"292. If the accused or any of the accused adduces any evidence, the prosecutor shall be entitled to reply."

Clauses (a) and (b) have been drafted by the Joint Committee (1922) and clause (c) has been added during the debate in the Assembly on the motion of Mr. Srinivasa Rao. See the *Legislative Assembly Debates*, February 7, 1923, page 2011.

907. Object and scope of section :—The object of the law in this section is to let each side have an opportunity of commenting on the evidence of the other, and not to give an additional advantage to the prosecution. Therefore, where the defence counsel first said that he meant to adduce evidence, but afterwards informed the Court that he did

not mean to call evidence, the Judge should not allow the right of reply—*Hurry Churn v. Emp.*, 10 Cal. 140. This section makes the right of reply dependent upon the fact of evidence having been *actually* adduced—*Emp v Bhaskar*, 30 Bom. 421; *Emp. v Abdul Ali*, 11 Bom L.R. 177, 11 Cr.L.J. 284. Under the Code of 1882, the prosecutor had a right of reply, if the accused "stated that he meant to adduce evidence," whether he did or did not actually adduce evidence

908. What amounts to adducing evidence.—The putting in of the depositions of certain prosecution witnesses made before the committing Magistrate and of the statements of the accused made under sec. 162 to a Police constable, forming part of the record sent up by the Magistrate, cannot be said to be adducing evidence by the accused within the meaning of this section. The tender of them as evidence by the accused is merely an application to the Judge for the exercise of the discretion vested in him by sec 288—*Emp v Stewart*, 31 Cal 1050.

The prosecution shall be entitled to reply if the documentary evidence for the defence is adduced *after* the case for the prosecution is closed—*Emp. v Sreenath*, 43 Cal. 426, 17 Cr.L.J. 423. See clause (c) of the section. Therefore, where during the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses and *before entering upon his defence*, the accused puts in some documentary evidence, it does not give a right of reply to the Crown, because so long as the case is in the hands of the prosecution, the putting in of documents cannot be said to take the prosecution by surprise, and this is the correct test for determining whether the prosecution should have the right of reply—*Emp. v Timol*, 10 C.W.N. cclxvii; *Emp v. Kaliprosanna*, 14 Cal 245, *Q. E. v Solomon*, 17 Cal. 930; *Emp. v. Sreenath*, 43 Cal 426, *Q v Greesh*, 10 Cal 1024; *Q E v. Krishnaji*, 14 Bom 436, *K. E v Berch*, 7 L.B.R. 84, 15 Cr.L.J. 241. [*Contra*—*Q E v Hayfield*, 14 All 212, *Q E. v Venkatapathi*, 11 Mad. 339; *Q E v Moss*, 16 All. 88, *Emp v. Bhaskar*, 30 Bom. 421; *K. E. v. Manuel*, 4 L B R 5 and *Crown v Bhuro*, 1 S L.R. 91; in these cases it has been held that the prosecution is entitled to a right of reply even if any documentary evidence is put in by the defence *before* the close of the evidence for the prosecution (e.g. If any document is produced by the defence during the cross-examination of a prosecution witness). This view is no longer correct by reason of clause (c) newly added in the section.]

If, while the case for the prosecution is going on, the defence in his cross-examination utilises a witness for the prosecution to his own advantage or puts in a lot of documentary matter through such witness, it cannot deprive him of his right to the last word, because it does not amount to adducing evidence for the defence—*Emp. v. Abdul Ali*, 11 Bom.L R. 177, 11 Cr L.J. 284

909. Reply.—Reply means reply generally to the whole case. Even if one of the accused calls witnesses, and the others do not, the prosecution is entitled to reply not merely on the evidence adduced by one of the accused, but generally on the whole case. It is not the intention of this section that the prosecution is to sum up as to such of the accused

as do not call evidence, and to reply only on the evidence adduced by the others—*Q. E. v. Sadanand*, 18 Bom. 364.

293. (1) Whenever the Court thinks that the jury or assessors should view the place in which the offence charged is alleged to have been committed, or any other place in which any other transaction material to the trial is alleged to have occurred, the Court shall make an order to that effect, and the jury or assessors shall be conducted in a body, under the care of an officer of the Court, to such place which shall be shown to them by a person appointed by the Court.

(2) Such officer shall not, except with the permission of the Court, suffer any other person to speak to, or hold any communication with, any of the jury or assessors, and unless the Court otherwise directs, they shall, when the view is finished, be immediately conducted back into Court.

This section speaks of the view of the *locus in quo* by jurors and assessors, whereas section 539B relates to the view of the place by Judges and Magistrates.

Examination of witness, not permitted.—The assessors can only view the scene of the alleged offence, and cannot examine any witnesses on the spot; because by sub-section (2) the officer conducting the jurors or assessors to the spot cannot suffer any other person to speak to them—*Q. v. Chutterdharee*, 5 W R 59

294. If a juror or assessor is personally acquainted with any relevant fact, it is his duty to inform the Judge that such is the case, whereupon he may be sworn, examined, cross-examined and re-examined in the same manner as any other witness.

295. If a trial is adjourned, the jury or assessors shall attend at the adjourned sitting, and at every subsequent sitting, until the conclusion of the trial.

910. When trial should be adjourned :—A Judge is bound to adjourn a case in which a witness summoned for the defence is absent, especially if he is a material witness and the case cannot be satisfactorily decided in his absence—*Q. v. Ishan*, 15 W.R. 34; *Q. v. Rajnarain*, 18 W R 20; *In re Kali Prasanna*, 23 W.R. 58. But under such circum-

stances the Judge will not be justified in discharging the jury in the midst of a trial and adjourn the case to the next Sessions—*In re Putansamy*, 4 Bom.L.R. 939

296. The High Court may, from time to time, make rules as to keeping the jury together during a trial before such Court lasting for more than one day; and subject to such rules the presiding Judge may order whether and in what manner the jurors shall be kept together under the charge of an officer of the Court, or whether they shall be allowed to return to their respective homes.

In every case involving the punishment of death or of transportation for life in which the trial lasts for more than one day, the jury should be kept together during the trial by the Sheriff or Deputy Sheriff or such other officer as the presiding Judge may appoint for that purpose; and in every other case in which the trial shall last for more than one day, it shall be in the discretion of the presiding Judge whether the jury shall be kept together in manner aforesaid or shall be allowed to return to their respective homes—*Bombay Gazette*, 1875, Part I, p 653 .

F.—Conclusion of Trial in Cases tried by Jury.

297. In cases tried by jury, when the case for the defence and the prosecutor's reply (if any) are concluded, the Court shall proceed to charge the jury, summing up the evidence for the prosecution and defence, and laying down the law by which the jury are to be guided.

911. "When the case are concluded" :—This section specially enacts that the Judge shall only charge the jury when the case for the defence and the prosecutor's reply are concluded, i.e. after all the evidence has been taken on both sides, and the counsel of both parties have finished addressing the jury. A Judge who charges the jury and takes verdict as regards some only of the accused, and afterwards hears arguments and takes verdict as regards the remaining accused, will be acting irregularly and contrary to the provisions of this section—*Abdul Hameed*, 36 Mad 585, 15 Cr.L.J. 197. After the witnesses for the prosecution and a certain number of witnesses for the defence had been examined, the foreman of the jury asked if the defence could not cut down the number of witnesses they had summoned; the defence thereupon agreed to dispense with all further witnesses save one. The Judge taking the foreman's intervention as an indication that the jury had decided to acquit, proceeded to charge the jury upon the case as it stood. The jury however found the accused guilty, whereupon the Judge ordered

of summing up the case is to present the jury, as materially and impartially as he can, a summary of the evidence and the considerations and inferences to be drawn from the evidence, and as they appear both on the negative and the affirmative sides of the case—*Enayet Hussain v. Emp.*, 49 All 209, 28 Cr.L.J. 15. The jurors ordinarily are not men who are used to weighing the evidence and it is therefore necessary that all help should be given to them in the light of the observations made by eminent Judges in the decided cases—*Abdul Gani v. K. E.*, 53 Cal. 181, 42 C.L.J. 205. Where the Judge did not sum up the evidence at all but simply charged the jury with these words—"It is for you to say from the evidence you have heard whether you consider the accused guilty or not," it was held that the charge was wholly insufficient, and a retrial was ordered in the case—*Emp. v. Badal*, 1902 A.W.N. 201. Where the Judge did not sum up the evidence to the jury, but only treated it generally and called it a very poor evidence which standing alone amounted to nothing, it was held that the charge to the jury was defective—*Q. E. v. Gangia*, 23 Bom. 316. But it is not necessary for the Judge, in his charge to the jury, to go into the minutest details in the evidence—*Samaruddin v. Emp.*, 40 Cal. 367, 13 Cr.L.J. 821. It is impossible for the Judge to state every item of the evidence or to draw the attention of the jury to every fact which has been deposed; but he can, without difficulty, give a summary of the leading points of the evidence and the considerations and inferences to be drawn from it on the one side or on the other—*Enayet Hussain v. Emp.*, 49 All. 209, 28 Cr.L.J. 15; *Jati Mali v. Emp.*, 33 C.W.N. 918, 1929 Cr.C. 477.

In summing up the case, the Judge must analyse the evidence and place before the jury all facts which legitimately arise in favour of the accused—*Emp. v. Rajab Ali*, 31 C.W.N. 881, 28 Cr.L.J. 742 (744); *Emp. v. Mira*, 6 Bom.L.R. 31; and this he must do, even though the pleader for the accused thought it unnecessary to place much reliance on the defence of the accused—*In re Sangam*, 17 Cr.L.J. 19 (Mad.). Where the charge to the jury was entirely one-sided, and the jury were practically told that there was no doubt as to the facts of the case and that there was no use of considering the matter from any point of view other than that presented by the prosecution, held that the charge was entirely defective, and there must be a retrial—*Emp. v. Rajab Ali*, supra; *Tajali Mian v. Emp.*, 7 Pat. 50, 28 Cr.L.J. 843 (846). The Judge is entitled to have regard to the elaboration and skill with which the rival contentions have been placed before the jury by the advocates on both sides, but he cannot omit any matters of prime importance, especially if they favour the accused, merely because they have been elaborately discussed by the advocate—*Emp. v. Maigowda*, 27 Bom. 644; *Emp. v. Munhuwasayo*, 3 S.L.R. 102, 11 Cr.L.J. 13; *Emp. v. Fakira*, 40 Bom. 220. So also, he cannot omit to draw the attention of the jury to what appears to be a possible answer to the charge against the accused, notwithstanding that it has escaped the counsel of the accused—*K. E. v. Upendra*, 19 C.W.N. 653 (F.B.), 16 Cr.L.J. 561. Omission to put the material facts or to put the defence to the jury is sufficient to cause the High Court to quash

the conviction if this Court comes to the conclusion that the verdict of the jury was affected thereby—*K. E. v. Barendra*, 28 C.W.N. 170 (109); *R v Hill*, (1911) 7 Cr App Rep. 26; *R. v. Wilson*, (1913) 9 Cr. App. Rep. 124; *R. v. Smith*, (1920) 81 J.P. 67. But where the Judge made a reference to the statement made by the accused, the mere omission to draw the attention of the jury to the defence of the accused is not a misdirection and does not vitiate the trial—*K. E. v. Barendra Kumar Ghose*, 28 C.W.N. 170, 38 C.L.J. 411 (*Sankarilola Postmaster Murder Case*). The Judge is to put everything in favour of the accused before the jury, but he is not bound to do anything more. It is not his business to assume the part of the defence counsel. It is his duty to place the evidence before the jury as he finds it, and though the inference left to be drawn reasonably is that it would be unsafe to accept this evidence, it is certainly open to the jury to believe what the witness said, and to accept it if they choose to do so. In such a case it cannot be said that there was any misdirection—*Samiuddin v. Emp.*, 32 C.W.N. 616 (619), 29 Cr.L.J. 497.

If there are material discrepancies in the evidence, the Judge should point out to the jury where those discrepancies are. Merely telling the jury that there are discrepancies without telling them anything about those discrepancies, is a misdirection—*Enayet Hussain v. Emp.*, 49 All. 209, 28 Cr.L.J. 15.

The Judge must be careful not to usurp the functions of the advocate, and should present the evidence of the case to the jury in a dispassionate and impartial manner without expressing any opinion on the reliability of the evidence on either side—*K. E. v. Taribullah*, 25 C.W.N. 682, 23 Cr.L.J. 244.

In cases of very serious offences, and where the evidence is merely circumstantial, the evidence should be read over in *extenso* to the jury (and not merely summed up)—*Reg. v. Fateh Chand*, 5 B.H.C.R. 85. Where the trial has been a prolonged one, the Judge ought to read over to the jury in *extenso* the important testimonies in the trial—*Q. E. v. Fakira, Ratanlal* 850. But an omission to read out the material portions of the evidence is not in itself sufficient for the reversal of the verdict of the jury. In each case it must be a question whether such omission was such as to mislead the jury, and the Appellate Court will not interfere unless it has prejudiced the accused—*Emp. v. Appunna*, 5 Bom.L.R. 207.

The law does not expressly require a Judge to formulate, at the conclusion of the delivery of his charge, specific questions for the jurors' reply. Such a practice is however helpful in deciding the legal effect of the Judge's finding, but the formulation of such questions requires great care, and the queries should be confined within the narrowest possible compass—*Rupan Singh v. K. E.*, 4 Pat 626, 27 Cr.L.J. 49.

§14. "Laying down the law":—It is the duty of the Judge to give a direction upon the law to the jury so far as to make them understand the law as bearing upon the facts, and to enable them to decide

915. Misdirection to jury :—Examples :—(1) Omission to give the jury a sufficient explanation of the law so as to enable them to decide the point at issue is a misdirection—*Emp. v. Jhubboo*, 8 Cal. 739; *Biru v. Q. E.*, 25 Cal. 561, *Sugaligadu*, 2 Weir 500; *In re Palavesa Tevan*, 12 Cr.L.J. 140, 9 M.L.T. 345; *Abbas v. Q. E.*, 25 Cal. 736. Thus, where in a dacoity case, the Judge stated to the jury: "Dacoity is committed when any number of persons not less than five conjointly commit robbery" but did not explain to the jury what was necessary to constitute the offence of robbery, it was an omission to lay down the law, and amounted to a misdirection—*Mari Valayan v. Emp.*, 30 Mad. 44; *Nawab Ali v. K. E.*, 11 O.L.J. 315, 25 Cr.L.J. 1129. So also, omission to explain to the jury the difference between murder and culpable homicide, or to tell them under what view of the facts the accused ought to be convicted of murder or culpable homicide or to be acquitted, is a misdirection—*Hla Gyi v. K. E.*, 3 L.B.R. 75. Where the act of the accused was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death and thus came within the definition of murder (punishable under sec. 302 I. P. C.) and the Judge himself described the act to the jury as "imminently dangerous" but said that the offence was punishable under section 304 I. P. C. (culpable homicide not amounting to murder), held that there was a misdirection in not explaining to the jury as to how the act which he himself described as "imminently dangerous" was rendered punishable under section 304 I. P. C.—*Muhammad Yunus v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 318 (324). In a case of criminal breach of trust, the Judge should tell the jury that the test they are to apply is whether the circumstances relied upon by the accused showed an intention of causing "wrongful gain" or "wrongful loss," and the Judge should also explain the meaning of these terms. Omission to do so amounts to a misdirection—*Browne v. K. E.*, 7 Bur. L.T. 20. It is a misdirection not to adequately explain to the jury the law in regard to abetment—*Hemanta Kumar v. Emp.*, 47 Cal. 46; or the law in regard to onus of proof—*Abdul Gohar v. K. E.*, 26 C.W.N. 972, 36 C.L.J. 152, 24 Cr.L.J. 76.

(2) Failure to call the attention of the jury to the different elements constituting the offence is a misdirection—*Taju Pramanik v. K. E.*, 25 Cal. 711. Thus, where in a case of murder, the Judge simply asked the jury to find whether the prisoner inflicted the injuries on the deceased, it was held to be a misdirection; the jury ought to have been asked to find as to the intention of the accused to cause death or the knowledge that he was likely to cause death—*Q. E. v. Babya*, 1 Bom. L.R. 784; *Natabar v. Emp.*, 35 Cal. 531. Similarly, where in a case under secs. 474 and 475 I. P. C., the Judge told the jury that the only issue which they had to decide was whether the forged documents were in the possession of the accused, ignoring altogether the question of knowledge combined with intention which is so absolutely requisite to justify a conviction under sec. 474 I. P. C., it was held that the Judge had misdirected the jury—*Q. E. v. Abaji*, 16 Bom. 165. Where in a case of retaining stolen property, the Judge directed the jury to decide whether the property was stolen and whether it was retained by the accused, without

asking them to decide whether the accused *knew* or had reason to believe the property to be stolen, it was held that this amounted to a misdirection—*Q. E. v. Baiya*, 15 Bom. 369. So also, in a case of receiving property stolen in the commission of a dacoity (sec. 412 I. P. C.) the Judge directed the jury to the effect that if they found that the properties were properly identified as having been the properties stolen at the time of the dacoity, and were found in the accused's possession, they were bound to presume the accused's guilt, but the jury were not properly directed that it was their duty to weigh all the circumstances of the case and consider the accused's explanation and then decide whether or not they should make such a presumption; *held* that this was a serious misdirection—*Satya Charan v Emp*, 52 Cal 223, 26 Cr L.J. 1155.

(3) Failure to point out to the jury as to the relevancy or otherwise of a confession made under inducement, and merely telling the jury that if the confession was true it was enough to warrant the conviction of the accused, is a misdirection—*Thandraya v Emp*, 26 Mad. 38. See notes under sec 298.

(4) Omission to explain to the jury the attitude to be taken towards a retracted confession as evidence against a co-accused, is a misdirection—*Hemanta v Emp*, 47 Cal 46. Where the Sessions Judge directed the jury that the retracted confession of a co-accused is practically of no value against any body but the confessor, but asked the jury to take into consideration the confession while considering the cases of the other two co-accused individually, *held* that this was a misdirection, as it was likely to prejudice the jury and lead them to give some weight to such statements when they should have disregarded them altogether—*In re Ibrahim*, 42 C L.J. 496, 26 Cr.L.J. 1146.

It is a misdirection to tell the jury that the retracted confessions are not to be held true unless they are corroborated by independent reliable evidence, because there is no rule of law that a retracted confession must be supported by independent reliable evidence corroborating it in material particulars—*Q. E. v Gangia*, 23 Bom. 316 (Contra—*Q. E. v. Mahabir*, 18 All 78; *Azimuddy v Emp.*, 31 C W.N. 410, 28 Cr.L.J. 485; *Cholakei*, 2 Weir 507, *Karreti Venkatasami*, 2 Weir 509, and *Sokhan*, 2 Weir 509, where it has been held that if a confession is subsequently retracted and it is not corroborated by independent evidence, the Judge should point out to the jury that it is not safe to rely on the retracted confession unless it is corroborated by independent reliable evidence, and an omission to point this out to the jury amounts to a misdirection). It is also a misdirection to the jury to tell them to leave out of consideration the retracted confessions of the accused—*Papakla*, 8 M.L.T. 372, 8 I.C. 573. The question to be put to the jury regarding such confessions is not whether they are corroborated by independent evidence but whether having regard to the circumstances under which they were made and retracted and all the circumstances connected with them, it was more probable that the original confessions or the statements retracting them

were true. An omission on the part of the Judge to put this question to the jury amounts to a misdirection—*Q. E v Raman*, 21 Mad 83.

Where the Sessions Judge at first dealt with the confession of an accused, and pointed out in clear and unambiguous language that the confession having been retracted could only be used as evidence against that accused alone and that it should not be taken into consideration as against any of the other accused, and then he proceeded to refer to the evidence of an approver and warned the jury to see whether the evidence of the approver was corroborated by the evidence of independent and reliable witnesses, but the Sessions Judge did not repeat the same remark when dealing with the individual cases of the accused, held that there was no misdirection. Having once given a fair summary of the evidence, it was not to be expected that he would go on repeating what he had already said in a previous part of the charge, when he was dealing with the cases of the individual accused—*Ayub Mandal v. Emp.*, 54 Cal. 539, 28 Cr L J. 689 (691).

(5) A Sessions Judge should caution the jury that although it is not illegal to convict the accused upon the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice, still it is not the practice of the Court, nor safe or proper, to convict on such evidence, unless it is corroborated in material particulars. Omission to state this amounts to a misdirection—*Rebati Mohan v. Emp.*, 56 Cal 150, 30 Cr L J 435 (439); *Surya Kanta v. K. E.*, 24 C.W.N 119; *Q. E v. Arumuga* 12 Mad. 196. But another Calcutta case lays down that an uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice is admissible in law, although it has long been the practice for the Judge to warn the jury of the danger of convicting a prisoner on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Therefore, it is not a misdirection to tell the jury that a conviction upon the evidence of the approver alone will not be illegal—*Emp v Jamalul*, 51 Cal. 160 (163) following the judgment of Lord Reading C. J in *R. v. Baskerville*, [1916] 2 K.B. 658 (663); See also *Ledu Molla v. Emp.*, 52 Cal 595, 42 C.L.J. 501, 26 Cr.L J 1037.

(6) Where there are several accused persons, and the case as against all of them does not stand on the same footing, and their defences are different, omission by the Judge to ask the jury to consider the case as against each of the accused individually, is a serious misdirection—*Khijiruddin v Emp.*, 53 Cal 372, 42 C.L.J. 504, 27 Cr L J 266.

(7) When a charge to the jury placed prominently before them all the circumstances that went against the accused, and did not call their attention to any of those that were in favour of the accused, it was held that there was a misdirection sufficient to vitiate the trial—*Rahamat Ali v. Emp.*, 4 C.W.N 196; *Emp. v. Fakira*, 40 Bom 220; *Abdul Gafur v. Emp.*, 21 Cr L J. 670 (Cal.); *Sugahgadu*, 2 Weir 500 (501); *Mammat Ali v. Emp.*, 44 C.L.J 233, 28 Cr.L J 19. Omission to make the jury acquainted with the nature of the case for the prosecution and the nature of the case for the defence is a misdirection—*Afrudai v. K. E.*, 23 C.W.N 523, 20 Cr L J 661. But the fact that every point in favour of the accused has not been put to the jury does not amount to a misdirection.

The charge must be judged as a whole and one must see whether judging it as a whole the case for the two sides has been fairly put, so that the jury can understand what they have to decide and can come to a right conclusion. It is not necessary for the Sessions Judge to repeat everything that has been said by the pleader for the defence in his speech. But he should draw the attention of the jury to the more essential items and the strongest argument that has been advanced for the defence. A mere reference to the argument of the pleader is insufficient—*Haricharan v. Emp.*, 34 C.L.J. 512; *Abdul Salim v. Emp.*, 49 Cal. 573. The fact that the address of the defence counsel to the jury is a lengthy one does not excuse the Judge from pointing out important points of the defence argument to the jury—*Peary v. Emp.*, 20 C.W.N. 436 (F.B.). A verdict obtained from the jury without placing before them an important piece of evidence in favour of the defence, whatever may have been its real worth, cannot be sustained—*Khijiruddin v. Emp.*, 53 Cal. 372, 42 C.L.J. 504, 27 Cr.L.J. 266.

(8) A Judge's direction to the jury to consider the proof of previous conviction as evidence giving rise to an inference regarding the character of the prisoner amounts to a misdirection—*Roshan v. Emp.*, 5 Cal. 768. See section 310. So also, the omission on the part of the Judge to warn the jury not to take the previous conviction into consideration when deciding on the guilt of the accused, amounts to a misdirection—*Harī Charan v. Emp.*, 27 Cr.L.J. 398 (Cal.).

(9) Omission to tell the jury that if they entertain any reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused, the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt and should be acquitted is a serious misdirection—*Panchu Das v. Emp.*, 34 Cal. 698; *Sugahgadu*, 2 Weir 500 (501).

(10) Where the Judge stated in his charge to the jury that there was a mass of oral evidence on behalf of the prosecution as well as for the defence, but that the jury might neglect it all, it was held that this was a misdirection, because it is the duty of the jury to give their verdict upon considering the whole of the evidence—*Emp. v. Mira*, 11 Bom.L.R. 31.

(11) Omission to invite the jury to consider carefully what each of the accused said in his statement with reference to the charges framed against him, is a misdirection—*Hemanta v. Emp.*, 47 Cal. 46.

(12) The Sessions Judge is guilty of misdirection where he has failed to draw pointed attention to the fact that the jury have to rely upon the testimony of an absent witness, and where evidence which ought not to have been allowed to be given has been improperly admitted under sec. 33 of the Evidence Act—*Annari Muthriyan v. Emp.*, 39 Mad. 449, 16 Cr.L.J. 204.

(13) Where in a case of theft, the evidence against the accused was the possession of stolen property 5 years after the occurrence, it was held that the Judge had misdirected the jury by saying: "On this evidence, notwithstanding that it is nearly 5 years since the crime occurred, will decide whether you are satisfied with the prisoner's explanation."

his possession of the stolen property." The proper course would be to tell them to consider whether after 5 years it was reasonable to require the prisoner to prove how he came by the goods or whether his story, not being in itself improbable, ought not to be accepted—*Ruthanvithil*, 2 Weir 489.

(14) Omission to point out to the jury the discrepancies in the evidence of the principal witnesses for the prosecution constitutes a misdirection—*Tenaram v. K. E.*, 33 C.L.J. 180, 22 Cr.L.J. 475; *Emp. v. Durga Charan*, 26 C.W.N. 1002, 23 Cr.L.J. 567. Merely telling the jury that there are material discrepancies in the evidence, without pointing out to them what those discrepancies are, amounts to a misdirection—*Enayet Husain v. Emp.*, 49 All. 209, 28 Cr.L.J. 15.

(15) Where a number of persons who could have given important information were not examined as witnesses for the Crown, the Judge should point out this fact to the jury and direct them that an adverse inference should be drawn against the prosecution. His omission to do so amounts to a misdirection—*Md. Yunus v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 318 (326); *Tenaram v. K. E.*, 33 C.L.J. 180, 22 Cr.L.J. 475; *Emp. v. Dhunno*, 8 Cal. 121; *Tajali v. Emp.*, 7 Pat. 50, 28 Cr.L.J. 843 (844).

(16) Failure on the part of the Court to put clearly before the jury the law relating to the right of private defence arising on the admitted and proved facts and to direct their attention to find as to whether the accused was, and if so, how far, justified in preventing injury to himself in attacking his opponent, is a serious misdirection vitiating the trial—*Aseruddin v. Emp.*, 53 Cal. 980, 28 Cr.L.J. 273. Where the accused raised the plea of private defence, and the case for the prosecution was that there was no right of private defence at all, the Judge should simply tell the jury that the question they had to decide was whether or not the right of private defence came into existence and not how far it extended or whether it was exceeded. Moreover, in dealing with the law as to the right of private defence, there are several important points the omission of which would amount to a serious misdirection. Thus, in a murder case, in which the right of private defence is set up, the Judge in explaining sec. 100 I. P. C. which contains a list of six heads of offences, should point out those heads which would and those which would not apply to the case they were trying; otherwise the jury would naturally disregard those to which their attention was not specially directed by the Judge. Further, in explaining the law as to private defence the Judge should also explain to the jury the provisions of section 101 I. P. C. in a case where there is a charge of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as well as the minor charge of causing grievous hurt. The omission on the part of the Judge to explain these points amounts to a misdirection—*Muhammad Yunus v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 318 (325, 326). On a charge under sec. 304 I. P. C. where the defence of the accused is that the deceased came into his house for robbery at midnight and that the accused inflicted wounds on him which proved fatal, the Judge should expound the law to the jury not only with reference to the right of private defence of person but also with reference to the right of private defence

of property, and should direct the jury to consider whether the accused had not used more force than was necessary for preventing the deceased from running away with the stolen property. Omission to so charge the jury amounts to a misdirection—*Baseruddi v. Emp.*, 28 C.W.N. 585, 39 C.L.J. 525.

(17) The Judge is entitled to tell the jury that when a prisoner is charged with causing hurt to another, the burden of proving that it was done in the exercise of the right of private defence lies on the prisoner—*Afiruddi v. K. E.*, 23 C.W.N. 833, 20 Cr.L.J. 661. But when the accused has examined witnesses to prove the defence (e.g., the right of private defence) set up by him, it is no longer necessary for the Judge to refer to the law relating to burden of proof (because the accused has discharged that burden), the Judge should simply ask the jury to decide the question of fact on the evidence before them. If in such a case the Judge refers to the provisions of section 105 of the Evidence Act, it would mislead the jury and lead them to think that the defence set up by the accused would require a higher standard of proof. This is clearly a misdirection—*Alid Yunus v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 318 (325).

(18) It is a misdirection to suggest to the jury that in capital cases stronger evidence of a higher degree of certainty is required than in other criminal cases—*Leg. Rem. v. Lalit Mohan*, 49 Cal. 167.

(19) Omission to warn the jury to pay no attention to the previous proceedings amounts to a misdirection—*Mir Mowz v. K. E.*, 31 C.L.J. 305, 21 Cr.L.J. 554, 58 I.C. 858.

(20) Where one of the witnesses for the prosecution is himself suspected of being implicated in the offence, the jury should be directed not to accept his evidence without the most careful scrutiny. Omission to give such a direction amounts to a serious misdirection—*Satya Charan v. Emp.*, 52 Cal. 223, 26 Cr.L.J. 1155.

(21) The question as to whether the accused was under 12 years of age and incapable of understanding the nature of his act is one for the jury to decide, notwithstanding no proof may have been adduced on the point; and if the Judge attempts to exclude the consideration of the question from the jury by saying that they should leave that question out of account altogether, it amounts to a misdirection—*Emp. v. Ali Raza*, 28 O.C. 69, 26 Cr.L.J. 310.

(22) Where the witnesses who had made certain statements before the committing Magistrate retracted those statements in the trial, the Sessions Judge ought to tell the jury that the witnesses should be looked upon with suspicion and that their evidence should be regarded with great caution, and the Judge ought to ask the jury to decide for themselves as to which of the two versions is correct. If instead of doing so, the Judge expresses his opinion with a certain degree of assertion to the effect that the statements made before the committing Magistrate are true and that the depositions given before him are false, his charge to the jury is vitiated by misdirection—*Abdul Gani v. K. E.*, 53 Cal. 192, 42 C.L.J. 205, 26 Cr.L.J. 1577.

(23) Where a Judge repeatedly tells the jury that if they are *morally* convinced of the guilt of the accused, their verdict should be that of guilty, it amounts to a misdirection. The jury has to return a verdict of guilty not upon their *moral* belief of a case but upon the *legal* proof of the facts constituting the offence—*Enayet v. Emp.*, 49 All. 209, 28 Cr.L.J. 15.

(24) It is a misdirection not to explain to the jury the difference between a crime and a civil wrong (e.g. the distinction between a civil and a criminal trespass)—*K. E. v. Madan Mandal*, 41 Cal. 662, 15 Cr L J 155.

916. Effect of misdirection:—A misdirection does not justify a reversal of the verdict of the jury unless the misdirection has in fact occasioned a failure of justice—*Legal Remembrancer v. Shyam Sundar*, 26 C.W.N. 558, *Ramdas v. Emp.*, 8 Pat. 344, 30 Cr.L.J. 721 (723). Unless the misdirection is material, the conviction will not be disturbed in appeal—*In re Mullumayandi*, 45 M.L.J. 845, *Wafadar v. K. E.*, 21 Cal. 955. The High Court will not set aside a verdict where it is not erroneous in spite of the misdirection—*Emp. v. Namaddi*, 22 C.W.N. 572; *Wafadar v. K. E.*, 21 Cal. 955. See Note 1151.

But if the misdirection is of a serious character, e.g. where there is a grave omission on the part of the trial Judge to direct the jury on an important point, it will justify a reversal of the conviction; such a misdirection cannot be made good merely by counsel's calling attention to it at the termination of the summing up—*Padam Prasad v. K. E.*, 33 C.W.N. 1121 (1141) (S.B.), 50 C.L.J. 106, 30 Cr L J 993.

917. Non-direction:—Mere non-direction is not necessarily misdirection, those who allege misdirection must show that something wrong was said or that something was said which would make wrong that which was left to be understood—*Eknath v. K. E.*, 1 P.L.J. 317, 17 Cr. L.J. 353, *Abrath v. N. W. Ry. Co.*, (1886) L.R. 11 A.C. 247; *R. v. Stodder*, (1909) 25 T.L.R. 712; *K. E. v. Barendra*, 28 C.W.N. 170 (109); *Emp. v. Fateh Chand*, 44 Cal. 477. A non-direction is not a misdirection unless the jury has been misled or unless the non-direction is of primary importance—*Champa v. Emp.*, 29 Cr L J. 325 (333) (Pat.). It is only when the non-direction is such that there are grounds for thinking that the jury by reason of it may have been put on the wrong track and made to arrive at a wrong conclusion that such non-direction can amount to a misdirection—*Bajit Mian v. Emp.*, 6 Pat. 817, 29 Cr.L.J. 81 (83). In a charge of unlawful assembly, the omission to explain clearly to the jury the alleged common object of the unlawful assembly is not a misdirection but a mere non-direction which will not justify the verdict being set aside, if the prisoner was not prejudiced thereby—*Rahamat-Ali v. Emp.*, 4 C.W.N. 196, *Abdul Sheikh v. Emp.*, 17 Cr L J 92 (Cal.). Failure to point out to the jury the weakness of the evidence against the accused and the possibility of the offence having been committed by another is not a positive misdirection, but merely a non-direction—*Q. v. Choonce*, 5 W.R. 13. Omission to call the attention of the jury to the evidence of

defence witnesses whom the High Court considered to be untrustworthy ■ a mere non-direction and not a misdirection—*Emp v. Rochia*, 7 Cal. 42. Omission to enter into details concerning the identification of stolen articles is not a mis-direction—*Q. v Madhul Mal*, 1 W.R. 22.

Duty of Judge. **298. (1) In such cases it is the duty of the Judge—**

- (a) to decide all questions of law arising in the course of the trial, and especially all questions as to the relevancy of facts which it is proposed to prove and the admissibility of evidence or the propriety of questions asked by or on behalf of the parties; and in his discretion, to prevent the production of inadmissible evidence, whether it is or is not objected to by the parties;
- (b) to decide upon the meaning and construction of all documents given in evidence at the trial;
- (c) to decide upon all matters of fact which it may be necessary to prove in order to enable evidence of particular matters to be given;
- (d) to decide whether any question which arises is for himself or for the jury, and upon this point his decision shall bind the jurors.

(2) The Judge may, if he thinks proper, in the course of his summing up, express to the jury his opinion upon any question of fact, or upon any question of mixed law and fact, relevant to the proceeding.

Illustrations.

(a) It is proposed to prove a statement made by a person not being ■ witness in the case on the ground that circumstances are proved which render evidence of such statement admissible.

It is for the Judge, and not for the jury, to decide whether the existence of those circumstances has been proved.

(b) It is proposed to give secondary evidence of a document the original of which is alleged to have been lost or destroyed.

It is the duty of the Judge to decide whether the original has been lost or destroyed.

(20) Where a judge repeatedly tells the jury that if they are morally convinced of the guilt of the accused, their verdict should be that of guilt, it amounts to a misdirection. The jury has to return a verdict of guilty not upon their moral belief of a case but upon the legal proof of the facts constituting the offence—*Fravel v. Emp.*, 43 All 209, 25 Cr.L.J. 15.

(21) It is a misdirection not to explain to the jury the difference between a crime and a civil wrong (e.g. the distinction between a civil and a criminal trespass)—*K. E. v. Madan Mandal*, 41 Cal 662, 15 Cr.L.J. 155.

916. Effect of misdirection—A misdirection does not justify a reversal of the verdict of the jury unless the misdirection has in fact occasioned a failure of justice—*Legal Remembrancer v. Shivam Sundar*, 26 C.W.N. 558, *Ramdas v. Emp.*, 8 Pat. 344, 30 Cr.L.J. 721 (723). Unless the misdirection is material, the conviction will not be disturbed in appeal—*In re Mullinayandi*, 45 M.L.J. 845; *Wafadar v. K. E.*, 21 Cal 955. The High Court will not set aside a verdict where it is not erroneous in spite of the misdirection—*Emp. v. Nairnaddi*, 22 C.W.N. 572; *Wafadar v. K. E.*, 21 Cal. 955. See Note 1151.

But if the misdirection is of a serious character, e.g. where there is a grave omission on the part of the trial judge to direct the jury on an important point, it will justify a reversal of the conviction, such a misdirection cannot be made good merely by counsel's calling attention to it at the termination of the summing up—*Padam Prasad v. K. E.*, 33 C.W.N. 1121 (1141) (S.B.), 50 C.L.J. 106, 30 Cr.L.J. 993.

917. Non-direction:—Mere non-direction is not necessarily misdirection, those who allege misdirection must show that something wrong was said or that something was said which would make wrong that which was left to be understood—*Elnath v. K. E.*, 1 P.L.J. 317, 17 Cr.L.J. 353; *Abrath v. N. W. Ry. Co.*, (1886) L.R. 11 A.C. 247; *R. v. Stodder*, (1909) 25 T.L.R. 712; *K. E. v. Barendra*, 28 C.W.N. 170 (199); *Emp. v. Fateh Chand*, 44 Cal 477. A non-direction is not a misdirection unless the jury has been misled or unless the non-direction is of primary importance—*Champa v. Emp.*, 29 Cr.L.J. 325 (333) (Pat.). It is only when the non-direction is such that there are grounds for thinking that the jury by reason of it may have been put on the wrong track and made to arrive at a wrong conclusion that such non-direction can amount to a misdirection—*Bajit Mian v. Emp.*, 6 Pat. 817, 29 Cr.L.J. 81 (83). In a charge of unlawful assembly, the omission to explain clearly to the jury the alleged common object of the unlawful assembly is not a misdirection but a mere non-direction which will not justify the verdict being set aside, if the prisoner was not prejudiced thereby—*Rahamat-Ali v. Emp.*, 4 C.W.N. 196, *Abdul Sheikh v. Emp.*, 17 Cr.L.J. 92 (Cal.). Failure to point out to the jury the weakness of the evidence against the accused and the possibility of the offence having been committed by another is not a positive misdirection, but merely a non-direction—*Q. v. Choonee*, 5 W.R. 13. Omission to call the attention of the jury to the evidence of

by the Judge. It is the duty of the Judge to direct the attention of the jury to those portions of the evidence confirming or corroborating the accomplice's story which do or do not fulfil the requirements of the rule of law that an approver's evidence must be corroborated in material particulars and must be such as to connect the accused with the crime. But the Judge must not tell the jury that such or such witness does in fact corroborate the accused. That is the function of the jury and depends upon whether they believe the witness or not—*Rebati Mohan v. Emp.*, 56 Cal 150, 32 C.W.N. 945, 30 Cr.L.J. 435 (438, 439). Though an omission to direct the attention of the jury to those portions of the corroborative evidence which amount to corroborative evidence in law would only be a non-direction, it is a misdirection if the Judge points out to the jury certain portions of the evidence as fulfilling the requirements above stated, when in fact they do not do so—*Rebati Mohan*, supra.

Where the counsel for the prosecution in his opening address referred to a complaint preferred against the accused on an earlier occasion, and it had no bearing on the present case except to show that the accused was a man of immoral character, and it appeared that the complaint had not been formally proved in the earlier case, the Judge should caution the jury that the contents of the complaint are not relevant to the matter in issue before them and they should pay no attention to the contents of the complaint. His omission to do so amounts to a misdirection—*Padam Prasad v. Emp.*, 33 C.W.N. 1121 (1141) (S.B.), 50 C.L.J. 106, 30 Cr.L.J. 993, 1929 Cr.C. 228.

Confessions:—It is for the Judge to decide whether the statements or confessions made to the Magistrate and how much of the confessions made to the police are admissible; leaving it to the jury to decide amounts to a misdirection—*Amiruddin v. K. E.*, 45 Cal. 557. Omission to mention to the jury that a confession made by the accused to the police-officer is inadmissible in evidence is a misdirection—*Someshwar v. Emp.*, 3 P.L.T. 101, 23 Cr.L.J. 91. The Judge must decide whether the confessions are voluntarily made or caused by inducement, threat or promise. It is not for the jury to decide. But once the confessions are admitted in evidence it is for the jury to determine the weight to be attached to them and whether they are true or false—*Khiro Mandal v. K. E.*, 33 C.W.N. 1112 (1113), 1929 Cr.C. 362; *Emp. v. Kesari*, 11 Bom. L.R. 332, 2 I.C. 517, 10 Cr.L.J. 65. But the Judge should charge the jury that the mere confessions of prisoners tried simultaneously with the accused for the same offence, which are in a very qualified manner made operative as evidence by sec. 30 of the Evidence Act, ought to be valued merely as accomplice's testimony, and to be treated as evidence of a peculiarly infirm and defective character requiring careful scrutiny before it can be safely relied on—*Q. v. Ramdoyal*, 21 W.R. 47. Where a Judge admitted in evidence a confession made before a Police Officer and directed the jury that the confession could and should be used not merely against the maker but also against his co-accused, it was a misdirection—*Amiruddin v. K. E.*, 45 Cal. 557.

As regards retracted confessions, see Note 915, no. (4) under sec. 297.

920. Inadmissible evidence:—It is the duty of the Judge to see that evidence which is not admissible in itself should not be allowed to go in, to the prejudice of the accused—*Abbey v. Q. E.*, 25 Cal 736. It is the duty of the Judge to interpose and see that no improper use of the law is made against the accused and that no improper evidence is given to the jury—*Padam Prasad v. K. E.*, 33 C.W.N. 1121 (1141) (S B.), 50 C.L.J. 106; *R. v. Wakefield*, (1799) 27 St. T. 679. Where a document, which is not *per se* admissible, is admitted by the Court, and the accused having sufficient opportunity at the trial omits to take any objection, he cannot afterwards in appeal impeach the verdict of the jury on the ground that the document had been admitted without formal proof. But it is competent to the High Court to consider whether, after excluding the evidence wrongly admitted, the rest of the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict—*Ram Bhagwan v. Emp.*, 19 Cr.L.J. 896 (Pat). Where during the trial before a jury the Public Prosecutor read an alleged confession of the accused which not being recorded according to law was inadmissible in evidence, held that the irregularity of allowing it to be read might have influenced the minds of the jury, however carefully the Judge might have endeavoured to remove any impression caused thereby, and that the accused was entitled to a retrial—*Damodar v. Emp.*, 3 P.L.T. 52, 23 Cr.L.J. 141.

If inadmissible evidence has been admitted by the Judge, the High Court will consider whether the evidence improperly admitted is of such a nature that it possibly may have considerably influenced the minds of the jury, and whether it is reasonably certain that the jury would have acted on the unobjectionable evidence if the wrongly admitted evidence had not also been presented to them—*Padam Prasad v. K. E.*, 33 C.W.N. 1121 (1140) (S B.), 50 C.L.J. 106, 30 Cr.L.J. 993.

Meaning and construction of document.—The Judge must explain to the jury the legal construction to be put upon a document and its legal effect and bearing—*Q. v. Setul*, 3 W.R. 69. If there appears to be a palpable blot or alteration on the face of a document, the Judge has every right to draw the attention of the jury to it—*Q. v. Kissoree*, 17 W.R. 58.

921. Clause (c) :—It is the duty of the Judge to decide upon all matters which it may be necessary to prove in order to enable evidence of particular matters to be given. Thus, if it is proposed to give secondary evidence of a document the original of which is alleged to have been lost or destroyed, it is the duty of the Judge to decide whether the original has been lost or destroyed—*Q. E. v. Lalsingh, Ratanlal* 452. Where the accused made one confession before the committing Magistrate, and another confession before the Court of Session, retracting the previous confession, and alleged that he was beaten by the Police and the previous confession was caused by inducement offered by the Police, it was held that the Judge ought to decide whether the first confession was induced by illegal promise and whether that inducement still existed or had been effectually dispelled when the Magistrate recorded the confession—*Q. E. v. Rupya, Ratanlal* 245.

922. Expression of opinion by Judge :—Though it is open to a Judge to express his opinion to the jury on any matter of fact, still the Judge ought to refrain from expressing any decided opinion on matters of fact in unmistakable terms, because the decision of the questions of fact is left entirely for the jury—*Bharut Chunder*, 1 W.R. 2; *Q. v Gunga*, 1 W R 25, *Rahamat Ali v Emp.*, 4 C.W.N. 196 The Judge in his charge to the jury ought not to express his own opinion in terms too dogmatic and unqualified, even though he informs them that they are not bound by any opinion of his—*Ofel Molla v. K. E.*, 18 C W N 180, 15 Cr L J 147, *Tajali Mian v Emp.*, 7 Pat. 50, 28 Cr.L.J. 843 (844), *Topandas v Emp.*, 25 Cr L J 761 (Sind). The Judge should be careful to express his opinion in such a way as not in any way to interfere with the duties of the jury to finally decide according to their own view of the facts—*Fazoruddin v K. E.*, 42 C.L.J. 111, 26 Cr.L.J. 1553 The Judge should not impress his own opinion indelibly on the mind of the jury and thus give them no option but to arrive at a decision which he himself arrived at—*Khjuruddin v. Emp.*, 53 Cal. 372, 42 C.L.J. 504, 27 Cr L J 266, *Naibulla v Emp.*, 43 C L J 488, 27 Cr L J. 1038. He should present the facts in their natural aspect and ought to leave the jury to decide the facts for themselves, and he must not suggest far-fetched explanations of points that tell in favour of or against either party—*Kizhakedath Unniram*, 2 Weir 386; *In re Subbu Tevan*, 14 M L T. 442, 14 Cr L J 628 If he expresses any opinion, he should also add that it is his own opinion which is not binding on the jury and that the jury is at liberty to draw their own conclusions—*Laxmana*, 2 Weir 385 (386), *Q E v Bepin*, 10 Cal. 970; *Topandas v Emp.*, 25 Cr.L J 761 (Sind), *Panchu Das v Emp.*, 34 Cal 698; *Natabar v. Emp.*, 35 Cal. 531.

In the course of his summing up, the Judge has a right to express his opinion, and if he expresses an opinion which is an unfair one, the High Court can interfere to remove the ill consequences of such action. But it is not necessary that the Judge should, in expressing his opinion, qualify it by the most elaborate safeguards. The question is, whether on the whole the case has been fairly left within the jury's province. If the Judge attempts to take the case out of the jury's province by something in the nature of imposing his own view upon the jury, it is a case of misdirection, but if a Judge simply states his opinion which the law allows him to state, in such a manner that intelligent jury men should see for themselves that it is only his opinion and nothing else, it is not necessary for him to add as a safeguard a remark that it is only his opinion and that the jury are perfectly at liberty to form their own—*Des Raj v Emp.*, 5 O W N. 497, 29 Cr L.J. 721 (722). The Judge should not refrain from expressing his own opinion about the facts Any anxious care on the part of the Judge to avoid suggesting even the faintest suspicion of his own opinion to the jury is entirely misconceived A Judge ought to tell a jury what his opinion is, so long as he makes it clear that they are at liberty to regard or disregard it as they please. A charge which avoids any expression of opinion would generally amount to a

920. Inadmissible evidence:—It is the duty of the Judge to see that evidence which is not admissible in itself should not be allowed to go in, to the prejudice of the accused—*Abbas v. Q. E.*, 25 Cal. 736. It is the duty of the Judge to interpose and see that no improper use of the law is made against the accused and that no improper evidence is given to the jury—*Padam Prasad v. K. E.*, 33 C.W.N 1121 (1141) (S.B.), 50 C.L.J. 106; *R. v Wakefield*, (1799) 27 St. T 679. Where a document, which is not *per se* admissible, is admitted by the Court, and the accused having sufficient opportunity at the trial omits to take any objection, he cannot afterwards in appeal impeach the verdict of the jury on the ground that the document had been admitted without formal proof. But it is competent to the High Court to consider whether, after excluding the evidence wrongly admitted, the rest of the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict—*Ram Bhagwar v. Emp.*, 19 Cr.L.J 886 (Pat.). Where during the trial before a jury the Public Prosecutor read an alleged confession of the accused which not being recorded according to law was inadmissible in evidence, *held* that the irregularity of allowing it to be read might have influenced the minds of the jury, however carefully the Judge might have endeavoured to remove any impression caused thereby, and that the accused was entitled to a retrial—*Damodar v. Emp.*, 3 P.L.T. 52, 23 Cr.L.J 141.

If inadmissible evidence has been admitted by the Judge, the High Court will consider whether the evidence improperly admitted is of such a nature that it possibly may have considerably influenced the minds of the jury, and whether it is reasonably certain that the jury would have acted on the unobjectionable evidence if the wrongly admitted evidence had not also been presented to them—*Padam Prasad v. K. E.*, 33 C.W.N 1121 (1140) (S.B.), 50 C.L.J 106, 30 Cr.L.J 993.

Meaning and construction of document.—The Judge must explain to the jury the legal construction to be put upon a document and its legal effect and bearing—*Q. v. Setul*, 3 W.R 69. If there appears to be a palpable blot or alteration on the face of a document, the Judge has every right to draw the attention of the jury to it—*Q. v. Kissoree*, 17 W.R. 58.

921. Clause (c):—It is the duty of the Judge to decide upon all matters which it may be necessary to prove in order to enable evidence of particular matters to be given. Thus, if it is proposed to give secondary evidence of a document the original of which is alleged to have been lost or destroyed, it is the duty of the Judge to decide whether the original has been lost or destroyed—*Q. E. v. Lalsingh*, Ratanlal 452. Where the accused made one confession before the committing Magistrate, and another confession before the Court of Session, retracting the previous confession, and alleged that he was beaten by the Police and the previous confession was caused by inducement offered by the Police, it was held that the Judge ought to decide whether the first confession was induced by illegal promise and whether that inducement still existed or had been effectually dispelled when the Magistrate recorded the confession—*Q. E. v. Rupaya*, Ratanlal 245.

they need not find which of the two statements is false—*Md Humayun*, 21 W R 72.

924. Questions of fact.—It is the duty of the jury and not of the Judge to decide all questions of fact. Where in the summing up, the Judge left no question of fact for the jury to decide but decided all himself, and said expressly that in his opinion it was proved that the accused had committed murder, and the only thing he left to the jury was to say which of the exceptions to sec 300 I P C. applied if the jury held that the offence did not amount to murder, it was held that such a summing up was not in accordance with law, and a new trial should be ordered—*Q v Shamsher*, 9 W.R. 51. But although the jury are the sole judges of facts, still it is the duty of the Judge to help the jury to find facts. He has to advise the jury as to the logical bearing of the evidence admitted upon the matters to be found by them—*Afruddi v. K E*, 23 C W N 833, 20 Cr L J. 661.

The following are instances of questions of facts:—(1) The question of intent in a case of kidnapping—*K E v. Hughes*, 14 All 25; (2) the question as to whether there was free consent, in a case under sec. 376 I P C—*Q v Gopaul*, 1 W R 21, (3) the question whether a fact was or was not proved, or what fact was proved—*Sadhu Shelkh v. Emp*, 4 C W N 576, (4) the question as to the identity of thumb impressions on two or more documents for the purpose of ascertaining whether the thumb impressions are of one and the same person—*Pancha Mandal v. Emp*, 1 C L J 385, (5) the question whether possession of the stolen property was recent enough to warrant a conviction for the substantive offence of dacoity—*Guzzala Hanuman v. Emp*, 26 Mad. 467, (6) the question as to whether the accused was under 12 years of age and incapable of understanding the nature of his act—*Emp v. Ali Raza*, 28 O C 69, 26 Cr L J 310, (7). The question whether a confession is true or false is a question of fact to be decided by the jury, and the question whether the confession is voluntary (and therefore admissible) or not is for the Judge to determine. It is not open to the Judge to ask the jury to determine whether the confession is voluntary or not, even though it is a question of fact, for the result would be that the jury would have had put before them evidence which was inadmissible, and the difficulty of removing the effect of the inadmissible evidence from the jury's mind is obvious—*Khiro Mandal v. K. E*, 33 C.W.N. 1112 (1113), 1929 Cr. C. 362.

Illustration (a) :—Although Illustration (a) lays down that in a charge of murder the Judge should explain to the jury the distinction between murder and culpable homicide, still where in a trial for murder, a verdict for culpable homicide not amounting to murder could not be properly come to, under any aspect of the case before the Court, the Judge is not called upon to explain to the jury the distinction between murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder—*Ngai Mja K. E.*, 8 L.B.R. 306 (F.B.), 17 Cr.L.J. 49, 32 I.C. 641.

300. In cases tried by jury, after the Judge has finished his charge, the jury may retire to consider their verdict.

Except with the leave of the Court, no person other than a juror shall speak to, or hold any communication with, any member of such jury.

925. After a charge is made to the jury, the jury should not be allowed to disperse but should at once retire to consider the verdict. Where after the charge, they were allowed to go home and come back some hours later, and then they considered their verdict, held that the trial was vitiated—*Sariman v. Emp.*, 6 P.L.T. 552, 26 Cr.L.J. 861.

This section, which is explicit in its terms, should be strictly observed and it is highly undesirable that a jury in any case should have any communication with any body (even the Judge) who is not a jurymen upon the subject matter of the trial. It is also highly undesirable that a Police constable should be stationed anywhere or in any position in which he can hear the deliberations of the jurymen, or that anybody should be in a position where it is possible for him to know the form the deliberations of the jury took or what view any particular juror expressed about the matter—*Banamali*, 44 Cal. 723, 21 C.W.N. 167, 18 Cr.L.J. 311. Where it was proved that after the charge to the jury had been delivered, a person other than a juror spoke to or held communication with a member of the jury without the leave of the Court, it was held that that was sufficient to upset the verdict, and it was not necessary to consider whether the irregularity had in fact prejudiced the accused—*Benimadhub v. K. E.*, 46 Cal. 207, 22 C.W.N. 740, 19 Cr.L.J. 737. But where during an adjournment of the Court before the Judge's charge was finished; one of the jurors was seen conversing with strangers but it did not appear that the conversation was about the case, it was held that this was not a sufficient ground for interfering with the verdict of the jury—*In re Pulla Subba*, 10 L.W. 379, 20 Cr.L.J. 790, 53 I.C. 694.

After the conclusion of the evidence and after the conclusion of the address of the Public Prosecutor, and before the defence had been heard in full and before the Sessions Judge had summed up the case to the jury, one of the jurors, in a room occupied by the clerks of the pleaders, in answer to some questions put to him, intimated that in his opinion the accused was guilty of the charge against him, and the Sessions Judge, although informed of the fact, proceeded with the trial, and took the verdict of the jury; held that the verdict must be set aside and there should be a fresh trial before a fresh jury—*Emp. v. Nazir Ali*, 25 C.W.N. 240. After the jury had retired to consider their verdict in a criminal case they saw the Judge in his chamber and asked him for a direction on a point of law. The Judge and the jury then went into the Court-room and the jury in the presence of the pleaders put certain questions to the Judge, and the answers thereto were recorded. Held that the mere fact that a question was put by the jury to the Judge, not in open

Court but in chamber did not vitiate the trial, but was at best an irregularity—*Bilaschandra v. Emp.*, 27 C.W.N. 626 (628)

301. When the jury have considered their verdict, the foreman shall inform the Judge what is their verdict, or what is the

Delivery of verdict.

verdict of a majority.

926. Verdict—It is a dangerous thing for a Court to rely upon anything except the verdict of the jury, or to listen to the deliberations of the jury, or to the statements of individual jurymen made to this or that person after they had performed their duty and delivered their verdict—*Banamali*, 44 Cal. 723, 21 C.W.N. 167.

The law does not prescribe any specific form in which the verdict is to be returned. The jury may return their verdict in any form they think fit—*Q. v. Hurry Prosad*, 14 W.R. 59

The jury can return a verdict for a lesser offence, ignoring the graver charge, if the evidence before them does not warrant a verdict for the latter—*Q. v. Saloo Sheikh*, 3 W.R. 41. And the jury may do so, even though the accused was not charged with the lesser offence—*Pattikadan v. Emp.*, 26 Mad. 243. Thus, the jury can return a verdict for abetment or attempt, though the prisoner was charged with the substantive offence only—*S. P. Ghosh v. Emp.*, 8 Bur. L.T. 247, 16 Cr.L.J. 676; *Subraji v. K. E.*, 13 O.C. 295, 11 Cr.L.J. 630. Where the charge against the accused was under sec. 149 read alternatively with sec. 325 I. P. C. (i.e. being members of an unlawful assembly, and causing grievous hurt by implication) a verdict of guilty of the offence under sec. 325 alone, although it did not form the subject of a separate charge, was legally sustainable—*Govt. v. Mahaddi*, 5 Cal. 871. When a person is charged with several offences arising out of a single act or series of acts, the word 'verdict' means the entire verdict on all the charges and is not confined to a verdict on a particular charge—*Krishna Dhan v. Q. E.*, 22 Cal. 377. Where there are several accused, the jury have to give their verdict on the acts against each man severally, and even when several prisoners are jointly tried, the jury can convict one and acquit the others—*Jamiruddi v. K. E.*, 16 C.W.N. 909, 13 Cr.L.J. 715.

By 'verdict' should be understood the *collective opinion* of the jury as a body, arrived at after mutual consultation and ascertained and announced by the foreman. In case of disagreement among the jury, the *individual opinions* of the members are never intended to be disclosed—*Public Prosecutor v. Abdul Hamid*, 36 Mad. 585. If a Judge records the individual opinions of the jurors by name, the procedure is opposed to the fundamental principle of the scheme of trial by jury—*Jagannath v. Emp.*, 12 O.L.J. 643, 11 O.W.N. 534, 26 Cr.L.J. 1346. Where it was held that the verdict of the jury was arrived at by casting lots, wh the Judge held an inquiry and examined the individual jurors, h the statements of the jurors as to what happened in the jury-room

the mode in which the verdict was arrived at were inadmissible—*Emp. v. Harkumar*, 40 Cal. 693, 17 C.W.N. 787, 14 Cr.L.J. 392.

Where after the delivery of the verdict the jury wants to say something more, it is undesirable to stop the jury at such stage of the proceedings, for it may happen that before the verdict is recorded the foreman may make some observations in respect of that verdict which may show the Judge that the jury have not properly understood the case. It would then be the duty of the Judge not to record the verdict, but to re-charge the jury so as to lay the case properly before them—*Narayan v. Emp.*, 30 Cal. 485. Where the jury were apparently not able to follow the summing up of the Judge as regards the law bearing on the charges, it is the duty of the Judge, when the foreman told him of it, to explain it to them again—*In re Palavcsa Tevan*, 1911 M.W.N. 190, 12 Cr.L.J. 140. There can be no valid verdict if the jury have not rightly understood the nature of the offence in question—*Q. v. Sustiram*, 21 W.R. 1.

302. If the jury are not unanimous, the Judge may

Procedure where jury differ. require them to retire for further consideration. After such a period as the Judge considers reasonable, the jury may deliver their verdict, although they are not unanimous.

927. Application of section :—Under this section the Sessions Judge can ask the jury, if they are not unanimous, to retire for further consideration, *before* the delivery of verdict, but cannot do so *after* its actual delivery—*Kya Nyun v. K. E.*, 7 L.B.R. 140, 15 Cr.L.J. 678; *Pub. Pro v. Abdul Hamid*, 36 Mad. 585.

But if the verdict is not clear, the Judge may require them, after delivery of verdict, to consider it even though they be unanimous, since a verdict which is ambiguous or not clear cannot be received—*Q. v. Ukoor*, 1 W.R. 50.

928. If the jury are not unanimous :—A jury may be required to retire for further consideration, only when their verdict is not unanimous. An unanimous verdict of the jury, unless it is contrary to law, must be received by the Judge—*Govt. v. Mahaddi*, 5 Cal. 871; *Q. v. Joykisto*, 7 W.R. 22; *Hia Gyi v. K. E.*, 3 L.B.R. 75. If the jury is unanimous, and there is no ambiguity in the verdict, the Judge cannot require them to reconsider their verdict—*Q. E. v. Madhavrao*, 19 Bom. 735; *Q. E. v. Devji*, 20 Bom. 215. If the Sessions Judge disagrees with the unanimous verdict of the jury, the only course open to him is to act under sec. 307—*Emp. v. Kondiba*, 28 Bom. 412.

When the jury are not unanimous, it is open to the Judge to require them to retire for further consideration, giving at the same time further directions on matters of law—*Emp. v. Bhadmia*, 8 Bom.L.R. 258. But the Judge is not bound to summon a fresh jury—*Q. v. Gopaul*, 1 W.R. 41.

303. (1) Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, the jury shall return a verdict on all the charges on which the accused is tried, and the Judge may ask them such questions as are necessary to ascertain what their verdict is.

Verdict to be given on each charge.

Judge may question jury.

Questions and answers to be recorded.

(2) Such questions and the answers to them shall be recorded.

929. Verdict on all the charges—The Judge ought to call upon the jury to return a verdict on each one of the heads of the charges. If the trial is for murder of two persons, and the jury return a verdict of guilty, the Sessions Judge should ascertain, whether the verdict relates to the killing of one or the other or both—*Q E v. Berkia, Ratanlal 746; Krishna Dhan v. K E. 22 Cal 377*

Where there are more than one accused as well as several charges, it would be a convenient course if the officer of the Court were to take a verdict of the jury upon each charge separately. Thus, in a case the accused were charged under sections 147, 148, 304, 325 and 326 I. P. C., and the Sessions Judge asked the jury the comprehensive question: "I shall want you to give me a verdict in respect of the offences under sections 147, 148, 304, 325 and 326 I. P. C. for each of the accused" and the jury returned an incomplete verdict, i.e., they gave a verdict only as regards sections 147 and 148 and expressed no opinion as regards the other charges; and the Sessions Judge had to question the jury again on the other charges. The High Court held the procedure to be faulty, and directed that in such a case the officer of the Court should at first put the question to the jury: "What is your verdict with regard to each of accused ■■ regards the charge under section 147 I. P. C.?" He would then get a clear answer upon this charge. Then he would ask: "What is your verdict with regard to each of the accused ■■ regards the charge under section 148?" He would then get a definite answer to that question. Then he would proceed on the same way and ask: "What is your verdict with regard to each of the accused as regards the charge under section 304?" and so on. If this procedure ■■ adopted, there would be no difficulty in getting a complete verdict from the jury—*Eran Khan v. Emp. 50 Cal 658 (663), 24 Cr L J 838, A I ■■ 1924 Cal. 47.*

If a Judge charges the jury and takes verdict as regards some only of the accused, and afterwards hears arguments and takes verdict as regards the remaining accused, he acts irregularly and contrary to the provisions of this Code—*Pub Pro v. Abdul Hamud, 36 Mad. 585*

930. Questioning the jury :—This section provides a suitable procedure where the verdict of the jury is so vague and uncertain that in order to ascertain whether the jury intended to bring in a verdict of guilty or not guilty, it is necessary to ask supplementary questions—*K E. v. Deraptulla, 34 C.W.N 283 (284).* The Judge is entitled to

the mode in which the verdict was arrived at were inadmissible—*Emp. v. Harkumar*, 40 Cal. 693, 17 C.W.N. 787, 14 Cr.L.J. 392

Where after the delivery of the verdict the jury wants to say something more, it is undesirable to stop the jury at such stage of the proceedings, for it may happen that before the verdict is recorded the foreman may make some observations in respect of that verdict which may show the Judge that the jury have not properly understood the case. It would then be the duty of the Judge not to record the verdict, but to re-charge the jury so as to lay the case properly before them—*Narayan v. Emp.*, 30 Cal. 485. Where the jury were apparently not able to follow the summing up of the Judge as regards the law bearing on the charges, it is the duty of the Judge, when the foreman told him of it, to explain it to them again—*In re Palavesa Tevan*, 1911 M.W.N. 190, 12 Cr.L.J. 140. There can be no valid verdict if the jury have not rightly understood the nature of the offence in question—*Q v. Sustiram*, 21 W.R. 1.

302. If the jury are not unanimous, the Judge may require them to retire for further consideration. After such a period as the Judge considers reasonable, the jury may deliver their verdict, although they are not unanimous.

927. Application of section—Under this section the Sessions Judge can ask the jury, if they are not unanimous, to retire for further consideration, *before* the delivery of verdict, but cannot do so *after* its actual delivery—*Kya Nyun v. K E.*, 7 L.B.R. 140, 15 Cr.L.J. 678, *Pub Pro v Abdul Hamid*, 36 Mad 585.

But if the verdict is not clear, the Judge may require them, after delivery of verdict, to consider it even though they be unanimous, since a verdict which is ambiguous or not clear cannot be received—*Q v. Ukoor*, 1 W.R. 50.

928. If the jury are not unanimous:—A jury may be required to retire for further consideration, only when their verdict is not unanimous. An unanimous verdict of the jury, unless it is contrary to law, must be received by the Judge—*Govt v. Mahaddi*, 5 Cal. 871; *Q. v. Joykisto*, 7 W.R. 22, *Hia Gyi v. K. E.*, 3 L.B.R. 75. If the jury is unanimous, and there is no ambiguity in the verdict, the Judge cannot require them to reconsider their verdict—*Q. E. v. Madhavrao*, 10 Bom. 735; *Q. E. v. Devji*, 20 Bom. 215. If the Sessions Judge disagrees with the unanimous verdict of the jury, the only course open to him is to act under sec. 307—*Emp. v. Kondiba*, 28 Bom. 412.

When the jury are not unanimous, it is open to the Judge to require them to retire for further consideration, giving at the same time further directions on matters of law—*Emp. v. Bhadmia*, 6 Bom.L.R. 258. But the Judge is not bound to summon a fresh jury—*Q. v. Gopaul*, 1 W.R. 41.

303. (1) Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, the jury shall return a verdict on all the charges on which the accused is tried, and the Judge may ask them such questions as are necessary to ascertain what their verdict is.

Verdict to be given on each charge.

Judge may question jury.

Questions and answers to be recorded.

(2) Such questions and the answers to them shall be recorded.

929. Verdict on all the charges—The Judge ought to call upon the jury to return a verdict on each one of the heads of the charges. If the trial is for murder of two persons, and the jury return a verdict of guilty, the Sessions Judge should ascertain, whether the verdict relates to the killing of one or the other or both—*Q E v. Berkia, Ratanlal 746; Krishna Dhan v K E. 22 Cal 377.*

Where there are more than one accused as well as several charges, it would be a convenient course if the officer of the Court were to take a verdict of the jury upon each charge separately. Thus, in a case the accused were charged under sections 147, 148, 304, 325 and 326 I P C., and the Sessions Judge asked the jury the comprehensive question: "I shall want you to give me a verdict in respect of the offences under sections 147, 148, 304, 325 and 326 I P. C for each of the accused" and the jury returned an incomplete verdict, i.e., they gave a verdict only as regards sections 147 and 148 and expressed no opinion as regards the other charges; and the Sessions Judge had to question the jury again on the other charges. The High Court held the procedure to be faulty, and directed that in such a case the officer of the Court should at first put the question to the jury: "What is your verdict with regard to each of accused as regards the charge under section 147 I P C?" He would then get a clear answer upon this charge. Then he would ask "What is your verdict with regard to each of the accused as regards the charge under section 148?" He would then get a definite answer to that question. Then he would proceed on the same way and ask "What is your verdict with regard to each of the accused as regards the charge under section 304?" and so on. If this procedure is adopted, there would be no difficulty in getting a complete verdict from the jury—*Eran Khan v Emp., 50 Cal 658 (663), 24 Cr L J 838, A I R 1924 Cal 47.*

If a Judge charges the jury and takes verdict as regards some only of the accused, and afterwards hears arguments and takes verdict as regards the remaining accused, he acts irregularly and contrary to the provisions of this Code—*Pub Pro v Abdul Hamid, 36 Mad 585*

930. Questioning the jury.—This section provides a suitable procedure where the verdict of the jury is so vague and uncertain that in order to ascertain whether the jury intended to bring in a verdict of guilty or not guilty, it is necessary to ask supplementary questions—*K E. v. Deraftulla, 34 C.W.N. 283 (284).* The Judge is entitled

question the jury as to their verdict, only where it is ambiguous or incomplete so that it is necessary to ascertain what the verdict really is—*Abdul Hamid*, 36 Mad. 585; *Emp. v. Abdul Hamid*, 32 Cal 759; *Q. E. v. Dada*, 15 Bom 452; *Wafadar v. Q. E.*, 21 Cal. 955; *Q. E., v. Devji*, 20 Bom. 215, *Q v Sustiram*, 21 W.R. 1. If the verdict of the jury is incomplete or is not free from ambiguity, the Judge is wrong in accepting such verdict without questioning the jury as to what their verdict really is. Thus, where the jury returned a verdict of 'guilty but not voluntarily' under a charge of voluntarily causing grievous hurt, and the Judge accepted the verdict to be one of guilty, and convicted the accused, it was held that the verdict was really one of not guilty, and the Judge was wrong, without further questioning the jury, in treating it as a verdict of 'guilty'—*Emp. v. Khudiram*, 12 C.W.N. 530; see also *K. E. v. Chidghan*, 7 C.W.N. 135. So also, where in a case there were several accused, and several charges under sections 147, 148, 304, 325 and 326 I. P. C., and the jury returned a verdict of guilty under sec. 147 against some of the accused and under section 148 against the rest, but gave no verdict on the other charges, held that the verdict of the jury was incomplete and it was necessary for the Sessions Judge to put further questions to the jury to ascertain what their verdict was as regards the charges under sections 304, 325 and 326 I. P. C.—*Eran Khan v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 658; *Ram Prasad v. Emp.* 26 Cr L.J. 1090 (Nag) If the verdict of the jury is confused and unintelligible, it is the duty of the Judge to obtain from them a proper and correct verdict before accepting the verdict given—*Wilson*, 30 C W N 693, 27 Cr L.J. 926 Thus, at the conclusion of a trial, the jury returned a verdict of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The Judge questioned them as to which part of sec. 304 I. P. C. their verdict came under Their answers revealed the fact that they did not at all understand the law, whereupon the Judge again explained the law. The jury again retired, considered their verdict and brought in a unanimous verdict of murder. Held that the first verdict being incomplete and the result of a misunderstanding of the law, the Judge was right in explaining the law to them; the second verdict was the legal verdict and one acceptable by the Judge—*Emp v. Nga Tin Gyi*, 4 Rang. 488, 28 Cr. L.J. 213 (214). In a case of rioting, if the verdict of the jury leaves it uncertain what the common object of the assembly is, the Judge ought to ask the jury questions under this section to ascertain the common object. If he does not do so, the verdict is bad in law—*Wafadar v. Q. E.*, 21 Cal. 955 (973). Where in a case under sec 408 I.P.C. the jury returned a verdict of guilty but were not definite as to the amount embezzled, but gave some approximate amount which was a fraction of the amount charged, and where the Judge was inclined to think that a much larger amount than that mentioned by the jury had been misappropriated, held that in a case like this, the Judge was entitled to ask the jury such questions as were necessary to ascertain what their verdict was—*Khirode v. K. E.*, 29 C.W.N. 54, 40 C.L.J. 555, 26 Cr.L.J. 532. Where the verdict is general and complete and free from ambiguity, the Judge is not competent to put questions to the jury, but must accept it without question—

Emp. v. Dhunum, 9 Cal. 53; *Q. E. v. Desai*, Ratant 442; *Q. E. v. Dada*, 15 Bom. 452; *Emp. v. Kondiba*, 28 Bom. 412; *Emp. v. Chirkua*, 2 A.L.J. 475, *In re Ram Naicker*, 22 M.L.J. 355; *Edon v. Emp.*, 21 Cr.L.J. 829 (Cal.); *Bilas Chandra v. K. E.*, 27 C.W.N. 626 (628). Where the verdict was clear and precise, but for some reason or other the Judge took upon himself to examine the jurors to ascertain whether their verdict was based upon the evidence of one or other of two important witnesses called for the Crown, held that Judge was not permitted by law to ask such questions—*K. E. v. Deraptulla*, 34 C W N 283 (284).

When the jury have delivered a verdict, the Judge cannot ask them to reconsider their verdict. The Judge is only entitled to question the jury to ascertain what their verdict really is—*Abdul Hamid*, 36 Mad. 585; *Lyme v. Crown*, 4 Lah 382; *Kya Nyun v. K. E.*, 7 L.B.R. 140, 15 Cr.L.J. 678. If he disagrees with their verdict, he should proceed under section 307, but he cannot ask them to reconsider their verdict—*Kya Nyun*, *supra*. But the Judge is not obliged to accept an absurd verdict either as a verdict of guilty or as a verdict of not guilty. In such a case he is quite entitled to tell the jury to consider the matter over again. He is not bound to accept and interpret for himself a verdict of an unintelligible character, but he can, if he likes, ask questions of the jury, or recharge the jury on certain specific points and ask them to go and get their heads clear on the subject and give a proper verdict. But it is not a proper procedure for the Judge to cross-examine the jury—*Hamid Ali v. Emp.*, 57 Cal. 61, 1930 Cr. C. 401.

Object of questions:—This section never contemplates that on ascertaining that the jury are not unanimous, the Judge should make minute inquiries to learn the nature of the majority and its opinion, so that he would have the opportunity of accepting or refusing that opinion as a verdict according as it coincides with his own opinion or not. Whatever may have been the individual opinion of the Judge, if he went so far as to ask the jury what was the exact majority, and what was the opinion of the majority, the Judge ought to receive that verdict without hesitation *Hurry Churn v. Emp.*, 10 Cal 140.

Asking reasons for verdict:—This section enables the Judge to ask only such questions as are necessary to ascertain what the verdict is. Questions put to the jury, demanding their reasons for the verdict (i.e., reasons for convicting or acquitting the accused), specially, if the verdict is unanimous, exceed the limits of questioning which the law contemplates in this section—*Emp v. Bhadmia*, 11 Bom L.R. 258, *Emp v. Dhunum*, 9 Cal 53; *K. E. v. Deraptulla*, 34 C W.N. 283 (284), *In re Subia Thevan*, 43 Mad 744, *In re Ram Naicker*, 22 M L J 355, *Arunachella v Emp.*, 13 Cr L.J. 586 (Mad); *Emp v. Ali Hyder*, 4 P L T 425, 26 Cr L.J. 856, *Ram Jag v. Emp.*, 7 Pat 55, 29 Cr L.J. 466 (468).

But a reference under section 307 does not become invalid by reason of the Sessions Judge having asked the jury questions as to the reason of their verdict—*In re Subbia Thevan*, 43 Mad. 744, 39 M L J. 65, 21 Cr.L.J. 406. On the other hand he should ask reasons under certain circumstances. See Note 937 under section 307.

Questions and answers to be recorded :—The questions put to and the answers given by the jury must be recorded in their exact words, it is not enough if their substance only is recorded—*Emp. v. Jhubboo*, ■ Cal. 739.

304. When by accident or mistake a wrong verdict is delivered, the jury may, before or immediately after it is recorded, amend the verdict, and it shall stand as ultimately amended.

931. "By accident or mistake" :—This section contemplates cases where the verdict delivered is not in accordance with what was intended to be delivered by the jury, such mistake being the result of an accident only. But where the jury commits a mistake in understanding the law, and such mistake results in an erroneous verdict, it cannot be amended by the jury under this section but can be corrected only by the Judge disagreeing with the jury and referring the case under sec 307 to the High Court—*Emp. v. Kondiba*, 28 Bom. 412. So also, where the jurors being misled by the notes of the foreman as to some of the evidence, delivered an erroneous verdict, such a verdict could not be said to have been delivered by accident or mistake and could not be amended by the jury under this section—*In re Ram Naicker*, 22 M L.J. 355, 13 Cr.L.J. 285.

After the witnesses for the prosecution and certain witnesses for the defence were examined, the Judge addressed the jury and asked them to give their verdict. The jury gave a verdict of guilty; thereupon the Judge proceeded with the examination of the remaining witnesses for the defence, and after it was done, he again summed up the case to the jury and asked them to reconsider their verdict in the light of additional evidence. The jury again returned a verdict of guilty and the Judge passed sentence on the accused. *Held* that the first verdict was illegal because the Judge had charged the jury *before* the examination of the defence witnesses was finished (sec. 297); and the second verdict was illegal, because section 304 empowers the jury only to amend a wrong verdict delivered by accident or mistake but does not empower them to reconsider a verdict in the light of additional evidence. As soon as the first verdict was delivered (even though it was illegal) the jury became *functus officio* and they had no power to deliver a fresh verdict on further evidence taken. The procedure was wholly illegal, the conviction and sentence must be set aside and a new trial held—*Lyme v. Crown*, 4 Lah 382. Where the jury at first brought in an unanimous verdict of guilty, but the Sessions Judge who apparently was of a contrary opinion proceeded to charge the jury again with the result that the jury altered their verdict into one of not guilty, *held* that the procedure was entirely illegal, and the case must be retried—*Leg. Rem. v. Jahey*, 32 C.W.N. 144 (145), 29 Cr.L.J. 228.

Where the verdict of the jury is clear and there is no accident or

mistake in delivering it, it is a proper verdict and cannot be amended under this section; and a second verdict delivered by the jury after being questioned by the Judge cannot be allowed as an amendment—*Q. E. v. Chunilal, Ratanlal* 982; *Q. E. v. Madhavrao*, 19 Bom. 735.

"Before or immediately after it is recorded"—The power of amending a verdict provided by this section must be exercised before or immediately after it is recorded, and cannot be exercised after the jurors have dispersed. In a trial by jury the foreman announced the verdict of 'not guilty' as the unanimous verdict of the jury, and the verdict was recorded and the prisoner acquitted. From information received some days afterwards the Judge was led to believe that the jurors were not agreed as regards the verdict; the Judge summoned the foreman and examined him on oath, he deposed that the verdict given as the unanimous verdict was really the verdict of a majority, and was given as the unanimous verdict owing to a misunderstanding that the opinion of the majority was binding upon all jurors. It was held that the Court had no jurisdiction, in consequence of the foreman's subsequent statement, to set aside the verdict and the order of acquittal—*Emp v Brian Carter*, 1913 P R. 6 (F B), 13 Cr L J 815.

305. (1) When in a case tried before a High Court

Verdict in High Court
when to prevail.

the jury are unanimous in their opinion, or when as many as six are of one opinion and the Judge agrees with them, the Judge shall give judgment in accordance with such opinion.

(2) When in any such case the jury are satisfied that they will not be unanimous, but six of them are of one opinion, the foreman shall so inform the Judge.

(3) If the Judge disagrees with the majority, he shall at once discharge the jury.

Discharge of jury in
other cases,

(4) If there are not so many as six who agree in opinion, the Judge shall, after the lapse of such time as he thinks reasonable, discharge the jury.

931A. Under this section, if the jury is unanimous, their verdict is bound to be accepted by the Judge, and it is only when the jury are not unanimous that it lies with the Judge to take one of the courses specified in the section—*S. P. Ghosh v Emp.*, ■ Bur L T 724, 16 Cr L J 676.

Under sub-section (3), if the jury are divided in the proportion of six to three, the Judge should ascertain the verdict of the majority before discharging the jury. Where six of the jury agreed to a verdict, and the

presiding Judge, without ascertaining what their verdict was, discharged the jury and ordered a retrial, and the retrial came before another Judge and another jury; it was *held* that the previous Judge having improperly discharged the jury without ascertaining what their verdict was and whether he agreed or disagreed with the verdict of the majority, the previous Judge had null the legal seisin of the case and no other Judge could try it—*Emp. v. Jatindra*, 8 C.W.N. xlviii.

For the purposes of this section, the Judge of the Judicial Commissioner's Court sitting in Session is a High Court (see sec. 266) and not a Court of Session; consequently, he has no power to disagree with the unanimous verdict of the jury and to refer the case to the High Court under sec. 307—*K. E. v. Mithoo*, 25 Cr.L.J. 428, A.I.R. 1925 Sind 34.

306. (1) When in a case tried before the Court of

Verdict in Court of Session when to pre-
vail. Session the Judge does not think it necessary to express disagreement with the verdict of the jurors or of a majority of the jurors, he shall give judgment accordingly.

(2) If the accused is acquitted, the Judge shall record judgment of acquittal. If the accused is convicted, the Judge shall, *unless he proceeds in accordance with the provisions of Section 562*, pass sentence on him according to law.

The italicised words have been added by section 80 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. The amendment is merely verbal, and is the same as that made in sections 245 (2) and 258 (2).

932. When the verdict of the jury has been delivered, the Sessions Judge is bound to say and record whether he agrees with the verdict or not—*Q. v. Chand Bagdee*, 7 W.R. 6; *Q. v. Bahar Ali*, 15 W.R. 46. It is not competent to a Sessions Judge, after the jury has returned their verdict and gone away, and in the absence of the accused, to examine some witnesses and then to act on the evidence in determining whether or not he should differ from the jury—*Emp. v. Ningappa*, 7 Bom L.R. 979, 3 Cr L.J. 42. If he agrees with and accepts the verdict of the jury (or of the majority) he is bound to deliver judgment according to the verdict; once he agrees with the verdict, he cannot afterwards reconsider it or disagree with it and refer the matter to the High Court—*Q. E. v. Mojahur*, 4 C.W.N. 683. Where the Sessions Judge wrote in his judgment: "There is room for doubt as to whether the accused is guilty; however, I see no reason to differ from the unanimous verdict of the jury on what are questions of fact. Not agreeing with but accepting the verdict of the jury I convict the accused." *Held*, that this method of expression was not desirable. A Sessions Judge is under no obligation whatsoever to have or express his individual opinion upon really disputable questions

of fact which are for the jury. If a Judge agrees or disagrees, it is a matter *prima facie* for himself, but if he disagrees with the verdict and is of opinion that it is necessary for the ends of justice to submit the case to the High Court, he is bound to do so (sec. 307). If he is not clearly of opinion that the conviction is wrong so as to make it necessary for the ends of justice to submit the case to the High Court, then it may be said that "the Judge does not think it necessary to express disagreement" (sec. 306), and his opinion being on that view irrelevant, he will be well advised to keep it to himself—*Ebrahim Molla v Emp.*, 56 Cal. 473, 33 C.W.N. 371 (373), 30 Cr.L.J. 1030, 1929 Cr.C. 28

Acquittal —As soon as the judgment of acquittal is pronounced, the prisoner is entitled to be discharged from custody (if there is no other charge pending against him), and his further detention is illegal. It is for the jail authorities, in whose custody the prisoner was, to satisfy themselves of the result of the trial, and no formal warrant of release by the Court to the jail authorities is necessary—*Anonymous*, 5 M.H.C.R. App. 2

Sentence —If the verdict of the jury is one of guilty, it is the duty of the Judge to pass an adequate sentence for the offence for which the jury have convicted the prisoner, and the fact that the Judge has differed from the jury cannot be a ground for passing a light sentence—*Nabber*, 3 W.R. (Cr. Let.) 16. If the Judge agrees with the verdict of the jury and convicts the accused, he should not, in passing sentence, give any weight to the doubts he may entertain as to the propriety of the verdict—*Ramdas v Emp.*, 8 Pat. 344, 30 Cr.L.J. 721 (724)

307. (1) If in any such case the Judge disagrees

Procedure where Sessions Judge disagrees with verdict.

with the verdict of the jurors, or of a majority of the jurors, on all or any of the charges on which any accused person has been tried, and is clearly of opinion that it is necessary for the ends of justice to submit the case in respect of such accused person to the High Court, he shall submit the case accordingly, recording the grounds of his opinion, and, when the verdict is one of acquittal, stating the offence which he considers to have been committed, and in such case, if the accused is further charged under the provisions of Section 310, shall proceed to try him on such charge, as if such verdict had been one of conviction.

(2) Whenever the Judge submits a case under this section, he shall not record judgment of acquittal or of conviction on any of the charges on which such accused has been tried, but he may either remand such accused to custody or admit him to bail.

(3) In dealing with the case so submitted the High Court may exercise any of the powers which it may exercise on an appeal, and subject thereto it shall, after considering the entire evidence and after giving due weight to the opinions of the Sessions Judge and the jury, acquit or convict *such* accused of any offence of which the jury could have convicted him upon the charge framed and placed before it; and if it convicts him, may pass such sentence as might have been passed by the Court of Session.

Change.—This section has been amended by sec 81 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. The main changes are the following—*first*, in subsection (1) the words "any accused person" have been substituted for the words "the accused," and the words "in respect of such accused person" have been added, in subsection (2) and (3) the words "such accused" have been substituted for the words "the accused." The reasons are thus stated: "This amendment prescribes that when a Judge accepts the verdict of the jury in respect of some of the accused, but not of others, he need only refer the case of the latter to the High Court"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914).

Secondly, the italicised words at the end of sub-section (1) have also been newly added "We think, however, that a further amendment is required in section 307, to provide for the case of a person who is also charged with a previous conviction under section 310. It seems obvious that if the Judge disagrees with the verdict of the jury on the principal charge, and submits the case to the High Court, it is desirable that the record should be complete. We propose therefore to insert at the end of section 307 (1) a provision for the trial of the further charge under section 307"—*Report of the Select Committee* of 1916. Under the old law, it was held that if a case was referred to the High Court under sec. 307, there was no conviction or acquittal in the Court of Session. It was the High Court which could convict or acquit the accused, and it was only after such conviction by the High Court that the accused could be asked under sec 310 to plead to a previous conviction—*Emp. v. Kandaswamy*, 30 Mad. 134. Under the present amendment, provision is made for the trial of the charge of previous conviction, in the Sessions Court itself.

933. Scope of section.—*Assessor-case tried with jury*:—Where the Sessions Judge tried the accused with jury for an offence triable by jury, and with the jurors as assessors for an offence triable with assessors, and differing from them in their verdict and opinion referred both matters to the High Court, it was held that as to the matter triable with assessors, the Judge should not have included it in the reference but should have disposed of it according to law—*Emp. v. Kalidas*, 8 Bom.L.R. 599; *Emp. v. Vyankatsing*, 9 Bom.L.R. 1057; *Q. E. v. Devu*, Ratanlal 600; *In re Kambala Narayana*, 36 M.L.J. 452. But if

the Judge tries the assessor-case with the aid of the jurors as *jurors* and not as assessors, and disagrees with their *verdict* (not *opinion*), he can refer the case to the High Court—*Q. E. v. Jeyram*, 23 Bom. 606; *Surya v. Q. E.*, 25 Cal. 555.

Who can refer :—The reference under this section must be made by the Judge who held the trial and heard the evidence and not by the officer who succeeds him as Judge—*Emp v Dil Mahomed*, 2 C.L.J. 48 But see section 559

High Court —Since the 'High Court' in this section does not include a Judicial Commissioner's Court (see sec 266), a Judge of the Judicial Commissioner's Court of Sind sitting in Sessions has no power to refer a case under this section to the J. C. Court in its High Court jurisdiction—*K E v Mithoo*, 25 Cr L J. 428. A.I.R 1925 Sind 34, *Emp. v Jiand*, 22 S L R 319 (F B), 29 Cr L J. 945

934. Disagreement :—The Judge can refer the case to the High Court if he disagrees with the verdict of the jury. If he once accepts the verdict he cannot subsequently reconsider it, and disagreeing with the verdict refer the case to the High Court—*Q E v Mojahur*, 4 C W N 683 The disagreement may be on questions of law as well as of fact That is, the Sessions Judge may submit to the High Court a case in which he disagrees with the jury on their finding of facts as well as a case in which he consider that the jury have not followed his directions as to the law—*Q v Koonjo*, 20 W R 1.

The mere fact that the Judge entertains some doubts about the correctness of the verdict of the jury does not make it obligatory on him to refer the case under sec. 307, see *Saroda Charan*, 41 C L J 320, 26 Cr.L J 1006, *Bajit Alian v Emp.*, 6 Pat. 817, 29 Cr L J 81 (82) It is not in every case of doubt nor in every case in which the Judge entertains a view different from that of the jury, that a reference can be made under this section, but the verdict of the jury must be manifestly wrong before such reference can be made—*Emp v Swarnamoyee*, 41 Cal. 621, *Ramdas v. Emp.*, 8 Pat. 344, 30 Cr L.J. 721 (722) And in this regard there is no difference between a case where the jury acquits the accused and the case where the jury convicts, and the Judge disagrees with the verdict—*Ramdas v. Emp*, supra Where the jury misunderstands the law as explained by the Judge and delivers a wrong verdict, the Judge should refer the case to the High Court under this section, and not ask the jury to reconsider their verdict—*Emp v Kondiba*, 28 Bom 412.

Where the Judge in his direction to the jury himself expressed the opinion that the prosecution evidence was open to hostile criticism, and the jury regarding the evidence with suspicion delivered a verdict of not guilty, the Judge was not justified in referring the case to the High Court, because there could not be said to have been a disagreement between the Judge and the jury, but rather agreement—*K E. v. Chidghan* 7 C W N 135

A reference should not be made where the disagreement between the Judge and the jury is merely on a technical point of law. Thus, where the Judge considered the offence to be under sec. 366 I. P. C. but left to the jury to decide whether the offence was under sec. 363 or sec. 366 I P C., and the jury found that the offence was under sec. 363 I. P. C., *held* that there was only a technical difference between the two sections, and the Judge should, in view of his own summing up, have accepted the verdict of the jury, and should not have made a reference to the High Court—*Emp v Ali Raza*, 28 O.C. 69, 26 Cr.L.J. 310. A Sessions Judge wrote in his judgment "There is room for doubt as to whether the accused is really guilty. Not agreeing with but accepting the unanimous verdict of the jury, I convict the accused." *Held* that this method of expression was improper. If the Judge really disagrees with the verdict, *i.e.* has a settled and considered opinion that the crime has not been proved against the accused, it seems to be clear that it is necessary for the ends of justice to refer the case. If he does not think this necessary, his "disagreement" cannot be a reality at all, and the less his inconclusive state of mind is exposed, the better—*Ebrahim Molla v. Emp*, 56 Cal. 473, 33 C.W.N. 371 (373), 30 Cr.L.J. 1030. See this case cited under sec. 306.

A reference can be made to the High Court only on the ground of disagreement between the Judge and the jury and on *no other grounds*. Where the jury returned a verdict of not guilty, the mere fact that in a similar case upon similar evidence the High Court had convicted some other persons, is no ground for referring the case to the High Court—*Emp v Irya Doddappa*, 6 Bom L.R. 599.

935. "Necessary for the ends of justice"—This section requires as an essential condition of the reference that the Judge must disagree with the verdict of the jurors or a majority of them, on all or any of the charges, and that the Judge should be clearly of opinion that it is *necessary for the ends of justice* to submit the case to the High Court—*Emp. v. Irya Doddappa*, 6 Bom L.R. 599, 1 Cr.L.J. 743. This seems to indicate that something more must be in the Judge's mind than a mere disagreement with the jury or a mere feeling that he would himself have come to a different conclusion. That is, he must be of opinion that the verdict was one which reasonable men could not have arrived at on the evidence before them—*In re Veerappa*, 51 Mad. 956 (F.B.), 30 Cr.L.J. 317 (321). This section leaves the referring of a case to the High Court entirely to the *discretion* of the Judge, for it is only where he disagrees with the verdict of the jury so completely that he considers it *necessary for the ends of justice* to submit the case to the High Court, that he should do so. This discretion should however always be exercised when the Judge thinks that the verdict is not supported by evidence. It is the only way in which the miscarriage of justice by a perverse verdict of a jury can be remedied by the High Court—*Q. E. v. Guravadu*, 13 Mad. 343; *Saroda Charan v. Emp.*, 41 C.L.J. 320, 26 Cr.L.J. 1006, *Ravidas v. Emp.*, 8 Pat. 344, 30 Cr.L.J. 721 (722). When the Judge points out to the jury the weak links in the prosecution and

they do not consider them, it is proper for the Judge to refer the case to the High Court, because such a reference is really necessary for the ends of justice—*Emp. v. Abdul Rahaman*, 9 C.L.J. 432, 2 I.C. 593, 10 Cr.L.J. 57.

When the disagreement between the Judge and the jury is such a complete dissent that the Judge is obviously unable to do justice to the accused by accepting the verdict, there is no option left to him but to refer the case to the High Court, for it is clearly necessary for the ends of justice—*Saroda Charan*, supra; *Imp. v. Bhawani*, 2 Bom. 525, Q. E. v. *Devji*, 20 Bom. 215. The mere fact that the Sessions Judge does not agree with the unanimous verdict of the jury does not make it obligatory on him to make a reference. Section 307 clearly gives him a discretion in the matter, and it is only when he is clearly of opinion that it is necessary for the ends of justice to submit the case to the High Court that he shall so submit it. If he is not clearly of that opinion, his failure to submit the case is not a subject for interference by the High Court—*Eran Khan v. Emp.*, 50 Cal 658, 24 Cr L J 838, *Ramdas v. Emp.*, supra. It depends entirely upon the opinion of the Sessions Judge whether he considers it necessary for the ends of justice to refer the case to the High Court, and his opinion is final on this point. The High Court cannot direct the Sessions Judge to be of opinion that such reference is necessary for the ends of justice, and to refer the case accordingly—*Bepin Chandra v. Emp.*, 32 C W N 673 (676), 29 Cr L J 819.

It is no longer the law that before making a reference the Judge must be satisfied that the verdict is *perverse*. It is sufficient that he should be clearly of opinion that a reference is necessary for the ends of justice—*Ismail v. Emp.*, 23 C.W.N 747, 19 Cr L.J. 830; *Saroda Charan v. Emp.*, 41 C L J. 320, 26 Cr.L.J. 1006.

936. Submit the case :—*Whether whole case should be referred :—*It is not intended that when the Sessions Judge is not prepared to accept the verdict of the jury in its entirety, but is prepared to accept it as regards some of the accused, the *whole* case is to be referred to the High Court. Where the Judge agrees with the jury in respect of a particular accused, the Judge ought to convict or acquit him as the case may be; and it is only with reference to those accused in respect of whom he declines to accept the verdict of the jury that he should make the reference—*Emp. v. Babur Ali*, 42 Cal 789, 19 C W N 584, 18 Cr.L.J. 321. This is now expressly made clear by the present amendment. But where the disagreement between the Judge and the jury is as to some of the *charges*, it is necessary that the whole case should be referred. When the accused was tried on several charges, and the Sessions Judge accepted the verdict of the jury as to some and disagreed as to the other charges, and referred the case to the High Court only as to these latter, it was held that by this limited form of reference the High Court was precluded from considering the entire evidence on record, and that the Sessions Judge should have referred the whole case leaving it to the High Court to consider the whole of the evidence that

was placed before the jury—*K. E. v. Ananda Charan*, 21 C.W.N. 435, 18 Cr.L.J. 551.

'Recording the grounds of his opinion':—In referring the case under this section, the Sessions Judge should state what material portions of the evidence he believes to be true, and his reasons for arriving at his conclusions so as to enable the High Court to appreciate them and to give due weight to them—*K. E. v. Panit*, 3 P.L.T. 413, 23 Cr.L.J. 421, A.I.R. 1922 Pat 348; *Emp. v. Dyamanark*, 6 Bom.L.R. 519. Where the Judge merely said that the verdict was against the weight of evidence, and expressed no other opinion in his reference, it was held that he ought to have set out on what portions of the evidence or on what facts the accused should have been convicted—*K. E. v. Bhut Nath*, 7 C.W.N. 345. So also, where the Sessions Judge merely stated in his reference that the verdict of the jury was erroneous and inconsistent and could not be accepted and that if the evidence had been believed all the accused should have been found guilty, held that the reference was not a proper reference, as it did not state the grounds of his opinion. The reference should be so complete and self-contained that it ought not to be necessary to refer to the order sheet—*K. E. v. Taribulla*, 25 C.W.N. 682, 23 Cr.L.J. 244. The order of reference under sec. 307 must be in the nature of a judgment giving a proper summary of the evidence and the reasons for the opinion of the Judge. In making the reference he should in effect show the reasons for his opinion in as clear a manner as he would have done if the case had not been a jury case and he had had to write a judgment—*Emp. v. Sheo Din* 50 All. 540, 29 Cr.L.J. 342, 26 A.L.J. 296. He should state with some fulness his view of the evidence and the credibility of the more important witnesses, because the High Court has to attach more or less weight to the opinion of the Judge who saw and heard the witnesses—*Emp. v. Chander Krishna*, 10 Bom.L.R. 173.

Reflections on jurors:—The reference of the Sessions Judge should not contain any extra-judicial observations, e.g. any reflections on the conduct of the jurors which are not supported by any material on the record. The 'opinion' of the Sessions Judge is his opinion on the merits of the case and does not include his speculations as to the conduct of jurors. Such an imputation is not fair to the jurors—*Emp. v. Dhananjoy*, 51 Cal. 317 (350, 351), 38 C.L.J. 384; *Mamfru v. Emp.*, 51 Cal. 418 (430), 38 C.L.J. 397. It would be most unfortunate if persons of respectability called upon to discharge the responsible duty of jurors were exposed to the risk of aspersions upon their conduct. If the Judge disagrees with the verdict of the jury, it is open to him to do so and to refer the case to the High Court if he is clearly of opinion that such a course is necessary for the ends of justice, but this does not require that he should make reflections upon the conduct of the jurors which are not supported by evidence on the record. Such an imputation is unfair to the jurors, unfair to the Judge himself, unfair to the accused and unfair to the High Court also—*Mamfru v. Emp.*, 51 Cal. 418 (429, 431), 38 C.L.J. 397.

Recording evidence:—The Judge should state in his reference

evidence for the prosecution and for the defence, the facts which in his opinion are proved upon the evidence recorded in the case, and the conclusions to which these facts led him—*Emp. v. Irya*, 6 Bom.L.R. 509, 1 Cr.L.J. 743.

'Stating the offence':—In case of an acquittal by the jury the Sessions Judge should state in his reference what offence the accused has in his opinion committed, and on what grounds he differs from the jury—*Emp. v. Chander Krishna*, 10 Bom.L.R. 173, *Emp. v. Sahal Roy*, 3 Cal 623; *K. E. v. Taribulla*, 25 C.W.N. 682, 23 Cr.L.J. 244

If Judge refuses to refer—Where a jury convicted the accused against the opinion and advice of the Sessions Judge, and the latter declined to refer the case to the High Court under this section, it was held on appeal by the accused that the High Court had no power to interfere, however wrong or absurd the verdict might have been, in as much as there was no misdirection by the Sessions Judge, and as there was evidence against the accused which was open to the jury to believe—*Q. E. v. Chinna*, 14 Mad 36, *In re Kaiyan*, 4 M.L.T. 483, 11 Cr.L.J. 93

Notice to accused—Where the Judge differed from the verdict of the jury and made a reference under this section, the High Court, before proceeding with the case, gave notice to the accused, as in appeal, to bring forward any objections to the Sessions Judge's recommendations—*Q. v. Ottum*, 19 W.R. 38

937. "Opinion of the jury"—The 'opinion of the jury' in sub-sec. (3) means nothing more than the verdict of the jury, it does not mean the reasons on which the verdict is founded—*Emp. v. Annada*, 36 Cal 629, *Emp. v. Tarapada*, 18 C.W.N. 615, *Emp. v. Dhananjay*, 51 Cal. 347 (352), 38 Cr.L.J. 384, *Emp. v. Ali Hyder*, 4 P.L.T. 425, 26 Cr.L.J. 856 (859), *Ramjag v. Emp.*, 7 Pat 55, 29 Cr.L.J. 466 (468), *K. E. v. Punit*, 3 P.L.T. 413, 23 Cr.L.J. 421, A.I.R. 1922 Pat 348, *Emp. v. Chellan*, 29 Mad 91. What the Judge has to record in his reference is the conclusion (i.e. verdict) of the jury and not the reasons on which that conclusion is based. And the circumstance that no such reason has been ascertained does not warrant the High Court to decline to go into the evidence and arrive at its own judgment as to the guilt or innocence of the accused—*Emp. v. Chellan*, 29 Mad 91. But the Judge should do well to take the reasons of the jury for the view taken by them, and to record the reasons, especially when there is some inconsistency in their verdict—*Emp. v. Annada*, 36 Cal. 629, *Emp. v. Bhulotan*, 6 P.L.J. 264, 23 Cr.L.J. 11. The absence of the reasons of the jury for their verdict only enhances the High Court's responsibility in the matter, and requires it to go into the evidence more carefully—*Emp. v. Bhulotan* supra. Even where the jury are unanimous in their verdict, the Judge should ask for specific findings on the particular facts on which he himself relies. This would enable the High Court to understand the particular grounds on which the jury proceeded, and it will then only be necessary to consider the propriety of those grounds—*Pamanna*, 2 Weir 385 (389); *Emp. v. Kankaya*, 22 N.L.R. 42, 27 Cr.L.J. 773. Where in a trial by jury the

unanimous verdict of the jury. If the verdict is not unanimous, the weight to be attached to it is necessarily diminished; but if the verdict is unanimous, the High Court should not interfere with it unless it is clearly wrong or perverse or unreasonable—*Emp. v. Dhananjay*, 51 Cal. 347 (353); *Emp. v. Jamaldi*, 51 Cal. 160 (165), 28 C.W.N. 536, 25 Cr.L.J. 1000, *Emp. v. Kankonja*, 22 N.L.R. 42, 27 Cr.L.J. 733; *Emp. v. Madan Mandal*, 41 Cal. 662. If the verdict of the jury is unanimous and is neither perverse nor clearly and manifestly wrong, the High Court should not re-open the matter *ab initio* and proceed to try it *de novo*. For, if the case is re-opened *ab initio*, it is difficult to see what useful function is performed by a jury—*Emp. v. Panna Lal*, 46 All. 265 (267), 22 A.L.J. 162, 25 Cr.L.J. 931, *Emp. v. Nagar Ali*, 56 Cal. 132, 30 Cr.L.J. 584 (585), 32 C.W.N. 952. The High Court will not interfere on a reference under this section unless that Court is of opinion that the verdict of the jury could not be supported by the evidence on the record—*Emp. v. Gohing Singh* 5 Pat. 573, 27 Cr.L.J. 1308. The High Court will not interfere upon any mere preponderance of evidence, unless it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the verdict is so distinctly against the evidence that it may be termed a perverse verdict—*Pamianna*, 2 Weir 398 (389), *Asgar v. K. E.*, 22 C.W.N. 811, 20 Cr.L.J. 20, *Emp. v. Alozzel*, 29 C.W.N. 842, 26 Cr.L.J. 1298, *Emp. v. Chanoo*, 22 C.W.N. 1028, 20 Cr.L.J. 223. It is not the practice of the High Court to interfere in case of acquittal by jury, unless the acquittal stands out as patently bad. If the verdict is patently bad and amazingly perverse, in as much as the jury have overlooked the overwhelming evidence for the prosecution and accepted the slight evidence added by the defence, the High Court will interfere—*Emp. v. Alaharaj Behari* 3 Luck. 456, 20 Cr.L.J. 452 (453), *Emp. v. Jukhan*, 27 A.L.J. 509, 30 Cr.L.J. 1078 (1079). The High Court will not disturb the unanimous verdict of acquittal in a case where there is a substantial gap in the chain of evidence—*K. E. v. Sukku Bewa*, 38 C.L.J. 155, 25 Cr.L.J. 165. On a reference to the High Court to set aside an unanimous verdict of conviction, the High Court will interfere where the prosecution has not adequately proved its case and where the facts are suspicious, and will give the benefit of doubt to the accused—*Emp. v. Yakub*, 30 C.W.N. 859, 27 Cr.L.J. 1341. In dealing with an unanimous verdict of acquittal, the High Court will have to consider whether the jury were entirely unreasonable in giving the benefit of doubt to the accused, and whether it was impossible for the jury to arrive at any other reasonable conclusion than that the guilt of the accused had not been brought home to them—*Emp. v. Golam Kadir*, 28 C.W.N. 876, 25 Cr.L.J. 1284.

939. Power of High Court—In case of a reference under this section the High Court is to give weight not only to the opinion of the jury but to that of the Judge as well—*Emp. v. Neamatulla*, 17 C.W.N. 1077; *Emp. v. Bhullolan*, 23 Cr.L.J. 11, 6 P.L.J. 264; *K. E. v. Punil*, 3 P.L.T. 413, 23 Cr.L.J. 421; *Manindra v. K. E.*, 41 Cal. 754; *Emp. v. Ljall*, 29 Cal. 128; *Q. E. v. Iswari*, 15 Cal. 269. But although the High Court is bound in dealing with a reference under this section to

give due weight to the opinions of the Judge and the jury, still it is not bound in any way by these opinions, and the question whether the decision in the case is to be for acquittal or for conviction is entirely open to the High Court and left open to it to decide after consideration of the evidence and the opinions of the Judge and the jury—*In re Nanni Kudumban*, 45 M.L.J. 406, 25 Cr.L.J. 145, *Emp. v. Sri Narain*, 11 C.W.N. 715, *Q. E. v. Dada*, 15 Bom. 452; *Emp. v. Annada*, 36 Cal. 629; *Emp. v. Abdul Rahaman*, 9 C.L.J. 432, 2 I.C. 593, 10 Cr.L.J. 57. When once a reference is made to the High Court, the language of the Code does not justify any undue preference being given to the opinion of the jury over that of the Judge. The High Court has to weigh both the opinions and consider the entire evidence on the record just as it would consider in any criminal matter coming before it for decision—*K. E. v. Ramcharan*, 27 O.C. 29, 11 O.L.J. 210, 25 Cr.L.J. 785; *Emp. v. Ramchandra*, 55 Cal. 879, 29 Cr.L.J. 823 (825).

The Bombay High Court has held that the whole case is open to the High Court when hearing a reference, and in dealing with the reference the High Court exercises all the powers which it exercises on appeal—*Emp. v. Shankar Balkrishna*, 47 Bom. 31 (32). But a Full Bench of the Madras High Court has recently laid down that on a reference under sec. 307, the whole matter is not re-opened and the High Court cannot try the case as if there had been no trial; but the High Court should only confine itself to the question whether the Judge's view of the verdict is justified by the evidence, and if it is not, to confirm the verdict—*In re Veerappa*, 51 Mad. 956 (F.B.), 30 Cr.L.J. 317 (321), overruling *In re Nanni Kadumban*, 45 M.L.J. 406, 25 Cr.L.J. 145.

The words "subject thereto" in subsection (3) do not mean that the powers of the High Court are subject to the limitations and provisions contained in sec. 423 (2). Therefore it is open to the High Court, on a reference under sec. 307, to reverse the verdict of the jury, even though there has not been any misdirection by the Judge or any misunderstanding by the jury of the law as laid down by the Judge. This section gives the High Court a power to reconsider the entire evidence, and to arrive at an independent conclusion of its own on the question of fact as well as of law in the interests of justice. The High Court, when acting under sec. 307, is clothed with the powers, as regards procedure, of a Court of appeal, if for good reasons it desires to exercise any of them, e.g. a power to release the accused on bail under sec. 426, or to take additional evidence or direct it to be taken under sec. 428—*Emp. v. Shera*, 50 All. 625 (F.B.), 26 A.L.J. 321, 29 Cr.L.J. 353 (356, 357).

The High Court cannot consider any question on which the Judge and the jury are agreed—*K. E. v. Madan Mandal*, 41 Cal. 662, 15 Cr.L.J. 155. So also, the High Court cannot consider any question on which the Judge had accepted the verdict of the jury, although he did not agree with them—*Emp. v. Profulla*, 51 Cal. 41. Although the High Court can consider the entire evidence, still it should not ignore the verdict of the jury on a question of fact. Unless there is an astounding

reason for it, the verdict of the jury on a question of fact will not be set aside. The mere fact that another view of the evidence might be taken is not enough—*K. E. v. Panit Chain*, 3 P.L.T. 413, 23 Cr.L.J. 421, A.I.R. 1922 Pat. 348.

Power to convict for offence not charged—Ordinarily the High Court cannot convict the accused for any offence with which he was not charged—*K. E. v. Madan Mandal*, 41 Cal. 662. But the combined effect of this section read with sec. 238 is that the High Court may, in dealing with a case coming before it under this section, convict an accused for a minor offence, although he was not charged with such offence—*K. E. v. Sitanath*, 22 Cal. 1006. And a Sessions Judge accepting the jury's finding on the graver charges can make a reference to the High Court with the object of having some of the accused convicted on minor charges—*Emp. v. Hari*, 37 C.L.J. 34, 24 Cr.L.J. 674, A.I.R. 1923 Cal. 108. But where in a case of offence under sec. 147 I.P.C. the common object assigned in the charge as framed to support the case has not been sustained, the High Court on a reference under sec. 307 of this Code cannot invent another common object in order to support the conviction—*Emp. v. Akbar*, 51 Cal. 271 (275), 25 Cr.L.J. 773, A.I.R. 1924 Cal. 449.

939A. No appeal from High Court :—A High Court in dealing with a reference under this section is not acting in the exercise of its original criminal jurisdiction but only as a Court of reference in a criminal matter—*In re Horace Lyall*, 29 Cal. 286; and therefore no appeal lies from its own judgment passed under this section—*Q. E. v. Adveppa*, Ratnial 691.

Trial when ends—When a case is referred to under this section, the trial cannot be deemed to be concluded, until the High Court either convicts or acquits the prisoner—*Q. E. v. McCarthy*, 9 All. 420.

G.—Re-trial of Accused after Discharge of Jury.

308. Whenever the jury is discharged, the accused shall be detained in custody or on bail (as the case may be), and shall be tried by another jury, unless the

Re-trial of accused
after discharge of jury.

Judge considers that he should not be re-tried, in which case the Judge shall make an entry to that effect on the charge, and such entry shall operate as an acquittal.

940. If a jury is discharged in the course of a trial for misconduct, the Judge should hold a fresh trial before another jury newly empanelled—*Rahim Sheikh v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 872 (cited under sec. 282).

Where a jury has returned a verdict of not guilty and the Judge disagrees with the jury and discharges them, and then passes an order under sec. 308 making an entry to the effect that no retrial is necessary and that the accused be acquitted, it is not open to the Judge, in making

the order under sec. 308, to pass remarks, implying the guilt of the accused (who is a police officer) and suggesting for the consideration of the Police Department that severe departmental action should be taken against him. The accused, being acquitted, is entitled to the benefit of the order of acquittal and all the consequences which it implies—*Ahmad Shah v. Emp.*, 23 S.L.R. 397, 30 Cr.L.J. 877 (878).

This section does not affect the construction of sec. 403. An accused who is re-tried under this section is not 'tried again' within the meaning of sec. 403 but is being tried on the original indictment and on his original plea of not guilty. Sec. 403 therefore does not bar the retrial held under this section—*Emp v Nirmal*, 41 Cal 1072.

H.—Conclusion of Trial in Cases tried with Assessors.

309. (1) When in a case tried with the aid of assessors, the case for the defence and the prosecutor's reply (if any) are concluded, the Court may sum up the evidence for the prosecution and defence and shall then require each of the assessors to state his opinion orally on all the charges on which the accused has been tried, and shall record such opinion, and for that purpose may ask the assessors such questions as are necessary to ascertain what their opinions are. All such questions and the answers to them shall be recorded.

Delivery of opinions of assessors.

(2) The Judge shall then give judgment, but in doing so shall not be bound to conform to the opinions of the assessors.

Judgment.

(3) If the accused is convicted, the Judge shall, unless he proceeds in accordance with the provisions of Section 562, pass sentence on him according to law.

Change :—This section has been amended by sec. 82 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. The following changes have been made :—(a) The italicised words have been newly added in sub-section (1). "This amendment assimilates the procedure by which assessors give their opinion to that adopted for ascertaining the verdict of the jury, namely, by question and answer"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914). (b) The italicised words have been added in sub-section (3). This amendment is merely verbal, and is the same as that made in sec. 306 (2).

941. Summing up.—The object of summing up the evidence is to enable the Sessions Judge, in long and intricate cases, to place the

evidence in an intelligible form, so as to assist the assessors in arriving at a reasonable conclusion, and not to give the Judge an opportunity of expressing his opinion in emphatic terms on every single matter put in evidence—*Sadulla Hanif v. Emp.*, 9 Cal. 875. In summing up the evidence to the assessors, the Judge should not, as he may do in charging the jury, express any opinion upon any question of facts arising in the case—*K. E. v. Tirumal*, 24 Mad. 523, *Dewan Singh v. Q. E.*, 22 Cal. 865. He should not obtrude on the assessors his own opinion on the worthlessness or otherwise of the evidence, because the assessors might become embarrassed in coming to an independent opinion of their own in the face of the very decided opinion expressed by him—*Sadulla v. Emp.*, 9 Cal. 875. But a discussion and statement of points by a Judge with the assessors with the object of getting the best assistance for the proper adjudication of the case are not improper as the real object of appointing assessors is to assist the Court—*Q. v. Amruteshwar*, 15 W.R. 25. In a case of rioting, where the dispute arises over the possession of a piece of land and the Crown admits the possession of the accused, and the accused themselves urge the plea of private defence, it is the duty of the Sessions Judge to explain to the assessors the legal aspect of the plea put forward by the accused, and to direct their attention to it by putting specific questions to them on the point—*Sunder Bhat v. Emp.* 3 P.L.J. 653 19 Cr.L.J. 993.

Record of summing up—The Sessions Judge should not ask the pleader for the prosecution to record his summing up to the assessors. If the Judge himself is incapable of recording the heads of the summing up, he should avail himself of the services of some Court Officer or direct it to be done by some independent person—*Sadulla v. Emp.* 9 Cal. 875.

942. Opinions of assessors :—A trial is altogether bad if the assessors are not asked and are apparently not allowed to give their opinions in the case—*Nazimuddi v. Emp.*, 40 Cal. 163, 13 Cr.L.J. 497. If a Sessions Judge decides a case without inviting the opinions of the assessors, he virtually holds the trial without the aid of assessors, and his finding or sentence will be without jurisdiction—*Q. v. Matarn Mal*, 22 W.R. 34; *K. E. v. Tirumal*, 24 Mad. 523 (535). Even if he considers the evidence untrustworthy or unsatisfactory or inconsistent he is bound to consult the opinions of the assessors, otherwise he acts without jurisdiction—*Kassu Mal v. Munna Lal*, 111 All. 414. Where in a Sessions trial the accused first pleaded not guilty, but in the course of her examination after the completion of the prosecution evidence, she pleaded guilty, and thereupon the Judge without taking the opinion of the assessors found her guilty and sentenced her, held that it was the duty of the Judge to proceed with the trial as provided by this section and hear the defence and then take the opinions of the assessors—*Emp. v. Bai Nani*, 7 Bom.L.R. 731, 2 Cr.L.J. 609. Where a trial was held for two offences, one with jury and the other with the jurors as assessors, and with regard to the latter offence the Judge convicted the accused

without taking the opinions of the jurors as assessors, the conviction was held to be bad—*Sivaga*, 2 Weir 334.

"The opinions of the assessors should be recorded separately. It is not, in the Court's opinion, sufficient that this record should contain a mere verdict of guilty or not guilty, or proven or not proven; what the Court requires is not only the result arrived at by each assessor sitting on a Sessions trial, but if possible, the reasons by which each assessor arrived at the result—that is, the grounds of his opinion. While avoiding prolixity, a Sessions Judge should be careful to be intelligible and precise in recording such opinions"—*Cal. G. R. & C. O.*, p. 26

The opinions of *all* the assessors should be taken. Where the Judge took the opinions of two only of the assessors, the trial was illegal and not merely irregular—*Rama Krishna v Emp.*, 26 Mad 598. The opinion of each assessor is to be recorded in his own words—*Fatu Santal v K. E.*, 11 P.L.J. 147, 22 Cr.L.J. 417. Each assessor should be required to state his opinion *individually*. The Judge should not receive the *joint* opinion of all the assessors, delivered through one of them—*Sadulla v Emp.*, 9 Cal 875, *Hassan Khan v Emp.*, 1887 P R 41.

Where the accused is being tried on several charges, the assessors should be required to give their opinions on *each* of the charges—*Q v. Matam*, 22 W.R. 34. This is now made clear by the present amendment.

The assessors are to give their opinions *orally*, and not in writing, or in the form of a judgment—*Lalit v Emp.*, 39 Cal 119, 13 Cr L.J. 433.

Consultation between assessors.—There is no provision in this Code authorizing a Judge to allow or forbidding him to allow consultation between the assessors aiding him in trying a case. Though a Judge may allow one assessor to consult his co-assessors before giving his opinion, yet a refusal to allow such a course does not amount to any irregularity, and the Judge is entitled to have before him each assessor's individual and *independent* opinion—*In re Sennimalai*, 2 L.W. 933, 16 Cr.L.J. 717.

Grounds of opinion.—It is very desirable that the assessors should be invited and encouraged by Judges to state briefly the *grounds* of their opinions as well as the result—*Q. E. v. Mahadu*, 2 Bom.L.R. 322; *Q. E. v. Fakira*, 2 Bom L R 323. Assessors are appointed to aid the Judge in the trial and to give their opinions. When the opinion formed by the Judge differs from the opinions formed by the assessors, he should always ascertain the grounds of the assessors' opinions—*Q v Minnat*, 3 W R. 6; *Q. v Bushmo*, 3 W R. 21, *Guranditta v Crown*, 1905 P R. 48, 3 Cr L J 132.

When opinion may be dispensed with.—When there is absolutely no evidence to show that the offence has been committed by the accused, the Judge can abstain from taking the opinions of the assessors—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 388, 391. See sec 289. But the Judge cannot do so, simply because he considers the evidence unsatisfactory or untrust-

worthy—*Kassa Mal v. Munna Lal*, 10 All. 414. When the case is withdrawn by the Public Prosecutor with the consent of the Court, an acquittal should be recorded without taking the opinions of the assessors, or whatever may be their opinions—*Q. E. v. Chenbasapa*, Ratanlal 307.

Reconsidering opinion:—After once summing up the case to the assessors and after taking their opinions, the Judge has no power to reopen the matter and press upon the attention of the assessors a part of the accused's confession, in order to induce them to change their opinions—*Emp v Tika Ram*, 1886 A.W.N 22.

Taking fresh evidence after opinion:—When the opinions of the assessors have been taken, the trial is at an end, except for the purpose of giving judgment. The Judge has no legal authority to reopen a trial or recall witnesses, and cause fresh evidence to be summoned, and take a second and third opinion from the assessors—*Hasan v. Emp.*, 1888 P.R. 29; *Q. E. v. Ram Lal*, 15 All. 136. Where, after the assessors had given their opinions and had been discharged, the Judge sitting alone took some further evidence in the case before writing judgment, the trial was held to be illegal and was set aside—*Jaisukh v. Emp.*, 43 All. 25, 22 Cr.L.J. 127. It is the Judge together with the assessors that constitutes the Court, and not the Judge sitting alone; and all evidence must be recorded by the Judge in the presence of the assessors—*Ibid* In a trial for murder in which the soundness of the accused's mind was at issue, the Judge, after taking the opinions of the assessors, reserved judgment and had a private interview with the Civil Surgeon as to the state of mind of the accused. It was held that the procedure was extremely illegal. Instead of discussing with the Civil Surgeon out of Court, the Judge ought to have examined him as a witness in the presence of the assessors, and the accused ought to have been given an opportunity of cross-examining him—*Q. E. v. Jai Lal*, 1889 A.W.N. 181.

943. Questions to assessors.—Prior to the present amendment, the section did not expressly authorise the Judge to put any question to the assessors, but it was laid down in some cases that if there was anything obscure in their opinions it was open to the Judge to put to them such questions as were necessary to elucidate or supplement their opinions—*Nazimuddi v. Emp.*, 40 Cal. 163; *Ramesh Chandra v. Emp.*, 41 Cal. 350. This is now expressly provided by the present section as amended. But the questions can be asked only after the delivery of the opinion and not before, and for no other purpose except to clear up any obscurity in the verdict. The Judge cannot put questions to the assessors by way of cross-examination—*Nazimuddi*, 40 Cal. 163, 13 Cr.L.J. 497; *Ramesh Chandra*, 41 Cal. 350, 18 C.W.N. 496, 15 Cr.L.J. 395.

944. Judgment:—In passing judgment the Judge is not bound to conform to the opinions of the assessors. Although the assessors no doubt assist the Judge and regard must be paid to their opinions, *K. E. v. Tirumal*, 24 Mad. 523, still it is the Judge who has to decide the case

on the facts as well as the law, and he is not bound by the assessors' opinions—*Emp. v. Shanker*, 14 Bom.L.R. 710, 13 Cr.L.J. 677. But the Judge cannot convict the accused for an offence in respect of which the opinions of the assessors were not taken. Thus, the accused was charged with and tried for abetment of murder. The opinion of the assessors was that he was not guilty of the offence charged. The Sessions Judge accepted the opinion, but convicted the accused of causing evidence of murder to disappear under sec. 201 I.P.C. Held that it was imperative on the Judge to have taken the opinions of the assessors on the charge relating to sec. 201 I.P.C. The conviction and sentence must be set aside—*Emp. v. Appaya*, 25 Bom.L.R. 1318 (1320), 26 Cr.L.J. 304. But in the recent case of *Emp. v. Ismail*, 52 Bom 385, 29 Cr.L.J. 403 (405), Fawcett J. has expressed the opinion that the case of *Emp. v. Appaya*, (supra) must be regarded as overruled by the Privy Council decision in *Begu v. Emp.*, 6 Lah 226 (P.C.), 26 Cr.L.J. 1059, where their Lordships upheld the action of the Sessions Judge in convicting the accused of an offence under section 201 I.P. Code although he was charged with murder.

The Judge should form his opinion on the evidence at the trial, and not merely upon the views of the committing Magistrate—*Dewan Singh v. Q. E.*, 22 Cal 805

The judgment must be recorded. But failure to record judgment does not invalidate the trial, but is only an irregularity curable by sec. 537—*Savu Pasunbadi*, 2 Weir 392

The judgment must contain all the particulars specified in sec. 367, even though the trial is held with the aid of jurors as assessors. A reference to the heads of the charges to the jury is not sufficient—*Q. E. v. Dattu*, Ratanlal 426

It is neither convenient nor commendable for the Sessions Judge to embody his summing up to the assessors, in his judgment. But his doing so does not make the judgment illegal or vitiate it so as to render it invalid—*Khudiram v. Emp.*, 9 C.L.J. 55, 3 I.C. 625

The judgment must be recorded by the Judge who held the trial. Whether after the assessors had given their opinions, the Judge left the district without recording his judgment, and his successor, after considering the evidence recorded at the trial, convicted and sentenced the accused, the conviction was set aside and a retrial ordered—*Q. v. Ramdoyal*, 21 W.R. 47

Cancellation of trial—The accused were committed to the Sessions on a certain charge. At the commencement of the trial, two more charges were added. The trial then proceeded up to the point where the assessors' opinions were taken. The Judge reserved judgment but in writing it, he was of opinion that one of the charges was improperly added, and he therefore cancelled the trial and held a fresh trial. It was held that the second trial was invalid, because the trial Judge had no authority to cancel or set aside the trial which had been originally held; and the assessors' opinions having been recorded, he

worthy—*Kassa Mal v. Manna Lal*, 10 All. 414. When the case is withdrawn by the Public Prosecutor with the consent of the Court, an acquittal should be recorded without taking the opinions of the assessors, or whatever may be their opinions—*Q. E. v. Chenbasapa*, Ratanlal 307.

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Taking fresh evidence after opinion:—When the opinions of the assessors have been taken, the trial is at an end, except for the purpose of giving judgment. The Judge has no legal authority to reopen a trial or recall witnesses, and cause fresh evidence to be summoned, and take a second and third opinion from the assessors—*Hasan v. Emp.*, 1888 P.R. 29; *Q. E. v. Ram Lal*, 15 All. 136. Where, after the assessors had given their opinions and had been discharged, the Judge sitting alone took some further evidence in the case before writing judgment, the trial was held to be illegal and was set aside—*Jaisukh v. Emp.*, 43 All. 25, 22 Cr.L.J. 127. It is the Judge together with the assessors that constitutes the Court, and not the Judge sitting alone, and all evidence must be recorded by the Judge in the presence of the assessors—*Ibid*. In a trial for murder in which the soundness of the accused's mind was at issue, the Judge, after taking the opinions of the assessors, reserved judgment and had a private interview with the Civil Surgeon as to the state of mind of the accused. It was held that the procedure was extremely illegal. Instead of discussing with the Civil Surgeon out of Court, the Judge ought to have examined him as a witness in the presence of the assessors, and the accused ought to have been given an opportunity of cross-examining him—*Q. E. v. Jai Lal*, 1889 A.W.N. 181.

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(c) If he answers that he has been so previously convicted, the Judge may proceed to pass sentence on him accordingly; but, if he denies that he has been so previously convicted, or refuses to or does not, answer such question, the jury or the Court and the assessors (as the case may be) shall then hear evidence concerning such previous conviction, and in such case (where the trial is by jury), it shall not be necessary to swear the jurors again."

It should be noted that clause (b) of the present section is entirely new. This clause has been added in order to avoid the inconvenience which may at present arise in cases tried by assessors whose opinion is not binding on the Judge. Under the amendment, in any trial held with the aid of assessors, the Court is given a discretion to proceed or refrain from proceeding with the trial of the accused on the charge of the previous conviction—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914)

945. Scope and object of section—This section applies to trials before a Court of Session and not to trials before a Magistrate—*Dehri Sonar v Emp*, 50 Cal 367. The law as to the taking of evidence of previous conviction in a trial before a Magistrate has been enacted in the new section 255A.

The object of this section in prohibiting the proof of previous conviction to be put in until the accused is convicted, is to prevent the accused from being prejudiced at the trial—*Maung E Gyi v. Emp.*, 1 Rang. 520. Therefore, where in the course of a trial a witness was allowed to say that he had heard that the accused was an old offender, the verdict was set aside, because the improper statement of the witness might have influenced the verdict of the jury—*Q E v Jhinguri*, 1890 A.W.N. 12. The provisions of this section are imperative and must be strictly complied with. Where an accused is undergoing a trial, only the charge relating to his previous conviction shall not be read until he has been convicted or the opinions of the assessors have been recorded on the charge of the present offence. Where both charges were read out to the assessors at the commencement of the trial, held that the trial was vitiated, and the conviction and sentence must be set aside—*Raju v. Emp*, 28 Cr.L.J. 667 (668) (Lah). Where the charge in regard to the previous convictions and the portion of the statement of the accused before the committing Magistrate admitting such previous convictions were read to the assessors before the conclusion of the trial for the substantive offence, the trial was vitiated—*Teka Ahir v K E*, 22 Cr. L.J. 719, 5 P.L.J. 706. The jury ought to be informed that the accused is charged with previous conviction, only after their verdict is taken and never before—*Chundi Perugadu*, 2 Weir 393. And the record should invariably show that no reference to previous conviction has been made until the subsequent offence has been found proved against the accused—*Krishto Behari v Emp.*, 12 C.L.R. 555. A Judge's direction to the jury to consider proof of previous conviction as evidence regarding the character of the prisoner amounts to a misdirection—*Roshun v Emp*, 5 Cal 769. But where no failure of justice was caused i.e. where the accused was

not prejudiced (e.g. in a *prima facie* case of theft), the High Court refused to interfere in a case in which the accused was called upon to plead simultaneously to a charge of theft and previous conviction—*Behar Behari v. Emp.*, 13 C.L.R. 110.

946. Previous conviction :—The previous conviction referred to in this section must be a conviction within British India. A conviction outside British India (e.g. in Berar) does not fall within the purview of this section, and cannot be taken into account for the purpose of affecting the punishment on a second conviction in British India. But it is not absolutely improper, however, to take such conviction into consideration—*Emp. v. Lalsingh*, 7 C.P.L.R. 24.

The charge alleging the previous conviction need not show the amount of the former punishment—*Anonymous*, 4 M.H.C.R. App 11.

How to prove—If the accused admits that he had been previously convicted, the Judge is justified under this section in passing sentence upon such admission—*Yasin v. K. E.*, 28 Cal. 689; *In re Subramanian*, 1916 M.W.N. 327, 17 Cr.L.J. 288, especially when the Magistrate passes a sentence which is legal even without proof of the previous conviction—*In re Subramanian*, *supra*. But if he does not plead to the charge of previous conviction, it cannot be proved by an extract from the record of previous conviction without proof of identity—*Chundi Perugadu*, 2 Weir 393; *Tuki Mahomed v. Kisto Nath*, 15 W.R. 53. See also notes under section 511

311. Notwithstanding anything in the last foregoing section, evidence of the previous conviction may be given at the trial for the subsequent offence, if the fact of the previous conviction is relevant under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

In a trial of offences under secs 395 and 402 I. P. C., the evidence of previous conviction is not permissible under sec. 54 of the Evidence Act, no evidence having been previously offered of the accused's good character. Nor does sec. 11 or 14 of the Evidence Act justify the admission of such evidence—*Teka Ahir v. K. E.*, 5 P.L.J. 706, 22 Cr.L.J. 719.

J.—List of Jurors for High Court, and summoning Jurors for that Court.

312. The names of not more than four hundred persons shall at any one time be entered in the special jurors' list.

Number of special jurors.

312. The High Court may prescribe the number of persons whose names shall be entered at any one time in the special

Number of special jurors.

jurors' list, provided that no definite number of Europeans or of Americans or of Indians shall be so prescribed.

This section has been redrafted by sec 18 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, XII of 1923. The reason of this amendment is thus stated: "The High Court special jury list should in our opinion be revised and it should no longer be limited to 200 Europeans and 200 non-Europeans. It should include all who are qualified, to whatever nationality they may belong. This revision will probably increase the proportion of non-Europeans in the list. This proposal involves the amendment of section 312 of the Code"—*Report of the Racial Distinctions Committee, Para. 25.*

313. (1) The Clerk of the Crown shall, before the first day of April in each year, and subject to such rules as the High Court from time to time prescribes, prepare—

Lists of common and special jurors

(a) a list of all persons liable to serve as common jurors; and

(b) a list of persons liable to serve as special jurors only.

(2) Regard shall be had, in the preparation of the latter list, to the property, character and education of the persons whose names are entered therein.

(3) No person shall be entitled to have his name entered in the special jurors' list merely because he may have been entered in the special jurors' list for a previous year.

(4) The Governor-General in Council or the Local Government in the case of the High Court at Fort William in Bengal, and in the case of other High Courts the Local Government, may exempt any salaried officer of Government from serving as a juror.

(5) The Clerk of the Crown shall, subject to such rules as aforesaid, have full discretion to prepare the said list as seems to him to be proper, and there shall be no appeal from or review of his decision.

Discretion of officer preparing lists.

not prejudiced (e.g. in a *prima facie* case of theft), the High Court refused to interfere in a case in which the accused was called upon to plead simultaneously to a charge of theft and previous conviction—*Bepin Behari v. Emp.*, 13 C.L.R. 110

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(5) The Clerk of the Crown shall, subject to such rules as aforesaid, have full discretion to prepare the said list as seems to him to be proper, and there shall

Discretion of officer preparing lists.

be no appeal from or review of his decision.

The drawing up of the list of special jurors is entirely in the discretion of the Clerk of the Crown and the High Court will not interfere—*In re Sham Chand*, 1 Ind. Jur. (N. S.) 106.

314. (1) Preliminary lists of persons liable to serve as common jurors and as special jurors, respectively, signed by the Clerk of the Crown, shall be published once in the local official Gazette before the fifteenth day of April next after their preparation.

(2) Revised lists of persons liable to serve as common jurors and special jurors, respectively, signed as aforesaid, shall be published once in the local official Gazette before the first day of May next after their preparation.

(3) Copies of the said lists shall be affixed to some conspicuous part of the Court-house.

315. (1) Out of the persons named in the revised lists aforesaid, there shall be summoned for each session in the town which is the usual place of sitting of each High Court, as many of those who are liable to serve on special or common juries, respectively, as the Clerk of the Crown considers necessary.

(2) No person shall be so summoned more than once in six months unless the number cannot be made up without him.

(3) If, during the continuance of any sessions, it appears that the number of persons so summoned is not sufficient, such number as may be necessary of other persons liable to serve as aforesaid shall be summoned for such sessions.

The words "in the town.High Court" have been substituted for the words "in each Presidency town." A similar amendment has been made in sec. 316 and in the third proviso of section 276

The words "as many of ...necessary" have been substituted for the words "at least twenty-seven of those who are liable to serve on special juries, and fifty four of those who are liable to serve on common juries" by section 84 of the Cr. P. Code Amendment Act XVIII of 1923.

316. Whenever a High Court has given notice of its intention to hold sittings at any place outside the town which is the usual place of sitting of such High Court for the exercise of its original criminal jurisdiction, the Court of Session at such place shall, subject to any direction which may be given by the High Court, summon a sufficient number of jurors from its own list, in the manner hereinafter prescribed for summoning jurors to the Court of Session.

The italicised words have been substituted for the words "Presidency towns" by sec. 85 of the Cr. P. Code Amendment Act XVIII of 1923. Similar amendment occurs in secs. 276 and 315.

317. (1) In addition to the persons so summoned as jurors, the said Court of Session shall, if it thinks needful, after communication with the commanding officer, cause to be summoned such number of commissioned and non-commissioned officers in Her Majesty's Army or Air Force resident within ten miles of its place of sitting as the Court considers to be necessary to make up the juries required for the trial of persons charged with offences before the High Court as aforesaid.

(2) All officers so summoned shall be liable to serve on such juries notwithstanding anything contained in this Code; but no such officer shall be summoned whom his Commanding Officer desires to have excused on the ground of urgent official duty, or for any other special official reason.

In sub-section (1) the words 'or Air Force' have been added, and in sub-section (2) the word 'official' has been substituted for 'military,' by the Repealing and Amending Act (X of 1927).

318. Any person summoned under Section 315, Section 316, or Section 317, who, without lawful excuse, fails to attend as required by the summons, or who, having attended, departs without having obtained the permission of the Judge, or fails to attend after an adjournment of the Court after being ordered to attend, shall be deemed guilty of a contempt and be liable, by

order of the Judge, to such fine as he thinks fit; and in default of payment of such fine, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months in the civil jail until the fine is paid:

Provided that the Court may in its discretion remit any fine or imprisonment so imposed.

K.—List of Jurors and Assessors for Court of Session, and summoning Jurors and Assessors for that Court.

319. All male persons between the ages of twenty-one and sixty shall, except as next hereinafter mentioned, be liable to serve as jurors or assessors at any trial, held within the district in which they reside, or, if the Local Government, on consideration of local circumstances, has fixed any smaller area in this behalf, within the area so fixed.

Where the Sessions Judge of Kanara asked the High Court for special permission to hold his Court at Sirsi instead of at Karwar, the High Court declined to permit it, as no assessors could be called upon to attend at Sirsi, which was outside the area fixed—*In re Karwar Sessions Judge's Letter*, Ratanlal 304

320. The following persons are exempt from liability to serve as jurors or assessors, namely:—

Exemptions.

- (a) officers in civil employ superior in rank to a District Magistrate;
- (aa) *members of either Chamber of the Indian Legislature and members of a Legislative Council constituted under the Government of India Act;*
- (b) salaried Judges;
- (c) Commissioners and Collectors of Revenue or Customs;
- (d) police-officers and persons engaged in the Preventive Service in the Customs Department;
- (e) persons engaged in the collection of the revenue whom the Collector thinks fit to exempt on the ground of official duty;

- (f) persons actually officiating as priests or ministers of their respective religions;
- (g) persons in Her Majesty's Army or Air Force, except when, by any law in force for the time being, they are specially made liable to serve as jurors or assessors;
- (h) surgeons and others who openly and constantly practise the medical profession;
- (i) legal practitioners (as defined by the Legal Practitioners' Act, 1879), in actual practice;
- (j) persons employed in the Post Office and Telegraph Departments;
- (k) persons exempted from personal appearance in Court under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, Sections 640 and 641;
- (l) other persons exempted by the Local Government from liability to serve as jurors or assessors.

Change :—Clause (aa) has been added by the Legislative Members Exemption Act XXIII of 1925, on the recommendation of the Reforms Inquiry Committee (contained in Para. 91 of their Report) that members of the legislatures in India should be exempt from sitting as jurors or assessors in criminal trials—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (Gazette of India, 1925, Part V, p 180).

321. (1) The Sessions Judge, and the Collector of the district or such other officer as the Local Government appoints in this behalf, shall prepare and make out in alphabetical order a list of persons liable to serve as jurors or assessors and qualified in the judgment of the Sessions Judge and Collector or other officer as aforesaid to serve as such, and not likely to be successfully objected to under Section 278, clauses (b) to (h), both inclusive.

(2) The list shall contain the name, place of abode and quality of business of every such person; and, if the person is an European or an American, the list shall mention the race to which he belongs.

order of the Judge, to such fine as he thinks fit; and in default of payment of such fine, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months in the civil jail until the fine is paid:

Provided that the Court may in its discretion remit any fine or imprisonment so imposed.

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Where the Sessions Judge of Kanara asked the High Court for special permission to hold his Court at Sirsi instead of at Karwar, the High Court declined to permit it, as no assessors could be called upon to attend at Sirsi, which was outside the area fixed—*In re Karwar Sessions Judge's Letter, Ratanlal 304.*

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- (d) police-officers and persons engaged in the Preventive Service in the Customs Department;
- (e) persons engaged in the collection of the revenue whom the Collector thinks fit to exempt on the ground of official duty;

(2) In the event of a difference of opinion between the Sessions Judge and the Collector or other officer as aforesaid, the name of the proposed juror or assessor shall be omitted from the list.

(3) A copy of the revised list shall be signed by the Sessions Judge and Collector or other officer as aforesaid and sent to the Court of Session.

(4) Any order of the Sessions Judge and Collector or other officer as aforesaid in preparing and revising the list shall be final.

(5) Any exemption not claimed under this section shall be deemed to be waived until the list is next revised.

(6) The list so prepared and revised shall be again revised once in every year.

Annual revision of list.

(7) The list so revised shall be deemed a new list and shall be subject to all the rules hereinbefore contained as to the list originally prepared.

All Collectors should exercise great care in the revision of the jurors' list so as to include all qualified persons of intelligence who are liable to serve and to exclude unfit persons—*Mad. G. O. No. 474*, dated 16th March 1889. The list should show against each person the language or languages understood by him—*C. P. Cr. Cir, Pt. II, No. 33*.

325. In the case of any district for which the Local

Government has declared that the trial of certain offences shall, if the Judge so direct, be by special jury, the Sessions Judge and the Collector of such district or other officer as aforesaid shall prepare, in addition to the revised list hereinbefore prescribed, a special list containing the names of such jurors as are borne on the revised list and are, in the opinion of such Sessions Judge and Collector or other officer as aforesaid, by reason of their possessing superior qualifications in respect of property, character or education, fit persons to serve as special jurors: Provided always that the inclusion of the name of any person in such special list shall not involve the removal of his name from the revised list nor relieve him

Preparation of list of special jurors.

of his liability to serve as an ordinary juror in cases not tried by special jury.

326. (1) The Sessions Judge shall ordinarily, seven days at least before the day which he may from time to time fix for holding the sessions, send a letter to the District Magistrate requesting him to summon as many persons named in the said revised list or the said special list as seem to the Sessions Judge to be needed for trials by jury and trials with the aid of assessors at the said sessions, the number to be summoned not being less than double the number required for any such trial, and including, where any accused person is an European or an American, as many Europeans or Americans as may be required for the purpose of choosing jurors or assessors for the trial.

(2) The names of the persons to be summoned shall be drawn by lot in open Court, excluding those who have served within six months, unless the number cannot be made up without them; and the names so drawn shall be specified in the said letter.

(3) Where the accused requires and is entitled to be tried under the provisions of section 275, there shall be chosen by lot, in the manner prescribed by or under section 276, from the whole number of persons returned the jurors who are to constitute the jury until a jury containing the proper number of Europeans or Europeans and Americans or of Indians as the case may be, has been obtained:

Provided that, in any case in which the proper number of Europeans or Americans cannot otherwise be obtained, the Court may, in its discretion for the purpose of constituting the jury, summon any person excluded from the list on the ground of his being exempted under section 320.

(4) Where under the proviso to subsection (3), the Court proposes to summon as a juror any person in His Majesty's Army, the provisions of section 317 shall apply in like manner as they apply for the purpose of the summoning of military jurors for a trial under section 316.

The italicised words have been added by sec. 19 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, XII of 1923.

947. Sections 326 and 327 contemplate as the ordinary or normal procedure that all assessors should be summoned on the first day on which a criminal Session commences, however many trials it may be proposed to hold in the course of that Session—*Chutta v. Emp.*, 17 Cr.L.J. 17 (All.).

The duty of issuing a precept to the District Magistrate to summon jurors and assessors is imposed upon the Sessions Judge himself, it cannot be performed by a Subordinate Judge in temporary charge of the current duties of the Court of Session—*Anonymous*, Ratanlal 148.

Where owing to the fact that only three jurors attended the Court, the Judge summoned jurors from among the residents of the town on the day fixed for the trial, held that the jury as constituted was not a proper jury; the Judge ought to have summoned the jurors after drawing their names by lot from the list of persons liable to serve on the jury, in accordance with sub-section (2), but instead of doing so, he chose persons specially selected (a thing which the Legislature has taken special pains to render impossible), this was a serious irregularity which could not be cured by sec. 537—*Brojendra v K E.*, 7 C W N 188

'Double the number required' —See 55 Cal 794, 33 C W.N. 1053 and other cases cited under sec. 274

327. The Court of Session may direct jurors or assessors to be summoned at other periods than the period specified in section 326, when the number of trials before the Court renders the attendance of one set of jurors or assessors for a whole session oppressive or whenever for other reasons such direction is found to be necessary.

328. Every summons to a juror or assessor shall be in writing, and shall require his attendance as a juror or assessor as the case may be, at a time and place to be therein specified.

329. When any person summoned to serve as a juror or assessor is in the service of Government or of a Railway Company, the Court to serve in which he is so summoned may excuse his attendance if it appears on the representation of the head of the office in which he is employed that he cannot serve as a juror

or assessor, as the case may be, without inconvenience to the public.

Court may excuse attendance of juror or assessor.

330. (1) The Court of Session may for reasonable cause excuse any juror or assessor from attendance at any particular session.

Court may relieve special jurors from liability to serve again as jurors for twelve months.

(2) The Court of Session may, if it shall think fit, at the conclusion of any trial by special jury, direct that the jurors who have served on such jury shall not be summoned to serve again as jurors for a period of twelve months.

List of jurors and assessors attending.

331. (1) At each session the said Court shall cause to be made a list of the names of those who have attended as jurors and assessors at such session.

(2) Such list shall be kept with the list of the jurors and assessors as revised under section 324.

(3) A reference shall be made in the margin of the said revised list to each of the names which are mentioned in the list prepared under this section.

Penalty for non-attendance of juror or assessor.

332. (1) Any person summoned to attend as a juror or as an assessor who, without lawful excuse, fails to attend as required by the summons, or who, having attended, departs without having obtained the permission of the Court, or fails to attend after an adjournment of the Court, after being ordered to attend, shall be liable by order of the Court of Session to a fine not exceeding one hundred rupees.

(2) Such fine shall be levied by the District Magistrate by attachment and sale of any moveable property belonging to such juror or assessor within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court making the order.

(3) For good cause shown, the Court may remit or reduce any fine so imposed.

(4) In default of recovery of the fine by attachment and sale, such juror or assessor may, by order of the Court of Session, be imprisoned in the civil jail for the

term of fifteen days, unless such fine is paid before the end of the said term.

948. Gentlemen on the jury list are under no obligation to notify their change of address to the Court before leaving their usual place of residence, or to make any arrangement for the acceptance of notice and for the giving of information to the Court that he would be unable to attend. Therefore, where summons was served by affixing the duplicate on the door of the dwelling house of a juror, who at the time was living away from home, and had no knowledge of such service, held that he was not liable to fine for non-attendance—*Moni Lal v Emp*, 6 C.W.N. 887.

The summons to a juror or assessor must be served in the manner provided by sec 69. The issue of summons to a juror or assessor by a registered letter is illegal, and no fine can be imposed for the non-attendance of the juror or assessor in such a case—*In re Sarat Chandra*, 1 C.W.N. cxvi.

The order of a Sessions Judge under this section fining an assessor is not appealable—*Bisseshur*, 8 W R. 83

L.—Special Provisions for High Courts.

333. At any stage of any trial before a High Court under this Code, before the return of the verdict, the Advocate General may, if he thinks fit, inform the Court on behalf of Her Majesty that he will not further prosecute the defendant upon the charge; and thereupon all proceedings on such charge against the defendant shall be stayed, and he shall be discharged of and from the same. But such discharge shall not amount to an acquittal unless the presiding Judge otherwise directs.

949. *Nolle prosequi* :—After the trial had commenced and the evidence partly gone into, the Judge retired from the case under sec. 556 as he was a share-holder of the prosecuting Bank, and the case was adjourned without the jury being discharged. The Chief Justice purporting to act under Cl. 13 of the Charter Act appointed another Judge to preside at the trial of the accused. In answer to a question by the Judge, the Standing Counsel intimated that he intended proceeding with the trial from the point where it had been left, whereupon it was contended on behalf of the accused that the presiding Judge could not proceed with the trial as the previous Judge and the jury empanelled before him had still the seisin of the case. The Advocate General thereupon, in order to get rid of the many difficulties arising out of the case, entered a *nolle prosequi*, and the accused was discharged—*Emp v. Khagendra*, 2 C.W.N. 481. In a trial before the High Court Sessions, the jury were divided in the proportion of six to three. But the Judge, without ascertaining what the verdict of the majority was, discharged the jury and ordered a retrial. The

retrial came before another Judge and another jury, and it was contended on behalf of the accused that as the previous Judge had discharged the jury without ascertaining what their verdict was and whether he agreed or disagreed with the verdict of the majority, the discharge of the jury was illegal and the previous Judge had still the seisin of the case, and no other Judge could try it. As the question was of some difficulty, the Advocate General entered a *nolle prosequi*, and the Judge discharged the accused—*Emp. v. Jatindra*, 8 C.W.N. xlviii. In another Calcutta case the jury in the first trial returned a unanimous verdict of not guilty on the main charge of murder, and were divided in the proportion of 5 to 4 on other counts. In the second trial on the remaining counts (ordered under sec. 308 Cr. P. C.) the jury returned a verdict of not guilty by a majority of seven to two. The Judge disagreed with the verdict. The accused was brought up again before the learned Judge "to be dealt with according to law." The Advocate General thereupon appeared and entered a *nolle prosequi*—*Emp. v. Nirmal Kanta Roy*, 41 Cal. 1072. After the close of the case for the prosecution and just as the counsel for the defence was going to call his witnesses, the foreman of the jury suddenly informed the Court that they had come to a unanimous verdict as to the guilt of the accused and did not desire to hear anything more. Upon this, the Counsel for accused said that it was a misbehaviour on the part of the jury to give a verdict without hearing the evidence for the defence; he therefore asked the Court to discharge the jury and to empanel a fresh jury. But the Advocate General entered a *nolle prosequi*—*Emp. v. Olu Muhammad*, 7 C.W.N. xxxi.

Discharge—Acquittal—In *Emp. v. Jatindra*, 8 C.W.N. xlviii, the Judge ordered that the discharge amounted to an acquittal, but in *Emp. v. Nirmal*, 41 Cal. 1072 and *Emp. v. Olu Md.*, 7 C.W.N. xxxi, the Judge simply discharged the accused but did not acquit him.

An order of discharge under this section is no bar to fresh proceedings being taken before a competent Magistrate upon complaint or upon a Police report or under section 190 (c). In spite of an order of discharge passed under sec. 333, the accused may be sent up for trial upon the same charges, and the order of discharge does not require to be set aside for initiation of fresh proceedings on the same charges—*Emp. v. Sheikh Idoo*, 40 Cal. 71. But in a recent case the same High Court has been of opinion that an order of discharge passed on a *nolle prosequi* entered under this section puts an end to the indictment on which the prisoner is brought before the Court, and he cannot be subsequently proceeded against on the same charge—*Emp. v. Jitendra Nath*, 52 Cal. 590, 26 Cr.L.J. 1397. It is curious that no reference was made in this case to the earlier case of 40 Cal. 71.

334. For the exercise of its original criminal jurisdiction every High Court shall hold sittings on such days and at such convenient intervals as the Chief

Justice of such Court from time to time appoints.

Time of holding sittings.

335. (1) The High Court shall hold its sittings at the place at which it now holds them, or at such other place (if any) as the Governor-General in Council in the case of the High Court at Fort William, or the Local Government in the case of the other High Courts, may direct.

(2) But it may, from time to time, in the case of the High Court at Fort William with the consent of the Governor-General in Council, and in all other cases with the consent of the Local Government, hold sittings at such other places within the local limits of its appellate jurisdiction as the High Court appoints.

(3) Such officer as the Chief Justice directs shall give notice beforehand in the local official Gazette of all sittings intended to be held for the exercise of the original criminal jurisdiction of the High Court.

336. (Repealed.)

This section which dealt with the place of trial of European British subjects has been repealed by sec. 20 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, XII of 1923

CHAPTER XXIV.

GENERAL PROVISIONS AS TO INQUIRIES AND TRIALS.

<p>337. (1) In the case of any offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session or High Court, the District Magistrate, a Presidency Magistrate, any Magistrate of the first class inquiring into the offence, or, with the sanction of the District Magistrate, any</p>	<p>337. (1) In the case of any offence triable exclusively by the Court Court or Court of Session, or any offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to ten years, or any offence punishable under section 211 of the Indian Penal Code with im-</p>
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other Magistrate, may with the view of obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in, or privy to, the offence under inquiry, tender a pardon to such person on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to such offence, and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof.

prisonment which may extend to seven years, or any offence under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code, namely sections 216A, 369, 401, 435, and 477A, the District Magistrate, a Presidency Magistrate, a Sub-divisional Magistrate or any Magistrate of the first class may, at any stage of the investigation or inquiry into, or the trial of, the offence, with a view to obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to the offence, tender a pardon to such person on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence, and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof :

Provided that, where the offence is under inquiry or trial, no Magistrate of the first class other than the District Magistrate shall exercise the power hereby conferred unless he is the Magistrate making the inquiry or holding the trial, and, where the offence is

under investigation, no such Magistrate shall exercise the said power unless he is a Magistrate having jurisdiction in a place where the offence might be inquired into or tried and the sanction of the District Magistrate has been obtained to the exercise thereof.

(4) Every Magistrate other than a Presidency Magistrate, who tenders a pardon under this section, shall record his reasons for so doing; and when any Magistrate has made such tender and examined the person to whom it has been made he shall not try the case himself, although the offence which the accused appears to have committed may be triable by such Magistrate.

(2) Every person accepting a tender under this section shall be examined as a witness in the case.

(1A) Every Magistrate ** who tenders a pardon under subsection (1) shall record his reasons for so doing, and shall, on application made by the accused, furnish him with a copy of such record;

Provided that the accused shall pay for the same unless the Magistrate for some special reason thinks fit to furnish it free of cost.

(2) Every person accepting a tender under this section shall be examined as a witness in the Court of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence and in the subsequent trial, if any.

(2A) In every case where a person has accepted a tender of pardon and has been examined under subsection (2), the Magistrate before whom the proceed-

ings are pending shall, if he is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is guilty of an offence, commit him for trial to the Court of Session or High Court as the case may be.

(3) Such person, if not on bail, shall be detained in custody until the termination of the trial by the Court of Session or High Court, as the case may be.

(3) Such person unless he is already on bail shall be detained in custody until the termination of the trial.
* *

Change—This section has been amended by sec. 86 of the Cr.P.C. Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923). The principal changes are:—

(a) The old section was restricted to offences triable by the High Court or the Court of Session. the new section includes several other offences

(b) A change has been made as regards the Magistrates who can tender pardon. "The Magistrates who should be allowed to tender a pardon should, in our opinion, be Magistrates of the first class who are inquiring into the offence and any District Magistrate, Presidency Magistrate, Sub-divisional Magistrate, or, with the sanction of the District Magistrate, a Magistrate of the first class, having jurisdiction in any place where the offence might be inquired into or tried"—*Report of the Joint Committee (192)*

(c) The power to tender a pardon should be exercisable during an investigation as well as after a magistral inquiry has begun—*Ibid.*

(d) Subsection (4) of the section has been omitted. The first part of that sub-section has now been re-enacted as sub-section (1A); and the latter part has been omitted as unnecessary in view of the new sub-section (2A). See the *Report of the Select Committee of 1916*.

950. Scope—offences—The old section applied only to offences triable exclusively by the Court of Session—*Asghar Ali*, 2 All 260; *Subramaniya Aiyar*, 25 Mad. 61 (66), *Q. E. v Dala*, 10 Bom. 190; *Mahandu v. Emp.*, 1 Lah. 102; *Shcobhajan v. Emp.*, 2 P.L.T. 125, *Sardara v. Emp.*, 22 Cr.L.J. 676 (Lah.). These cases are now rendered obsolete by reason of the change made in this section

But where several offences are being inquired together, the fact that some of the offences do not fall under this section will not debar the Magistrate from granting pardon in respect of the offences which fall under it. All that this Section requires is that the offence in respect of which pardon is tendered must be an offence described herein—*Harumal*

v. Crown, 16 Cr.L.J. 632, 9 S.L.R. 43, *Balmokund v Crown*, 1915 P.R. 17, 16 Cr.L.J. 354; *Ismail v. Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1045 (Nag)

The words "triable exclusively by the Court of Session" mean an offence shown in the second schedule as so triable. A charge under sec 395, I. P. C. does not cease to be an offence triable exclusively by a Court of Session, merely because the charge is triable by, and in fact has been tried by, a District Magistrate under sec 30 of this Code—*Bhallu v. Emp.*, 1897 P.R. 3. So also, a valid pardon, once having been validly given, is not affected by the fact that after the pardon, the Sessions Judge at the trial altered the charges from those framed by the Magistrate to some other offences—*Kouromal v. Crown*, 25 Cr.L.J. 1057, 19 S.L.R. 183.

950A. Secs. 347 and 494 :—Sec. 337 does not suggest the idea that the only method of obtaining the evidence of a co-accused against another is by tendering him a pardon, another way of obtaining his evidence is to withdraw the prosecution against him under sec 494. Secs 337 does not govern sec 494 nor abridges in any way the wide words of sec 494. Sec 337 appears in another connection and deals only with granting pardon to an under-trial prisoner in some serious cases. If he satisfies the conditions of pardon, he gets acquitted, if not, he may be tried for the offence. But if a case is withdrawn under sec. 491, he may, if he is discharged, be tried for the offence which he admits in his examination as a witness to have committed, and if he is acquitted, he cannot be retried, even though he refuses to give his evidence for the prosecution—*G. V. Raman v. Emp.*, 56 Cal. 1023, 33 C.W.N. 468 (473).

951. Pardon :—*When can be tendered :—*Under the old section, a pardon could be tendered only in an inquiry (see the words 'offence under inquiry') but not during an investigation—*Emp v Motilal Hiralal*, 46 Bom 61, 22 Cr.L.J. 728. But the Lahore High Court held that the word 'inquiry' in the section included everything done by the Magistrate whether the case was challinced or not, and therefore pardon could be tendered where the offence was only under investigation by the police—*Sher Muhammad v Crown*, 3 Lah 431, *Bhallu v Emp* 1897 P.R. 3. This was also the view in Sind—*Crown v Andal*, 5 S.L.R. 174, 13 Cr.L.J. 33. This conflict of opinion has now been removed by the present amendment and under the present section it can be tendered at any stage of the investigation as well.

All that this section requires is that there should be an investigation in progress regarding the offence. If at the date of the pardon, proceedings were going on against the accused for an offence mentioned in the section, the pardon is perfectly legal, and the approver is a witness against the accused—*Ismail Panju v Emp.*, 21 Cr.L.J. 1045 (Nag). A pardon may be tendered to a person even after a charge has been framed against him—*Mangu v. Emp.*, 22 Cr.L.J. 1045. A pardon can be tendered to an approver during the trial of the offence even though the principal offender has absconded and the court may therefore proceed. In such a case the approver's statement is admissible.

under sec. 512—*In re Dagdu*, 46 Bom. 120, 22 Cr L.J. 620 This section does not require that a trial or an inquiry should be in progress at the time the pardon is tendered. Therefore, a pardon is not illegal by reason of the fact that at the time when the Magistrate had granted pardon he had adjourned the case under sec. 526(8). Although the Magistrate had postponed the investigation or inquiry, he did not become *functus officio*, he had not ceased to be the Magistrate who would be or was investigating or inquiring into the offence. The Magistrate was the only Magistrate who at that time had jurisdiction to inquire into the case—*Bal Chand v. Emp.*, 49 All 181, 27 Cr L.J. 1369, 24 A.L.J. 1050.

Who can grant pardon —See notes under "Change" above. Where the offence is under investigation, the Magistrate (other than the District Magistrate) tendering pardon must have jurisdiction over the offence. A Magistrate of one district cannot tender pardon to a person implicated in an offence committed in another district and inquired into in the latter district. The pardon so tendered is illegal and cannot be validated by the operation of sec 529—*Q E v. Chidda*, 20 All. 40

Where the offence is under investigation, the Magistrate can grant pardon only with the sanction of the District Magistrate. This sanction should be a written sanction: but an oral sanction, though irregular, would be valid—*Sultan Khan v K. E.*, 5 A.L.J. 691, 8 Cr.L.J. 445 (450)

A Deputy Commissioner trying a case triable exclusively by the Sessions Court, under the powers conferred by sec. 30, can offer a conditional pardon to an accused under this section—*Paban Singh v. Emp.*, 10 C.W.N. 847

Power of Local Government —The Local Government has no power to offer a conditional pardon to an accused for the purpose of giving evidence against the other accused, under this section—*Paban Singh*, 10 C.W.N. 847, *Banu Singh v Emp.*, 33 Cal. 1353. (A new provision regarding conditional pardon has been inserted in sec. 401, sub-sec. 5A) But the Local Government as an executive authority, has power to refrain from prosecution independently of this section—*Emp. v Har Prosad*, 45 All. 226 (229), 21 A.L.J. 42. This section is addressed to certain Courts of justice, and has nothing to do with the powers of the Local Government in the matter of instituting or refraining from instituting any prosecution. The Local Government can grant pardon even though the case is not triable exclusively by the Court of Session or High Court. It can examine an accomplice as a witness even though no formal tender of pardon has been granted to him. Thus, where the Government of C P., having before it the case of a Subordinate Judge who was suspected of receiving bribes, issued a notification to the effect that no prosecution would be instituted by the Government against any person who would come forward with evidence that he had paid or offered bribe to the accused (Sub-Judge), and in consequence of the notification two men came forward and gave evidence against the Sub-Judge, held that their evidence was admissible on the principle of sub-section (2) of this section, although no pardon was formally tendered to them under sec. 337 and

although the offence (sec. 161 I. P. C.) was not triable exclusively by a Court of Session or High Court—*Emp. v Har Prosad*, supra

To whom pardon can be tendered.—Pardon can be tendered to any person who is supposed to be directly or indirectly concerned in, or privy to, the offence. The word "supposed" must be taken as intended to exclude merely the case of a man who has actually been convicted of the crime, and not the case of a man who though admitted to be a party to the crime is unconvicted; therefore where pardon was tendered to a person who pleaded guilty but was not convicted, it was held that the pardon was properly granted and that his evidence was admissible—*Q. E. v. Kallu*, 7 All. 160; *Q. E. v. Bhagya*, Ratanlal 750 (752)

It is not necessary that the person to whom a pardon is tendered should himself be charged with an offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session; it is not even necessary that he should be an accused in the case; all that is required by this section is that he should be supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to such offence, with which another person is charged—*Kashim v Emp.*, 24 Cr.L.J. 566, 11 N.L.J. 144.

Pardon cannot be tendered to a person whose complicity in the crime is not admitted by himself, such a person cannot be considered to be an approver, and his evidence cannot be taken as that of an approver—*Sant Ram v Emp.*, 24 Cr.L.J. 799

Condition of pardon.—The only condition on which pardon can be tendered to an accomplice is the one specified in this section. A tender of pardon on condition that the approver should profess to have been present at the scene of the offence and to have personal knowledge of the circumstances under which the offence was committed (which was not true) is illegal. The accomplice should not be bound over to any particular narration, and in a tender of pardon there should be no temptation offered to strain the truth—*Q. E. v. Yakub*, Ratanlal 612 (614), following *Winsor v Q.*, L.R. 1 Q.B. 312

Disclosure.—This section requires that the disclosure shall be reduced into writing. If it is made orally, the verbal testimony of the Magistrate to whom it has been made will be sufficient to prove the statement. But as a rule of caution the approver's statement should be always reduced to writing, so that no dispute may subsequently arise as to what the exact terms of the statement were—*Ram Nath v Emp.*, 29 P.L.R. 165, 29 Cr.L.J. 413 (415).

952. Effect of pardon.—A person who has been granted pardon under this section and who has fulfilled the conditions of pardon must be released, and cannot be re-arrested in respect of the same offence or for any offence inseparably connected with it. Thus, in a dacoity case, an accused was tendered pardon under this section. He made a full statement implicating himself and others, pointed out the place where he had a carbine and ammunition concealed, gave them up to the Police and in all respects complied with the conditions of the pardon. At the close of the case he was released. He was then re-arrested and tried under

section 20 of the Arms Act in respect of the possession of the carbine and ammunition which he had given up to the Police. *Held* that the possession of carbine and ammunition being an offence in connection with the matter of the dacoity, and inseparable from his guilt as a dacoit, his prosecution for such an offence, after he had fulfilled his condition of pardon in the dacoity case, was improper and must be set aside—*Shiam Sundar v. Emp.*, 19 A L J 717, 22 Cr L J 699, 63 L C 827.

A pardon tendered to person in respect of one offence is no bar to his trial and conviction for an entirely different offence—*Emp. v. Sardara*, 46 All 236 (240), 22 A L J 85, 25 Cr.L.J. 956 But it will bar his trial and conviction in respect of offences which are so closely connected with the offence in respect of which the pardon was tendered that they may be said to be covered by the terms of the pardon—*Q. E. v. Ganga Charan*, 11 All 79 Thus, where the approver who was granted pardon in connection with a case of forgery, made a full and true disclosure of the circumstances of the crime, and in so doing he also related the details of some other earlier offences (e.g. money order fraud) committed by himself and the other accused, which were not relevant to the inquiry, but he made those disclosures under the belief that those earlier offences also fell within the scope of the inquiry, and he was not warned by the Magistrate against making those irrelevant statements, *held* that the approver should be given the benefit of doubt there might be as to his understanding of the pardon, and that the pardon granted in the forgery case should excuse him from prosecution for the earlier offences (e.g. money order fraud)—*Nilmadhab v. Emp.*, 5 Pat 171, 27 Cr L J 957 (961) "If the prisoner having been admitted as an accomplice to one felony, be thereby induced to suppose that he has freed himself from the consequences of another felony, the Judge will recommend the indictment for such other felony to be abandoned"—*Russell on Crimes* (4th Edn.), Vol. 3, p. 597.

953. Sub-section (1A)—Recording reasons :—Although sub-section (1A) requires the Magistrate, who tenders pardon, to record his reasons for so doing, still the recording of the reasons is not a condition precedent to the tender of pardon and its acceptance by the approver, and the pardon cannot be set aside merely because the reasons are not recorded. Such irregularity does not prejudice the approver—*Emp. v. Shama Charan*, 13 Cr L.J. 588 (590) (All.); *Sultan Khan v. Emp.*, 5 A L J 691, 11 Cr.L.J. 445 (451). When the facts which led up to the tender of pardon appear on the record, the omission to state the reasons is not an illegality which vitiates the proceedings, but a mere irregularity curable by sec. 537, unless it has occasioned a failure of justice—*Dukhu*, 27 A.L.J. 227, 30 Cr L.J. 1157 (1158), *Emp. v. Annada*, 36 Cal. 629; *Crown v. Waryam*, 5 Lah. L.J. 408; nor even can it be a ground for excluding the approver's evidence as inadmissible—*Dy. Leg. Rem. v. Banu Singh*, 5 C.L.J. 224.

954. Sub-section (2) :—Approver as witness :—According to clause (2) the approver shall be examined as a witness in the case. The expression "in the case" (see the old section) includes the preliminary inquiry, and does not refer to the trial alone—*Q. E. v. Ramasawami*, 24

Mad. 321; *Local Govt. v. Mullu*, 11 N.L.R. 59, 16 Cr L.J. 417. This is now made clear by the present amendment of this sub-section.

The amendment of this clause also makes it clear that the approver must be examined both in the Court of the committing Magistrate and in the subsequent trial, and not in the former Court alone. But if the approver when examined before the committing Magistrate resiles from his previous disclosures and says that they were made under police pressure, he need not be examined at the subsequent trial; and the fact that he was not examined before the Sessions Judge does not bar his trial for the offence in respect of which the pardon had been granted—*Ram Nath v Emp*, 29 P L R 165, 29 Cr.L.J. 413 (416). If the approver when examined as a witness in the committing Magistrate's Court did not comply with the conditions of pardon, it was not necessary that he should be examined as a witness before the Court of Session—*Crown v. Andal*, 5 S.L.R 174, 13 Cr L J 33. It is not compulsory to examine the approver in the Sessions Court if he has shown by his evidence in the Magistrate's Court that he is an untrustworthy witness—*Sashi v. Emp*, 42 Cal 856, 19 C W N 295, 16 Cr.L J 65. Where an approver when examined in the preliminary inquiry keeps back material evidence within his knowledge, the Magistrate can withdraw the pardon, and the prosecution is not bound to put him forward as a witness in the sessions trial—*Q E v Ramasawmi*, 24 Mad 321. A person who has not satisfied the conditions of pardon at the commitment, need not be examined at the trial in the Sessions Court; the evidence given by him before the committing Magistrate can be used as evidence in proceedings taken against him—*Nga Po v. K. E*, 7 Cr.L J. 245 (Bur.), *Suba v. K E*, 1905 P.R. 41.

An approver cannot be examined as a witness unless and until he has been discharged by a written order; a mere promise of immunity from prosecution given by the Local Government does not amount to an order of discharge. Unless he is formally discharged, he does not cease to be an accused person and cannot be examined as a witness, and he does not cease to be an accused person by reason of the mere fact that the police did not send him up for trial—*Mahandu v. Crown*, 1 Lah. 102 (dissenting from *Sardar v. Emp*, 1904 P R 21).

A pardon was tendered to and accepted by an accused in the committing Magistrate's Court, but by some mistake his name was still in the category of the accused when the case came before the Sessions Court, and he was placed on the dock along with other accused. The mistake was soon found out, and the Sessions Judge then removed him from the dock, and he gave evidence in the trial. Held that the approver's evidence was admissible—*Ayub Mandal v Emp*, 54 Cal 539, 28 Cr L J 689.

955. Accused illegally pardoned.—It is illegal for a Magistrate to convert an accused into a witness (approver) except when a pardon has been lawfully granted under sec 337. *Reg v Hanmanta* 1 Bom 610. Therefore, where a Magistrate tenders pardon to one of the accused persons in a case not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, and examines him as a witness, the statement made by that accused is

irrelevant and inadmissible even as confession of a co-accused—*Emp. v. Ashgar*, 2 All. 260. *Contra*—*Subramania Ayyar v. K. E.*, 25 Mad. 61 (68), in which it was held that although the tender of pardon was illegal, he was competent to give evidence as a witness.

It has been pointed out in this Madras case (25 Mad. 61, ■ pp 68-69) that the question as to whether an approver, who has been illegally pardoned, can be a competent witness, depends upon the further question whether the approver had pleaded guilty or not. If he had not pleaded guilty, and had neither been acquitted nor discharged nor convicted, he cannot be examined as a witness against the other accused. This was the *ratio decidendi* of the decision in 1 Bom. 610 and ■ All. 260. But when the approver had pleaded guilty (as in 25 Mad. 61), no issue remained to be tried as between him and the Crown; he could not be said to be tried jointly with the other accused; he was not in charge of the jury, his incompetency to give evidence had been removed, and an oath could be lawfully administered to him.

956. Conviction based on approver's evidence :—

Though a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds on the uncorroborated testimony of an approver (sec. 133, Evidence Act), *Q. E. v. Kallu*, 7 All 160, *Raj v. Ramasami*, 1 Mad. 394; yet it has now become the universal practice not to convict on the testimony of an accomplice, unless it is corroborated in material particulars—*Q. E. v. Kallu*, 7 All 160; *Ramaswami v. Emp.*, 27 Mad. 271; *Q. E. v. Krishnabhat*, 10 Bom 319, *Emp. v. Shrinivas*, 7 Bom. L.R. 969, 3 Cr.L.J. 33, *Q. E. v. Maganlal*, 14 Bom 115; *Yasin v. K. E.*, 28 Cal 689, *Shabrah v. Crown*, 1919 P.R. 20, 20 Cr.L.J. 191, 49 I.C. 607, *Madan v. Emp.*, 4 P.L.T. 381, 24 Cr.L.J. 723. The evidence of an approver should not be believed without material corroboration, and in order to see whether there is such a corroboration, it is the duty of the Court to scrutinize and marshall out very carefully the proof relating thereto. Where this duty has not been properly performed by the lower Court, the High Court will interfere in revision and set aside the conviction—*Manna v. Emp.*, 1911 P.W.R. 3, 12 Cr.L.J. 35. The Judge in his charge to the jury should take care to point out that although a conviction based on the uncorroborated testimony of the approver is not illegal, yet it is not the practice of the Court so to convict, and should state also that the evidence of the approver was given on conditional pardon—*Q. v. Bykant*, 10 W.R. 17; *Jamiruddi v. Emp.*, 29 Cal. 782, *Surya Kanta v. K. E.*, 24 C.W.N. 119 (F.B.), 31 C.L.J. 20. But when the Judge had warned the jury of the danger of convicting the accused on the uncorroborated testimony of the approver, and the jury, notwithstanding the Judge's remarks, convicted the accused, it was held that the conviction was valid in law, and could not be questioned by the High Court—*Q. v. Mohima*, 15 W.R. 37. See also *Emp. v. Jamaldi*, 51 Cal. 160, cited in Note 915 (5) under sec. 297.

As to the amount of corroboration necessary, no hard and fast rule can be laid down; it depends upon the nature of the crime, on the extent of the complicity of the accused, and the nature of the corrobora-

tive facts—*Kamala v. Sital*, 28 Cal. 339; *Deo Nandan v. Emp.*, 33 Cal. 649, *K. E. v. Malhar*, 26 Bom. 193, *Ramaswami v. Emp.*, 27 Mad. 271. The evidence of the approver should be corroborated not only as to the circumstances of the case, but also as to the identity of the prisoner—*Reg v. Imam*, 3 B.H.C.R. 57, *Reg v. Buddhu*, 1 Bom. 475, *Q. E. v. Krishnabhat*, 10 Bom. 319; and also in material particulars in respect to that person having committed the offence—*Q v Sadhu*, 21 W.R. 69, *Siar Nania v. K. E.*, 18 C.W.N. 550, 15 Cr.L.J. 438, *Kashiram v. Emp.*, 24 Cr.L.J. 566 (Nag.). The corroboration should be such as to support that portion of the approver's testimony which makes out that the prisoner was present at the scene of the offence and participated in the acts of commission—*Q v. Mohesh*, 19 W.R. 16 See sec. 133, and Ill. (b) to sec. 114, Evidence Act.

957. Sub-section (2A)—Magistrate cannot try the case.—Sub-section (2A) lays down that the Magistrate tendering the pardon must commit the case to the Sessions; this means that he is not competent to proceed with the trial himself—*Emp. v Peru*, 2 O.W.N. 464, 26 Cr.L.J. 1216. Thus, where in a case of robbery, the Magistrate grants a conditional pardon to an approver and is satisfied that there is a *prima facie* case, he has no jurisdiction to dispose of the case himself but is bound under the provisions of this clause to commit the case to the sessions—*Nga Kin v Emp*, 4 Bur L.J. 11, 26 Cr.L.J. 829. The Magistrate before whom the suspected person is brought face to face, and who attempts to induce him by promise of pardon to make a full and true disclosure, assumes to a certain extent the function of a police-officer and identifies himself with the prosecution, and is doubtless on that reason that it is considered proper to disqualify him from trying the case—*Q. E v Batera*, 1898 P.R. 3. A Deputy Commissioner trying a case under the special powers conferred by sec. 30, does so as a Magistrate, and if he tenders pardon to one of the accused, he cannot try the case himself—*Pabon Singh v Emp*, 10 C.W.N. 847; *Kishar v Emp*, 25 Cr.L.J. 1341 (Nag.).

This sub-section debars only the Magistrate rendering the pardon from trying the case, but a District Magistrate sanctioning the tender of pardon to an approver is not precluded from trying the case—*Akbar v Crown*, 1919 P.R. 30, 21 Cr.L.J. 306, 55 I.C. 466.

'Examined'—In *Q. E v Batera*, 1898 P.R. 3 it was held that the examination referred to in the old sub-section (4) referred to an examination made by the pardon-tendering Magistrate on the tender of the pardon and directly resulting from it, and not the examination made by any other Magistrate in the course of the trial. But the examination referred to in the new sub-section (2A) is the examination made under sub-section (2) which speaks of an examination made in the Court of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence as well as the examination in the subsequent trial, if any.

Approver cannot be committed—Under sub-section (2A) it is clear that when pardon has been granted to an accused, the case of the other accused alone should be committed to the sessions. *The approver cannot*

be committed to the sessions, for since he has been granted a pardon he cannot be tried. If the Magistrate commits the approver along with the other accused (which Magistrates frequently do under a mistaken view of the law), the sessions Judge ought to make a reference to the High Court for getting the commitment of the approver quashed. If, however, the sessions Judge does not make any such reference, treating the commitment of the approver as if there had been no commitment, the procedure is not illegal but a mere irregularity—*Bhagwandin v. Emp.*, 6 O.W.N. 218, 30 Cr L J 567 (569). The approver cannot be committed to the sessions, but must be detained in custody until the termination of the trial. If he is committed, the commitment will be quashed by the High Court—*Emp. v. Peru*, 2 O.W.N. 464, 12 O.L.J. 542, 26 Cr.L.J. 1216.

958. Sub-section (3) :—The approver shall be, unless he is on bail, detained until the termination of the trial—*Mg. Po v. K. E.*, 8 L.B.R. 357, 17 Cr L J 391, and nothing can be done against an approver who has not complied with the conditions on which the tender of pardon was made to him, until after the case in the Court of Session has been finished, then his trial should be commenced *de novo*—*Q. E. v. Bhan*, 23 Bom 493. See Note 962 under sec. 339.

The meaning of this sub-section is that the approver shall not be set at large until the judicial proceedings pending against the accused person are finished. It is immaterial for the purpose of this sub-section whether the proceedings are finished by a Magisterial order of discharge (under sec. 209) before trial, or by a Judge's order of acquittal after trial. In the case of the Magisterial discharge, the sub-section will be satisfied if the approver is detained in custody or is on bail until the order of discharge is made—*Emp. v. Intya* 37 Bom. 146, 13 Cr L J 842.

338. At any time after commitment, but before judgment is passed, the Court to which the commitment is made may, with the view of obtaining on the trial the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in, or privy to, any such offence, tender, or order the committing Magistrate or the District Magistrate to tender, a pardon on the same condition to such person.

Power to direct tender of pardon.

959. Who can tender pardon :—After the commitment of the case to the Sessions, either the Court of Session can itself tender pardon, or it can direct the Committing Magistrate or the District Magistrate to tender pardon. The Local Government cannot tender a pardon under this or the previous section, but it can withdraw the prosecution under sec. 494—*Banu Singh v. Emp.*, 33 Cal. 1353; *Pabon v. Emp.* 10 C.W.N. 847.

The Sessions Court can direct only the committing Magistrate or the District Magistrate to tender pardon, but it cannot direct a Police Officer to do so—*In re Fakir Mahomed*, 6 W.R. (Cr. Let) 5.

To whom pardon can be tendered :—Pardon can be tendered under this section to an *accused*. There is no ground for the suggestion that the words ‘any person’ in this section do not include a person accused before the Sessions Judge—*Harunlal v. Crown*, 9 S.L.R. 43, 16 Cr.L.J. 632. A pardon can be tendered to an accused person provided he is *unconvicted*. The words “supposed . . . offence” in this section exclude those who have been actually convicted; but a tender of pardon to a person who has pleaded guilty but has not been convicted is not prohibited by this section; and the evidence of such person examined as a witness is admissible—*Q. E. v. Kallu*, 7 All. 160, *Q. E. v. Bhagya*, Ratanlal 750 (752).

When pardon may be tendered —Pardon can be tendered at any time ‘after commitment and before judgment is pronounced’; but it is extremely improper, though not illegal, to grant pardon at a late stage of the trial after the close of the prosecution and the defence, and after the opinion of the assessors has been given, though judgment has not yet been pronounced—*Emp. v. Hulia*, 1884 A.W.N. 147.

339. (1) Where a pardon has been tendered under

Commitment of person to whom pardon has been tendered.

section 337 or section 338, and the *Public Prosecutor certifies that in his opinion any person who has accepted such tender has, either by wilfully concealing anything essential or by giving false evidence, not complied with the condition on which the tender was made, such person may be tried for the offence in respect of which the pardon was so tendered, or for any other offence of which he appears to have been guilty in connection with the same matter* :

Provided that such person shall not be tried jointly with any of the other accused, and that he shall be entitled to plead at such trial that he has complied with the conditions upon which such tender was made; in which case it shall be for the prosecution to prove that such conditions have not been complied with.

(2) The statement made by a person who has accepted a tender of pardon may be given in evidence against him *at such trial*.

(3) No prosecution for the offence of giving false evidence in respect of such statement shall be entertained without the sanction of the High Court.

Change :—The italicised words and the proviso have been added by sec. 87 of the Cr. P. Code Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923).

960. Certificate of Public Prosecutor :—"We would make a certificate by the Public Prosecutor as the basis of the prosecution of a person who has accepted a tender of pardon"—*Report of the Joint Committee* (1922). Under the old law, it was the trying Court which had the authority to determine whether the pardon had been forfeited so as to necessitate the trial of the approver—*Emp. v. Mariama*, 1889 P.R. 6; *K. E. v. Kadu*, 1904 P.R. 31; *Sashi v. Emp.*, 42 Cal. 856, *Emp. v. Kachri*, 7 N.L.R. 65, 10 I.C. 622, 12 Cr.L.J. 326. Under the present law, no such determination by the trying Court is necessary, but the certificate of the Public Prosecutor is sufficient.

The certificate of the Public Prosecutor is an essential requisite under this section, and the absence of the certificate vitiates the trial of the approver—*Ali v. Crown*, 5 Lah. 379 (381), 26 Cr.L.J. 237. The certificate of the Public Prosecutor is the sole basis of the prosecution of an approver, and therefore an approver cannot be prosecuted merely at the instance of a suggestion by the presiding Judge that he should be so dealt with—*Emp. v. Maria Basappa*, 26 Bom. L.R. 1240, 26 Cr.L.J. 469. Where there was no certificate of the Public Prosecutor at the time of the commitment of the approver to the Sessions, but the certificate was subsequently filed in the Court of the Sessions Judge after he noticed the absence of the certificate and before the trial proceeded, held that the proceedings before the committing Magistrate were merely irregular and not invalid, and the trial was in order, as the provisions of sec. 339 as regards the requirement of the certificate were complied with before the trial began, and especially as no objection had been taken either before the committing Magistrate or before the Sessions Court even after the point was brought prominently to notice—*Nga Wa Gyi v. Emp.*, 3 Rang 55, 4 Bur.L.J. 23, 27 Cr.L.J. 254.

961. Forfeiture of pardon—The approver will be said to have broken the conditions of pardon, if he wilfully conceals anything essential or gives false evidence—*Maung Po v. K. E.*, 8 L.B.R. 357, 17 Cr.L.J. 391, *Emp. v. Kothia*, 30 Bom. 611. The approver must be considered to have failed to comply with the conditions of pardon as soon as it is established that his disclosure is not a full and true one, and this fact becomes apparent as soon as he is shown to have made a statement entirely inconsistent with the one upon the strength of which the pardon was granted. Thus, if after having made a disclosure, he subsequently says before the committing Magistrate that his disclosure was false and made under police pressure and that he knows nothing about the occurrence of the crime, he forfeits his pardon—*Ram Nath v. Emp.*, 29 P.L.R. 165, 29 Cr.L.J. 413 (416). If after accepting the tender of pardon the approver refuses to make any statement, saying that he knows nothing, his pardon will be revoked and he will be committed for trial—*Emp. v. Budhan*, 29 All. 24. The prosecution may proceed against the approver if he breaks the condition of his pardon by giving a false evidence under section 512 of this Code, in a case where the principal offender has absconded—*In re Dagdu*, 46 Bom. 120, 22 Cr.L.J. 620. But the absconding of the approver

before the conclusion of cross-examination does not amount to a wilful concealment of facts—*Maung Po v. K. E.*, supra

It is a matter of great importance that strictest faith should be kept with the approver and his mere failure to secure the conviction of his accomplices does not justify the withdrawal of pardon—*Q. E. v. Habibulla*, 1695 P.R. 15. But the approver will forfeit his pardon if he screens one of the offenders, although he helps to secure the conviction of the other offenders—*Suraj Bhan v. Crown*, 1918 P.R. 21, 19 Cr.L.J. 926. Where an approver made a fair, full and true disclosure of all the circumstances relative to the crime, and the whole of the evidence showed that the crimes were in all probability exactly as he said they were, and that he had not concealed the name of any person concerned in the crime nor concealed the part which he himself took in the crime, it was held that he had complied with the conditions of the pardon, and the fact that there were slight inconsistencies upon immaterial points with a previous statement made by him would not justify a forfeiture of pardon—*Srinop v. Emp.*, 12 C.L.R. 226. An approver who makes a full and true disclosure of facts both before the committing Magistrate and the Sessions Court, but in the cross-examination resiles from the statement made by him in his examination-in-chief, sufficiently fulfils the conditions of his pardon, and the pardon cannot be forfeited—*Emp. v. Kothia*, 30 Bom. 611. Where a person of low intellect who has accepted a tender of pardon complies with the terms of his pardon in his examination-in-chief, but makes damaging admissions in his cross-examination though he does not actually resile from his previous statement, and in re-examination returns more towards his previous statement, held that it cannot be said that he had not complied with the conditions of his pardon—*Emp. v. Jagannath*, 3 O.W.N. 474, 27 Cr.L.J. 763. Any trifling discrepancies elicited in cross-examination do not justify the forfeiture of pardon—*Kanwar Singh v. Emp.*, 1902 P.R. 34. But where the approver gave true evidence regarding the offence before the committing Magistrate but resiled from that evidence before the Sessions Judge, held that he must be deemed to have forfeited his pardon—*Local Government v. Mullu*, 11 N.L.R. 59, 16 Cr.L.J. 417.

No 'withdrawal' of pardon necessary :—The word 'forfeited' has been substituted in the 1898 Code for the word 'withdrawn' occurring in the 1882 Code. Under the present Code no formal withdrawal of a pardon and no formal declaration that the pardon has been forfeited are necessary—*Sashi v. K. E.*, 42 Cal. 856; *Emp. v. Saber*, 42 Cal. 756; *Khial v. Emp.*, 39 All. 305; *Kullan v. Emp.*, 32 Mad. 173; *Emp. v. Kothia*, 30 Bom. 611; *Suraj Bhan v. Crown*, 1918 P.R. 24, 19 Cr.L.J. 926; *To Gale v. K. E.*, 7 L.B.R. 1, 14 Cr.L.J. 401; *Emp. v. Kachri*, 7 N.L.R. 65, 10 I.C. 622; the forfeiture is incurred *ipso facto* by the act of the approver—*Emp. v. Abani Bhashan*, 37 Cal. 845. The substitution of the word 'forfeited' for 'withdrawn' indicates that a pardon cannot be withdrawn but can only be forfeited on the ground of the breach of the conditions. Under the present law, the question is whether the accused has forfeited his pardon by some act of his own, and not whether the

Magistrate has validly withdrawn it—*K. E. v. Bala*, 25 Bom. 675. And no question can arise at all as to its validity, if the pardon has been withdrawn by an unauthorised Magistrate—*Suraj Bhan v. Crown*, 1918 P.R. 24, 19 Cr.L.J. 926. Under the old law, the pardon remained in force until it was formally withdrawn; under the present law, the result of a failure to observe the conditions is that the approver may be put on his trial without any formal order of withdrawal or cancellation. The act terminating the pardon was, under the old law, the withdrawal of pardon by the authority who granted it; under the present Act, it is the forfeiture by the approver—*Sashi v. K. E.*, 42 Cal. 856.

Therefore, where an approver was tendered pardon by the District Magistrate, but in the Court of Session he did not fulfil the condition of pardon, whereupon the Sessions Judge directed the commitment of the approver, held that the order of the Sessions Judge was not illegal. It was not necessary that the pardon granted by the District Magistrate must be withdrawn by the Magistrate before the approver could be committed to the Sessions. The Sessions Judge was competent to order the approver to be committed to the Court of Session when he was of opinion that the approver had forfeited the pardon—*Crown v. Kadu*, 1904 P.R. 31; *Chanan v. Crown*, 1 Lah. 218, 21 Cr.L.J. 518.

962. Trial of the approver :—Commitment or trial along with other accused, illegal—Sub-section (3) of section 337 lays down that the approver shall be detained in custody until the termination of the trial of the other accused persons by the Court of Session. The effect of that section read with this section is that action can be taken against an approver, who has forfeited his pardon, after the trial of the other accused in the Court of Session is finished, and then his trial should be commenced *de novo*. If he has forfeited his pardon during the preliminary inquiry, he cannot be committed to the Sessions along with the other accused—*Q. E. v. Bhan*, 23 Bom. 493, *Emp. v. Revappa*, 4 Bom.L.R. 826; *Q. E. v. Ramaswami*, 24 Mad 321, *Aruna Chellum v. Emp.*, 31 Mad 272; *Emp. v. Mohan*, 5 N.L.R. 134, 3 I.C. 922. (Contra—*Sashi v. K. E.*, 42 Cal. 856, *Q. E. v. Brij Narain* 20 All. 529; *Emp. v. Budhan*, 29 All. 24, *K. E. v. Bala*, 25 Bom. 675; in these cases it is held that the commitment of the approver along with the other accused is not illegal).

If the accused has forfeited his pardon during the trial, he cannot be tried at once along with the other accused, since he has not been regularly committed to the Sessions but has been sent up as a witness—*Q. E. v. Sudra*, 14 All. 336; *Q. E. v. Mulaa*, 14 All. 502, *Sashi v. K. E.*, 42 Cal. 856; *Q. E. v. Kushya*, Ratanlal 119; *Chanan v. Crown*, 1 Lah. 218, 21 Cr.L.J. 518. This is now expressly provided for by the proviso newly added. The contrary view taken in *Sultan v. Emp.*, 5 A.L.J. 691, 8 Cr.L.J. 445 (450) that the trial of the approver along with the other accused is not illegal, is no longer correct. Before the approver can be tried by a Sessions Judge, the Sessions Judge should send him to a competent Magistrate for a regular commitment—*Q. E. v. Rama Tewari*.

15 Mad 352; *Q. E. v. Sadra*, 11 All. 336; *Q. E. v. Jagat Chandra*, 22 Cal 50. The approver should not be deprived of the benefit of a preliminary inquiry where he should have an opportunity of making his defence—*Rama Varma v. Q.*, 3 Mad. 351.

Where one of the accused at first promised to make a clean breast of all the circumstances and was tendered a pardon conditional on his doing so, but before he was treated as an approver and put into the box he made a statement to the Court that he did not want the pardon and that he wished to be tried and that the pardon might be cancelled, whereupon he was tried along with the other accused, held that as the pardon though accepted for a time was rejected by the accused himself (and not forfeited) before it actually took effect, the case did not fall under this section and the so-called pardon was not a bar to the trial of the accused along with the others. The pardon referred to in this section is an accepted pardon the acceptance must continue in force till the person pardoned actually gives evidence and it is only then that any question would arise as to whether he has forfeited the pardon by not giving true evidence in the case—*In re Basireddi Narappa*, 45 M.L.J. 613.

Where the Judge sends up the approver to a Magistrate for commitment, the committing Magistrate must in his commitment-order give reasons for holding that the approver has forfeited his pardon—*K. E. v. Po Ket*, 10 Bur L T 46, 8 L.B.R. 447, 17 Cr.L.J. 337.

Detention in custody:—The Sessions Court is not justified, as soon as the trial has closed of the offence with respect to which pardon has been tendered to an approver, in sending the approver in custody to the Magistrate with a view to taking action against him for breach of the conditions of pardon. The approver is entitled to be discharged as soon as the trial closes, and action can be taken against him only by way of re-arrest—*Emp v. Kothia*, 30 Bom 611; *K. E. v. Po Ket*, 10 Bur L.T. 46, 17 Cr.L.J. 337. It is improper to keep the accused in further custody after the termination of the original trial—*Local Govt. v. Mallu*, 11 N L.R. 59, 16 Cr.L.J. 417; *Emp. v. Abani Bhushan*, 37 Cal. 845.

963. Plea of pardon:—See the proviso The approver is entitled to plead, both before the committing Magistrate and before the Sessions Judge, in bar to his trial, that he had fulfilled the conditions on which pardon was tendered to him—*Emp v. Kothia*, 30 Bom. 611; *Gangua*, 37 All 331; *Chanan v. Crown*, 1 Lah. 218, 21 Cr.L.J. 518; *K E v Po Ket*, 10 Bur L.T. 46, 17 Cr.L.J. 337. The plea should be taken at the commencement of the proceedings before the Magistrate, and it would then be necessary for the Magistrate to consider whether the pardon has been forfeited—*Sashi v. K. E.*, 42 Cal. 856. But the approver is entitled to plead the bar of pardon before the Sessions Judge although he had not done so before the committing Magistrate—*Gangua v. Emp*, 37 All. 331, *Sashi v. K. E.*, 42 Cal. 856. Even though the committing Magistrate has decided against the approver, it is open to him to plead his pardon again at the trial before the Sessions Judge—

Sashi, 42 Cal 856; *Khial v Emp*, 39 All. 305; *K E v. Po Ket*, 8 L B R 447, 17 Cr.L.J 337.

Before an approver can be put on his trial on account of forfeiture of pardon, he must be given an opportunity of meeting with the allegation of the prosecution that he has failed to make a full and true disclosure of the facts within his knowledge, as required by sec. 337. The mere expression of opinion by the Sessions Court that the person has not complied with the conditions of the pardon is not sufficient—*Emp v Mariama*, 1889 P.R. 6, *To Gale v K. E*, 7 L.B.R. 1, 14 Cr.L.J. 401. The proper course is to draw up an order setting forth specifically the alleged breach of the condition of pardon, and to call upon the approver to shew cause on a future date why he should not be tried for the offence in respect of which pardon was tendered. On the date fixed for the hearing, unless the approver admits the alleged breach of the condition, the Magistrate or Judge should hear the evidence relied upon as establishing the breach and any rebutting evidence which the approver may offer, and should then record a definite finding as to whether there was a breach or not. A definite finding arrived at in this manner is essential before the approver can be placed on his trial for the original offence—*To Gale v. K E.*, 7 L.B.R. 1, 14 Cr L J 401. See the new Section 339A.

The onus is on the prosecution to prove that the approver has forfeited his pardon—*Sashi v. K* ■, 42 Cal. 856; *K. E. v. Bala*, 25 Bom 675. *Emp. v Kothia*, 30 Bom. 611, *Kullen v. Emp.*, 32 Mad. 173, *Khials v Emp*, 39 All 305. See the proviso

963A. Sub-section (2).—This sub-section lays down that the statement (i.e. the disclosure made by the approver upon which the pardon was granted) is admissible in evidence against him. This statement is not excluded from evidence by the provisions of sec. 24, Evidence Act. In fact, this clause is an exception to the rule of evidence enacted in sec. 24, Evidence Act so far as that section excludes a confession made as the result of inducement or promise; because an approver's disclosure is in its very nature always the result of an inducement or promise, viz. the inducement to confess upon a promise of pardon. But a disclosure extorted by threat or violence or pressure would be ruled out of evidence—*Ram Nath v. Emp.*, 29 P L R 165, 29 Cr.L.J, 413 (415), following *Sultan Khan v Emp*, 5 A L.J. ■, 8 Cr.L.J 445 (451).

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tion is necessary for the prosecution on each branch of the alternative charge—*Q. E. v Dala*, 10 Bom. 190. Want of sanction is not a mere irregularity but is an illegality which vitiates the proceedings—*Sharina v. Emp.*, 1884 P.R. 42; *Q. E. v Nala*, 27 Cal. 137.

Sanction to prosecute should not be given merely on the ground that the approver contradicted himself before the committing Magistrate. A witness who is in any way induced to make a false statement in connection with a capital charge should be allowed every possible *locus penitentiae*—*K. E. v. Bodha*, 11 A.L.J. 964, 15 Cr.L.J. 70. But the granting of *locus penitentiae* is a matter for judicial discretion, according to the circumstances of each particular case—*Dukha* 27 A.L.J. 227, 30 Cr.L.J. 1157 (1158).

It is not necessary that an approver should be punished for perjury if he can be punished sufficiently for that and the original crime, on a conviction for that original crime. Sanction, therefore, ought to be refused, unless it appears that a conviction for the original crime is unlikely or a prosecution for it is undesirable for any other reason, or that on a conviction for the original crime the sentence that could be passed would be too light to cover both offences. Before sanction can be granted, therefore, it must be shown that there is no intention of prosecuting the approver for the original crime, or that he has already been prosecuted for it and has either been acquitted or has received or is likely to receive such a light sentence that it is not sufficient to cover his further crime of perjury—*Local Govt. v. Gambhir*, 23 N.L.R. 35, 28 Cr.L.J. 645 (646).

An approver was granted conditional pardon under sec 337, and then instead of being examined under sub-section (2) of sec 337, he was sent by the D.S.P. to the committing Magistrate to have his statement recorded. The Magistrate recorded his statement on oath in a miscellaneous proceeding, and the approver then made a statement implicating himself and others in a dacoity. He was then examined as a witness in the committal proceedings, and there he denied all knowledge of the dacoity. The District Magistrate thereupon applied to the High Court for sanction to prosecute him for perjury. Held that the preliminary examination on oath was an unjustifiable and unnecessary procedure not authorised by law and it cannot provide the material for a prosecution for perjury, in case the approver should subsequently renege from his statement. No sanction can be granted on such material. The proper course would have been to proceed with the trial of the approver for dacoity after obtaining the certificate of the Public Prosecutor—*K. E. v. Nga Bo Gye*, 3 Rang. 224, 26 Cr.L.J. 1396, A.I.R. 1925 Rang. 286.

The sanction must be given by the High Court. The object is that the propriety of the prosecution of the approver should be considered and determined independently; such an independent consideration cannot be expected from the Sessions Judge—*Sharina v Emp.*, 1884 P.R. 42.

An application to the High Court for sanction for prosecution of approver should be made by motion in open Court and not by a letter.

reference—*Q. E v Manik Chandra*, 24 Cal. 492; *In re Madiga Nallavadu*, 32 Mad. 47, *Crown v. Bulaka*, 1904 P R. 10, 1 Cr L J. 793; *Crown v. Raja*, 1912 P L R. 175, 13 Cr. L. J. 451. An action can be taken by the High Court under this subsection against an approver in respect of a statement made by him which is *prima facie* false, even though the approver has not been examined as a witness in the case in connection with which he made his statement—*Emp. v. Raja*, 1913 P L R 227, 14 Cr L J 64.

339A. (1) *The Court trying under section 339 a person who has accepted a tender of pardon shall—*

(a) *if the Court is a High Court or Court of Session, before the charge is read out and explained to the accused under section 271, sub-section (1), and*

(b) *if the Court is the Court of a Magistrate, before the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution is taken,*

ask the accused whether he pleads that he has complied with the conditions on which the tender of the pardon was made.

(2) *If the accused does so plead, the Court shall record the plea and proceed with the trial, and the jury, or the Court with the aid of the assessors, or the Magistrate, as the case may be, shall, before judgment is passed in the case, find whether or not the accused has complied with the conditions of the pardon, and if it is found that he has so complied, the Court shall, notwithstanding anything contained in this Code, pass judgment of acquittal.*

965. This section has been newly added by sec 88 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923

"We consider that it is desirable to lay down some procedure with regard to the plea contemplated by the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 339. The Bill contains no indication as to when this plea is to be raised and what is to be the effect of it, and difficulties of procedure may obviously arise with reference to sections 225, 271 (2) and 272. We, therefore, propose a new section to be added after section 339, which lays down that when a person to whom a pardon is tendered is being tried under that section, he shall, at the commencement of the proceedings, be asked whether he raises the plea that he has complied with the conditions on which the pardon was granted, and, if he does so plead,

the Court shall record a finding on the point and, if it finds that the conditions have been complied with, shall acquit the accused."—*Report of the Joint Committee* (1922).

When the approver is put on his trial, it is the duty of the trying Court to decide first of all, whether the approver has forfeited his pardon, before his original offence can be tried—*Emp v. Kothia*, 30 Bom 611, *Kullan v. Emp*, 32 Mad 173, *Sashi v K E*, 42 Cal 856; *Kannar v. Emp*, 1902 P R. 34; *Local Govt. v. Mullu*, 11 N L R 59, 16 Cr L J. 417; *To Gale v K E*, 7 L B R. 1, 14 Cr L J 401. *K E v Po Ket*, 10 Bur. L T 46, 17 Cr L J. 337.

It is duty of the Sessions Judge to ask the approver whether he pleads that he has complied with the conditions of the pardon. Where the committing Magistrate asked him whether he pleaded that he had complied with the conditions on which the tender of pardon had been made, but this question was not repeated in the Sessions Court, and no plea was recorded, held that there was a contravention of the imperative provisions of this section, and the trial of the approver must be set aside and a retrial held—*Itwari v Emp*, 6 O W N 372, 30 Cr L J 559.

If the approver pleads that he has complied with the conditions of pardon, the Court should come to a clear finding as to whether the accused has or has not complied with the conditions of the pardon, and this finding should be recorded, before he can be properly tried and convicted—*Itwari v. Emp*, supra, *Emp. v. Jagannath*, 3 O W N. 474, 27 Cr L J. 789. The approver should be asked not simply whether he has complied with the conditions on which the pardon was granted, but he should be asked whether he pleads that he has complied with the conditions on which the tender of pardon was made, and the record should show that he was so asked. The terms of this section should be clearly explained to him, and it should be made clear to him that he can plead the pardon as a bar to his trial—*Ali v. Crown*, 5 Lah 379 (381), 26 Cr L J 237.

The question as to whether the approver has forfeited his pardon should be left to the jury and should not be decided by the Judge himself. Where the Judge decided the question himself and convicted the accused, the conviction was set aside as illegal—*In re Alagirisami* 33 Mad 514.

340. Every person ac-

Right of accused to be defended.
Right of accused to be defended by a pleader.

cused before any Criminal Court may of

340. (1) Any person

accused of an offence before a Criminal Court, or against whom proceedings are institute under this Code in any s

Right of person against whom proceedings are instituted to be defended, and his competency to be a witness.

Court, may of right be defended by a pleader.

(2) *Any person against whom proceedings are instituted in any such Court under section 107, or under Chapter X, Chapter XI, Chapter XII or Chapter XXXVI or under section 552, may offer himself as a witness in such proceedings.*

Change :—This section has been re-drafted by sec. 89 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923.

"The expression *person accused* in section 340 may be read as referring only to persons accused of any offence, it is proposed to make it clear that any person against whom proceedings are instituted under this Code is entitled to be defended by a pleader. It is also laid down that persons against whom proceedings under Chapters X, XI, XII, XXXVI, or under Section 552 of the Code are pending do not labour under the ordinary disability of an accused person to be sworn, and that they may be examined as witnesses in such proceedings."—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914)

966. Scope :—It has been laid down in some cases that persons against whom proceedings are instituted under Chapters VIII and X are in the position of 'accused' persons within the meaning of this section and are entitled to be defended by a pleader—*Jhoja Singh v Q. E.*, 23 Cal 493, *Crown v Ida*, 1900 P.R. 15, *Emp v Girand*, 25 All 375, *Abinash v Emp*, 4 C.W.N. 797; *Nakhi Lal v Q. E.*, 27 Cal 656 (658). The Legislature has now added the words "person against whom proceedings are instituted" which would expressly include persons proceeded against under Chapters VIII and X, and it will no longer be necessary to enter into the much vexed question as to whether such persons are in the position of accused persons. Under the amended section, a person against whom proceedings have been instituted under sec 110 is entitled as a matter of right to have a reasonable opportunity afforded him of defending himself—*Jatoi v Emp*, 20 S.L.J. 122, 27 Cr.L.J. 935.

Where an inquiry under sec. 476 is started against any person, the Court should hear the pleader appearing on behalf of such person—*Ram Nihore v K. E.*, 8 A.L.J. 237, 10 I.C. 740, 12 Cr.L.J. 231.

But a person against whom no process has been issued is neither an 'accused' person nor a 'person against whom any proceedings have been instituted', such a person has no right to attend, much less to be represented by a pleader, during a preliminary inquiry held under section 202 before issue of process. If he chooses to attend, he may do so like any other member of the public; but he has no *locus standi* as a party—*Shaikh Chand v. Mahomed Hanif*, 4 N.L.R. 81, 8 Cr.L.J. 20, *Golap Jan v. Bholanath* 38 Cal. 880.

Sec 340 gives the accused person a right to be defended by a pleader, and this right begins from the moment that "any person is

accused of an offence before a Criminal Court or proceedings are instituted under this Code in any such Court." An application by the Police for remand under sec. 167 can be held to be a "proceeding" instituted under this Code in a Criminal Court. He is an accused, and appears as such before the Magistrate. Therefore, at least from the moment after the 24 hours of arrest that he appears before the Court, this right begins. His legal advisers can appear, oppose the remand, offer bail, or make any other legal application on his behalf—*In re Llewellyn Evans*, 50 Bom 741, 28 Bom. L.R. 1043, 27 Cr L J 1160

967. Right of accused to be defended by pleader :

The accused has a right to choose his own pleader, and the Court is not entitled to tell him to appoint another pleader, because the pleader already engaged does not know how to behave in Court—*In re James Fitzgerald Ratanlal* 861. The Court has no power to forbid a duly qualified pleader to appear for the accused—*Reg v Dajee*, Ratanlal 25. The accused has a right that the pleader engaged by him must be heard. It is not a question of indulgence but of right. It is an elementary principle of law that no order ought to be made to a man's prejudice without hearing him, and his counsel must be heard before a final opinion is formed by the Court. The Court has no discretion to refuse to hear the counsel—*Emp v Iboo*, 1 Cr L J 760, 6 Bom. L.R. 665. If the Court refuses to hear the pleader for the accused, it is not a mere irregularity but an illegality vitiating the trial, so that the conviction must set aside and a retrial held—*In re Muthukaruppa*, 55 M.L.J. 626, 29 Cr L J 1082. The Court cannot ask the pleader to sit down in the middle of the cross-examination, though it has power to disallow improper questions put by him—*Reg. v Dajee*, Ratanlal 25. It is the duty of the Magistrate to afford the accused and his friends every opportunity of making his defence and he should not personally interpose in any way between them. It is therefore improper for a Magistrate to refuse to allow the pleader engaged by the wife of an accused for his defence to have an interview with him or to appear and sit in Court—*Q E v Uksudev*, 1 Bom L.R. 856. An accused should be given a reasonable opportunity of defending himself. When after the commencement of the trial, an application is made asking time to engage a pleader, the reasonable course for the Magistrate to adopt would be to proceed with the examination-in-chief of the prosecution witnesses and then to allow a reasonable time to the accused to appoint a pleader—*Pila v K E*, 47 All 147, 26 Cr L.J. 575. If the accused's pleader is not heard, the conviction will be set aside—*In re Munirama*, 5 M.L.T. 290, 2 Cr.L.J. 305.

But a pleader not otherwise authorised to practise in a Court (e.g. a second grade Advocate) has no right to be heard by the Court. But the Magistrate has a discretion to permit him to appear for an accused person. This permission should be given sparingly and only in those cases in which the Magistrate considers that it is for the interests of the accused that it should be given—*In re W Calogredy*, 10 Bur.L.T. 117, 18 Cr L J 345.

Pleader appointed by Court:—The position of a pleader appointed by the Court to defend a prisoner is not the same as that of a pleader whom the accused has authorised to act for him. Any admission made by the former are not binding on the accused—*Q. E. v. Sangaya*, 2 Bom L.R. 751 (cited under sec. 271)

Private Pleader.—Under sec. 4 (r), an accused person cannot claim as of right to be represented by a private person, but he may be represented by such person with the permission of the Court. But in permitting or disallowing the appearance of private persons as pleaders, a Magistrate should exercise a discretion in each case—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 400, and a general order that no person will be allowed to practise as a private pleader is illegal—*Krishnamachariar*, 12 M.L.J. 354, 2 Weir 401; *In re Nagasami*, 31 M.L.T. 458, 1922 M.W.N. 809. An order excluding any particular individual in any particular case would be within the discretion of the Magistrate and therefore legal—*Krishnamachariar* (supra).

968. Mukhtars.—Under the Code of 1872 the accused had a right to appear and be heard by a Mukhtar—*Imp. v. Shivram*, 6 Bom. 14. But under sec. 4 (r) of the Code of 1898 (before it was amended in 1923), a Mukhtar could appear only with the permission of the Court—*In re Anant Ram*, 30 All. 66. But still it was held to be improper for a Magistrate to shut up the defence of the accused merely because he was represented by a Mukhtar, and a general order prohibiting Mukhtars to appear in Sessions Courts was held to be illegal—*Ishan Chandra v. Emp.*, 38 Cal. 488. "Magistrates should not, by the indiscriminate exclusion of person who are invested by law a distinct professional status in criminal trials, deprive parties of legal aid which they can frequently obtain at a moderate cost"—*Cal. G. R. & Co. O.*, p. 29, *Ishan Chandra v. Emp.*, 38 Cal. 488

Under section 4, clause (r) as now amended by Act XXXV of 1923, Mukhtars have now been placed on the same footing as pleaders, and are entitled as of right to appear in all criminal Courts without requiring any special permission

969. Sub-section (2):—A person against whom proceedings are instituted under sec. 488 may give evidence on his own behalf, as such person is not an 'accused' person and the proceedings are not criminal proceedings—*Nur Mahomed v. Bismella*, 16 Cal. 781, *Bachai v. Jamuna*, 25 Cr.L.J. 1091 (Cal.). A person against whom proceedings are started under Chapter X may be examined on oath as a witness—*Hirananda v. Emp.*, 9 C.W.N. 983

341. If the accused, though not insane, cannot be made to understand the proceedings, the Court may proceed with the inquiry or trial; and, in the case of a Court other than a High Court, if such inquiry

Procedure where accused does not understand proceedings.

results in a commitment or if such trial results in a conviction, the proceedings shall be forwarded to the High Court with a report of the circumstances of the case, and the High Court shall pass thereon such order as it thinks fit.

970. Scope of section.—This section is intended to provide for cases where the accused is unable to understand the proceedings through deafness, or dumbness, or through ignorance of the language of the country and the want of an interpreter. In such cases the High Court will order the detention of the prisoner during His Majesty's pleasure—*Emp v. Husen* 5 Bom 262, *Q E v Hussein*, Ratanlal 151

This section is inapplicable where the inability to understand the proceedings arises from unsoundness of mind. In such cases the procedure prescribed by Chapter XXXIV should be followed—*Emp v Husen* 5 Bom. 262, *Q E v Kasima*, Ratanlal 832. But if after inquiry under that Chapter, it appears that the prisoner is not a lunatic, the Magistrate should proceed under this section—*In re Adala* 11 M L T 24, 13 Cr L J 24

A reference can be made under this section if the accused cannot be made to understand the proceedings. If, however, the deaf mute is intelligent and able to understand the proceedings, e g by means of signs, the provisions of this section do not apply and the case should be dealt with as in the ordinary way—*Emp v. Gunga*, 28 Cr L J 650 (Lah.); *Alla Dia*, 10 Lah 566, 29 Cr.L.J. 1104, *Dubi Halwai*, 19 W.R. 37; *K. E v. Dada Mahadu*, 3 Bom L.R 371, *K. E v. Nga San*, 4 Bur. L.T. 150, 11 I.C. 250, 12 Cr L J 386. In modern practice, want of speech and hearing does not imply want of capacity either in the understanding or in memory, but only a difficulty in the means of communicating knowledge. The law in India certainly does not expressly provide for a sane deaf mute being exempted from punishment. If his mind is sound his inability to hear and speak will not excuse him—*K. E v Nga San*, supra. If it be shown that the deaf and dumb person had sufficient intelligence to understand the character of his criminal act, he is liable to punishment—*Deaf and Dumb Accused* 40 Bom 598, 18 Cr L J. 143, Russell on Crimes, Vol 1, p 62

971. Duty of Magistrate—Where the accused is deaf and dumb, some means of communication with him should be adopted. The Magistrate should try and get into communication with him with the assistance of his relations, the Magistrate should make enquiry as to whether he has any friends or relatives who are accustomed to communicate with him and the manner in which he is communicated with in the ordinary affairs of his life—*Deaf and Dumb Man*, 8 Bom L R 849, 4 Cr.L J 444, *K E v Nga San*, 4 Bur L.T. 150, 12 Cr L J 386, *Q E. v. Samuel*, Ratanlal 696, *Anonymous*, 2 Weir 402. Where the Magistrate omitted to attempt to communicate with the deaf-and-dumb accused, the

conviction was set aside as the accused was certainly prejudiced by such omission—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 403

In making a reference under this section the Magistrate should state his view of the conduct of the accused and must take some evidence regarding the previous history and habits of the accused—*Q. E v Samuel*, Ratanlal 696 The Magistrate should, when making a reference, record a finding as to whether the accused is capable of realising the criminal character of the act done by him, or can understand the purpose or nature of the judicial proceedings that have been taken against him—*Emp v. Gunga*, 30 P.L.R. 597, 30 Cr.L.J. 948

Magistrate cannot pass sentence.—The Magistrate can convict the accused, and upon conviction can refer the case to the High Court, but cannot pass sentence—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 403, *Emp v Gahna*, 1889 P.R. 37 If the Magistrate passes sentence upon the accused, the High Court will set aside the sentence and pass such order as it thinks proper—*Emp v Gahna*, 1889 P.R. 37.

Summary Trial.—Where the accused is a deaf-mute, it is highly inconvenient to conduct the trial summarily even though the offence is summarily triable—*Deaf and Dumb Man*, 8 Bom.L.R. 849, 4 Cr.L.J. 444

972. Reference to High Court.—Reference can be made under this section to the High Court, if the inquiry or trial results in a committal or conviction—*Q. E v Trikam*, Ratanlal 180 The Judge should proceed to the end of the trial and then refer the case if a conviction follows—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 403, and should not refer the case in the midst of the trial before any conviction or committal takes place—*Deaf and Dumb Man*, 4 Bom.L.R. 825 Where, during the course of a trial, it appeared that the accused was a deaf and dumb person, and the Magistrate therefore referred the case to the High Court, expressing his opinion that the prisoner was guilty, it was held that the Magistrate ought to have proceeded to the end of the trial by convicting the accused, and the mere expression of opinion that the accused was guilty did not amount to a conviction. The High Court returned the case to the Magistrate and directed him to proceed with the trial, and if the same resulted in a conviction, to forward the proceedings again to the High Court—*In re Dumb Man*, Ratanlal 879, *In re Dumb Man*, Ratanlal 836

Orders which High Court may pass.—The High Court may treat the proceedings before the Lower Court as amounting to a sufficient trial and pass sentence upon the accused according to the facts established in the case—*Q. v Bowka*, 22 W.R. 35; or may give him a further opportunity of being heard in the matter of the charge—*Q. v. Bowka*, 22 W.R. 35, *Q. v. Bowka*, 22 W.R. 72, or may direct a re-trial if the Magistrate's trial was defective—*Deaf and Dumb Man*, 8 Bom.L.R. 849, 4 Cr.L.J. 444, or may, upon a consideration of the tender age of the accused, direct him to be made over to his father to be looked after by him—*Q. v. Ganga*, 7 N.W.P. 131; or may, in a proper case, discharge the accused with an admonition—*Q. v. Bowka*, 22 W.R. 35, *K. E. v Monya*, 4 Bom.L.R. 296

The High Court may, if it is of opinion that the accused was by reason of unsoundness of mind incapable of knowing that what he did was contrary to law, and that no benefit will be likely to result to the accused by his being tried by the Court of Session, direct him to be kept in jail pending the order of the Local Government—*Q. E. v. Somir*, 27 Cal. 368. In two Punjab cases it has been held that if a deaf and dumb person who is unable to understand the proceedings of the trial, is found guilty, the proper course to be taken is to treat him as a lunatic and to report the case under sec. 471 for the orders of the Local Government—*Emp. v. Gahna*, 1889 P.R. 37, followed in *Crown v. Dost Muhammad*, 1911 P.R. 13, 12 Cr L J. 613, 12 I C 989.

In serious cases, it is the practice of the High Court to refer the matter to the Local Government. In the case of a minor offence the High Court itself can pass an appropriate sentence or discharge the accused—*Emp. v. Rahman*, 1 Lah. 260, 21 Cr L J 621. Where a deaf and dumb accused was found guilty of attempt to commit suicide, and at the trial he made certain signs indicating his guilt, the High Court affirmed his conviction and sentenced the accused to one day's simple imprisonment—*Emp. v. Khashaba*, 25 Bom LR 43, A I R 1923 Bom. 194.

342. (1) For the purpose of enabling the accused to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, the Court may, at any stage of any inquiry or trial, without previously warning the accused, put such questions to him as the Court considers necessary, and shall, for the purpose aforesaid, question him generally on the case after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before he is called on for his defence.

(2) The accused shall not render himself liable to punishment by refusing to answer such questions, or by giving false answers to them; but the Court and the jury (if any) may draw such inference from such refusal or answers as it thinks just.

(3) The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed.

(4) No oath shall be administered to the accused.

This section makes a departure from the English law, under which it is not permissible for the Court to ask the accused any questions except

Questions incidental to the conduct of the trial, e.g. whether the accused wishes to cross-examine a witness or to give evidence, etc. It is a principle of English law that the whole burden of proving the offence is on the prosecution, the accused can stand by and do nothing; and he is protected from all judicial questioning at the trial. Indian law, however, allows the Court to put questions to the accused, and the answers thereto may be "taken into consideration," whatever that phrase may mean. It was for this reason that Sir James FitzJames Stephen characterised this section as embarrassing, illogical and hypocritical.

973. Scope—There is a conflict of opinion as to whether this section applies to trials of *summons* cases. According to the Bombay, Calcutta, Allahabad, Patna and Lahore High Courts, and the Sind and Nagpur J C Courts, the Magistrate is bound in a summons case to examine the accused under this section—*Emp v Fernandez*, 45 Bom 672, 22 Bom.L.R. 1040, 22 Cr.L.J. 17, *Emp v Gulabjan*, 46 Bom 411 (445), 23 Bom.L.R. 1203, 23 Cr.L.J. 45, *Bechu Lal v Emp*, 54 Cal 286, 28 Cr.L.J. 297, *Gulzari v. Emp*, 49 Cal 1075; *Khacho Mal v. Emp*, 27 Cr.L.J. 405 (All), *Gulam Rasul v K E*, 6 P.L.J. 174, 2 P.L.T. 390, 22 Cr.L.J. 427, *Raghu v. Emp*, 1 P.L.T. 241, 21 Cr.L.J. 705, *Parameswar v. Emp*, 3 P.L.T. 347, 23 Cr.L.J. 440, *Muhammad Baksh v. Emp*, 4 Lah.L.J. 230, 23 Cr.L.J. 154, *Emp v. Nabu*, 20 S.L.R. 34, 26 Cr.L.J. 1554, *Bhagwan v. Emp*, 22 N.L.R. 65, *Emp v Paris*, 19 S.L. 121. But according to the Madras High Court, this section does not apply to trials in summons cases. The use of the expression "before the accused is called on for his defence" in section 342 itself as well as in section 256 relating to trials in warrant cases and in section 289 relating to trials in sessions cases, and the absence of such an expression in the sections relating to trials in summons cases under chapter XX of the Code, show that the provisions of section 342 are not intended to apply to summons cases—*Ponnusamy v. Ramasamy*, 46 Mad 758 (F.B.), 45 M.L.J. 224, 24 Cr.L.J. 833.

This section applies to *summary* trials of warrant cases and the accused must be examined in such trials—*Mahomed Husain v. Emp.*, 41 Cal. 743; *Parsotim v. K. E.*, 6 Pat. 504, 28 Cr.L.J. 1037, *Balkeshwar v. Emp.*, 3 P.L.T. 322, 23 Cr.L.J. 114; *Parameswar Lal v. Emp*, 3 P.L.T. 347, 23 Cr.L.J. 440. According to the Calcutta High Court and the Nagpur and Sind Courts, this section applies to summary trials of summons cases also, and the examination of the accused in such a trial is imperative—*Moyzuddin v K. E.*, 33 C.W.N. 947, *Bhagwan v Emp.*, 22 N.L.R. 65, 27 Cr.L.J. 632; *Emp. v. Nabu*, 20 S.L.R. 34, 26 Cr.L.J. 1554. See Note 867 under sec 263. But according to the Madras High Court, this section does not apply to summary trials of summons cases, as there is no distinction between a summary trial of summons cases and an ordinary trial of summons cases—*Dharma Singh v. K. E.*, 46 Mad 766 (F.B.).

This section does not apply to an inquiry under section 117, because the person called upon to give security is not in the position of an *accused* person within the meaning of section 342. Therefore the omission to ex-

amine the person called upon to give security is a mere irregularity curable under section 537, and not an illegality vitiating the proceedings—*Benode Behari v. Emp.*, 50 Cal 995. So also, a person proceeded against under sec. 488 is not looked upon as an accused person, and omission to examine him does not vitiate the proceedings. The words "after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before he is called on for his defence" are inappropriate to a proceeding under sec. 488—*In re Vithaldas*, 52 Bom 769, 29 Cr.L.J. 1051 (1052), *Bachal v. Jamuna*, 25 Cr.L.J. 1091 (Cal); *Mehr Khan*, 10 Lah 406, 29 Cr.L.J. 1002 (1003, 1004).

Where an accused is examined by the Court before any evidence for the prosecution has been taken and before the commencement of the preliminary inquiry, his examination cannot be said to be under sec. 342, because at that stage there was no evidence for the prosecution recorded against him and no circumstances which he could be called upon to explain. The statement must be taken to have been recorded under sec. 164—*Bahauala v. Crown*, 11 Lah 183, 26 P.L.R. 331, 26 Cr.L.J. 1238.

This section applies only to a case of an original trial, and does not apply where additional evidence is taken by the Magistrate under the direction of an Appellate Court under sec. 428. In such a proceeding it is not necessary to examine the accused about the additional evidence. There might be cases where the accused could properly be questioned by the Magistrate in regard to the additional evidence so taken, but the omission to do so is not an illegality—*Narayan v. Emp.*, 52 Bom 699, 30 Bom L.R. 651, 29 Cr.L.J. 972 (973), *Mohiuddin v. Emp.*, 4 Pat. 488, 26 Cr.L.J. 811 (813).

974. Object and mode of examination:—The real object of the examination is to enable a Judge to ascertain from time to time from a prisoner, particularly if he is undefended, what explanation he may desire to offer regarding any fact stated by a witness, or after the close of the case, how he can meet what the Judge may consider to be damnable evidence against him—*Husein v. Emp.*, 6 Cal 96, *Mazhar Ali v. K. E.*, 50 Cal 223, 36 C.L.J. 417, *Tani v. Emp.*, 48 I.C. 487, 20 Cr.L.J. 12 (Nag). And in order that the accused may explain all the facts appearing in evidence against him, it is necessary that his attention should be directed to all the vital parts of the evidence against him, specially if he is an ignorant person who cannot be expected to know or understand what particular parts of the evidence are or are likely to be considered by the Court to be against him—*Tani v. Emp.*, supra. The Court should not only point out to the accused the circumstances appearing in the evidence which requires explanation, but it must, out of fairness to the accused, exercise that power in such a way that the accused may know what points in the opinion of the Court require explanation, and failure or refusal on the part of the accused to give the explanation will entitle the Court to draw an inference against him—*K. E. v. Alimuddi*, 52 Cal 522, 29 C.W.N. 231, 26 Cr.L.J. 631.

The object of this section is to enable the accused to explain each and every circumstance appearing in evidence against him, this cannot be

done by such a general question as "what have you to say?" or "What is your defence?" The specific point or points which weigh against the accused must be mentioned; for if this is not done, he cannot be reasonably expected to be able to explain those points—*Maung Hman v. K. E.*, 1 Rang 689, *K. E. v. Alimuddi*, 52 Cal. 522, 41 C.L.J. 101, 26 Cr L.J. 631. The word "generally" does not limit the nature of the questioning to one or more questions of a general nature relating to the case, but it means that the questions should relate to the whole case generally and should not be limited to any particular part or parts of it. The word "generally" does not mean that the accused cannot be subjected to a detailed examination by the Court. The law intends that the salient points appearing in the evidence against the accused must be pointed out to him in a succinct form and that he should be asked to explain them if he wished to do so—*K. E. v. Alimuddi*, 52 Cal 522 (*per* M. N. Mukerjee J., Newbould J. *contra*). The question must be framed in such a way as to enable the accused to know what he is to explain, what are the circumstances which are against him and for which an explanation is needed. A general question as to whether the accused has anything further to say is not a sufficient compliance with the requirements of this section—*Bhokari v. Emp.*, 5 P.L.T. 445, 25 Cr.L.J. 711, A.I.R. 1924 Pat. 791; *Udhao v. Emp.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 417 (Nag); *Durga Ram v. Emp.*, 6 P.L.T. 33, 26 Cr L.J. 716. But another Patna case lays down that where the facts of the case are simple, a general question such as "Have you any statement to make?" may be sufficient—*Banamali v. K. E.*, 6 P.L.T. 39, 26 Cr.L.J. 682.

There is a difference in the wording of the first and the second portions of sub-section (1) of sec. 342, the former being discretionary ('may put questions') and the latter mandatory ('shall question him'). If the Court has put questions to the accused under the first part of sub-section (1), it would be a sufficient compliance with the provisions of the second portion if the Court gives to the accused an opportunity, by putting to him one general question (*e.g.*, "Have you got to say anything else?"), to explain the circumstances appearing in the case against him, and in this connection the examination of the accused under the first portion of this sub-section may be usefully looked into—*Md Nasiruddin v. Emp.*, 4 Pat 459, 6 P.L.T. 588, 26 Cr L.J. 954.

The examination of the accused under this section is intended to enable the accused to explain any circumstances appearing against him and not to elicit answers calculated to supplement the case for the prosecution and to show that he is guilty—*Q. E. v. Rangi*, 10 Mad 295 (315); *Bhola Nath*, 51 All 313, 30 Cr.L.J. 101 (105). The object of the examination is not to make the accused confess his guilt or assist the prosecution by admitting facts which may go to criminate him—*Q. E. v. Bhairab*, 3 C.W.N. 702, *Tufani v. K. E.*, 15 C.L.J. 323, 13 Cr.L.J. 283; *Q. E. v. Veeran*, 9 Mad. 224. The Court cannot put questions to the accused as to what took place on the occasion, in order to convict him out of his own mouth—*Q. E. v. Kamandu*, 10 Mad. 121 (123). Nor is it competent for the Court to examine the accused for the purpose of

filling up gaps in the evidence for the prosecution—*Mohideen Abdul Qadir v. Emp.*, 27 Mad. 238 (240); *Jeremiah v. Vas.*, 36 Mad. 457; *Mohan Singh*, 42 All. 522, *Devi Dayal v. Crown*, 4 Lah. 55; *Annabi v. Emp.*, 39 Mad. 449; *Basanta Kumar v. Q. E.*, 26 Cal. 49, *Yasin v. K. E.*, 28 Cal. 689; *Gaung Gyi v. K. E.*, 4 L.B.R. 214, ■ Cr.L.J. 62, *Mahadeo v. Emp.*, 22 N.L.R. 1, 27 Cr.L.J. 66. Thus, where in a charge of defamation the prosecution is unable to prove that the accused made and published the defamatory matter, it is illegal for the Magistrate to examine the accused for the purpose of supplying this defect in the prosecution evidence—*Mohideen v. Emp.*, 27 Mad. 238; *Devi Dayal v. Crown*, 4 Lah. 55, 24 Cr.L.J. 693. So also, it is improper to put questions to the accused for the purpose of proving his identity, when such identity was not established by the prosecution evidence—*Abbas Ali v. K. E.*, 3 L.B.R. 208. The object of the examination is to enable the accused to explain the evidence standing against him; but where the prosecution has not let in evidence implicating the accused in the offence with which he is charged, the Magistrate is not entitled to put questions to him under this section, and the answers to such questions are inadmissible in evidence against him—*Re Abibulla Ravuthan* 39 Mad. 770, *Devi Dayal v. Crown*, 4 Lah. 55, 24 Cr.L.J. 693, *Q. E. v. Vceran* 9 Mad. 224.

When a Magistrate is examining a prisoner, he should refrain from assuming that the prisoner is guilty of the crime with which he is charged. The proper mode is to tell the prisoner that he is charged with a certain offence and to ask him if he has any explanation to give of the charge, and whether he wishes to make any statement—*Murthi*, 2 Weir 438.

In permitting the Court to examine the accused person from time to time, the law does not contemplate that the examination of an accused person is to be conducted in the manner of cross-examination of an adverse witness by a counsel—*Hussein v. Emp.*, ■ Cal. 96, *Emp. v. Alimuddi*, 52 Cal. 522 (per Newbould J.), *Niru Bhagat v. K. E.*, 1 Pat. 630, 24 Cr.L.J. 91, *Faqir Singh v. Emp.*, 10 Lah. 223, 29 Cr.L.J. 769 (770), *Umar Din v. Emp.*, 2 Lah. 129, 23 Cr.L.J. 388; *Panchu v. Emp.*, 3 P.L.T. 649, 23 Cr.L.J. 233, *Emp. v. Yakub*, 5 All. 253; *Hurry Churn v. Emp.*, 10 Cal. 140; *Mahadeo v. Emp.*, 22 N.L.R. 1, 27 Cr.L.J. 66. The Judge or Magistrate is not to establish a Court of Inquisition, and to force a prisoner to convict himself by making some incriminating admissions after a series of searching questions, the exact effect of which he may not comprehend—*Hussein v. Emp.*, 6 Cal. 96, *Umar v. Emp.*, 2 Lah. 129, 23 Cr.L.J. 388, *Mohiuddin v. Emp.*, 4 Pat. 488, 6 P.L.T. 154, 26 Cr.L.J. 811 (814). It is not necessary, nor is it desirable, to examine the accused in great detail or to force him to disclose his defence so as to enable the prosecution to take advantage of it when the witnesses for the accused are examined—*Md. Nasiruddin v. Emp.*, 4 Pat. 459 ■ P.L.T. 588. It is highly improper to subject the accused to a very embarrassing and cruel series of questions intended rather to puzzle the accused than to elucidate the case or to enable him to furnish an explanation ■ to the circumstances appearing in evidence against him—*Emp. v. Anant*, 6 Bom. L.R. 94, 1 Cr.L.J. 105. Where an accused is undefended, the Magistrate

should simply point out to him the elements of the evidence adduced against him, which seems in his own interest to demand his explanation; where the accused is defended by a lawyer, the tribunal should not enter upon a lengthy examination of the accused person, which might easily develop into a recounting of the history of the whole case or into what would be far worse, some sort of cross-examination—*Panchu v. Emp.*, 3 P.L.T. 649, 23 Cr.L.J. 233. But the mere fact that a large number of questions (*viz.*, 55) were asked does not make the examination inquisitorial, where it appeared that the questions were asked not to elicit statements from the accused for the purpose of supplementing the case for the prosecution, but the object of the greater part of the questions was to ascertain whether the accused (who attempted no defence) admitted the facts stated by the witnesses or wished to offer any explanation, and the examination was not made in the nature of cross-examination—*Khudiram v. Emp.*, 9 C.L.J. 55, 3 I.C. 625.

It is a sufficient compliance with this section if the Court asks the accused *generally* whether he wishes to offer an explanation of any of the evidence which has been given against him. And although this section also gives the Court power to put *specific* questions to the accused with regard to any of the evidence adduced for the prosecution, still it is entirely in the discretion of the Judge whether he should, after having put the general question, ask such specific questions on particular points in the evidence—*Emp. v. Narayana*, 26 Bom L.R. 109, 25 Cr.L.J. 1127.

If there are several accused, the Magistrate must examine each accused *separately* if he records the statements of all the accused collectively, the trial is vitiated and must be set aside—*Ghasiti v. K. E.*, 11 Lah. 554, 27 Cr.L.J. 408. Where the Magistrate recorded the statements of the several accused separately before the charge, but after the close of the prosecution evidence questioned the accused jointly, and recorded a joint statement, the procedure was illegal—*Girdhari v. Emp.*, 29 P.L.R. 436, 29 Cr.L.J. 469.

When, of two accused persons tried together one has made a statement on a particular point in the case against them, it is not improper for the Magistrate to take another statement from the co-accused under this section—*Satya Narayan*, 55 Cal. 858, 32 C.W.N. 319 (323), 29 Cr.L.J. 1022.

Under this section it is the accused himself who should be asked as to whether he would make any statement. Where at the close of the prosecution case the *pleader* of the accused persons (and not the accused themselves) was asked *if they wished to make any statement*, and the pleader stated that they would not do so, *held* that this was not a compliance with sec. 342, since one of the essential points for which this section provides is that the accused themselves should have an opportunity of making their statements directly to the Court and not through the intervention of a pleader—*Messer Bepari v. K. E.*, 29 C.W.N. 939, 26 Cr.L.J. 1332.

975. Examination imperative—The first portion of this section as to putting questions to the accused is an enabling provision, but

the second portion as to the examination of the accused is imperative. The word 'shall' shows that the provisions of the latter part of this section as to the examination of the accused after the close of the prosecution evidence are mandatory and not discretionary only—*Rameshar v. Emp.*, 11 P.L.T. 493, 26 Cr L.J. 927; *Emp. v. Savalya*, 9 Bom. L.R. 356; *Varisal v. K. E.*, 46 Mad. 449 (455) (F.B.), *Emp. v. Harishchandra*, 10 Bom. L.R. 201, *Ah Foong v. K. E.*, 22 C.W.N. 834, 20 Cr L.J. 21, *Gulla v. Crown*, 1918 P.R. 1, *Raghu v. K. E.* 5 P.L.J. 430, 21 Cr L.J. 705, *Suraj Pandey v. K. E.* 1 P.L.T. 641, 21 Cr L.J. 793, *Tani v. Emp.* 20 Cr.L.J. 12 (Nag.). The Sessions Judge is bound to examine the accused even though he has been examined before the committing Magistrate—*Nainamalai*, 14 L.W. 418, 23 Cr L.J. 697, *Emp. v. Raja*, 9 Bom. L.R. 730; *Emp. v. Nga Po*, 4 Rang. 361, 27 Cr L.J. 1364, *Emp. v. Md Shafi*, 26 Cr L.J. 1576 (Oudh). Omission to examine the accused is not merely an error in form but goes deeper into the case and vitiates the whole trial—*Emp. v. Basappa* 17 Bom L.R. 692, 16 Cr L.J. 765, *Gulabjan*, 46 Bom. 441 (444); *Fernandez v. Emp.* 45 Bom. 672, *Gangadhar v. Reid*, 25 C.W.N. 609, 23 Cr L.J. 41, *Haro Nath v. Ala Bux*, 28 C.W.N. 119, *Ramnath v. Emp.* 2 P.L.T. 549, 22 Cr L.J. 460, *Fatu Santal v. K. E.* 6 P.L.J. 147, 22 Cr L.J. 417, *Parameshwar v. Emp.* 3 P.L.T. 317, 23 Cr L.J. 440; *Baij Nath v. K. E.* 4 P.L.T. 231, 24 Cr L.J. 311, *Rameshar v. K. E.* 11 P.L.T. 493, 26 Cr L.J. 927, *Varisal Rowther v. K. E.* 46 Mad. 449 (456) (F.B.), *Pramatha v. Emp.* 50 Cal. 518, *Mazahar v. K. E.* 50 Cal. 223, *Legal Remembrancer v. Satish Chandra*, 51 Cal. 924 (929), *Emp. v. Gamadia*, 27 Bom.L.R. 1405, 50 Bom. 34. The defect is not cured by sec. 537, that is, the non-compliance vitiates the trial even though the accused has not been prejudiced thereby—*Pramatha Nath v. Emp.* 50 Cal. 518, *Mozahar v. K. E.*, 50 Cal. 223, *Ram Charan v. Emp.*, 7 P.L.T. 259, 26 Cr L.J. 1289, *Ghulla v. Crown*, 1918 P.R. 1, *Md Baksh v. Crown*, 4 Lah L.J. 230, *Raghu v. K. E.*, 5 P.L.J. 430, 21 Cr L.J. 705, *Suraj Pandey v. K. E.*, 1 P.L.T. 641, 21 Cr L.J. 793, *Durga Ram v. Emp.* 6 P.L.T. 33, 26 Cr.L.J. 716, *K. E. v. Nga Po*, 11 Bur L.T. 134, 18 Cr L.J. 944. The illegality cannot be waived even by the consent of the accused or their pleaders—*Emp. v. Gamadia*, 27 Bom. L. 1405, 50 Bom. 34, 27 Cr L.J. 165 (166).

Failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of this section vitiates the whole trial, and the accused is to be retried—*Sailendra v. Emp.* 38 C.L.J. 175, *Gangadhar v. Bhangi*, 25 Cr L.J. 1152 (Nag.); *Emp. v. Sheopal*, 1 O.W.N. 833, 26 Cr L.J. 655, and the retrial should take place from the stage at which the trying Magistrate omitted to examine the accused—*Gamadia* 50 Bom. 34, 27 Cr L.J. 165 (169), *Motankhan*, 21 S.L.R. 331, 28 Cr L.J. 417 (418). But where there are many serious defects in the prosecution case, and the chance of conviction seems to be remote, no useful purpose will be served by sending the case back for retrial—*Leg. Rem v. Satish Chandra*, 51 Cal. 924 (927), 39 C.L.J. 411.

It is not a sufficient compliance with this section if the Sessions Judge merely reads over to the accused a statement made by the latter before

the committing Magistrate and recorded by that Magistrate under section 364—*Fatu Santal v. Emp.*, 11 P.L.J. 147, 22 Cr.L.J. 417.

But an insufficient examination of the accused person does not necessarily invalidate the trial if the statements made by the accused indicate that they were not altogether ignorant of some of the salient points appearing in the evidence against them, and endeavoured to explain some of the points—*K. E. v. Alimuddi*, 52 Cal. 522, 29 C.W.N. 231, 26 Cr.L.J. 631

976. When examination may be dispensed with :—(1) The examination of the accused is obligatory only in cases where the accused is called on for his defence. If a Magistrate discharges an accused without framing a charge, the non-examination of the accused does not vitiate the proceeding—*Varisat Rowther v. K. E.*, 46 Mad. 449 (461) (F.B.).

(2) When the accused has left the case entirely in the hands of his legal adviser, the Judge need not ask the accused to explain any circumstances appearing in evidence against him—*Gandi Tatarya*, 2 Weir 405

(3) Where the accused has been exempted from personal appearance under sec. 205, the Court may also dispense with his examination, and may examine the pleader instead—*Crown v. Jamal*, 6 S.L.R. 206, 14 Cr.L.J. 272, *Maung Po v. Haka Singh*, 4 Rang. 506, 28 Cr.L.J. 226

(4) Since the object of the examination is to enable the accused to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, it follows that where the accused has admitted his guilt, and had been examined by the committing Magistrate, it is not necessary for the Sessions Judge to examine the accused again—*Khudiram v. Emp.*, 9 C.L.J. 55, 3 I.C. 625

(5) The examination of the accused may be dispensed with in those cases in which owing to the admission or plea of the accused (sec. 243) or owing to the weakness of the evidence called in support of the prosecution (secs. 245, 253) the accused can either be convicted on his own plea without the taking of evidence or acquitted on the evidence—*Emp. v. Nabu*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1554, 20 S.L.R. 34

977. Time for examination :—The accused is to be examined after the evidence for the prosecution has been recorded. He cannot be examined before any prosecution evidence has been heard or recorded, because there is nothing which he can be asked to explain at that stage—*Q. E. v. Veeran*, 11 Mad. 224; *Emp. v. Kura*, 1882 A.W.N. 166; *In re Sadayan*, 5 M.L.T. 216; *Emp. v. Baljit*, 1883 A.W.N. 238.

The accused is to be examined after the evidence for the prosecution has been closed and before he is asked to enter upon his defence—*Q. E. v. Bava*, Ratanlal 227, *Raghu Bhumi v. K. E.*, 5 P.L.J. 430, 21 Cr.L.J. 705; *Mazahar Ali v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 223. It is unfair to the accused and contrary to law to examine the accused before the examination of all the prosecution witnesses is completed—*Ram Harakh v. Emp.*, 1 O.L.J. 238, 15 Cr.L.J. 436; *Rameshwar v. Emp.*, 2 P.L.T. 741, 22 Cr.L.J. 259; *Tilak v. Bhaya Ram*, 22 Cr.L.J. 598 (Pat.) Therefore,

where the accused was examined after two prosecution witnesses had given evidence, and then another prosecution witness was examined, held that the procedure offended against this section and the conviction must be set aside, and retrial ordered—*Ramesnar v. Emp.*, supra; *Balkeshwar v. Emp.*, 3 P.L.T. 322, 23 Cr L J 114; *Gulzari Lal v. Emp.*, 49 Cal. 1075; *Ghaza Ali v. Crown*, ■ Lah. L.J. 618, 27 Cr L.J. 87, *Lachhman v. Emp.*, 7 Lah. 564, 27 P.L.R. 427, 27 Cr L J 1007, *Emp v Bhau Dharma*, 30 Bom L.R. 385, 29 Cr L J 535 (536). But the Allahabad High Court is of opinion that although all the witnesses for the prosecution ought to be examined before the examination of the accused, under the imperative provisions of section 342, still if the evidence of the witnesses who are examined after the examination of the accused introduces no new matter, the irregularity in procedure does not prejudice the accused, and is curable by section 537—*Emp v Bechu Chaube*, 45 All 124, 20 A L J 874, 21 Cr.L.J. 67, *Khacho Mal v Emp.* 27 Cr L J 405 (406) (All.), *Rammu v. Emp.*, 27 Cr L J. 719 (All.), *Emp v Jhabbar* 26 A L J 100, 30 Cr L J. 531 (536). The Patna High Court has also laid down that if the accused ■ defended, any violation of any rule as to the stage at which he is to be examined, does not make much difference. If he has not been prejudiced, the error ought not to vitiate the trial—*Mohiuddin v Emp.*, 4 Pat. 488, 26 Cr L J 811 (815).

The accused should be examined *before the evidence for the defence* ■ taken. The examination of the accused after all the prosecution witnesses ■ well as the witnesses for the defence are examined, vitiates the conviction and sentence, and the trial must be taken up again from the close of the prosecution case, and the accused must be examined before he has entered upon his defence—*Surendra v. Isamuddi*, 51 Cal. 933 (934), 26 Cr.L.J. 261; *Ram Charan v Emp.*, 7 P L T 259, 26 Cr.L.J. 1289. But in a very recent Calcutta case it has been laid down that an examination of the accused after the conclusion of the defence evidence is a mere irregularity curable by sec. 537—*Tamez Khan v Rajabali*, 31 C.W.N. 337 (338), 28 Cr.L.J. 347 (dissenting from 51 Cal 933).

Although the Magistrate may under the first part of sub-section (1) examine an accused person before the case for the prosecution is concluded, still this would not absolve the Magistrate from the obligation imposed upon him by the latter part of sub-section (1) to examine the accused after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before he is called on for his defence—*Ramnath v Emp.*, 2 P L T 549, 22 Cr.L.J. 460; *Moinuddin v Emp.*, 2 P L T 455, 22 Cr L J. 422, *Bhokari v. Emp.*, 5 P.L.T 445, 25 Cr L J 711, *Hamid Ali v Sri Kissen*, 28 C.W.N 118, 24 Cr.L.J. 943.

The accused must be examined after the *examination, cross-examination and re-examination* of all the prosecution witnesses are over. It ■ not enough that the accused has been examined after the examination-in-chief of the prosecution witnesses and before their cross-examination and re-examination. Until the prosecution witnesses have been cross-examined and re-examined, it cannot be said what the exact case that the accuse

will have to meet is, and if he is forced to disclose his defence before cross-examination, it might very well be that the prosecution witnesses would be on their guard and the value of the cross-examination destroyed. The provision in sec. 342 is for the benefit of the accused; and to enable him to obtain the full benefit of the section it is clear that he must be examined after the cross-examination and re-examination of the prosecution witnesses are over—*Mitarjit Singh v. K. E.*, 11 P.L.J. 644 (649), 2 P.L.T. 520, 22 Cr.L.J. 697; *Kashi Pramanik v. Dasu Paramanik*, 27 C.W.N. 28; *Jummon v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 308; *Mazahar v. K. E.*, 50 Cal. 223, *Gulzar Lal v. Emp.*, 49 Cal. 1075; *Fernandez v. Emp.*, 45 Bom. 672, *Emp. v. Nathu Kasturchand*, 50 Bom. 42, 27 Bom. L.R. 105, 26 Cr.L.J. 690. *Pramatha Nath Mukerjee v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 518 (523) ('Servant' Defamation Case), *Dibakanta v. Gour Gopal*, 50 Cal. 939 (947); *Local Govt. v. Maria*, 20 N.L.R. 174, 26 Cr.L.J. 971 (F.B.), *Motan Khan v. Emp.*, 21 S.L.R. 331, 28 Cr.L.J. 417. Therefore where after some of the prosecution witnesses were examined-in-chief, the Magistrate examined the accused, and then some more prosecution witnesses were examined, and all the prosecution witnesses were cross-examined, but the accused was not examined again, held that there was no substantial compliance with the provisions of this section—*Sailendra v. K. E.*, 38 C.L.J. 175; *Krishnappa v. Emp.*, 25 Cr. L.J. 713 (Nag); *Mad. Sadiq v. Emp.*, 26 P.L.R. 533, 26 Cr.L.J. 1370. Where the prosecution witnesses are first examined-in-chief, then the accused are examined under this section, and afterwards the prosecution witnesses are cross-examined, the procedure is illegal and the trial is vitiated—*Haronath v. Ala Bux*, 28 C.W.N. 119, 38 C.L.J. 281. Such non-compliance with the provisions of this section is not an irregularity curable by sec. 537—Ibid., *Mazahar v. K. E.*, 50 Cal. 223. But the Madras High Court holds that the words "after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined" mean 'when the prosecution has finished calling evidence' and do not include the cross-examination and re-examination of the prosecution witnesses. Therefore, where in a warrant case the accused does not cross-examine the prosecution witnesses after their examination-in-chief, and then the Magistrate examines the accused and frames a charge, and afterwards at a later stage the accused cross-examines the prosecution witnesses and then the prosecution re-examines them, held that the omission to further examine the accused after the cross-examination and re-examination of the prosecution witnesses does not vitiate the trial—*Varisai Rowther v. K. E.*, 46 Mad. 449 (F.B.), 24 Cr.L.J. 547 (overruling *Maruda Mathu Vannian, In re*, 45 Mad. 820). This view of the Madras Full Bench has been followed by the Rangoon High Court—*Nga Hla v. Emp.*, 3 Rang. 139, 26 Cr.L.J. 1336; *Subbaya Naidu*, 7 Rang. 470, 1929 Cr. C. 507 (509); and by the Allahabad High Court—*Sudarian v. Emp.*, 49 All. 551, 28 Cr.L.J. 399 (400). See also *Emp. v. Bechar Chaudh*, 45 All. 124, where the witnesses for the prosecution were examined-in-chief and on the same day the accused were questioned under sec. 342, and afterwards the witnesses for the prosecution were cross-examined; the High Court made no objection to this procedure. The Oudh Chief Court also holds that if the accused has been examined

before the framing of the charge, the omission to re-examine him after the frame of charge and the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses does not vitiate the trial, if the cross-examination adds nothing on which it is necessary to further examine the accused—*Emp. v. Brij Behari*, 28 O.C. 130, 12 B.L.J. 102, 2 O.W.N. 327, 26 Cr.L.J. 1301; *Khuman v. Emp.*, 2 O.W.N. 378, 26 Cr.L.J. 1374.

Where the accused has been examined after the prosecution has finished its evidence under sec. 252, but a new and material matter in support of the prosecution case is elicited in cross-examination or re-examination of the prosecution witnesses under sec. 256, it is desirable that the accused should again be questioned on the case under sec. 342 and asked generally to explain the circumstances. So also, if the accused has already been examined before the framing of the charge, and the prosecution calls fresh evidence after the formulation of the charge, the accused must again be examined under sec. 342 on the termination of that evidence—*Varisai Routhier v. K. E.* 46 Mad. 449 (1871) (F.B.), 24 Cr.L.J. 547. The accused was examined by the Magistrate before the charge was framed and after all the prosecution witnesses had been examined and cross-examined at considerable length. After the charge was framed, most of the witnesses were recalled by the accused (under sec. 256) for a further lengthy cross-examination, after which the Magistrate proceeded to record the defence evidence without questioning the accused again. Held that, as the prosecution witnesses had been once cross-examined at great length, it would be unnecessary for the Court to examine the accused again after the further cross-examination, when no fresh circumstances were discovered after the recall and re-cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses—*Byrne v. Crown*, 4 Lah. 61, 25 Cr.L.J. 801, *In re Thachroth*, 45 M.L.J. 279, 25 Cr.L.J. 7, *Fazl Karim v. Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1418 (Lah.). The accused was examined after the examination and cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, and then the Magistrate called upon him to enter upon his defence (sec. 256). Thereupon the accused applied to the Court for recall of some of the prosecution witnesses for further cross-examination (sec. 257) and the Magistrate granted the application. Held that it was not incumbent upon the Magistrate to further examine the accused after the latter had re-cross-examined the prosecution witnesses under sec. 257. After the accused had entered upon his defence, the stage at which he must be examined under sec. 342 had passed—*Obedar Rahaman*, 56 Cal. 1157, 1930 Cr. C. 219 (220), 31 Cr.L.J. 406.

Where an accused person has been examined under this section after the close of the prosecution case, and the Court examines a person under sec. 540 (whether such person be a prosecution witness or another person), it is not necessary to examine the accused again, especially where the deposition of such person does not disclose any fresh facts, and the accused is in no way prejudiced in not having been examined again—*Prayag Gope v. K. E.*, 3 Pat. 1015 (1017), 5 P.L.T. 571, 25 Cr.L.J. 1418 (1419) (Lah.); *Emp. v. K.*

30 Bom L.R. 1086, 29 Cr.L.J. 1057 (1058); *Allah Dittu v. Emp.*, 23 S.L.R. 1, 29 Cr.L.J. 932 (933).

This section does not make it obligatory to again examine the accused after a charge has been added to or altered, when he has already been examined prior to the addition or alteration of the charge—*Shamlal v. K. E.*, 1 Pat. 54, 23 Cr.L.J. 146.

Retrial :—Where a trial was vitiated on the ground that the accused was not examined at the proper stage, a retrial would be ordered, and the retrial should take place not *de novo* but from the stage in which the Magistrate ought to have examined the accused—*Mitarjit v. K. E.*, 1 P.L.J. 644 (649), 22 Cr.L.J. 697; *Pramatha Nath v. Emp.*, 50 Cal 518 (525), 24 Cr.L.J. 248, 27 C.W.N. 389, *Diba Kanta v. Gour Gopal*, 50 Cal. 939 (948); *Motankhan v. Emp.*, 21 S.L.R. 331, 28 Cr.L.J. 417 (418); *Surendra v. Isamuddi*, 51 Cal 933 (934); *Ram Charan*, 7 P.L.T. 259, 26 Cr.L.J. 1289; *Md. Hayat Khan*, 29 Cr.L.J. 475 (477) (Nag.).

978. Who can examine :—The Court conducting the trial or inquiry is alone authorised to examine the accused person and the counsel or other person conducting the prosecution should not be allowed to take any part in the examination—*C. P. Cr. Cir.*, Part II, no. 24. Sec. 342 allows the Court, but not the complainant to put questions to the accused—*Q. E. v. Kamandu*, 10 Mad. 121 (123).

A Special Bench constituted under the Criminal Law Amendment Act (XVI of 1908) can examine the accused under this section—*Nagendra Nath*, 19 C.W.N. 923, 21 C.L.J. 396 (*Mussalmanpara Bomb case*).

Where the Magistrate who has partly tried the case and examined the accused is transferred, and the accused demands a *de novo* trial, the succeeding Magistrate is bound to examine the accused again, and failure on his part to do so vitiates the trial. It is the Magistrate who tries the case and decides it who must examine the accused, and it is not sufficient for his predecessor-in-office to have done so—*Akhbar Mohd. v. Emp.*, 29 Cr.L.J. 125 (126) (Lah.).

979. Improper questions :—It is highly objectionable to put questions to the accused in regard to the matter which he had previously mentioned in his confession and which he had repudiated as untrue—*K. E. v. Bhut Nath*, 7 C.W.N. 345. The Magistrate cannot put him any question with the object of trapping him into some sort of admission after he has resiled from his confession—*Umar Din v. Emp.*, 2 Lah. 129. It is improper to examine an accused about a confession which is inadmissible, and if he is examined about such a confession, the questions and the answers to them are not admissible in evidence against the accused—*Gaung Gy. v. K. E.*, 4 L.B.R. 244, 8 Cr.L.J. 62. It is improper to put questions to the accused to ascertain what witnesses the accused intends to call at the trial or what evidence they will give, or what his defence is—*Q. E. v. Hargobind*, 14 All. 242; *Q. E. v. Hawthorne*, 13 All. 345, *Mohideen Abdul v. Emp.*, 27 Mad. 238.

It is improper for a Magistrate to put questions to the accused, before his conviction in the present trial, about his previous convictions, either

with a view to take them into consideration for the purpose of conviction or with a view to dispense with formal evidence as to the alleged previous convictions and as to the identity of the accused in the event of conviction—*Emp. v. Allomah*, 24 Bom 129, *Yasin v. K E*, 24 Cal. 680. But see *Emp. v. Kisan*, 4 N.L.R. 163

980. Written statements—Though written statements can be put in and accepted by the Court, still they can not be allowed to take the place of the examination of the accused as required by this section—*Arvita Lal v. Emp.*, 42 Cal. 957, *Harnama v. Emp.*, 22 Cr.L.J. 270 (Lah); *Rajhu Bhuray v. K E*, 5 P.L.J. 430, *Bhagwat v. Emp.*, 4 Pat 231, 26 Cr.L.J. 932 (937), *Mohiuddin v. Emp.* 2 P.L.T. 455; *Balkeshwar v. Emp.* 23 Cr.L.J. 114, 3 P.L.T. 322, *In re Nainamalai*, 14 L.W. 418, 23 Cr.L.J. 697, *Udhao v. Emp.* 25 Cr.L.J. 417 (Nag). The accused is not entitled as a matter of right to put in a written statement in lieu of any answers he may give to questions put in him under sec. 342—*Emp. v. Ring*, 53 Bom 470, 1929 Cr. C. 114 (110), 31 Cr.L.J. 65. The object of this section is to elicit answers from the accused, in regard to certain matters, and since written statements are generally drawn up by the legal advisers or friends of the accused and not by the accused themselves, the practice of making such written statements will defeat the object of this section *K E v. Duggendra* 19 C.W.N. 1043, *Pramatha v. Emp.* 50 Cal. 518 (524), 27 C.W.N. 389, 21 Cr.L.J. 218. The promise to file written statements made at the time of the plea does not exempt the Court from its duty of examining the accused under this section—*Pramatha v. Emp.*, supra; *Mitarajit*, 6 P.L.J. 644 (649), 22 Cr.L.J. 607. But where the written statement filed was full and elaborate, and covered all the points raised by the prosecution, and no further purpose would have been served by any further questions to the accused, and it was not shown that the irregularity had caused him any prejudice, the conviction need not be set aside nor retrial ordered—*Ramnath v. Emp.*, 2 P.L.T. 549, *Bhagwat v. Emp.*, 4 Pat. 231, 6 P.L.T. 73, 26 Cr.L.J. 932 (937). Where the accused has refused to answer questions and puts forward a written statement, it would be useless for the Magistrate to go on questioning him, and the Magistrate should accept the written statement, especially where such statement meets all the points of the prosecution—*Bhagwat v. Emp.*, supra. Where the accused, upon being examined by the Magistrate and asked whether he had anything to say, replied in the negative, and filed a long written statement explaining the circumstances against him, the written statement should be accepted as a substitute for oral examination—*Mohiuddin v. Emp.*, 4 Pat. 488, 26 Cr.L.J. 811 (813). Sec. 256 directs the Court to accept a written statement and it is intended that the Court should read it, and if an accused states that he will file a written statement, the writing is to be accepted in lieu of an oral statement—*Mohiuddin*, supra. Where the accused persons were not examined under this section after the examination of the prosecution witnesses, but they filed written statements at that stage and also after the examination of the defence witnesses, held that the accused not having been prejudiced and there having been no miscarriage

being brought before a Magistrate is not an accused person, and he can give evidence on oath in a trial of his accomplices—*Q. E. v. Mona Puna*, 16 Bom. 661; *Aung Min v. K. E.*, 4 L.B.R. 362.

The term "accused" means a person under trial; a person called upon to show cause under Section 133 is not an accused person within the meaning of this section, and oath can be administered to him—*Hiranda v. Emp.*, 2 C.L.J. 149. The parties to a proceeding under sec. 145 are not accused persons and they can be examined on oath—*Mad Ayub v. Sarfaraz*, 26 Cr L J 70 (Oudh). A person proceeded against under sec. 488 is not an accused person, and he is permitted to give evidence on oath on his own behalf, under sec 340 (2)—*In re Vithaldas*, 52 Bom. 768, 29 Cr L J 1051 (1052). So also, a person against whom the Public Prosecutor has withdrawn the case can be administered oath and examined as a witness—*Emp v Govind*, 18 Bom.L.R. 266, 17 Cr.L.J. 256. An Informer is not an accused person and this section does not prevent oath being administered to him—*Mal Singh v. Emp.*, 1887 P.R. 38. A party to a proceeding under sec. 363 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, for the erection of an unauthorised structure, is not an accused person, and is not exempt from the administration of oath under sec. 342. The erection of the unauthorised structure is not an offence; it is only when an order for demolition of the structure is disobeyed that the person is said to commit an offence and becomes an accused—*Krishen Doyal v Corporation of Calcutta*, 54 Cal 532, 31 C.W.N. 506 (508), 28 Cr.L.J. 407.

343. Except as provided in sections 337 and 338,

No influence to be used to induce disclosures, no influence, by means of any promise or threat or otherwise, shall be used to an accused person to induce him to disclose or withhold any matter within his knowledge.

985. See Sec. 24 of the Evidence Act, and compare section 163 ante. Where the case against an accused is withdrawn and he is examined as a witness, any inducement offered to such person should be deemed as offered to him as a witness and not as an accused and does not make his evidence inadmissible, though the credit to be attached to such witness is diminished—*Emp v. Govind*, 18 Bom L.R. 266, 17 Cr.L.J. 256. For instances of inducement, threat and promise, see notes under section 163.

344. (1) If, from the absence of a witness, or any

other reasonable cause, it becomes necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of, or adjourn any inquiry or trial, the Court may, if it thinks fit, by order in writing, stating the reasons therefor, from time to time postpone or adjourn it, on such terms as

Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings

it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody :

Provided that no Magistrate shall remand an accused person to custody under this section for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time.

Remand.

(2) Every order made under this section by a Court other than a High Court shall be in writing signed by the presiding Judge or Magistrate.

Explanation.—If sufficient evidence has been obtained to raise a suspicion that the accused may have committed an offence, and it appears likely that further evidence may be obtained by a remand, this is a reasonable cause for a remand.

Reasonable cause for remand.

986. Scope of section—This section relates to proceedings in inquiries or trials, and has nothing to do with Police investigations; and it contemplates a remand to jail, not to Police custody—*In re Krishnaji*, 23 Bom 32 The custody mentioned in this section is quite different from the custody under section 167. The power of remand under sec. 167 is given to detain prisoners in custody while the police make the investigation, and in a proper case, to commence the inquiry. But the custody under sec. 344 is intended for undertrial prisoners—*In re Nagendra Nath*, 51 Cal. 402 (412).

This section is applicable to cases even before the issue of process under sec 204, and the Magistrate is entitled under sec 344, if there be a reasonable cause for doing so, to postpone any inquiry or trial and impose postpone the issue of process, even if the case be a warrant case—*Ram Saran v Nikhad Narain*, 6 P L T 477, 26 Cr L J 1179 (1180)

This section enables a Magistrate to postpone or adjourn the inquiry or trial, but does not entitle him to stay further proceedings in a case on his file—*Murugan v Gutha Ramu*, 53 M L J 455, 28 Cr L J 849

987. Adjournment—Although it is the policy of the law that a Court should proceed to inquiry into and try a case as soon as it takes cognizance of a complaint, still he can postpone the inquiry or trial if in his opinion there are sufficient and reasonable grounds for so doing—*Ram Saran v Nikhad Narain*, 6 P L T 477, 26 Cr L J 1179 (1180) But adjournments should not be made except upon strong and reasonable grounds. It is most inexpedient for a sessions trial to be adjourned. The trial before a Court of Session should proceed and be dealt with continuously from its inception to its finish. Occasions may arise when it is necessary to grant adjournments, but such adjournments should be granted only on the strongest possible ground and for the shortest possible

period—*Badri Prasad v. K. E.*, 10 A.L.J. 473, 13 Cr L.J. 861 “The evidence of witnesses should invariably be recorded as soon as possible after their attendance. If from unavoidable causes an adjournment is indispensable, there should be no unnecessary delay. Witnesses remaining over from day-to-day should, as a rule, be examined at the first sitting of the Court on the following day, and every effort should be made to minimise the inconvenience to which they may be put. After the examination of witnesses has commenced, the trial or preliminary inquiry should be proceeded with until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, those for the prosecution being first examined, and if any witness be detained for a longer period than two days, the Magistrate should be careful to record the reason for each detention in the ordersheet of the case.”—*Cal G.R. & C.O.* p. 30. Where a trial is adjourned to a particular date, it is not competent for the Magistrate to accelerate the date of hearing against the wishes of the accused or his pleader. The trial should not be concluded nor judgment pronounced without waiting till that date—*Karam Din v. Emp.*, 1898 P R 14

It is discretionary with the Court to adjourn the inquiry or trial. But this discretion is to be exercised only if there is reasonable cause for the adjournment. If the Magistrate does not exercise his discretion judicially in postponing a case, the High Court will interfere and set aside the order, but if the discretion is exercised in a sound and judicial manner, it will not be interfered with—*Ram Saran v. Nikhad*, 6 P L T 477, 26 Cr L.J. 1179 (1181). On the other hand, if the Magistrate has exercised proper judicial discretion in refusing to adjourn a case, the High Court will not interfere—*Ramiah v. Ramiah*, 50 Mad. 839, 28 Cr L.J. 812 (813). When a Magistrate is of opinion that a party before him is unnecessarily wasting time and protracting the case, he has a discretion to refuse an adjournment for bringing fresh witnesses—*Ali Sher v. Mir Md*, 26 Cr.L.J. 958 (Sind).

- The Magistrate should take some evidence before granting adjournment. On an application for adjournment by the prosecution on the ground that it would not be advisable to proceed with the case in the absence of an accused whose appearance had up to the date of the application not been secured, the Magistrate should, before granting the application, require the production of some evidence. But the omission to do this, in a case in which the Magistrate had recorded some evidence before the issue of warrant, would not by itself entitle the accused to claim to be discharged—*Billinghurst v Meek*, 49 Cal 182, 22 Cr L.J. 465

The Court which adjourns the inquiry or trial and remands the accused is bound to record clearly the ground of adjournment and remand—*Manikam v Q*, 6 Mad 63

988. Grounds of adjournment :—The Magistrate may adjourn a trial for the purpose of allowing the accused to secure the attendance of his witnesses—*In re Dinoo Roy*, 16 W.R. 21, Q. v. Totaram, 11 W R. 15. The fact that the accused's advocate has gone to another place where he is detained in a lengthy criminal case is a

reasonable ground for adjournment—*Esteves v. Emp.*, 4 Bur.L.T. 213, 12 Cr.L.J. 474 If the Sessions Judge is of opinion that the prosecution has not laid a basis for the reception of the depositions taken before the committing Magistrate in the absence of the accused, he should adjourn the trial under this section, and under section 540 summon such witnesses as he may deem material—*Emp v Sāgambar*, 12 C.L.R. 120 A Magistrate is justified in adjourning a case till the disposal of a counter case, where a point of law raised in the former case can be conveniently decided after the disposal of the latter case—*Ram Saran v. Nikhad*, 6 P.L.T. 477, 26 Cr.L.J. 1179 Where the counsel for the accused in a capital case applied for permission to cross-examine the witnesses on the day following as he was not prepared to cross-examine them that day, the Court should grant the application—*Sadasiv v Emp.*, 41 Cal 299 According to the provisions of secs. 256 and 257, the accused is entitled as a matter of right to ask for an adjournment, after a charge has been framed against him, to enable him to adduce evidence in support of his defence—*Emiaz Ali v Jagat* 1 C.W.N. 313 If a witness not examined before the committing Magistrate is tendered at the trial as a witness for the prosecution, and the accused objects on the ground that the examination of that witness will be a surprise to him, this may be a good ground for adjournment or postponement—*Q E v Khan Mahamad*, 1889 P.R. 1 Where a Magistrate has once issued process for the attendance of a defence witness, he is bound to enforce his attendance and cannot refuse an adjournment which is asked for by the accused in order that the witness's attendance may be secured—*Mahir Lal v Emp.*, 24 Cr.L.J. 370 (Cal). Where it is notified to the Court that an application is intended to be made to the High Court for transfer of the case, the Court is bound to give the party making the application a reasonable time for obtaining the order of the High Court, and, if necessary, to postpone the hearing—*Q E v Virasami*, 19 Mad. 375 The pendency of an appeal against the conviction of the accused in a case is a good ground for adjourning the trial of the same accused in a subsequent case—*In re Mantra Kamaraju*, 11 M.L.T. 90, 11 Cr.L.J. 495 The accused is entitled to have an adjournment of his case so as to enable him to secure the services of a pleader whom he wants to engage for the purpose of cross-examining the prosecution-witnesses—*Paras Ram v Jalal Din* 1916 P.W.R. 14, 17 Cr.L.J. 7

What are not good grounds for adjournment—The Magistrate cannot postpone an inquiry for a reason not contemplated by this section, for instance, his being busy with executive work—*Muthoora v Heera*, 17 W.R. 55 The fact that the accused wants time to engage an advocate and prepare his defence is not a sufficient cause for adjourning a trial in ordinary cases, though in complicated and difficult cases an adjournment may be granted on that ground—*Taung Do v Crown*, 1 L.B.R. 270. But see 1916 P.W.R. 14 cited above Where a number of persons are accused of having committed an offence, the absence of some of them is not a reasonable cause for adjourning the inquiry into the guilt of the rest who have appeared before the Magistrate—*Emp v Nga Tun*.

L.B.R. 60 The absence of a co-accused and the desirability of a joint trial are not sufficient reasons for the further postponement of proceedings—*Billinghurst v. Meek*, 49 Cal 182.

Where two counter cases are filed, one on a complaint and the other on a police-challan, and the complainant in one case is the accused in the other, there is no rule of law that the complaint-case should be postponed till the disposal of the police-challan case. The Court should adopt the procedure which will meet the ends of justice. In a Calcutta case the High Court ordered that the two cases must be tried simultaneously but must be dealt with separately from each other, each on its own merits, and the judgments in both the cases should be pronounced after both the trials are finished—*Sk Bahatar v. Nobadati*, 28 C.W.N. 487, 26 Cr.L.J. 65 (66, 67). In a Patna case where it was found that the main question for decision in one case could be conveniently decided after the disposal of the counter-case, it was held that the Magistrate had acted rightly in postponing the one case till the disposal of the other—*Ram Saran v. Nikhad Narain*, ■ P.L.T. 477, 26 Cr.L.J. 1179 (1181).

989. Stay of criminal proceedings pending civil suit :
—This section empowers the criminal Court to adjourn an inquiry or trial for 'any reasonable cause' and the institution of a civil suit between the same parties and in respect of the same property is certainly a reasonable cause for which criminal proceedings should be stayed—*Pars Ram v. Jalal Din*, 1916 P.W.R. 4, 17 Cr.L.J. 7. See also *Ankamma v. Adribhotlu*, 18 L.W. 236, 24 Cr.L.J. 640; and *In re Periasami*, 20 L.W. 544, 35 M.L.T. 99. But there is no hard and fast rule that a criminal case should be stayed pending the disposal of a civil suit in relation to the same subject matter. Each case must be decided upon its own facts—*Gopal Chandra*, 33 C.W.N. 969 (972); *Raj Kumari v. Bama Sundari*, 23 Cal 610 (620); *Subramanian Chettu*, 2 Weir 415; and the institution of a civil suit is not always a valid ground for adjourning a criminal prosecution, although the issues and evidence in the two cases are practically the same—*Mathura v. Durga*, 2 Cr.L.J. 798, 2 A.L.J. 747; *Gopal Chandra* supra; *Ramiah v. Ramiah*, 50 Mad. 839, 28 Cr.L.J. 812; *Brojobashi*, 13 C.W.N. 398. But it is highly undesirable that the same dispute should be allowed to be fought out simultaneously in the civil and criminal Courts; and so the criminal proceedings should be stayed pending the decision of the civil suit—*Kanhaiyalal v. Bhagwan*, 48 All. 60, 23 A.L.J. 956, 26 Cr.L.J. 1485 (1488); *Raj Kumari v. Bama Sundari*, supra; *Shri Nana Maharaj*, 16 Bom. 729. Although a decision of the Civil Court is not technically binding upon the Criminal Court, still if the Civil Court decision is in favour of the accused, ■ creates such a doubt ■ his guilt that it would almost become impossible for the latter Court not to give him its benefit. Therefore it is proper for a Criminal Court to adjourn the proceedings till the decision of the civil suit—*Pars Ram v. Jalal Din*, 17 Cr.L.J. 7, 1916 P.W.R. 4. Where the decision of the civil suit, which has been instituted several months before the criminal case, ■ likely to throw considerable light upon the dispute in the criminal case, the proceedings of the Criminal Court should be stayed pending the decision of

the civil suit—*Linton v. Emp.*, 28 P.L.R. 103, 28 Cr.L.J. 326 (327). The test in every case would be whether the accused is likely to be seriously prejudiced by the continuance of the criminal proceedings against him, during the pendency of the civil proceedings—*Jehangir v. Framji*, 30 Bom.L.R. 962, 29 Cr.L.J. 1053 (1056). If the object of prosecuting the criminal proceedings, while a civil suit in relation to the same matter is pending, be in reality to prejudice the trial of the civil suit or to coerce the accused into a compromise of the civil suit on terms to be practically dictated by the complainant, the Magistrate should as a general rule postpone the criminal proceedings till the disposal of the civil suit—*Subramanian Chetti*, 2 Weir 415 (416), *Jehangir Pestonji v. Framji*, 30 Bom.L.R. 962, 29 Cr.L.J. 1053 (1056). If the criminal proceedings might in a material way affect the plaintiff's civil rights, it would be undesirable in the interests of the fair administration of justice that the criminal proceeding should continue during the pendency of the civil suit—*Khobhari v. Bhagwat*, 1 P.L.W. 793, 18 Cr.L.J. 771 (772). Indirect motive or coercion by way of pressure on the defendants in the civil suit may lead a Court to stay the criminal proceedings—*Gopal Chandra*, 33 C.W.N. 969 (974). One important test to determine whether the criminal proceedings should be stayed pending the civil suit is whether the criminal prosecution is public or private. If it is public, the Court will not as a rule stay the criminal proceeding, if it is private, there will not be the same reluctance on the part of the Court to interfere with the criminal proceeding—*Jehangir v. Framji*, *supra*, *Gopal Chandra*, 33 C.W.N. 969 (972), *Raj Kumari v. Bama Sundari*, 23 Cal 610 (619).

An order staying a criminal trial, on a complaint of rioting and mischief in which questions of possession will have to be gone into, until a civil suit on a question of title has been disposed of, is not a proper order—*Nambia v. Sudalai Muthu*, 44 M.L.J. 642, 25 Cr.L.J. 280, A.I.R. 1923 Mad 595. But in cases arising out of a disputed title in which it is difficult to draw the line between *bona fide* claim and criminal trespass, if the title is already the subject-matter of a civil suit before the institution of criminal proceedings, it may be advisable for the criminal court to abide the civil trial—*Ramiah v. Ramiah*, *supra*.

The Magistrate has a discretion in such cases to adjourn or continue the criminal proceedings. If, on a consideration of all the circumstances, he exercises his discretion and either stays the criminal proceedings pending the disposal of the suit, or declines to do so, the High Court will not, as a general rule, interfere—*Subramania Chetti*, 2 Weir 415 (416), *Varadarajulu Naidu*, 1 M.H.C.R. 66.

990. Costs of adjournment.—The words "on such terms as it thinks fit" empower the Criminal Courts to allow the costs of an adjournment—*Crown v. Shuldhama*, 1904 P.R. 20, *Sannasi v. Sivasubramania*, 33 M.L.J. 366, *Raghunandan v. Ramadin*, 2 P.L.W. 218, 19 Cr.L.J. 2. This section clearly entitles a Court to award costs of adjournment to a party who has been put to unnecessary expenses by an adjournment on the application of the other party. A judicious exercise of t

power would have the effect of preventing many useless adjournments—*Mathura Prosad v. Basant*, 28 All 207. Where the accused asks for an adjournment to which he is not entitled, the Court may make an order of adjournment conditionally on his paying the costs of the other side—*Sew Prasad v. Corporation of Calcutta*, 9 C.W.N 18. But it is improper to direct the accused to pay the costs of adjournment when he applies under section 526 for a transfer—*Fatta v. Crown*, 1911 P.W.R. 8.

An order for costs will be made only in those cases where the circumstances are exceptional and where for some reason or other the ordinary everyday method of conducting criminal cases must be departed from—*In re Abdul Rahiman*, 42 Bom. 254, 20 Bom L.R. 124, 19 Cr L.J. 326. No order for costs should be made where the adjournment is inevitable and there is no other alternative. Thus, where the accused person being absent, the Court cannot proceed with the case, and is bound to adjourn the hearing, it would be entirely opposed to the spirit of this section if the Magistrate under such circumstances passes orders awarding the costs of adjournment against the accused—*Browne v. Chandra Singh*, 1906 P.R. 6, *Beedha v. Emp.*, 20 A.L.J. 280, 23 Cr.L.J. 243.

This Section does not apply to proceedings in appeal, and therefore an order requiring the appellant to pay the costs of adjournment is improper and *ultra vires*—*Suraj Bhan v. Crown*, 1919 P.R. 29.

Against whom costs may be awarded :—The costs are to be paid by the party applying for the adjournment; where a criminal case is taken up on a Police charge-sheet filed on information given by a private person and such person engages a Vakil and moves the Court for an adjournment owing to the absence of the Vakil, held that an order for costs can be validly made against that person on granting the adjournment prayed for, even though he may not be a complainant under sec 200, since an Informant is a person recognised in the Code as initiating criminal proceedings as much as a complainant acting under section 190—*Sannasi Kudumban v. Sivasubramania*, 40 Mad. 1130, 33 M.L.J. 366. But where the prosecution is wholly conducted by the Police and the adjournment is asked for only for the convenience of the Police, the complainant cannot be ordered to bear the costs of the adjournment—*Emp. v. Laxman*, 24 Bom L.R. 380. If an adjournment takes place for which the complainant is solely to blame, then of course an order can be made that the complainant should pay any costs which may have been incurred by the accused for the adjournment—*Ibid*.

991. Remand :—Remands to custody should not ordinarily be ordered under this section without first recording some evidence to show that good grounds exist for believing that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence—*Ahmed Ali v. Emp.*, 11 N.L.R. 162; if the offence is bailable, the accused should be admitted to bail and not remanded to custody—*Raghunandan v. Emp.*, 8 C.W.N 779.

When the accused is at first brought before a Magistrate and remand is desired, it is not necessary to go fully into the charge; it is ordinarily sufficient to show by the evidence of a Police officer that they believe that

the accused is concerned in the commission of an offence; and on such proof the accused will be remanded to custody. If the accused is again brought up after a remand, and further remand is asked for, some direct evidence of the guilt of the accused should be required to justify the Magistrate in ordering for further remand; and with each remand the necessity for the production of evidence of guilt becomes more strong—*Ponnusami v. Q*, 6 Mad. 69. *Jamini v Emp*, 36 Cal 174, *Ahmad Ali v. Emp.*, 11 N L.R. 162, 16 Cr L J 705

An order of remand cannot be passed in the absence of the accused. To remand is to re-commit to custody. The commitment requires the presence of the accused, the re-commitment also requires his presence—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 409

Grounds of remand—The Magistrate can remand the accused, if sufficient evidence has been obtained to raise a suspicion that the accused may have committed an offence, and it appears likely that further evidence may be obtained by such remand—*Narendra v Emp* 36 Cal 166. Where evidence was available, but it appeared necessary to the Magistrate to defer the examination of witnesses in order that further evidence might be produced, so that the inquiry when commenced might be continuous, held that the remand of the accused in such a case was justified—*Manikam v Q*, 6 Mad 63. But a Magistrate is not justified in postponing an inquiry and remanding the accused, when there is no evidence at all which could be the foundation of a charge, and merely on the expectation that after some time on some inquiry being made some evidence might be obtained—*Muthoor v Heera*, 17 W R. 55. Where the accused person had already made a confession and had produced an article stolen from a person, and there was ample evidence before the Magistrate, it was held that the remand of the accused in order to get from him a confessional statement is most improper—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 414

Remand to police custody—This section does not empower the Magistrate to remand an accused person, who is in the custody of the Magistrate, to Police custody for the purpose of obtaining information with regard to the offences which the accused may be alleged to have committed—*In re Rama*, 4 Bom L R 878, *In re Krishnaji*, 23 Bom 32

Period of detention—Fifteen days is the longest period for which an accused person may be remanded at a time by an order of the Magistrate—*Reg v Surkya*, 5 B H C R 31. An accused person has the right to have the evidence against him recorded at as early a period as possible, and the fact that there is or may be a great deal of evidence forthcoming is not a sufficient ground for detention for an inordinate period—*Manikam v Q*, 6 Mad 63

345. (1) The offences punishable under the sections

Compounding offences. of the Indian Penal Code *specified* in the first two columns of the ta

next following may be compounded by the persons mentioned in the third column of that table:—

Offence	Sections of Indian Penal Code applicable	Persons by whom offence may be compounded.
Uttering words, etc with deliberate intent to wound the religious feelings of any person	298	The person whose religious feelings are intended to be wounded
Causing hurt ...	323, 334	The person in whom the hurt is caused
Wrongfully restraining or confining any person	341, 342	The person restrained or confined
Assault or use of criminal force ..	352, 355, 358	The person assaulted or to whom criminal force is used
Unlawful compulsory labour ..	374	The person compelled to labour
Mischief, when the only loss or damage caused is loss or damage to a private person	426, 427	The person to whom the loss or damage is caused
Criminal trespass ..	447	The person in possession of the property trespassed upon.
House trespass ..	448	
Criminal breach of contract of service	490, 491, 492	The person with whom the offender has contracted.
Adultery ..	497	The husband of the married woman
Enticing or taking away or detaining with criminal intent a married woman	498	
Defamation	500	The person defamed.
Printing or engraving matter, knowing it to be defamatory.	501	
Sale of printed or engraved substance containing defamatory matter knowing it to contain such matter.	502	
Insult intended to provoke a breach of the peace.	504	The person insulted
Criminal intimidation, except when the offence is punishable with imprisonment for seven years.	506	The person intimidated
Act caused by making a person believe that he will be an object of divine displeasure	508	The person against whom the offence was committed.

(2) The offences punishable under the sections of the Indian Penal Code specified in the first two columns of the table next following may, with the permission of the Court before which any prosecution for such offence is

pending, be compounded by the persons mentioned in the third column of that table :—

Offence	Sections of Indian Penal Code applicable	Persons by whom offence may be compounded.
Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means	324	The person to whom hurt is caused.
Voluntarily causing grievous hurt	325	Ditto
Voluntarily causing grievous hurt on grave and sudden provocation	335	Ditto
Causing hurt by doing an act so rashly and negligently as to endanger human life or the personal safety of others	337	Ditto
Causing grievous hurt by doing an act so rashly and negligently as to endanger human life or the personal safety of others	338	Ditto
Wrongfully confining a person for three days or more	343	The person confined
Wrongfully confining a person in secret	346	Ditto.
Assault or criminal force in attempting wrongfully to confine a person	357	The person assaulted or to whom the force was used
Dishonest misappropriation of property	403	The owner of the property misappropriated
Cheating	417	The person cheated
Cheating a person whose interest the offender was bound, by law or by legal contract, to protect	418	Ditto
Cheating by personation	419	Ditto
Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property or the making, alteration or destruction of a valuable security	420	Ditto
Mischief by injury to work of irrigation by wrongfully diverting water when the only loss or damage caused is loss or damage to a private person	430	The person to whom the loss or damage is caused
House-trespass to commit an offence (other than theft) punishable with imprisonment	451	The person in possession of the house trespassed upon
Using a false trade or property mark	462	The person to whom loss or injury is caused by such use
Counterfeiting a trade or property mark used by another	483	The person whose trade or property mark is counterfeited
Knowing, selling, or exposing or possessing for sale or for trade or manufacturing purpose, goods marked with a counterfeit trade or property mark	486	Ditto

Offence	Sections of Indian Penal Code applicable	Persons by whom offence may be compounded
<i>Marrying again during the lifetime of a husband or wife</i>	494	<i>The husband or wife of the person so marrying</i>
<i>Uttering words or sounds or making gestures or exhibiting any object intending to insult the modesty of a woman or intruding upon the privacy of a woman</i>	509	<i>The woman whom it is intended to insult or whose privacy is intruded upon.</i>

(3) When any offence is compoundable under this section, the abetment of such offence or an attempt to commit such offence (when such attempt is itself an offence) may be compounded in like manner.

(4) When the person who would otherwise be competent to compound an offence under this section is under the age of eighteen years or is an idiot or lunatic, any person competent to contract on his behalf may, *with the permission of the Court*, compound such offence.

(5) When the accused has been committed for trial or when he has been convicted and an appeal is pending, no composition for the offence shall be allowed without the leave of the Court to which he is committed, or, as the case may be, before which the appeal is to be heard.

(5A) *A High Court acting in the exercise of its powers of revision under section 439 may allow any person to compound any offence which he is competent to compound under this section.*

(6) The composition of an offence under this section shall have the effect of an acquittal of the accused *with whom the offence has been compounded.*

(7) No offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section.

Change :—This section has been amended by sec. 90 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act xviii of 1923. The changes are of minor character and no reasons have been particularly stated in the Bill.

992. Withdrawal and composition :—A withdrawal (Sec 248) must be by intimation to the Magistrate holding the trial, whereas in many cases composition can be effected without the permission of the Court. A withdrawal is permissible in a summons case, whereas most

of the compoundable cases are warrant cases. A withdrawal is the result of act of one party only, namely the complainant, without the consent of the accused, whereas a composition presupposes an arrangement between both parties and implies a consent of the accused—*Murray v. Q. E.*, 21 Cal. 103; *Bayan Ali v. K. E.*, 20 C.W.N. 1209. Permission to withdraw can be given only to the complainant, whereas the right to compound an offence does not always belong to the complainant—*Chellum v. Ramasawmi*, 14 Mad 379. On the withdrawal of the complaint the Magistrate can award compensation to the accused (*Himmat v. Bakhtawar*, 1883 P R. 24), but compensation cannot be awarded when a case is compounded—*Emp v Khushali*, 1888 P II 19.

A Magistrate has the option to permit the complainant to withdraw or not, but if the offence is compoundable without the leave of the Court, and a petition of compromise is put in, the Magistrate is bound to give effect to it. Whether a petition (e.g. a petition praying that the case be struck off the file) is one for withdrawal or compromise is to be judged from the fact whether the accused consented to it or not. Where it appeared that the accused had never consented to the compromise of the case, the petition was not a petition of compromise under this section, but one of withdrawal, and the Magistrate's refusal to permit withdrawal, and the subsequent proceeding resulting in the trial and conviction of the accused were not illegal—*Bayan Ali v K E* 20 C W N 1209, 18 Cr L J 107.

A Railway guard abused and assaulted a passenger, whereupon the latter made a complaint to the police, who instituted a case against the accused. A few days later, the accused offered an apology to the complainant, who thereupon gave a letter to the accused in which he wrote, "Mr John (the accused) came to me and offered an unconditional apology. I beg to withdraw the case against him." This letter was produced by the accused in Court. The Magistrate treated the letter as a withdrawal and not as a compromise, and as withdrawal could only be made in Court by intimation to the Magistrate, he treated the withdrawal as invalid and proceeded with the trial and convicted the accused. Held that the Magistrate was misled by the word 'withdraw' used in the letter, that the case was one of compromise and not of withdrawal, because a withdrawal could be made only by the prosecuting authority (police) in this case, and that the offence having been compounded, the accused must be acquitted—*Emp v John*, 45 All 145 (146, 148).

993. Requisites of composition—In order to amount to a composition, the arrangement must be one by which the parties have settled their differences and not a mere arrangement to settle the disputes in future as the result of some action either by themselves or by third parties. Therefore where the parties signed a *muchilika* referring their dispute to arbitrators but no arbitration took place and no award was passed, held that the mere signing of the *muchilika* did not amount to a composition of the offence—*Ramalinga v. Varadarajulu*, 49 M L J 44, 22 L W. 390, 26 Cr.L J 1591. A mere agreement between the parties to refer the case to arbitration is not a final settlement of the dispute a

does not amount to a composition. Where the parties filed a petition of compromise agreeing to be bound by the decision of arbitrators named therein and asked for an adjournment for settlement of their disputes, but after the arbitrators made the award, the complainant refused to abide by that award, *held* that there was no composition and the Magistrate could proceed with the trial—*Srish Chandra v. Abani Nath*, 42 C L J 139, 26 Cr L J 1584.

Although a composition also signifies that the person against whom the offence has been committed has received some gratification (whether of a pecuniary character or otherwise) as an inducement for his desiring to abstain from a prosecution (*Murray v Q. E.*, 21 Cal 103), still the passing of such consideration or gratification is not absolutely necessary to effect a valid composition—*Hudayat v. Q. E.*, 1896 P.R. 9. And it is not necessary that the consideration should be of a monetary character—*Mahomed Kani v. Pattani*, 39 Mad 946. An apology is a sufficient consideration in cases of defamation or abuse—*Emp. v John*, 45 All 145 (146). If the matter is settled by respectable persons and a compromise entered into, the Court is not concerned to inquire into the nature or value of the consideration, and if the complainant considers that his grievance is redressed by the fact of respectable persons intervening, even though he may not have received any money payment or even a direct apology from the accused, the complainant is at full liberty to compound the prosecution—*Crown v Lilaram*, 2 S L R 16, 10 Cr L J 228.

To constitute a valid composition, it must appear that the parties were free from influence of any kind, and were fully aware of their respective rights—*Murray v Q. E.*, 21 Cal 103. If the consent of a party is obtained by threat and coercion, there is no valid composition—*Hanmant*, 31 Bom L R. 789, 1929 Cr.C 322 (323).

The offence must be compoundable.—Before allowing a composition, it is the duty of the Magistrate to find upon the evidence that a compoundable offence has been committed. If the evidence discloses a non-compoundable offence, the Magistrate, upon a petition of compromise, cannot treat the case as a compoundable one, and allow composition and acquit the accused—*Emp v. Ranchhod*, 37 Bom 369, *Q E v Naran, Ratanlal* 699, *Emp. v Asmal*, 4 Bom.L.R. 718; *Guru Prosad v. Ajodhyanath*, 20 Cr.L.J 552 (Pat). It is contrary to public policy to compound a non-compoundable offence (e.g. criminal breach of trust) and any agreement to that effect is wholly void in law—*Majubar v Mukhtashed*, 40 Cal. 113 (118). The Magistrate has no jurisdiction to allow composition of a non-compoundable offence on the ground that it would be better for the complainant to compromise and that the accused also desires to compromise, and that it is probable that the case might in the end turn out to be a compoundable offence—*K. E. v Hira Singh*, 1907 P.R. 11.

994. When offence can be compounded :—A case may be compounded at any time before the sentence is pronounced, therefore a petition of compromise filed by the parties when the judgment

was actually being written should be accepted—*Aslam v. K. E.*, 45 Cal. 816, 22 C.W.N. 744

An offence falling under sub-section (1), i.e. an offence for the composition of which no permission of the Court is necessary, can be compounded even before a charge of the offence is laid in Court by the person injured. An offence is complete when the acts constituting it have been committed, apart from the question whether a charge or complaint has been laid before the Court or not, and there is nothing in this section to suggest that a composition of an offence to be valid must be effected only after the accused is brought before the Court. A composition made to prevent a case coming into Court is just as much a lawful composition under this section as one made after the case has come into Court—*Kumarasami v. Kuppusami* 41 Mad 685 (687), 19 Cr L J 359, *Mrs Torpey v. Emp.* 49 All. 494, 28 Cr.L J 495 (496)

A Magistrate cannot allow composition after the records of the case have been called for by the High Court under sec 435 with a view to transfer the case. When the records of the case were called for by the High Court, the case was no longer on the file of the Magistrate and his jurisdiction was suspended. But the parties may compound the offence before the Magistrate to whom the case may be transferred by the High Court—*In re Maruti*, 49 Bom 533, 27 Bom L R 350, 26 Cr L J 996

995. Proof—Although the provisions of the Contract Act may not apply, the proof of the arrangement must be similar to that which the Court requires for the proof of any agreement which is in issue—*Murray v. Q. E.*, 21 Cal 103. The burden of providing that the offence has been validly compounded lies upon the accused—*Ibid*

Proof as to factum of composition—In case of an offence falling under sub-section (1), i.e. an offence compoundable without the permission of Court, if one party alleges that the case has been compromised (outside the Court), and the other resiles from the compromise and denies the same, it is competent to the Court, before which the case is pending, to take evidence concerning the factum of the alleged compromise, and to decide whether a compromise has in fact been arrived at or not; and if it finds that there has been a valid composition, it should pass an order of acquittal—*Mahomed v. Pattani* 39 Mad 946, *Kumarasami v. Kuppusami*, 41 Mad 685 (686). But in cases of offences covered by sub-section (2) which can be compounded only with the permission of the Court, any compromise arrived at by the parties outside the Court is of no legal effect and cannot be recognized by any Court dealing with the offence. Consequently the Court is not bound (nor competent) to order any inquiry into the factum of a compromise alleged by one of the parties and denied by the other—*Naurang v. Kidar Nath*, 22 Lah 400, 29 Cr.L.J. 585 (587)

996. Magistrate when bound to allow composition :— If the offence falls under sub-section (1), it is compoundable irrespective of the permission of the Court, and so if a petition of compromise is put in, the Court is bound to allow composition and cannot refuse to do so—

Emp. v. Ram Gopal, 1886 A.W.N. 167. In a case of such offence, if the composition is proved, the Magistrate must give effect to it and cannot proceed with the trial—*Emp v Mulo*, 6 S.L.R 284, 14 Cr.L.J. 292. As soon as the parties have arrived at a compromise of an offence falling under sub-section (1), the Magistrate has nothing more to do except to record a judgment of acquittal—*Naurang v. Kidar*, 11 Lah. 400, 29 Cr.L.J. 585 (587). He is not at liberty to call upon the parties to adduce further evidence that the case has been compounded—*Emp. v Ganakrishna*, 16 Bom.L.R. 939, 16 Cr.L.J. 88, 26 I.C. 1000. It is his duty to accept the compromise and to dismiss the case and acquit the accused. He is wrong in ordering the petition to be put up on the record—*Kusum v. Bechu*, 3 C.W.N. 322, *Mahomed Ismail v Faisuddi*, 3 C.W.N. 548. Where the complainant and the accused are willing to compromise, a composition cannot be refused on the ground that the master in whose quarrel the servant (complainant) was injured refuses to give his permission—*Lalla v K. E.*, 17 O.C. 92, 15 Cr.L.J. 567.

If a charge is framed in respect of a compoundable offence, and the proper person files a petition of compromise, the Magistrate cannot alter the charge into one of a non-compoundable offence, to prevent composition. He must give effect to the petition and acquit the accused—*Hastu v. Crown*, 1914 P.R. 29, 16 Cr.L.J. 81 (F.B.). If the offence in respect of which the complaint was made be an offence compoundable without the leave of the Court, and a petition of compromise is made, the Magistrate is bound to give effect to the petition and acquit the accused, even though by mistake he had mentioned a non-compoundable offence in the summons served upon the accused—*Kadir Akram v. Emp.*, 2 P.L.T. 602, 62 I.C. 189, 22 Cr.L.J. 493. Where a person is prosecuted for offences under secs. 323 (compoundable) and 353 (non-compoundable), 1 P. Code, and the complainant applies to have the case under sec. 323 struck off, the Magistrate should allow the composition and proceed only in respect of the other offence—*Emp. v. Corrie*, 1884 A.W.N. 256.

If the offence is compoundable, it may be compromised, even though the case has been sent up by the Police—*Q. E. v. Nawab Jan*, 10 Cal. 551. See also *Emp. v. John*, 45 All. 145.

997. Who can compound.—An offence can be compounded only by the person specified in this section, although the complaint might have been made by some other person. Thus, where A made a complaint for cheating her husband B, it is the person cheated (i.e. B) who can compound the offence, and not A, although the complaint was filed by A. The composition by A will not have the effect of acquitting the accused. This shows that it is not competent for the complainant in every case to compound an offence—*Dajiba v. Emp.*, 51 Bom. 512, 29 Bom.L.R. 718, 28 Cr.L.J. 581 (582). See also *Emp. v. John*, 45 All. 145, where the case was started by the police, but the composition was made by the injured person. The offence of hurt can be compounded only by the person to whom the hurt is caused—*Emp v. Lala*, 15 A.L.J. 467, 18 Cr.L.J. 722. The widow or other relations of such person (that person dying in

consequence of the hurt) cannot compound—*Gangamma* 2 Weir 418; *Emp. v. Rahmat*, 37 All. 419, 16 Cr.L.J. 586; *Crown v. Ramzan*, 7 S.L.R. 200. Where hurt was caused to three persons, and one of them died subsequently, the remaining two cannot compromise the offence as regards the deceased—*Emp. v. Sultan Singh*, 31 All. 606, 10 Cr.L.J. 473. In other words, where there are several complainants, one complainant can compound the offence committed against himself but not the offence committed against others—*Shib Chandra v. Rabbani*, 27 C.W.N. 169.

The offence of defamation can be compounded only by the person defamed, and not by another person aggrieved by the defamation. Thus, where a charge of defamation for imputing unchastity to a woman is instituted on the complaint of the husband, the husband cannot compound the offence—*Chhotulal v. Nathabhai* 25 Bom. 151. In such a case the wife is the only person who can compound the offence; and she can do so without the consent or even against the will of her husband. But if the defamatory matter was published with the intention of injuring the reputation of both husband and wife, and the husband instituted the complaint, then no one except the husband could compound—*Chellam v. Ramaswami*, 14 Mad. 379. An offence under section 499 I.P.C. can be compounded only by the husband of the woman. Though a complaint of that offence may be made by any person having the care of the woman during her husband's absence (section 199), still such person cannot compound the offence, and an acquittal based upon such composition is illegal—*Mahabul Ali v. Emp.*, 4 Lah. L.J. 488, *Harnam v. Sain Das*, 24 Cr.L.J. 120 (Lah.); *Asir Alam v. Emp.*, 5 Lah. L.J. 183. A charge of criminal trespass can be compounded by the person who is in actual possession of the property trespassed upon, and he (and not the juridical possessor) is the person who can bring the complaint in respect of the offence. "Otherwise, we might have the juridical possessor (e.g. a trustee) prosecuting for criminal trespass, and the actual possessor compounding the offence, a result which could never have been contemplated by the Legislature"—*Tok Gyl v. K. E.*, 8 L.B.R. 428.

A minor cannot compound an offence—*Shib Singh v. Q. E.*, 1491 P.R. 17; but under sub-section (4) it can be compounded with the permission of the Court by the person competent to contract on behalf of the minor.

Court, the so called compromise arrived at between the parties out of Court is of no legal effect and cannot be taken cognizance of by any Court dealing with the offence—*Naurang v. Kidar Nath*, 9 Lah 400, 29 Cr.L.J. 585 (587) Such permission can be granted only by the Court, and not by a police officer, because the granting of permission to withdraw is a judicial act—*Anonymous*, Ratanlal 91. The duty of granting the permission is cast upon the Magistrate trying the case, and that duty cannot be assigned either to the District Magistrate or to the police—*Partap Singh*, 31 P L R 121, 1930 Cr.C. 304.

In case of offences falling under sub-section (2), it is the duty of the Magistrate to decide whether he will or will not allow a compromise and the responsibility rests entirely with him. If the compromise is made at an early stage, and the offence is not so serious that punishment is absolutely necessary, the Magistrate should exercise his discretion in allowing the composition. Where the Magistrate refused to allow composition without sufficient reason, the High Court in revision allowed it—*Sewa Singh v. Crown*, 1922 P.W.R. 7, A.I.R. 1922 Lah. 138, 23 Cr. L.J. 85. Before allowing composition of an offence, the Magistrate should take into consideration all the circumstances of the case and should bear in mind that such offence is punishable not only for the satisfaction of the injured person but also to protect society by deterring others from committing similar offences. The degree of prevalence of such offences at any particular place or time may fitly be considered in determining whether composition should or should not be allowed—*Crown v. Konoo Meah*, 1 L R. 349. The Magistrate may refuse to allow composition, if it is arrived at at a late stage, and some of the offences are non-compoundable—*Hanmant*, 31 Bom L R 789, 1929 Cr C 322 (323). In cases falling under subsection (2), if the parties are nearly related to one another and are willing to patch up their quarrels, the Magistrate should not refuse to allow composition—*Aminulla v. Emp.*, 26 C.W.N. 536. Where the accused was charged with two offences, of which one was compoundable with the permission of the Court, and the other a non-compoundable offence, and the Magistrate after examining the complainant issued summons in respect of the compoundable offence only, it was not illegal for him to grant permission for compounding the case—*Md. Ismail v. Samad*, 20 C.W.N. 946 (947).

Under sub-section (5), when an appeal is pending in respect of the offence, it is the Appellate Court alone which can allow the composition; and the permission of the Appellate Court is necessary even in respect of offences which are ordinarily compoundable without the sanction of the Court.

Where it is found that the accused were acquitted by the trial Court of one of the two offences charged against them, the Appellate Court ought not to withhold its permission to allow composition, even though the occurrence bore more or less a serious aspect—*Tulan v. Chintan*, 55 Cal 1190, 30 Cr.L.J. 484 (485).

Permission by High Court in revision—The High Court as a Court of Revision can exercise all the powers of an Appellate Court and can

grant permission to compound an offence—*Emp v. Ram Piyari*, 32 All. 153; *Emp. v. Shuboo*, 45 All. 17, *Nidhan v. K. E.*, 1904 P.L.R. 252, *Lalla v. K. E.* 17 O.C. 92; *Chotal v. Emp.*, 21 Cr L.J. 590 (Oudh); In the following cases it was laid down that an offence could not be allowed to be compounded when the case came before the High Court in Revision, when the High Court was sitting neither as a Court of Original Jurisdiction nor as a Court of Appeal—*Emp v Lala*, 15 A.L.J. 467; *Ram Chandra v. Emp.*, 37 All. 127, *Naqi v. K. E.*, 11 A.L.J. 13; *Rambhara v. Emp.*, 42 All. 474, *Crown v Harnam*, 1918 P.R. 35; *Alhoy v. Rameshnar*, 43 Cal 1143, *Audhi v Emp.* 3 P.L.T. 458, *Adhar v. Subodh*, 18 C.W.N. 1212, *Sankar Rangayya v Sankar Ramayya*, 39 Mad. 604. This latter view has now been rendered obsolete by the new sub-section (5A) of this section which expressly gives the High Court the power to allow composition in revision. The High Court may in revision grant permission to compound an offence and acquit the accused, where such permission has been wrongly withheld by the Appellate Court—*Titan v. Chintan*, 55 Cal 1190, 30 Cr L.J. 484 (485)

Composition on Retrial—When the accused was charged with and convicted of an offence compoundable without the leave of Court, but on appeal the conviction was set aside and a retrial ordered, and the complainant then offered to compound the case, it was held that it was open to the parties to compound the case in the same manner in which it could be compounded before conviction by the Magistrate, and that no permission of the Court was necessary for the composition—*Umrat v. Makkulan*, 3 A.L.J. 523.

Recording reason—When allowing composition under sub-section (2), the Magistrate should briefly record his reason for granting sanction, so that, if an appeal is preferred, the Appellate Court may be in a position to judge whether the discretion has been properly exercised—*Crown v. Konoo Meah*, 1 L.B.R. 349

999. Compromise cannot be withdrawn:—When the parties have filed a petition of compromise, they cannot afterwards be allowed to withdraw the petition and to insist upon the case being tried—*Mahomed Kan v Pattani*, 39 Mad. 946, *Kumarasami v Kuppusami*, 41 Mad. 685 (686); *Kusam v Bechu*, 3 C.W.N. 322, *Hem Chandra v Girindra*, 33 C.L.J. 226; *Ram Richpal v Mata Din*, 25 Cr L.J. 810 (Lah.) A composition arrived at between the parties is complete as soon as it is made, and the accused is entitled to be acquitted, even though one of the parties later on resiles from the compromise—*Hem Chandra v. Girindra*, 33 C.L.J. 226, 22 Cr L.J. 301

1000. Subsection (6)—Acquittal—When the petition of composition is put in, the Magistrate's sole remaining duty is to record a formal order of acquittal and to set the accused person at liberty—*Hasta v Crown*, 1914 P.R. 29. The Magistrate is bound to acquit the accused; he acts illegally if he proceeds with the trial and convicts the accused—*Kora Raman v Kandan*, 2 Weir 418, *Emp. v. John*, 45 All. 145. Any sentence that he may pass subsequently is illegal, for the composition of

an offence has the effect of an acquittal—*Emp. v. Corrie*, 1884 A.W.N. 256.

The High Court in revision can set aside an order of acquittal passed on a petition of compromise, if there has been any material irregularity—*Crown v. Ramzan*, 7 S.L.R. 200, 15 Cr.L.J. 553.

Compensation can be awarded under Section 250 only when the Magistrate himself acquits the accused after trial. But a composition of an offence has in itself the effect of acquittal and no trial is held; and therefore no compensation can be awarded where the offence is compounded under this section—*Emp. v. Khushali*, 1888 P.R. 19; *Q. E. v. Sangappa*, Ratanlal 957. Proceedings under Section 250 are inapplicable to a case where the accused person himself has, by an agreement with the prosecutor, arrived at a settlement and been a party to the compounding of the offence—*In re Harkishandas*, 10 Bom.L.R. 1056.

When an offence is compounded, the accused must be acquitted. The conviction of the accused after composition is illegal and must be set aside—*Emp. v. John*, 45 All. 145 (148). A composition has the effect of an acquittal and not a discharge, and is therefore a complete bar to the prosecution of the accused for the same offence—*Imp. v. Mulo*, 6 S.L.R. 284, 14 Cr.L.J. 292; *Crown v. Harnam*, 1910 P.L.R. 22, 11 Cr.L.J. 386. The Magistrate cannot after composition institute proceedings against the accused under Section 437 (now 436)—*Emp. v. Unkar*, 1884 A.W.N. 13. A composition has the effect of barring not only a prosecution for the same offence, but also for a cognate offence based on the same facts—*Q. E. v. Asmal*, Ratanlal 519, or for an offence involved in the former offence which has been compounded—*Shaikh Basiruddin v. Shaikh Khairat Ali*, 17 C.W.N. 948. But the compounding of an original charge is not a conclusive answer to a charge made against the complainant under Section 211 L.P.C.—*Q. E. v. Atar Ali*, 11 Cal. 79.

Where there are several accused persons, the composition of an offence with one of them has not the effect of acquittal of all the accused persons but only of the particular accused with whom the composition took place—*Muthia Naek v. K. E.*, 41 Mad. 323; *Emp. v. Alibhai*, 45 Bom. 346. *Anantia v. Crown*, 5 Lah. 239, 25 Cr.L.J. 629; *Ram Kishen v. Emp.*, 1 Lah. 169; *Chandan v. Emp.*, 19 A.L.J. 374; *Emp. v. Mohna*, 7 Lah. 344, 27 Cr.L.J. 576. This is now made clear by the words "with whom the offence has been compounded" newly added in subsection (6). In *Calcutta and Patna cases*, it was held that if a compoundable offence was committed by a number of persons, and the complainant compounded the offence with only one of them, the effect of such compromise was to compound the complaint not only in respect of the persons with whom it was actually compounded, but also in respect of the other persons, and the composition operated as an acquittal of all the accused—*Chander Kumar v. Emp.*, 7 C.W.N. 176; *Shyam Behari v. Sagar*, 20 Cr.L.J. 824, 53 I.C. 824, 1 P.L.T. 32; *Amar Ali v. Emp.*, 2 P.L.T. 584; *Sural Kumar v. Emp.*, 4 P.L.T. 107. This view is no longer correct.

Where an accused is charged with two offences, and one offence is compounded, the charge for the other offence does not *ipso facto* lapse.

and the accused is not necessarily acquitted in respect of that offence—*Emp. v. Jarnali*, 26 Cr.L.J. 686 (Lah.).

The composition effected under this section would be a complete bar to a civil suit for damages—*Imp. v. Mulo*, 6 S.L.R. 284, 14 Cr.L.J. 292.

346. (1) If, in the course of an inquiry or a trial before a Magistrate in any district outside the presidency towns, the evidence appears to him to warrant a presumption that the case is one which should be tried or committed for trial by some other Magistrate in such district, he shall stay proceedings and submit the case, with a brief report explaining its nature, to any Magistrate to whom he is subordinate or to such other Magistrate, having jurisdiction, as the District Magistrate directs.

(2) The Magistrate to whom the case is submitted may, if so empowered, either try the case himself, or refer it to any Magistrate subordinate to him having jurisdiction, or commit the accused for trial.

1001. When Magistrate should proceed under this section :—(1) The application of this section would be necessary if in the course of proceedings before a Magistrate, it should transpire that the offence committed is apparently one which the particular Magistrate is not competent to try, or one in which it appears that he is in some way personally interested (sec. 556) or which he is declared to be otherwise incompetent to deal with (sec. 482, 487)—*Prinsep*

(2) Proof of previous conviction against a person accused before a Magistrate will justify his taking action under this section—*Q E v Chandra Dallal*, 1891 A.W N 200

(3) When a Magistrate finds that he has no jurisdiction to try a case, he should not discharge the accused but should proceed under this section—*Munisami*, 2 Weir 323 If the offence is within his jurisdiction, he should proceed in the ordinary way, and if it is a Sessions case, commit it to the Sessions, he need not submit the case under this section to a superior Magistrate—*Amir Khan v K E*, 7 C W N 457

(4) When the evidence discloses circumstances of aggravation, which make the offence one cognizable by a superior tribunal, it becomes the duty of the trying Magistrate to use the proper procedure for sending the case to the higher Court—*Q E v Gundaya*, 13 Bom 502 No tribunal can properly clutch jurisdiction by intentionally ignoring the facts which make the offence really cognizable by a higher tribunal—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 21 and 3 Weir 421; *K. E. v Ayyan*, 24 Mad 675 Thus, where a theft is accompanied with violence, it becomes a case of robbery, which

is beyond the jurisdiction of a second-class Magistrate, and such Magistrate cannot ignore the fact of violence and try the case as one of theft only—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 420 (421).

Similarly, no Magistrate is entitled to cut down an offence from that which is established by the evidence in order to give himself summary jurisdiction—*In re Chunder Seekor*, 1 C.L.R. 434; *Bishu Shaik v. Salur*, 29 Cal. 409; *Ramanund v. Koylash*, 11 Cal. 236; *Sheo Bhajan v. Mosawi*, 27 Cal. 983; *Emp. v. Abdool*, 4 Cal. 18.

Framing of charge neither necessary nor illegal:—It is not illegal for a Magistrate of the 2nd or 3rd class to frame a charge, even though at the time of framing the charge he intended to submit the case to a superior Magistrate or to the District Magistrate—*K. E. v. Nga Po*, 1905 U.B.R. (Cr.P.C.) 33. On the other hand, if the inferior Magistrate sends the case to the superior Magistrate, without framing a charge, the superior Magistrate cannot send back the case to the inferior Magistrate, with direction to prepare a charge under a particular section—*Q. E. v. Fakira, Ratanlal* 499.

1002. Power of the superior Magistrate:—The superior Magistrate to whom the case is submitted may either try the case himself or refer it to any subordinate or commit the accused for trial. But he has no power to send the case back to the Subordinate Magistrate for an order of committal, because the Sub-Magistrate's jurisdiction ceases when he submits the case to the superior Magistrate, and he cannot therefore re-assume jurisdiction and commit the accused—*Hampanna*, 45 Mad 846, 23 Cr L.J. 710. If the superior Magistrate tries the case himself, he must try it *de novo*; he cannot convict the accused on the evidence recorded by the Magistrate who submitted the case; he must hear the evidence afresh. Failure to do so vitiates the whole trial; and the fact that the accused did not want the witnesses to be recalled and consented to rely upon the evidence recorded by the submitting Magistrate does not cure the illegality. The special provisions of sec. 350 do not apply where a case is submitted under this section by a subordinate Magistrate to a superior Magistrate—*Muhammad v. K. E.*, 1905 P.L.R. 91; *Ambica v. Emp.*, 111 Cr.L.J. 625 (Pat.); *Inayat Husain v. Emp.*, 1905 P.L.R. 106; *In re Paravada China Venku Naidu*, 17 L.W. 247, 24 Cr.L.J. 413. The law requires that the Judge by whom the case is to be tried should himself hear all the evidence of the witnesses and form an opinion of their credibility. Where a case partly heard by an inferior Magistrate was brought by a superior Magistrate to his own file, who then recorded the rest of the evidence, and then passed a decision on the whole evidence, the conviction was held to be illegal—*Q. v. Kullian*, 2 N.W.P. 468. If however, the accused is not prejudiced by the evidence not being taken afresh, the High Court will refuse to set aside the conviction—*Q. E. v. Chandra Ballab*, 1894 A.W.N. 200.

But if the superior Magistrate, to whom the case is submitted, commits the case to the Sessions, instead of trying it, he need not take the evidence afresh, but can commit the case upon the evidence recorded by

the inferior Magistrate—*Kamani v. Fakir*, 12 C.W.N. 136; *Q. E. v. Shesha*, Ratanlal 472; *Emp. v. Ram Prosad*, 12 N.L.R. 146, 12 Cr.L.J. 57.

347. (1) If, in any inquiry before a Magistrate or in any trial before a Magistrate before signing judgment, it appears to him at any stage of the proceedings that the case is one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session or High Court, and if he is empowered to commit for trial, he shall * * * commit the accused under the provisions hereinbefore contained.

(2) If such Magistrate is not empowered to commit for trial, he shall proceed under section 346.

1003. Change:—The words "stop further proceedings and" occurring in the old section between the words "shall" and "commit" have been omitted by sec 91 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923 "This amendment is designed to bring section 347 into line with section 208"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914).

Under the old law, there was a conflict of opinion as to the meaning of the words "stop further proceedings" In *In re Durant*, Ratanlal 975, *In re Sessions Judge*, 17 M L T 83, 15 Cr.L.J. 704 and *Phanindra v. Emp.*, 36 Cal. 48, 12 C.W.N. 1014, a very restricted meaning was assigned to these words, viz., that as soon as the Magistrate considered that the case was one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session, he should at once stop all proceedings and then and there pass an order of commitment to the Sessions, even though neither the witnesses for the prosecution had been cross-examined nor the defence witnesses examined In other words, the power of a Magistrate to make commitment under this section was not subject to the provisions of Chapter XVIII, and the Magistrate was not bound to follow the procedure of that Chapter but could commit even though all the evidence on either side had not been taken

But a more reasonable construction has been given to the words in some other cases Thus, in another Madras case and other cases, the words 'stop further proceedings' have been interpreted to mean that the Magistrate should stop proceeding with the case as a trial and should commit the case to the Sessions, and in thus committing he should adopt the procedure laid down in Chapter XVIII These words do not enable the Magistrate to shorten the proceedings and then and there pass an order of commitment—*Kangayya*, 36 Mad 321, *Emp v Channing Arnold*, 6 L B R. 129 (F.B.), 13 Cr L J 877; *Uth Bai v Crown*, 17 S L.R 188, 26 Cr L.J 148 The words "under the provisions hereinbefore contained" show that the Magistrate must make his proceedings conform to the provisions of Chapter XVIII, that sec. 347 does not override or dispense with the obligation of following Chapter 18, and that before he writes

and signs a committal order, the provisions of that Chapter must be followed and he must not conform to the mere passing of the committal order under section 213—*Emp. v. Channing Arnold*, supra. It was not intended by this section to enable the Magistrate to deprive the accused of any of the rights conferred on him by Chapter XVIII—*In re Chinnavan*, 15 Cr L.J. 366 (Mad.), and an order of commitment made without taking all such evidence as the accused was prepared to produce before the Magistrate is invalid—*Emp. v. Muhammed Hadi*, 26 All 177; *Q. E. v. Ahmadi*, 20 All. 264. In a recent case the Calcutta High Court has also laid down that though the Magistrate decides to commit the case to the Sessions under sec 347, he should still follow the procedure of Chapter XVIII and allow the accused to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses (sec. 208) where the application to cross-examine was made before the charge was framed and before the Magistrate decided to commit the case to the Court of Session—*Jyotsna Nath v. Emp.*, 51 Cal. 442 (445), 26 Cr L.J. 63, A.I.R. 1924 Cal 780.

This latter view will now prevail as a result of the present amendment which has deleted the above ambiguous words. Thus, it has been held in a very recent case that the phrase "under the provisions hereinbefore contained" relates to those provisions in Ch. 18 which define the procedure to be adopted in the inquiries into cases triable by the Court of Session. So, where the evidence recorded is not read over to each witness in the presence of the accused in accordance with the provisions of sec. 360 read with secs. 207 and 208 of Ch. 18, no commitment can be made under sec 347—*Damodaran*, 52 Mad 995, 57 M L J. 555, 31 Cr.L.J. 273, 1929 Cr. C. 602. If the Magistrate omits to follow the provisions of Ch. 18, and the case comes up to the High Court in revision before the order of commitment is made, the High Court will direct the Magistrate to reopen the inquiry *de novo*, irrespective of the question whether the accused has been prejudiced by the omission or not—*Damodaran*, supra. But if the case comes up to the High Court in revision after a committal order has been made, the High Court will not quash the commitment on the ground of omission to follow the procedure of Ch. 18, if the omission has not caused any prejudice to the accused—*In re Chinnavan*, 15 Cr.L.J. 366.

1004. Procedure :—It is not intended by this section that if the Magistrate finds that an order of commitment is to be made, proceedings under Chapter XVIII are to be commenced *de novo*—*In re Chinnavan*, 15 Cr.L.J. 366 (Mad.); *Emp. v. Ilahi Balsh*, 2 All. 910; therefore, if the Magistrate has already completed the evidence of the complainant and his witnesses, it is not necessary for him to take that evidence afresh. Only in respect of the remaining proceedings the provisions of Chapter XVIII should be followed—*Emp. v. Ilahi*, supra.

'Ought to be tried' :—See notes under section 207 for the meaning of these words. This section is couched in general terms, and gives the Magistrate very wide powers to commit if he is of opinion that the case is one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session. The discretion

vested in the Magistrate under this section cannot be limited by the provisions of sec. 254, that is, there is no suggestion in this section that the only possible reason for a competent Magistrate to commit a case is that he will not be able to pass a sufficiently severe sentence—*K. E. v. Ishahat*, 3 Rang. 42, 26 Cr.L.J. 1349; *Crown Prosecutor v. Bhagavathi*, 42 Mad 83 (85), 19 Cr.L.J. 997. The Magistrate's power of committal to the Sessions are not confined to cases where he considers that he cannot give adequate punishment. Other circumstances may be taken into consideration in deciding the question whether a case should be committed to the Sessions, viz., the gravity of the offence, the punishment prescribed for the offence, the section under which the accused is charged, the special difficulties of the case, its public importance, and the wishes of the parties—*Krishnaji v Emp* 53 Bom 611, 1920 Cr. C. 124, 30 Cr.L.J. 1090 (1095), *Emp v Bhimaji* 42 Bom 172 (178), 19 Cr.L.J. 342, 20 Bom L.R. 89. If the Magistrate considers, for instance that a complicated question of law arises or that some connected matter is already before the Court of Session or that the facts are such that a trial with the aid of a jury or with the aid of assessors (who may be chosen from experts in the particular matters involved in the case) would be a satisfactory procedure, the Magistrate should commit the case to the Court of Session under sec. 347—*Crown Prosecutor v Bhagavathi*, supra. Where the editor of a widely circulated newspaper was charged with the offence of sedition, before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, and he applied for commitment of the case to the High Court Sessions, held that the case should be committed under sec. 347, the fact that there was a congestion of work in the High Court Sessions was not a sufficient ground for the Magistrate's refusal to commit—*Krishnaji*, supra.

If in a case some of the accused persons are charged with an offence which ought to be tried by the Court of Session, and the case against the other accused is a summons case which the Magistrate can try and adequately punish, it is not illegal for the Magistrate to commit *all* the accused to the Sessions—*Ghani Yakub v Crown*, 14 S.L.R. 85, 21 Cr.L.J. 791.

'Before signing judgment'.—The commitment can be made if the judgment has not been given or signed. After signing judgment, no Court can alter or review the same. See sec. 369.

Commitment may be made after framing a charge—*Emp v Kudrutollah*, 3 Cal 495.

348. (1) Whoever, having been convicted of an offence punishable under Chapter XII or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code with imprisonment for a term of three years or upwards, is again accused of any offence

Trial of persons previously convicted of offences against coinage, stamp-law or property.

punishable under either of those Chapters with imprison-

ment for a term of three years or upwards, shall, if the Magistrate before whom the case is pending is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for committing the accused, be committed to the Court of Session or High Court, as the case may be, unless the Magistrate is competent to try the case and is of opinion that he can himself pass an adequate sentence if the accused is convicted:

Provided that, if any Magistrate in the district has been invested with powers under section 30, the case may be transferred to him instead of being committed to the Court of Session.

(2) When any person is committed to the Court of Session or High Court under sub-section (1), any other person accused jointly with him in the same inquiry or trial shall be similarly committed, unless the Magistrate discharges such other person under section 209.

Change .—The italicised words have been added by sec 92 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923

"If the Magistrate . . . committing the accused" —"This amendment has been made on the lines of section 209 (1)" —*Report of the Select Committee of 1916.*

"Is competent to try the case" —"We have introduced this amendment to make it clear that the section does not empower the Magistrate to pass sentence in a case which he is not competent to try" —*Report of the Joint Committee of 1922*

In the proviso, the words "any Magistrate in the district" have been substituted for the words "the District Magistrate" occurring in the old section. This amendment is merely verbal.

Sub-section (2) :—"This clause provides that when any person is committed to the Court of Session under sec 348, any other person accused jointly, whom the Magistrate believes to be guilty, shall be similarly committed. Identical treatment will thus be accorded to all the accused"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons (1914).*

Sections 348 and 349 —If the accused is an old offender, the Magistrate should act under this section, and not refer the case to a superior Magistrate under section 349—*Dasari Ramudu*, 2 Weir 423. That section (sec. 349) does not apply to a case where the accused is an old offender—*K. E. v. Po Thue*, 4 L.B.R. 282. If a Magistrate instead of proceeding under this section erroneously sends up the case under section 349, it is open to the District Magistrate to take the case on his own file or to transfer it to some other first class Magistrate—*Mari Naicken*, 2 Weir 422.

1005. Procedure :—The Magistrate must first of all determine, either as a preliminary matter or at any rate before framing a charge, whether there has been a previous conviction. If a previous conviction is proved, the Magistrate will then have to consider whether in the circumstances of the case his powers enable him to try and pass adequate sentence. If he thinks they do not permit, he should not try but commit the case to the Sessions (but he should not discharge the accused); if they do permit, he may try the case himself. If he commits the case to the Sessions, he ought not to find the accused guilty, but should merely frame a charge under section 210, and commit the case for trial under Chapter XVIII—*In re Kora Sellandhi* 35 Mad 552

Commitment not imperative.—The words "unless convicted" did not exist in the Code of 1892 or in the earlier Codes, and therefore it was imperative on the Magistrate to commit if a previous conviction was proved, and he could not try the case himself—*Gaudasing, Ratanlal* 704. But the 1893 Code gives a discretion to the Magistrate to try the case himself if he is competent to pass adequate sentence

1006. Powers of District Magistrate—Under the proviso to this section, if the District Magistrate is invested with powers under sec 30, the case may be transferred to him instead of being committed to the Sessions. In such a case the District Magistrate need not try the case *de novo*. He can, under section 350, act on the evidence already recorded by the Magistrate who transferred the case. See notes under sub-section (3) of section 350

If the District Magistrate considers that the case should be committed to the Sessions, he should himself commit, and not send back the case to the Subordinate Magistrate with a direction to commit—*Q E v Veeranna*, 11 Mad 377. If the District Magistrate commits the case, instead of trying it, he can, it seems, act upon the evidence recorded by the subordinate Magistrate, and need not commence the inquiry *de novo*. See *Q E v Shesha*, *Ratanlal* 472 and *Kamani v Fakira*, 12 C W N. 136 cited in Note 1002 under sec 346

349. (1) Whenever a Magistrate of the second or third class, having jurisdiction, is of opinion, after hearing the evidence for the prosecution and the accused, that the accused

Procedure when
Magistrate cannot pass
sentence sufficiently
severe.

guilty, and that he ought to receive a punishment different in kind from, or more severe than, that which such Magistrate is empowered to inflict, or that he ought to be required to execute a bond under section 106, he may record the opinion and submit his proceedings, and forward the accused, to the District Magistrate or Sub-divisional Magistrate to whom he is subordinate.

(1A) *When more accused than one are being tried together and the Magistrate considers it necessary to proceed under sub-section (1) in regard to any of such accused, he shall forward all the accused who are in his opinion guilty to the District Magistrate or Sub-divisional Magistrate.*

(2) The Magistrate to whom the proceedings are submitted may, if he thinks fit, examine the parties and recall and examine any witness who has already given evidence in the case, and may call for and take any further evidence, and shall pass such judgment, sentence or order in the case as he thinks fit, and as is according to law :

Provided that he shall not inflict a punishment more severe than he is empowered to inflict under sections 32 and 33.

Change :—Sub-section (1A) has been added by sec. 93 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. This is similar to sub-section (2) of section 348.

1007. Application of section :—*The provisions of this section are subject to the express provision of sec 348. Therefore, where the accused is an old offender, a second-class Magistrate should commit him to the Sessions under sec. 348, and not submit the case to the superior Magistrate under this section—Dasari Ramudu, 2 Weir 423, K. E. v. Po Thwe, 4 L B R. 282.*

The procedure prescribed by this section is unsuited to cases tried summarily—*K. E. v. Jalal Khan, 4 L B R. 277.*

1008. Reference to Superior Magistrate :—*Who can refer*—Only the second or third class Magistrate can refer. A first class Magistrate is not competent to submit the case under this section—*Q. E. v. Pershad, 7 All 414*

This section does not authorise any Bench of Magistrates to refer a case for higher punishment—*K. E. v. Jalal, 4 L B R 277.*

Reference discretionary :—*Whether a case ought to be referred to the superior Magistrate or not is within the discretion of the subordinate Magistrate, and the District Magistrate cannot direct the subordinate Magistrate to send up the case under this section. If he so directs, his order is ultra vires—Anonymous, 2 Weir 427.*

To whom case can be referred :—The case can be referred to the District Magistrate or the Magistrate to whom the referring Magistrate is subordinate, and to no other Magistrate—*Emp v. Vinayak, 38 Bom 719. 16 Cr L J 273*

When reference can be made:—This section authorises a reference to the superior Magistrate when the subordinate Magistrate considers that the accused should receive a severer sentence than he himself is competent to inflict. If the punishment which the subordinate Magistrate proposed was one which he himself could inflict, the reference was improper and the Magistrate should himself try the case—*In re Phulla*, 1891 A.W.N. 99. When a case was sent to the District Magistrate not because the referring Magistrate was not competent to pass a severe sentence but on the ground that it was advisable that the matter should be dealt with by the District Magistrate, it was held that the transfer was neither under sec. 349 nor under sec. 192, and therefore the conviction made by the District Magistrate was illegal and must be set aside—*Q. E. v. Radhe*, 12 All 66.

Under this section the Magistrate can make a reference to a superior Magistrate if he considers that the accused should receive a severer punishment than he can inflict, it does not apply where the Magistrate thinks that the accused should be dealt with under section 562, because an order under sec. 562 directing release upon probation of good conduct is not a punishment—*Baba v. Emp.*, 24 Cr L J 738 (Nag).

1009. Powers and duties of referring Magistrate:—

If the subordinate Magistrate submits the case to the higher Magistrate for severer punishment, he cannot convict the accused, the conviction and sentence are reserved for the higher Magistrate. The referring Magistrate is only required to state his opinion that the accused is guilty, but he cannot convict—*Q. E. v. Mahadu*, Ratantial 387; *Prayag Gope v. K. L.*, 3 Pat 1015 (1017), 5 P L T 571, 25 Cr L J. 1276. If the subordinate Magistrate not only records his opinion that the accused is guilty (as he is required to do) but also convicts the accused, the conviction will be treated as a mere surplusage or as a legal nullity, and the Magistrate to whom the case is sent can proceed with it without a reference to the High Court for the purpose of having the conviction formally quashed—*Emp. v. Narayan*, 52 Bom. 456, 30 Bom. L.R. 620, 29 Cr L J. 001 (005). The referring Magistrate can frame a charge if he likes, and the framing of charge is not illegal—*Emp. v. Po Yin*, 17 Cr L J 201 (Bur), *K. L. v. Hla Gyi*, 2 L.B.R. 285; *Q. E. v. Kondi*, Ratantial 948.

If the subordinate Magistrate sends the case for the purpose of binding down the accused under sec. 106, the Magistrate should neither convict nor pass sentence himself. The conviction, sentence and the orders for security are all to be passed by the superior Magistrate—*Mysore v. Sheikh v. Ali Sheikh*, 21 Cal 622. *Rohmuddi v. Emp.*, 35 Cal. 153.

'Forward the accused'—The reason of forwarding the accused is that the accused has a right to be present at the proceedings held before the Magistrate to whom the case is transferred, such proceedings are a continuation of the proceedings before the referring Magistrate—*Gunesh*, 7 W R 38. The right exists even though the referring Magistrate does not examine the parties or recall and re-examine them and the accused will be at liberty to contend before the superior Magistrate.

there is no sufficient case made out against him, and the Magistrate if he thinks so, may discharge or acquit him—*Reg. v. Raghya*, 7 B H C.R. 31.

Sub-section (1A) :—It was held under the old section that where several accused were charged before the subordinate Magistrate, he could convict some of them and send up the others to the superior Magistrate, such a procedure was not improper nor the conviction illegal, but in such a case it was more advisable to forward all the accused to the superior Magistrate instead of convicting some of the accused—*Raghava*, 2 Weir 428, *Nachian*, 2 Weir 429. The new sub-section (1A) now makes it imperative on the Magistrate, under such circumstances, to forward all the accused to the superior Magistrate. See *K. E. v. Dodo*, 18 S.L.R. 216, 26 Cr L J 1363.

But if there are several accused, and the Magistrate finds only one of them to be guilty, he should not send all the accused to the superior Magistrate, but should acquit the accused whom he finds not guilty and send that accused alone whom he considers guilty—*Sultan Md. v. Emp.*, 24 A L J 60, 26 Cr.L J 1630

1010. Sub-section (2) :—Powers and duties of the Superior Magistrate :—When a case is referred to a superior Magistrate, the whole case is opened up for him to deal with it according to his own discretion—*Q E v. Bapuda*, Ratanlal 350. In dealing with the case, he should not confine himself to considering whether the decision of the subordinate Magistrate was plainly and manifestly opposed to the evidence, but he should find on the evidence the facts which he considers proved and pass judgment accordingly—*Q E v. Appaji*, Ratanlal 636, *Anonymous*, 5 M H C.R. App. 43. If the superior Magistrate convicts the accused for an aggravated form of the offence, he must commence the trial afresh for such offence and cannot act on the evidence already recorded—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 21 (22) and 2 Weir 428. So also, if the offence is one which is beyond the jurisdiction of the subordinate Magistrate to try, the superior Magistrate cannot act upon the evidence already recorded by the subordinate Magistrate—*Q E v. Sittaram*, 1 Bom. L.R. 27. The Magistrate to whom a case is transferred is competent to pass 'such judgment, sentence or order as he thinks fit'. He is free to deal with the case according to his own discretion, and he can, if he thinks fit, order a commitment to the Court of Session—*Q E. v. Chinnappa*, Ratanlal 945; *In re Chinnimangodu*, 1 Mad. 289, *Q E. v. Viranna* 9 Mad 377; *Abdul Wahab v. Chaudia*, 13 Cal 305, *Emp v. Abdulla*, 4 Bom. 240. He has to make up his mind whether the accused are guilty or not and exercise his own independent judgment in the case, and to write a judgment conformable to the requirements of section 367. He cannot simply pass sentence on the accused without writing any judgment—*Karuppa v. Emp*, 1920 M W.N. 120, 54 I.C. 404, 21 Cr.L.J 52

The superior Magistrate to whom the case is referred has no power to send back the case to the subordinate Magistrate upon any ground whatsoever. He must dispose of it himself by acquitting or convicting the accused or by committing him for trial—*Emp. v. Thakur Dajal*, 26

All. 314, Q. E. v. *Chinnappa*, Ratanlal 945; *Dula v. Bhagirat*, 6 C.L.R. 276; and even if the case is sent back to the subordinate Magistrate, the latter cannot take up the case; after he has referred the case his jurisdiction over it ceases, and any order passed by him would be illegal—*Dula v. Bhagirat*, supra; Q. E. v. *Hara*, 10 Bom 196. If the superior Magistrate thinks that a commitment to the Sessions is necessary, he himself should make the commitment he cannot send back the case to the referring Magistrate with direction to commit the case to the Sessions—Q. E. v. *Varanna*, 11 Mad 377. If however, the reference is defective, e.g. if the referring Magistrate has omitted in record in writing the statement of the accused, as required by section 364, the superior Magistrate can return the case with a direction to supply the defect, and the subordinate Magistrate in such a case is also competent to come to a fresh and different conclusion as to the guilt of the accused and acquit some of them—*Anonymous* 2 Weir 426.

Moreover, the Magistrate to whom a case is referred cannot refer the case to another Magistrate for inquiry—*Anonymous* 6 M H C R App 2, *Anonymous*, 4 Mad 23, *Ponnusamy v Emp.* 36 Mad 470. *K E v Nga Po*, 1905 U B R (Cr P C) 33. A case once referred under this section cannot be referred to another Magistrate for inquiry or trial—*Emp. v Vinayak* 38 Bom 719. Even if the superior Magistrate thinks that the reference by the inferior Magistrate was incorrect or illegal, he can report it for orders under section 438, but himself cannot quash the reference and order retrial by another Magistrate—*Jawind Singh v Emp.* 1900 P R 14.

The superior Magistrate can act upon the evidence already recorded by the subordinate Magistrate and is not bound to hold a *de novo* trial under sec 350—*Raghava*, 2 Weir 428 (429). This is now made clear by the amendment made in sub-section (2) of sec 350 which lays down that that section does not apply to a transfer of proceedings under section 349. See *K. M v Dodo*, 18 S.L.R 216, 26 Cr L.J 1363.

350. (1) Whenever any Magistrate, after having heard and recorded the whole or any part of the evidence in an inquiry or a trial, ceases to exercise jurisdiction therein, and is succeeded by another Magistrate who has

Conviction or commitment on evidence partly recorded by one Magistrate and partly by another.

and who exercises such jurisdiction, the Magistrate so succeeding may act on the evidence so recorded by his predecessor, or partly recorded by his predecessor and partly recorded by himself; or he may re-summon the witnesses and recommence the inquiry or trial:

Provided as follows:—

- (a) in any trial the accused may, when the second Magistrate commences his proceedings,

demand that the witnesses or any of them be re-summoned and re-heard;

- (b) the High Court, or in cases tried by Magistrates subordinate to the District Magistrate, the District Magistrate may, whether there be an appeal or not, set aside any conviction passed on evidence not wholly recorded by the Magistrate before whom the conviction was held, if such Court or District Magistrate is of opinion that the accused has been materially prejudiced thereby, and may order a new inquiry or trial.

(2) Nothing in this section applies to cases in which proceedings have been stayed under section 346 or in which proceedings have been submitted to a superior Magistrate under section 349.

(3) *When a case is transferred under the provisions of this Code from one Magistrate to another, the former shall be deemed to cease to exercise jurisdiction therein and to be succeeded by the latter within the meaning of sub-section (1).*

Change :—The italicised words have been added by section 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. The reasons are stated below in their proper places.

1011. Object and scope of section :—The general principle is that a case must be decided by the Magistrate who heard the evidence. But if this principle has to be strictly observed, it will follow that in every case of transfer, the succeeding Magistrate will have to try from the beginning all cases which have been partly heard by his predecessor-in-office, and there will be endless delay in trials. And this section is obviously intended to meet such cases—*Hardwar v. Khago*, 20 Cal. 870; *Jangul v. Emp*, 19 Cr L.J. 657 (Nag). In view of the frequent changes in the office of Magistrates, the Code provides specially that a Magistrate may pronounce judgment on evidence recorded by his predecessor or on evidence partly recorded by his predecessor and partly by himself—*Tarada v. Q*, 3 Mad. 112.

This section applies not only where one Magistrate is succeeded by another but also where the second Magistrate is in his turn succeeded by another Magistrate. The third Magistrate can act on evidence recorded by his two predecessors. This section is not confined to a case where

there is only a single occurrence of one Magistrate succeeding another—*Gourdan v. Krishnam*, 45 M L J. 404

This section gives the succeeding Magistrate jurisdiction to decide the case on evidence recorded by his predecessor, but it cannot give him jurisdiction to deliver a judgment written by his predecessor. Where the Magistrate who heard the evidence and tried the case was transferred to another district, and from that place he sent a written judgment which was pronounced by his successor at the place where the case was tried, held that there was no jurisdiction to do so and the conviction and sentence so passed were illegal and that the accused must be retried—*Hainab Charan v. Arun Ali*, 50 Cal 664, 38 C L J 202, 24 Cr L J. 499; *Md. Rafique v K E.*, 43 C L J 100, 27 Cr L J 406. But the Madras High Court and the Oudh Chief Court hold that the succeeding Magistrate can sign and pronounce the judgment written by his predecessor and thus adopt it as his own—*In re Savarimuthu* 40 Mad 108, 32 M L J. 81, *Chandika v Emp.*, 28 O C 109, 11 O L J 725, *In re Sankara Pillai*, 18 M L J. 197, 7 Cr L J 459

1012. Application of section (1) This section applies to an inquiry under Chap VIII therefore where a Magistrate holding an inquiry under section 107 is transferred after the examination of some prosecution witnesses and is succeeded by another, the person called upon to shew cause why he should not give security may under proviso (a) insist upon the re-summoning and re-examination of those witnesses—*Buroda v Karimuddi*, 4 C L R 452 *Venkatachinnayya*, 43 Mad 551 (F B)

(2) This section is applicable to proceedings under section 145. Where in the course of such proceedings one Magistrate is transferred, the succeeding Magistrate can act upon the evidence already recorded—*Ali Mahomed v Tarak* 13 C W N 420, *Anu v Jitu*, 37 Cal 812, *Sondi Singh v Govind Singh*, 5 P L T 237, 25 Cr L J 89, *Syed Sadek v Sachindra*, 37 C L J 128, 24 Cr L J 569

(3) This section applies to inquiries preliminary to commitments. The succeeding Magistrate can commit the case to the Sessions on evidence recorded by his predecessor-in-office—*Sessions Judge v Malunga*, 31 Mad 40, *K. E. v Nanhua*, 36 All 315, 15 Cr L J 354, *Ghulam Jannat v. Emp.*, 7 Lah 70, 27 Cr L J 627

(4) This section would enable a Magistrate to try a case in which his predecessor has issued a process and granted adjournment, but has recorded no evidence—*Q. E. v. Govinda*, Ratanlal 652

(5) This section does not apply to cases tried by Benches of Magistrates—*Damri v. Bhowani*, 23 Cal 194, *Q E. v Basappa*, 18 Mad. 394, *Hardwar v Khaga*, 20 Cal 870; *Girdhari v Crown*, 2 Lah 237, *Abdul Ghani v. Emp.*, 1922 P.L.R. 1, 22 Cr.L.J. 511, *Itala v K E.*, 9 Bur L T. 203, 18 Cr.L.J 96. Even the new section 350A does not apply where one Magistrate of a Bench is replaced by another; that section contemplates cases wherein all the Magistrates constituting the Bench have heard the proceedings throughout. See Note 1019 under that section.

(6) This section applies only to Magistrates but not to Sessions Judges. A Sessions Judge is not competent to pronounce judgment on evidence recorded by his predecessor, or on evidence partly recorded by his predecessor and partly by himself—*Q. v. Ramdoyal*, 21 W R. 47; *Durga Charan v. Emp.*, 11 C L J. 59; *Tarada v. Q.*, 3 Mad. 112; *Badri Prasad v. Emp.*, 35 All 63, 13 Cr L J. 861. Even the consent of the accused would not enable the Sessions Judge to do so and validate such procedure—*K E v. Sakharam*, 26 Bom. 50; *Bhuta Singh v. Emp.*, 1890 P R. 1, *Q. v. Salamat*, 23 W R. 59.

(7) This section refers to cases where one Magistrate is succeeded by another Magistrate, and does not apply where the Magistrate remains the same and his official designation is merely changed. Thus, where a Head Assistant Magistrate, having almost completed the trial of a criminal case, was appointed to the office of a Deputy Magistrate in another place in the same District, and the case was brought on to his file to the latter place by order of the District Magistrate, he could proceed to try the case from the point at which he had arrived as Head Assistant Magistrate prior to his transfer to the post of Deputy Magistrate, and the accused cannot demand under proviso (a) that the trial must be commenced *de novo*—*Karuppana v. Ahobalamatam*, 22 Mad. 47.

(8) This section does not apply where the District Magistrate holds further inquiry into a case under section 437 (now 436). In such a case, he must hold the inquiry *de novo* and cannot rely on the evidence recorded by the Magistrate who previously tried the case—*Q. E. v. Hasnu*, 6 All 367.

1013. "Succeeded" :—A liberal construction should be put upon the provisions of section 350. Where on the death of a Magistrate empowered under section 30, the District Magistrate, being the only remaining Magistrate in the district having powers under that section, took upon his file a case which was being tried by the deceased, it was held that the District Magistrate must be regarded as having succeeded the deceased Magistrate within the meaning of this section—*Gorelal v. Emp.*, 10 Cr. L J 705 (Nag). When a case is transferred from one Magistrate to another, the former Magistrate is said to be 'succeeded' by the latter. See sub-section (3) and notes thereunder.

1014. 'Recommence the inquiry or trial' :—If the succeeding Magistrate chooses to recommence the trial, he must recommence by resummoning and re-examining the witnesses. But he cannot go to any stage previous to that. He cannot dismiss the complaint under section 203—*Balram v. Baldeo*, 7 C.P.L.R. 36, or refer the case to the Police under section 202 for inquiry and report—*Sadappachariar v. Ragunadachariar*, 9 Mad. 282.

If a charge has already been framed by the preceding Magistrate, the succeeding Magistrate cannot cancel the charge—*Sriramulu v. Krishna Row*, 39 Mad. 585; *Crown v. Nathu*, 1903 P.R. 14; *Sirhadri v. Sitaram*, 2 L.W. 1244, 17 Cr L J. 1. The principle is, that if the proceedings before the preceding Magistrate have developed into the stage of a trial by the

frame of a charge, the succeeding Magistrate cannot go beyond the stage of trial and transform the trial proceedings into an inquiry by cancellation of the charge—*Sriramulu v. Krishna Row*, 38 Mad. 585. And since the succeeding Magistrate cannot cancel the charge, an order subsequently passed letting off the accused is one of acquittal and not one of discharge—*Simhadri v. Sitarama*, *supra*; *Sriramulu v. Krishna*, 38 Mad. 585.

If a trial is commenced *de novo* by the succeeding Magistrate, he must observe all the procedure of the trial and cannot omit any part of the procedure. Where in a *de novo* trial the Magistrate omitted to examine the prosecution witnesses (who had already been examined by the preceding Magistrate) but allowed them to be cross-examined by the defence, it was held that the trial was not in due compliance with this section and ought to be set aside—*Sobh Nath v. Emp.*, 12 C.W.N. 138; *Sidik v. Emp.*, 20 S.L.R. 50, 27 Cr.L.J. 332. A *de novo* trial means a trial from the beginning of the case. The object of granting a *de novo* trial is to enable the Magistrate who hears the case to see the way in which the witnesses give evidence before him, to mark their demeanour and thereby to be in a position to judge of their credibility. This object is lost if the witnesses are not examined again but are only allowed to be cross-examined by the accused. Such a procedure is not a *de novo* trial, and the conviction of the accused must be set aside—*Narayana v. Bojanna*, 49 M.L.J. 423, 26 Cr.L.J. 1596. Similarly, where the Magistrate holding the *de novo* trial merely read over to the accused the deposition of the prosecution witnesses (recorded by the preceding Magistrate) though he allowed them to be cross-examined, the procedure was held to be illegal—*Hnin v. Than Pe*, 19 Cr.L.J. 321, 9 L.B.R. 92, 44 I.C. 337, *Mangal Singh v. Crown*, 1919 P.W.R. 16; *Mangal Singh v. Emp.*, 22 Cr.L.J. 119 (Lah). A Magistrate proceeding to recommence the inquiry or trial cannot rely upon the previously recorded evidence—*Kartar v. Emp.*, 28 Cr.L.J. 302 (Lah). Cf. *In re Rangaswami*, 52 Mad. 73, 30 Cr.L.J. 183 (184).

Transfer of Magistrate to his original place—Before the conclusion of the trial the trying Magistrate was transferred. Thereupon the case was transferred to the file of a superior Magistrate who began to try it *de novo*. Afterwards the original Magistrate was re-transferred to his original place, and the superior Magistrate transferred the case to him with a direction to proceed from where he had originally left it. It was held that the inferior Magistrate must try the case *de novo*, and could not proceed from where he had originally left the case, because all that had taken place before the inferior Magistrate originally had been superseded—*Daroga Choudhury v. Emp.*, 20 Cr.L.J. 638 (Pat), *Jago Singh v. Emp.*, 20 Cr.L.J. 820 (Pat), *Emp. v. Anand Sarup*, 3 All 563.

Transfer of case to the original Magistrate—A Magistrate was transferred after he had finished the major portion of the trial of a case. The succeeding Magistrate granted a *de novo* trial. But the District Magistrate was of opinion that as only a small amount of work remained to be done in the case, it could be best done by the Magistrate who had commenced the case, and so he (Dt. Magistrate) transferred the case to the original

Magistrate. *Held* that even the original Magistrate to whom the case was thus transferred could not take up the case from the point at which he had left it, but that he must start the case *de novo*, because as soon as he was transferred all the proceedings which had previously taken place before him were wiped out—*Sardar Khan Saheb v. Athanulla*, 47 M.L.J. 926, 26 Cr.L.J. 510. In another case it has been held that the District Magistrate cannot transfer the case to the original Magistrate (who has no more jurisdiction to proceed with the case), but that the new Magistrate who has taken up the case *de novo* must proceed with the trial—*Sriranga v. Subramania*, 24 L.W. 640, 28 Cr.L.J. 23 (24).

1015. Proviso (a) —Right of Accused:—Under the proviso (a), the accused has a right to demand that the witnesses or any of them shall be resummoned or reheard. The policy of the law is that an accused should be able to claim a right not to be convicted by a Magistrate who has not himself heard the whole evidence—*Sahib Din v. Crown*, 3 Lah. 115, 23 Cr.L.J. 330. The accused can exercise his right under the proviso (a) in case of a trial only; where a preliminary inquiry before commitment is transferred before frame of charge, the accused is not as of right entitled to an inquiry *de novo*—*Palanlandy*, 32 Mad. 218, *Crown v. Nathu*, 1903 P.R. 14. Proceedings in a warrant case before a charge is framed are merely an inquiry and not a trial, and if a case is transferred at that stage, the accused cannot demand a fresh examination of witnesses to be made by the succeeding Magistrate—*Ramanathan v. K. E.*, 46 Mad. 719. But the accused is not altogether without a remedy, because as soon as the charge is framed by the succeeding Magistrate, he can under sec. 256 recall all the prosecution witnesses whose evidence has been taken, and thus he has a right equivalent to that of demanding a *de novo* trial—*Palanlandy v. Emp.*, 32 Mad. 218 (219). But according to the Calcutta High Court a trial commences as soon as the case is called on with the Magistrate on the Bench, the accused on the dock, and the representatives of the prosecution and for the defence are present in Court for the hearing of the case. The proper time for the accused to ask for resummoning and rehearing of the witnesses is as soon as the trial commences before the second Magistrate—*Gomar Sirdar v. Q. E.*, 25 Cal. 863. In trials of summons cases and in summary trials, the time when the accused is to demand that the witnesses shall be resummoned and reheard is when the second Magistrate commences his proceedings—*Sahib Din v. Crown*, 3 Lah. 115, 23 Cr.L.J. 330.

According to the Calcutta High Court, this proviso applies only to a trial and does not apply to an inquiry under section 145, consequently, a Magistrate has power to proceed with the inquiry of a case under sec. 145, where a portion of the evidence has been recorded by his predecessor, and he is not bound to start the proceeding *de novo* on the application of the accused—*Syed Sadek v. Sachindra*, 37 C.L.J. 128; *Sondi Singh v. Govind*, 5 P.L.T. 237, 25 Cr.L.J. 89. But a Full Bench of the Madras High Court has laid down that the proviso (a) applies to an inquiry under sec. 117, because such inquiry, according to sub-section (2) of sec. 117,

is made in the manner prescribed for conducting "trials" in summons or warrant cases and in fact has all the features of a trial—*Venkata Chinnaya v. K. E.*, 43 Mad 511 (F B). This is also the view of the Oudh Court—*Baij Nath, v Emp.*, 27 O C. 323, 25 Cr L J 1380.

The accused person must himself claim or waive the right. Where a case was transferred from one Magistrate to another, and during the arguments on the transfer application the pleader for the accused stated his intention not to have a *de novo* trial in the Court to which the case was transferred, and subsequently the accused demanded a trial *de novo*, it was held that there was no waiver of the right under this section, and that there must be a *de novo* trial—*Jangi Lal*, 19 Cr L J 657 (Nag).

The Magistrate is not bound to ascertain from the accused whether he wishes to exercise the right conferred by this proviso. This section confers the right on the accused to demand, and does not prescribe that the Magistrate shall ask the accused whether he will exercise the right or not—*Nga Po v. K. E.*, U.B.R. (1912) 151. The Magistrate is not bound to have the accused brought before him to ascertain whether he wishes to exercise this right—*Kesram v. Emp.*, 1884 P R. 6. An omission on the part of the Magistrate to ask the accused whether he wants evidence to be reheard is a mere irregularity, curable by sec. 537. In *Barachi v. K. E.*, 10 Bur. L.T. 73, 17 Cr.L.J. 401, however, it has been held that it is necessary for the Magistrate to acquaint the accused with the fact that he is entitled to have the witnesses re-called and re-examined. There are many cases in which it is desirable that the Magistrate who passes judgment should have the opportunity of seeing the witnesses.

But there is no doubt that if the accused wants the evidence to be reheard, the Magistrate must recommence the trial—*Hnyin v. Than Pe*, 10 L.B.R. 92, 10 Cr.L.J. 321, and the refusal by the Magistrate to do so would be an illegality not curable by sec. 537—*Amir Khan v. Emp.*, 1903 P.R. 3; *Gomer Sirdar v. Q. E.*, 25 Cal. 863.

An accused can demand a *de novo* trial on the ground of transfer of the trying Magistrate, but not on the ground that that Magistrate had not heard his counsel—*Chandika Prosad v. K. E.*, 28 O C. 109, 25 Cr.L.J. 1075.

Where the accused claims under this section to have the witnesses re-examined by the succeeding Magistrate, the witnesses should be re-summoned without the payment of any fees—*Elias v. Ezekiel*, 8 Bur. L.T. 43.

Under this clause, when a trial is held *de novo*, it is the duty of the Magistrate, on the desire of the accused, to re-summon the witnesses. But the Magistrate can resummon only those witnesses who are available. If any witness dies in the meantime, and the evidence which he gave before the previous Magistrate is proved and relied upon, and the other witnesses are resummoned, the procedure is quite in accordance with law—*Lekal v. Emp.*, 11 Lah 570, 28 Cr.L.J. 451.

1016. Proviso (b) :—A District Magistrate can under proviso (b) set aside a conviction passed by a first class Magistrate in the district

though no appeal lies from his order to the District Magistrate—*Q. E. v. Pitya Gopal*, 2 Bom 100; *Opendra v. Dukhini*, 12 Cal 473, *Q. E. v. Laskari*, 7 All. 853; *In re Padmanabha*, 8 Mad 18.

1017. Sub-section (2) :—The procedure laid down in this section does not apply to proceedings stayed under sec. 346—*Muhammad v. K. E.*, 1905 P.R. 25. Thus, where a Magistrate trying a case was of opinion that the accused deserved a severer punishment than he could inflict, and stayed the proceedings and submitted the case to the District Magistrate under sec. 346, it was held that the District Magistrate could not convict the accused on the evidence recorded by the referring Magistrate even though the accused did not want the evidence to be reheard—*Muhammed v. K. E.*, 1905 P.R. 25, *Ambika v. Emp.*, 19 Cr.L.J. 625 (Pat). In such a case the accused has no power to waive his right to a trial *de novo*; and the failure to hold a trial *de novo* is an illegality which vitiates the whole trial and is not merely an irregularity covered by sec. 537—*Ambika v. Emp.*, 19 Cr.L.J. 625 (Pat).

This subsection as now amended further lays down that the procedure of this section does not apply to sec. 349. Even prior to this amendment it was held that the superior Magistrate to whom a case had been transferred under section 349 could act upon the evidence already recorded by the subordinate Magistrate and was not bound to hold a *de novo* trial—*Raghava*, 2 Weir 428. This is now made clear by the present amendment. See *K. E. v. Dodo*, 18 S.L.R. 216, 26 Cr.L.J. 1363.

1018. Sub-section (3) —Transfer of proceedings :—Subsection (1) applies where the Magistrate is transferred from one place to another, the case remaining in the same Court. But does that subsection apply where a case is transferred from one Magistrate to another, under section 528, the Magistrate remaining in the same post? In other words, does that subsection apply to transfer of cases as well, or is it confined only to transfer of Magistrates only? There was some difference of opinion under the old section as to this question. In the following cases, it has been held that this section covers cases where proceedings are transferred by section 528 from the Court of one Magistrate to that of another: because as soon as a case is transferred from one Magistrate to another the former 'ceases to exercise jurisdiction' in the case within the meaning of this section—*Mahesh v. Emp.*, 35 Cal. 457, *Kudratulla v. Emp.*, 39 Cal. 781; *Palaniandy v. Emp.*, 32 Mad. 218, *Barachi v. Emp.*, 10 Bur. L.T. 73, 17 Cr.L.J. 401; *Chandra Kishore v. K. E.*, 21 C.W.N. 755; *Ramdas v. Emp.*, 40 All. 307, *Nanhua*, 36 All. 315, *Albar Ali v. Emp.*, 20 Cr.L.J. 41 (Nag); *Ganga Chetty v. Emp.*, 20 Cr.L.J. 496; *Rupa Singh v. Emp.*, 22 Cr.L.J. 82, 1 P.L.T. 679. But the contrary view was taken in the following cases—*Q. E. v. Angnu*, 1889 A.W.N. 130; *Dy. Leg. Rem. v. Upendra*, 12 C.W.N. 140; *Crown v. La Tok*, 1 L.B.R. 301; *Q. E. v. Radhe*, 12 All. 66, *Q. E. v. Bashir*, 14 All. 346; *Lavya v. Emp.*, 1 N.L.R. 187.

To remove this conflict of opinion, subsection (3) has been added, adopting the former view. "There has been some difference of opinion

as to the position when cases are transferred from one Magistrate to another otherwise than from a predecessor to a successor in office. The Amendment provides that the Magistrate from whom the case is transferred shall be deemed to cease to have jurisdiction within the meaning of this section"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914).

350A. *No order or judgment of a Bench of Magistrates shall be invalid by reason only of a change having occurred in the constitution of the Bench in any case in which the Bench by which such order or judgment is passed is duly constituted under sections 15 and 16, and the Magistrates constituting the same have been present on the Bench throughout the proceedings.*

Changes in constitution of Benches.

This section has been added by sec. 95 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act XVIII of 1923

In the Bill of 1921, it was intended to add the following sub-section to section 350 :—

"(4) The provisions of this section shall apply, so far as may be, to proceedings before any Bench of Magistrates constituted under section 15 wherever the Magistrates sitting together in any proceeding are not the same as those who were sitting together at the last hearing thereof "

In other words, it was intended to lay down that if during the hearing of a trial, any Magistrate of a Bench was absent and was replaced by another, such a change would not affect the proceeding and the trial need not be commenced *de novo*; the new Magistrate would be able to act on the evidence already recorded. But this clause did not meet with the approval of the Joint Committee who observed, "We think, however, that the new sub-section (4) which has been introduced in the Bill to deal with the case of Benches goes somewhat too far, and we have substituted for it a new section after section 350 which in our opinion gives effect to the law as laid down by the High Courts. Briefly, it provides that a judgment of a Bench shall be valid when the Bench is duly constituted at the time of passing the judgment and the judgment is passed by Magistrates all of whom have heard the proceedings throughout "

—*Report of the Joint Committee* (1922)

1019. All Magistrates must be present throughout :—This section lays down that all the Magistrates who take part in the judgment must have been present throughout the proceedings. If one of them has been absent during the trial or during a portion of the trial and has not heard all the evidence, he cannot take part in the judgment. Thus, where the evidence for the prosecution was taken before two Honorary Magistrates A and B and on a subsequent day the evidence for the defence was taken and judgment delivered by B and C, held that as C was not present throughout the proceeding, the trial was bad. The High Court set aside the decision and ordered a new trial.—*Hardwar v*

Khega, 20 Cal. 870 (873); *Q. E. v. Basappa*, 18 Mad. 394. Where the evidence for the prosecution was heard by three Magistrates A, B and C, and on a subsequent day four different Magistrates, D, E, F and G, none of whom had previously attended, recorded the evidence for the defence and acquitted the accused, *held* that the trial must be set aside—*Ram Sundar v. Rajab*, 12 Cal. 558 (559); *Itala v. Emp.*, 8 L.B.R. 463, 18 Cr. L.J. 96. Where the trial of the accused was commenced before a Bench of four Magistrates who heard part of the evidence, and continued before the same four Magistrates and another who joined as the fifth, and all the five Magistrates delivered judgment, *held* that the trial was vitiated and there must be a retrial—*Re Subramania*, 38 Mad. 304 (305); *Damri v. Bhowani*, 23 Cal. 194 (195). Only those persons who have heard the whole of the evidence can decide the case. If the trial is commenced by two Magistrates A and B, and then a third member C joins and takes part in the decision, the trial is vitiated. Although the two Magistrates A and B have heard the evidence throughout, it is impossible to say to what extent their opinion may not have been influenced by the third Magistrate who has only heard a portion of the evidence—*Damri v. Bhowani*, *supra*. Four Magistrates A, B, C and D, commenced the trial. But A was absent during a part of the trial, but eventually he, with the three other Magistrates who had been sitting throughout the trial, signed the order convicting the accused. *Held* that the trial was vitiated, as A was absent during a part of the proceedings, even though the three Magistrates sat throughout the proceeding and formed the quorum according to rules. It is wrong that a Magistrate who has been absent during a part of the trial should express an opinion on evidence which he has not heard and very possibly influence his fellow Magistrates, although they are in a better position than he is to decide the case—*Emp. v. Gangappa*, 23 Bom.L.R. 833, 22 Cr.L.J. 615, 63 I.C. 151 (152). Where in a trial before a Bench consisting of three Magistrates, one of them was absent after the commencement of the trial, and important evidence was recorded in his absence, but on the following day he joined with the other Magistrates in signing the order of conviction of the accused, the conviction was held to be bad—*Shumbhu v. Ram Komul*, 13 C.L.R. 212. This section practically lays down that sec. 350 does not apply to trials before Benches of Magistrates; that in such trials the case should be decided by the Magistrates who have heard the whole of the evidence—*Damri v. Bhowani*, *supra*, *Hardwar v. Khega*, *supra*, *Itala v. Emp.*, 8 L.B.R. 463, 18 Cr.L.J. 96; *Girdhari v. Crown*, 2 Lah. 237 (239); *Abdul Ghani*, 1922 P.L.R. 1, 22 Cr.L.J. 511, 62 I.C. 335. In an Allahabad case a trial was partly held before J and N who heard the prosecution evidence, and the case was adjourned and on the next day was heard by J and P, before whom the prosecution witness was cross-examined and defence evidence was taken; the case was again adjourned and on the third day J and N proceeded to deliver judgment. *Held* that the judgment ought to have been delivered by J and P who had heard the major portion of the evidence—*Emp. v. Mathura*, 41 All. 116 (125). This case was decided with reference to certain rules framed by the U. P. Government as to the

constitution of Benches, and also with reference to the circumstances of the case. But it is no longer good law in view of the present section 350A, because the Magistrate P was *not present throughout* the proceedings.

Where out of three Magistrates constituting a Bench, only one is present on all hearings throughout the trial, sitting sometimes with one, sometimes with the other, and sometimes with both, the trial is bad ■ contravening the provisions of this section, even though the quorum consisted of two—*Banwari v. Emp.*, 7 Lah. 122, 27 Cr.L.J. 463. Thus, ■ Bench of Magistrates consisted of A, B and C. A and B began the trial and recorded a portion of the evidence. B and C sat at the next two hearings, and all the three sat at the subsequent hearings and signed the judgment. *Held* that the trial was bad as it contravened the provisions of this section, even though the quorum required was only two—*Suraj Bali v. Emp.*, 4 O.W.N. 1240, 29 Cr.L.J. 310 (311), *Brij Bhukhan v. Ram Kirat*, 10 O.L.J. 614, 25 Cr.L.J. 198, A.I.R. 1923 Oudh 163 (165). In order that the conviction should be legal, it must be by a quorum of Magistrates required under the rules, each of whom has heard the whole evidence—*Emp. v. Nihchal*, 13 S.L.R. 166, 53 I.C. 609, 20 Cr.L.J. 760.

1020. Absence of unnecessary Magistrates :—Where a trial was begun before a Bench of seven Magistrates, and when the judgment was pronounced, only five out of the seven were present, and these five members constituted a legal Bench, it was held that the mere circumstance that two out of the seven Magistrates were absent on the day on which the accused was convicted did not affect the legality of the conviction, as the other five Magistrates who legally constituted the Bench attended the trial from beginning to end—*Karuppana v. Chairman*, 21 Mad. 246. Where two Magistrates who decided a case sat throughout the trial and constituted as quorum of the Bench, the trial would not be vitiated by the mere fact that two other Magistrates who were not necessary to the quorum and who were present at the time of the commencement of the inquiry were not on the Bench at the time of the decision of the case—*Venkatrama v. Swaminatha*, 38 Mad. 797, 15 Cr.L.J. 549, *Balbhadri v. Tibhuban*, 8 Cr.L.J. 43, 3 M.L.R. 67, *Khuda Bakhsh v. Emp.*, 15 A.L.J. 463, 18 Cr.L.J. 749. But if by reason of the absence of a member, the remaining members did not legally constitute the Bench, the trial could not proceed. Thus, where a Bench consisted of A, B, and C, but A was absent on the first day of trial when the witness was examined and also on the day of judgment, it was held that the conviction of the accused by B and C alone was bad and that there must be a retrial—*In re Tantravalu Bapiraju*, 36 M.L.J. 362, 20 Cr.L.J. 823, 51 I.C. 824.

Want of quorum .—Where a Bench of Magistrates constituted by the Local Government is, under the notification, required to consist of not less than two members, one member of the Bench alone adjudicate upon a case—*K. E. v. Lado* 1902 A.Y. 12. Where a case was tried by a Bench of Magistrates, one of whom was absent during the evidence while the other was sitting close by and present, the trial was bad.

case, *held* that as the hearing took place practically before only one of the Honorary Magistrates, the order must be set aside and the case tried *de novo*—*Sultan v. Shamser*, 25 O.C. 182, 23 Cr.L.J. 696, A.I.R. 1922 Oudh 21. Where the rules relating to a Bench of Magistrates provide that two members shall constitute the quorum, the evidence recorded by a Magistrate sitting singly is not evidence recorded in a Court, and the mere reading over to the Bench, when properly constituted, of the statements so recorded would not render those statements admissible as evidence—*Emp v. Gulu*, 20 S.L.R. 134, 27 Cr.L.J. 542 (543). Similarly, a trial by two members of a Bench which according to rules must consist of not less than three members, is bad in law—*Q. E. v. Muthia*, 16 Mad. 410. Thus, where a Bench of three Magistrates constituted under the rules commenced a trial and heard the prosecution evidence but afterwards one member of the Bench was absent, and the remaining two Magistrates went on with the trial, heard the defence evidence and convicted the accused, *held* that the trial having been in contravention of the rules was void. The trial ought to have been adjourned till the absent member was present, or it should have been held afresh before a different set of Magistrates—*Emp v. Mohideen*, 44 Bom. 400, 21 Cr. L.J. 369. See also 36 M.L.J. 362 *supra*.

351. (1) Any person attending a Criminal Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such Court for the purpose of inquiry into or trial of any offence of which such Court can take cognizance and which, from the evidence, may appear to have been committed, and may be proceeded against as though he had been arrested or summoned.

(2) When the detention takes place in the course of an inquiry under Chapter XVIII or after a trial has been begun, the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and the witnesses reheard.

1021. This section applies even though a trial has actually been begun. In *Q. v. Sutherland*, 14 W.R. 20, it was held that this section could not be applied where the trial was actually being proceeded with, because such a course deprived the prisoner of the opportunity of preparing his defence and subjected him to be tried on evidence which was taken before he was put into the position of a prisoner. This ruling is no longer good law, because sub-section (2) provides for the difficulty presented in that ruling and requires the proceedings to be commenced afresh.

This is a self-contained section and the cognizance which a Magistrate takes under this section in respect of an offence is independent of the provisions of sec. 190 (c). Consequently the provisions of section 191 are inapplicable where a Magistrate takes cognizance under this section—

Emp v Sakha, 5 N L R 113 (114). As to taking cognisance against a witness in a case, see notes under section 190 (c)

352. The place in which any Criminal Court is held for the purpose of inquiring into or trying any offence shall be deemed an open Court to which the public generally may have access, so far as the same can conveniently contain them :

Provided that the presiding Judge or Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, order at any stage of any inquiry into, or trial of, any particular case, that the public generally, or any particular person, shall not have access to or be or remain in, the room or building used by the Court.

1022. Court to be open :—*Jail trial*—This section does not necessarily make a trial in a jail invalid where there is nothing to show that admittance was refused to any one who desired it or that the prisoners were unable to communicate with their friends or counsel. But it is undesirable to hold trials in a jail, because it is difficult to get counsel to appear in jail—*Sahai Singh v Crown*, 1917 P.W.R 21.

The evidence of a Ghosha woman should be taken behind a purdah at a private place where she can come, in the presence of the accused only, the Judge taking such precaution as he can to secure her identity—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 432.

Exclusion of police Officers :—A police officer who has investigated into a case should not be allowed to be present before a Magistrate when he records a confession made by the accused—*Emp. v. Ramananda*, 1885 A W.N. 221.

This section gives power to the Court of ordering that any particular person shall not remain in the room used by the Court. It makes no exception in the case of a Police-officer. When the accused person objects to the presence of a Police-officer or other person, the Magistrate has to decide whether the accused's fear of prejudice to his case is reasonable, considering the intelligence and susceptibilities of the class to which he belongs, and not merely whether the presence is convenient or helpful to the Court or the prosecution. It is not advisable that a Police officer interested in the case proceeding before the Magistrate should receive exceptional treatment, as a seat on a dais, as it is calculated to breed suspicion in the mind of the accused as to the independence of the Magistrate—*Nathu Singh v Emp.*, 8 N.L J 95, 26 Cr.L.J. 1130.

case, held that as the hearing took place practically before only one of the Honorary Magistrates, the order must be set aside and the case tried *de novo*—*Sultan v. Shamser*, 25 O.C. 182, 23 Cr.L.J. 696, A.I.R. 1922 Oudh 21. Where the rules relating to a Bench of Magistrates provide that two members shall constitute the quorum, the evidence recorded by a Magistrate sitting singly is not evidence recorded in a Court, and the mere reading over to the Bench, when properly constituted, of the statements so recorded would not render those statements admissible as evidence—*Emp. v. Gulu*, 20 S.L. 134, 27 Cr.L.J. 542 (543). Similarly, a trial by two members of a Bench which according to rules must consist of not less than three members, is bad in law—*Q. E. v. Muthia*, 16 Mad 410. Thus, where a Bench of three Magistrates constituted under the rules commenced a trial and heard the prosecution evidence but afterwards one member of the Bench was absent, and the remaining two Magistrates went on with the trial, heard the defence evidence and convicted the accused, held that the trial having been in contravention of the rules was void. The trial ought to have been adjourned till the absent member was present, or it should have been held afresh before a different set of Magistrates—*Emp. v. Mohideen*, 44 Bom 400, 21 Cr.L.J. 369. See also 36 M.L.J. 362 *supra*.

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Detention of offenders attending Court. although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such

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This is a self-contained section and the cognizance which a Magistrate takes under this section in respect of an offence is independent of the provisions of sec. 190 (c). Consequently the provisions of section 191 are inapplicable where a Magistrate takes cognizance under this section—

taken in the absence of the prisoner at a former trial was read out to them and put in as evidence at the present trial, it was held that the proceeding was irregular and prejudicial to the prisoner, and that such witnesses should have been subjected to a fresh oral examination in the presence of the prisoner—*Q. v. Bishonath*, 12 W.R. 3. See also *Q. E. v. Nund Ram*, 11 All. 609, *Reg v. Buldev, Ratanlal* 24.

The Magistrate should not only take the evidence in the presence of the accused, but his record must show on the face of it that he had done so. The Magistrate should, by the use of a few apt words on the face of the deposition, make it apparent that he had taken the evidence in the presence of the accused—*Q. E v Pohop Singh*, 10 All. 174.

When his personal attendance is dispensed with—See sec. 205. The presence of an accused person may be dispensed with on ground of his illhealth—*Emp v King*, 14 Bom L.R. 236. A respectable *pardanashin* woman should not ordinarily be compelled to appear in person in the first instance unless and until there is a strong likelihood of the charge being proved—*Habbo v. Crown*, 1909 P.W.R. 5, 9 Cr.L.J. 158, *In re Kandamani*, 45 Mad 359, and where her presence is dispensed with, the evidence may be recorded in the presence of her pleader—*Prem Kaur v Mai Sham*, 1908 P.W.R. 20; *In re Kandamani*, 45 Mad. 359, 23 Cr.L.J. 260

354. In inquiries and trials (other than summary trials) under this Code by or before a Magistrate (other than a Presidency Magistrate) or Sessions Judge, the evidence of the witnesses shall be recorded in the following manner.

Manner of recording evidence outside presidency-towns.

355. (1) In summons cases tried before a Magistrate other than a Presidency Magistrate, and in cases of the offences mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 260, clauses (b) to (m) both inclusive, when tried by a Magistrate of the first or second class, and in all proceedings under section 514 (if not in the course of a trial), the Magistrate shall make a memorandum of the substance of the evidence of each witness as the examination of the witness proceeds.

Record in summons cases and in trials of certain offences by first and second class Magistrates

(2) Such memorandum shall be written and signed by the Magistrate with his own hand, and shall form part of the record.

(3) If the Magistrate is prevented from making memorandum as above required, he shall record

reason of his inability to do so, and shall cause such memorandum to be made in writing from his dictation in open Court, and shall sign the same, and such memorandum shall form part of the record.

1024. Scope of section :—In summons cases, the deposition may be recorded in the form of a memorandum, but it is not necessary that the recorded deposition should be read over to the accused, and an omission to do so cannot be regarded as a fatal defect—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 433.

In cases referred to in section 260, if they are tried summarily, only the substance of the evidence must be embodied in the judgment, as well as the particulars mentioned in section 264. If those cases are tried regularly, instead of summarily, the procedure of this section is to be followed—*Kuchi v. K. E.*, 3 L.B.R. 3. The language of section 354 ("other than summary trials") shows that section 355 does not apply to a summary trial, and in such a trial, the Magistrate need not make any memorandum of the substance of the evidence of each witness. Even if he makes such a memorandum, the notes do not form part of the record and need not and should not be kept on the record, the Magistrate is at liberty to destroy the notes if he pleases—*Mantoo v. Emp.*, 49 All. 261, 28 Cr.L.J. 97 (dissenting from *Salish Chandra v. Emp.*, 48 Cal. 280); *Ismail v. Emp.*, 25 A.L.J. 346, 28 Cr.L.J. 442. See Note 864 under sec. 263. This section applies to offences coming within clauses (b) to (m) of sec. 260, but not to offences falling under sec. 261. Therefore, in a trial of an offence specified in sec. 261, the Magistrate is not bound to make any memorandum of evidence. Even if he takes down rough notes of evidence in such a trial, they do not form part of the record and may be destroyed by him—*Chimanlal v. Emp.*, 29 Bom. L.R. 710, 28 Cr.L.J. 537 (538).

In proceedings under Chapter XXXVI (maintenance proceedings) the evidence ought not to be recorded as in summary trials, but in the manner provided by this section—*Kalidas v. Durga Charan*, 20 Cal. 351.

There is no provision as to the language in which the memorandum is to be recorded. But there is also no provision which renders it illegal for an Indian second class Magistrate to record the memorandum in English. Such a procedure is a mere irregularity which does not vitiate the trial, unless a failure of justice has been occasioned thereby—*Q. E. v. Gopal*, 19 Mad. 269.

Under Sub-section (2) the Magistrate must sign the record, if he omits to do so, the illegality vitiates the trial—*Balkeshwar v. Emp.*, 3 P.L.T. 322, 23 Cr.L.J. 114, A.I.R. 1922 Pat. 5.

356. (1) In all other trials before Courts of Session and Magistrates (other than Presidency Magistrates), and in all inquiries under Chapters XII and

Record in other cases
outside presidency-
towns.

XVIII, the evidence of each witness shall be taken down in writing in the language of the Court by the Magistrate or Sessions Judge, or in his presence and hearing and under his personal direction and superintendence, and shall be signed by the Magistrate or Sessions Judge.

(2) When the evidence of such witness is given in English, the Magistrate or Sessions

Evidence given in English. Judge may take it down in that language with his own hand, and, unless the accused is familiar with English, or the language of the Court is English, an authenticated translation of such evidence in the language of the Court shall form part of the record.

(2-A). *When the evidence of such witness is given in any other language, not being English, than the language of the Court, the Magistrate or Sessions Judge may take it down in that language with his own hand, or cause it to be taken down in that language in his presence and hearing and under his personal direction and superintendence, and an authenticated translation of such evidence in the language of the Court or in English shall form part of the record.*

(3) In cases in which the evidence is not taken down in writing by the Magistrate or Sessions Judge, he shall, as the examination of each witness proceeds, make a memorandum of the substance of what such witness deposes; and such memorandum shall be written and signed by the Magistrate or Sessions Judge with his own hand, and shall form part of the record.

Memorandum when evidence not taken down by the Magistrate or Judge himself.

(4) If the Magistrate or Sessions Judge is prevented from making a memorandum as above required, he shall record the reason of his inability to make it.

Change.—Sub-section (2A) has been added by section 96 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. The reason is thus stated: "Section 356 does not provide for evidence being taken down in any other language than that of the Court or, if the language of the Court is not English, in English. The result is a certain loss of accuracy whenever evidence is given in a third language, as it has to

be translated into, and taken down in, the language of the Court or in English. The object of the amendment is to secure greater accuracy and to avoid waste of time in translation"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1921).

The words "or cause it to be taken.... superintendence" in sub-section (2A) are intended "to meet the case of a Magistrate or Judge who does not know the language in which the evidence is given. In such cases it will be necessary for the Magistrate or Judge to have the statement recorded in the language in which the evidence is given"—*Legislative Assembly Debates*, 7th February 1923, page 2035

1025. Record of evidence :—The provisions of this section are imperative, and omission to record the evidence in the mode prescribed by this section is a material irregularity sufficient to set aside the proceedings—*Janki Prosad v. Emp.*, 19 Cr.L.J. 235 (Pat.); *Q. E. v. Barmajit*, 1891 A W N 145. Where a Magistrate made no vernacular record of the evidence of the complainant and his witnesses, the procedure was held to be illegal—*Matai v. Anant Ram*, 1890 A W N 164; *Udit Naran v. Emp.*, 17 A L J 1146, 21 Cr.L.J. 28.

The provisions of sub-section (1) are imperative, and the entire evidence must be recorded fully either by the Magistrate himself, or by somebody else under the direction of the Magistrate. In the latter case (i.e., where the evidence is recorded by any person other than a Magistrate), the Magistrate should under sub-section (3) make a memorandum of the evidence. But subsection (3) does not override the provisions of sub-section (1) but is merely supplementary to it. In other words, the fact that the Magistrate is making a memorandum of the evidence does not do away with the necessity of the evidence being fully recorded by some other officer of the Court. Where a Magistrate, in a proceeding under section 145, neither recorded the evidence fully in his own hand, nor caused it to be recorded fully by anybody else, but simply made a memorandum of the evidence, purporting to act under subsection (3), it was held that the provisions of subsection (1) not being complied with, the whole proceedings must be set aside—*Sadananda v. Krishna Mandal*, 42 Cal. 381.

If the Court consists of more than one Judge (e.g. a Tribunal of three Commissioners constituted under the Defence of India Act), it is not necessary that all the Judges should sign the deposition. It is sufficient if the Presiding officer alone signs it—*Taj Mahmud v. Emp.*, 29 P.L.R. 14, 29 Cr L J 212 (214)

Where there is a discrepancy in a material part of the evidence of the principal prosecution witnesses between the record in the vernacular in which that witness gave evidence and the record in English, the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt created thereby. Generally speaking, the evidence as recorded in the vernacular in which the witness deposed is entitled to a greater weight and is more reliable than the record made in the English language, but where the Magistrate who made the English record was an experienced Magistrate fully conversant with the

vernacular in which the witness gave his evidence, the English record is also reliable, but all the same, the accused is entitled to the benefit of any doubt caused by the discrepancy between the two records—*Sadhu Singh v. Crown*, 24 Cr.L.J. 624 (Lah)

Where the evidence was taken in the language of the Court by the Magistrate's recorder, the omission on the part of the Magistrate to make a memorandum of the evidence under subsection (3) did not vitiate the proceedings, where it appeared that the Magistrate carefully heard the evidence, clearly appreciated its gist, took considerable care in sifting the evidence and arrived at a correct conclusion. But still the Magistrate ought to follow the provisions of subsection (3) and ought not to ignore them—*Sumran v. Emp.*, 4 O.W.N 1200, 29 Cr.L.J. 70

357. (1) The Local Government may direct that in any district or part of a district, or

Language of record
of evidence.

in proceedings before any Court of Session, or before any Magistrate

or class of Magistrates, the evidence of each witness shall, in the cases referred to in section 356, be taken down by the Sessions Judge or Magistrate with his own hand and in his mother-tongue, unless he is prevented by any sufficient reason from taking down the evidence of any witness, in which case he shall record the reason of his inability to do so and shall cause the evidence to be taken down in writing from his dictation in open Court.

(2) The evidence so taken down shall be signed by the Sessions Judge or Magistrate, and shall form part of the record :

Provided that the Local Government may direct the Sessions Judge or Magistrate to take down the evidence in the English language, or in the language of the Court, although such language is not his mother-tongue.

1026. The authority conferred on an officer by this section is personal to that officer and remains in force only so long as he remains in the particular district in which it has been conferred—*Anon.*, 5 M H C R App 9 Therefore, where a Magistrate empowered to record the deposition in his own handwriting while in district B did the same when he was transferred to another district, under the belief that the authority previously given to him in district B was personal to him and still remained in force, and committed the accused for trial, it was held that the Magistrate's proceeding was irregular, but since the accused was not prejudiced thereby, his commitment was not set aside—*Chathanadiyal Kalu Nair*, 2 Weir 434 (435)

The plea of the accused need not be recorded in the words of the very language in which it is made; when it is a foreign language, the record must be in the language in which it is interpreted to the Court—*Emp v Vaimbilee*, 5 Cal 826.

358. In cases of the kind mentioned in section 355, the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, take down the evidence of any witness in the manner provided in section 356, or, if within the local limits of the jurisdiction of such Magistrate the Local Government has made the order referred to in section 357, in the manner provided in the same section.

1027. The ordinary and proper and convenient way of recording evidence is to take it down in the first person exactly as spoken by the witness—*Q v Zoolfikar*, 16 W R 36 The Judge should in taking down evidence adhere as far as possible to the words actually used either in the question or in the answer given by the witness. The provisions of law will not be complied with by recording a more or less accurate paraphrase of the evidence given by a witness—*Emp v Nga Saw*, 11 Bur. L R. 8 The Judge is not bound to make a verbatim record of any particular questions and answers. It is left to the discretion of the Judge, if either side specially requests him to do so.—*Ibid*

359. (1) Evidence taken under section 356 or section 357 shall not ordinarily be taken down in the form of question and answer, but in the form of a narrative.

Mode of recording evidence under section 356 or section 357. (2) The Magistrate or Sessions Judge may, in his discretion, take down, or cause to be taken down, any particular question and answer.

360. (1) As the evidence of each witness taken under section 356 or section 357 is completed, it shall be read over to him in the presence of the accused, if in attendance, or of his pleader, if he appears by pleader, and shall, if necessary, be corrected.

Procedure in regard to such evidence when completed. (2) If the witness denies the correctness of any part of the evidence when the same is read over to him, the Magistrate or Sessions Judge may, instead of correcting the evidence, make a memorandum thereon of the objec-

tion made to it by the witness, and shall add such remarks as he thinks necessary.

(3) If the evidence is taken down in a language different from that in which it has been given and the witness does not understand the language in which it is taken down, the evidence so taken down shall be interpreted to him in the language in which it was given, or in a language which he understands.

1028. Object and Scope of Section :—The object of this section is to give an opportunity to the witnesses to explain or correct the statements made by them—*Ramdhari v Emp*, 4 P.L.W. 44, 19 Cr L.J. 169 This section is enacted for the protection of witnesses; it provides that a witness in order to satisfy himself that the evidence which has been taken down is correct may have it interpreted to him, if he desires it, in a language which he understands—*In re Okhoy*, 7 C.L.R. 393

This section applies to evidence recorded under section 356 or 357, but not to evidence recorded in summons cases under section 355. Where the evidence in a summons case is recorded in the form of a memorandum, under section 355, it is not incumbent on the Magistrate to read over the memorandum of the deposition to the witness—*Ramdhari v. Emp.*, 4 P.L.W. 44, 19 Cr L.J. 169, and omission to do so is not fatal to the conviction—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 433

In an enquiry under sec. 107, the evidence must be recorded as in a summons case (see sec. 117), i.e., it must be recorded in the manner prescribed in section 355, and not as laid down in sec. 356 or sec. 357. Sec. 360 does not apply to a case in which the evidence is recorded under sec. 355 and hence in an inquiry under sec. 107 it is not necessary that the deposition should be read over to the witness in the presence of the accused—*Legal Remembrancer v Jafar*, 52 Cal 668, 26 Cr L.J. 1456

But in an inquiry in a good behaviour case, the provisions of section 360 will apply, and failure to comply with those provisions would vitiate the inquiry or trial—*Sanatan v. Emp*, 52 Cal 632, 41 C.L.J. 352, 26 Cr L.J. 1240, *Nawab Ali v. Emp*, 52 Cal 470, 26 Cr L.J. 1233.

This section applies to the evidence of witnesses, and not to the examination of the accused—*Q v Radhoo*, 12 W.R. 44.

This section applies to proceedings under section 145, and the evidence of each witness must be read over to him in the presence of the accused, the term "accused" being applicable to persons proceeded against under Chapter XII. Even if the term accused does not apply to such persons, still this section would cover the proceedings under Chapter XII, because, section 356 (which is referred to in this section) expressly mentions Chapter XII—*Ram Narain v. Dhonrai*, 3 P.L.T. 291, 23 Cr L.J. 125, *Aswini Kumar v. Pati*, 52 Cal. 437, 29 C.W.N. 474, 26 Cr.L.J. 914 But a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court has laid

down that the parties to the proceedings under section 145 are not 'accused' persons, and that therefore the provisions of sec. 360 apply to proceedings under sec. 145 only to this extent that the evidence of each witness must be read over to that witness; and the attendance of the parties at the reading over is not necessary—*Narendra v. Sabarati*, 52 Cal. 721 (F.B.), 29 C.W.N. 701, 41 C.L.J. 479, 26 Cr.L.J. 1194. This decision practically over-rules the case of *Ishan Chandra v. Hriday*, 29 C.W.N. 475, 26 Cr.L.J. 915, where it was held that the word 'accused' not being applicable to the parties in a proceeding under Ch. XII, section 360 had no application at all to such a proceeding, and it was not obligatory to read over the deposition to the witnesses. In a later Patna case, it has been held that even an omission to read over the evidence to the witness is a mere irregularity which does not vitiate an order under sec. 145—*Sondhi Singh v. Sri Govind*, 5 P.L.T. 237, 25 Cr.L.J. 89.

A Tribunal constituted under the Defence of India Act is bound to follow the provisions of this section. Even though the Commissioners forming the Tribunal are authorised to make only a memorandum of the substance of the evidence of each witness, instead of recording the evidence fully, still the memorandum must be read over to the witness, under this section—*Taj Mahmud v. Emp.*, 29 P.L.R. 14, 29 Cr.L.J. 212 (215).

1029. Deposition must be read over to witness :—The Calcutta High Court laid down that provisions of this section are obligatory and not merely directory. It is incumbent on the Judge to read over the deposition to each witness, even though such a procedure should occupy considerable time—*Amrita Lal*, 42 Cal. 957, *Jyotish Chandra*, 36 Cal. 955. And a departure from such a practice might lead to considerable embarrassment and place a serious impediment in the administration of justice—*Jyotish Chandra v. Emp.*, 36 Cal. 955. The object of this section is to ensure the accuracy of the record, and omission to comply with the provisions of this section is an illegality which vitiates the trial, irrespective of whether the accused have been prejudiced or not, and is not a mere irregularity curable by section 537—*Haronath v. Sonai Mia*, 28 C.W.N. 119, 38 C.L.J. 281, 25 Cr.L.J. 289; *Hiralal v. Emp.*, 28 C.W.N. 908, 52 Cal. 159. It is not a sufficient compliance with this section if the Magistrate merely hands over the recorded deposition to the witness to read it for himself and the witness reads it himself, because the section requires that the deposition must be read over in the presence, i.e., in the hearing of the accused, in order that the accused should have an opportunity of correcting any mistake in it—*K. E. v. Jogendra*, 42 Cal. 240; *Saharati v. Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 951 (Cal.); *Md Yasin v. Emp.*, 52 Cal. 431, 29 C.W.N. 650. It is not a sufficient compliance with this section if the deposition is read by a witness himself, and afterwards it is explained by the Judge to the accused in the absence of the witness—*Jessarati v. Emp.*, 29 C.W.N. 526, 26 Cr.L.J. 1009. But the Patna High Court holds that even though a deposition is not read over to the witness, according to the provisions of this section, but is read by the witness himself, still the deposition is legal evidence. In other words,

non-compliance with this provision of the section does not vitiate the trial if the accused has not been prejudiced—*Jagna Dhannuk v. K. E.*, 5 Pat. 63, 7 P.L.T. 396, 27 Cr.L.J. 484. See also *Mohiuddin v. Emp.*, 4 Pat 489, 6 P.L.T. 154, 26 Cr.L.J. 811 (815), *Abdul Rahman v. Emp.*, 27 Cr.L.J. 669, 4 Bur. L.J. 213, *Mayeth v. Emp.*, 3 Rang. 612, 27 Cr.L.J. 857. And the same view has recently been taken in the Privy Council case of *Abdul Rahman v. Emp.*, 5 Rang 53 (P.C.), 31 C.W.N. 271, 28 Cr.L.J. 259, in which Lord Phillimore observed. "Although it is regrettable that such an irregularity should creep in, and though it might be taken into account with other elements of objections to the satisfactory character of the trial, it would not by itself be a ground sufficient for quashing a conviction. The bare fact of such irregularity, unaccompanied by any probable suggestion of any failure of justice having been thereby occasioned, is not enough to warrant the quashing of a conviction, which may be supported by the curative provisions of sec 537." Their Lordships disapproved of the ruling in the Calcutta case of *Hiralal v. Emp.*, 52 Cal 159 (cited *supra*). The Privy Council ruling has since been followed by the Calcutta High Court in *Fahar v. Emp.*, 31 C.W.N. 691, 28 Cr.L.J. 751. The contrary view taken in the several Calcutta cases cited above must now be deemed as overruled.

Depositions of witnesses which have not been read over to the witnesses are nevertheless admissible under sec 145 Evidence Act to contradict the witnesses in a subsequent trial—*Fazlur Rahman v. Emp.*, 6 Pat. 478, 28 Cr.L.J. 772.

This section lays down that the evidence of each witness shall be read over to him as it is completed, and this procedure should be strictly followed. It is not a sufficient compliance with this section to read out each sentence of the statement of a witness as it is being recorded—*Wadhawa v. Emp.*, 22 Cr.L.J. 669 (Lah.). The evidence of a witness is 'completed' when he has been examined-in-chief, cross-examined, and, if necessary, re-examined. Therefore it is not improper, if the whole deposition is read over to the witness after his cross-examination is over. Thus, where a witness was examined on 18th November, and cross-examined on a subsequent day (on the 9th December) and then the Magistrate read over to him the whole of his deposition including his examination-in-chief on that day (9th December), the procedure was not illegal—*Kamini Kumar*, 33 C.W.N. 664, 1929 Cr. C. 26. But it is improper for the Magistrate to examine a number of witnesses and ask them to be in a room and then have the deposition read over to them at the end of the day's work. Such a procedure is not merely an irregularity but an illegality vitiating the trial—*In re Kuppa Mudaliar*, 49 Mad 71, 49 M.L.J. 421, 26 Cr.L.J. 1587, A.I.R. 1925 Mad 1206, *Abdul Bari v. K. E.*, 42 C.L.J. 585, 27 Cr.L.J. 375, A.I.R. 1026 Cal 157, *Shamserali v. Emp.*, 53 Cal 129, A.I.R. 1926 Cal 563, 27 Cr.L.J. 688.

There is nothing in the section to indicate the exact time when the deposition should be read over, and if the deposition is read over at the close of the cross-examination, it fulfils the requirements and objects of the section—*Ramdhar v. Emp.*, 4 P.L.W. 44, 19 Cr.L.J. 169.

'In the presence of the accused':—The deposition must be read over to the witness, *in the presence of the accused*, so as to give the accused an opportunity to challenge the correctness of the record—*Rameshwar v. Emp.*, 6 P.L.T. 493, 26 Cr.L.J. 927. A conviction based upon evidence not read over in the presence of the accused is illegal and must be set aside—*Singiri Eradu*, 2 Weir 435. It is improper to have the deposition of the witness read over to him by a clerk in the verandah of the Court-house, though both the witness and the clerk were in view of the accused. Such a deposition cannot be admitted in evidence—*Nga San v. K. E.*, U.B.R. (1912) 1st Qr. 123. If the accused is in attendance, the deposition must be read over in the presence of the accused, and not in the presence of his pleader. It is only when the accused appears by a pleader (*i.e.*, when his personal attendance has been dispensed with) that the reading over of the evidence in the presence of the pleader is sufficient—*Kasim Ali v. Sarada Kripa*, 30 C.W.N. 336, 27 Cr.L.J. 509. But in a recent Calcutta case it has been held that the words "if he appears by pleader" in this section are not restricted to cases where the personal attendance of the accused has been dispensed with, but that a deposition may be read over in the presence of the pleader during a temporary absence of the accused—*Harī Narayan v. Emp.*, 46 C.L.J. 368, 29 Cr.L.J. 49 (53). Where the accused persons appear by pleaders, the deposition of a witness may be read over in the presence of a pleader of one of several accused—*Rukhal Chandra v. K. E.*, 36 Cal. 808, 13 C.W.N. 942.

The object of reading over a deposition to a witness is to obtain an accurate record from him of what he really means to say, and to give him an opportunity of correcting the words which the Magistrate or his clerk has taken down. It is not to enable the accused or his advocate to suggest corrections. No doubt, the evidence has to be read over in the presence of the accused or his pleader. He is entitled to be sure that it has been read over, and that the witness has had an opportunity of correcting the written word. But the accused is not entitled to convey any suggestion to a witness in the form of a correction which would make him alter his evidence, though the accused may call attention to obvious slips. The primary object of this section is to fix the witness and to enable him to protect himself against any inaccuracy in the words taken down from his lips—*Abdul Rahman v. Emp.*, 5 Rang. 53, 31 C.W.N. 271, 25 A.L.J. 117, 28 Cr.L.J. 259 (262), 29 Bom.L.R. 813 (P.C.).

While the evidence of one witness is being read over to that witness, it is highly improper for the Court to proceed with the evidence of the next witness. Such a procedure is a violation of the provision of this section, and vitiates the inquiry or trial—*Manik v. K. E.*, 41 C.L.J. 393, 26 Cr.L.J. 1267; *Adilzadi v. K. E.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1016 (Cal.); *Singiri Eradu*, 2 Weir 435; *Darghai v. Emp.*, 52 C.L.J. 1, 26 Cr.L.J. 1213. The Rangoon High Court holds that such a procedure does not vitiate the trial but is a mere irregularity curable—*Abdul Rahman v. K. E.*, 4 Bur. L.R. 1, 21 Cr.L.J. 1, 21 M.L.J. 1. This view has been taken in *In re A*, 21 M.L.J. 1. This

view has since been affirmed by the Privy Council in *Abdul Rahman v. Emp.*, 5 Rang 53 (P.C.).

When a deposition is not read over to a witness in the presence of the accused according to the provisions of sub-section (1), the witness cannot be prosecuted for perjury—*Emp. v. Mayadeb*, 5 Cal. 762; *Jyotish v. Emp.*, 36 Cal. 955; *Mahendra v. Emp.*, 12 C.W.N. 845, 8 Cr.L.J. 116; *Ram Narain v. Dhanrai*, 3 P.L.T. 291, 23 Cr.L.J. 125, *Brahmadco v. Emp.*, 2 P.L.T. 380; *Kartar Singh*, 1917 P.R. 12, 18 Cr.L.J. 607 (608); *Kadir v. Emp.*, 18 Cr.L.J. 966, 11 Bur.L.T. 202, *Kamatchinathan v. Emp.*, 28 Mad. 308, *Nelluri v. Emp.*, 42 Mad. 561, *K. E. v. Jogendra*, 42 Cal. 240, 18 C.W.N. 1242. *Contra—Tunya v. Emp.*, 12 Bur.L.T. 167, 20 Cr.L.J. 506, 51 I.C. 666, where it is held that a witness can be prosecuted for perjury in spite of the fact that his deposition has not been read over to him in the presence of the accused, the deposition should not be treated as a nullity merely because of the irregularity, it can be proved by other evidence, e.g. by evidence that the witness admitted it to be correct when it was read over to him, and by the evidence of the Judge or Magistrate who recorded it. So also it has been held in *In re Bogra*, 8 M.L.T. 117, 11 Cr.L.J. 482, that evidence read over to the witness in the absence of the accused may not be used as evidence against the accused but may be the basis of a prosecution of the witness for perjury.

Under this section, the Magistrate is not required to record a memorandum at the end of each deposition that the deposition was read over in the presence of the accused, though it is much better to do so in order to prevent complaints as to his not having done so—*Rameshwar v. Emp.*, 6 P.L.T. 493, 26 Cr.L.J. 927; *Bhagwat Singh v. Emp.*, 4 Pat. 231, 6 P.L.T. 73, 26 Cr.L.J. 939. But the absence of such a memorandum does not prove that the deposition was not read over—*Bhagwat v. Emp.*, supra; *Arjun Kurmi v. Emp.*, 8 P.L.T. 166, 28 Cr.L.J. 77 (79).

An objection on the ground that the provisions of sec. 360 have not been observed should be taken at once. Where no such contention has been raised in the Courts below, it is not competent for the accused to put forward this objection for the first time in revision before the High Court—*Arjun Kurmi*, supra.

1030. Deposition may be corrected:—Before a deposition is closed, a witness should be given an opportunity of explaining and correcting any contradictions which it may contain, and the statement which the witness finally declares to be the true one must be taken to be that which he intended to make—*Reg. v. Balkrishna*, Ratanlal 54. An honest witness who wishes to alter or correct a statement he has once made, should be allowed to do so, and should not be deterred from doing so by the fear of a criminal charge—*Habibulla v. Q. E.*, 10 Cal. 937.

If the Court instead of allowing the correction to be made, proceeds to make a memorandum according to sub-section (2), such memorandum must be appended to the deposition and care should be taken that the practice and the form prescribed by law are exactly adhered to—*Q. v. Komurooddee*, 13 W.R. 17.

1031. Language :—If the deposition is recorded in a language which the witness does not understand, it must be interpreted to the witness in the language which he understands. If the deposition is read over to the witness in a language which is neither understood by the accused nor by the witness, it is an illegality which materially prejudices the accused—*Q. v. Issur Rant*, 8 W.R. 63. But if the witnesses did not require their depositions to be interpreted to them in their own language, the reading over the depositions to them in a language which they did not understand, would not afford any ground for the accused to have his conviction set aside—*In re Okhoy*, 7 C.L.R. 393.

The distinction between section 360 and sec. 361 is very marked. Under the latter section if evidence is given in a language not understood by the accused or his pleader, it is to be interpreted in their language, while under sec. 360 when it is read over, it is to be interpreted to the witness in his own language, but there is no provision for its being interpreted to the accused. Thus, if the depositions are taken down in English, and the language of the accused is Hindee, and the language of the witness is Burmese, the depositions will have to be taken by getting the witness' answers in Burmese, having them interpreted to the Court so that they may be taken down in English, and further interpreted to the accused so that he may understand them in Hindee. When however, the deposition comes to be read over, as it will be in English, it will be interpreted to the witness in Burmese, but not to the accused in Hindee; and if the accused neither knew English nor Burmese, he will be none the wiser—*Abdul Rahman v. Emp.*, 5 Rang 53 (P.C.), 31 C.W.N. 271, 52 M.L.J. 585.

Subsection (3) of this section does not mean that the deposition recorded in English should first be read over to the witness as recorded in English, and shall then be translated into the language in which the witness has deposed—*Hari Narayan v. Emp.*, 46 C.L.J. 368, 29 Cr.L.J. 49 (52).

361. (1) Whenever any evidence is given in a language not understood by the accused, and he is present in person, it shall be interpreted to him in open Court in a language understood by him.

Interpretation of evidence to accused or his pleader.
(2) If he appears by pleader and the evidence is given in a language other than the language of the Court, and not understood by the pleader, it shall be interpreted to such pleader in that language.

(3) When documents are put in for the purpose of formal proof, it shall be in the discretion of the Court to interpret as much thereof as appears necessary.

1031A. If the accused appears by a pleader who understands the language in which the evidence is given by the witness, the omission to interpret the evidence to the accused is not a material defect—*Q. v. Bhoobun*, 24 W R. 50, *Arjun Kurmi v. Emp.*, 8 P.L.T. 166, 28 Cr.L.J. 77 (79).

Under sub-section (3), it is not necessary to interpret formal documents such as Government Gazettes at length, that would be merely wasting time. It would be enough if the prisoner were made to understand what they were and for what purpose they were used—*Q. v. Ameerooddeen*, 15 W R. 25.

362. (1) In every case in which a Presidency Magistrate imposes a fine exceeding two hundred rupees or imprisonment for a term exceeding six months, he shall either take down the evidence of the witnesses with his own hand, or cause it to be taken down in writing from his dictation in open Court. All evidence so taken down shall be signed by the Magistrate and shall form part of the record.

Record of
evidence in
Presidency
Magistrate's
Courts.

362. (1) In every case tried by a Presidency Magistrate in which an appeal lies, such Magistrate shall either take down the evidence of the witnesses with his own hand, or cause it to be taken down in writing from his dictation in open Court. All evidence so taken down shall be signed by the Magistrate and shall form part of the record.

Record of
evidence in
Presidency
Magistrate's
Courts.

(2) Evidence so taken down shall ordinarily be recorded in the form of a narrative, but the Magistrate may, in his discretion, take down, or cause to be taken down, any particular question or answer.

(2-A) In every case referred to in sub-section (1) the Magistrate shall make a memorandum of the substance of the examination of the accused. Such memorandum shall be signed by the Magistrate with his own hand, and shall form part of the record.

(3) Sentences passed under section 35 on the same occasion shall, for the purposes of this section, be considered as one sentence, unless they are sentences of imprisonment ordered to run concurrently.

(4) *In cases other than those specified in sub-section (1), it shall not be necessary for a Presidency Magistrate to record the evidence or frame a charge.*

Change :—Sub-section (1) has been amended as shown in parallel columns; the, italicised words in sub-section (3) have been inserted; and sub-sections (2-A) and (4) have been newly added, by sec. 99 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act XVIII of 1923. The reasons are stated below.

1032. Scope :—*Summary trials* :—The provisions as to summary trials do not apply to trials before Presidency Magistrates. A warrant case must be tried by them in the manner laid down in Chapter XXI, subject to the provisions of this section as to the recording of evidence—*Q. E. v Abdul, Ratanlal* 539.

Reference under sec. 123 (2) :—In cases where the Presidency Magistrate makes a reference to the High Court under sec. 123 (2), he must duly record the evidence, but it is not necessary that he should record it as fully as a Mofussil Magistrate—*Emp. v. Nepal*, 13 C.W.N. 318.

Sub-section (1) :—“We think that the opening words of sub-section (1) of section 362 require amendment. As the section stands, it seems to imply that a Presidency Magistrate, before he commences his inquiry, must make up his mind as to the maximum limit of the sentence which he will impose. We think that the sub-section would read better as amended by us; compare the wording of section 264.”—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*

But even this amendment does not improve the position, because in order to ascertain whether an appeal will lie from his sentence, the Presidency Magistrate will have to make up his mind whether he will pass a sentence of over six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding two hundred rupees (sec. 411). The Joint Committee in confirming the above amendment has also admitted it :—

“We are inclined to agree with those critics who point out that the re-draft proposed in sub-section (1) of section 362 does not get rid of the difficulty that a Magistrate has to make up his mind as to the sentence he will impose before he begins trying the case. We do not see how this difficulty can be got rid of; but we think that the amendment proposed has the advantage of bringing the language of this section into conformity with the language of sections 263 and 264, and we would, therefore retain this sub-clause.

“In order to meet difficulties that have arisen, we have introduced a sub-section (2-A) laying down that Presidency Magistrates, in cases subject to appeal, shall make a memorandum of the substance of the examination of the accused, and we have introduced a new clause making a consequential amendment in sub-sec. (4) of sec. 364.

“The non-official members, who constituted a majority in the Committee, expressed their dissatisfaction with the distinctions drawn in the

Code between Presidency Magistrates and other Magistrates, and in particular with regard to this clause would have liked to see Presidency Magistrates required, in warrant cases at all events, to keep as full a record as any other Magistrates. But the Committee as a whole held that there was some force in the contention put forward by numerous High Court Judges that no change should be made in the Code affecting to any extent the special powers of Presidency Magistrates until a much fuller inquiry had been made into the question of their status, powers and procedure. We desire to take this opportunity of placing on record our hope that it may be possible to appoint a small committee to undertake the investigation"—*Report of the Joint Committee (1922)*

Where a Presidency Magistrate sentences an accused person to imprisonment for more than ■ months, he is bound to record the evidence of witnesses, even though the sentence is imposed for the purpose of the detention of the accused in a reformatory—*Emp v Md Roshan*, 26 Bom L R. 1232, 26 Cr.L.J. 454

1033. Sub-section (2):—*Mode of recording evidence*—Evidence should be recorded in the form of direct narration. Where a Presidency Magistrate, in contravention of the provisions of this section, recorded the evidence of some more or less formal witnesses in the form of an indirect narration, it was held that such irregularities in the mode of recording evidence, where no failure of justice had been occasioned thereby, were cured by sec 537, and the trial was not on that account vitiated—*In re Gulab Chand*, 18 Cr.L.J. 336 (Mad).

It is the duty of the Magistrate, in recording evidence under this section, to take a note of all the material facts, whether they appear in the course of the examination-in-chief or in the course of the cross-examination—*Ah Foong v. K. E*, 46 Cal. 411, 22 C.W.N. 834, 20 Cr. L.J. 24.

Sub-sec. (2A)—Records of examination of accused in non-appealable cases:—Sub-sec. (2A) provides for a memorandum of the substance of the examination of an accused person being kept by the Presidency Magistrate, signed by the Magistrate with his own hand in appealable cases only. Sec. 364 does not apply to a record made by a Presidency Magistrate of an examination of an accused person in the course of a trial held by him (see sub-section 4 of sec 364). The result is, that the Legislature has made no provision for the record of examination of accused in non-appealable cases. But it may be inferred that, when the legislature has expressly taken away the necessity to record the evidence and to frame a charge in non-appealable cases, by enacting sub-section (4) of sec. 362, they have not certainly contemplated that the examination of an accused person in non-appealable cases should be recorded in full. It will be sufficient if the substance of the examination of the accused in non-appealable cases is recorded in the form provided under sec 370—*Sadagar v. K E*, 56 Cal 1067, 33 C.W.N. 543 (545), 30 Cr.L.J. 526.

Sub-section (3) :—"Unless . . . concurrently" :—"It is provided that when sentences in excess of one are passed which are ordered to run concurrently, it is the heaviest sentence which determines the applicability of section 362"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914).

1034. Sub-section (4) :—"It is intended by this sub-section to remove the uncertainty which at present exists regarding the duties of a Presidency Magistrate in recording evidence and framing a charge in petty cases"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914)

Sub-section (1) provides that the evidence must be fully recorded in cases where the Presidency Magistrate passes appealable sentences; and there is no obligation on the Magistrate to record evidence in non-appealable cases—*Emaman v. Emp.*, 31 Cal 983; *Shaikh Babu v. Emp.*, 33 Cal. 1036 In a Bombay case it has been held that although the Magistrate has a discretion in cases not falling under this section to take down the evidence or not, still this discretion should be exercised judiciously in a reasonable spirit and not arbitrarily, and there should be a record of the evidence, so that the High Court in Revision may judge of the propriety or legality of the order passed by him—*Emp. v. Haris Chandra*, 10 Bom. L.R. 201. The new sub-section (4) now totally dispenses with the necessity of recording evidence in non-appealable cases.

363. When a Sessions Judge or Magistrate has recorded the evidence of a witness, he shall also record such remarks (if any) as he thinks material respecting the demeanour of such witness whilst under examination.

Remarks respecting
demeanour of witness.

1035. The object of this section is to give to the Appellate Court some aid in estimating the value of the evidence recorded by the Magistrate—*Q. v. Rasoo Kullah*, 12 W R. 51. But though in criminal cases the Appellate Court should be guided by the remarks made under this section as to the demeanour of witnesses, yet it is bound to independently consider the facts of the case—*Moula Baksh v. Q. E.*, 1893 P.R. 6 But where a Sessions Judge of experience had in the most emphatic manner stated that the demeanour of the witnesses was evasive, that they inspired him with no confidence, and that no man could be convicted on their testimony, the Appellate Court before accepting their testimony must be assured in the most positive and convincing manner that there was no ground for the Sessions Judge's criticism. Where the evidence is all oral, and its credibility is a mere matter of opinion, the opinion of the Court which heard the witnesses and noticed their demeanour must be treated as almost conclusive—*Emp v. Bishen Singh*, 1914 P.L.R. 125.

It is always unsafe for a Judge or a Magistrate to pronounce an opinion as to the credibility of a witness, until the whole of the evidence has been taken. A Magistrate may note the demeanour of the witness, but except there is very clear proof afforded by his own statements that the witness is unworthy of credit, it is unsafe to assume that he is so.

till the evidence has been exhausted—*Palani Nandan*, 2 Weir 435 (436). It is one thing to record a remark about the demeanour of the witness, and it is quite a different thing to make or record any remark or opinion as to the substance of the deposition of that witness. The parties are entitled to claim that the Magistrate shall not prejudge their cases or form an opinion about the respective merits of their cases or about the depositions of their witnesses, until they have been fully and finally presented to the Magistrate by the counsel in their concluding arguments and after the entire evidence has been recorded. Any opinion formed and expressed by the Magistrate at an earlier stage of the case is bound to be prejudicial to the party concerned, and he may apply for a transfer of the case to some other Magistrate—*Sikandar Lal*, 10 Lah. 778, 30 Cr L.J. 129 (131)

364. (1) Whenever the accused is examined by any Magistrate, or by any Court other than a High Court established by Royal Charter or the Chief Court of

Examination of accused how recorded.

Oudh, the whole of such examination, including every question put to him and every answer given by him, shall be recorded in full in the language in which he is examined, or if that is not practicable, in the language of the Court or in English; and such record shall be shown or read to him, or if he does not understand the language in which it is written, shall be interpreted to him in a language which he understands, and he shall be at liberty to explain or add to his answers.

(2) When the whole is made conformable to what he declares is the truth, the record shall be signed by the accused and the Magistrate or Judge of such Court, and such Magistrate or Judge shall certify under his own hand that the examination was taken in his presence and hearing and that the record contains a full and true account of the statement made by the accused.

(3) In cases in which the examination of the accused is not recorded by the Magistrate or Judge himself, he shall be bound * * * * * as the examination proceeds, to make a memorandum thereof in the language of the Court, or in English, if he is sufficiently acquainted with the latter language, and such memorandum shall be written and signed by the Magistrate or Judge with his own hand, and shall be

annexed to the record. If the Magistrate or Judge is unable to make a memorandum as above required, he shall record the reason of such inability.

(4) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to apply to the examination of an accused person under section 263, or in the course of a trial held by a Presidency Magistrate.

Change :—The words "Chief Court of Oudh" have been added by the Oudh Courts Act XXXII of 1925. The italicised words at the end of sub-section (4) have been added and the words "unless he is a Presidency Magistrate" which occurred in sub-section (3) have been omitted, by the Crim. Pro. Code Second Amendment Act XXXVII of 1923. The object of this amendment is "to make it clear that in cases where an appeal lies, the Presidency Magistrate shall take down a memorandum of the examination of the accused person as already provided in the new sub-section (2A) of section 362, and that in non-appealable cases no record of the examination of the accused need be made"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons*, (Gazette of India, 1923, Part V, page 242). See also 50 Cal. 1067 cited in Note 1033 under sec. 362.

1036. Scope and application of section :—The rules laid down in this section are applicable to the examination of the accused under section 342—*Emp. v. Nagar*, 4 Bom. L.R. 461.

This section applies only to examination of the accused during inquiries and trials, and not during investigations, which are governed by sec. 164—*Reg. v. Bai Ratan*, 10 B.H.C.R. 166. But still the rules laid down in this section are equally applicable to confessions taken under sec. 164, in the course of an investigation—*Reg. v. Shivya*, 1 Bom. 219; *Emp. v. Gajadhar*, 1883 A.W.N. 243. See sec. 164 (2).

This section does not apply to a summary trial. See sub-section (4). See also sec. 354 ('other than summary trials'). If a case is tried summarily, the Magistrate need not record the full statement of the examination of the accused in the form under sec. 364; i.e. he need not record the questions and answers in detail. It is sufficient if he makes a brief note of the examination on the record—*Bhawani v. Emp.*, 3 O.W.N. 946, 28 Cr.L.J. 76; *Parsotim v. K. E.*, 6 Pat. 504, 11 P.L.T. 757, 28 Cr.L.J. 1037.

This section applies to the record of statement made by an accused. A person against whom no process has been issued is not in the position of an accused person, and if such person is examined in an inquiry under sec. 202, his statement cannot be regarded as having been recorded under this section—*Sat Narain v. Emp.*, 32 Cal. 1085.

This section does not apply where there has been no examination of the accused. The Magistrate only examines the accused when he thinks "necessary for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstance

appearing in the evidence against him. The examination of an accused prior to commitment is in the discretion of the Magistrate. If the Magistrate does not examine the accused, or if the accused is unwilling to submit to an examination, it is sufficient for the Magistrate to make a note of the fact and record it as a reason for not examining the accused—*Crown v. Dosu*, 11 S.L.R. 52.

1037. Record of questions and answers :—Where the Judge asked the accused persons as to whether they would make any statement or not, and they replied in the negative, the Judge should record what the exact questions were that were put to the accused. Where in such a case there was no record made of the questions and answers and the only indication of it was to be found in the order sheet wherein the Judge made the following remark "The accused declined to make any statement in this Court and on being asked whether they would adduce evidence they replied in the negative;" held that the provisions of section 364 were violated, and the trial having been vitiated by such omission, the accused should be retried—*Emp v Nani Mandal*, 52 Cal 403, 41 C.L.J. 50, 26 Cr.L.J. 761; *Sarat Chandra v. Emp*, 52 Cal. 446, 26 Cr.L.J. 1244, A.I.R. 1925 Cal 821, *Messer Bepar v K E*, 29 C.W.N. 939, 26 Cr.L.J. 1032.

It is not necessary for the Magistrate to state in the body of the examination that the statement comprised every question put to the accused and every answer given by him, and that he had liberty to add to or explain his answers. Attestation at the foot of the examination is sufficient—*Q v Goshto*, 15 W.R. 68.

Where the confession of the accused was recorded in a simple narrative form instead of in the form of questions and answers as required by this section, and there was nothing to show that the accused was prejudiced thereby, it was held that the irregularity did not affect the admissibility of the statement in evidence and was cured by sec 533—*Emp v Deo Dat*, 45 All. 166; *Emp v. Anta*, 1892 A.W.N. 60, *Emp. v. Munshi*, 8 Cal 616; *Fekoo v. Emp.*, 14 Cal 539, *Khudiram v Emp*, 9 C.L.J. 55, 3 I.C. 625. Although it is of great importance to record the questions put to the accused (because sometimes a statement made in answer to a question put may have a different meaning if considered without such question) still if the omission to record the questions does not affect the sense and meaning of the prisoner's statement, the omission will not make the statement inadmissible in evidence—*Emp v Sagambar*, 12 C.L.R. 120, *Nawab v Emp*, 28 Cr.L.J. 341 (342) (Lah.), *Titu Miah v. Q*, 8 Cal. 618 (Foot-note).

Record need not be in Magistrate's handwriting—There is nothing in this Code which necessitates a Magistrate to take down the examination of the accused in his own hand. It is enough if he appends a certificate that the examination was conducted in his presence and contains accurately all that was said by the accused—*Q v. Lucky Narain*, 20 W.R. 50.

1038. Language :—The law requires that ordinarily the statement of the accused must be recorded in the language in which it was made, the object being to represent the very words and expressions used so as to ensure accuracy and prevent misrepresentation and misconstruction of what was said—*Q. E. v. Sagal*, 21 Cal. 642; *Emp. v. Nani Mandal*, 52 Cal 403, 41 C.L.J. 50, 26 Cr.L.J. 761. This rule of law ought not to be deviated from unless it is shown that it was impracticable to write the statement in the language in which it was made. If the answers were not taken down in the language in which they were given, the irregularity cannot be cured by sec. 533—*Q. E. v. Nilmadhab*, 15 Cal 595, *Jai Narain v. Q. E.*, 17 Cal. 862; *Bawa v. K. E.*, 10 O.C. 112. Section 364 lays down that the confession is to be recorded in the language in which it was made, or if that is not practicable, in the language of the Court or in English. And it would be for the prosecution to establish the impracticability of recording the statement in the language in which it was made—*Jai Narain v. Q. E.*, 17 Cal. 862, *Q. E. v. Nilmadhab*, 15 Cal. 595; *Bawa v. K. E.*, 10 O.C. 112, 6 Cr.L.J. 94. Where the accused was examined by the Magistrate in *Marathi* and gave his answers in *Marathi*, the statements should be recorded in *Marathi*. It is illegal to record them in English—*Q. E. v. Surmal*, Ratanlal 633; *Q. E. v. Visram Babajee*, 21 Bom. 495. If however it is not practicable to record the statement in the language in which it is made, the law directs that the statement shall be recorded in the language of the Court or in English—*Q. E. v. Sagal*, 21 Cal. 642. Thus, where the confession of the accused person made in Bengali was recorded by the Magistrate in English, because he could not write Bengali well and there was no mohurrer with him at the time, it was held that there was no illegality—*Q. E. v. Razai Mian*, 22 Cal. 817. See also *Khudiram v. Emp.*, 9 C.L.J. 55, 3 I.C. 625. Where the Magistrate recorded the confession of the accused on a holiday, and since he could not get the service of any one to write Hindustani, he recorded the confession in English, translated it in Urdu to the accused who admitted it to be correct, held that the confession was properly recorded in accordance with the provisions of this section—*Emp. v. Bachanna*, 1891 A.W.N. 35. Where a confession made in Hindustani was recorded by a Muhammadan Magistrate in Bengali, the language of the Court, the High Court held that it could not be presumed that the Magistrate must have had sufficient acquaintance with Urdu so as to be able to record the statement in that language, and that in the absence of any evidence it should be presumed that the Magistrate found it impracticable to record the statement in Urdu—*Lal Chand v. Q. E.*, 18 Cal. 549. So also, in *Emp. v. Deo Dat*, 45 All 166, *Emp. v. Anta*, 1892 A.W.N. 60, *Q. E. v. Visram Babaji*, 21 Bom. 495, *Rutti Ram v. Emp.*, 1899 P.R. 7, and *Nawab v. Emp.*, 28 Cr.L.J. 341 (342) (Lah.), although it was practicable for the Magistrate to record the statement in the language in which it was made, still an English record was held to be good, if it was translated to the accused in his own language, and no prejudice was caused to him, the irregularity being cured by sec. 533. See also *Emp. v. Fernand*, 4 Bom.L.R. 785. Where the Magistrate was a Bengalee, and the accused was a Bengalee,

but the accused made his confession partly in Bengali and partly in English, and he understood English well and he read through his statement and corrected it, *held* that the Magistrate did not act illegally in recording the confession in English—*Nilmadhab v. Emp.*, 5 Pat. 171, 27 Cr.L.J. 957.

When a Magistrate is unable to record a confession in the language in which it is made, he should not employ a *police officer* to write it down. The employment of a police-officer even as a scribe in recording a confession is objectionable—*Khudiram Bose v. Emp.*, 9 C.L.J. 55, 3 I.C. 625.

Although the terms of sections 164 and 364 are imperative, still if the Magistrate, instead of recording the confession himself, employed a clerk to do so, it was held that the irregularity would be cured by sec. 533 by examining the Magistrate—*Badan Singh v. K. E.*, 1909 P.R. 2.

If the confession of the accused is made in a foreign language, unknown to the Court or Magistrate, the Code does not require that it should be recorded in that language. In such a case, the record of the confession should be in the language in which it is conveyed to the Court by the interpreter—*Emp. v. Vaimbilee*, 5 Cal 826. Where a statement was made by the accused in Manipuri and communicated to the Magistrate by an interpreter in Bengali, and the Magistrate recorded it in English, and there was also a record in Manipuri, but the two records differed, it was held that the record in Manipuri should be regarded as the proper record and the only evidence in the case—*Q. E. v. Sagal*, 21 Cal. 642.

1039. 'Shown or read over to accused' etc. :—Before a statement can be admitted in evidence, it is necessary to see that such statement has been deliberately made and recorded, and that after being recorded, it has been *shown or read over* to the accused so that he might be assured that his words have been correctly taken down—*Q. v. Narain*, 7 W.R. 49. It is not sufficient for the Sessions Judge merely to read over to the accused the statement recorded by the committing Magistrate, but the Judge should record any explanation or statement the accused may make at the time. Merely recording in the judgment of the Sessions Judge that the statement or examination of the accused as recorded by the committing Magistrate was put in and read out to him is not enough—*Fatu*, 5 P.L.J. 147. Where there was nothing to show that the record of the confessional statement made by the accused before the committing Magistrate was shown or read over to the accused, such statement cannot be used as evidence against him—*Emp. v. Dewan Kahar*, 4 P.L.T. 186, 24 Cr.L.J. 497. This section requires that the record shall be shown or read over to the accused, and if he does not understand the language in which it is written, it must be interpreted in a language which he understands. Where a Magistrate showed or read a confession recorded in English to the accused who did not understand English, the provisions of this section were not complied with—*Bheebecker* 4 N.W.P. 16.

1040. Sub-section (2)—Record must be signed.—The record of confession must be signed by the accused. A record which does not bear the signature of the accused is not admissible in evidence until th

defect is cured in the manner provided by sec. 533—*Emp. v. Gajadhar*, 1883 A.W.N. 243. Where the signature or mark of the accused was not taken to the record of the statement made by him to a Magistrate, the defect can be cured by examining the Magistrate as a witness to prove that the statement recorded was duly made—*Q. E. v. Chedda*, 1896 A.W.N. 161, *Q. E. v. Raghu*, 23 Bom. 221; *Reg. v. Deva Dayal*, 11 B.H.C.R. 237. Where the signature of the accused was not taken by the committing Magistrate, and no objection was raised before the Sessions Court by his pleader on the ground of absence of signature, and no prejudice was caused to the accused, it was held that, under the circumstances of the case, the irregularity was not a sufficient ground for reversing the judgment—*Reg. v. Deva Dayal*, 11 B.H.C.R. 237. The signature of the accused to his confession is taken as a voucher of the authenticity of the statement, and not as an admission of its correctness. Therefore, where the signature is not taken at the time the confession is made, but is taken the next day, and the Magistrate swears of the authenticity of the confessional statement, there is no such illegality or irregularity as would affect the admissibility of the statement in evidence—*Khudiram v. Emp.*, 9 C.L.J. 55, 3 I.C. 625. Where, through an oversight, the Magistrate did not take the signature of the confessing accused, and the latter refused to affix his signature when he was subsequently asked to do so, but at the trial the Magistrate and his clerk were examined as to the confession having been duly made by the accused, held that the defect was cured by sec. 533, and the confession was admissible in evidence—*Ba Yin v. Emp.*, 7 Rang. 759. The record must be signed by the accused himself in his own handwriting, it cannot be signed by another person for the accused. If so signed, it is inadmissible in evidence—*Reg. v. Daya Anand*, 11 B.H.C.R. 44, but now see section 533.

If the accused is unable to write, his mark or thumb impression (45 All. 166) is a sufficient compliance with the requirements of this section. But if he can write, his thumb-impression is not sufficient—*Sadananda v. Emp.*, 32 Cal. 550.

The signature of the accused must be taken in the presence of the Magistrate. To take it in an adjoining room in the presence of a clerk and not in the immediate presence of the Magistrate is not a proper compliance with the provisions of this section—*Q. E. v. Bhika*, Ratanlal 687.

Refusal to sign.—Sub-section (2) involves only the Magistrate offering the record for the accused's signature, but it does not empower the Magistrate to require the accused to sign. Therefore an accused who refuses to sign the record of statement does not commit an offence punishable under sec. 180 I. P. C. That section of the Penal Code applies only when the Magistrate is legally empowered to require the accused to sign the statement—*K. E. v. Ba Tin*, 3 L.B.R. 199; *Imp. v. Sirsapa*, 4 Bom. 15. But it has been laid down by the Allahabad High Court that the language of this section makes it compulsory upon the accused to sign the statement; the Magistrate is a public servant legally competent to require the accused to sign the statement, and if the accused refuses to do so, he

commits an offence under sec. 180 I. P. C.—*Emp. v. Umer Khan*, 39 All. 399. So also, *per Melville J. in Imp. v. Sirsapa*, 4 Bom 15

Signature of Magistrate:—The affixing of an unreadable initial to the statement of the accused is not a proper compliance with this section—*Q. v. Bhikaree*, 15 W.R 63

1041. Certificate:—The absence of the certificate in the recorded examination of the accused is not necessarily fatal to its admissibility—*Reg v. Vyankatray*, 7 B H C R. 50. Though a Magistrate omitted to certify a confession as required by sec 364 and did not record the whole of the questions put to the accused, the High Court declined to interfere where no prejudice resulted to the accused—*Kamalagadu*, 2 Weir 436. A defect in the certificate to be attached by a Magistrate to the examination of the accused can be cured only by taking evidence that the accused duly made the statement recorded, either by examining the Magistrate or some other person who was present when the statement was recorded. It cannot be cured by examining a witness to prove that it was taken down in the handwriting of the Magistrate himself—*Emp v Balasur*, 8 C.P.L.R. 6, *Emp v. Lal Sheikh*, 3 C.W.N 387; *Reg v Peradi*, 2 B H C R. 397, *Q E v. Anga Valayan*, 22 Mad 15, *Q E v Raghu*, 23 Bom 221, *Badan v K. E.*, 1909 P R 2. It cannot be cured by the addition of the certificate at the direction of the District Magistrate after an appeal is disposed of—*Reg. v Vyankatrao*, 7 B H C R 50

This section does not prescribe any particular form of the certificate. When a confession bore a certificate of the Magistrate containing the words "taken by me" but did not say that the confession was made in his hearing, it was held that the certificate substantially complied with the requirements of this section—*Noshai v. Emp.*, 5 Cal 958

The certificate need not be in the handwriting of the Magistrate; it is sufficient if it is signed by the Magistrate—*Q. v. Rezza Hosain*, 8 W R 55

1042. Non-compliance with the section.—The rule laid down in this section should be strictly followed—*Emp v Gajadhar*, 1883 A.W.N. 243. Magistrates should in all cases be careful to observe all the provisions of section 164 and this section, for although various defects can be cured, the value of the confession may be very much diminished by non-compliance with the strict letter of the law—*Ratti Ram v Q E*, 1899 P.R 7

Non-compliance with the formalities of this section may be remedied by sec. 533 by oral evidence (of the Magistrate who recorded it) that the accused duly made the statement recorded—*Q E v Raghu*, 23 Bom 221, *Lal Chand v Q E.*, 18 Ca. 549, *Reg v Vithoji*, 2 B H C R 398. Where the confession though signed by the accused was not recorded in the manner prescribed by this section, and there was no certificate showing that the record contained in full the statement made by the accused, it was admitted in evidence in spite of these defects, and held to be proved by its production—*Ahmed Din v. Emp.*, 1881 P.R. 20. *Sher Singh v. Emp.*, 1881 P.R 21.

But section 533 does not apply and cannot make a confession admissible, where no attempt has been made to conform to the provisions of this section. Thus, where the confessions were neither recorded in the language of the accused, nor were signed by the accused, nor certified by the Magistrate, held that there was a total non-compliance with the provisions of this section, and sec 533 would not cure such grave irregularities—*Q. E. v. Viran*, 9 Mad. 224. Where no record whatever has been made of a confession, such confession cannot be proved merely by oral evidence. Section 533 deals with errors in the record and does not apply where no record whatever has been made of such a confession—*Emp. v. Gulaba*, 33 All. 260, 14 Cr L.J. 211. See also *Emp v Nani Mandal*, 52 Cal 403 cited in Note 1037 ante

365. Every High Court established by Record of evidence in Royal Charter High Court. may from time to time, by general rule, prescribe the manner, in which evidence shall be taken down in cases coming before the Court, and the Judges of such Court shall take down the evidence or the substance thereof in accordance with the rule (if any) so prescribed.

365. Every High Court established by Record of evidence in Royal Charter, High Court, and the Chief Court of Oudh shall from time to time, by general rule, prescribe the manner in which evidence shall be taken down in cases coming before the Court, and the evidence shall be taken down in accordance with such rule.

Change :—This section has been amended by section 99 of the Criminal Pro Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. "The word 'shall' would make it compulsory upon High Courts to prescribe by rules the manner in which evidence should be taken down. The section will not of course limit the discretion of the High Court as to what form the rules should take"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*.

"We do not think it necessary that the Judges of the Court should take down the evidence themselves. But we are of opinion that there should certainly be some record"—*Report of the Joint Committee (1923)*

The words "and the Chief Court of Oudh" have been added by the Oudh Courts Act XXXII of 1925.

CHAPTER XXVI.

OF THE JUDGMENT.

366. (1) The judgment in every trial in any Criminal Court of original jurisdiction shall be pronounced, or the substance of such judgment shall be explained,—

Mode of delivering judgment.

- (a) in open Court either immediately after the termination of the trial or at some subsequent time of which notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders, and
- (b) in the language of the Court, or in some other language which the accused or his pleader understands :

Provided that the whole judgment shall be read out by the presiding Judge, if he is requested so to do either by the prosecution or the defence.

(2) The accused shall, if in custody, be brought up, or, if not in custody, be required by the Court to attend to hear judgment delivered, except where his personal attendance during the trial has been dispensed with and the sentence is one of fine only or he is acquitted, in either of which cases it may be delivered in the presence of his pleader.

(3) No judgment delivered by any Criminal Court shall be deemed to be invalid by reason only of the absence of any party or his pleader on the day or from the place notified for the delivery thereof, or of any omission to serve or defect in serving, on the parties or their pleaders or any of them, the notice of such day and place.

(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit in any way the extent of the provisions of section 537.

The requirements of sections 366 and 367 are not mere matters of form. The provisions of these sections are based upon good and substantial grounds of public policy, and whether they are or not, the Sessions Judges must obey them and not be a law in themselves—Q E. v Hargobind, 14 All 242.

1043. Judgment :—Judgment means the expression of opinion of the Judge or Magistrate arrived at after due consideration of the evidence and of the arguments—*Damu v. Sridhar*, 21 Cal. 121. An order of dismissal of a complaint under section 203 is not a judgment—*Emp. v. Chinna*, 29 Mad. 126. An order dismissing a case for default of appearance of the complainant is not a judgment—*Ratanchand v. Emp.*, 5 N.L.R. 76, *Bibhuti v. Dasimoni*, 10 C.L.J. 80. Judgment means a judgment of conviction or acquittal, but not an order of discharge under section 209 or 253—*Diwarka v. Benimadhab*, 28 Cal. 652; *Mir Ahmad v. Md. Askari*, 29 Cal. 726, *Emp. v. Maheshwari*, 31 Mad. 543; *Emp. v. Nabi*, 8 Bom. L.R. 250. On the other hand, if the Magistrate, after taking some evidence, however incomplete the evidence may be, enters into the merits of the complaint and makes an order of discharge, such an order is a judgment—*Diwarka v. Benimadhab*, 28 Cal. 652. The final order of acquittal on a petition of composition is not a judgment—*Hasta v. Crown*, 1914 P.R. 29, 16 Cr.L.J. 81, because such an order is made without any consideration of the evidence.

The judgment referred to in this section is a judgment passed in a trial; the section does not therefore apply to final orders made in sanction proceedings under section 195—*In re Nagappa*, 6 Bom.L.R. 897. (Sanction proceedings, however, are now abolished).

1044. Delivery of judgment :—The delivery of judgment and the passing of sentence is an integral part of the criminal trial and must be done by the Judge himself. It is not a mere formality, and a deliberate breach of this express provision of law is not a mere irregularity curable by section 537. Where on the date fixed for delivery of the judgment, the Judge being ill, he signed and dated his judgment and sent it to be translated to the accused by the interpreter, the Judge himself not being present in Court, and the judgment was so translated by the interpreter, it was an illegality and a retrial must be ordered—*Rambit v. Emp.*, 24 Cr.L.J. 584, 1 Bur. L.J. 122. But the Allahabad High Court takes a more liberal view and holds that where a Magistrate wrote out a judgment, signed and dated it, but owing to physical incapacity had it read out by another Magistrate, it was in the most an irregularity which was covered by sec. 537—*Nur Md. Khan v. Emp.* 21 A.L.J. 137, 24 Cr.L.J. 173. A judgment which is not delivered is no judgment. Where a Judge after writing his judgment but before delivering it, dies or leaves the Bench, his written judgment cannot be considered as a judgment, but it is merely an opinion. A judgment though written and signed, is inoperative until it is pronounced, and must be taken merely as an expression of opinion—*Ramdhun v. K. E.*, 11 A.L.J. 745, 14 Cr.L.J. 562.

The judgment must be delivered in open Court—*Damu v. Sridhar*, 21 Cal. 121.

The judgment must be pronounced by the Judge or Magistrate who held the trial. The duty of signing and delivering the judgment cannot be delegated by the presiding officer to another person. Where a Magistrate, after holding trial in one district, went away to another district and

thence sent his judgment to the Magistrate of the former district to be delivered, and the District Magistrate delivered it, the trial was set aside and retrial ordered—*Q. E. v. Jia Lal*, 1889 A.W.N. 181, *Baisnab Charan v. Amin Ali*, 50 Cal 664, 38 C.L.J. 202, 24 Cr L J 489. But the Madras High Court and the Oudh Chief Court are of opinion that the delivery of the judgment by the successor of the Magistrate who wrote it is not illegal—*In re Sankara Pillai*, 18 M.L.J. 197, 7 Cr.L.J. 459, *Chandika v. Emp*, 28 O.C. 109, 11 O.L.J. 725. See also *In re Savarimuthu*, 40 Mad 108, where it has been held that the succeeding Magistrate can date, sign and pronounce a judgment written by his predecessor, and thus adopt it as his own.

The judgment must be pronounced in the presence of the accused. Where the accused having absconded, the Magistrate passed sentence in his absence, and upon his re-arrest pronounced the judgment again, it was held that the Magistrate should not have pronounced his previous judgment in the absence of the accused—*Q. E. v. Ghohram, Ratanlal* 325, *Crown v Sardar*, 1917 P R 36. If, however, the judgment is one of acquittal or of fine only, it may be passed in the absence of the accused, under sub-section (2)—*Crown v Jamal Khatun*, 6 S L R 206.

The judgment in a criminal case must be passed without undue delay, as delay is not only unjust to the accused, as it prevents them from appealing at once, but is opposed to the principles of law—*Emp v Baldeo*, 5 C P.L.R. 24. In a trial by jury, it is not necessary, under section 367, to record a judgment, but only the heads of charges to the jury should be recorded; and these should be written out as soon as possible after the charge to the jury has been actually delivered, when the facts of the case are fresh in the mind of the Judge—*Fanindra v Emp*, 36 Cal 281. In this case the charge to the jury was written 3 weeks after; and the High Court severely condemned the delay.

It is not necessary that the whole of the judgment should be read. It is sufficient if the substance of the judgment is delivered. Omission to read a portion in the judgment is a mere irregularity covered by section 537—*Venkataramanayya*, 2 Weir 711, *Kamakshamma v Emp*, 38 Mad 498, 14 Cr L J 595.

1045. Conviction or acquittal before judgment :—

The judgment must always be written and delivered before sentence is passed. It is illegal to pronounce a sentence at the termination of the trial and to postpone the writing of the judgment to a future occasion—*Punjab Circ.*, p 239. In as much as the sentence in a case of conviction, and the direction to set the accused at liberty in a case of acquittal, can only follow on the decision and cannot precede it, and in as much as the decision must be contained in the written judgment, it must necessarily follow that the sentence is illegal if there is no written judgment when it is passed—*Q. E. v. Hargobind*, 14 All. 242. Where the judgment was delivered after the order of acquittal was passed, the acquittal was set aside and a re-trial ordered—*Q. E. v. Abdul Majid*, 1892 A.W.N. 157. Where the judgment was written and delivered some days after the prisoners were convicted

and sentenced, it was held that this was a violation of the express provisions of this section and was more than a mere irregularity, and the conviction and sentence must be set aside—*Bandanu Atchayya v. Emp.*, 27 Mad. 237.

In some cases, however, it has been held that such an irregularity does not vitiate the whole proceedings unless there has been a failure of justice; such irregularity will be cured by section 537—*Tilak Chandra v. Baisagomoff*, 23 Cal. 502, *Crown v. Moriokhan*, 5 S.L.R. 131; *Emp. v. Thave Issaji*, 13 Bom.L.R. 635, *Damu v. Sridhar*, 21 Cal. 121; *Kamakshamma*, 38 Mad. 498, *Sankaralinga v. Narayan*, 45 Mad. 913 (F.B.); *Md. Hayat Mulla*, 7 Rang. 370, 1930 Cr. C. 203 (204); *Ata Md. v. Emp.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 705 (Lah.) Sec. 497 (4) now provides for acquittal of the accused before judgment on taking a bond from him for appearance on the day of judgment.

Where a Magistrate died after pronouncing the sentence but before writing the judgment, the High Court reversed the conviction and sentence and ordered a retrial—*Q. E. v. Kamthia*, 1 Bom.L.R. 160. But in *Weir* 438, where the Magistrate died after passing sentence but before recording a judgment, it has been held that a conviction on a trial regularly held will not be set aside merely because the Magistrate had been unavoidably prevented from recording a judgment, and the right of appeal of the accused would not be taken away by the absence of a complete judgment.

Loss of judgment.—This section only imposes the condition that the judgment must be pronounced in open Court and imposes a few other conditions but such conditions do not include the condition that the record should not have been lost. In cases where the judgment has been lost, the appropriate course for a Judge is to re-write the judgment from memory and from the materials on record, and place it on record—*Kamakshamma v. Emp.*, 38 Mad. 498.

367. (1) Every such judgment shall, except as

Language of judgment. Contents of judgment.

otherwise expressly provided by this Code, be written by the presiding officer of the Court or from the

dictation of such presiding officer in the language of the Court, or in English; and shall contain the point or points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision; and shall be dated and signed by the presiding officer in open Court at the time of pronouncing it, and where it is not written by the presiding officer with his own hand, every page of such judgment shall be signed by him.

(2) It shall specify the offence (if any) of which, and the section of the Indian Penal Code or other law under

which, the accused is convicted, and the punishment to which he is sentenced.

(3) When the conviction is under the Indian Penal Code, and it is doubtful under which of two sections or under which of two parts of the same section of that Code the offence falls, the Court shall distinctly express the same and pass judgment in the alternative.

(4) If it be a judgment of acquittal, it shall state the offence of which the accused is acquitted and direct that he be set at liberty.

(5) If the accused is convicted of an offence punishable with death, and the Court sentences him to any punishment other than death, the Court shall in its judgment state the reason why sentence of death was not passed.

Provided that, in trials by jury the Court need not write a judgment, but the Court of Session shall record the heads of the charge to the jury.

(6) *For the purposes of this section, an order under section 118 or section 123, sub-section (3), shall be deemed to be a judgment.*

1046. Change.—The italicised words in sub-section (1) and the new sub-section (6) have been added by section 100 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923

Under the old section it was held that the judgment must be written by the Magistrate himself, he could not get it written by a clerk—*Q. E. v. Lakshmitai, Ratanlal* 545. *Subramanya v Q*, 6 Mad 396, and that if the judgment was written at the dictation of the Magistrate, and the Magistrate merely signed it, the procedure was illegal—*Manik Lal v Corporation of Calcutta*, 4 C.L.J. 411. The present Amendment in sub-section (1) will now allow such procedure

Language of judgment—Under this section, the judgment should be written in the language of the Court or in English. Where an Honorary Magistrate wrote his judgment in Urdu instead of in Hindi, the language of the Court, it was held to be irregular, but such irregularity was curable by section 537—*Dhanukdhari v Harihar*, 4 C.L.J. 232, 4 Cr.L.J. 162.

1047. Contents of judgment.—The judgment must be self-contained and nothing should be left out. If any material finding is left out in the judgment, the defect cannot be cured by the Magistrate's subsequent

explanation to the Appellate Court—*Jurakhan v. K E*, 7 C.L.J. 238. A judgment should contain sufficient particulars to enable a Court of Appeal to know what facts were found and how—*Q. E. v. Dhurmiya, Ratanlal* 833. The judgment should show that the Court had considered the evidence and had found in a case of conviction that the facts proved to the satisfaction of the Court brought an offence home to the accused person whom the Court convicted—*Q. E. v. Pandeh Bhat*, 19 All 506 (F B). Where a judgment, though not a long and elaborate one, affords a clear indication that the Court duly considered the evidence, it is a good judgment—*Kasimuddi v Q E*, 1 C W N 169. But if the judgment is so meagre that it is impossible to form an opinion as to the merits of the case or to say whether there has been a miscarriage of justice or not, the judgment must be set aside—*Rupa Mandal v Keshab*, 5 C L.J. 452.

Where an Appellate Court finds that the Magistrate has not written a judgment in conformity with the provisions of section 367, the correct procedure is to accept the appeal and to remand the case for hearing *de novo*. The Appellate Court cannot retain the appeal on its file and ask for a judgment which the Magistrate has failed to record—*Karuppiah v. Emp.*, 1920 M W N 120, 21 Cr L.J. 52.

Points for determination—Every judgment of a Criminal Court must contain a clear statement of the points for determination—*Bom H C. Cr Cir.*, p 38. "The attention of all Criminal Courts is invited to the necessity of very strictly observing the provisions of the latter portions of clause (1) of section 367, which declares that the judgment must contain the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision"—*Cal G R & C O.*, ¶ 36. Where the Sessions Judge convicted the accused without stating the facts of the case or the points for determination or even the section under which the accused was convicted, the judgment was set aside—*Eltar Khan v Emp.*, 9 C W N. xxlii. The accused person is entitled to have an independent judgment of the trying Court, and such judgment must be prepared in accordance with, and must contain the particulars required by, section 367. Otherwise it is no judgment at all. Where a second class Magistrate thinking that a severer punishment should be inflicted on the accused than what he was authorised to award, recorded his opinion and forwarded the proceeding to the Sub-divisional Magistrate, and the latter in convicting the accused wrote the following judgment: "I agree with the finding arrived at by the learned trying Magistrate and convict all the accused for the offence of unlawful assembly as stated in the charge", held that this was not a judgment at all—*Thakur Singh v Emp.*, 20 Cr L.J. 444 (Pat). Where the Magistrate has given strong and legal reasons for his decision, his omission to refer to the minute details of the case does not vitiate his judgment—*Durga Singh v. Emp.*, 24 Cr L.J. 181 (Pat). Where the judgment showed that the Judge had appreciated the points which the prosecution had to establish, and that he had clearly in view the points for determination, *viz.*, the credibility of the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution, and he expressed his opinion on that point, it was held that the judgment was good.

and should not be set aside—*Rohimuddi v Q. E.*, 20 Cal. 353. Where an Appellate Court rejected an appeal without specifying the points for determination, or the decision or the reasons thereof, the appeal was ordered to be reheard—*Utam v. Crown*, 1876 P R 6.

In every case of mischief, the question of legal title to the property is a point for determination. It is the duty of the Criminal Court to determine what was the intention of the alleged offender and whether he was not acting in the exercise of a *bona fide* claim of right—*Emp. v. Budh Singh*, 2 All 101. In a case of dacoity, the Judge should at first give a general outline of the case, the course of the investigation and the arrest of the various accused, and then the case for and against each accused should be dealt with in detail, and the Judge should arrive at a conclusion with regard to each individual accused—*Nga Mu v Emp.*, 2 Bur.L.J. 199. In a case of unlawful assembly and riot, the judgment should contain as one of the points for determination a statement as to the existence of the elements constituting the unlawful assembly—*Ram Lal v Haricharan*, 37 Cal 194. It is the duty of the Judge to determine, where several alternative common objects of the unlawful assembly are alleged in the charge, which of the common objects is made out—*Manaruddi v Emp.*, 35 Cal 718, *Dasarathi v Raghu*, 36 Cal. 158. In a charge of theft, the point for determination is the dishonest intention, especially if a *bona fide* claim is set up—*Ram Lal v Hari Charan*, 37 Cal 194.

'Decision thereon'—The Sessions Judge should be careful to record findings on all the charges under which the prisoner is sent up for trial—*Q. v. Mahomed Ali*, 13 W R 50. Where there are several accused, the case of each accused should be dealt with in detail, and the Judge should arrive at a decision with regard to each individual accused—*Nga Mu v Emp.*, 2 Bur.L.J. 199, *In re Dakshinamurti*, 1918 M W N 129, 19 Cr L.J. 200.

Reasons for decision—Every judgment must contain the reasons for decision, a judgment which states merely the offence and the punishment and contains no statement of the reasons for conviction is insufficient and invalid—*Q. E. v Kana*, Ratanlal 310. Even in a summary trial, the law requires under sec. 263 that the Magistrate should give a brief statement of the reasons for his finding. A judgment in a single line is not a judgment in accordance with law—*Jankey Rai v Emp.*, 20 Cr L.J. 431 (Pat). In a proceeding under sec. 145, the Magistrate should, in the final order, sufficiently state the reasons therefor, so that the High Court may in revision determine whether or not the Magistrate has directed his mind to the consideration of the effect of the evidence adduced before him—*Bhuban Chandra v. Nibaran*, 49 Cal 187, 25 C W N 687. An order of discharge under section 253 is not a judgment, and the writing of reasons is not necessary. But it is desirable that the Magistrate should record his reasons for the discharge, although it is not compulsory—*Emp v Nabi Fakira*, 11 Bom. L.R. 250.

Remarks and comments :—The testimony and conduct of police-officers examined in a criminal trial may be commented upon in the judgment in

the same degree as those of any other material witnesses, but no further—*Q v. Budri*, 23 W.R. 65. Comments on the conduct of witnesses and parties should not go beyond what is really necessary for the elucidation of the case. Any humorous remarks or ridicule on strangers should be avoided—*Ma Kyn v. Kin Lat*, 11 L.C. 1000, 4 Bur.L.T. 173; *Emp. v. Baldeo*, 5 C.P.L.R. 24. The language of a judgment should be temperate and sober, and not satirical. A judgment should not admit irrelevant matter to the record, but should confine itself to a consideration of the issues before the Court, together with a fair and legitimate comment on any errors or irregularities that may be disclosed in the course of the trial—*Emp v Thomas Pellako*, 5 Bur.L.T. 20, 13 Cr.L.J. 259. A judgment should not contain remarks about the accused to the effect that he was a person of wealth and influence and had prevented truth from appearing, unless such conduct of the prisoner is established by evidence—*Q v. Dhurum*, ■ W.R. 13. The judgment should not contain any damaging remarks regarding a witness in a criminal trial—*In re Malik Umar*, 1910 P.W.R. 2, 11 Cr.L.J. 178, or regarding the conduct of a counsel when such counsel's conduct was not at all objectionable—*Lachchu v. Emp.*, 1 O.L.J. 141, 15 Cr.L.J. 420; or regarding a person who is not a party or witness in the proceeding—*Benarsi Das v. Crown*, ■ Lah. 166, 26 Cr. L.J. 1326. An appellate judgment should not contain any imputations about the motives of the trying Magistrate—*Yacoo*, 2 Weir 535. The High Court has power to expunge any objectionable remarks from the lower Court's judgment; see Note 1214 under sec. 439.

Specification of offence :—See sub-section (2). The offence of which the accused is convicted must be specified in the judgment with the same precision as in the charge—*K. E v Taik Pyn*, 5 L.B.R. 21, 2 J.C. 619; *Manaruddi v Emp.*, 35 Cal 718.

Sentence :—Under this section, the sentence is a part of the judgment, and when an accused person is convicted, it is incumbent upon the Court to pass a formal sentence of even a single day's imprisonment or any other punishment to make the record legally complete—*Emp. v. Kalua*, 1894 A.W.N. 219. In estimating the sentence to be passed, the defence put forward by the accused should not be treated as a matter of aggravation—*Emp v. Cheda Lal*, 1883 A.W.N. 170.

As to the legality of passing sentence before judgment, see Note 1045 under sec. 366.

1048. Signing :—This section requires that the judgment must be signed. But if the judgment is written entirely in the hand of the Magistrate, or partly written by his own hand and partly written by another at his dictation, it does not become inoperative by reason of the fact that he forgot to sign and date it. The irregularity does not affect the merits of the case, and is cured by sec. 537—*Ram Singh v Emp.*, 47 All. 294, 23 A.L.J. 8, 26 Cr.L.J. 699; *Md. Hayat Mulla*, 7 Rang 370, 1930 Cr. C. 203 (204).

The signature should be made with a pen and not with a stamp. There are obvious reasons why judicial documents should be authentic.

cated in such a manner that their authenticity may admit of proof. But the affixing of a signature with a stamp would be no more than a mere irregularity—*Subramanya v. Q.*, 6 Mad. 396. But mere initialling is not signing—*Q. E. v. Nanhu*, O.S.C. 192.

The signature of the Magistrate must be appended to the judgment at the time of pronouncing it in open Court—*Q. E. v. Ganpat*, Ratanlal 429, *In re Savarimuthu*, 40 Mad. 108. But omission to date and sign the judgment at the time of pronouncing it is an irregularity covered by sec. 537—*Venkataramanayya*, 2 Weir 711 (712).

The dating and signing of the judgment must be done by the presiding officer of the Court; it cannot be delegated to any body else—*Q. E. v. Jia Lal*, 1889 A.W.N. 181. Where a Magistrate who has tried a case and written out the judgment is succeeded by another before he has actually pronounced the same, it is not obligatory on the succeeding Magistrate to pronounce the same, and much less can he be compelled to do so, though he may, if he chooses, date, sign and pronounce it, in which case he will be adopting it as his own—*In re Savarimuthu*, 40 Mad. 108. *Quære*, whether it will be legal for the succeeding Magistrate to date, sign and pronounce the judgment written by his predecessor, when the accused demands a *de novo* trial (under sec. 350)?—*Ibid*.

Sub-section (3).—*Judgment in the alternative*—The 'doubt' in sub-section (3) is the same as that referred to in sec. 236, i.e., a doubt as to the application of law to the facts proved and not a doubt as to whether the accused had committed any offence. See notes under sec. 236. Where the judgment did not state in express terms that the Court was in doubt as to the question under which of two sections the offence fell, it was held that this was at most an irregularity and did not vitiate the judgment—*Boya Takirugadu*, 2 Weir 440.

Sub-section (4).—*Judgment of acquittal*—Under sub-section (4) if the judgment is one of acquittal, the accused is entitled to be discharged from custody immediately on the judgment of acquittal being pronounced, and his further detention becomes unlawful. No formal warrant of release addressed by the Court to the Superintendent of the Jail is necessary, it is for the jail authorities (in whose custody the accused had remained) to satisfy themselves of the result of the trial—*Anonymous*, 5 M.H.C.R. App. 2.

1049. Sub-section (5).—*Judgment in capital cases*—Where the Judge convicts the accused of murder and passes on him the alternative sentence of transportation for life, he should state his reasons for not passing the capital sentence—*Dwarka*, 4 O.W.N. 977, 23 Cr.L.J. 980 (1922). A person convicted of murder should ordinarily be sentenced to death. To justify the passing of a sentence of transportation for life, there should be really extenuating circumstances, and not a mere absence of aggravating circumstances—*Emp. v. Nga Myat* 113 Cr.L.J. 113 (Bur.); *Crown v. Nga Tha*, 1 L.B.R. 216 (F.B.), *Mi She Yi v. K. E.* 25 Cr.L.J. 1121 (Rang). The fact that the crime was committed without premeditation in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel is not an extenuating

the same degree as those of any other material witnesses, but no further—*Q v. Budri*, 23 W.R. 65. Comments on the conduct of witnesses and parties should not go beyond what is really necessary for the elucidation of the case. Any humorous remarks or ridicule on strangers should be avoided—*Ma Kyn v. Kin Lat*, 11 I.C. 1000, 4 Bur.L.T. 173; *Emp v. Baldeo*, 5 C.P.L.R. 24. The language of a judgment should be temperate and sober, and not satirical. A judgment should not admit irrelevant matter to the record, but should confine itself to a consideration of the issues before the Court, together with a fair and legitimate comment on any errors or irregularities that may be disclosed in the course of the trial—*Emp. v. Thomas Pellako*, 5 Bur.L.T. 20, 13 Cr.L.J. 259. A judgment should not contain remarks about the accused to the effect that he was a person of wealth and influence and had prevented truth from appearing, unless such conduct of the prisoner is established by evidence—*Q v. Dhurum*, 8 W.R. 13. The judgment should not contain any damaging remarks regarding a witness in a criminal trial—*In re Malik Umar*, 1910 P.W.R. 2, 11 Cr.L.J. 178, or regarding the conduct of a counsel when such counsel's conduct was not at all objectionable—*Lachchu v. Emp.*, 1 O.L.J. 141, 15 Cr.L.J. 420; or regarding a person who is not a party or witness in the proceeding—*Benarsi Das v. Crown*, 11 Lah. 166, 26 Cr.L.J. 1326. An appellate judgment should not contain any imputations about the motives of the trying Magistrate—*Yacoob*, 2 Weir 535. The High Court has power to expunge any objectionable remarks from the lower Court's judgment, see Note 1214 under sec. 439.

Specification of offence—See sub-section (2). The offence of which the accused is convicted must be specified in the judgment with the same precision as in the charge—*K. E v Taik Pyn*, 5 L.B.R. 21, 2 I.C. 619, *Manaruddi v Emp.*, 35 Cal. 718.

Sentence—Under this section, the sentence is a part of the judgment, and when an accused person is convicted, it is incumbent upon the Court to pass a formal sentence of even a single day's imprisonment or any other punishment to make the record legally complete—*Emp. v. Kalua*, 1864 A.W.N. 219. In estimating the sentence to be passed, the defence put forward by the accused should not be treated as a matter of aggravation—*Emp. v. Cheda Lal*, 1893 A.W.N. 170.

As to the legality of passing sentence before judgment, see Note 1045 under sec. 306.

1048. Signing :—This section requires that the judgment must be signed. But if the judgment is written entirely in the hand of the Magistrate, or partly written by his own hand and partly written by another at his dictation, it does not become inoperative by reason of the fact that he forgot to sign and date it. The irregularity does not affect the merits of the case, and is cured by sec. 537—*Ram Singh v Emp.*, 47 All. 294, 23 A.L.J. 8, 26 Cr.L.J. 688, *Md Hayat Mulla*, 7 Rang. 370, 1930 Cr. C. 203 (204).

The signature should be made with a pen and not with a stamp. There are obvious reasons why judicial documents should be authentic.

cated in such a manner that their authenticity may admit of proof. But the affixing of a signature with a stamp would be no more than a mere irregularity—*Subramanya v. Q.*, 6 Mad. 396. But mere initialling is not signing—*Q. E. v. Nanhu*, O.S.C. 192.

The signature of the Magistrate must be appended to the judgment at the time of pronouncing it in open Court—*Q. E. v. Ganpat*, Ratanlal 429; *In re Savarimuthu*, 40 Mad. 108. But omission to date and sign the judgment at the time of pronouncing it is an irregularity covered by sec. 537—*Venkataramanayya*, 2 Weir 711 (712).

The dating and signing of the judgment must be done by the presiding officer of the Court, it cannot be delegated to any body else—*Q. E. v. Jia Lal*, 1889 A.W.N. 181. Where a Magistrate who has tried a case and written out the judgment is succeeded by another before he has actually pronounced the same, it is not obligatory on the succeeding Magistrate to pronounce the same, and much less can he be compelled to do so, though which case he will be
108 *Quære*, whether
e, sign and pronounce
the judgment written by his predecessor, when the accused demands a *de novo* trial (under sec. 350)?—*Ibid*

Sub-section (3).—*Judgment in the alternative*—The 'doubt' in sub-section (3) is the same as that referred to in sec. 236, i.e., a doubt as to the application of law to the facts proved and not a doubt as to whether the accused had committed any offence. See notes under sec. 236. Where the judgment did not state in express terms that the Court was in doubt as to the question under which of two sections the offence fell, it was held that this was at most an irregularity and did not vitiate the judgment—*Boya Takirugadu*, 2 Weir 440.

Sub-section (4).—*Judgment of acquittal*—Under sub-section (4) if the judgment is one of acquittal, the accused is entitled to be discharged from custody immediately on the judgment of acquittal being pronounced, and his further detention becomes unlawful. No formal warrant of release addressed by the Court to the Superintendent of the Jail is necessary, it is for the jail authorities (in whose custody the accused had remained) to satisfy themselves of the result of the trial—*Anonymous*, 5 M.H.C.R. App. 2.

1049. Sub-section (5).—*Judgment in capital cases*—Where the Judge convicts the accused of murder and passes on him the alternative sentence of transportation for life, he should state his reasons for not passing the capital sentence—*Dwarika*, 4 O.W.N. 977, 28 Cr.L.J. 980 (982). A person convicted of murder should ordinarily be sentenced to death. To justify the passing of a sentence of transportation for life, there should be really extenuating circumstances, and not a mere absence of aggravating circumstances—*Emp. v. Nga Myat*, 18 Cr.L.J. 113 (Bur), *Crown v. Nga Tha*, 1 L.E.R. 216 (F.B.), *Mi She Yi v. K. E.*, 25 1121 (Rang). The fact that the crime was committed without
tion in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel is not a

circumstance—*Emp. v. Nga Myat*, 18 Cr.L.J. 113. The reasons justifying the infliction of the lesser penalty under sec. 367 (5) must be such as are in accordance with established legal principles. The drunkenness of the accused is not a sufficient reason for not inflicting capital sentence. Unless drunkenness amounts to unsoundness of mind so as to enable insanity to be pleaded by way of defence, or unless the degree of drunkenness is such as to establish incapacity in the accused to form the intent necessary to constitute the crime, drunkenness is neither a defence nor a palliation and is not a reason for inflicting a sentence of transportation for life instead of a death sentence—*Waryam v. Crown*, 7 Lah 141, 27 Cr.L.J. 764.

The fact that the accused murdered his victim merely to escape from custody is not a sufficient reason for imposing the lesser sentence of transportation. But where the case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence and it is open to question whether the injuries to the head of the deceased would have caused his death had he not been drowned, these may be reasons for inflicting the lesser punishment—*Munnun v. Emp.*, 4 O.W.N. 754, 28 Cr.L.J. 860 (861). The fact that the accused is a woman is not a sufficient ground for passing a sentence of transportation instead of one of death—*Emp. v. Nibbia*, 1888 A.W.N. 134; *Mi She v. K. E.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 1121 (Rang). The fact that the accused is a pregnant woman is not a sufficient ground for commutation of sentence—*Q. v. Panhee*, 15 W.R. 66, in such a case the execution is to be deferred till after delivery, see sec. 382. The fact that the body of the murdered man has not been found is not a sufficient ground—*Emp. v. Bhagirath*, 3 All 383, *Emp. v. Sadhu*, 1882 A.W.N. 160; *Emp. v. Rogi*, 1881 A.W.N. 112, *Contra—Q. v. Budurooddeen*, 11 W.R. 20.

It is clear from sub-sec. (5) that when a person is found guilty of murder, the sentence of death must be the normal sentence and the sentence of transportation for life is provided only as an abnormal sentence, in passing which reasons must be given as to why the capital sentence is not passed—*per Cuming J.* in *Emp. v. Dulani*, 33 C.W.N. 1226 (1230). But S. K. Ghosh J. is of opinion (p. 1232) that sec. 367 (5) should not be interpreted in this way, for such a construction would make the sentence of transportation an exception in murder cases. But this is not true, for in actual practice, capital sentence is sparingly inflicted. Sec. 367 (5) has nothing to do with the measure or degree of punishment in murder cases, but simply lays down a matter of procedure, namely, that reasons should be recorded if a capital sentence is not passed. The sentence of death is not to be taken as a normal sentence, but the Court must look to the circumstances of the case in deciding the sentence to be passed.

Where the Sessions Judge feels reasonable doubt whether a sentence of death would be the proper penalty, the doubt, like all other doubts, should be given in favour of the accused, and a sentence of transportation should be passed. In such a case, it is highly improper for the Sessions Judge to pass a sentence of death and to leave the responsibility to the

High Court of commuting the sentence, if necessary—*Shwe Cho v. K. E.*, 3 L.B.R. 111.

1050. Heads of charge to the jury :—Under this section, the Judge is not required to write out *in extenso* the charge which he addresses to the jury. He is to record merely the heads of the charge, because it is impossible for the Judge to write down everything he says to the jury—*Keamuddi v. Emp*, 51 Cal 79 (82). The heads of charge to the jury need not be a verbatim reproduction of the Judge's observations to the jury, nor is it necessary that the charge should be written out before it is delivered. But whether they are written out before delivery or taken down verbatim, they should be placed on record by the Judge as soon as he may find it possible to do so and whilst what he said is fresh in his recollection. The record need not be meticulous or lengthy, but it must give accurately the substance of what the Judge said to the jury so that the High Court may, if occasion arises, be able to ascertain from the record whether the law and the facts relative to the case were fairly and properly put to the jurors. Where the Judge's record of his charge to the jury is simply this. "Sections 141 to 149 and 299 to 304 I. P. Code read over and explained;" held that such a short summary was not a sufficient compliance with the law—*Rupan Singh v K E*, 4 Pat 626, 27 Cr L J 49, *Khayruddin v Emp*, 53 Cal. 372, 27 Cr L J 266; *Chotan v Emp.*, 7 Pat. 361, 29 Cr L J 804 (805). The heads of the charge mean that the Judge must faithfully record the line upon which he addressed the jury, both on the evidence and on the law, and the object of these heads of charge is to inform the High Court, should occasion arise, of what direction he gave in law to the Jury and the nature of the summing up of the evidence not only for the prosecution but also for the defence. The heads of charge are not intended to be an exhaustive detail of every particular which the Judge may have addressed to the jury, but they should contain in an intelligible form and with sufficient fulness the points of law and direction given by the Judge to the jury, and the record should represent with absolute accuracy the substance of the charge by the Judge to the jury—*Eknath v K E*, 1 P L J. 317, *Fanindra v Emp*, 36 Cal 281, *Emp v Ikramuddin*, 39 All 348, *Abdul Gafur v Emp*, 35 C L J 437, 26 C W N 996, *Khayruddin v Emp*, 53 Cal 372, 42 C L J 504, 27 Cr L J 266, *Rahamalli v Emp*, 26 Cr L J 1151 (Cal). The heads of the charge should contain such statement as will enable the Appellate Court to decide whether the evidence has been properly laid before the jury, or whether there has been any misdirection in the charge—*Q v Kasim* 23 W R 32, *Emp v Baij Nath* 1903 A W N 232, *Abbas v Q E*, 25 Cal 736 *In re Shambulal*, 10 Bom L R 565, *Panchu v Emp*, 34 Cal 698; *Ikramuddin v Emp*, 39 All 348, 18 Cr L J 491 *Dnarika v Emp* 33 C W N 84

Although under sec. 367, only the heads of the charge to the jury are required to be recorded, still as the law allows an appeal on grounds of misdirection, it is not only desirable but necessary that the charge should be recorded with sufficient fulness to enable the Appellate Court to see

that all points of law were clearly explained to the jury, and that the summing up was proper and free from misdirection—*Wilson*, 30 C.W.N. 693, 27 Cr.L.J. 926; *Panchu v. Emp.*, 34 Cal. 698; *Abdul Gafur v. Emp.*, 26 C.W.N. 996, 24 Cr.L.J. 8; *Laxumana*, 2 Weir 385. The Judge should also record in his charge what evidence he reads out to the jury—*Q. E. v. Baswantappa*, Ratanlal 917. It is not sufficient for the Judge to state in his record of the heads of the charge that he referred to certain sections of the Penal Code and explained to the jury the law with regard to the offence; he should set out in the record the directions which he gave to them in respect of the law, in order that the High Court may not have to speculate as to what the Judge said but may be in a position to judge whether the elements constituting the particular offence in question had been properly and fairly explained to the jury—*Kasimuddin v. Emp.*, 47 Cal 795, 21 Cr.L.J. 694, *Chotan Singh v. Emp.*, 7 Pat. 361, 29 Cr.L.J. 804 (805). The Judge's comments on the evidence of identification should be recorded in a form which will enable the Appellate Court to know what was actually said—*Abdul Gafur v. Emp.*, supra. But failure to record in the charge what actually the Judge's explanation of the law was would not vitiate the trial where it has not occasioned a failure of justice. The High Court will not therefore order a retrial on this ground if it is of opinion that if the jury accepted the evidence of the prosecution they were entitled to convict the accused of the offence charged—*Chotan Singh v. Emp.*, 7 Pat. 361, 29 Cr.L.J. 804 (805); *Kasimuddin v. Emp.*, supra.

Where a joint trial is held of several offences some of which are triable by jury and others with the aid of assessors, and in respect of the latter offences the jurors become assessors, it is the duty of the Sessions Judge to pronounce a judgment containing the particulars specified in this section, in respect of the latter offences. A reference to the charge to the jury is not a sufficient compliance with the requirements of this section—*Q. E. v. Datta*, Ratanlal 426.

1051. Appellate Judgment :—"It should be observed that section 424 of the Code extends the provisions of section 307 to the judgments of the Lower Appellate Courts, and it is essential that the judgment of such Courts should comply with the provisions of this section"—*Cal G. R. & C. O.*, p. 36. An appellate judgment, like the judgment of the Court of first instance, must fulfil the conditions laid down in this section, that is, the judgment must state the points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for the decision—*Emp. v. Devendra*, 17 Bom.L.R. 1085, 16 Cr.L.J. 832; *Kali Charan v. Geli Beza*, 2 P.L.T. 228, 22 Cr.L.J. 640, 63 I.C. 336; *Bindarban*, 21 Cr.L.J. 223 (Lah.); *Dalip Singh v. Crown*, 5 Lah. 308; *Mangla v. Emp.*, 2 P.L.T. 616, 63 I.C. 416, 22 Cr.L.J. 636. Where the Appellate Court merely rejected the appeal without specifying these points, the appeal was ordered to be reheard—*Utam v. Crown*, 1876 P.R. 6.

Besides specifying these points, the Appellate Court has to decide two more points, viz., (1) Is the objection raised in the memorandum of appeal a valid objection? and if not, (2) Is there any ground apparent on the record for interference in appeal? A judgment which does not decide these

points is not a valid judgment—*Jairam v. Emp.*, 11 N.L.R. 84, 13 Cr.L.J. 559.

It is the duty of the Sessions Judge, in disposing of an appeal, to record a judgment according to law; any deficiency in that judgment cannot be made up for by a reference to the judgment of the Magistrate. It is his duty to go into the evidence and try the appeal in a proper manner. Where the Sessions Judge in appeal stated no facts and gave no reasons in his judgment for the conclusion arrived at by him, the appeal must be reheard—*Bhola Nath v. Emp.*, 7 C.W.N. 30; *Ektar v. Emp.*, 9 C.W.N. xxiii

An appellate judgment must be quite independent and stand by itself; it ought not to be read in connection with or as supplementary to the judgment of the Court of first instance—*Jamait v. Emp.*, 35 Cal. 138, *Mangala v. Emp.*, 2 P.L.T. 616, 63 I.C. 416; *Solhu v. Krishna Ram*, 25 Cr.L.J. 113 (Lah.), *Thakur Singh v. Emp.*, 20 Cr.L.J. 444 (Pat.), *Dasogi v. Emp.*, 20 Cr.L.J. 645 (Pat.); *Bach v. Emp.*, 1 Rang 301. Even when confirming the judgment of the trial Court, the Appellate Court should take its own view of the evidence after perusing the record. The judgment of the Court of appeal should be such that the High Court as a Court of Revision might on looking into the judgment be in a position to judge for itself what the case was and how far the Court of appeal had considered the evidence as bearing on the guilt or innocence of the accused, before it affirmed the judgment of the trial Court—*Inatulla v. Emp.*, 39 C.L.J. 117, 25 Cr.L.J. 1041

The judgment of the Appellate Court in dealing with the case of several accused convicted in a joint trial must show on the face of it that the case of each accused has been taken into consideration, and should state reasons, as far as may be necessary, to show that the Appellate Court has devoted judicial attention to the case of each accused—*Jamait v. Emp.*, 35 Cal. 138, *Dakshinamurti v. Emp.*, 1918 M.W.N. 129, 19 Cr.L.J. 200, *Arindra v. K. E.*, 20 C.W.N. 1296, *In re Bapu Naidu*, 11 L.W. 958, 16 Cr.L.J. 735; *In re Cherukath*, 16 Cr.L.J. 496 (Mad.), *In re Chinna Manikkam*, 48 M.L.J. 504, 26 Cr.L.J. 1089, *Madad Ali v. K. E.*, 24 O.C. 230; *Solhu v. Krishna Ram*, 25 Cr.L.J. 113 (Lah.).

The Appellate Court must record reasons for confirming, reversing or modifying the sentences or orders of the Magistrate, unless the reasons are set out, the High Court cannot revise the proceedings of the Appellate Court—*Anonymous*, 5 M.H.C.R. App. 12. Where the Appellate Judge merely says that he adopts the reasons given by the trial Court, to support the grounds of his decision, or merely states that he is satisfied that the judgment of the trial Court is substantially right, the judgment is erroneous in form—*Dasogi v. Emp.*, 20 Cr.L.J. 645 (Pat.), *Baishnab Charan v. Emp.*, 24 Cr.L.J. 311 (Cal.)

An Appellate Court is not required to write a long and elaborate judgment, but it is clearly its duty not only to examine the evidence but also to write a judgment affording a clear indication that the appeal has

properly tried and that the points urged by the appellant have been duly considered and decided. An Appellate Court which writes a judgment which the High Court is unable to follow without reference to the judgment of the trial Court, obviously fails in the discharge of the duty imposed upon it by law—*Dalip Singh v. Crown*, 2 Lah. 308 (310), 23 Cr. L.J. 9.

The judgment of the Appellate Court must show that it has duly considered the evidence of both sides and the pleas raised in appeal, with a judicial mind—*Beni v. Emp.*, 4 O.L.J. 80, 18 Cr.L.J. 689; if it does not consider the evidence for the defence, nor even alludes to it, it is defective—*In re Seperumal*, 11 Cr.L.J. 331, 7 M.L.T. 182; *In re Ballusu*, 1912 M.W.N. 881, 13 Cr.L.J. 712; *Beni v. Emp.*, (supra). Even though the Counsel for the appellant does not refer to the defence evidence, it is the duty of the Appellate Court to look into that evidence and after dealing with it come to its own decision—*Fidoi Hossein v. Emp.*, 40 Cal. 376, 14 Cr.L.J. 419. Where a District Magistrate disposed of an appeal in a case under section 100, in which a large mass of evidence had been produced on both sides, by a short judgment in a few lines dealing with some general observations upon the volume of evidence which was put before him and without proper consideration thereof, held that the judgment was not in accordance with law—*Sunehri v. Emp.*, 10 A.L.J. 921, 23 Cr.L.J. 378. A District Magistrate should not dispose of an appeal from an order requiring a person to furnish security, otherwise than by a judgment showing on the face of it that he has applied his mind to a consideration of the evidence on the record and of the pleas raised by the appellant both in the Court below and in the memorandum of appeal—*Lal Behari v. Emp.*, 38 All. 393, 17 Cr.L.J. 309. But the Appellate Court is not bound to give its opinion as to the character of the evidence in prolix detail—*Q. E. v. Pandeh Bhat*, 19 All. 506. Where in the judgment of the first Court, evidence was set out at great length and reasons fully explained, the judgment of the Appellate Court which confirms the judgment of the trial Court does not become defective in law by reason of the fact that it does not set out again in detail the whole of the evidence and reasons for believing the witnesses. If it appears from the judgment that the Appellate Court appreciated the arguments adduced against the credibility of the prosecution witnesses—*Kafiluddin v. Emp.*, 20 Cr.L.J. 239 (Cal.). But although as a general rule, it is not incumbent on the Appellate Court, when confirming a decision of the Lower Court, to set forth its reasons in full, still if there is anything peculiar in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Court should notice it—*Reg. v. Moraba*, 11 B.H.C.R. 101. But it is not a sufficient compliance with the requirements of this section, if the District Magistrate hearing the appeal and confirming the order of the lower Court gives no reasons for his decision but merely says that he has considered the evidence carefully and thinks that it is sufficiently strong to justify the order—*San Dan v. K. F.*, 2 Rang. 641; or if the Appellate Court states no reasons whatever and confirms the judgment of the Lower Court in these general terms: "I see no reason for distrusting the finding of the Lower Court"—*In re Ram*

Das, 13 Cal 110, *Emp. v. Sameshar*, 1888 A.W.N. 280, *Emp. v. Bhujpal*, 1886 A.W.N. 289; or "after reading the evidence and hearing the counsel I am of opinion that the Lower Court has decided the case rightly; I find no ground for interference, appeal is dismissed"—*Girish v. Q. E.*, 23 Cal 420, *Farkan v. Samsheer*, 22 Cal. 241, *Rohimuddy v. Q. E.*, 20 Cal. 353; *Q. E. v. Pandeh*, 19 All 506, or "the prosecution evidence is sufficient to warrant the conviction; I decline to interfere" *Shamsher Ali*, 2 Weir 536; or "I have perused the judgment of the Lower Court, and I agree with the findings arrived at by the learned trying Magistrate and convict all the accused for the offence of rioting as stated in the charge"—*Thakur Singh v. Emp.*, 20 Cr.L.J. 444 (Patna).

Where the judgment of the Appellate Court was in the nature of a stereotyped one, which might answer for any case, it was not one in accordance with this section or section 424—*Kasimuddi v. Q. E.*, 1 C.W. N. 169.

Even when an Appellate Court rejects an appeal summarily under section 421, it is advisable to state shortly in its order the reason or reasons which have influenced it in coming to the conclusion that there is no sufficient ground for interference in the case—*Q. E. v. Nanhu*, 17 All. 241; *Ramrao v. Emp.*, 13 N.L.R. 169, 18 Cr.L.J. 993. Although in rejecting an appeal under section 421, the Appellate Court is not bound to write a judgment and give reasons for its decision—*Q. E. v. Warubai*, 20 Bom. 540, *Rash Behari v. Balgopal*, 21 Cal. 92; *Ramrao v. Emp.*, 13 N.L.R. 169, *K. E. v. Krishnaya*, 25 Mad. 534, still the recording of reasons is necessary in view of the possibility of such orders being challenged by an application for revision—*Q. E. v. Nanhu*, 17 All. 241; *Kundan v. Emp.*, 36 All 496, 15 Cr.L.J. 512. See Note 1132 under sec. 421.

Even where the Appellate Court dismisses the appeal because no one appears to argue the appeal, the Court is bound to read and consider the evidence and dispose of the appeal by writing a judgment in accordance with the provisions of this section—*Noai Sheikh*, 11 C.W.N. cxxxv.

Defective Appellate Judgments:—It is difficult to lay down any rule with precision as to what judgment of an Appellate Court complies, and what judgment does not comply, with the requirements of this Code. It cannot be held that merely because the form of judgment does not exactly comply with all the requirements of this section and of section 424, it is not a valid judgment. The omissions in the judgment must be substantial in order to invalidate it—*Q. E. v. Pandeh*, 19 All. 506. Though the judgment of the Appellate Court is not in proper form, the High Court should not interfere with an order of acquittal, unless there has been a miscarriage of justice—*Rupa Mandal v. Keshab*, 5 C.L.J. 452, 11 Cr.L.J. 349. Where the Appellate judgment shows that the Judge had appreciated and had in view all the points, the High Court should not interfere in revision merely because the form of judgment does not exactly comply with all the requirements of this section—*Rohimuddy v. Q. E.*, 20 Cal. 353. But where the Appellate Court which dismissed the appeal not summarily but after notice to the parties, omitted to write the judgment

altogether, such an omission was not a mere irregularity curable by sec. 537, but a grave illegality—*Emp. v. Devendra*, 17 Bom. L.R. 1085, 16 Cr L J 832, 31 L.C. 1008.

1052. Sub-section (6) :—"We think it desirable to lay down that orders under sections 118 and 123 (3) should be deemed to be judgments for the purposes of the section"—*Report of the Joint Committee* (1922) This sub-section supersedes *In re Ramasamy Chetty*, 27 Mad 510 (512) where it was held that an order passed in security proceedings was not a "judgment"

In *Venkatachinnaya v K E*, 43 Mad 510, it was contended for the Crown that the word 'inquiry' in section 117 did not mean a trial; but Ayling J., in overruling this contention observed as follows (at pp. 524-525) —"If the word is to be given the narrow interpretation contended for the Crown, such provisions as those in Chapter XXVI regarding judgments will not apply to security cases That is to say, the Magistrate in ordering security under section 118 would be under no legal obligation, *inter alia*, to record a judgment setting forth his reasons (section 367) or to give the accused a copy of it without delay (section 371). So far as I can see, apart from the operation of section 117, the Magistrate might simply record an order requiring the execution of a bond, without recording any reasons or discussing the evidence I do not think this could have been intended, especially as care has been taken to provide for an appeal against an order for security (*vide* section 406) and for the interference of Chief Presidency or District Magistrate (section 125)" The present sub-section gives legislative recognition to the above remarks of Ayling J

368. (1) When any person is sentenced to death,
 Sentence of death. the sentence shall direct that he be
 hanged by the neck till he is dead.

(2) No sentence of transportation shall specify the place to which the person sentenced is to be transported.

9. No Court, other than a High Court, when it has signed its judgment, shall alter or review the same, except as provided in Sections 395 and 484 or to correct a clerical error.

369. Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, or in the case of a High Court established by Royal Charter, by the Letters Patent of such High Court, no Court, when it has signed its judgment, shall alter or review the

Court not to alter judgment

Court not to alter judgment

same, except * * to correct a clerical error.

Change :—This section has been amended by section 101 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923

The wording of the old section admitted of the interpretation that High Courts had unlimited powers of altering or reviewing their judgment (though such interpretation was never made in any of the decided cases). The present section as now amended lays down that the High Court has no power to alter or review its judgment except as provided by the Letters Patent. The references to sections 395 and 484 have been omitted, because there are cases other than those referred to in these two sections, in which a review of judgment is possible e.g., section 434. See the *Report of the Joint Committee of 1922*

1053. Scope of section—Although this section refers in express terms to judgments under Chapter XXVI of the Code, still it is clear that the principle laid down herein applies also to final orders which are in the nature of judgments—*In re Harilal*, 22 Bom 949. An order which is passed on full inquiry and after hearing both sides is in the nature of a judgment, and such an order cannot be altered after it is once passed and signed. Thus, an order of a District Magistrate, passed after full enquiry, refusing to deliver to the Political Superintendent of a Foreign State, a property seized in execution of a search warrant, cannot be altered by the Magistrate himself. The only course open to the Magistrate is to make a reference to the High Court, and have his own order cancelled—*In re Harilal*, 22 Bom 949. An order under Chapter XII is in the nature of a judgment, and a Magistrate having passed an order under section 146 cannot cancel the order and pass an order under Section 147 instead—*Ram Dulare v Ajodhya*, 16 O C 192, 14 Cr L J 605, *Lachmi v. Bhusi*, 19 Cr L J 225 (Pat). An order in sanction proceedings (now abolished) comes under this section and a Sessions Judge refusing to revoke a sanction has no jurisdiction to review his order and revoke it—*Q E v Ganesh*, 23 Bom 50. A final order in maintenance proceedings (sec. 488) is in effect a judgment, and the Magistrate cannot review a final order passed in such a proceeding—*Nanda v Manmaya*, 21 C W.N. 344.

But this section does not apply to an order of dismissal of complaint under section 203. Such an order is not a judgment within the meaning of this section—*Emp. v. Channa*, 29 Mad. 126, and the Magistrate can re-hear the complaint—*Chunna*, 29 Mad. 126, *Alakhatambi v. Hassan Ali*, 1 N L R 18. So also an order directing issue of process under sec. 204 is not a judgment, and a Magistrate can, on a reconsideration of that order, cancel the issue of process and order an inquiry under sec. 202—*Lalit Mohan v Nand Lal*, 27 C W.N. 651.

An order dismissing a summons case for default of appearance under section 247 is in the nature of a judgment, and a Magistrate cannot revive the case once dismissed for default—*Ram Coomar v. Ramji*, 4 C W.N. 26. But it is competent for a Magistrate to re-hear a warrant case in

Further inquiry:—An order for further inquiry does not amount to a review of the order of dismissal or discharge. The terms of this section must be read as controlled by section 437 (now 436). That section does not limit the power of a District Magistrate to make further inquiry into a case in which an order of dismissal or discharge may have been passed by a subordinate Magistrate; and there is no bar to a District Magistrate making further inquiry into a case in which such order may have been passed by himself—*Bidhu Chandalini v. Mohi*, 28 Cal. 102. But where a District Magistrate has already dealt with a case in revision and decided that there was no cause for interfering with the order of discharge, he cannot subsequently order further inquiry, because such an order would be an order reviewing the earlier one and is prohibited by this section—*Nga Than v. Emp*, 5 Bur. L.T. 37, 13 Cr.L.J. 301.

Proper procedure:—When a mistake has been made in the judgment (e.g., when an appeal has been erroneously dismissed as time-barred, or when an illegal sentence has been passed) it is not open to the Judge or Magistrate to alter or review his judgment or order, but the only course open to him is to submit the case to the High Court—*Emp v. Raghunath*, 6 Bom.L.R. 360, *Mga E. v. Emp*, 1 Bur. S.R. 354, *Q v. Poran Mal*, 23 W.R. 49; *In re Harilal*, 22 Bom. 949; *In re Dhondi*, 23 Bom. L.R. 846.

1055. No power of High Court to alter its judgment:—See notes under "Change" above. The law is now the same as it was practically before. It should be noted that inspite of the words 'other than a High Court' occurring in the old section, the High Court held that it had practically no power to alter or review its own judgment, under the old law. There being no provision in the Letters Patent or the Government of India Act authorising the High Court to exercise the power of review, the words "other than a High Court" could not be read as conferring on the High Court that power by implication—*In re Kunhammad*, 46 Mad. 382 (389). It has even been remarked in *In re Gibbons*, 14 Cal. 42 (47) that so far as the High Court was concerned there was no substantive enactment in this section, it did not confer any power on the High Court, nor did it take away any of the powers which existed in that Court before the passing of this section.

The Legislature has not conferred in express words upon the High Court the power of reviewing its judgment in all criminal cases, as it has done in all civil cases. The provisions of the old section, so far as they affect a High Court, merely apply to questions of law, which arise in its original criminal jurisdiction, and which are reserved and subsequently disposed of under the provisions of section 434 and the corresponding sections of the Letters Patent—*Q. E. v. Durgacharan*, 7 All. 672. The words 'other than a High Court' do not give the Division Bench of the High Court power to review its judgment passed by it in a criminal appeal. The words are to be accounted for by the power of review given to the High Court under section 434 on points specially reserved by the Judge presiding at the High Court Sessions—*Q. E. v. Mohan*, Patna 791, *In re Kunhammad*, 46 Mad. 382 (404). In other words, the High Court cannot entertain an application to review a judgment passed by it on appeal.

in a criminal case—*Q. v. Godai*, 5 W.R. 61, *Q. E. v. Mohun*, Ratanlal 791; *Hale v K E.*, 1909 P.R. 1; *Emp v Kale*, 45 All. 143 (145); *In re Arumuga*, 50 M.L.J. 51, 27 Cr L J 184 The Code of Criminal Procedure was passed after the Code of Civil Procedure. The latter contains a section expressly authorising review of judgment, but the former contains no corresponding section. From this it may be reasonably inferred that the Legislature did not intend to confer in criminal cases the power similar to that which they had given in civil cases—*Q. v. Godai*, 5 W.R. 61 (63). In criminal matters, the Letters Patent of the High Court confer on it full power and authority to review a case decided in the exercise of its original criminal jurisdiction on points of law. But such power to review does not appear to apply to a case decided in the exercise of its appellate or revisional criminal jurisdiction—*Ibrahim v. Emp.*, 30 Cr L J 749 (Rang.). As soon as an appellate judgment is pronounced and signed by the Judges, the High Court is *functus officio*, and neither the Court itself nor any Bench of it has any power to revise the decision or interfere with it in any way—*In re Gibbons*, 14 Cal. 42; *Q. E. v. Durgacharan*, 7 All. 672; *In re Kunhammad*, 46 Mad. 382 (401); *Paras Ram v Emp.*, 1 O.W.N. 891, 26 Cr.L J 543. Even if a single Judge of the High Court has passed an order dismissing an appeal, a Division Bench of the High Court cannot review that order by re-hearing the appeal—*Kunhammad*, 46 Mad. 382 (404). If the Division Bench of the High Court passes an erroneous order in appeal, the only remedy is to make a petition (under Ch. XXIX) to the Local Government, the authority with whom rests the discretion either of executing the law or of commuting or setting aside the sentence—*Q. E. v. Mohun*, Ratanlal 791; *Emp. v. Kale*, 45 All. 143 (145). So also, a Division Bench cannot review an order which has been passed by them in revision—*Q. E. v. Fox*, 10 Bom 176 (F.B.); *Gobind Sahai v. Emp.*, 38 All. 134; *Q. E. v. Durgacharan*, 7 All 672; *Al Ah Lok v. K. E.*, 1905 U B R. (Cr. P. C.) 35; *Nand Kishore v. Emp.*, 20 Cr.L.J. 447 (Pat.); *Q. E. v. Chimaba*, Ratanlal 458. A single Judge of the High Court has no power to alter or revise an order passed by him in revision—*In re Soma Naidu*, 47 Mad. 428 (431). The High Court will not review its order passed in appeal or revision, even on the ground of discovery of fresh evidence, because such evidence ought to have been produced at the trial—*Q. E. v. Chimaba*, Ratanlal 458; *Emp. v. Kale*, 45 All. 143 (145). So also, if a revision case is dismissed by the High Court for default of payment of printing charges, it is not competent for the High Court to rehear the case or entertain a fresh application for revision—*Appayya v. Venkatappayya*, 44 M L J. 27, 23 Cr.L J. 746. Even if a revision petition is dismissed for *default of appearance* of the practitioner who filed it, the High Court is not competent to restore the petition to its file—*In re Ranga Rao*, 23 M.L.J. 371. But in another recent case of the Madras High Court, as well as in cases of the other High Courts it has been held that when a criminal appeal or revision petition is dismissed by the High Court for default of appearance, there is no decision on the merits, and therefore there is no proper disposal of the case according to law. There being no provision in the Code for dismissing an appeal or

revision petition for default of appearance, the order of dismissal is no "judgment" at all, and the High Court is not debarred from rehearing the appeal or revision petition—*Kunhammad Haji*, 46 Mad. 382 (402, 403) (dissenting from *In re Ranga Rao*, 23 M.L.J. 371 and *Emp. v. Md Yasin*, 4 Bom 101); *Rajjab Ali v. Emp.*, 46 Cal 60 (63), 20 Cr.L.J. 265; *Kishen Singh v. Girdhari*, 23 Cr.L.J. 750 (Lah.); *Ibrahim v. Emp.*, 30 Cr.L.J. 749 (Rang.). Similarly, if an order is passed in the absence of the accused without giving him an opportunity of being heard in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) of sec. 439, as for instance where by mistake a case is posted on a day anterior to that fixed in the notice to the accused, the order is null and void, and the High Court is to proceed with the matter afresh after proper notice to the accused—*In re Soma Naidu*, 47 Mad. 428 (434), 46 M.L.J. 456, 34 M.L.T. 218, 26 Cr.L.J. 370; *Rajjab Ali v. Emp.*, 46 Cal 60 (63). If an appeal is dismissed by a High Court judge under sec. 421 without the appellant or his pleader being given reasonable opportunity of being heard in support of the same, the order is passed without jurisdiction, and the Court has power to make an order that the appeal should be reheard after giving the appellant or his pleader a reasonable opportunity of being heard—*Md. Sadiq v. Crown*, 7 Lah.L.J. 108, 26 Cr.L.J. 1169, A.I.R. 1925 Lah 355.

Under the present section as now amended, the power of the High Court is as limited as it was before the amendment. "In view of the cases reported in the Indian Law Reports, 7 All 672, 10 Bom 176 (F.B.), and 14 Cal. 42 (F.B.), it is proposed to make it clear that section 369 confers no power on the High Court to alter or review its own judgment after it has been signed"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1921) Even sec 361A does not confer on the High Court the power to review its own judgment—*Nazar Mohd. v. Hara Singh*, 26 P.L.R. 616, 27 Cr. L.J. 23; *Sadiq v. Emp.*, 7 Lah. L.J. 108, 26 Cr.L.J. 1169

As soon as the judgment is signed, it becomes final and the Court is *functus officio*. The mere fact that there has been no formal order issued by the High Court or communicated to the Lower Court in pursuance of the judgment does not enable the High Court to review its judgment. A judgment must be taken to mean and refer to the judicial act of the Court in finally disposing of the case and must therefore indicate only the order of the Court when it is read out and signed by the Judge, and cannot be meant to refer to the formal order on the judgment subsequently drawn up and issued merely as a clerical act by the ministerial officers of the Court—*In re Arumuga*, 50 M.L.J. 51, 27 Cr.L.J. 184, A.I.R. 1926 Mad 420

The High Court, like the Lower Courts, can review its judgment before it is signed—*Amoduni v. Darsan*, 38 Cal. 828, 13 Cr.L.J. 120; *Bibhutl v. Dasi Moni*, 7 C.W.N. vii. The Allahabad High Court can review its judgment after it is signed but before it is sealed, because the judgment of that High Court is not complete until it is sealed, and till then it may be altered by the Judge concerned—*Q. E. v. Lalit*, 21 All. 177; *Gobind Sahaj v. Emp.*, 38 All. 134; *Emp. v. Kallu*, 27 All 92.

370. Instead of recording a judgment in manner hereinbefore provided, a Presidency Magistrate shall record the following particulars :—

Presidency
Magistrate's judgment.

- (a) the serial number of the case;
- (b) the date of the commission of the offence;
- (c) the name of the complainant (if any);
- (d) the name of the accused person, and (except in the case of an European British subject) his parentage and residence;
- (e) the offence complained of or proved ;
- (f) the plea of the accused and his examination (if any);
- (g) the final order;
- (h) the date of such order; and
- (i) in all cases in which the Magistrate inflicts imprisonment, or fine exceeding two hundred rupees, or both, a brief statement of the reasons for the conviction.

1056. Scope of section :—This section does not apply to proceedings under section 2 (1) and 3 of the Workman's Breach of Contract Act (XIII of 1859). Those proceedings are not criminal proceedings, and no offence can be said to have been committed under those sections. A Presidency Magistrate is not therefore bound to frame a record in such proceedings in accordance with the provisions of this section—*Abheram v. Abdul*, 27 Cal. 131.

1057. Clause (i)—Reasons for conviction :—The meaning of this clause is that where the offence is sufficiently grave to involve a fine of Rs 200 or imprisonment as the substantive sentence, the Magistrate is bound to record his reasons (*In re Dervish Hussain*, 46 Mad. 253) so as to enable the party to bring the matter up to the High Court; but in petty cases, which can be met by a fine of few rupees, the decision of the Magistrate may be recorded shortly—*Motceram v. Belaseeram*, 14 Cal. 174. This section requires that in cases in which the accused is sentenced to imprisonment, a Presidency Magistrate shall record a brief statement of the reasons for the conviction. It is not sufficient for him to record that the offence is proved, for that may be necessarily implied from the fact that he has convicted the accused. The law requires something further as the reasons for the conviction—*Natabar v. Provash*, 27 Cal 461. So also, a mere statement to the effect "I believe the evidence for the prosecution and the evidence of the complainant, and I convict th

accused" is not a statement of reasons—*Emp. v. Shankar*, 17 Bom L R. 890, 16 Cr L.J. 771. The Magistrate should state his reasons in such a manner as to enable the High Court to judge of the sufficiency of the materials before the Magistrate to support the conviction—*Yacoob v. Adamson*, 13 Cal. 272; *Emaman v. Emp.*, 31 Cal. 983, *Toolsey v. Emp.*, 8 C.W.N. 587. Where there was not on the record any summary of the evidence nor such a statement of facts and reasons for conviction as would enable the High Court to say whether the materials were sufficient to support the conviction, it was held that the conviction should be set aside—*Toolsey, v. Emp.*, 8 C.W.N. 587; *Yacoob v. Adamson*, 13 Cal. 272; *Emaman v. Emp.*, 31 Cal. 983. Even, in a non-appealable case, the Presidency Magistrate should state his reasons so as to enable the High Court in revision to judge the sufficiency of materials before the Magistrate to support the conviction—*Yacoob v. Adamson*, 13 Cal. 272. A Presidency Magistrate (as also an Honorary Presidency Magistrate), who tries and convicts an accused in a summary trial is bound to give reasons for the conviction—*In re Varadarajulu*, 31 M.L.T. 400, *In re Thurman*, 20 L.W. 330, 25 Cr.L.J. 1084. But the omission to record the reasons in a summary trial is a mere irregularity, and the High Court will not interfere in revision if the accused has not been prejudiced—*In re Thurman* (supra).

The omission to record the various particulars required to be recorded under sec. 370 is a mere irregularity and not an illegality, where all the important items of these particulars have been recorded, and the omissions are of no real importance—*Bishnupada v. Emp.*, 30 C.W.N. 981, 27 Cr.L.J. 1131.

The imprisonment referred to in this clause is substantive imprisonment. A sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of fine is not a sentence of imprisonment within the meaning of this clause—*Moteeram v. Belaseeram*, 14 Cal. 174.

If the Magistrate omits to record the reasons, the defect is not cured by section 441 which permits a Presidency Magistrate to submit with the record (when called for under section 435) a statement setting forth the grounds of his decision. Section 441 does not abrogate the terms of section 370, but it merely allows the Presidency Magistrate to supplement the reasons which have been already recorded under section 370—*In re Dervish Hussain*, 46 Mad. 253. But if the statement submitted under section 441 discloses sufficient grounds for the decision, the defect in not recording reasons under sec. 370 may be excused under section 537, if no substantial failure of justice has occurred—*Ibid*.

371. (1) On the application of the accused a copy of the judgment, or when he so desires, a translation in his own language, if practicable, or in the language of the Court, shall be

Copy of judgment, etc., to be given to accused on application.

given to him without delay. Such copy shall in any case other than a summons case, be given free of cost.

(2) In trials by jury in a Court of Session, a copy of the heads of the charge to the jury shall, on the application of the accused, be given to him without delay and free of cost.

(3) When the accused is sentenced to death by a Sessions Judge, such Judge shall further inform him of the period within which, if he wishes to appeal, his appeal should be preferred.

The application for copy of judgment need not be stamped. See *Q. E. v. Ragba, Ratanfal* 364

Under clause (2), only a copy of the heads of the charge to the jury is supplied to the accused, because the Sessions Judge is not required to write a judgment but only to record the heads of the charge

The period of limitation for appeal from a sentence of death is 7 days from the date of the sentence (Art. 150, Limitation Act) excluding the time requisite for obtaining copies (sec 12, Limitation Act). Under subsection (3), the Judge should not only inform the accused that he must file his appeal within 7 days, but should also record that the accused was so informed, and whether he desires to appeal.—See *N. W. P. Gazette*, 1873, p. 101.

372. The original judgment shall be filed with the record of proceedings, and where the original is recorded in a different language from that of the Court and the accused so requires, a translation thereof into the language of the Court shall be added to such record.

373. In cases tried by the Court of Session, the Court shall forward a copy of its finding and sentence (if any) to the District Magistrate within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the trial was held.

Case of person sentenced to death.
Court of Session to send copy of finding and sentence to District Magistrate.

Judgment when to be translated.
the original is recorded in a different language from that of the Court

CHAPTER XXVII.

OF THE SUBMISSION OF SENTENCES FOR CONFIRMATION.

374. When the Court of Session passes sentence of death, the proceedings shall be submitted to the High Court, and the sentence shall not be executed unless it is confirmed by the High Court.

Sentence of death to be submitted by Court of Session.

When the record of a case in which a sentence of death has been passed is submitted to the High Court under section 374, all the Police Diaries connected with the case should be simultaneously forwarded—*Cal. G R & C O.*, p 39.

375. (1) If when such proceedings are submitted the High Court thinks that a further inquiry should be made into, or additional evidence taken upon, any point bearing upon the guilt or innocence of the convicted person, it may make such inquiry or take such evidence itself, or direct it to be made or taken by the Court of Session.

Power to direct further inquiry to be made or additional evidence to be taken.

(2) Such inquiry shall not be made nor shall such evidence be taken in the presence of jurors or assessors, and, unless the High Court otherwise directs, the presence of the convicted person may be dispensed with when the same is made or taken.

(3) When the inquiry and the evidence (if any) are not made and taken by the High Court, the result of such inquiry and the evidence shall be certified to such Court.

1058. Under this section the High Court can take additional evidence itself. In *Q. E. v. Basvanta*, 25 Bom. 168, the High Court admitted in evidence a confession rejected by the Sessions Judge. In *Bhagwan v. Crown*, 1911 P.W.R. 16, 12 Cr.L.J. 412, the High Court (then Chief Court) admitted further evidence and inspected the building where the offence was alleged to have been committed.

The High Court when recording further evidence under this section, can dispense with the presence of the accused, especially where the additional evidence is recorded by itself—*K. E. v. Tirumal*, 24 Mad. 523.

The High Court acting under this section is not entitled, with a view to make its opinion still more conclusive with reference to the discrepancies in the testimony of the witnesses on which the Trial Judge has pro-

perly dwelt, to test that testimony still further by reading the earlier statements of those witnesses made to the police and entered in the police diary; in other words, to treat as evidence what could be used at all events only for the purpose of discrediting those witnesses—*Dal Sing v. K. E.*, 44 Cal. 876 (P.C.).

376. In any case submitted under Section 374, whether tried with the aid of assessors or by jury, the High Court—
Power of High Court to confirm sentence or annul conviction.

- (a) may confirm the sentence, or pass any other sentence warranted by law, or
- (b) may annul the conviction, and convict the accused of any offence of which the Sessions Court might have convicted him, or order a new trial on the same or an amended charge, or
- (c) may acquit the accused person :

Provided that no order of confirmation shall be made under this section until the period allowed for preferring an appeal has expired, or, if an appeal is presented within such period, until such appeal is disposed of

1059. Power of High Court.—Though a High Court has power to substitute its own finding for the unanimous verdict of the jury in a trial for murder, when the sentence comes on for confirmation before the High Court, still as a matter of practice the High Court will not generally allow the verdict to be attacked arbitrarily. It is necessary that the convict must show *prima facie* that the verdict is unsupported by evidence. The High Court will not permit the same latitude in the criticism of the evidence before the jury that it allows in an ordinary appeal from a trial with assessors—*Gul v. Emp.*, 15 S.L.R. 103 (F.B.), 23 Cr L.J. 33. But the High Court will undoubtedly interfere with the verdict if it is perverse or if evidence has been improperly admitted or excluded, or if there is a misdirection by the Judge—*Gul v. Emp.*, *supra*. Where there has been a misdirection in the summing up to the jury, the conviction and sentence should be set aside and a retrial ordered—*Emp. v. Rajab Ali*, 31 C.W.N. 881, 28 Cr L.J. 742 (744). But questions of misdirection are of less importance in a case of reference, because on a reference the High Court is bound to come to its own *independent* conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, independently of the verdict of the jury or of the opinion of the Judge—*Hazrat Gul Khan*, 32 C.W.N. 345 (349), 29 Cr L.J. 546, 47 C.L.J. 240.

High Court may go into facts and law—When a case is submitted under section 374, the whole case is reopened before the High Court, and the High Court is bound to go into the *facts* as well as the law,

although the conviction is by the verdict of the jury—*Q. v. Jaffir Ali*, 11 W.R. 57, *Q. E. v. Chatradhari*, ■ C.W.N. 49; *Emp. v. Daji*, 17 Bom L.R. 1072, 16 Cr L J. 818; and the High Court's power under this section is not limited as in appeal—*Chatradhari*, 2 C.W.N. 49 In a case referred to the High Court for confirmation of a death sentence, it is the practice of the High Court to be satisfied on the facts of the case as well as the law that the conviction is right, before it proceeds to confirm the sentence—*Q. E. v. Abdul Razak*, Ratanlal 710 Though the jury have unanimously convicted an accused for murder, it is the duty of the High Court on a reference under sec 374, to be satisfied that the finding of fact is supported by the evidence on the record—*Arshed Ali v. Emp.*, 30 C.W.N. 166. Where the material evidence in the case could not be believed and was not supported by trustworthy evidence, and the confessions of some of the co-accused were not genuine but appeared to have been inspired in order to bring them into a line with the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, the High Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the accused, even though the jury passed a unanimous verdict of guilty, and there was no misdirection by the Judge to the jury—*Panchu Mandal v Emp.*, 32 C.W.N. 702 (704), 29 Cr.L J. 833.

Where the High Court hears the appeal of a co-accused not sentenced to death along with a reference under section 374 in respect of a person sentenced to death, it was held under the old law that it was not open to the High Court to go into the facts in the appeal—*Q. E. v. Chatradhari*, 2 C.W.N. 49, and the hearing of the appeal was limited, ■ laid down in sections 418 and 423 (2), to points of law only—*Ibid.* But now see the new sub-section (2) of section 418

Question of jurisdiction :—In determining whether the sentence should be confirmed, the High Court may also consider whether the conviction was by a Court of competent jurisdiction—*Emp. v. Sarmukh*, 2 All 218

1060. Commutation of sentence :—Where the condition of the convict was such that if he were ordered to be hanged, a complete severance of the body from the neck would ensue (owing to an aperture in the neck communicating with the larynx), the High Court commuted the sentence of death into one of transportation for life—*Boodhoo*, 2 C.L.R. 215. In *Autor Singh v. Emp.*, 17 C.W.N. 1213, there being a difference of opinion among the Judges who heard the reference, the case had to be referred to a third Judge (sec. 378) and there was a delay of six months in the High Court, before the final decision was arrived at The third Judge upheld the conviction for murder, but commuted the sentence of death into one of transportation on the ground that the capital sentence had been hung over the heads of the accused for six months owing to the delay in the High Court

Conviction for any other offence :—Where the accused was tried before the Sessions Judge for murder and concealment of murder, and was convicted of murder, but no finding was given on the minor charge, the High Court in acquitting the accused of the charge of murder, could convict him of the minor charge, where there was evidence to support

it, inspite of the omission of the Sessions Judge to give any finding in respect of this minor charge—*Md. Shah v. Crown*, 1913 P.R. 8. The Calcutta High Court altered the conviction for murder into a conviction for grievous hurt (sec. 326 I.P.C.) where it was found that the intention to kill was wanting—*Hazrat Gul Khan*, 32 C.W.N. 345 (353), ■■ Cr.L.J. 546. The Bombay High Court holds that in a reference under this section, the High Court cannot alter a conviction for murder into one for culpable homicide not amounting to murder, unless there is a petition of appeal along with the reference ■ no appeal is preferred, the only course is to order a retrial for the other offence—*Reg v. Balapa*, 1 Bom 639. But there is nothing in this section to warrant such a view

1061. Retrial :—Where the evidence taken before the Court of Session was incomplete, and further evidence was necessary before judgment could be properly pronounced upon the accused, the High Court ordered a retrial—*K. E. v. Daulat*, ■ C.W.N. 921 Where the accused was undefended in the Sessions Court, the High Court ordered ■ retrial on the same charge after proper arrangement being made for his defence—*K. E. v. Mohar Ali*, 19 C.W.N. 556, 16 Cr.L.J. 481. See also *Reg v. Balapa*, 1 Bom 639 above.

377. In every case so submitted, the confirmation of the sentence or any new sentence or order passed by the High Court, shall, when such Court consists of two or more Judges, be made, passed and signed by at least two of them.

Confirmation or new sentence to be signed by two Judges

378. When any such case is heard before a Bench of Judges and such Judges are equally divided in opinion, the case, with their opinions thereon, shall be laid before another Judge, and such Judge, after such hearing as he thinks fit, shall deliver his opinion, and the judgment or order shall follow such opinion.

Procedure in case of difference of opinion.

If the Judges of the High Court are in disagreement over the question of sentence, one favouring the death penalty and the other recommending that a sentence of transportation would meet the ends of justice, this in itself ■ a sufficient ground that death sentence is not to be inflicted. But this is not an inflexible rule, and the third Judge ■ required to go into the facts of the case and to judge for himself after considering all the circumstances, whether the case is or is not a fit one for the infliction of the death penalty—*Emp v. Dukari* 33 C.W.N. 1226 (1234) When a case is referred to a third Judge, he must give his own independent opinion, and should not necessarily decide the case according to the opinion of the Judge who was in favour of acquittal—*Emp v. Bundu*, 1897 A.W.N. 125

379. In cases submitted by the Court of Session to the High Court for the confirmation of a sentence of death, the proper officer of the High Court shall, without delay, after the order of confirmation or other order has been made by the High Court, send a copy of the order under the seal of the High Court, and attested with his official signature, to the Court of Session.

380. Where proceedings are submitted to a Magistrate of the first class or a Sub-divisional Magistrate as provided by Section 562, such Magistrate may thereupon pass such sentence or make such order as he might have passed or made if the case had originally been heard by him, and, if he thinks further inquiry or additional evidence on any point to be necessary, he may make such inquiry or take such evidence himself or direct such inquiry or evidence to be made or taken.

1062. The Magistrate to whom a case is submitted under section 562, must pass such sentence and make such order as he thinks fit. If, however, on a perusal of the evidence he comes to the conclusion that the conviction should not have taken place, he can acquit the accused under the powers vested in him under this section—*Mt Thi v. Mt Kin*, 1915 U.B.R. 1st Qr. 55

The Magistrate to whom the case is referred cannot send the case back to the inferior Magistrate. Where a second class Magistrate, finding the accused guilty of an offence under section 325 I. P. C., submitted the case to the District Magistrate for an order under section 562, but the District Magistrate sent the case back to the 2nd class Magistrate pointing out the sec. 562 [before its present amendment] was inapplicable (as the offence was beyond its scope), it was held that the District Magistrate's order sending back the case was illegal; because, under this section, he could pass such sentence or order as he might have passed if the case had originally come to him, and he could not have sent it to the second class Magistrate for the purpose of sentence if he had originally heard it—*K E. v. Abdul*, 4 L.B.R. 150

Appal.—See sections 407 and 408 as now amended.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

OF EXECUTION.

381. When a sentence of death passed by a Court of Session is submitted to the High Court for confirmation, such Court of Session shall, on receiving the order of confirmation or other order of the High Court thereon, cause such order to be carried into effect by issuing a warrant or taking such other steps as may be necessary.

"The date named by the Sessions Court, in its warrant for the execution of a sentence of death, shall not be less than fourteen or more than twenty-one days from the date of the issue of such warrant"—*Cal. G. R. & C. O.*, page 39

382. If a woman sentenced to death is found to be pregnant, the High Court shall order the execution of the sentence to be postponed, and may, if it thinks fit, commute the sentence to transportation for life.

1063. The fact that the accused is a pregnant woman is not a sufficient ground for commutation of sentence—*Q v Panhee*, 15 W R. 66, in such a case, execution will be deferred until delivery, as provided by this section

The High Court is the only tribunal in which the law has vested the power of postponing the execution of a sentence of death passed on a woman found to be pregnant—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 441 (442)

The pregnancy of the woman should be certified by a civil surgeon—*Bombay Gazette*, 1879, page 471.

383. Where the accused is sentenced to transportation or imprisonment in cases other than those provided for by section 381, the Court passing the sentence shall forthwith forward a warrant to the jail in which he is, or is to be confined, and, unless the accused is already confined in such jail, shall forward him to such jail, with the warrant.

1064. *Sentence when to commence*—A sentence of imprisonment ought to commence from the time the sentence is passed. A sentence of imprisonment to take effect at a future date is bad in law. A Magistrate

has no power to postpone the execution of the sentence ■ the request of the accused—*In re Kishen Soonder*, 12 W.R. 47. Where a Magistrate passes a sentence of imprisonment on an accused and admits him to bail in order that he may have the means of appealing, held that the admission to bail does not make the sentence one to commence at a future date, and does not therefore make it illegal—*In re Okhoy Kumar*, 7 C L R 393, *Kishen Soonder*, 12 W.R. 47. When a Judge convicts the accused, he must pass sentence on him at once; he has no power to adjourn the passing of sentence for an indefinite period—*Emp v. Keshavlal*, 14 Bom L R 144, 13 Cr L.J. 288

The commencement of the sentence cannot also be ante-dated. A sentence of imprisonment for the time already passed in the lock-up is illegal, but a sentence of imprisonment until the rising of the Court is good and legal—*Bhagel v. Crown*, 1907 P W R 9

When a prisoner has been committed to jail under two separate warrants, the sentence in the one to take effect from the expiry of the sentence in the other, the date of such second sentence shall, in the event of the first sentence being remitted on appeal, be presumed to take effect from the date on which he was committed to jail under the first or original sentence—*Cal. G. R. & C. O.*, page 40.

Where to be imprisoned:—When a case is submitted to the High Court under section 307, and the High Court passes a sentence, it does so ■ a Court of Reference and not in the exercise of its ordinary original jurisdiction, and therefore it has power, on conviction and sentence, to send the accused to jail outside the Presidency Town. The High Court is required to send the accused to that jail in which he would have been confined by the Court submitting the case—*In re Horace Lyall*, 29 Cal 286

It is illegal for a Magistrate to direct the accused to be imprisoned in a *Police lock-up*. A jail is a prison within the meaning of the Prisons Act and the Prisoners Act, but ■ does not include a police lock-up—*K. E. v Po Thin*, 7 L ■ R. 62

It is illegal to confine a person in a jail other than that mentioned in the warrant—*Shamsonessa v. Anne Love*, 11 Cal 527 (cited under section 384).

Calculation of period of imprisonment.—In calculating sentences of imprisonment, the day on which the sentence is passed and the day of release ought to be included and considered as days of imprisonment, for example, a man sentenced on the 1st January to one month's imprisonment should be released on the 31st January, and not on the 1st February.—*Mad. G. O. No 2411 dated 22-11-81.*

384. Every warrant for the execution of a sentence of imprisonment shall be directed to the officer in charge of the jail, or other place in which the prisoner is, or is to be, confined.

Direction of warrant for execution.

1065. The warrant of imprisonment must be signed by the Magistrate; and the signature should be affixed by pen and not by means of a stamp—*Subramanya Ayyar v. Q.*, 6 Mad. 396.

The period of imprisonment should be definite; thus, in an order under sec. 123, the Magistrate should state the period for which the accused is to be imprisoned in default of finding security; it is illegal to direct the accused to be imprisoned *until he gives security*—*Mailamdi v. Taripulla*, 8 Cal. 644

It is illegal to confine a person in a jail other than that mentioned in the warrant. Where a sheriff's officer delivered over to the officer-in-charge of the Alipore jail, a judgment-debtor who had been duly committed to Presidency Jail, the confinement in the Alipore jail was held to be illegal—*Shamshonnessa v. Anne Love*, 11 Cal. 527

385. When the prisoner is to be confined in a jail,
 Warrant with whom the warrant shall be lodged with
 to be lodged. the jailor.

386. (1) Whenever an offender has been sentenced
 Warrant for levy of to pay a fine, the Court passing the
 fine. sentence may take action for the
 recovery of the fine in either or both
 of the following ways, that is to say, it may—

(a) issue a warrant for the levy of the amount by attachment and sale of any moveable property belonging to the offender;

(b) issue a warrant to the Collector of the District authorising him to realise the amount by execution according to civil process against the moveable or immoveable property, or both, of the defaulter:

Provided that, if the sentence directs that in default of payment of the fine the offender shall be imprisoned, and if such offender has undergone the whole of such imprisonment in default, no Court shall issue such warrant unless for special reasons to be recorded in writing it considers it necessary to do so.

(2) The Local Government may make rules regulating the manner in which warrants under sub-section (1), clause (a), are to be executed, and for the summary determination of any claims made by any person other than the offender in respect of any property attached in execution of such warrant.

(3) *Where the Court issues a warrant to the Collector under sub-section (1), clause (b), such warrant shall be deemed to be a decree, and the Collector to be the decree-holder, within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, and the nearest Civil Court by which any decree for a like amount could be executed shall, for the purposes of the said Code, be deemed to be the Court which passed the decree, and all the provisions of that Code as to execution of decrees shall apply accordingly :*

Provided that no such warrant shall be executed by the arrest or detention in prison of the offender.

Change —The whole section has been redrafted by sec 102 of the Cr. P. C Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923 The old section stood as follows :—

"386 Whenever an offender is sentenced to pay a fine, the Court passing the sentence may, in its discretion, issue a warrant for the levy of the amount by distress and sale of any moveable property belonging to the offender, although the sentence directs that, in default of payment of the fine, the offender shall be imprisoned."

The main changes introduced are —*Firstly*, under the old law, fine could be recovered only by distress and sale of moveable property, under the present law it can be recovered by sale of *immoveable* property also, as provided in clause (b). *Secondly*, under the old law, fine could be recovered by distress and sale even though the offender had undergone the full term of imprisonment in default of payment of fine; the present section ordinarily prohibits the recovery of fine in such cases, and allows it only on special reasons; see the proviso to sub-sec. (1) *Thirdly*, sub-sections (2) and (3) have been newly added. The reasons have been stated below. In clause (a) the word 'attachment' has been substituted for 'distress' by the Select Committee of 1916, "as we think it is more appropriate."

1066. Scope of section —Sections 63–70 I. P. C., and the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code in respect of levy of fines shall apply to all fines imposed under any Act, Regulation, Rule or Bye-law unless the Act, Regulation, Rule or Bye-law contains an express provision to the contrary—*Section 25, General Clauses Act (X of 1897)*.

Thus, the provisions of sections 386–389 of this Code shall apply to the levy of penalties and fines imposed under Act V of 1861 (General Police Act) on conviction before a Magistrate—*Section 37, Police Act (V of 1861)* Compensation under section 250 of this Code shall be recoverable as a fine, and this section prescribes the mode in which the fine may ordinarily be recovered—*Paryag v. Arju Mean*, 22 Cal 139. But the provisions of this section do not apply to fines imposed under Act XXI of 1856 (Abkari Act); such fines cannot be levied by distress and sale of the offender's property—*Govt v. Junglee Beldar*, 17 W.R. 7.

A warrant can be issued under this section only to levy a *fine*, but not to recover the amount of damage done to a Railway carriage, where no *fine* has been imposed on the offender. Such warrant is illegal, and cannot be executed under this section—*Abdul Majid v Mukharji*, 10 P.L.T. 124, 30 Cr.L.J. 635.

1067. Sentence of fine :—*It should be specific.*—A sentence of fine imposed upon more than one prisoner individually and collectively, is not a proper sentence. It should be specifically stated in the sentence what amount each individual prisoner is to pay—*Anonymous*, 11 M.H.C.R. App. 5.

It should be levied immediately.—There should be no delay in the levy of a fine directly upon passing a sentence. A Magistrate cannot defer the levying of the fine imposed on the prisoner till the period of appeal shall have expired, or until the orders of the Appellate Court are received on appeal preferred by the accused. Nor can the Appellate Court order the original Court to abstain from levying the fine till the disposal of appeal—2 W.R. (Cr. Let.) 13. As to the period of limitation within which fine may be recovered, see section 70 I.P.C.

Who can levy fine—The term 'Court' is not restricted to the particular individual who held office. The successor in office of a Judge or Magistrate may levy a fine imposed by his predecessor—*Chunder Coomar v Modhusoodun*, 9 W.R. 50.

1068. Clause (a)—Distress and sale—It is lawful for the Magistrate to issue his warrant for the levy of fine by distress and sale of the goods of the offender, and at the same time to order his imprisonment for non-payment of fine. It is not necessary to postpone imprisonment till the distress and sale of goods have failed to realise the fine, and the imprisonment should not be allowed to stop the process for the levy of fine so as to give the offender time to remove his goods beyond the reach of the law—*Govt. v Junglee Beldar*, 17 W.R. 7.

This clause allows the distress and sale of moveable property of the offender. But growing crops are not moveable property for the purposes of this clause—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 444. Rights and interests or shares in the joint moveable property of a joint Hindu family, of which the accused is a member, cannot be sold under this clause—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 442 (443), *Q. E. v Sita Nath*, 20 Cal. 478, *Hira Lal v Crown*, 1915 P.L.R. 28, 16 Cr.L.J. 166. If the accused is a member of an Alayasantana family, the distress and sale of his moveable property in execution of a warrant under this clause is illegal—*Achuma v Rudra*, 2 Weir 443. But according to the Bombay High Court, the words "belonging to the offender" do not mean "belonging exclusively to the offender" and therefore the share of the accused in the moveable property of the joint Hindu family of which the accused is a member can be attached—*Shivlingappa v Gurlingava*, 49 Bom. 906, 27 Bom.L.R. 1363, 27 Cr.L.J. 652 (655). Moveable property (money) belonging to the accused's brother and deposited in Court by the accused's brother as security for the appearance of the accused in a criminal trial cannot be seized, as the money does

not belong to the accused. Even the fact that the accused and his brother are members of a joint Hindu family will not enable the Court to seize the money—*Girdhari Lal v. Emp.*, 19 A.L.J. 887, 22 Cr.L.J. 744. Moveable property of the offender in a Native State cannot be seized for the realisation of a fine adjudged by a British Court; only the property remaining in British India can be seized and sold—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 444.

1069. Clause (b).—The old law provided for the distress and sale of moveable property only; immoveable property could not be attached and sold for the recovery of fine—*Maaari v. Mehr Din*, 22 Cr L.J. 399 (Lah.), 61 I.C. 527; *Reg. v. Lalla*, 5 B.H.C.R. 63; *Q. E v. Sitanath*, 20 Cal 478. Clause (b) now allows attachment and sale of immoveable properties also.

1070. Proviso :—Levy of fine after imprisonment :—It was held under the old section that an offender who had undergone the full term of imprisonment to which he was sentenced in default of payment of fine was still liable to have the amount levied by distress and sale of any moveable property belonging to him—*Q v. Madoosoodun*, 3 W.R. 61, because the imprisonment which the Court imposed in default of payment was intended as a punishment for non-payment and not as a satisfaction and discharge of the amount due—*Reg v. Gulab Chand, Ratanlal* 91 (92). But the Court had a discretion in the matter whether fine should be recovered after the accused had undergone imprisonment for nonpayment. If it appeared that the fine was not paid for want of means or that its realisation would be ruinous to the offender or his family, it was not desirable that further steps should be taken for the levy of fine; but if there was reason to believe that the offender had means to pay but would not pay and would prefer to undergo imprisonment, the law was strictly enforced and steps were taken for the realisation of the fine within the period allowed by law—See *Punjab Circ.*, Chapter LI, p 264

The proviso in the present section now lays down that if the offender has undergone the whole term of the imprisonment awarded in default of fine, the Court should not issue a warrant for levy of the fine. "The new proviso directs that after the imprisonment awarded in default of payment of fine has been served, no further steps should be taken for the recovery of the fine, unless the Court for special reasons to be recorded considers it necessary. The infliction of a double punishment is ordinarily uncalled for, and by the issue of warrants for the recovery of fines when there is no real reason why they should be recovered, the time of the police is frequently wasted. Convicted persons also are thus harassed for long periods after they have expiated their offences by undergoing imprisonment."—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1921).

"Unless for special reasons..to do so" :—These words at the end of the proviso are intended for the case of a contumacious person who may evade the fine and suffer imprisonment, and yet having the means to pay the fine, not pay the fine. In such a case, the serving of the period of imprisonment provided in default of payment of fine should not absolve

the person from paying the fine. See *Legislative Assembly Debates*, 8th February, 1923, page 2061.

1071. Sub-section (2).—Claims of third parties :—By this sub-section, power is given to the Local Government to make rules regarding the execution of warrants and the determination of claims—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914).

Under the old law, when a claim was preferred by a third party to the ownership of the property distrained, the Magistrate was not required by law to try any such claim, because this section did not contain any provision for the trial of claims which might be preferred to the property distrained under this section—*Q. E. v. Gasper*, 22 Cal. 935, *Hira Lal v. Crown*, 1915 P.L.R. 28, 16 Cr.L.J. 166. What the Magistrate had to do in such a case was to postpone the sale of the property and to allow the claimant an opportunity of establishing his title in a Court having jurisdiction to determine civil rights—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 445. When a claim was preferred, the Court was to direct postponement of the sale of the property for such time as might be necessary to enable the claimant to establish his right (by a civil suit). But if the property was of such a nature that an immediate sale would be for the benefit of the owner, the property could be sold and the sale proceeds held over—*Q. E. v. Chhagan*, Ratanlal 976, *Q. E. v. Kandappa*, 20 Mad. 88, *Q. E. v. Gasper*, 22 Cal. 935.

Under the present law, the Magistrate is empowered to determine summarily the claims of third parties. This view was also taken in a Burma case—*Mingang v. Emp.*, 1 Bur. S.H. 332.

1072. Sub-section (3).—"We would add a clause after sub-section (2) to enable a fine to be realised through the Collector as if the order was a decree of a Civil Court. We can see no reason why a property-owner who may be able to conceal his moveables should not be forced to pay a fine which has been inflicted upon him by a Criminal Court, just as much, and by the same process, as a civil debt. It seems to be recognised that the liability is so enforceable by section 70, Indian Penal Code, and the decision in *Emp. v. Sitanath Mitra* 1 L.R. 20 Cal. 478, and we think that this should be made clear by the section under consideration. The proper person to effect such realisation is, we think, the Collector of the district, who will be treated as the decree-holder"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*.

The Joint Committee of 1922, approving of this amendment has remarked: "We recognise that the procedure prescribed may in some case involve considerable delay, and we attempted to find some more summary method of proceeding against immoveable property on the lines of those laws which enable moneys due to the Crown to be recovered as arrears of land revenue. We have, however, found ourselves unable to devise any procedure which will not be open to most of the objections put forward against the present clause."

The immoveable property of an agriculturist can be attached and sold in execution of an order passed under this section, and the mere fact that under sub-sec (3) the warrant is to be deemed a decree does not justify

a Court in holding that the exceptional provisions of sec. 22 of the Deccan Agriculturists Relief Act must be applicable to such a warrant. Sec. 386 sub-sec. (3) only applies the provisions of the C. P. Code as to execution of decrees, and there is nothing in the C. P. Code which involves the application of sec. 22 of the D. A. ■ Act. Sec. 22 of that Act mainly has reference to decrees which are passed in the ordinary way in *suits to which an agriculturist is a party*, and the mere fact that the warrant under sec. 386 (3) Cr. P. Code is executable as if it were a decree does not suffice to make the provisions of sec. 22 of the D. A. R. Act applicable ■ such a warrant—*Collector v. Mahadu*, 28 Bom.L.R. 1231, A.I.R. 1926 Bom 582 (583). In Punjab, sec. 16 of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act lays down that no land belonging to a member of an agricultural tribe shall be sold in execution of any decree or order by any Civil Court; and the combined effect of that section and of sec. 386 (3) Cr. P. Code is that such land cannot be sold in pursuance of a warrant issued by a Magistrate to the Collector for levy of a fine in a criminal case—*Emp v. Milkha*, 30 Cr.L.J. 1006 (1007), 1929 Cr C 212.

1073. Revision :—The order of a Magistrate for sale of properties under this section is not a judicial proceeding and is not the proper subject of criminal revision; the claimant whose property is wrongly sold under this section may proceed by way of civil suit (either against the purchaser or against the Secretary of State)—*Secretary of State v. Sukhdeo*, 1898 A.W.N. 173, *Q. E. v. Kandappa*, 20 Mad 88, *Hira Lal v. Crown*, 1915 P.L.R. 28, 16 Cr L.J. 166.

387. A warrant issued under Section 386 sub-section (1) clause (a) by any Court
Effect of such warrant. may be executed within the local limits of the jurisdiction of such Court, and it shall authorize the *attachment* and sale of any such property without such limits, when endorsed by the District Magistrate or Chief Presidency Magistrate within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such property is found.

Change :—The italicised words have been substituted for the words "such warrant" (occurring in the old section) by sec. 103 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act XVIII of 1923. This amendment is merely verbal, and consequential to the amendment of sec. 386.

The word *attachment* has been substituted for the word *distress* in this section as well as in section 386, as the term is more appropriate.

<p>388. When an offender has been sentenced to fine only and to imprisonment in default of</p> <p>Suspension of execution of sentence of imprisonment.</p>	<p>388. (1) When an offender has been sentenced to fine only and to imprisonment in de-</p> <p>Suspension of execution of sentence of imprisonment.</p>
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payment of the fine, and the Court issues a warrant under S. 386, it may suspend the execution of the sentence of imprisonment and may release the offender on his executing a bond, with or without sureties, as the Court thinks fit, conditioned for his appearance before such Court on the day appointed for the return to such warrant, such day not being more than fifteen days from the time of executing the bond; and in the event of the fine not having been realized the Court may direct the sentence of imprisonment to be carried into execution at once.

fault of payment of the fine, and the fine is not paid forthwith, the Court may—

(a) order that the fine shall be payable either in full on or before a date not more than thirty days from the date of the order, or in two or three instalments, of which the first shall be payable on or before a date not more than thirty days from the date of the order and the other or others at an interval or at intervals, as the case may be, of not more than thirty days, and

(b) suspend the execution of the sentence of imprisonment and release the offender, on the execution by the offender of a bond with or without sureties as the Court thinks fit, conditioned for his appearance before the Court on the date or dates on or before which payment of the fine or the instalments thereof, as the case may be, is to be made; and, if the amount of the fine or of any instalment, as the case may be, is not realised on or before the latest date on which it is payable under the order, the Court may direct the sentence of imprisonment to be carried into execution at once.

(2) In any case in which an order for the payment of money has been made, on non-recovery of which imprisonment may be awarded, and the money is not paid forthwith, the Court may require the person ordered to make such payment to enter into a bond as prescribed in sub-sec. (1), and, in default of his so doing, may at once pass sentence of imprisonment as if the money had not been recovered.

(2) *The provisions of sub-section (1) shall be applicable also in any case in which an order for the payment of money has been made, on non-recovery of which imprisonment may be awarded, and the money is not paid forthwith; and if the person against whom the order has been made, on being required to enter into a bond such as is referred to in that sub-section, fails to do so, the Court may at once pass sentence of imprisonment.*

Change—This section has been redrafted by the Criminal Procedure Code Second Amendment Act XXXVII of 1923. This amendment has been made on the recommendation of the Indian Jails Committee See *Gazette of India*, 1923, Part V, p. 242.

Sub-section (1) :—Sub-section (1) is inapplicable where no alternative sentence of imprisonment (for non-payment of fine) has been passed. Where a Magistrate sentences an offender to a fine, but omits to pass a sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of the fine, he has no power to bind over the accused in his own recognizance to appear (under clause b) —*Venkatrapragada*, 2 Weir 445

389. Every warrant for the execution of any sentence may be issued either by the Judge or Magistrate who passed the sentence, or by his successor in office.

Who may issue warrant.

See 9 W.R. 50 cited under sec. 386

390. When the accused is sentenced to whipping only, the sentence shall, *subject to the provisions of section 391*, be executed at such place and time as

Time and place of execution of sentence of whipping only.

the Court may direct.

The italicised words have been added by sec. 21 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act XII of 1923.

1074. It has been held that if the accused is sentenced to whipping only, the sentence cannot be deferred: it must be carried out as soon as practicable. This section authorises the Court to fix the time and place for its execution, but not to *postpone* it—*Q. E. v. Abdulla*, Ratanlal 906; *Meyyan v. Emp.*, 26 Mad. 465. An order that an accused shall not be whipped until after the expiry of the sentence of imprisonment passed in another trial, is illegal. The sentence should be carried out as soon as practicable—*Q. E. v. Nga Po*, L.B.R. (1900—1902) 53. The sentence cannot be postponed pending an intended appeal—*Meyyan v. Emp.*, 26 Mad. 465. But these cases should now be read subject to clause (a) of sec 391 which allows postponement of whipping if the accused furnishes bail.

Even if the case does not fall under sec. 391 (a), *i.e.*, even though the accused is sentenced to whipping only, and does not furnish bail, the sentence of whipping need not necessarily be carried out *on the very day* that it is passed. The words "at such place and time as the Court may direct" give a wide discretion to the Court in the matter, and the Court may direct that the sentence should be carried out as soon as *practicable*. Thus, if the Court passes the sentence of whipping at a late hour on Saturday and directs the sentence to be carried out as soon as practicable, it is not illegal to carry out the sentence on Monday (whipping not being allowed on Sunday by the Jail Rules)—*Emp. v. Gopala*, 30 Bom L R 389, 29 Cr L J 573 (574).

For general rules as to whipping see notes under sec 32

391. (1) When the accused—

**Execution of sentence
of whipping only, or of
whipping in addition to
imprisonment.**

(a) *is sentenced to whipping only and furnishes bail to the satisfaction of the Court for his appearance at such time and place as the Court may direct, or*

(b) *is sentenced to whipping in addition to imprisonment,*

the whipping shall not be inflicted until fifteen days from the date of the sentence, or if an appeal is made within that time, until the sentence is confirmed by the Appellate Court, but the whipping shall be inflicted as soon as practicable after the expiry of the fifteen days, or in case of an appeal, as soon as practicable after the receipt of the order of the Appellate Court confirming the sentence.

(2) The whipping shall be inflicted in the presence of the officer in charge of the jail, unless the Judge or Magistrate orders it to be inflicted in his own presence.

(3) No accused person shall be sentenced to whipping in addition to imprisonment, when the term of imprisonment to which he is sentenced is less than three months.

1075. This section has been amended by sec. 22 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, XII of 1923. The old section contemplated only those cases where the accused was sentenced to whipping as well as to imprisonment; if the accused was sentenced to whipping only, the section did not apply, and the sentence of whipping could not be postponed—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 446. But the newly added clause (a) now provides for such cases.

Clause (a) provides that a sole sentence of whipping should not be inflicted, if the accused furnishes bail, until 15 days from the date of the sentence, or if an appeal is made within that time, until the sentence is confirmed on appeal. This is because the Code now provides for an appeal from a simple sentence of whipping (sec. 413) which formerly was not appealable—*Emp. v. Gopala*, 30 Bom L.R. 389, 29 Cr.L.J. 573 (574).

Postponement of whipping till after expiry of imprisonment.—Where a person has been sentenced to whipping as well as to imprisonment, the whipping may be postponed, as provided by this section, until 15 days from the date of sentence or until confirmation of the sentence on appeal, but it is illegal to postpone the sentence of whipping till after the term of imprisonment has expired—*Anonymous*, 6 M.H.C.R. App. 38; *Anonymous*, 7 M.H.C.R. App. 29, *Q. E. v. Habla*, Ratanlal 803 (804), *Emp. v. Jagannath*, 4 Bom L.R. 929. Where an accused is convicted of two different offences, for one of which he is sentenced to imprisonment, and for the other to whipping, it is not permissible to postpone the whipping merely because the accused appeals against his conviction for the first offence—*Jaiwant*, 4 Bom L.R. 436. Where a Magistrate ordered that the prisoner be brought before him at the expiration of the sentence of imprisonment, and that the sentence of whipping should then be carried out, the High Court cancelled the sentence of whipping as having become inoperative and incapable of being carried out by lapse of time—*Hur Chandra v. Jafer Ali*, 20 W.R. 72. Where an accused is sentenced in one case to 18 months' imprisonment and 15 stripes, and in another case he is also sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment and 15 stripes and the Magistrate orders in the second case that the sentence passed in that case must take effect after the expiry of the sentence in the first case, held that the sentence of whipping in the second case is illegal and must be set aside, because under this section, whipping can be postponed till 15 days from the date of sentence or till the disposal of the appeal, but it cannot be postponed till 18 months—*Sagram*, Ratanlal 300 (301). Where the accused was sentenced to imprisonment for two years and was further ordered "to receive 30 stripes on the day of his release from prison," held that the sentence of whipping was altogether illegal and improper and must be set aside, as it was ordered to be carried out after the expiry of the imprisonment—*Emp. v. Jiwa Ram*, 1881 A.W.N. 138.

As soon as practicable.—The whipping must be carried into effect as soon as practicable after the expiry of the time specified in this section. But if through accident, or neglect or wilful breach of duty of the officer the sentence of whipping is not immediately carried into execution, the prisoner is not thereby freed from the liability of undergoing the sentence still remaining unexecuted—*Q. E. v. Mahadhu, Ratanlal* 136

Double sentence of whipping.—An accused cannot be sentenced to a double sentence of whipping when he is convicted of two offences, thus, where a person is convicted of offences under sections 454 and 380 I P C, it is illegal to pass a sentence of 15 stripes for each offence—*Q. E. v. Dagdu, Ratanlal* 955. The High Court altered the sentence to 15 stripes for both the offences

Sub-section (3).—When a sentence of imprisonment for less than three months is awarded, an additional sentence of whipping is illegal—*Q. E. v. Bhica, 2 Bom. L. R.* 54.

392. (1) In the case of a person of or over sixteen years of age, whipping shall be

Mode of inflicting punishment.

inflicted with a light rattan not less than half an inch in diameter, in such mode, and on such part of the person, as the Local Government directs; and, in the case of a person under sixteen years of age, it shall be inflicted in such mode, and on such part of the person, and with such instrument, as the Local Government directs.

(2) In no case shall such punishment exceed thirty stripes, and, in the case of a person under sixteen years of age, it shall not exceed fifteen stripes.

Limit of number of stripes.

'Such part of the person'.—(1) In case of a person of or over sixteen years of age, in C P, Madras, Bengal and Assam, the punishment of whipping is inflicted on the bare buttocks, the offender being tied to a triangle—See C P Gazette, Notification No 20 of 4-1-1899, Fort St George Gazette, 1898, Part I, p 1248, Wilkins, 148, Assam Gazette, 1899, Part II, p 384. In Burma the punishment is inflicted on the breech—Burma Gazette, 1891, Part I, p 201. In Bombay, if the punishment is inflicted in private (i.e. within the precincts of the prison), it shall be inflicted on the bare buttocks, and when inflicted in public (i.e. outside the jail precincts), across the bare shoulders—Bombay Government Gazette, 1893, Part I, p 110, Bom. G. R. No 608 of 1897

(2) In case of a person under sixteen years of age in Bombay, U. P., C. P., and the Punjab, the whipping is inflicted on the bare buttocks, with a light rattan not exceeding half an inch in diameter, but the offender is not tied to a triangle but simply held on it, or is held in some other convenient way. See Bom. G. R. No 6222, dated 16-9-1898; G. O.

No 1290 of 12-5-1898 (U. P.); C. P. Gazette Notification No. 20 of 4-1-1899, Punjab Gazette, 1899, Part I, p. 314. In Burma the whipping is inflicted on the breech—Burma Gazette, 1899, Part I, p. 307. In Bengal, it may be inflicted on the posteriors or on the hands as the Court may direct—Cal. G. R. and C. O., page 62. "Having regard to the general feeling of the respectable classes of the people as to the degrading character of the punishment of whipping, the Lieutenant-Governor has left it to the discretion of the Court in the case of juvenile offenders, to inflict the punishment on the hand instead of on the buttocks. This discretion should be exercised according to the circumstances of each case, as age and social position of the offenders and the nature of the offence. For very young boys of respectable position convicted of offences which do not imply depravity or confirmed dishonesty, strokes on the hand appear to be the appropriate punishment. Care is, however, necessary and should be taken to avoid causing serious injury to the hand when whipping is inflicted on the palm"—Cal. G. R. & C. P., pages 63-64. In C. P., if the boy is under twenty years of age, the whipping may be inflicted on the hands, at the discretion of the Magistrate—C. P. Gazette, Notification No. 20 of 4-1-1899.

Number of stripes.—Under the provisions of this section and the next, not more than one sentence of whipping and that not exceeding thirty stripes, should be awarded at one time—Emp v. Nga Po, 1906 U B R (Cr. P C) 47

393. No sentence of whipping shall be executed by instalments: and none of the following persons shall be punishable with whipping, namely—

Not to be executed
by instalments.
Exemptions

- (a) females;
- (b) males sentenced to death or to transportation or to penal servitude, or to imprisonment for more than five years;
- (c) males whom the Court considers to be more than forty-five years of age.

1076. This section forbids the execution of the punishment of whipping in respect of certain persons, and since the execution is prohibited, such persons cannot be sentenced to whipping, for it is futile to pass a sentence which cannot be executed. Therefore a person who is sentenced to 7 years' rigorous imprisonment cannot be sentenced to whipping in addition, because the execution of such punishment is prohibited by clause (b) of this section—Akbar v. Crown, 1919 P.R. 30

Sentence of whipping cannot be enhanced.—The accused was convicted under section 382 I. P. C. and was sentenced to whipping, and the sentence was duly executed. An application was afterwards made to enhance the sentence on the ground that it was inadequate; it was held

that the sentence of whipping could not be enhanced by the infliction of an additional number of stripes, because under this section no sentence of whipping could be executed by instalments—*Q. E. v. Balu, Ratanlal* 537.

Clause (b) :—A sentence of whipping passed on a person who is already under sentence of death etc., is illegal. Even if the sentence of whipping precedes instead of following the other sentence, the passing of the latter sentence renders the infliction of the punishment of whipping illegal—*Anonymous, 1 Mad* 56

394. (1) The punishment of whipping shall not be inflicted unless a medical officer, if Whipping not to be inflicted if offender not in fit state of health. present, certifies, or, if there is not a medical officer present, unless it appears to the Magistrate or officer present, that the offender is in a fit state of health to undergo such punishment.

(2) If, during the execution of a sentence of whipping, a medical officer certifies, or it appears to the Magistrate or officer present that the offender is not in a fit state of health to undergo the remainder of the sentence, the whipping shall be finally stopped.

1077. 'Particular attention should be directed to section 394 which prohibits the execution of a sentence of whipping when the offender is not in a fit state of health to undergo that punishment, and all officers are reminded that the Governor-General in Council considers that the precaution of having a medical officer present at the time of the infliction of the punishment should be observed in every instance when practicable"—*Cal G II & C O.* page 65

Before the commencement of whipping, the Medical Officer must give a certificate whether the offender is in a fit state of health to undergo the whole punishment of whipping. There is no provision of law authorising a medical officer to give a certificate that the accused is fit to receive only a portion of the sentence, such a certificate cannot be held as granted under sub-section (1)—*Pub. Prosecutor, 31 Mad.* 84. Such a certificate cannot be treated as one under sub-section (2), because that sub-section refers to a certificate granted during the execution of the sentence—*Ibid*

Under sub-section (1), the Medical Officer is to give a certificate either that the offender is in a fit state of health to undergo the whole sentence passed on him or that he is not in a fit state of health to undergo it at all. If he certifies that the accused is fit to undergo a smaller number of stripes than that ordered by the Magistrate, the certificate cannot be held as one granted under this section, and is invalid; the

Magistrate cannot in such a case inflict a smaller number of stripes in accordance with the medical certificate, and in lieu of the rest of the stripes not inflicted he cannot award imprisonment under section 395 *infra*—Public Prosecutor, 31 Mad. 84.

395. (1) In any case in which under Section 394,

Procedure if punishment cannot be inflicted under S. 394. a sentence of whipping is wholly or partially prevented from being executed, the offender shall be kept

in custody till the Court which passed the sentence can revise it; and the said Court may, at its discretion, either remit such sentence, or sentence the offender in lieu of whipping, or in lieu of so much of the sentence of whipping as was not executed, to imprisonment for any term not exceeding twelve months or to a fine not exceeding five hundred rupees which may be in addition to any other punishment to which he may have been sentenced for the same offence.

(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorise any Court to inflict imprisonment for a term or a fine of an amount exceeding that to which the accused is liable by law, or that which the said Court is competent to inflict.

Change —The italicised words have been added by section 105 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. "The Amendment in sub-section (1) enables a sentence of fine to be awarded in lieu of a sentence of whipping which cannot be carried out"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914)

Under the old law it was held that the Court had no power to revise a sentence of whipping by inflicting a fine—*Q. E. v. Sheodin*, 11 All 308; *Anonymous*, 2 Weir 449 These cases are now rendered obsolete

1078. 'Wholly or partially prevented' :—"Wholly prevented" refers to sub-section (1) of section 394, 'Partially prevented' refers to sub-section (2) of that section—Public Prosecutor, 31 Mad 84

'The Court which passed the sentence can revise it' —The only Court which can revise the sentence is the Court which passed the sentence Even where a sentence of imprisonment and whipping passed by a District Magistrate is confirmed on appeal by the Sessions Judge, still the Magistrate is not prevented from revising the sentence—*Emp. v. Chelu*, 1889 P R 10 But the words 'the Court which passed the sentence' do not mean the same officer who inflicted the sentence, therefore, where a Magistrate who passed the original sentence of whipping was transferred, the District Magistrate who had jurisdiction over the whole district was

competent to commute the sentence of whipping to one of imprisonment—*Chhajju v. Emp.*, 1901 P R 33.

Power of revision.—The Court can revise the sentence of whipping by awarding solitary confinement in lieu of whipping, under this section—*Q. E. v. Gaman*, 1899 P.R. 14. The Court may remit the sentence altogether, even though it is competent to inflict a term of imprisonment in lieu of whipping—*Crown v. Po Thit*, 1 L.B.R. 202

The imprisonment which the Court can award under this section in lieu of whipping must not exceed the term which the Court is competent to award under sec 32. Where a Magistrate sentences the accused to the maximum term of imprisonment which he is competent to inflict as well as whipping, and the whipping cannot be carried out, he cannot sentence him to a further term of imprisonment in lieu of whipping, but ought to remit the sentence of whipping altogether—*Karat Ahamad*, 2 Weir 449, *Q. E. v. Ram Baran*, 21 All. 25, *Crown v. Barkat Ali*, 1901 P.R. 11.

396. (1) When sentence is passed under this Code

Execution of sentences on escaped convicts. on an escaped convict, such sentence, if of death, fine or whipping, shall, subject to the provisions here-

inbefore contained, take effect immediately, and, if of imprisonment, penal servitude or transportation, shall take effect according to the following rules, that is to say—

(2) If the new sentence is severer in its kind than the sentence which such convict was undergoing when he escaped, the new sentence shall take effect immediately.

(3) When the new sentence is not severer in its kind than the sentence the convict was undergoing when he escaped, the new sentence shall take effect after he has suffered imprisonment, penal servitude or transportation, as the case may be, for a further period equal to that which, at the time of his escape, remained unexpired of his former sentence.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section—

(a) a sentence of transportation or penal servitude shall be deemed severer than a sentence of imprisonment;

(b) a sentence of imprisonment with solitary confinement shall be deemed severer than a sentence of the same description of imprisonment without solitary confinement; and

- (c) a sentence of rigorous imprisonment shall be deemed severer than a sentence of simple imprisonment with or without solitary confinement.

1079. The word *sentence* includes an order of imprisonment passed under section 123—*Q. E. v. Pandu Khandu, Ratanlal 774, Contra.—K. E. v. Nga Po Thin, 2 L.B.R. 72.*

What this section contemplates is that the severer sentence must be undergone first. Where the accused who was a life-convict under sentence of transportation for murder was convicted for attempting to escape from lawful custody and was sentenced to four months' rigorous imprisonment, the latter sentence must not commence immediately, but should be undergone after the expiry of the sentence of transportation—*Q. E. v. Mahadu, Ratanlal 965.*

397. When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment, penal servitude or transportation is sentenced to imprisonment, penal servitude or transportation, such imprisonment, penal servitude or transportation shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment, penal servitude or transportation to which he has been previously sentenced, *unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence:*

Provided that if he is undergoing a sentence of imprisonment, and the sentence on such subsequent conviction is one of transportation, the Court may, in its discretion, direct that the latter sentence shall commence immediately or at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced:

Provided, further, that where a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment by an order under section 123 in default of furnishing security is, whilst undergoing such sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the making of such order, the latter sentence shall commence immediately.

Change :—The italicised words and the second proviso have been added by section 106 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act XVIII of 1923. The reasons are stated below.

1080. Principle :—The general rule is that a sentence commences to run from the time of its being passed, and this section creates

an exception in the case of persons already undergoing imprisonment, and postpones the operation of the subsequent sentence until after the expiry of the previous sentence—*In re Krishnanand*, 3 B.L.R.A.C. 50; *Q. v. Sobrai*, 20 W.R. 70.

'Undergoing imprisonment'—A person is said to be undergoing an imprisonment the moment the sentence of imprisonment is passed, though he has not yet been sent to jail. Therefore, where a person is tried on the same day for two different offences in two different trials, then as soon as the first trial is over and he is convicted and sentenced he is said to 'undergo imprisonment', and if he is convicted and sentenced in the second trial also, he is said to be sentenced to imprisonment 'while already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment' within the meaning of this section—*Muthusami*, 2 Weir 451, *Emp v Nga Po*, 3 Bur L.J. 32, 25 Cr.L.J. 1310 But in *Makhan v Emp*, 19 Cr.L.J. 207 (All.), it has been held that until an accused has actually passed into jail, he cannot be said to be undergoing imprisonment, and therefore where two sentences of imprisonment are passed in two trials on the same accused on the same day, this section does not apply, as the accused cannot be said to be 'undergoing imprisonment' under the first trial, as soon as the sentence is passed, therefore the second imprisonment need not commence after the expiry of the imprisonment awarded in the first trial, the Magistrate may order that the two sentences should be concurrent.

Detention under the order of a Civil Court is not a sentence of imprisonment within the meaning of this section; therefore a Magistrate has no power to order that the sentence of imprisonment awarded by him shall take effect on the expiry of a term of detention in the Civil jail which had been ordered by a Civil Court—*Emp v Makha Gyi*, 4 Bur L.J. 9, 3 Rang. 93, 26 Cr.L.J. 821, A I R. 1925 Rang 202.

1081. Order of sentences :—The meaning of this section is that sentences will take effect in the order in which they are passed. The sentence which is first passed and which the accused is undergoing must be given effect to first, and any subsequent sentence passed upon the accused must follow after the expiration of the first sentence. Where a Magistrate passes separate sentences of imprisonment on the same accused in separate trials and on the same day, the sentences will take effect in the order in which they are passed, by the terms of this section, and the Magistrate need not therefore give any direction in his judgment in respect of the same—*Muthusami*, 2 Weir 451.

But the above rule as to the sequence of sentences applies only to the 1st para of this section. It is only the sentences mentioned in para 1 (viz sentences of imprisonment) that can be directed to take effect in the order in which they were passed. A sentence of whipping cannot be deferred till the sentence of imprisonment, for that will contravene the provisions of sec. 391—*Q E v Sagram*, Ratanlal 300. As regards the sentences mentioned in the first proviso, the Magistrate has a discretion to direct either that the subsequent sentence should take effect after the expiration of the prior sentence, or that it should take effect at once.

Imprisonment in foreign territory :—Where a person sentenced to imprisonment in a foreign territory is subsequently convicted of an offence in British India, it is competent for the Magistrate to pass a sentence which shall take effect after the expiration of the sentence in the foreign State—*Q. E. v. Venkataram*, 20 Mad. 444

1082. Concurrent sentences :—It was held, prior to the present amendment, that a Magistrate could not direct that the subsequent sentence should run concurrently with the previous sentence, because a Magistrate could pass concurrent sentences only when the offences were tried at one and the same trial (see sec. 35)—*Kamal Mandal v. K. E.*, 20 C.W.N. 1300; *Q. E. v. Mahomed, Ratanlal* 532; *Anonymous*, Ratanlal 18, *Q. E. v. Bhagwandas*, 2 Bom. L.R. 111; *Erip. v. Tukaram*, 4 Bom. L.R. 876; *Govindasamy*, 13 Cr.L.J. 466, 1912 M.W.N. 396; *Pattayil v. Sarai*, 2 Weir 453; *Harak Narain v. Emp.*, 19 A.L.J. 316. *Malbul v. K. E.*, 11 A.L.J. 263, 14 Cr.L.J. 240; *Ngai Sein Po v. Emp.*, 1 Rang. 306; *Emp. v. Ganda Singh*, 1912 P.L.R. 20, *Q. E. v. Khudj Bux*, 2 S.L.R. 23; *K. E. v. San*, 4 L.B.R. 147, 7 Cr.L.J. 445, even where the trials were held on the same day, the Magistrate could not make the sentences in the two trials concurrent—*Muzafar v. Q. E.*, 1894 P.R. 12. But now the amendment made at the end of the first para of this section will allow the subsequent sentence to run concurrently with the previous one. "In accordance with the amendment, a Court will be empowered to pass a sentence to run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment etc. which the person convicted is already undergoing"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914). See *Mahadeo v. Emp.*, 27 Cr.L.J. 807 (812) (Nag).

'At the expiration of' :—A person was convicted by a Magistrate and sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment, and a month afterwards he was sentenced to three years' imprisonment by the Court of Session, which directed the sentence to take effect on the expiration of the sentence passed by the Magistrate. On appeal the conviction and sentence passed by the Magistrate were set aside. It was held that the sentence of the Sessions Court must be deemed to have commenced from the time it was ordered to commence, viz after the expiration of the Magistrate's sentence whether by reversal or completion of the punishment, and not before—*Anonymous*, Ratanlal 139; *K. E. v. Khandu*, Ratanlal 523. But in *Anonymous*, 2 Weir 450, under similar circumstances, it was held that the imprisonment already undergone must be reckoned as imprisonment under the sentence in the conviction which was not reversed. So also the Calcutta High Court lays down: "Where a prisoner has been committed to jail under two separate warrants, the sentence in the one to take effect from the expiry of the sentence in the other, the date of such second sentence shall, in the event of the first sentence being remitted in appeal, be presumed to take effect from the date on which he was committed to jail under the first or original sentence"—*Cal G. R. & C. O.*, page 40. But these remarks can only apply where the sentences in the two trials are of the same kind; otherwise the Bombay rulings cited above should apply. Those rulings are more reasonable and practical, though the Madras case and the Calcutta High Court Rule are more favourable to the accused

First proviso :—Where a person who is already undergoing imprisonment is sentenced by the Sessions Judge to transportation for life, the sentence of transportation passed by him will commence at the expiration of the previous sentence of imprisonment, unless the Judge in his discretion makes a further order that the sentence of transportation shall take effect immediately—*Q. E. v Hari, Ratanlal* 391.

An order directing that a sentence shall take effect on the expiration of another sentence, is not a part of the judgment and may therefore be made after the judgment has been signed. Therefore, where a Sessions Judge, in ignorance of the fact that the accused is already undergoing imprisonment, sentences him to transportation for life, it is subsequently open to him to order, even after the judgment has been signed, that the sentence of transportation shall take effect immediately—*Q. E. v Hari, Ratanlal* 391.

1083. Second proviso :—This proviso lays down that if a person who is imprisoned under section 123 in default of furnishing security, is subsequently sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the passing of the order under section 123, the latter sentence (i.e., the substantive sentence of imprisonment) shall take effect immediately. This is also laid down in a large number of decided cases. *Joghi v Emp.*, 31 Mad 515; *Vishnu*, 37 Bom 178, 13 Cr L J 849; *Emp. v. Durga*, 5 Bom. L.R. 26; *Lekria*, 8 N L.R. 20, 13 Cr.L.J. 189.

Under the old law, there was no distinction as to whether the offence for which the person imprisoned under sec 123 was subsequently convicted was committed before or after the making of the order under section 123. The law was that if a person undergoing imprisonment under section 123 was subsequently convicted of an offence and sentenced to imprisonment (whether this offence was committed before or after the sentence of imprisonment passed under section 123 was immaterial), the latter imprisonment must take effect at once and should not be postponed till after the expiry of the period of imprisonment awarded under section 123—*Q. E. v Tulshya, Ratanlal* 970, *Venkatigada*, 2 Weir 452, *In re Pichari*, 16 Cr.L.J. 622 (Mad), *Emp v Vishnu Balakrishna* 14 Bom L.R. 965, 37 Bom. 178, *Emp v. Kanji*, 5 Bom L.R. 26, *Emp. v Durga*, 6 Bom L.R. 1098, *Pandhi*, 3 S.L.R. 114, 4 I.C. 603, *Crown v Sukhal*, 15 S.L.R. 205, 23 Cr L.J. 255, *Crown v Ghulam*, 7 S.L.R. 203, *Muthu Komaran*, 27 Mad 525, *Joghi v Emp.*, 31 Mad 515, *Shin Taung v. Emp.*, 10 Bur. L.T. 266, *Diwan Chand*, 1895 P.E. 14, *Lekria*, 8 N L.R. 20. And this law has not been altered under the present section. In *Emp. v Arjun*, 34 Bom 326 and *Markanda v K. E.*, 1 P.L.J. 212 it has been held that the two sentences must run concurrently. This would be in consonance with the amendment made at the end of the first para of this section. (In *Emp. v Tula Khan* 30 All 334 it was held that the sentence under section 123 must take effect first. But this ruling was dissented from in almost all the cases cited above).

With reference to this amendment the Joint Committee (1922) observe :—“We think that the law should be that in cases where an offence has

been committed prior to the order under sec 123 but the conviction takes place subsequently, the sentences should ordinarily run concurrently; but where the offence is committed after the order under sec. 123 has been passed, e.g., cases of escape from custody or jail or offences committed in jail, then we think that the imprisonment for the subsequent offence should ordinarily not be concurrent; otherwise the prisoner might in some cases receive no further punishment for his subsequent offence "

398. (1) Nothing in section 396 or section 397

**Saving as to sections
396 and 397.**

shall be held to excuse any person from any part of the punishment to which he is liable upon his former or subsequent conviction.

(2) When an award of imprisonment in default of payment of a fine is annexed to a substantive sentence of imprisonment, or to a sentence of transportation or penal servitude for an offence punishable with imprisonment, and the person undergoing the sentence is after its execution to undergo a further substantive sentence or further substantive sentences of imprisonment, transportation or penal servitude, effect shall not be given to the award of imprisonment in default of payment of the fine until the person has undergone the further sentence or sentences.

Sub-section (2) renders obsolete the ruling in *Anonymous*, Ratanlal 132, where it has been held that when a convict is imprisoned under two warrants which order consecutive punishments, the first warrant should be completely executed both in respect of the substantive sentence of imprisonment and the imprisonment in default of fine, before any effect is given to the second warrant. Now, under sub-section (2) the imprisonment in default of payment of fine shall take effect last of all.

399. (1) When any person under the age of fifteen

Confinement of youthful offenders in reformatories.

years is sentenced by any Criminal Court to imprisonment for any offence, the Court may direct that such person, instead of being imprisoned in a criminal jail, shall be confined in any reformatory established by the Local Government as a fit place for confinement, in which there are means of suitable discipline and of training in some branch of useful industry or which is kept by a person willing to obey such rules as the Local Government prescribes with regard to the discipline and training of persons confined therein.

(2) All persons confined under this section shall be subject to the rules so prescribed.

(3) This section shall not apply to any place in which the Reformatory Schools Act, 1897, is for the time being in force.

1084. A sentence of imprisonment is a condition precedent to an order under this section. Where there is no preliminary sentence of imprisonment, an order under this section cannot be passed—*Bakhtawar*, 1910 P R 34, ■ I C. 1166

The period of detention in the Reformatory School should be a definite period. Where the trying Magistrate ordered the offender to be detained in a Reformatory for five years 'or until he attains the age of 18 years,' in lieu of imprisonment, it was held that the words 'or until 18 years' should be deleted—*Emp v Rama Sudama*, 15 Bom L R. 306, 14 Cr.L J. 256.

The period of detention in the Reformatory must not be longer than the period of imprisonment at first ordered. Where a Magistrate finding a juvenile offender guilty of theft in a building sentenced him to three months' rigorous imprisonment and ordered that in lieu of that sentence the offender should be confined in a Reformatory for 14 months, it was held that having once passed a sentence of imprisonment for a particular term, it was not competent to the Magistrate to direct that the offender should be confined in a Reformatory for a longer term—*Reg v. Ganpaya*, Ratanlal 109.

'Reformatory':—Where no Reformatories have been established, but only Reformatory Schools, the Court should not order the offender under this section to be sent to a Reformatory, but should pass an order under the Reformatory Schools Act, sending the boy to a Reformatory School—*Q E v Madasami*, 12 Mad 94.

Subsection (3).—The introduction of the Reformatory Schools Act repeals the operation of this section so far as may be practicable in those places where that Act applies—*Q E v Madasami* 12 Mad 94. Thus, this section has no application in the Punjab where the Reformatory Schools Act is in force—*Crown v. Noor Mahomed*, 1918 P R 17, 19 Cr L J 917, 47 I C 433

400. When a sentence has been fully executed, the officer executing it shall return the warrant to the Court from which it issued with an endorsement under

Return of warrant on execution of sentence.

his hand certifying the manner in which the sentence has been executed.

CHAPTER XXIX.

OF SUSPENSIONS, REMISSIONS AND COMMUTATIONS OF SENTENCES.

401. (1) When any person has been sentenced to punishment for an offence, the Governor-General in Council or the Local Government may, at any time, without conditions or upon any conditions which the person sentenced accepts, suspend the execution of his sentence or remit the whole or any part of the punishment to which he has been sentenced.

Power to suspend or remit sentences.

(2) Whenever an application is made to the Governor-General in Council or the Local Government for the suspension or remission of a sentence, the Governor-General in Council or the Local Government, as the case may be, may require the presiding Judge of the Court before or by which the conviction was had or confirmed to state his opinion as to whether the application should be granted or refused, together with his reasons for such opinion, and also to forward with the statement of such opinion a certified copy of the record of the trial or of such record thereof as exists.

(3) If any condition on which a sentence has been suspended or remitted is, in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council or of the Local Government, as the case may be, not fulfilled, the Governor-General in Council or the Local Government may cancel the suspension or remission, and thereupon the person in whose favour the sentence has been suspended or remitted may, if at large, be arrested by any police-officer without warrant and remanded to undergo the unexpired portion of the sentence.

(4) The condition on which a sentence is suspended or remitted under this section, may be one to be fulfilled by the person in whose favour the sentence is suspended or remitted, or one independent of his will.

(4A) The provisions of the above sub-sections shall also apply to any order passed by a Criminal Court under

any section of this Code or of any other law, which restricts the liberty of any person or imposes any liability upon him or his property.

(5) Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to interfere with the right of His Majesty, or of the Governor-General when such right is delegated to him, to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment.

(5A) Where a conditional pardon is granted by His Majesty or, in virtue of any powers delegated to him, by the Governor-General, any condition thereby imposed, of whatever nature, shall be deemed to have been imposed by a sentence of a competent Court under this Code and shall be enforceable accordingly.

(6) The Governor-General in Council and the Local Government may, by general rules or special orders, give directions as to the suspension of sentences and the conditions on which petitions should be presented and dealt with.

Change .—The italicised words and sub-sections (4A) and (5A) have been added by section 107 of the Cr P C Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923).

1085. Scope of section .—This section applies only to persons sentenced to imprisonment, and not to persons upon whom a conditional pardon has been tendered under section 337—*Q E v Gangacharan*, 11 All 79

In cases of murder, the Judge may report any extenuating circumstances calling for a mitigation of the punishment to the Government, and the Govt may thereupon take such action under this section as it thinks proper—*Q. E v Kader Nasya*, 23 Cal 604 *Q E v Lakshman* 10 Bom 512. In these two cases, the accused committed murder without any apparent sane motive, and was suffering from mental derangement of some sort, and the High Court holding that the accused was not entitled to be acquitted under section 84 I P C., recommended the case to the Local Government under this section to be dealt with in such manner as it thought fit.

Procedure .—All recommendations for remission or suspension of a sentence made under section 401 by an officer of any subordinate Court to the Local Government, in regard to a convict whose case has been before the High Court on appeal, shall be made through the High Court—*Cal. G. R. & Co O* p 40

Certified copy of record .—The original record need not be sent
“Objection has been taken to the inconvenience of this, and we think

that it will be sufficient to require a certified copy of the record to be furnished."—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*

"Such record thereof as exists":—"It is well known that in the case of proceedings in a High Court the Judges object to their notes being treated as part of the record, and we have therefore referred in our proposed amendment of section 401 (2) to 'a certified copy of the record of the trial, or of such record thereof as exists' We think in cases where it is necessary, in considering a petition for mercy, for Government to know, as it frequently may be, the nature of the evidence given at a trial in a High Court, we can safely trust to the courtesy of High Court Judges to furnish a copy of their notes"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*

Subsections (4A) and (5A) :—"The new clause (4A) is intended to make it clear that the power to remit sentences conferred by section 401 can be exercised in the case of orders of a penal nature, e.g. orders under section 563 of the Code. The object of the new clause (5A) is to enable any condition, upon which a pardon has been granted by His Majesty or by the Governor General when such power has been delegated to him, to be enforced in the same way as a sentence of a Court"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons (1921)*.

In sub-section (4A), the word 'law' has been used instead of the more common word 'Act' to make it clear that this section applies to the case of persons sentenced by tribunals constituted by Regulations and Ordinances—*Report of the Joint Committee (1922)*

Subsection (5) :—"Or of the Governor-General":—"We have made a formal amendment in this sub-section in view of the special delegation to the present Governor-General of His Majesty's prerogative of pardon"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*

402. (1) The Governor-General in Council or the Local Government may, without the

Power to commute punishment. consent of the person sentenced, commute any one of the following sentences for any other mentioned after it:—

death, transportation, penal servitude, rigorous imprisonment for a term not exceeding that to which he might have been sentenced, simple imprisonment for a like term, fine.

(2) Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of section 54 or section 55 of the Indian Penal Code.

Sub-section (2) has been added by section 108 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923 "Doubts have been expressed as to the consistency of section 402 with section 54 or 55 of the Indian Penal Code, and these have now been resolved"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons (1914)*.

CHAPTER XXX

OF PREVIOUS ACQUITTALS OR CONVICTIONS.

403. (1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under section 236, or for which he might have been convicted under sec. 237.

(2) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made against him on the former trial under section 235, sub-section (1).

(3) A person convicted of any offence constituted by any act causing consequences which, together with such act, constituted a different offence from that of which he was convicted, may be afterwards tried for such last mentioned offence, if the consequences had not happened, or were not known to the Court to have happened, at the time when he was convicted.

(4) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence constituted by any acts may, notwithstanding such acquittal or conviction, be subsequently charged with, and tried for, any other offence constituted by the same acts which he may have committed, if the Court by which he was first tried was not competent to try the offence with which he is subsequently charged.

(5) Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, or section 188 of this Code.

Explanation.—The dismissal of a complaint, the stopping of proceedings under section 249, the discharge of the accused, or any entry made upon a charge under section 273, is not an acquittal for the purposes of this section.

Illustrations.

(a) A is tried upon a charge of theft as a servant and acquitted. He cannot afterwards, while the acquittal remains in force, be charged with theft as a servant, or upon the same facts with theft simply, or with criminal breach of trust.

(b) A is tried upon a charge of murder and acquitted. There is no charge of robbery; but it appears from the facts that A committed robbery at the time when the murder was committed; he may afterwards be charged with, and tried for, robbery.

(c) A is tried for causing grievous hurt and convicted. The person injured afterwards dies. A may be tried again for culpable homicide.

(d) A is charged before the Court of Session and convicted of the culpable homicide of B. A may not afterwards be tried on the same facts for the murder of B.

(e) A is charged by a Magistrate of the first class with, and convicted by him of, voluntarily causing hurt to B. A may not afterwards be tried for voluntarily causing grievous hurt to B on the same facts, unless the case comes within paragraph 3 of the section.

(f) A is charged by a Magistrate of the second class with, and convicted by him of, theft of property from the person of B. A may be subsequently charged with, and tried for, robbery on the same facts.

(g) A, B and C are charged by a Magistrate of the first class with, and convicted by him of, robbing D. A, B and C may afterwards be charged with, and tried for, dacoity on the same facts.

1086. Principle—This section is an amplification of the well known maxim of law '*nemo debet bis vexari*'. This principle does not rest on any doctrine of estoppel but embodies the well established rule of common law that a man may not be put twice in peril for the same offence—*Emp v Chinna*, 29 Mad 126 (F B.). Where an offence has already been the subject of judicial investigation and adjudication, and there has been an acquittal, the acquittal is conclusive, and it would be a very dangerous principle to adopt to regard a judgment of not guilty as not fully establishing the innocence of the accused—*Rex v. Plummer*, [1902] 2 K B. 339; *Emp v. Lalit Mohan*, 38 Cal 559 (578).

1087. "A person":—Person not tried at the first trial—This section bars a subsequent trial of the same person who had once been placed on trial for the same offence. But does it bar the trial of persons who had not been placed in the first trial but who were implicated in the offence committed by the accused who was placed in the first trial? According to *Bishun Das v. K. E.*, 7 C.W.N 493, the principle of this

section extends to such persons, and therefore where three out of five persons concerned in the same offence were at first placed on trial and acquitted, a subsequent trial of the remaining two persons for the abetment of the offence was barred by this section. But this ruling has been disapproved of in several other cases. Thus, where on a complaint charging a number of persons with several offences, only three were sent up for trial, and they were acquitted on the ground that the prosecution case was untrue, and subsequently other persons alleged to be implicated in the same offences were sent up, it was held (dissenting from *Bishun Das v K E*, 7 C.W.N. 493) that the trial of these persons was not barred under this section—*Kokari Sardar v Mehr Khan*, 37 Cal. 680, *Subal Chandra v Ahadulla*, 53 Cal. 606, 30 C.W.N. 546, 27 Cr.L.J. 788. So also, where in a previous trial, two persons were acquitted by the jury of the offence of conspiring with a third person who was not placed on trial, it was held that the acquittal of those two persons did not operate as a bar to the trial of the third person—*Manindra v Emp*, 41 Cal. 754, 18 C.W.N. 580. See also *Hatim Mollah*, 10 C.W.N. 1031. But, in such a case, although the plea of *autre fois acquit* would not be available to the present accused, and the acquittal of another person would not bar the issue of process against the present accused, still the fact that another person accused upon the same facts of having been implicated in the same offence has been acquitted may properly be taken into consideration by the Magistrate in determining whether upon the material before him there is sufficient ground for proceeding to issue process against the present accused—*Subal Chandra v Ahadulla*, 53 Cal. 606, 30 C.W.N. 546, 27 Cr.L.J. 788.

Person absent in the first trial:—Where a complaint against two accused A and B was dismissed, and the accused A who attended Court to answer the charge was acquitted, the acquittal would operate in favour of the other accused (B) also who was absent, and would bar fresh proceedings against him on the same facts—*Panchu v Umar*, 4 C.W.N. 346. In this case the second accused was placed on trial, though he was absent on the day of hearing. But where out of three persons concerned in an offence, two persons were found and the third absconded and the two were placed on trial and convicted, the case of the third, when found, should be heard and decided irrespective of the fact that there had been a previous trial and conviction of the other accused, the second trial is not barred by this section—*Emp v Ghure*, 36 All. 168, 12 A.L.J. 231, 15 Cr.L.J. 200.

1088. "Tried".—There must be a previous trial of the accused, to bar a subsequent trial under this section. Where a complaint of a non-cognizable offence was made before the Police, and the Magistrate did not take cognizance of that offence on the police report, there could not be said to have been a trial of that offence, and consequently a subsequent complaint of that offence is not barred by this section—*Govt v Shidapa*, 5 Bom. 405. So also, where a Magistrate after taking cognizance of an offence dismisses the complaint under section 203, there cannot be said to have been a trial of the accused; and it is open to the Magistrate to

rehear the complaint—*Emp. v. Chinna*, 29 Mad 126. So also, where no process had been issued against the accused, and no proceedings taken against them, but the Magistrate simply permitted the withdrawal of the charge-sheets against the accused, it was held that the withdrawal of the charge-sheets was no bar to fresh proceedings being taken against the accused by drawing fresh charge-sheets—*In re Muthia-Moopan*, 36 Mad 315, 14 Cr.L.J. 559.

It is not necessary that there should be a full previous trial and an acquittal or conviction on the merits. Where the accused appears and answers to a charge but he is acquitted under sec. 247 for non-appearance of the complainant, he is said to be *tried* and acquitted (although there was no trial on the merits) and he cannot be tried again for the same offence—*Suraya v. Venkata*, 2 Weir 457, *In re Guggilapu Peddaya*, 34 Mad 253; *Suku Ram v. Krishna*, 33 C.W.N. 260, 30 Cr.L.J. 585. The words "who has once been tried" mean against whom proceedings have been commenced in Court, i.e., against whom the Court has taken cognizance of the offence and issued process. Therefore where the Police filed a charge-sheet against a certain person before a Magistrate and summons was issued, but before it was served the Public Prosecutor, with the consent of the Court, withdrew from the prosecution under sec. 494, and the accused was acquitted, it was held that the accused must be said to have been 'tried and acquitted' within the meaning of this section, and the acquittal barred a further trial for the same offence—*In re Dudikula Lal Sahib*, 40 Mad. 976. But in another Madras case it is held that the non-appearance of a complainant on the first day of hearing and the consequent acquittal of the accused under sec. 247 do not bar a retrial, because the accused cannot be said to have been 'tried' on the first complaint, the trial of an accused in a summons case cannot be said to begin until the particulars of the offence are stated to the accused under sec. 242, and where there is nothing in the record to show that any trial was commenced on the first complaint, sec. 403 would not bar the Court from taking cognizance of the second complaint—*Kotayya v. Venkayya*, 40 Mad. 977 (Note). See Note 1089 below.

Irregularity in the first.—If there is a gross irregularity or illegality in a trial, such trial will not operate as a bar to a retrial of the accused for the same offence—*Shahabat*, 13 W.R. 42. Even if the order of acquittal was passed in the first trial under a misapprehension of law, it would still operate as a bar to a second trial—*Bawa Manghnidas*, 4 S.L.R. 174, 11 Cr.L.J. 731, 8 L.C. 936. The absence of a charge does not make the trial illegal. Where the trial had otherwise been regularly conducted even though no formal charge had been framed, the order of acquittal would bar subsequent proceedings—*Emp. v. Gurdu*, 3 All 129.

But where the first trial was conducted without any complaint at all, the trial was void *ab initio* and therefore a second trial is not barred—*Nanakram v. Emp.*, 19 Cr.L.J. 796 (Oudh). The trial of an accused under sec. 21 of the Bengal Food Adulteration Act (VI of 1919) without obtaining the sanction of the Municipality is not a trial at all. Conse-

quently the acquittal of the accused at such a trial does not bar a fresh prosecution after having obtained the necessary sanction—*P. Banerjee v. Bipin Bihary*; 30 C.W.N. 382, 27 Cr.L.J. 751

1089. Conviction or Acquittal :—This section bars a second trial when the accused is *acquitted* in the first trial, and not where he is simply *discharged*—*Parmeshwari v. Jagannath*, 17 A.L.J. 867.

What amounts to acquittal—It is not necessary that there should be an acquittal *on the merits*; therefore the withdrawal of the remaining charges under section 240, on conviction of one of several charges, has the effect of acquittal, and bars a *fresh trial on the same facts*—*Okhoy v. Modhoo*, 19 W R 55. The non-appearance of the complainant in a summons case has the effect of acquitting the accused (sec. 247) and he cannot be tried again for the same offence—*Emp v. Dulla*, 45 All. 58; *Nityananda v. Rakhahari*, 38 C L.J. 196, 24 Cr.L.J. 716, *Suku Ram v. Krishna*, 33 C.W.N. 260, 30 Cr L.J. 585, *Panchu v. Umar*, 4 C.W.N. 346; *Ram Mahto v. Emp*, 2 P L T. 170, *Kiran Sarkar v. Emp*, 5 P.L.T. 15, 24 Cr.L.J. 815, *In re Guggilapu Paddaya*, 34 Mad 253, *In re Sinnu Goundan*, 38 Mad. 1028, 26 M L J 160, *Suraya v. Venkata*, 2 Weir 457. *Contra*—*Kotayya v. Venkayya*, 40 Mad 977 (Note) cited in Note 1088. The withdrawal of a summons-case by the complainant operates as an acquittal of the accused. A compromise under sec. 345 has the effect of acquittal—*Wali Asmal, Ratanlal* 519; *Hasta v. Crown*, 1914 P R 29, 16 Cr L.J. 81, 26 I C. 993. The withdrawal of the Public Prosecutor from the case under section 494 (b) has the effect of acquitting the accused, and will bar a *fresh trial*—*Sivarama*, 12 Mad 35, *In re Dudikula*, 40 Mad. 976; *Mahadeogir v. Emp*, 14 Cr L.J. 135, 9 N.L.R. 26, *Menghraj*, 23 Cr.L.J. 305. But an order made under sec 494 (a) is an order of *discharge* of the accused person and sec 403 does not bar the entertainment of a *fresh complaint*—*Ramanand v. Ali Hassan*, 26 Cr L.J. 129 (Pat). The dismissal of a summons-case amounts to an acquittal—*Saifuddin*, 1917 P.W.R. 14, 18 Cr L.J. 324. An order of acquittal under sec 258 cannot be treated as an order of discharge, it is one of acquittal and bars a second trial of the same offence on the same facts—*In re Gandhi Apparaju*, 43 Mad 330, 21 Cr L.J. 91

But a wrong order of acquittal will not bar a subsequent trial under this section. If a Magistrate tries a warrant case as a summons-case and acquits the accused without framing a charge, such an order of acquittal will be treated as one of *discharge* only, and cannot operate as a bar to a *re-trial*—*Emp v. Jada*, 1886 A W N 260, *Lajja Ram*, 1888 A W N 96. If in a warrant case, before the charge is drawn up and the accused called upon to plead to it, the Magistrate erroneously acquits the accused, the acquittal amounts only to a discharge and does not bar a *re-trial*—*Robert Sheriff*, 6 W R 13. (But if the trial has been otherwise regularly conducted, the absence of a formal charge will not convert the order of acquittal into one of discharge, and the order of acquittal will bar a *re-trial*—*Emp v. Gurdu* 3 All 129) Where a preliminary charge-sheet was laid by the Police before the Magistrate under sec 107, against several persons, but the Police intending to withdraw it in order that

they might present a fresh charge-sheet against some only of those included in it, the Magistrate permitted the withdrawal and endorsed on the charge-sheet that the accused were acquitted, it was held that such an endorsement was illegal, because neither an order of discharge nor one of acquittal could be passed in a case where no process has been issued against the accused; and therefore the Magistrate's order was no bar to fresh proceedings being taken on a second charge-sheet—*In re Muthia Moopan*, 36 Mad. 315

On the other hand, where a person who ought to have been acquitted, is erroneously ordered to be discharged only, the order of discharge will be treated as one of acquittal, and will bar a re-trial. Thus, where a Public Prosecutor withdraws from the case under sec. 494, after the frame of charge, the accused ought to be acquitted and not discharged, if however, he is ordered to be discharged, he will be deemed to have been acquitted and a subsequent trial and conviction on the same facts is illegal and will be set aside—*Q. E. v. Sivarama*, 12 Mad. 35. So also, where in a warrant case, the accused has pleaded to a charge, the Magistrate can either convict or acquit him; his order dismissing the case will be one of acquittal, and not one of discharge of the accused—*In re Jadubar*, 5 C.L.R. 259, *Hasta v Crown*, 1914 P.R. 29, 16 Cr.L.J. 81, 26 I.C. 993.

An Appellate Court set aside a conviction and sentence on the ground that the Court below did not comply with the provisions of sec. 360. It left the question of retrial to the District Magistrate. The District Magistrate held a retrial. Held that the order of the Appellate Court did not amount to an acquittal. It was passed on a consideration of a point of law only and without recording any finding on the merits of the case. Such an order did not bar the retrial of the accused by the District Magistrate—*Emp. v. Miajan*, 53 Cal. 192, 27 Cr.L.J. 733, following *Beni Madhab v. Emp.*, 46 Cal. 212.

Burden of proof.—The burden of proof of previous conviction or acquittal is upon the party setting it up—*Raghunandan*, 1889 A.W.N. 8.

1090. Court of competent jurisdiction:—The Council of Elders established under the Punjab Frontier Regulation (IV of 1897) is a Court of competent jurisdiction, for the purposes of this section, and a person convicted by such Council cannot be retried on the same facts—*Sarwar v Emp.*, 1884 P.R. 30. Under the Burma Village Act, the village headman has the power to try as a Court an offence under sec. 294 I.P.C. and other offences. Therefore, a person who had once been tried by the village headman for an offence under sec. 294 I.P.C. is not liable to be tried again for the same offence—*Nga E. v. K E*, 1 Rang. 449. A village Munsif in Madras is not a recognised tribunal under the Cr.P. Code, and consequently an acquittal by a village Munsif does not bar the trial of the accused by a Magistrate—*Rama Naidu v. Veerapuram Venkatasami*, 53 M.L.J. 102, 28 Cr.L.J. 507.

It is necessary to a plea of *autre fois acquit* that the first Court should have had competent jurisdiction to try the offence, and therefore the con-

viction or acquittal of an accused by a Court not having jurisdiction is no bar to the institution of fresh proceedings against the accused on the same facts—*Pratab*, 2 W.R. 9; *Q. E. v. Robert Sheriff*, 5 W.R. 13. A trial by a Court not having jurisdiction is void *ab initio*, and the accused, if acquitted, is liable to be retried. It is not necessary to get the trial set aside before the accused can be retried—*Q. E. v. Husain*, 8 Bom. 307. Where a conviction by a Magistrate who had no jurisdiction to try the offence is set aside by the Appellate Court, and that Court discharges the accused without ordering a retrial, this section does not bar fresh proceedings being taken in the proper Court—*Abdul Ghani v. Emp.*, 29 Cal 412, *Hussain v. Emp.*, 39 All. 293. But where an accused is tried and acquitted by a Court which on the face of it is a Court of competent jurisdiction in respect of the offence charged, his subsequent trial is barred by this section; and the second Court in which the accused is tried again is not entitled to impeach the competency of the Court which held the first trial on the ground that the presiding officer might perhaps have laboured under the disqualification prescribed by sec 556. Until the order of acquittal passed by the first Court is set aside by some competent Court, the man acquitted is entitled to plead it under sec 403 in connection with any other proceeding that may be taken against him—*Darbari v. K. E.*, 8 A.L.J. 1129.

The trial of the accused by a Court in a *Native State* bars their trial by a Court in British India on the same facts and for the same offence—*Tela Singh v. Emp.*, 5 Lah L.J. 574.

The word "jurisdiction" refers not only to the character and status of the tribunal, but also includes local jurisdiction as laid down in secs 177-184 and 188. Therefore, previous acquittal of an offence by a Court having no local jurisdiction to try the offence is not a bar to the subsequent trial by a competent Court—*In re Shanker*, 53 Bom. 60, 30 Cr L.J. 54 (56).

Where the law requires a previous sanction (now abolished) or complaint under sec 195 before a charge can be entertained by a Court, that Court is not a Court of competent jurisdiction until the sanction has been obtained or the complaint has been made. Therefore the discharge or acquittal of the accused owing to want of such sanction or complaint does not bar a subsequent trial of the accused for the same offence after the requisite complaint has been made or sanction obtained—*Emp. v. Ambaji*, 52 Bom. 257, 29 Cr L.J. 545, *Emp. v. Juwan*, 37 All. 107, 16 Cr L.J. 144; *In re Samsuddin*, 22 Bom. 711, *Jivram v. Emp.*, 40 Bom. 97, 16 Cr L.J. 761, *Fakir Mahomed v. Emp.*, 21 S.L.R. 1, 27 Cr L.J. 1105 (1106); *Muhammad Yasin v. Emp.*, 5 Pat. 452, 27 Cr L.J. 819 (850). Therefore, where the accused was acquitted in the previous trial for the offence of forgery and cheating a Sub-Registrar, for which no sanction was obtained under section 195 before prosecution, the acquittal did not bar a subsequent trial for aiding and abetting cheating held after a formal sanction had been granted by the Sub-Registrar. The previous trial was not a trial by a Court of competent jurisdiction.

since no sanction under sec. 195 was obtained before trial—*Emp v. Jivan*, 13 A.L.J. 4, 37 All. 107. *Contra—Ganapathi*, 36 Mad. 308 (314), where it was held that the absence of a sanction or complaint did not affect the competency of the tribunal. But this decision has been disapproved of in almost all the cases cited above.

No sanction is required for a prosecution under sec. 82 of the Registration Act, and therefore, a Court has jurisdiction to try the accused for that offence, without a sanction—*Maung Saing v. K. E.*, 1 Rang 299, 25 Cr.L.J. 191 (following *Gopi Nath v. Kuldip*, 11 Cal. 566). But see *Hussain Khan v. Emp.*, 39 All. 293 and *Mohan Lal v. Emp.*, 19 A.L.J. 813, 22 Cr.L.J. 50.

While such conviction or acquittal remains in force :—This means 'as long as such conviction or acquittal is not set aside by a Court of Appeal or Revision.' If the conviction or acquittal is set aside by the Appellate Court, the result will be that the previous trial is annulled and the prisoner may be again put upon his trial—*Kali Churn*, 7 W.R. 2. So long as the conviction or acquittal is not set aside it will bar a second trial, even though the second Court considers that the acquittal in the first trial is not warranted by the evidence produced in the first trial—*Dwarkanath*, 7 W.R. 15 (22). So also, an acquittal of an offence arising out of certain facts under a wrong section will prevent a further inquiry into any offence based on the same facts, until that acquittal is set aside—*Ram Nidh v. Ram Saran*, 26 O.C. 282.

1091. Retrial.—Where the jury is discharged under section 305, the accused may be retried under section 303; such a retrial is not barred by this section. In such a case, the accused is being tried on the original indictment, and not 'tried again.' The duty of the Court is to continue the trial of the accused before another jury, and this process may continue, without the accused being 'tried again' under section 403—*Emp v. Nirmal Kanta*, 41 Cal. 1072. (Moreover, in such a case, i.e., where the jury is discharged under section 305, the accused is neither convicted nor acquitted, and therefore his retrial is not barred under this section).

An appeal or a revision is not a retrial, but a continuation of the same trial—*Q. E. v. Jabanullah*, 23 Cal. 975 (977); *Bahvant*, 9 All. 134; *Bali Reddi*, 37 Mad. 119 (122); and therefore the Court of Appeal can convict the accused on a charge on which he has been acquitted by the first Court, or order a retrial on the same charge—*Krishna Dhan*, 23 Cal. 377.

1092. "For the same offence" :—The former conviction or acquittal is a bar to a second trial, if the offence is the same. Thus, a person charged with and acquitted of an offence under the Bombay Abkari Act (V of 1878) cannot subsequently be tried for the same offence—*Q. E. v. Gustadi*, 10 Bom. 181 (182). An offence under sec. 5 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1914 (reckless driving) and an offence under sec. 279 I. P. C. (rash driving on the public road so as to endanger human life)

are the same, even though punishable under different Acts, and a person convicted of the former offence cannot be again charged with the latter—*Gur Narain v. Emp.*, 26 A.L.J. 160, 29 Cr.L.J. 271. The accused was tried and convicted for an offence under the Railways Act. In that trial, although there was no charge for assault, the Court took into account the fact that the accused had committed an assault upon the complainant, and in consideration thereof inflicted a heavy sentence. The accused was subsequently charged under sec. 323 I. P. C. Held that the second trial was illegal in as much as it was a trial for practically the same offence for which he had been already punished, though indirectly, in the first trial—*Kailashpati v. Gopi*, 33 C.W.N. 948 (949). The accused was at first charged with having forged pattahs A and B, but no mention of any charge as to pattah II was made in the order of commitment, and he was tried and acquitted on the indictment for forging pattah A. He was subsequently charged with having forged pattah B. Held that as the offence of forging pattah B was not the same offence as forging pattah A, the second trial was not barred, even though evidence was given at the first trial tending to show that both pattahs were forgeries. The Court before which the second trial is held has nothing to do with the evidence given in the former trial except for the purpose of ascertaining whether the offence which formed the subject of the first trial is the same as the offence which forms the subject of the second charge. If the offence is the same, the former conviction or acquittal is a bar to a second trial, whether the second Court considers that the former conviction or acquittal was warranted by the evidence given in the first trial or not. If the offence is not the same, the former conviction or acquittal is no bar to the trial upon the second charge, notwithstanding that the evidence given in the two cases is the same. Two distinct offences cannot be converted into one offence by reason of any evidence adduced upon the trial for one of them—*per Peacock C.J.* in *Q. v. Dwarkanath*, 7 W.R. 15 (20, 21).

The trial of the accused for the dishonest receiving or retaining of certain stolen articles bars a second trial of the accused in respect of other stolen articles found in his possession on the same date, in the absence of evidence to show that the different articles which were the subject of the charges in the two trials were received at different times—*Ganesh Sahu v. Emp.*, 50 Cal. 594; *K. E. v. Bishun Singh*, 3 Pat. 503 (519), 5 P.L.T. 319, 25 Cr.L.J. 738; *Ishan Muchi v. K. E.*, 15 Cal. 511; *Q. E. v. Makhan*, 15 All. 317. See also *Sheo Charan v. Emp.*, 45 All. 485, 24 Cr.L.J. 432. But the Sind Court dissents from those rulings and is of opinion that where properties are stolen on different dates, the presumption is that the properties passed from the hands of the thief to the receiver at different dates, and the burden lies on the accused to prove that they passed to him at one and the same time. In the absence of such proof, a prior acquittal of the receiver with regard to one item of stolen property does not bar subsequent trial in respect of a different item of property stolen on a different date—*Dadlomal v. Emp.*, 21 S.L.R. 154, 27 Cr.L.J. 1256 (1257).

Where a person has been tried for some offence and acquitted, he cannot be subsequently charged with *conspiracy*, of which that offence is alleged to form a part—*Emp. v. Lalit Mohan*, 38 Cal 559

Continuing offence :—A person who has once been tried for building a house without the sanction of the Municipal Committee and acquitted, cannot be retried for the same offence simply on the ground that the house continues to stand and thus constitutes a continuing offence. The previous acquittal will bar a retrial—*Saifuddin*, 1917 P.W.R. 17, 18 Cr L J 324.

Second complaint by different person :—A person once convicted of an offence cannot be tried again for the same offence and on the same facts, even though the complainant in the second case is not the same person as the complainant in the first case. Thus, the accused assaulted several persons A, B, etc. At first A filed a complaint against the accused, and they were convicted under section 323 I. P. C. Afterwards B filed a similar complaint against the same accused on the same facts. Held that the second trial was barred—*Ram Chandar v. Emp.*, 18 A L J 85.

"Same facts" :—A Court ought not to decide that a charge pending trial before him is barred under this section without an investigation of the facts put forward on behalf of the complainant—*Radha Kishan v. Fatik Chand*, 23 C.W.N 543. Where the complainant charges the accused before the Magistrate with a certain offence, and a preliminary objection is put forward on behalf of the accused that he had been previously tried on the same facts in another Court and acquitted, it is the duty of the Magistrate to hear the evidence and ascertain what are the facts in the two cases, in order to determine whether the facts in the present case are the same as those in the previous case—*M. N. Mukherjee v. Matangi Charan Palit*, 23 C.W.N 599, 20 Cr.L.J 572. Where the accused was charged in the former trial for an offence under sec 401 I. P. C., but the charge failed because the approver's statement on which the prosecution was based was considered unreliable, a subsequent trial for an offence under sec. 413 I. P. C. is not barred by the provisions of this section, because the second trial is not based on the same facts as those on which the former trial proceeded. In the first trial the prosecution rested primarily on the approver's statement, but in the second trial the prosecution is based entirely on the evidence as to the discovery of the stolen property in the house of the accused—*Chhagan v. Emp.*, 26 P.L.R 470, 26 Cr.L.J. 1097. Where the prosecution of the accused rests on facts wholly and completely different from those on which he was previously prosecuted, the previous acquittal does not bar the subsequent proceedings, even though under the same section of the I. P. Code. Thus, the previous acquittal of an accused on a charge under sec 498 I. P. C. is not a bar to subsequent proceedings under the same section on a charge of subsequent detention of the same woman upon different facts—*Waryam v. Emp.*, 29 P.L.R. 52, 29 Cr.L.J 3

1093. Trial for different offence upon the same facts:

The protection offered by this section extends to different offences only when they are based on the same facts and fall within the provisions of section 236 or section 237—*Q. E. v. Subedar Krishnappa*, 1 Bom. L.R. 15 Where a person has been tried and convicted or acquitted for an offence arising out of a particular set of facts, he cannot, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, be again tried in respect of any offence based on the same facts, unless the case can be brought under one or other of the specific exceptions to the rule provided by sub-sections (2) to (4)—*Mahadeogir v. Emp.*, 9 N.L.R. 26, 14 Cr.L.J. 135.

Examples:—(1) A trial for the offence of theft of an animal bars a subsequent trial for the offence of mischief for subsequently killing that animal—*Madar*, 1 Weir 497. Similarly where a person was tried for the offence of mischief and was acquitted on the ground that the tree in respect of which the mischief was alleged to have been committed was his own property, he cannot afterwards be tried for theft of the same tree, on the same facts—*Q. E. v. Erramreddi*, 11 Mad 296

(2) Where the accused with a body of people committed rioting and mischief to the trees of the complainant, and was at first tried for the offence of mischief alone and acquitted, held that he could not be tried again for the offence of rioting which was based on the same facts as the offence of mischief—*In re Chinnappa* 19 L.W. 31, 25 Cr.L.J. 244, A I R 1924 Mad 478

(3) Where the accused have been tried and acquitted on charges of forgery and abetment thereof, they cannot afterwards on the same facts be prosecuted for offences under sec. 82 (c) of the Registration Act, since they could have been charged in the previous trial under sec 82 of the Registration Act—*Maung Saing v. Emp.*, 1 Rang 299, 25 Cr L.J. 191, A I R. 1924 Rang. 213

(4) A person acquitted of using criminal force cannot be tried for hurt on the same facts—*Kaptan v Smith*, 16 W II 3

(5) Where a person is convicted on a charge under sec 411 I P C of having been dishonestly in possession of property knowing it to be stolen, he cannot be subsequently convicted under sec 414 I P. C of voluntarily assisting in concealing other property stolen on the same occasion from the same person—*Q. E. v. Mian Jan*, 28 All 313 The accused was charged before the Sessions Judge with the offence of abetment of theft; the Judge acquitted the accused but was satisfied that he had committed the offence of receiving stolen property (sec 411 I P C) The Judge however did not charge him with that offence, as he could have done under sec. 236 of this Code. Subsequently, the accused was charged with an offence under sec 411 I P C, and put on his trial Held that the second trial was barred under the provisions of sec 403—*In re Pundalik*, 26 Bom L R 440, 26 Cr L J 831

(6) Where a person has been tried and acquitted on a charge under section 211 I P. C he cannot be tried again on a charge under sec. 182 I P C—*Ganapathi*, 36 Mad 308

(7) A person acquitted on a charge under section 324 I. P. C. cannot be again tried on the same facts for an offence under section 323 I. P. C.—*Wali Asmal, Ratanlal* 519.

(8) A conviction under sec. 5 of the Motor Vehicles Act (VIII of 1914) for reckless driving bars a subsequent prosecution on the same facts under sec. 279 I. P. C. for rash driving on the public road so as to endanger human life—*Gur Narain v. Emp.*, 26 A.L.J. 160, 29 Cr.L.J. 271.

(9) Where the prisoner was at first tried under sec. 498 I. P. C. for having enticed away a married woman from her husband, and was acquitted on the ground that the whole case was fabricated, and the prisoner was next charged and convicted under sec. 363 I. P. C. of having kidnapped two infants of the woman, who were with her when she left the house; it was held that the second trial was illegal, because so long as the acquittal under section 498 I. P. C. remained in force, the second Court was bound to take it as proved that the accused did not entice away the woman; and therefore, the offence under sec. 363 alleged to have been committed while the prisoner enticed away the woman was disproved by the above finding of fact—*Ganesh Das*, 1911 P.L.R. 56, 12 Cr.L.J. 94, 9 I.C. 511.

(10) A person acquitted of the charge of cheating cannot be tried again for the offence of falsification of accounts, upon the same facts—*Emp v Nand Kishore*, 20 Cr.L.J. 667 (Patna).

(11) The accused was tried under sec. 363 I. P. C. and acquitted. The Sessions Judge directed further inquiry to be made to ascertain whether offences under secs. 366 and 368 I. P. C. were committed. It was held that the order directing further inquiry was illegal, in as much as kidnapping (sec. 363 I. P. C.) is an essential element in offences under secs. 366, 368 I. P. C., and the accused having been already acquitted of the offence of kidnapping, he could not be put on trial again for offences under secs. 366, 368 I. P. C.—*Md. Saleh v. Emp.*, 20 Cr.L.J. 526 (Pat.).

(12) An acquittal of the prisoner on charges under secs. 380, 411 I. P. C. for being found in possession of a quantity of jute, bars subsequent proceedings in respect of the same act under sec. 54A of the Calcutta Police Act, because in the previous trial the charge of theft (secs. 380, 411 I. P. C.) might have been joined with a charge under sec. 54A of the Calcutta Police Act, under the provisions of sec. 236 of this Code—*Manhari v. K. E.*, 45 Cal. 727, 22 C.W.N. 199, 19 Cr.L.J. 198.

(13) Where the accused was acquitted of a charge of unlawful assembly with the common object of assaulting a person, the District Magistrate is not justified in ordering a further inquiry into the offence of hurt on the same facts, while the order of acquittal remains in force—*Jalram v. v. Raj Kumar*, 5 C.W.N. 72.

(14) Where a person was at first charged with kidnapping a minor girl, under section 363 I. P. C., but the trying Magistrate finding that the

girl was not under sixteen, acquitted the accused, a second trial on the same facts for the offence of abducting the girl in order to confine her secretly (section 365 I. P. C.) was barred. The accused in the first trial might have been charged in the alternative with the second offence, under section 237 of this Code—*Kala Nath v. K. E.*, 24 C.W.N. 856, 21 Cr L J. 639.

(15) If a person charged under section 338 I. P. C., with having caused grievous hurt by rashly driving a motor car, was acquitted on the ground that it was not proved that he was driving the car, he cannot be subsequently tried under section 16 of the Motor Vehicles Act for the offence of driving the car without a license—*Maksuddin v. Emp*, 2 P.L.T. 31, 22 Cr L.J. 63.

(16) Where an accused was tried under sec 408 I P. C for criminal breach of trust in respect of three sums of money alleged to have been dishonestly misappropriated, and it was part of the prosecution case at the trial that he had made three false entries to conceal the misappropriation, and he was acquitted by the jury, but was subsequently charged on the same evidence under section 477A I P C (falsification of accounts) in respect of the said three entries, it was held that he should not on the same facts be tried again for what were virtually the same offences charged in a different form—*Emp v Jhaqbar*, 49 Cal 924

(17) Where the accused were at first charged under sec. 193 I P. C. and acquitted by the Magistrate who dealt very exhaustively with the evidence and came to the conclusion that the culpability of the accused had not been established beyond reasonable doubt, and the accused were subsequently charged with offences under secs 467 and 471 read with sec 120B of the I P C upon facts which were wholly inseparable from the facts upon which the previous case was proceeded with, held that the subsequent trial was barred by this section—*Cheraghali v Satish*, 30 C.W.N. 384, 26 Cr.L J 1023

(18) The accused went into a Mahomedan graveyard and there cut down a tree. They were at first tried under sec 297 I P. C for hurting the religious feelings of the Muhammadans by cutting down the tree, and were acquitted. They were subsequently prosecuted for theft of the tree. Held that the trial of the accused for theft, based on the same set of facts, was barred under sec 403—*Fatfeh Md v Emp*, 8 Lah. 52, 27 Cr L J 1019 (1020)

(19) The accused who was employed on a steamship assaulted the captain of the ship and was convicted of an offence under sec 68 Calcutta Police Act. Subsequently the captain filed a complaint under sec 103 (iv) of the Merchant Shipping Act against the accused on the same facts. Held that the second trial was barred. In fact the second complaint was for the same offence under a different enactment—*Alfred Laird v Emp*, 31 C W N 195, 28 Cr L J 233 (234)

(20) The acquittal of the accused on a charge under rule 21 of "Burma Forest Rules for having extracted teak timber without a l

and under rule 71 for converting timber at a sawpit without a sawpit license, is a bar to the subsequent prosecution of the accused on the same facts for offences under secs. 379 and 411 I. P. Code—*Yeok Kuk*, 6 Rang. 386, 29 Cr.L.J. 930 (931).

But the previous trial for an offence founded on a particular set of facts does not bar a second trial for a different offence based on *different* facts. Thus, the previous acquittal on a charge of theft does not bar a subsequential trial for the offence of receiving stolen property, as the latter offence is supported by certain additional facts ascertained subsequent to the first trial—*Dy. Leg. Rem. v. Hatim Molla*, 10 C.W.N. 1031. An acquittal on the charge of murder does not prevent another trial upon a charge of robbery, because the two offences are so widely different that in the first trial for murder the accused could not have been convicted of the offence of robbery under the provisions of sec. 237 of the Code—*Walla v. Crown*, 4 Lah. 373 (375). The accused falsely represented himself to be another and borrowed money by executing a mortgage of a property standing in the latter's name. He subsequently falsely personated the latter in the Registration office for getting the mortgage registered. He was at first charged with cheating by false personation (sec. 419 I. P. C.) but acquitted. He was subsequently charged under sec. 82 (c) Registration Act. Held that the second trial was not barred, because the offence committed in the Registration office was a different and subsequent offence for which he could not have been charged in the first trial, under sec. 236 of this Code—*Me Tok v. Emp.*, 6 Bur L.J. 201, 28 Cr.L.J. 908 (910).

"For which a different charge might have been made":—This section protects a person against a trial for 'any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him *might have been made*', but where the offence for which he is to be tried again is the same charge that was made against him in the first trial, the defence must fail. Thus, where the accused was charged in the first trial with the murder of A under section 302 I. P. C., as well as with culpable homicide of A under section 304 I. P. C., and was acquitted by the jury of the charge of murder, but the jury disagreeing as to the culpable homicide, the accused was retried for that offence, it was held that the second trial was not illegal, for a charge in respect of that offence had already been made in the first trial. If the accused had been charged with murder alone, no doubt a verdict of not guilty would protect him from another trial for culpable homicide; but where a charge of culpable homicide was also made, the case falls outside the provisions of the law dealing with cases where it 'might have been made'—*Emp. v. Nirmal Kanta Roy*, 41 Cal 1072, 18 C.W.N. 723, 15 Cr.L.J. 460.

1094. Sub-section (2)—Sub-section (2) permits a second trial for a distinct offence for which a charge might have been framed under sec. 235 (1) as having been committed in the course of the same transaction.

The expression "distinct offence" means an offence entirely un-

connected with a former offence charged—*Yeok Kuk*, 3 Rang. 386, 29 Cr L J 930 (931).

Examples :—(1) Where certain persons, after beating the inmates of a house, carried off a woman, and on the first trial they were charged under sections 452 and 325 I. P. C. for house-trespass and grievous hurt, and convicted, it was held that such conviction did not bar a subsequent trial for the offence of abduction which had been committed in the course of the same transaction. The case fell under section 235 (1) and therefore under sub-section (2) of this section—*Baldeo v. K E*, 3 A.L.J. 2, 3 Cr.L.J. 93.

(2) A previous conviction for being in possession of counterfeit coins, under section 243 I. P. C., does not bar a subsequent trial under section 240 I. P. C. for passing other coins, knowing them to be counterfeited. They were two distinct offences—*Emp. v. Prasanna*, 31 Cal 1007.

(3) The accused was at first tried on a charge of abetment of forgery of a document. He was again tried by the Sessions Court, in respect of the same document, for using as genuine a forged document. It was held that the previous acquittal was no bar to the second trial. The case was not governed by sub-section (1) of this section, in as much as the case was not one contemplated by section 236, there being nothing doubtful what should be the true view of the offence committed; the case fell under sub-section (2) of this section, because the two offences were distinct offences, and committed in the course of the same transaction within the meaning of section 235 (1)—*Jivram v. Emp.*, 40 Bom 97.

(4) The acquittal of an accused of a charge under section 400 I. P. C. does not bar the trial of the accused under section 395 I. P. C. for committing one of the dacoities in respect of which evidence was given at the previous trial—*Q. E. v. Subedar Krishnappa*, 1 Bom.L.R. 15.

(5) Where six documents were alleged to be fabricated at one and the same time, and in first the accused was tried for fabricating three of the documents and acquitted, a second trial for fabricating the other three documents was not barred. But in the circumstances of the case it was not desirable that the second trial should take place, as the fabricating of all the documents was treated in the first trial as one offence—*Emp. v. Inamullah*, 2 A.L.J. 673, 2 Cr L J 790.

(6) A conviction for an offence under sec 5 of the Motor Vehicles Act VIII of 1914 (reckless driving) does not bar a subsequent prosecution under sec 325 or 328 I. P. C. (causing grievous hurt to a person in consequence of rash driving)—*Gur Narain v. Emp.* 26 A.L.J. 160, 29 Cr L J 271.

(7) The conviction of the accused for an offence under the Excise Act does not prevent the accused from being subsequently tried for an offence under the Merchandise Marks Act, the two offences being distinct and committed in the course of the same transaction—*Q. E. v. Croft* 23 Cal 174.

(8) The conviction of the accused for committing affray (sec 160 I. P. C.) is no bar to their trial and conviction for the offence of causing hurt (sec. 323 I. P. C.) committed in the course of the affray—*Rari Sukh v. Emp.*, 47 All. 284, 23 A.L.J. 8, 26 Cr.L.J. 688

(9) A complaint was preferred under sections 352 and 504 I P C but the Magistrate issued process upon the accused directing him to appear and take his trial under section 352 only. The Magistrate acquitted the prisoner of the offence under section 352, but being of opinion that on the evidence adduced a *prima facie* case of an offence under section 504 had been made out, ordered process to issue directing the accused to appear and stand his trial under section 504. It was held that sub-section (2) of this section applied and the retrial was not illegal—*Buyay Krishna v. Balai Chand*, 20 Cr.L.J. 43

(10) The accused who were Police constables, committed rioting in the course of which they took several persons in custody. They were at first tried for wrongful confinement under section 342 I P C in respect of the arrests made by them, and were acquitted; subsequently they were convicted of rioting under section 147 I P C. Held, that the second trial was not barred. The two offences fell under section 235 (1) of this Code—*Ram Sahay v. Emp.*, 48 Cal 78, 24 C.W.N 763, 21 Cr.L.J. 614

(11) The accused was charged under sec 409 I P. C. for criminal breach of trust in respect of Rs. 18,924, alleged to have been misappropriated by him between 1st October 1921 and 1st March 1922. The charge was withdrawn with the leave of the Court and the accused was acquitted. He was subsequently charged with having committed criminal breach of trust in respect of a sum of Rs 100 on the 30th November 1921. The prosecution alleged that the defalcation of this item of Rs. 100 was not included in the sum of Rs 18,924 and the facts relating thereto were not known to him at the time of the previous charge. Held that as the sum of Rs 100 (the subject of the subsequent charge) was not included in the gross sum of Rs 18,924 (the subject of the previous charge), the offence subsequently charged was not the same in respect of which the accused was previously acquitted; therefore the previous acquittal did not operate as a bar to the subsequent trial of the accused—*Nagendra Nath v. Emp.*, 50 Cal 632, 25 Cr.L.J. 156, 27 C.W.N. 578 (following *Emp. v. Kashinath*, 12 Bom.L.R. 226). But where the prosecution knew perfectly well what was the gross sum in respect of which the accused had committed breach of trust, and they could have proceeded against the accused in the first trial in respect of the gross amount under sec 222 (2), but instead of doing so they elected to proceed on three items and got the accused convicted, and then they picked up three other items and got the accused tried a second time, held that the second trial was not desirable, though not illegal—*Sidh Nath v. Emp.*, 33 C.W.N 454 (457), 1929 Cr. C 90 (91)

(12) A person who has been convicted of theft (sec 379 I. P. C.) in respect of a certain quantity of opium can be subsequently tried for

illicit possession of the same opium under sec. 9 of the Opium Act (I of 1878)—*Deoki v. Emp.*, 48 All. 496, 24 A.L.J. 559, 27 Cr.L.J. 767.

(13) A person acquitted of the offence of causing hurt with a dangerous weapon (sec 324 I. P. C.) can be subsequently tried for the offence of going armed with a dangerous weapon under sec. 19 (e) Arms Act—*Manjubhai*, 53 Bom. 604, 1929 Cr C 38, 30 Cr.L.J. 1059 (1061).

This clause applies when the case falls under subsection (1) of sec. 235, and not to a case falling under subsection (2) of sec 235. Thus, a person who has been tried and acquitted of offences under sections 201 and 202 I. P. C. cannot be tried again for an offence under section 176 I. P. C. based on the same facts. Such a case does not come under section 235 (1) but under section 235 (2), and therefore sub-section (2) of section 403 does not apply. It falls under sub-section (1) of section 403 and the second trial is barred—*Sharbekhan v Emp.*, 10 C.W.N. 518; see also *Ghamandi v. Babu*, 27 A.L.J. 1056 1929 Cr C 491 (492).

1095. Sub-section (3).—‘Constituted a different offence’—The facts or circumstances must be such as to indicate a different kind of offence of which there could be no conviction at the first trial. It is not enough to show merely circumstances of aggravation or serious consequences of the offence which have occurred since the first trial. Where a person was convicted under section 31 of the Rangoon Police Act, 1899 for being in possession of an article supposed to be stolen, he cannot be tried subsequently for an offence under section 457 I. P. C. merely on the ground that the owner of the article is traced and some further evidence is available—*Nga Shwe v Emp* 8 Bur L.T 129, 16 Cr.L.J. 267, 28 I.C. 155. The new evidence must constitute a different kind of offence, for which he could not have been tried at the first trial.

‘Were not known to the Court.’—The new facts or consequences must have occurred since the conviction or acquittal at the first trial. Thus, where a person was at first tried for causing grievous hurt and convicted, and after the conviction the injured man died, it was held that the accused could be again tried for the offence of culpable homicide, since the consequence of hurt (i.e. the death) did not take place until after the first trial—*Crown v Sarbiland* 1901 P.R. 3 *Sailani*, 36 All. 4. So also, where a person was acquitted of an offence under the Bombay City Municipal Act, for proceeding to erect certain balconies in contravention of the Act, he can be subsequently tried for failure to remove these balconies after notice, because the offence of non-removal of these balconies could not have been committed until the notice to remove them was served, and the service was made only after the previous acquittal—*Municipality of Bombay v Javer* 4 Bom L.R. 575.

But if the new facts or consequences were known to the Court at the time of the first trial, a second trial for an offence constituted by these new facts would be barred. Thus, where the prisoner was at first tried for causing hurt, and before the trial and conviction for hurt the injured man died, and this fact was known to the Court which convicted the prisoner for hurt, he could not again be tried for homicide.

under this sub-section, though he might be under sub-section (4)—*Mahadeogir v. Emp.*, 9 N.L.R. 26, 14 Cr.L.J. 135.

1096. Sub-section (4) :—‘Was not competent’ :—The words ‘was not competent to try’ mean ‘had no jurisdiction to try’—*K. E. v. Krishna Aiyar*, 24 Mad 641. Jurisdiction includes local jurisdiction, so if the previous Court had no local jurisdiction to try the subsequent offence, it was a Court “not competent to try” that offence within the meaning of this clause—*In re Shanker*, 53 Bom. 69, 30 Cr.L.J. 54 (56). If a person has been acquitted or convicted of an offence, but the same facts disclose another offence which could not be tried by the same Magistrate who tried the first offence, then the previous acquittal or conviction is no bar to further proceedings for the latter offence—*In re Venkataranga*, 18 Cr.L.J. 643 (Mad), *Palani Goundan v. Emp.*, 48 M.L.J. 490, 26 Cr.L.J. 1087. Therefore the trial of the accused for an offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt by a Magistrate does not bar the trial of the accused for attempt to murder on the same facts, as the previous trial was by a Court not competent to try the latter offence—*Q v Panna*, 7 N.W.P. 371. Where a Magistrate convicted the accused of rioting, a fresh complaint of dacoity based on the same facts was not barred, since the Magistrate who tried the offence of rioting was not competent to try the offence of dacoity—*Viran Kutti v. Chiyamu*, 7 Mad 557. Similarly, a previous conviction for the offence of causing hurt tried before a Magistrate does not bar a subsequent trial by the Sessions Judge of an offence under section 304, upon the same facts—*Emp v Bahinu*, 5 Bom L.R. 125, *In re Gandi Apparaju*, 43 Mad 330. A conviction by a Magistrate for a minor offence does not bar a subsequent trial for murder, because the Magistrate was not competent to try the offence of murder—*Ladkia*, Ratanlal 337 (338); *Wadhwa v Crown*, 1912 P.R. 7. A person acquitted or convicted by a Magistrate under section 465 I.P.C. may on the same facts be tried by a Court of Session under section 467 on the allegation that the document said to have been forged was a valuable security—*Abdul Hakim*, 19 Cr.L.J. 388 (Cal), 44 I.C. 740. When on a complaint made under sections 409 and 477A I.P.C., a second class Magistrate proceeded to deal with the case as one under section 408 I.P.C. and acquitted the accused, and the complainant afterwards presented a further complaint to the District Magistrate praying for the trial of the accused under sections 409 and 477A I.P.C.; it was held that the District Magistrate was competent to take cognizance of the second complaint, as the second class Magistrate who dealt with the first complaint was not empowered to commit the accused persons for trial to the Court of Session—*Krishnadhane v. Mahendra*, 23 C.W.N. 518. The accused was tried and acquitted on a charge under sec 498 I.P.C. for having taken away a girl from the custody of her mother with intent to have illicit intercourse with her. He was subsequently charged under secs 363 and 366 I.P.C. for having kidnapped the girl from the lawful guardianship of her mother with intent to have intercourse with her. Held that the plea of *autre fois acquit* would prevail with respect to the charge under sec 363, but not with respect to the charge under

sec 366, as it was a Sessions offence which the Magistrate who tried the accused under sec. 498 was not competent to try—*Chhanu Prasad*, 10 P.L.T. 446, 29 Cr.L.J. 760 (761). A person convicted by a village Headman under the Burma Village Act, for assault, can be tried subsequently by a Magistrate for the causing of hurt upon the same facts, the village Headman not being competent to try the offence of causing hurt—*Nichit v. Mi Nyun*, (1919) 3 U.B.R. 135, 20 Cr.L.J. 533, 51 I.C. 773.

It however the Court (Sessions Judge) which tried the previous offence was also competent to try the subsequent offence, the trial of the latter offence is barred by this section, and the fact that the first offence was triable with the aid of assessors and the second offence was triable by a jury, is immaterial—*K. E v Krishna Aiyar*, 24 Mad. 641. This sub-section refers to the competency of the tribunal to try the offence, and not to the nature of the offence, i.e., as to whether it is triable by jury or with assessors.

It was held in a Madras case that the words "competent to try" in this clause referred to the character and status of the tribunal, and that where the law required a sanction or complaint under sec 195 before the Court could take cognizance of the offence, the sanction or complaint was not a condition of the competency of the tribunal but was only a condition precedent for the institution of proceeding before that tribunal; and that want of sanction or complaint did not make the Court incompetent to try the offence within the meaning of this clause if the Court was otherwise competent to try the offence—*In re Ganapathi*, 36 Mad 308 (314). But this ruling has been disapproved of in 37 All 107, 52 Bom 257 and several other cases. See these cases cited in Note 1090 ante. The words "competent to try" are equivalent to "in a legal position to have tried and acquitted or convicted". That is, they refer narrowly to the legal position of the Court at the time of the former trial in relation to the particular offence committed by the accused, and not broadly to the jurisdiction of the Court with regard to the class of offences in general—*Babu Lal v Ram Saran*, 30 Cr.L.J. 806 (809) (Pat). Thus, the absence of a proper complaint by the person specified under section 199 of this Code renders the Court "incompetent" to try the offence. Where a Magistrate dismissed a complaint of an offence under section 498 I.P.C. on the ground that the complaint was not made by the person specified under section 199, and acquitted the accused, it was held that the order of acquittal amounted to a finding that the Court was 'not competent to try the offence' in the absence of a complaint by the proper person, and therefore a fresh complaint instituted by the proper person (the husband of the woman) was not barred under this section—*Umeruddin v. Emp*, 31 All 317, 9 Cr.L.J. 526. Similarly, where the accused was first tried under sections 366, 368 and 376 I.P.C. and acquitted, and subsequently, the husband of the woman preferred complaint under section 498 I.P.C. on the same facts, and the accused was tried and convicted, it was held that the second conviction was illegal, since the previous Court was not competent to try the accus-

under this sub-section, though he might be under sub-section (4)—*Mahadeogir v. Emp.*, 9 N.L.R. 26, 14 Cr.L.J. 135.

1096. Sub-section (4) :—‘Was not competent’:—The words ‘was not competent to try’ mean ‘had no jurisdiction to try’—*K. E. v. Krishna Aiyar*, 24 Mad. 641. Jurisdiction includes local jurisdiction; so if the previous Court had no local jurisdiction to try the subsequent offence, it was a Court “not competent to try” that offence within the meaning of this clause—*In re Shanker*, 53 Bom. 69, 30 Cr L.J. 54 (56). If a person has been acquitted or convicted of an offence, but the same facts disclose another offence which could not be tried by the same Magistrate who tried the first offence, then the previous acquittal or conviction is no bar in further proceedings for the latter offence—*In re Venkataranga*, 18 Cr L.J. 643 (Mad), *Palani Goundan v. Emp.*, 48 M.L.J. 490, 26 Cr L.J. 1087. Therefore the trial of the accused for an offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt by a Magistrate does not bar the trial of the accused for attempt to murder on the same facts, as the previous trial was by a Court not competent to try the latter offence—*Q v Panna*, 7 N.W.P. 371. Where a Magistrate convicted the accused of rioting, a fresh complaint of dacoity based on the same facts was not barred, since the Magistrate who tried the offence of rioting was not competent to try the offence of dacoity—*Viran Katti v. Chiyamu*, 7 Mad. 557. Similarly, a previous conviction for the offence of causing hurt tried before a Magistrate does not bar a subsequent trial by the Sessions Judge of an offence under section 304, upon the same facts—*Emp. v. Bahin*, 5 Bom L.R. 125, *In re Gandhi Apparaju*, 43 Mad. 330. A conviction by a Magistrate for a minor offence does not bar a subsequent trial for murder, because the Magistrate was not competent to try the offence of murder—*Ladkia*, Ratanlal 337 (338), *Wadhawa v. Crown*, 1912 P.R. 7. A person acquitted or convicted by a Magistrate under section 465 I.P.C. may on the same facts be tried by a Court of Session under section 467 on the allegation that the document said to have been forged was a valuable security—*Abdul Hakim*, 19 Cr L.J. 388 (Cal), 44 I.C. 740. When on a complaint made under sections 409 and 477A I.P.C., a second class Magistrate proceeded to deal with the case as one under section 408 I.P.C. and acquitted the accused, and the complainant afterwards presented a further complaint to the District Magistrate praying for the trial of the accused under sections 409 and 477A I.P.C.; it was held that the District Magistrate was competent to take cognizance of the second complaint, as the second class Magistrate who dealt with the first complaint was not empowered to commit the accused persons for trial to the Court of Session—*Krishnadhone v. Mahendra*, 23 C.W.N. 518. The accused was tried and acquitted on a charge under sec 498 I.P.C. for having taken away a girl from the custody of her mother with intent to have illicit intercourse with her. He was subsequently charged under secs 363 and 366 I.P.C. for having kidnapped the girl from the lawful guardianship of her mother with intent to have intercourse with her. Held that the plea of *autre fois acquit* would prevail with respect to the charge under sec 363, but not with respect to the charge under

is no bar in the retrial of the accused for the same offence—*Q. v. Shahbut*, 13 W.R. 42.

Discharge of accused:—Sec. 403 applies only to cases of acquittal or conviction, and has no application to a case in which the accused person has been discharged—*Parameshwari v. Jagan Nath*, 17 A.L.J. 867, 20 Cr.L.J. 403, 51 I.C. 163

It is competent for the Magistrate to rehear a complaint after the accused is discharged under sec. 253 or 259. See notes under those sections. An order of discharge under sec. 333 is no bar to fresh proceedings—*K. E. v. Sheikh Idoo*, 49 Cal. 71; but see *Emp. v. Jitendra*, 52 Cal. 590, 26 Cr.L.J. 1397. Where a person is discharged under sec. 119, he is merely permitted to depart. Such a discharge is not an acquittal, and fresh proceedings may be taken against the accused. See *Velu Tayi Ammal v. Chidambaravelu*, 33 Mad. 85. Where a conviction by a Magistrate who had no jurisdiction to try the case is set aside on appeal, and the Appellate Court, without ordering a retrial, merely discharges the accused, this section does not bar a fresh trial by a competent Magistrate—*Abdul Ghami v. Emp.*, 29 Cal. 412, *Ram Reddi*, 3 Mad. 48

But although there is nothing in law against the entertainment of a second complaint on the same facts against a person who has been discharged, yet, unless very strong grounds are shown, (i.e., discovery of new facts, etc.), a person who has been charged once and discharged ought not to be harassed on the same charge—*In re Malayil*, 18 Cr.L.J. 329 (Mad.).

When an order of discharge is passed, no formal order under sec. 436 or 437 is necessary for the institution of a fresh trial—*Mohesh Mistree*, 1 Cal. 282; *Emp. v. Donnelly*, 2 Cal. 405, *Emp. v. Hari Dayal*, 4 Cal. 16, *Nobin v. Russik*, 10 Cal. 268; *Q. E. v. Dolegobind*, 28 Cal. 211, *Mir Ahmad v. Md. Askari*, 29 Cal. 726, *Mehrbani*, 29 All. 7, *Emp. v. Gowdapa*, 2 Bom. 534; *Q. E. v. Dorabji*, 10 Bom. 131; *Chinnathambi v. Gurusamy*, 28 Mad. 310, *Narayanasawmy*, 32 Mad. 220; *Alauddin*, 17 O.C. 273, 15 Cr.L.J. 638.

PART VII.

OF APPEAL, REFERENCE AND REVISION.

CHAPTER XXXI.

OF APPEALS.

404. No appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Criminal Court except as provided for by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force.

Unless otherwise provided, no appeal to lie.

1099. No appeal :—Ordinarily no appeal lies, except as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other special law. In a case in which no appeal lies from an order, the proper course is to make an application for revision—*Zahur v Md. Hasan*, 1893 A.W.N 147. Although the law may not allow appeal in certain cases, the High Court in the exercise of the powers vested in it as a Court of Revision, may, in those cases and on very exceptional grounds, act as an Appellate Court—*Q. E v. Sheikh Badrudin*, 11 Bom 197. If an appeal is presented to the High Court in a case in which no appeal is allowed to the High Court, the case may be disposed of under its revisional powers, if the High Court finds that it is a proper case in which it may exercise its revisional jurisdiction. See *Rongai*, 9 Cal. 513.

1100. Appeal to Privy Council .—Unlike the Civil Procedure Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure contains no provision for appeal to the Privy Council. It is only in the power of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council exercising the prerogative right on behalf of the Crown to entertain appeals in matters of criminal jurisdiction—*In re Joy Kissen Mookerjee*, 1 W R 13 (P.C.)

An appeal to the Privy Council lies only under very special and exceptional circumstances. It is not in every case in which it could be shown that the Judge had misdirected the jury, that an appeal will be allowed—*MacCrea*, 15 All 310. Before granting the certificate that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Privy Council, the High Court must be satisfied that there is a reasonable ground for thinking that grave and substantial injustice may have been done by reason of some departure from the principles of natural justice—*In re Bal Gangadhar Tilak*, 33 Bom 221, 10 Bom L R 973, 11 Cr L J. 226.

The power of the Judicial Committee to review proceedings of a criminal nature is undoubted. But there are reasons both constitutional

and administrative which make it manifest that this power should not be lightly exercised. The overruling consideration on the topic has reference to justice itself—*Channing Arnold v. Emp.*, 41 Cal. 1023 (P.C.), 18 C.W.N. 785 (800). The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council does not lightly interfere in criminal cases; but where justice had been gravely and injuriously miscarried, and the sentence pronounced against the appeal formed an invasion of his liberty and denial of his just rights as a citizen, their Lordships felt called upon to interfere, although the proceedings taken were unobjectionable in form—*Louis Edouard Lanier v. King*, 18 C.W.N. 98 (103) (P.C.), 15 Cr.L.J. 305, 26 M.L.J. 1. In the region of fact, the Judicial Committee will not interfere unless something gross amounting to a complete misdescription of the whole bearing of the evidence has occurred—*Channing Arnold v. K. E.*, 41 Cal. 1023 (P.C.), 18 C.W.N. 785 (799).

The rule has been repeatedly laid down and invariably followed that His Majesty will not review or interfere with the course of criminal proceedings, unless it is shown that by a disregard of the forms of legal process or by some violation of the principles of natural justice or otherwise, substantial and grave injustice has been done—*In re Dillet*, (1887) 12 A.C. 459 (467), *Abdul Rahman v. Emp.*, 5 Rang. 53 (P.C.), 6 Bur. L.J. 65, 29 Bom.L.R. 813, 31 C.W.N. 271, 52 M.L.J. 585, 25 A.L.J. 117, 22 Cr.L.J. 259; *Clifford v. K. E.*, 40 Cal. 568 (P.C.), 18 C.W.N. 374 (378), *Dal Sing v. K. E.*, 44 Cal. 876 (881) (P.C.). Their Lordships will not interfere on the mere ground of misdirection to jury, nor will they assume a miscarriage of justice to have resulted therefrom, without reference to the question whether that misdirection did or did not affect the jury's mind. The Judicial Committee is not a Court of criminal appeal. It is not guided by its own doubts of the accused's innocence or suspicion of his guilt. It will not interfere with the course of criminal law unless there has been such an interference with the elementary rights of the accused as has placed him outside the pale of regular law, or, within that pale, there has been a violation of the natural principles of justice so demonstratively manifest as to convince their Lordships, first, that the result arrived at was opposite to the result which their Lordships would themselves have reached, and secondly, that the same opposite result would have been reached by the local tribunal also if the alleged defect or misdirection had been avoided—*Channing Arnold*, *supra*. Where injustice of a serious character has occurred owing to the admission of a whole body of inadmissible evidence, their Lordships had to interpose—*Pillai v. K. E.*, 36 Mad. 501 (P.C.), 17 C.W.N. 1110. The Sovereign in Council interferes only when it is shown that injustice of a serious and substantial character has occurred. A mere mistake on the part of the Court below, as for example, in the admission of improper evidence, will not suffice, if it has not led to injustice of a grave character. Nor do the Judicial Committee advise interference merely because they themselves would have taken a different view of the evidence admitted. Such questions are, as a general rule, treated as being for the final decision of the Courts below. Error in

procedure may be of a character so grave as to warrant the interference of the Sovereign. Such error may, for example, deprive a man of a constitutional or statutory right to be tried by a jury or by some particular tribunal. Or it may have been carried to such an extent as to cause the outcome of the proceedings to be contrary to fundamental principles which justice requires to be observed. But where the error consists only in the fact that evidence has been improperly admitted, which was not essential to a result which might have been come to wholly independently of it, the case is different. The dominant question is the broad one, whether substantial justice has been done, and if substantial justice has been done it is contrary to the general practice of the Board to advise the Sovereign to interfere with the result—*Dal Singh v. K.-E.*, 44 Cal. 876 (882, 889) (P.C.), 15 A.L.J. 475, 19 Bom L.R. 510, 21 C.W.N. 818, 33 M.L.J. 555, 18 Cr.L.J. 471. The extreme case in which the Judicial Committee would advise His Majesty to interpose is this, that it must be established demonstratively that justice itself in its very foundation has been subverted, and that it is therefore a matter of general Imperial concern that by way of an appeal to the King it be then restored to its rightful position—*Channing Arnold*, 41 Cal. 1023 (P.C.), 18 C.W.N. 785 (803).

Period of limitation for appeal:—See Arts 150, 150A, 154, 155 and 157 of the Indian Limitation Act IX of 1908

405. Any person whose application under section 89 for the delivery of property or the proceeds of the sale thereof has been rejected by any Court, may appeal to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the sentences of the former Court.

'Court to which appeals ordinarily lie' means Court to which appeals lie in the majority of cases, even though in a particular instance, the appeal may lie to another Court—*In re Anant Ram*, 11 Bom 438

406. Any person who has been ordered under section 118 to give security for keeping the peace or for good behaviour may appeal against such order—

(a) If made by a Presidency Magistrate, to the High Court;

(b) If made by any other Magistrate, to the Court of Session :

Provided that the Local Government may, by notification in the local official Gazette, direct that in any district specified in the notification, appeals from such

orders made by a Magistrate other than the District Magistrate or a Presidency Magistrate shall lie to the District Magistrate and not to the Court of Session :

Provided further, that nothing in this section shall apply to persons the proceedings against whom are laid before a Sessions Judge in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) or sub-section (3A) of section 123.

1101. Change.—This section has been redrafted by section 109 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act XVIII of 1923. The old section stood thus :—

“406 Any person ordered by a Magistrate other than the District Magistrate or a Presidency Magistrate to give security for good behaviour under section 118 may appeal to the District Magistrate.”

The main changes introduced are :—(1) Under the old section an appeal was allowed only in a *good behaviour* case, no appeal lay from an order directing security to *keep the peace*—*In re Chet Ram*, 27 All. 623; *Har Datt v Emp.*, 14 A.L.J. 268, 17 Cr.L.J. 165, *Baranasi v. Partab*, 11 A.L.J. 16, 35 All. 103, *Suleman*, 11 Bom.L.R. 740, 10 Cr.L.J. 375, 3 I.C. 774, *Shamrao v Emp.*, 19 N.L.R. 160, 25 Cr.L.J. 67, A.I.R. 1924 Nag. 60. These cases are now over-ruled, and an appeal is now allowed from such order.

(2) Under the old law there was no appeal against an order of a *District Magistrate or Presidency Magistrate* directing security—*Phullu*, 1898 A.W.N. 127; under the present law, an appeal lies from the order of *any Magistrate*.

(3) Under the old law, the appeal lay to the *District Magistrate*; under the present law, it will ordinarily lie to the *Court of Session*, and in the case of orders by a *Presidency Magistrate*, to the *High Court*. The reason of this amendment has been thus stated “All cases in the district relating to the breach of the peace and good behaviour are cases in which the District Magistrate is interested officially, and it is only fair that any order passed by a Magistrate should be revisable on appeal by an independent tribunal such as the Sessions Judge”—*Legislative Assembly Debates*, 8th February 1923, pp. 2063, 2064

1102. Scope.—This section applies only to an order requiring security under sec. 118, an order directing security to keep the peace under sec. 106 is not appealable—*Rowtha v. Muttusamy*, 2 Weir 460

Clause (b) —Under the old law, an appeal from an order passed by a Magistrate (other than the District Magistrate) lay to the Court of the District Magistrate and not to the Court of Session—*Mahendra v. K. E.*, 48 Cal. 874, 25 C.W.N. 383, 23 Cr.L.J. 229, *Mahomed Shah*, 1 S.L.R. 98. Even an appeal from the order of an Additional District Magistrate lay to the District Magistrate and not to the Sessions Judge—*Mahendra*, 48 Cal. 874. Under the present law, the appeal will ordinarily lie to the

Sessions Court; only under a special notification under the first proviso, the appeal will lie to the District Magistrate.

Second proviso :—This proviso expressly lays down that the moment a reference is made to the Court of Session under sec. 123, it operates as a bar to an appeal. The reason is two-fold. *first*, since the Sessions Judge is seized of the case on the reference, any appeal to him is unnecessary; *secondly*, if an appeal is allowed to the Court of the District Magistrate under the first proviso, there may be two different decisions, one by the District Magistrate on appeal, and another by the Sessions Judge on the reference. The principle of this proviso was also recognised under the old law, see *Qamar Din v. Emp.*, 23 Cr.L.J. 454 (Lah.)

Where the order of a Sub-divisional Magistrate under sec. 123 is confirmed by the Sessions Judge, the order passed by the Sessions Court becomes the operative order, and no appeal lies therefrom to the District Magistrate as it were from the order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate—*Shwe Gyan*, L.B.R. (1893-1900) 381. When a reference has been made to the Sessions Judge under sec. 123 and disposed of, no appeal lies to the District Magistrate—*Crown v. Ida*, 1900 P.R. 15; nor even to the High Court—*Chand Khan*, 11 Cal. 878.

406A. *Any person aggrieved by an order refusing to accept or rejecting a surety under Section 122 may appeal against such order—*

Appeal from order refusing to accept or rejecting a surety.

- (a) if made by a Presidency Magistrate, to the High Court;
- (b) if made by the District Magistrate, to the Court of Session; or
- (c) if made by a Magistrate other than the District Magistrate, to the District Magistrate.

This section has been added by section 110 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act XVIII of 1923. "We think that there should be a general right of appeal against the rejection of a surety, and we have provided for it in section 406A"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*.

407. (1) Any person convicted on a trial held by any Magistrate of the second or third class, or any person sentenced under section 349, or in respect of whom an order has been made or a sentence has been passed under section 380, by a Sub-divisional Magistrate of the second class, may appeal to the District Magistrate.

Appeal from sentence of Magistrate of the second or third class.

(2) The District Magistrate may direct that any appeal under this section, or any class of such appeals, shall be heard by any Magistrate of the first class subordinate to him and empowered by the Local Government to hear such appeals, and thereupon such appeal or class of appeals may be presented to such Subordinate Magistrate, or, if already presented to the District Magistrate, may be transferred to such Subordinate Magistrate. The District Magistrate may withdraw from such Magistrate any appeal or class of appeals so presented or transferred.

Change :—The italicised words have been added by section 111 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act XVIII of 1923. A similar amendment is made in section 408 also.

1103. 'Convicted on a trial'.—Since the word 'offence' as defined by section 4 includes an act in respect of which a complaint may be made under section 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act, a person against whom an order under section 22 of that Act is made is a person 'convicted on a trial' within the meaning of this section, and an appeal against such conviction by a second or third class Magistrate lies under this section—*Ponnuswami* 29 Mad. 517; see also *Rodriks v. Papa Dada*, 46 Bom. 58.

Second or Third Class Magistrate.—If a second class Magistrate, after the hearing of the case is complete, is invested with first class powers and he convicts the accused in the latter capacity, he will be deemed to have held the trial as a second class Magistrate, and the appeal against his judgment in this trial will lie to the District Magistrate, and not to the Sessions Judge—*Emp. v. Nga Paw*, 4 L.B.N. 239, 8 Cr.L.J. 48 (49). The wording of this section ("trial held") shows that it is not the conviction by a second class Magistrate but the holding of trial by such Magistrate that determines the forum of the appeal—*Sheobhanjan*, *infra*. But where a Magistrate begins a trial as a second class Magistrate, but before the hearing of the case is complete (e.g. before the examination and cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses is finished, or before a charge is framed), he is invested with first class powers, i.e., where part of the trial is held by him as a second class Magistrate and part as a first class Magistrate, the proper tribunal for hearing the appeal from his conviction is the Sessions Judge and not the District Magistrate—*Sheobhanjan v. Emp.*, 6 P.L.T. 554, 26 Cr.L.J. 914 (915), *Babu Ram v. Crown*, 8 Lah. 203, 28 Cr.L.J. 781 (782), *Durga Das*, 28 Cr.L.J. 50 (51) (Lah.); *Emp. v. Maganlal*, 29 Bom. L.R. 482, 28 Cr.L.J. 474; *Venkatareddi v. Ramayya*, 51 Mad. 257, 29 Cr.L.J. 71.

An appeal from a Bench of Magistrates invested with 2nd or 3rd class powers will lie under this section to the District Magistrate—*Q. E. v.*

Narayanamsami, 11 Mad. 36 But if a Bench when sitting together is invested with first class powers, though consisting of second or third class Magistrates, an appeal from such Bench will not lie to the District Magistrate but to the Sessions Judge—*Havaladar v. Jagu Mian*, 9 Cal. 96.

'Sentenced under sec. 349':—Sec. 349 prescribes the procedure to be adopted when a Magistrate cannot pass adequate sentence. Under that section, a 2nd or 3rd class Magistrate can only transfer such case to the Subdivisional Magistrate.

1104. Sub-sec. (2) :—Transfer by District Magistrate—The District Magistrate may delegate his work of hearing appeals, but not any revisional work. Where a District Magistrate directed an Assistant Collector under him to perform all "routine work of the Collector's office including criminal, appellate and revisional work," it was held that ■ regards revisional work, such a delegation was *ultra vires*, because this section does not refer to work of that kind; but as regards appellate work, the delegation is valid—*Bai Harku v. Sitarum*, 2 Bom. L. R. 536.

An Additional District Magistrate is subordinate to the District Magistrate for the purposes of this sub-section, and the District Magistrate may transfer an appeal to the Additional District Magistrate. See sec. 10 (3).

The Court to which an appeal is transferred for disposal, and on which the responsibility for its correct disposal rests, is not bound by any opinion as to the necessity for taking further evidence formed by the Court from which the appeal was transferred and which is no longer responsible for the decision of the appeal—*In re Alagu Ambalam*, 31 Mad. 277, 18 M.L.J. 89, 7 Cr.L.J. 329.

Even though a District Magistrate has transferred the appeal to a Sub-divisional Magistrate, the District Magistrate has jurisdiction to withdraw the appeal to his own file from the file of a Sub-divisional Magistrate, by whom it has been heard in part. Where such Sub-Divisional Magistrate had issued summons for the examination of certain witnesses as Court witnesses, it is not incumbent on the District Magistrate, on the withdrawal of the case to his own file, to examine those witnesses, as he is not bound by any opinion of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate—*In re Alagu Ambalam*, *supra*

408. Any person convicted on a trial held by an Assistant Sessions Judge, a District Magistrate or other Magistrate ■ of the first class, or any person sentenced under section 349, or in respect of whom an order has been made or ■ sentence has been passed under section 380, by ■ Magistrate of the first class, may appeal to the Court of Session :

Provided as follows :—

(a) * * *

Appeal from sentence of Assistant Sessions Judge or Magistrate of the first class.

- (b) when in any case an Assistant Sessions Judge or a Magistrate specially empowered under section 30 passes any sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding four years, or any sentence of transportation, the appeal of *all or any of the accused convicted at such trial* shall lie to the High Court;
- (c) when any person is convicted by a Magistrate of an offence under section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, the appeal shall lie to the High Court.

Change :—The italicised words have been added by section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. Clause (a) which referred to European British Subjects has been omitted by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, XII of 1923

1105. 'Convicted' —A person who is convicted but on whom no sentence is passed, the person being released on probation under section 562, is said to be 'convicted' within the meaning of this section and can appeal—*Emp. v. Monohar*, 1904 P.R. 24, 1 Cr.L.J. 1098, *Emp. v. Madhav*, 28 Bom. L.R. 671, 27 Cr L.J. 873, *Hayat v Crown*, 1917 P.R. 20, 18 Cr.L.J. 401; *Bahadur v. Ismail*, 52 Cal. 463, 29 C.W.N. 151. If a Magistrate of the first class convicts a person and passes an order under sec 562 in a summary trial, section 414 will not apply but the case will be governed by this section, and an appeal will lie to the Sessions Judge—*Emp. v. Hira Lal*, 46 All 828 (830), 22 A.L.J. 751, 25 Cr L.J. 1244. An Ordinance (e.g. Ordinance III of 1914) is a law, and an infringement of its provisions is an offence. A person convicted of such offence by a District Magistrate may appeal to the Sessions Judge, and the latter has jurisdiction to hear the appeal—*Sher Singh v Emp.*, 1916 P.R. 10, 17 Cr L.J. 225 (226). A person who is directed by a 1st class Magistrate to pay compensation under sec 22 of the Cattle Trespass Act can be said to be convicted of an offence, and the appeal from his conviction is governed by this section—*Rodricks v Papa Dada*, 46 Bom. 58, 23 Bom L.R. 836, 22 Cr.L.J. 624

"Trial held" —If a trial is commenced by a second class Magistrate, but during the course of the trial and before the hearing is complete, he is invested with first class powers, the trial is said to be held by a first class Magistrate, and the appeal lies to the Sessions Judge. See *Sheobhanjan Sing*, 11 P.L.T. 554 and other cases cited in Note 1103 under sec. 407.

Sentence under section 349 —When a case is referred to a District Magistrate under section 349, the fact that he is also invested with special powers under section 30 will not empower him to pass a sentence of

years' imprisonment; such a sentence is *ultra vires* having regard to the last clause of section 349. The appeal in such a case will lie to the Court of Session, and not to the High Court under proviso (b)—*Nga Pya v. K. E.*, 4 L.B.R. 53, 6 Cr.L.J. 289.

Sentence under section 380:—Where proceedings were submitted under section 380 by a second class Magistrate to a first class Magistrate, in order that the accused might be dealt with under section 562, and the latter convicted and sentenced the accused, and the question arose under the old law as to whether an appeal lay to the Sessions Judge or to the District Magistrate, it was held that the sentence passed by the first class Magistrate under section 380 in a case submitted to him was unquestionably a sentence passed by such Magistrate, and the appeal lay to the Court of Session—*Emp. v. Bhimappa*, 17 Bom. L.R. 895, 16 Cr.L.J. 738, 31 I.C. 338. This is now expressly laid down in the present section as amended.

1106. Court of Session:—Where a Magistrate was authorised to try all offences throughout the whole District, and there were two Sessions Divisions in the District, an appeal from a sentence of the Magistrate will lie to the Sessions Division within whose jurisdiction the Headquarters of the Magistrate were situate, irrespective of the place where the offence was committed—*Valia Ambu v. Emp.*, 30 Mad. 136, *Hiralal v. Crown*, 1918 P.R. 7, 19 Cr.L.J. 310.

Appeal heard without jurisdiction.—Where an accused person was acquitted by a Sessions Judge in an appeal which he had no jurisdiction to hear, he may be re-arrested even after the expiration of the period to which he was originally sentenced to be imprisoned, and may be made to undergo the remaining portion of the sentence—*Gopala Shiru*, Ratnial 17 (18).

1107. Proviso (b):—The reason for this proviso obviously is that when a long term of imprisonment has to be undergone, the question whether the offence is proved should be tried in appeal by a Court of a higher grade than it would be tried by if the sentence were less—*Nga Pya*, 4 L.B.R. 53, 6 Cr.L.J. 289. The sentence of imprisonment exceeding four years in this proviso must be taken to mean the substantive sentence of imprisonment apart from any sentence of imprisonment in default of fine. Therefore an appeal from a sentence awarding 4 years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 100, and in default of fine, to six months' rigorous imprisonment, lies to the Court of Session and not to the High Court—*Khuda Bakhsh v. Crown*, 1918 P.R. 19, 19 Cr.L.J. 742; *Nga Tun Tha*, 1 L.B.R. 57.

An appeal from the conviction and sentence of less than four years' imprisonment by an Assistant Judge lies to the Sessions Judge, and not to the High Court simply because by the time the appeal is filed the Assistant Sessions Judge has been promoted to the position of Offg. Sessions Judge (and is therefore incompetent to hear the appeal against his own order). The proper procedure in such a case would be to file the appeal before the Offg. Sessions Judge who on receipt of the appeal would either send it

to the High Court or would postpone its hearing till the return of the permanent incumbent—*Garib Lal v. Crown*, 3 P.L.J. 192, 19 Cr.L.J. 442.

In calculating the term of 4 years under this proviso, the Court must not take into account the length of time during which the accused was under trial. The Court is only concerned with the actual substantive sentence imposed—*Jagadish*, 10 N.L.J. 135, 28 Cr.L.J. 672.

1108. Concurrent sentences:—Under section 35 (3), concurrent sentences cannot be aggregated together for the purpose of raising the status of the forum of appeal—*Gurusahay v. Emp.*, 3 P.L.J. 138; *Emp v Tulsı Ram*, 35 All 154, 11 A.L.J. 111. Therefore, where an Assistant Session Judge or a Magistrate specially empowered under sec 30 passes several sentences of imprisonment upon an accused, each of which is for a term of four years or under, and the sentences are ordered to run concurrently, the appeal from the conviction and sentences lies to the Sessions Court and not to the High Court—*Lakshmi v K. E.*, 23 C.L.J. 595, *Gurusahay v Emp.*, 3 P.L.J. 138, *Sher Muhammad v Crown*, 1901 P.R. 25, *Jagadish v. K. E.*, 10 N.L.J. 135, 28 Cr.L.J. 672.

Magistrate acting under section 30.—Under this proviso, where a person is convicted by a Magistrate invested with enhanced powers under section 30, and sentenced to imprisonment for more than four years, an appeal lies to the High Court and not to the Court of Session—*Ahmad Khan v. Crown*, 1916 P.R. 5, 17 Cr.L.J. 299.

If the appeal is presented to the Sessions Judge instead of to the High Court, and the Sessions Judge disposes of the appeal, the proceedings before the Sessions Judge are void under sec. 530 (r)—*In re Abdulla*, 2 Rang 396 (387), 26 Cr.L.J. 293.

1109. 'All or any of the accused':—"This amendment provides that in a trial in which more than one person are accused, and in which by reason of the sentences passed an appeal lies in the case of some persons to the Sessions Judge and of others to the High Court, the appeal of all shall lie to the latter tribunal"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914). If several persons are tried jointly, and the Assistant Sessions Judge passes a sentence of over four years' imprisonment on some of the accused, and a sentence of less than four years on the others, the appeal by the latter will also lie to the High Court and not to the Court of Session—*Palani v Emp.*, 17 M.L.J. 248, 5 Cr.L.J. 496, *Richhe v Emp.*, 13 A.L.J. 272, 16 Cr.L.J. 353, *Q. E. v. Jaisingh*, 1900 P.R. 12, *Debi Din v K. E.*, 24 A.L.J. 151, 27 Cr.L.J. 175 (The contrary view held in *Nittoor Moideen*, 43 M.L.J. 561 is hereby overruled). Even if in such a case, the persons over whom sentences of over four years were passed did not appeal to the High Court, the appeal of the other persons over whom sentences of less than four years were passed would lie to the High Court and not to the Court of Session—*Har Dayal v Emp.*, 37 All 471, 13 A.L.J. 719, 16 Cr.L.J. 606; *Ahmad Khan v Emp.* 1916 P.R. 5.

Proviso (c)—Where the accused was convicted by a District Magistrate under section 124A I. P. C., and sentenced to two years' imprisonment, and was in the same trial convicted of an offence under section 14

1. P. C. and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment, the two sentences must be aggregated and considered as one sentence under section 35 (3) for the purposes of appeal, and the appeal against the single sentence will lie to the High Court. It is not necessary that the prisoner will file an appeal against the conviction under section 124A to the High Court, and another appeal against the conviction under section 153A to the Court of Session—*Joy Chandra v. Emp.*, 38 Cal. 214 (219).

409. An appeal to the Court of Session or Sessions Judge shall be heard by Appeals to Court of Session how heard. the Sessions Judge or by an Additional Sessions Judge:

Provided that an Additional Sessions Judge shall hear only such appeals as the Local Government may, by general or special order, direct or as the Sessions Judge of the division may make over to him.

Change :—The proviso has been added by section 113 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923.

1110. Under this section, the Sessions Judge can transfer an appeal preferred to him to the Additional Sessions Judge; he cannot transfer it to the Assistant Sessions Judge for disposal. Even section 193 (2) does not confer on him such powers, because the word 'case' under that section does not include an appeal—*Abdul Razzak*, 37 All. 286, 16 Cr.L.J. 316.

410. Any person convicted on a trial held by a Sessions Judge, or an Additional Sessions Judge, may appeal to the High Court. Appeal from sentence of Court of Session.

1110A. If a Sessions Judge imposes a fine for intentional insult to him in Court, in a summary way, the accused is said to be 'convicted on a trial,' and may appeal under this section to the High Court—*In re Chappu Menon*, 4 M.H.C.R. 146

If a Sessions Judge on appeal has taken additional evidence under sec. 428, and has dismissed the appeal, the prisoner has no further right of appeal to the High Court—*Ishahak*, 27 Cal. 372.

'May appeal.'—This section confers a right of appeal to the High Court to a person convicted on a trial held by the Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge. The word 'may' does not mean that it is at the option of the High Court to entertain or not appeals under this section—*Pohpi*, 13 All. 171 (178).

411. Any person convicted on a trial held by a Presidency Magistrate may appeal to the High Court, if the Magistrate has sentenced him to imprisonment for a term exceeding six months or to fine exceeding two hundred rupees. Appeal from sentence of Presidency Magistrate.

1111. 'Imprisonment.'—The word 'imprisonment' means a substantive sentence of imprisonment, and does not include an award of imprisonment in default of payment of fine, the operation of which is contingent only on the fine not being paid. Therefore, where the Presidency Magistrate inflicted a sentence of six months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 200, and in default of payment, three months' simple imprisonment, the two sentences of imprisonment could not be combined to give the prisoner a right of appeal—*In re Jotharam*, 2 Mad. 30; *Schein v. Q. E.*, 16 Cal. 799, *Q. E. v. Hari*, 20 Bom. 145.

412. Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, where an accused person has pleaded guilty and has been convicted by a Court of Session or any Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class on such plea, there shall be no appeal except as to the extent or legality of the sentence.

No appeal in certain cases when accused pleads guilty.

1112. Conviction on his own plea:—The principle of this section is that the accused in pleading guilty to the charge is considered to have waived his right to question the legality of the conviction; he can only question the extent or legality of the sentence—*Emp v. Akub Ali*, 31 C.L.J. 122; *Emp v. Jafar*, 5 Bom. 85. When a person has been convicted on his own plea by a Presidency Magistrate, no appeal shall lie to the High Court, except as to the extent or legality of the sentence, although he is sentenced for a term exceeding six months or to fine exceeding Rs. 200—*Jafar*, 5 Bom. 85. Where a charge has been framed against an accused person under section 221 (7) of this Code, and such person has pleaded guilty to the charge that he is a previous convict, the Appellate Court under section 412 is precluded from opening the question whether the accused is a previous convict or not—*Emp. v. Kissan*, 4 N.L.R. 163, 9 Cr L.J. 56.

A person who pleaded guilty to the charge and was convicted by a second class Magistrate, is not barred from contending in appeal that the conviction is illegal. Sec. 412 bars the appeal where the conviction was by a first class Magistrate—*Chunilal v. Emp.*, 28 Bom L.R. 1023, 27 Cr.L.J. 1148.

If a person who has no right of appeal under this section, makes an appeal, and the Appellate Court hears the appeal, sets aside the conviction and acquits him, the order of acquittal is without jurisdiction and must be set aside by the High Court—*Emp. v. Nga Lu Gale*, 5 Rang 710, 29 Cr.L.J. 115 (116).

Extent and legality of the sentence:—Under this section, the right of appeal, when the accused has pleaded guilty, is limited to such matter as may be a special ground of complaint with respect to the sentence, (as distinguished from the conviction itself), whether on the ground that the sen-

tence is beyond what the circumstances of the case required, or that the sentence is illegal or not authorized by law—*Emp. v. Jafar*, 5 Bom. 85. Although the Appellate Court may reject an appeal on the ground that the accused has pleaded guilty before the Lower Court, still the extent and legality of the sentence will have to be considered by the Appellate Court—*Govind Raghu*, Ratnals 954; and in order to consider the legality of the sentence the Appellate Court must satisfy itself that the plea of guilty was properly made after the nature of the offence was explained to and understood by the prisoner—*Kalu Dosan*, 22 Bom. 759.

But where no sentence was passed (e.g., where the accused was convicted upon his own plea of guilty, and was released under section 562 on his executing a bond) the right of appeal is absolutely barred—*Hayata v Crown*, 1917 P.R. 20, 18 Cr.L.J. 401.

413. Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, there shall

No appeal in petty cases.

be no appeal by a convicted person in cases in which a Court of Session or the District Magistrate or other Magistrate of the first class passes a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding one month only or of fine not exceeding fifty rupees only or of whipping only.

413. Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, there shall

No appeal in petty cases.

be no appeal by a convicted person in cases in which a Court of Session [***] passes a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding one month only or in which a Court of Session or District Magistrate or other Magistrate of the first class passes a sentence of fine not exceeding rupees fifty only. * *

Explanation.—There is no appeal from a sentence of imprisonment passed by such Court or Magistrate in default of payment of fine when no substantive sentence of imprisonment has also been passed.

Change —This section has been amended by section 24 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1923. Under this section as now amended, a right of appeal is given against conviction by District Magistrates or Magistrates of the first class where they pass sentences of imprisonment even for a period of one month or less. Under the old law (section 416) only an European British subject could appeal against such sentence. "We consider that outside the presidency towns in the case of all persons, both European and Indian, there should be an appeal against any sentence of imprisonment passed by a Magistrate. This involves a substantial modification of the general law of the land and will to a certain

extent increase the work of the Sessions Courts. Nevertheless we are of opinion on general grounds, and apart from the particular case of the European British subject, that an appeal should lie against any sentence. It is to be noted that short sentences of imprisonment should where possible be avoided, and the number of sentences of one month and under passed by District Magistrates and first class Magistrates should not, as far as we can judge, be very large. In the case of a sentence passed in a trial by a Court of Session, we would allow no appeal in respect of a sentence of one month or under"—*Report of the Racial Distinctions Committee, Para. 19.*

This section also gives a right of appeal against a sentence of whipping.

1113. Sole sentence of imprisonment—Where the accused was sentenced to 14 days' imprisonment and to pay the cost of court-fees, the sentence is a sole sentence of imprisonment not exceeding one month; and the order to pay the court-fees is no part of the sentence and is not a sentence of fine added to imprisonment, so as to make it appealable (sec. 415)—*Madan v. Haran*, 20 Cal 687; *Q. E. v Khajabhoj*, 16 Mad 423, *Emp. v. Karuppanna*, 29 Mad. 188; *Para Munyan*, 1 Weir 724. *Contra—Thangavelu*, 22 Mad. 153, *Anonymous*, 2 Weir 723, 5 M.H.C.R. App. 28.

Fine—Compensation awarded under section 22 of the Cattle Trespass Act is not a fine, and therefore an appeal lies from an order awarding compensation less than rupees fifty—*Rodriks v. Papa Dada*, 46 Bom. 58, 22 Cr.L.J. 624.

Aggregation of sentences:—Where a person is charged with two separate offences in one trial, the amount of the whole punishment awarded for the two offences must be regarded as one sentence for the purpose of determining whether an appeal lies or not—*Harodhan*, 3 C.L.R. 511, *Reg. v Rama*, 1 Bom. 223. See section 415.

Passing appealable sentence at the request of accused—When a Magistrate at first passed a non-appealable sentence, and shortly afterwards at the request of the accused enhanced the sentence to make it appealable, and on appeal the Sessions Judge struck out the added sentence as illegal, and declined to hear the appeal on the ground that the sentence originally passed was not appealable, it was held that as the Magistrate had passed an appealable sentence, an appeal lay under this section, whether that sentence was passed legally or illegally, and that the Sessions Judge was bound to hear the appeal on the merits—*Keshavlal*, 35 Bom. 418, 12 Cr.L.J. 431.

**414. Notwithstanding anything here-
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tained, there
shall be no ap-
peal by a con-**

No appeal
from cer-
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victed person in any case

**414. Notwithstanding anything here-
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No appeal
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victed person in any case

tried summarily in which a Magistrate empowered to act under section 260 passes a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding three months only, or of fine not exceeding two hundred rupees only, or of whipping only.

This section has been amended by section 25 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, XII of 1923. By this amendment, certain sentences passed on summary convictions which were originally non-appealable (*viz.* imprisonment for three months or less, or whipping) are now made appealable. Under the old law, only European British subjects could appeal from such sentences.

If a Magistrate of the first class passes an order under sec. 562 in a summary trial, this section does not apply, because an order under sec. 562 is not a sentence of imprisonment or fine, but section 408 will govern the case and an appeal will lie to the Court of Session—*Emp v Hira Lal*, 46 All. 828 (829), 22 A.L.J. 751, 25 Cr.L.J. 1244.

415. An appeal may be brought against any sentence referred to in section 413 or section 414 by which any two or more of the punishments therein mentioned are combined, but no sentence which would not otherwise be liable to appeal shall be appealable merely on the ground that the person convicted is ordered to find security to keep the peace.

Explanation.—A sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of fine is not a sentence by which two or more punishments are combined within the meaning of this section.

1114. *Combination of sentences*.—Where the accused was sentenced to one day's imprisonment and a fine of fifty rupees, the fact that the accused was not actually sent to jail does not prevent the combination, the passing of the sentence of imprisonment is sufficient, and the two sentences of imprisonment and fine may be combined for the purposes of appeal—*Alam*, 33 All. 510, 12 Cr.L.J. 389.

Security to keep the peace.—The imprisonment to be undergone in default of furnishing security to keep the peace is not a part of a substantive sentence. If the substantive sentence is not in itself appealable, it does not become so, merely because the person convicted has been ordered to find security to keep the peace—*Maghu v. K. E.*, 7 O.C. 338, 1 Cr.L.J. 1054.

tried summarily in which a Magistrate empowered to act under section 260 passes a sentence * * * of fine not exceeding two hundred rupees only. * * *

The words "security to keep the peace" refer only to those cases where the accused is ordered to find security to keep the peace under *this Code*, and not where he is ordered to do so under any local enactment. Thus, where the accused was sentenced in a summary trial to a non-appealable term of imprisonment, and further ordered under sec. 31A of the Rangoon Police Act to give security, it was held that this section did not apply, and the sentence passed was appealable—*Kathan v. K. E.*, 4 L.B.R. 359.

Again, this section applies where the accused is ordered to give security to *keep the peace*, and not where he is required to furnish security for good behaviour—*Kathan v. K. E.*, 4 L.B.R. 359.

415A. *Notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter, when more persons than one are convicted in one trial, and an appealable judgment or order has been passed in respect of any of such persons, all or any of the persons convicted at such trial have a right of appeal.*

Special right of appeal
in certain cases.

This section has been added by sec. 114 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act XVIII of 1923, to remove the conflict of opinion which existed under the old law, as will be evident from the undernoted cases

1115. Where several persons are tried and convicted at one trial, some of whom are sentenced to appealable sentences while the rest are awarded non-appealable sentences, all of them will be able to appeal, the fact that non-appealable sentences are passed on some of them does not, by virtue of sec. 413, take away their right of appeal. Sec. 413 applies to the case where only a non-appealable sentence is passed and not where non-appealable as well as appealable sentences are pronounced—*Crown v. Naurati*, 1915 P.R. 30, *Ba Thaw v. K. E.*, 4 L.B.R. 354, 9 Cr.L.J. 356; *Jalsukh v. Crown*, 1916 P.R. 16, *Sheopal v. K. E.*, 15 O.C. 386, 14 Cr.L.J. 170; *Lal Singh v. Emp.*, 38 All. 395, *Biswanath v. Emp.*, 22 Cr.L.J. 297 (Pat). Section 413 curtails the right of appeal only in cases in which there is no sentence upon any convicted person above the limit prescribed by sec. 413; but if any of the convicted persons in the same case has received any punishment above that limit, the right of appeal of any other person receiving a sentence below that limit is not at all curtailed, but he along with the one who received a higher punishment has the right uncontrolled and uncurtailed—*Phetu v. K. E.*, 4 P.L.J. 435, 20 Cr.L.J. 545 (*per Jwala Prasad J.*). This view has been adopted in the present section.

The contrary view was taken in *In re Urama*, 15 Cr.L.J. 371, 16 M.L.T. 33; *Venkatakrishnaya*, 40 Mad. 591; *Phetu v. K. E.*, 4 P.L.J. 435 (*per Atkinson J.*); *Husain Khan*, 39 All. 293; *Crown v. Unar*, 18 Cr.L.J. 72, 10 S.L.R. 156; *In re Annasami*, 7 L.W. 571, *Jhagru*, 24 Cr.L.J. 679 (All.); in these cases it was held that the language of section 413 was imperative and took away the right of appeal under such

circumstances, and the accused against whom non-appealable sentences were passed could not acquire the right by reason of the fact that they were tried jointly with some other persons who received appealable sentences—*Annasami*, 7 L.W. 571, 19 Cr.L.J. 623. This view has not been accepted by the Legislature and is overruled by the present section.

Where a person has been ordered to be released on probation of good conduct under sec. 562 (which order is appealable under sec. 408) and other persons have been awarded non-appealable sentences, the latter persons also will be entitled to appeal, by operation of this section—*Bahadur v. Ismail*, 52 Cal. 463, 29 C.W.N. 151, 26 Cr.L.J. 455. Where more persons than one are jointly convicted in one trial by the High Court criminal sessions, and leave to appeal is granted to one of them under sec. 449 (1) on the ground of his being an European British Subject, such leave should also be granted to the other accused (even if they are not European British Subjects) in view of the provisions of sec. 415A—*Gallagher v. Emp.*, 54 Cal. 52, 28 Cr.L.J. 481.

416. [Repealed].

This section, which has been repealed by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, XII of 1923 stood as follows:—

"416. Nothing in sections 413 and 414 applies to appeals from sentences passed under Chapter XXXIII on European British subjects."

That is, it laid down that in respect of those sentences which were non-appealable in the case of Indian subjects, an European British subject had a right of appeal. This distinction is now abolished and both European and Indian subjects are placed on the same footing, and given equal rights of appeal.

417. The Local Government may direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court.

Appeal on behalf of Government in case of acquittal.

If one of two accused is acquitted, and no appeal is preferred by the Government against his acquittal, he must be deemed to be innocent of the charge made against him, and the Sessions Judge (in an appeal by the other accused against his conviction) ought not to pass any remarks impugning the correctness of the acquittal. If the Sessions Judge passes any such remarks, the High Court will order those remarks to be expunged from the record—*Abdul Aziz v. Emp.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 1245 (Lah.)

1116. Only Government can appeal:—The High Court has no authority to entertain an appeal under this section except upon an appeal by the Local Government—*Okhoy v. Madhoo*, 19 W.R. 55; *A David*, 11 C.L.R. 245; *Thandavan v. Peranna*, 14 Mad. 363. The intention of the Legislature is that there should be no interference by the High

Court with acquittal, even though improper, except upon a formal appeal by the Local Government—*Emp. v. Miyaji*, 3 Bom. 150. The law, by limiting the right of appeal against judgments of acquittal to the Local Government, prevents personal vindictiveness from seeking to call in question judgments of acquittal by way of appeal, and evidently intends that such interference shall take place only in those cases where there has been a miscarriage of justice so grave as would induce the Local Government to move in the matter—*Dy Leg. Rem v Karuna*, 22 Cal. 164

Even the District Magistrate is not competent to refer the case to the High Court. See Note 1197 under sec 438. Where the prisoners convicted by a Magistrate are acquitted on appeal by the Sessions Judge, it is not competent for the District Magistrate to transmit the proceeding to the High Court to have the Sessions Judge's order of acquittal set aside—*In re A David*, 5 C L R 245.

The power of appeal under this section should be sparingly used by the Government, but the discretion to exercise that power is not subject to the control of the High Court—*Emp v Sakharani*, 21 Bom L R 1054, *Emp. v. Moti*, 26 Bom L R 113, 25 Cr L J 786, *Crown v Arjan*, 1917 P.R. 43, 19 Cr L J. 85, 43 I C 245

As to the High Court's power of revising an order of acquittal, either at the instance of the Local Government, or at the instance of a private complainant, see Notes 1204 and 1219 under sec. 439.

1117. Public Prosecutor —Only the Public Prosecutor can file an appeal under this section. The Local Government cannot direct any other person to appeal. The Legal Remembrancer is a Public Prosecutor within the meaning of this section—*Legal Remembrancer v. Tularam*, 23 C.W.N. 96, 46 Cal. 544. But the Legal Remembrancer of Bengal cannot be deemed to be the Public Prosecutor for the province of Behar, from the mere fact that he has been directed by a letter of the Government of Behar to file an appeal in the Calcutta High Court under section 417 against an order of acquittal passed in a Behar case, when the letter did not specially appoint him as such, and especially when there is already a Public Prosecutor for the province of Behar. And the Legal Remembrancer of Bengal therefore cannot file the appeal—*Dy Leg Rem. v Gaya Prosad*, 41 Cal 425

A private prosecutor can neither present an appeal under this section nor apply in revision—*Thandavan v Perianna*, 14 Mad 363, *In re Poona Churn*, 7 Cal. 447.

1118. High Court —An appeal will lie under this section only to the High Court. Where a District Magistrate entertained an appeal from an order of acquittal passed by the subordinate Magistrate, it was held that the District Magistrate acted without jurisdiction—*Rangasami*, 7 Mad 213, *Sami Ayya*, 26 Mad. 478. So also, a Sessions Judge has no right to entertain an appeal against an order of acquittal—*Bajjanath v. Gouri Kant*, 20 Cal 633; *Baroda*, 2 C.W.N. cclvi

1119. Order of acquittal :—The withdrawal of a complaint by a complainant operates as an order of acquittal—*Luchi*, 19 W.R. 55. A judgment passed by the Sessions Judge, following the verdict of the jury acquitting the accused, is a judgment of acquittal for the purpose of appeal by the Local Government—*Emp v. Judoonath*, 2 Cal. 273. The words 'appellate order of acquittal' mean and include all judgments of an Appellate Court by which a conviction is set aside—*Gokool*, 24 W.R. 41.

The 'acquittal' contemplated by this section need not be acquittal upon all the charges. Where in a case tried by jury, an accused charged with murder was acquitted of that charge but was convicted of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, this section would apply and an appeal by the Local Government would lie in respect of the charge of murder, even though the judgment of the Sessions Judge was not a judgment of absolute acquittal—*Emp. v. Judoonath*, 2 Cal. 273, *Sitaram v. Emp.*, 12 O.L.J. 421, 2 O.W.N. 550, 26 Cr.L.J. 1364.

The acquittal in this section means the particular acquittal complained of by the Government. Where the accused is charged under secs 211 and 500 I. P. C. and acquitted of both the offences, but the Government preferred an appeal against the acquittal under sec. 500 I. P. Code, the High Court cannot question the propriety of the acquittal under sec 211 I. P. C.—*Q. E. v. Karigowda*, 19 Bom. 51.

An order of a Sessions Judge passed on appeal under sec 406 discharging an accused who was ordered by a Magistrate under sec. 118 to furnish security for good behaviour, cannot be considered to be an original or an appellate order of acquittal within the meaning of sec. 417, so as to give the Local Government a right of appeal to the High Court—*Emp. v. Samai Deen*, 1 Luck. 231, 13 O.L.J. 276, 27 Cr.L.J. 626.

Interlocutory orders .—This section allows an appeal only from an order of acquittal but not from any interlocutory order (e.g. an order refusing to amend the charges) which he has passed in a case which has ended in an acquittal. Any objection to such an interlocutory order cannot be included in the grounds of appeal against the order of acquittal. An order refusing to add or amend the charges is not an "order of acquittal", it is not even an order which can be said to form the basis of the order of acquittal or a necessary condition of its tenability. It cannot be said that the acquittal was due to the circumstance that the amendment was not allowed. But an order excluding as irrelevant a body of evidence tendered for the Crown, which had led to an acquittal as a logical and inevitable consequence, stands on a different footing. In such a case the Government, on its appeal against the acquittal, can also take objection to the order excluding the evidence—*Q. E. v. Vajram*, 16 Bom. 414 (428); followed in *Emp v. Stewart*, 21 S.L.R. 55, 27 Cr.L.J. 1217 (1228) (*per* Rupchand A.J.C.). In the latter case, Kincaid J.C. is of opinion (dissenting from 16 Bom. 414) that although an order refusing to add or alter charges is not appealable under section 417, still if such order is followed by an order of acquittal, the Local Government may appeal.

1120. When appeal will lie :—An appeal against acquittal is a special weapon which the Local Government judiciously reserves for exceptional occasions and which is used after most anxious consideration and in cases which are themselves of great public importance or in which a principle is involved. It cannot be expected that the Government will utilise it freely in cases which, though of importance to individual subjects, are of little or no general interest—*Siban Rai v Bhagwat*, 5 Pat 25 (32), 27 Cr L.J. 235. The High Court will not interfere merely because it might itself, sitting as a Court of original jurisdiction, have arrived at a different conclusion—*Mangat*, 1903 P R 11; *Jawai*, 19 Cr.L.J. 275, 44 I.C. 179, 1918 P L R. 70, *Bishen Singh*, 1914 P L R. 125, 15 Cr L J 203 (207); *Emp. v. Ram Karan*, 26 P L R 295, 7 Lah L J 528, 26 Cr L J 1141, *Robinson*, 16 All 212, *Gayadin*, 4 All 148, *Kunja Dusadh*, 23 Cr.L.J 410, 3 P.L.T. 396, but it must be shown, before an appeal can be accepted, that the judgment of the Lower Court was so clearly wrong or perverse or unreasonable that its maintenance would amount to a miscarriage of justice—*Ghulam Muhammad*, 1897 P R 10, *Emp v Ram Karan*, supra; *Gayadin*, 4 All. 148, *Bishen Singh*, supra, *Q E v Robinson*, 16 All. 212, *Kunja Dusadh*, 23 Cr L.J 410, 3 P L T. 396, *Emp v Sundardas*, 26 Cr L.J. 1028 (Sind). In respect to pure questions of fact, the power of Government to appeal from an acquittal should be limited to those cases where through the incompetence, stupidity or perversity of a subordinate tribunal such unreasonable and distorted conclusions have been drawn from evidence as to produce a positive miscarriage of justice. Where the decision of the Subordinate Court is an honest and not an unreasonable one, of which the facts were susceptible, the High Court will not interfere—*Q E. v. Robinson*, 16 All 212. The interference of the High Court should be limited to those instances in which the Lower Court has so obstinately blundered and gone wrong as to produce a result mischievous at once to the administration of justice and to the interests of the public—*Emp v Gayadin*, 4 All 148. In a Punjab case, however, it has been held (dissenting from 4 All 148) that sec 417 appears to place the Local Government in no better or worse position in appealing from a conviction, and it would be legislating rather than interpreting the law, to weigh a Government-appeal with the necessity of showing that the Court below 'obstinately blundered' or 'has so gone wrong as to produce a result mischievous to the administration of justice and to the interests of the public'—*Emp. v Ullam*, 1885 P R 29. In some other Punjab cases it has been held (dissenting from the Allahabad ruling) that in order to justify interference with a judgment of acquittal on a question of fact, it is sufficient if the finding is clearly wrong on the evidence and unreasonable in the opinion of the Appellate Court, whether or not the unreasonableness amounts to perversity, stupidity or incompetence or whether the Court below can be said to have obstinately blundered in coming to it—*K E v Chatter*, 1904 P R 7, 1 Cr L J 781, 1904 P L R 97. *Emp. v Bakhtawar*, 28 P.L.R. 313, 28 Cr L J 556 (561). In an appeal by Government from acquittal, the accused starts with a double presumption in his favour. Firstly, there is the rule that it lies for the prosecution to make out their

case, and until they do so beyond all reasonable doubt the accused must be presumed to be innocent, and *secondly*, that the accused having succeeded in securing an acquittal from a Court, the superior Court will not interfere until the Crown show conclusively that the inference of guilt is irresistible—*Ghulam Nabi*, 6 Pat. 768, 29 Cr.L.J. 301 (305). Before the High Court will interfere with an acquittal, the culpability of the accused must be very clear and indubitable—*Lachhman Das*, 1918 P.W.R. 30, 19 Cr.L.J. 710

Where there has been an acquittal by a unanimous verdict of the jury accepted by the Sessions Judge, the mere fact that there has been a misdirection to the jury will not justify the reversal of the verdict, unless the misdirection has in fact occasioned a failure of justice—*Shyam Sundar*, 26 C.W.N. 558. The High Court will not accept an appeal against an acquittal merely because the trial in the Court below was illegal on account of misjoinder of charges; the Appellate Court will interfere only where it is satisfied that the order of acquittal is obviously erroneous or is one which should not be maintained owing to the trial Court having omitted to consider material evidence—*Jagat Ram*, 48 I.C. 167, 19 Cr.L.J. 987 (Pun.). Where no evidence whatsoever was produced against the accused owing to the neglect or omission of the Crown, and he was acquitted, the High Court would not accept an appeal against the acquittal and remand the case to the lower Court on the ground that there had not been a proper trial of the accused. Such a procedure would expose the accused to a further ordeal and expenses, and he ought not to be made to suffer because of the deficiencies of the prosecution in the conduct of the trial—*Crown v Jaswant Rai*, 5 Lah. 404. The High Court will not interfere unless the judgment of the Court below was wrong and perverse and without jurisdiction and based upon obvious errors in procedure; it will not interfere where the decision of the Magistrate even though wrong was based at the most on a doubtful weighing of facts and not on any irregularity or negligence or other matter going to the jurisdiction or the regularity of the trial—*Dy. Legal Remembrancer v Amulya*, 18 C.W.N. 666, 15 Cr.L.J. 160. Where the question involved in the case is not of any public interest, and the parties have a remedy in a Civil Court, no interference with the order of acquittal is necessary—*Ganga Singh v Ramzan*, 26 Cr.L.J. 337 (Lah.). Where the evidence is all oral and its credibility is a mere matter of opinion without involving other considerations, the opinion of the Court which heard the witnesses must be treated as almost conclusive and the High Court should not interfere—*Chatter Singh*, 1904 P.R. 7, 1 Cr.L.J. 781; *Bishen Singh* 1914 P.L.R. 125, 15 Cr.L.J. 203 (207); *Emp v Samand*, 22 Cr.L.J. 172 (Lah.). Before the High Court could interfere, it must be satisfied that the indications of mistake are obvious or the evidence is too strong to be rejected—*Chatter Singh*, supra; *Bishen Singh*, supra; *Md Shaffi*, 1918 P.R. 25, 19 Cr.L.J. 723; *Pallia v. Crown*, 20 Cr.L.J. 188, 49 I.C. 604, 1919 P.W.R. 12, *Emp v Samand*, 22 Cr.L.J. 172 (Lah.), 59 I.C. 924. An appeal will lie under this section when there is an error of law on the part of the Lower Court—*Timmal*, 21 All. 122. Where the Session Judge has overlooked the material and crucial circumstance which goes to corroborate the evidence of a

complice and has acquitted the accused, the High Court will entertain the appeal from acquittal, and determine one way or the other the guilt of the accused—*Gobardhan*, 9 All 528. Where the Lower Court has considered evidence from a wrong angle, and has come to an erroneous decision, appeal will lie, and the High Court has jurisdiction to convict the accused—*Emp. v. Sunderdas*, 21 S.L. 111, 26 Cr.L.J. 1028 (1029); *Emp. Kadir Bux*, 9 S.L.R. 17, 16 Cr.L.J. 604, 32 I.C. 137.

1121. Appeal from acquittal and appeal from conviction compared:—The Code makes no distinction between an appeal from an acquittal and one from a conviction. Any rule of Court which differentiates their position would be tantamount to an usurpation of legislative functions by the Court. If there is any difference in the respective positions of Government as appellant under sec. 417 and a convict appealing from the judgment convicting and sentencing him, it takes its rise from the principles of judicial construction and adjudication in criminal cases, with which the statute law has no concern. There are certain rules of adjudication and conduct which judges in India invariably follow. One of these is that every man is to be presumed innocent until his guilt is established, another that if there is a reasonable doubt, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. An appellant from a judgment of conviction can always shake the support of these principles, if he can show that the facts of his case come within their purview. If he makes out that the evidence against him is not sufficiently reliable, as the lower Court thought, that all reasonable doubt as to his guilt is not removed thereby, he is at liberty to succeed on these principles. An appellant from a judgment of acquittal has, on the contrary, to work in the face of these principles and satisfy the Court that the accused can derive no benefit from them on the facts of the case under appeal. His task is thus naturally more difficult than that of the convict appellant. In all questions of fact, the Court of first instance, which has all the witnesses before itself, has a great advantage over the Court of appeal, which deals with the evidence second-hand; great regard is therefore paid to the opinion of the first Court on oral evidence, and a Court of appeal is ordinarily reluctant to differ from its opinion, unless for cogent grounds. In an appeal from a conviction regard is tempered somewhat by considerations of fairness to the accused in deciding the question of his guilt which the highest principles of criminal law enjoin on the Courts. But such considerations have no application in an appeal from an acquittal where naturally the Court is loath to disturb a finding of the first Court rejecting the evidence against the accused as unreliable and declaring his innocence. The cumulative effect of these considerations creates a considerable difference between an appeal from a conviction and one from an order of acquittal as regards the decision of their subject matter, though both appeals are placed on the same footing in the statute law of procedure—*K. E. v. Chatter Singh*, 14 P.R. 7, 1904 P.L.R. 97, 1 Cr.L.J. 781; *Q. E. v. Bibhuti*, 17 Cal. 133; *Harnaman*, 1909 P.R. 15, 4 I.C. 864, 11 Cr.L.J. 66. Upon sound principles of criminal jurisprudence, the indications of error in the judgment of acquittal ought to be clearer and more palpable and the evidence

more cogent and convincing in order to justify its being set aside than would be necessary in the case of a judgment of conviction—*K. E. Chatter Singh*, supra; *Emp. v. Bakhtawar*, 28 P.L.R. 313, 28 Cr.L.J. 55 (561); *Emp. v. Turezi*, 1920 P.L.R. 125, 21 Cr.L.J. 349, 55 I.C. 68. Apart from these considerations, there is no distinction as to the mode of procedure between the two classes of appeals. Both appeals are governed by the same rules and subject to the same limitations. There is nothing in the Code which indicates that an appeal from an acquittal allowed in the interest of public safety, peace and order, should receive any different treatment from any other appeal or class of appeals—*Harnaman* supra, *Q. E. v. Bibhuti*, 17 Cal. 485; *Q. E. v. Prag Dat*, 20 All 459; *Uttam*, 1885 P.R. 29; *Lakshmi Narasimham*, 2 Weir 462, *Chatter Singh*, 1904 P.R. 7, 1 Cr.L.J. 781. In both kinds of appeals, the appellant has to satisfy the Court that there does exist some good and strong ground apparent upon the record for interfering with the deliberate determination by the Judge who has had all the evidence before him and has arrived at that determination with that great advantage in his favour—*Q. E. v. Prag Dat*, 20 All 459. So also, with regard to the considerations of evidence, an appeal from an acquittal does not stand on a different footing from an appeal from a conviction. No distinction is drawn in the Code between two two kinds of appeal, as regards dealing with the evidence—*Dy. Legal Remembrancer v. Matukdhari*, 20 C.W.N. 128, 17 Cr.L.J. 9, *Emp. v. Sakharani*, 21 Bom. L.R. 1054, 21 Cr.L.J. 17, 54 I.C. 161. If the High Court thinks that the lower Court has taken an erroneous view of the evidence and should have convicted, the High Court can convict the accused, in the same way as it can acquit an accused in an appeal against a conviction, if it thinks that the lower Court ought to have acquitted. In this respect the Code makes no distinction between an appeal from an acquittal and an appeal from a conviction—*Emp. v. Moti*, 26 Bom. L.R. 113, 25 Cr.L.J. 786; *Emp. v. Sakharani*, supra, *Emp. v. Kadir Bux*, 9 S.L.R. 17, 16 Cr.L.J. 604, 32 I.C. 137. An appeal by Government against acquittal must be considered on its merits just as any other appeal always must be. The onus is on the appellant, and the onus is all the heavier if the judgment appealed from is one which approaches the consideration of the question from a correct point of view and gives the accused the benefit of a reasonable doubt which exists in the mind of the Judge—*Emp. v. Autar*, 47 All 306, 23 A.L.J. 25, 26 Cr.L.J. 676.

In an appeal from an acquittal, as in an appeal from a conviction, the appellant is entitled to go into facts and ask the appellate Court to take a view of facts different from that taken by the trial Court. But the accused in an appeal from acquittal retains his right of being presumed to be innocent until the charge is fully brought home to him. He has the right of being given the benefit of any reasonable doubt as to his guilt; he has also the benefit of the opinion of the trial Court upon the credibility of the witnesses whom that Court had the advantage of seeing face to face; and he has the right to ask the Appellate Court that the acquittal should not be set aside unless the trial Court has taken a perverse view of the

evidence and has arrived at an unnatural and distorted conclusion—*Deboo Singh*, 8 Pat. 496, 1929 Cr. C. 243 (248).

In a criminal appeal by the Government to the High Court, the arrest of the accused may be ordered pending appeal—*Gobin*, 1 Cal. 281, *Mangu*, 2 All. 340. In capital cases, in which the Government appeals under this section, it is undesirable that the prisoner's fate should be discussed while he remains at large; in such cases, the Government should apply for the arrest of the accused under section 427—*Gobardhan*, 9 All. 528. Where, on an appeal under this section, the accused is arrested and convicted, and sentence is passed on him, the sentence will run from the date of the committal of the accused to jail and not from the date of the arrest or of the sentence—*Mahuddi*, 11 C.L.R. 349.

Limitation :—An appeal under this section must be presented within six months from the date of the order appealed against (see Art. 157 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908).

418. (1) An appeal may lie on a matter of fact

Appeal on what as well as a matter of law, except matters admissible. where the trial was by jury, in which case the appeal shall lie on a matter of law only.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or in section 423, sub-section (2), when, in the case of a trial by jury any person is sentenced to death, any other person convicted in the same trial with the person so sentenced may appeal on a matter of fact as well as a matter of law.

Explanation.—The alleged severity of a sentence shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to be a matter of law.

Change .—Sub-sec. (2) has been added by sec 115 of the Cr P. C. Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923 The reason is stated below

1122. Scope of section —This section is applicable alike both to appeals by Government (sec 417) against an order of acquittal and to appeals by convicted persons against a conviction and sentence—*Emp v. Gubbi*, 17 C.P.L.R 75 (92) Therefore where in a case tried by jury, the Local Government appealed to the High Court under section 417 against an order of acquittal, and the grounds of appeal were all questions of fact, the High Court rejected the application, because under this section, an appeal in the jury-case could lie only on a question of law—*Parmeshur*, 10 Cal 1029

A Judicial Commissioner sitting on the original side and holding a sessions trial is to be deemed a Sessions Judge and not a Judge of the High Court, and an appeal from his decision lies under this section to

a Bench of the Judicial Commissioner's Court—*Khudabux v. Emp.*, 19 S.L.R. 309, 26 Cr.L.J. 562 (F.B.).

1123. Trial by jury:—Where the trial was by jury, the appeal would lie on a matter of law only. By restricting appeals from cases triable by jury to matters of law only, this section gives finality to the verdict of the jury, where there has existed no error of law nor misdirection, and where the Judge has concurred with the majority—*Balappa, Ratanlal* 730.

The words 'where the trial was by jury' mean 'where the trial was in fact held by jury' and not 'where the trial ought to have been held by jury.' And therefore where the accused was tried by jury in a case which ought to have been tried with the aid of assessors, no appeal would lie except on a question of law; the trial would be treated as one by a jury—*Parbhushankar*, 25 Bom. 680; *Jeyram*, 23 Bom. 696, *Surja Kurmi*, 25 Cal. 555. But in *Mohim Chunder*, 3 Cal. 765, *Goshain Luchmun*, 24 W.R. 30, *Bavabhai*, *Ratanlal* 961, *Narkoo*, 18 W.R. 59, it was held that in such a case the trial would be deemed as one held with the aid of assessors, treating the verdict of the jury as the opinion of the assessors, and the prisoner would not lose his right of appeal on the facts. In *Pattikadan Ummaru*, 26 Mad. 243, where a person was charged with an offence triable by jury, and the jury acquitted him of that charge but found him guilty of an offence triable with the aid of assessors, *Benson J.* held that the verdict was to be treated as an opinion of assessors, and that an appeal lay on the facts of the case; but *Bhashyam Aiyanger J.* held that the jury had authority under section 238, in trying an offence triable by jury, to find as an incident to the trial that certain facts were proved in the trial which constituted a minor offence, and to return a verdict of guilty on such offence, though such offence might not be triable by a jury, and therefore in this case the verdict was to be treated as a verdict on a trial by jury and an appeal would lie only on a point of law.

In a case where a person is tried by a jury, and there is also another charge which is tried by the Judge with the same jury as assessors, an appeal will lie on a question of fact—*Karuppa Gounden*, 18 Cr.L.J. 346 (Mad.).

1124. Matter of law.—An appeal under this section from cases tried by jury lies on matters of law only, and the Appellate Court cannot go into the facts of the case. If it were to do so, it would be substituting the decision of the Judges of that Court for the verdict of the jury who had the opportunity of seeing the demeanour of witnesses and weighing the evidence with the assistance which this affords, whereas the Judges of the Appellate Court can arrive at a decision only on a perusal of the paper-evidence—*Wafadar v. Q. E.*, 21 Cal. 955; *Ikramuddin*, 39 All. 348; *Ramesh Chandra*, 46 Cal. 895, 23 C.W.N. 661. If there is no question of law involved in the case, the High Court has no power to interfere, however absurd or perverse the verdict may be—*Chinna Tevan*, 14 Mad. 36. But this section does not prohibit the High Court, in a case in which

an appeal lies on a question of law, from deciding questions of fact which other sections of the Code require the Court to decide in order to do justice in the case—*Smither*, 26 Mad 1 (14) See page 1119 *post*.

Every petition of appeal in cases tried by jury should state clearly in what respect the law has been contravened. The Court will not hunt through the records and find out the illegality if any. The parties must point out in their petition of appeal wherein there has been a departure from the law. Unless the exact contravention of law is pointed out, the petition of appeal is liable to be rejected—*Gopal*, 1 W R 21.

Examples of 'matters of law'.—The question as to the admissibility of evidence which has been rejected by the Sessions Judge is a matter of law—*Pitambar*, 2 Bom. 61; so also, the question as to whether the evidence which had been admitted by the Sessions Judge ought to have been admitted is a matter of law—*Emp. v. Waman*, 27 Bom. 626; *Ramesh*, 46 Cal. 895, 23 C W N. 661, so also, an omission to consider relevant evidence—7 Cal 263, or a misdirection to the jury—*Ali Fakir*, 25 Cal 230; *Ramesh*, *supra*, or a non-direction by the Judge on a question of prime importance in favour of the prisoner—*Malgowda*, 27 Bom 644. But the High Court will not interfere with the verdict of the jury merely because the Sessions Judge admitted an inadmissible evidence regarding an unimportant matter which had only a remote bearing on the question in issue and the admission of which could not have affected the verdict of the jury—*Keramat v K. E.*, 42 C L J 528, 27 Cr.L.J. 277.

The High Court on a point of law as to the admissibility of evidence can review the whole case and determine whether the admission of rejected evidence would have affected the result of the trial—*Pitambar*, 2 Bom 61; *Ram Chandra Gooma*, 19 Bom 749.

When High Court can go into facts —Where a Judge does not agree with the verdict of the jury and submits the case to the High Court under section 307, the whole facts of the case may be gone into by the High Court. The clear provisions of section 307 allowing the High Court to consider the entire evidence are not in any way curtailed by section 418 or 423 and the High Court can interfere with the verdict of the jury if it thinks proper to do so—*Q E v McCarthy*, 11 All 420; see also *Ikramuddin*, 39 All 348. So also, the High Court can go into the facts when a case is referred to it under section 374 for a confirmation of the sentence of death—*Jaffir Ali* 19 W R 57. *Q E v Chatradhari*, 2 C W N 49. In short, in a case tried by a jury, the High Court can enter into facts only on a reference under section 307 or 374, and not on an appeal under this section.

Sub-section (2) .—Where in a Sessions trial of several accused, one of the accused was sentenced to death, and the other to lower punishments, and all of them appealed, it was held under the old law that the High Court, on a reference under section 374 in respect of the person sentenced to death, could go into the facts, but in dealing with the

appeal of the other persons the High Court must be confined to matters of law and could not enter into the facts—*Q. E. v. Chatradhari*, 2 C.W.N. 49. This anomaly is now removed by sub-section (2). "This clause provides that when in the case of a trial by jury, one person is sentenced to death and another to a lower punishment, the second accused may appeal on a matter of fact as well as on a matter of law. This is intended to remove the anomaly under the existing law that a High Court acting under section 374 could consider the facts of the case as regards the former accused, but on an appeal of the second accused could only intervene on a point of law"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914)

419. Every appeal shall be made in the form of a petition in writing presented by the appellant or his pleader, and every such petition shall (unless the Court to which it is presented otherwise directs) be accompanied by a copy of the judgment or order appealed against, and, in cases tried by a jury, a copy of the heads of the charge recorded under section 367.

1125. Scope of section :—This section prescribes the form under which a petition of appeal is to be presented. It applies even where the accused is in jail; section 420 deals only with the manner in which the petition of appeal is to be presented when the petitioner is in jail, and does not dispense with the other formalities prescribed by this section. Section 420 is not derogatory to the general rule laid down in section 419—*Q. E. v. Pohpi*, 13 A.J. 171 (179).

1126. Contents of petition :—A petition of appeal in a case tried by jury can be made only on a question of law, and the petition should state clearly in what respect the law has been contravened. The Court will not hunt through the records to find out the illegality, if any. If the contravention of law is not stated in the petition, it will be rejected—*Gopal*, 1 W.R. 21.

A petition of appeal containing defamatory statements against the Magistrate will not be entertained. Such petition may be returned for representation after eliminating the scandalous remarks—*In re Clive Durant*, 15 Bom. 488. A petition of appeal containing a false statement will not make the petitioner liable to punishment for the false statement; because a criminal appeal is a continuation of the criminal case, and the appellant has got all the privileges of the accused—*Subbaya*, 12 Mad. 451 (cited in Note 981 under section 342).

1127. Presentation of petition :—As regards presentation, no special method is enjoined in the Code, and the question is one of administrative convenience alone. Therefore an actual presentation to an officer of the Court, such as a Bench Clerk (in the High Court) or to one of the Judges, its members, is valid—*Kadirikoya*, 39 Mad. 527, 29 M.L.J. 101. But depositing a petition of appeal in a box kept for the convenience

of parties (in the compound of a Court-house) and intended for the deposit of papers for the Court is not a proper presentation, because the box is not intended for appeals and also because a petition of appeal might have been deposited there by a person who could not legally present it—*Vasudevayya*, 19 Mad. 354.

The petition should be presented in person; the transmission of it by post is not a sufficient compliance with the requirements of this section—*Luriseti Pitchaya*, 2 Weir 467, *Bhagwan*, *Ratanlal* 464; *Arappa*, 15 Mad 137.

Presentation by Pleader—The petition should be delivered to the proper officer of the Court, either by the appellant or by his pleader—*Q. E. v. Arappa*, 15 Mad. 137. Presentation of an appeal by the vakil's gomasta or clerk is equivalent to presentation by pleader, if the vakil has signed the petition and has been duly authorised by a *vakalatnama*—*Gudiyati Samuel*, 2 Weir 469, *Karappa Udayan*, 20 Mad 87. But presentation of the petition through a person who is not the clerk of the pleader, and over whose action and conduct the pleader has no control, is not a proper presentation—*Q. E. v. Ramasami*, 21 Mad 114. Where a petition of appeal was prepared on behalf of three accused and signed under vakalat by their pleader, and was presented by another pleader who held vakalat only from one of the accused, it was held that there was a proper presentation of the petition of appeal on behalf of all the accused—*Muthu Mira*, 2 Weir 470 (471). But where the prisoners had conflicting interests to each other, e.g., where each of the prisoners made confessions exonerating himself and incriminating the other, it would be improper for one pleader to present an appeal on behalf of both and to represent both who had conflicting interests—*Hira*, 1890 P R 13.

The word 'pleader' includes a 'mukhtar' as well as any other person authorised by the appellant, and the presentation of the petition through them would be proper—*Imp v Sivaram*, 6 Bom 14, *In re Suba Aitola*, 1 Mad 304. This is now made clear by the present definition of the word 'pleader' in section 4 (r) as amended in 1923, by which a mukhtar has been placed on the same footing as a pleader.

1128. Copy of judgment—It is in the discretion of the Appellate Court to admit an appeal without its being accompanied by a copy of the judgment or order appealed against, where injustice might accrue to the appellant by insisting on a strict compliance with this section. But in such cases, before hearing the appeal, the Court should have before it a copy of such judgment or order which it may get by sending for the record—*Emp v Sitaram* 5 Bom L R 704. Where there are several accused in a case, and all of them prefer a joint appeal, only one copy of the judgment appealed against is required to be filed, and it is not necessary that there shall be a distinct appeal-petition by each of the convicted persons separately accompanied by a separate copy of the judgment—*Emp v Sitaram*, 5 Bom L R 704, *Batasha v Emp.*, 18 Cr.L.J 512 (Oudh). Where the order appealed against is not complete in itself, and the reasons of the dismissal are given in another judgment

to which the order refers, a copy of such judgment also must be filed—*Parmanand v. Mohan Lal*, 30 Cr.L.J. 235 (236).

The Appellate Court has a discretion to dispense with the copy or order appealed against not only at the time of filing the appeal but even at any subsequent stage—*Parmanand*, *supra*.

A copy furnished in the prisoner's own language is sufficient—*Ratanlal* 82. See notes under Section 371.

420. If the appellant is in jail, he may present his petition of appeal and the copies accompanying the same to the officer in charge of the jail, who shall thereupon forward such petition and copies to the proper Appellate Court.

Procedure when appellant in jail.

1129. This section deals with the manner of presentation of an appeal by a prisoner in jail, but it does not dispense with the formalities prescribed by section 419. These formalities must be observed; see 13 All. 171 cited in Note 1125 under section 419.

Where the petitioner is in jail, every facility such as pen, ink, paper and even a writer should be allowed to him to enable him to prepare the petition of appeal—*Nitto Gopaul*, 13 W.R. 69; *Shek Dadabhai*, 1 B.H.C.R. 16.

Where a jail appeal has been presented through the officer-in-charge of the jail and has been dismissed under sec. 421 no further appeal can be preferred through Counsel under section 419—*Khali*, 44 All. 759, 23 Cr.L.J. 505; *Gaya Din*, 24 O.C. 304, 23 Cr.L.J. 148; *In re Kunhammad*, 46 Mad. 382 (392); *Ram Aular v. Emp.*, 11 O.L.J. 536, 1 O.W.N. 354, 25 Cr.L.J. 1313. The reason is that when a right of appeal has once been exercised, and that appeal has been disposed of, the accused will not be allowed to appeal again—*Khali*, *supra*.

A jail appeal can be heard and disposed of by a Vacation Judge—*In re Kunhammad*, 46 Mad. 382 (399).

A jail appeal was preferred by some of the prisoners, and while the appeal was pending, a petition of appeal on behalf of some of the prisoners was filed through a mukhtar. The Sessions Judge rejected the jail appeal in ignorance of the fact that an appeal had been filed through a mukhtar. *Held* that the High Court in its revisional powers would set aside the order of dismissal of the jail appeal, and direct the Sessions Judge to rehear both the appeals—*Emp. v. Mewa Ram*, 48 All. 208, 23 A.L.J. 1051, 26 Cr.L.J. 1621.

When a prisoner sentenced to death subject to confirmation of the High Court presents his appeal from jail under the provisions of this section, and the Local Government has granted him the privilege of being represented by a counsel at the expense of the Crown, but the accused refuses to give any instructions to such counsel, stating that he

does not wish to be represented by him, it is the duty of the counsel to conduct the appeal on behalf of the accused, without in the least considering what the accused's views may be on the subject. The concession of the Crown towards the accused may or may not be appreciated by the accused, but it in no way affects the conduct of the appeal—*Ram Prasad v. Emp.*, 4 O.W.N. 638, 28 Cr L.J. 679 (680)

421. (1) On receiving the petition and copy under section 419 or section 420, the Appellate Court shall peruse the same, and, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, it may dismiss the appeal summarily:

Summary dismissal of appeal. Provided that no appeal presented under section 419 shall be dismissed unless the appellant or his pleader has had a reasonable opportunity of being heard in support of the same.

(2) Before dismissing an appeal under this section, the Court may call for the record of the case, but shall not be bound to do so.

1130. Appellant not bound to appear—Once an appeal is received, it should not be dismissed merely because the appellant or his pleader failed to appear to support the petition, but the Appellate Court must consider whether there exist sufficient grounds for its interference, and must judicially determine the appeal on the merits—*Q. E. v. Deoshanker*, Ratanlal 593; *Ram Bharose v. Emp.*, 14 A L J 327, 17 Cr L J. 353; *Ratan Chand v. Emp.*, 9 Cr L J. 553, 5 N L R 76, *In re Kunhammad*, 46 Mad. 382 (402), *Baldeo v. Emp.*, 24 Cr L J 475 (Pat); *Koura v. Emp.*, 1895 P.R. 21. If the appellant does not appear but leaves the question of admission or rejection of the appeal to be determined by the Appellate Court on the papers, the Appellate Court is bound to peruse the papers and cannot dismiss the appeal summarily under this section on the ground of non-appearance of the appellant by counsel or in person—*Vali Mahomed*, Ratanlal 739 (740)

'No sufficient ground for interfering'—The appellant's pleader should be allowed, if necessary, to refer to the certified copies of the evidence to show that there were sufficient grounds for interfering. Where the Judge disallowed the pleader to refer to the evidence, he acted erroneously—*Manga v. K. E.*, 11 O.C. 360, 9 Cr L J 55

Where there are in the memorandum of appeal allegations of withholding witnesses, of refusals to grant warrants and summonses to witnesses, and of disregard of certain evidence filed in the case, there were sufficient grounds for interference—*Adam Isaq*, Ratanlal 916. So also, where the grounds of appeal disclose reasons for discrediting the witnesses for the prosecution, there are sufficient grounds for interference and the

Appellate Court ought not to dismiss the appeal—*Rangachariu*, 29 Mad 236.

If no sufficient grounds for interference are shown, the Appellate Court should not interfere, but should dismiss the appeal—*Emp v Sajivan*, 5 All. 386.

1131. Summary dismissal of appeal :—Although this section gives the Appellate Court power to dismiss an appeal summarily, that power must be exercised with judicial discretion. Appeals which are complicated both in law and fact ought not to be summarily dismissed—*Kailash*, 19 Cr.L.J. 228 (Cal.); *Sukhdeo*, 3 P.L.J. 389, 19 Cr.L.J. 209, *Rahimaddi*, 22 Cr.L.J. 349 (Cal.). Where there has been a dispute as to facts and where the credibility of witnesses for the prosecution has been impugned, it is proper for the Appellate Court to call for the record and look at the evidence, and not to dismiss the appeal summarily—*Padarath v. Emp*, 24 Cr.L.J. 477 (Pat.). The summary dismissal of an appeal is not justified where there were disputed questions of fact in the case, and the number of witnesses and documents were large, and the Court of first instance had discussed the evidence and come to certain findings—*Rahimaddi v. Emp.*, 22 Cr.L.J. 349 (Cal.).

An order of summary rejection of appeal under this section is final. Such an order is not open to review and it is immaterial whether such order is made before or after the papers have been called for—*Mahomed Yashin*, 4 Bom 101; *Q. E. v. Bhimappa*, 19 Bom 732; *Clegg*, 1687 P.R. 24. But the Madras High Court holds that if the appeal has been dismissed for default of the pleader's appearance, and it is proved to the satisfaction of the Appellate Court that there is a reasonable excuse for the non-appearance of the pleader, the Appellate Court may rehear the appeal on the merits—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 471, 7 M.H.C.R. App 29; *In re Kunhammad*, 46 Mad. 382 (403).

When an appeal is dismissed under this section, the Court has to power to alter the conviction and sentence—*Naga*, 11 Weir 475, *Govindrao*, Ratanlal 304 (305); *Bana*, Ratanlal 384 (385); *Mathurialdas*, Ratanlal 74.

Withdrawal of appeal :—A petition of appeal presented for admission may be withdrawn, before it is dismissed under this section—*Chundernath*, 5 C.L.R. 372.

Admission of a connected appeal :—Where two co-accused presented two appeals, the fact that the Appellate Court admitted the appeal of one of the appellants, does not affect his power to dismiss the other appeal summarily under this section—*Jagat Chandra v Lal Chand*, 5 C.W.N. 332.

Piecemeal disposal of appeal :—A person was convicted in one trial on two separate charges of cheating. On appeal the Sessions Judge summarily dismissed the appeal on one charge and admitted the appeal on the other, and the appeal on this latter charge was ultimately allowed. Held that the procedure adopted by the Appellate Court in disposing of

the appeal piecemeal, was no doubt unusual and undesirable, but not illegal—*Ismail v. Emp.*, 5 Rang 274, 28 Cr L J. 765 (766)

1132. Judgment and record of reasons—An Appellate Court in rejecting an appeal summarily under this section is not bound to write a judgment—*Rash Behari v. Balgopal*, 21 Cal. 92; *Varubai*, 20 Bom. 540; *Annavarapa Krishnayya*, 25 Mad 534; *Bala Subbanna*, 2 Weir 473; *Nazar Mohd v. Hara Singh*, 26 P.L.R 616, 27 Cr L J 23, *Gurbari*, 2 P.L.J. 695; *Nitya Pal v. Beni Madhab*, 11 C W N 623; *Ramrao*, 13 N.L.R 169, 18 Cr.L.J. 993; *Nga Ba*, 19 Cr L.J. 316 (Bur.); *Nga Sein*, U.B.R. (1906) 2nd Qr. 49. But it is advisable that a Court which dismisses an appeal under this section should briefly record its reasons for such dismissal, in view of the possibility of such order being challenged by an application for revision—*Q. E. v Ram Narain*, 8 All. 514; *Kundan*, 36 All. 496, 15 Cr L J 512, *Gurbari v. Em*, 2 P.L.J. 695; *Gobind v. Emp.*, 61 I.C. 49, 2 P.L.T. 10; *Ramkant*, 19 Cr L J. 304 (Pat.); *Q. E. v Nanhu*, 17 All 241; *Ramrao*, 13 N L 169, 18 Cr L J. 993; *Jagarnath v. Emp*, 25 Cr.L.J 1237 (Pat); *Brij Mohan v Emp*, 26 Cr.L.J. 4 (Oudh). Though ordinarily an Appellate Court in rejecting an appeal summarily is not bound to record a judgment, still the Court should not dispose of an appeal under this section otherwise than by a judgment showing on the face of it that it has applied its mind to a consideration of the evidence on the record, and of the pleas raised by the accused both in the Court below and in his memorandum of appeal—*Lal Behari*, 38 All 393, 17 Cr.L.J 309, *Janesh Ram v Gyan Chand*, 21 Cr.L.J 139 (Pat), *Chandrasekhar v. Rajaram*, 30 Cr L J. 791 (792) (Nag); *Gobind*, 2 P.L.T. 10, 61 I C 49, 22 Cr.L.J 321. Where in a case in which the evidence was voluminous, the Appellate Court, without considering either the evidence of the witnesses or the documents, disposed of the appeal practically in a single paragraph, the appellate judgment was not in accordance with law and the appeal must be reheard—*Narain Prosad v. Emp*, 1 P L T 716, 57 I C 664, 21 Cr L J 648

The Appellate Court need not go to the length of writing an elaborate judgment, but should notice briefly and clearly what objections were urged on appeal and how they were disposed of—*Ekkowrie*, 32 Cal 178. It should record at least so much as would satisfy the High Court, when an application for revision is made, that it has fully considered all the questions in issue and has appreciated the simplicity or gravity of the case—*Gurbari*, 2 P.L.J 695, 19 Cr L J 151. Where no reason is given for the summary dismissal, the High Court will either remand the appeal to the Appellate Court to be admitted and heard, or will itself examine the evidence—*Ramkant*, 19 Cr L J 304 (Pat), *Nga Ba*, 19 Cr L J. 316

1133. Proviso—Right of appellant to be heard:—This proviso is an embodiment of the legal maxim "*Audi alteram partem*," i.e., no man shall be condemned unheard. This maxim derives its origin from a saying of Seneca to the following effect: "Whoever may have decided anything, the other side remaining unheard, granted that

his decision may have been just, will not have been just himself"—*Pohpi*, 13 All. 171 (175).

Appeal from jail.—The proviso lays down that no appeal under section 419 shall be dismissed without giving the appellant or his pleader an opportunity of being heard. But this proviso does not apply to jail appeals presented under sec. 420, and therefore the Appellate Court is not bound to give the accused any time to engage counsel. But under Rule 50 of the Madras Rules of Practice, seven days' time is allowed before a jail appeal is circulated to the Judges. So an appellant has sufficient opportunity of engaging counsel if he wishes to do so—*In re Kunhammad*, 46 Mad. 382 (400).

As to the question whether notice should be given to an appellant filing his appeal from jail, it has been held in some Madras cases, that sec. 419 (which is referred to in this proviso) is of general application and embrace the cases of all appellants whether in or out of jail, and there is nothing in sec. 420 to indicate that it was intended to deprive appellants who are in jail of the opportunity of being heard on their appeal. Notice is, therefore, necessary to be given to the accused though he is in jail and there is nothing in this section to prevent the prisoner from being heard in person—*Kotina Butchaya*, 2 Weir 472 (473); if the prisoner is not represented by a pleader, the Appellate Court has power to direct that the prisoner be brought before it—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 473. If the convict files a petition of appeal from jail through a legal practitioner, the Appellate Court is not competent to dismiss the jail appeal summarily, but should hear the convict's pleader—*Bhawani v. K. E.*, 1 A.L.J. 693, 4 Cr.L.J. 373. But Mahmood J. has expressed the opinion in *Q. E. v. Pohpi*, 13 All. 171 (180) that as this proviso does not apply to an appeal presented from jail, neither the prisoner nor his pleader, if he engages one, has the right to insist that he shall be heard. The Sind' Court is of opinion that this proviso is confined to sec. 419, and does not apply to an appeal preferred by the accused from prison under sec. 420. If the accused is in jail, and has no pleader, any notice to him is useless, because he cannot appear in Court and cannot give any further information to the Court. Consequently, the Appellate Court can summarily dismiss such appeal on perusal of the papers, without calling upon him to appear—*Loung v. Emp.*, 20 S.L.R. 189, 27 Cr.L.J. 933 (934).

Other Appeals.—It is not competent to the Appellate Court to reject an appeal summarily without giving a reasonable opportunity to the appellant or his pleader of being heard—*Rangachari v. Emp.*, 29 Mad. 236; *Gobind*, 2 P.L.T. 10, 11 I.C. 49, 22 Cr.L.J. 321; *Rajkumar v. Tinkowri*, 12 C.W.N. 248; *Ranga Row v. Emp.*, 23 M.L.J. 371, 13 Cr.L.J. 710. If the appeal is rejected under this section without hearing the appellant or his pleader, the Appellate Court may be directed to rehear the petition of appeal, and to give the appellant an opportunity of being heard—*Fakira*, Ratanlal 703. Where the Appellate Court rejected the appeal summarily owing to default of the pleader's appearance, and satisfactory reason for his non-appearance was shown, the

Court should rehear the appeal on the merits—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 471, 7 M.H.C.R. App. 29; *In re Kunhammad*, 46 Mad. 382; *Ratan Chand*, 5 N.L.R. 76, 9 Cr.L.J. 553. Where the accused's pleader presents a time-barred appeal, together with an application for excusing the delay under sec. 5, Limitation Act, on the ground that the accused under a *bonafide* mistake had presented proceedings in a wrong Court, the Appellate Court should not dismiss the appeal summarily, but should give the pleader an opportunity of being heard as to the allegation of there being sufficient cause for excusing the delay—*Nurudin*, 21 Bom.L.R. 701, 28 Cr.L.J. 653 (655). Where the notice for hearing the appeal was served in the afternoon of 21st March on the appellant's pleader at Amalner asking him to be present on the 22nd March at Jalgaon or any other place where the camp of the District Magistrate might be, and on the day in question the District Magistrate was encamped at Edlabad, at a considerable distance from Amalner, so that the appellant's pleader could not appear at the place and the appeal was consequently dismissed, *held that the order of dismissal must be set aside as there was no sufficient notice to the appellant's pleader of the date and place of hearing*—*In re Arjun*, 22 Bom.L.R. 188, 55 I.C. 853, 21 Cr.L.J. 373. Where the District Magistrate called upon the appellant's pleader to argue the appeal on the same day that it was presented, and on the pleader asking time, the Magistrate refused to grant him time and rejected the appeal, it was held that the appellant's pleader was not afforded reasonable opportunity of being heard—*Emp v Gurshida*, 2 Cr.L.J. 58, 7 Bom.L.R. 69, *Ramtchal v Emp*, 36 Cal. 385, 13 C.W.N. 684, *In re Turka Hussan*, 48 Mad. 385, 47 M.L.J. 661. But this section does not contemplate that an appeal cannot be heard on the very day on which it is presented, and that notice must be given of some future date on which the appellant or his pleader may be heard. There is nothing in this section to prevent the Court from hearing the appellant's pleader at the time when he presents the appeal, if the pleader desires that course, but if he does not desire to be heard at once, then certainly the Court should appoint a future date of which notice is to be given to the appellant or his pleader, so that he may be heard on that date—*Basavaneppa*, 29 Bom.L.R. 488, 28 Cr.L.J. 467 (468).

A particular date should be fixed, on which the appeal is to be heard. A general notice posted in the Court that appeals will be heard for admission only on the first Court-day next after presentation is not a compliance with the provisions of this section. The Court should fix a time in each particular case, so as to enable the appellant or his pleader to be heard—*Malan*, 5 Mad. 11.

1134. Sub-section (2) :—Although the Legislature does not make it obligatory on the part of the Appellate Court to send for the records before dismissing an appeal, still the practice of summarily dismissing an appeal without calling for the records is always inconvenient and must not be adopted—*Emp v. Jugal Kishore*, 1883 A.W.N. 143. If questions of facts are argued in the appeal, the appeal ought not to be disposed of under section 421 without sending for the original records.

of the Court below—*In re Turka Husain*, 48 Mad. 385, 47 M.L.J. 661, 26 Cr.L.J. 411. Where the grounds of appeal disclose reasons for discrediting the witnesses for the prosecution, the Appellate Court ought to call for the records—*Rangachari v. Emp.*, 29 Mad. 236.

An Appellate Court is not bound to call for the record in an appeal in which the only question is a question of fact and the judgment of the Court below is so plain and clear that calling for the record would be a mere waste of time. But when the judgment of the lower Court is a long and intricate judgment requiring careful consideration, the Appellate Court ought not to refuse to call for the record—*Sukhdeo*, 3 P.L.J. 389, 19 Cr.L.J. 209.

After the record is sent for and received, the Appellate Court ought to hear the pleader and cannot dismiss the appeal summarily without hearing him, if the Appellate Court so dismisses the appeal, the order of dismissal must be set aside and the appeal will be directed to be reheard—*Lalit Kumar v. K. E.*, 42 C.L.J. 551, 27 Cr.L.J. 382, *Surendra v. K. E.*, 42 C.L.J. 554, 27 Cr.L.J. 554, 27 Cr.L.J. 412. But the Bombay High Court is of opinion that it is not imperative on the Appellate Court to hear the appellant's pleader, after the record is called for, and there would be no illegality on the part of the Court in dismissing the appeal after perusal of the record, without giving the pleader another opportunity of being heard, especially when the pleader had been heard before the records were called for, but it is desirable that the pleader should be heard after the record is called for, because his arguments about the evidence can then be better appreciated—*Baxavanappa*, 29 Bom L.R. 488, 28 Cr.L.J. 467 (468). The Sind Court is also of opinion that although the records have been called for, still as the case is not fixed for hearing under sec 423, it is not obligatory on the Court to give the pleader a hearing before dismissing the appeal, especially where the pleader has once been heard before the records were sent for—*Jivayo*, 2 S.L.R. 39, 10 Cr.L.J. 204.

1135. Revision:—Where an appeal has been dismissed summarily under this section without recording any reasons or judgment, the High Court can either go into the case on its own account and examine the evidence, or can remand the appeal to the Lower Appellate Court to be admitted and heard—*Ram Kant v. Emp.*, 19 Cr.L.J. 304 (Pat.). Though the practice usually is to remand the case to the Lower Appellate Court and ask for a judgment from that Court after a regular hearing, the High Court has discretion to go into the case itself, and, if necessary, to consider the questions of fact as if in first appeal—*Aman Ali*, 8 I.C. 379, 13 O.C. 309, 11 Cr.L.J. 631; *Nga Ba*, 19 Cr.L.J. 316 (Bur.). If the High Court finds that the case should not have been dealt with summarily, the High Court will send back the case ordering the Appellate Court to hear it on its merits and pass a judgment—*Nga Ba*, 19 Cr.L.J. 316 (Bur.). Where the Sessions Judge summarily dismissed an appeal from the conviction of a Magistrate, the High Court itself finding that the evidence on which the conviction was based was insufficient, set

aside the conviction and acquitted the accused, instead of remanding the appeal for a rehearing on the merits—*Isswar Chandra*, 10 C.W.N. 446 (448), 3 Cr.L.J. 385. See also *Aman Ali*, *supra*

422. If the Appellate Court does not dismiss the

Notice of appeal. appeal summarily, it shall cause

notice to be given to the appellants

or his pleader, and to such officer as the Local Government may appoint in this behalf, of the time and place at which such appeal will be heard, and shall, on the application of such officer, furnish him with a copy of the grounds of appeal;

and, in cases of appeals under section 417, the Appellate Court shall cause a like notice to be given to the accused.

1136. Restrictive order for admission :—A restrictive order for admission of a criminal appeal is not contemplated by this section, and must be deemed to be *ultra vires*. Therefore, where a criminal appeal was admitted for consideration of the sentence only, it was held that the whole appeal should be heard and that the appellant could not be restricted to any selected ground out of those specified in his petition—*Nafar v. Emp*, 41 Cal 406, 18 C.W.N. 147; *Gaya Singh v. Emp*, 4 Pat. 254, 6 P.L.T. 381, 26 Cr.L.J. 862. Except where there are express words as in secs 412 and 418, the Code does not provide for an appeal for the limited purpose of reviewing only a part of the judgment. The appellant has a right to be heard fully on the merits and the Judge is bound by sec. 424 to record a complete judgment—*Dagdu Gangaram*, Ratanlal 826

1137. Notice.—Notice to the appellant of the time and place of hearing is obligatory, and an order disposing of an appeal without giving such notice is illegal. The appeal must be restored to the file and disposed of according to law—*Venkataramudu* 2 Weir 475 (476). Where a criminal appeal filed through a counsel is admitted, it cannot be dismissed summarily without giving notice to the accused, for, after an appeal is admitted, the Court cannot act under sec 421—*Ta Pu v. Emp*, 3 Bur L.J. 18, 25 Cr.L.J. 933

To whom to be given —Notice may be given to the appellant or his pleader. But the attention of the pleader should be directed to the notice, when notice is given to the pleader only, the mere fact that the pleader of the appellant is present in Court when an order is made admitting an appeal is not sufficient—*Gopal Chunder*, 10 C.L.R. 57

The word 'pleader' includes mukhtear, and notice to the mukhtear is sufficient for the purposes of this section—*Shivram*, 11 Bom 14

If the appellant could not be found at the address given by him, the notice of the hearing of appeal or a copy of it should be left at the address given—*Hari Narayan*, Ratanlal 869

In case of appeals under sec. 417, notice must be given to the accused.

Where the Court passes an order, awarding compensation to the accused under sec. 250, and the complainant appeals, it is desirable that notice should be given to the accused so as to afford him an opportunity of supporting the order passed in his favour, although there is no express provision of law to that effect—*Palaniappavelan*, 29 Mad. 187, *Venkatarama v. Krishna*, 38 Mad. 1091; *Ram Chand v. Jesa Ram*, A I.R. 1924 Lah. 675 (676), 25 Cr.L.J. 609; *Menon v Ibrahim*, 20 S.L.R. 41, 27 Cr.L.J. 248. But the absence of notice to the accused will not vitiate the appellate proceedings—*Nagi Reddi v. Basappa*, 33 Mad. 89; *Krishna v Narayana*, 41 M.L.J. 172, 22 Cr.L.J. 583, 62 I.C. 823; *Rashid*, 8 Lah. 568, 28 Cr.L.J. 416. So also, no notice to the Crown is necessary, because it is a matter in which the Crown is very little interested—*Palaniappavelan*, supra; *Krishna v. Narayana*, supra; *Guruswami v. Tirumurthi*, 27 M.L.J. 629, 15 Cr.L.J. 648.

Although this section does not require any notice to be given to the complainant, still in appeals from orders under sec. 545, (directing that the expenses properly incurred by the prosecution be defrayed out of the fine), it would be better in practice to give notice to the complainant also. But the absence of such notice will not afford any ground for interference in revision—*Mangalchand*, 14 N.L.R. 131, 19 Cr.L.J. 927, 47 I.C. 443. It is the settled practice of the Calcutta High Court that where compensation has been awarded to the complainant under sec. 545, and an appeal is preferred, the notice of the appeal must be given to the complainant, and an order of acquittal in the absence of such notice may be set aside by the High Court in revision—*Bharasa v. Sukdeo*, 53 Cal. 969, 43 C.L.J. 583, 27 Cr.L.J. 1086.

Notice should also be given to such officer as the Local Government appoints—*Emp v. Palaniappavelan*, 29 Mad. 187. In Bengal, notice should be given to the Legal Remembrancer so far as the High Court is concerned. In other cases, the District Magistrate has been appointed as the officer to receive notices of appeals. If the rule is granted against the order of a Sessions Judge, he is the proper person to show cause—7 C.W.N. 80; *Calcutta Gazette*, 1883, Part I, page 1200. Where an appeal is preferred to the District Magistrate, notice must be given to the Public Prosecutor—*Bharasa v. Sukhdeo*, 53 Cal. 969, 43 C.L.J. 583, 27 Cr.L.J. 1086. In Bombay, District Magistrates should be served with notice—*Bombay Gazette*, 1883, Part I, page 182; 24 Bom.L.R. 1150. The same is the rule in the Punjab, Oudh and C. P. See *Punjab Gazette*, 1883, Part I, page 53; *Oudh Crim. Digest*, p. 27; *C. P. Gazette*, 1883, Part II, page 101. In Madras, the Public Prosecutor is the officer to be served with notice in case of appeals to the Sessions Court and the High Court—*Fort St. George Gazette*, 1887, Part I, page 30. In other cases, the District Magistrate is the proper officer. Thus, in an appeal before the Joint Magistrate, notice should be served on the District Magistrate—*Vellayan v. Solai*, 39 Mad. 595, 16 Cr.L.J. 600.

Omission to give notice to the District Magistrate is a mere irregularity, according to the Madras High Court—*Vellayan v. Solai*, 39 Mad. 505, 28 M.L.J. 693; but according to the Bombay High Court, such omission is an illegality and not merely an irregularity—*Emp. v. Shivlingappa*, 24 Bom L.R. 1150, A.I.R. 1923 Bom. 74, 24 Cr.L.J. 700. But objection on the ground of absence of notice should be made by the District Magistrate and not by the complainant; and the High Court will not interfere in revision at the instance of the complainant where the objection on the ground of absence of notice to the District Magistrate comes not from the District Magistrate but from the complainant—*Devendra v. Shetappa*, 25 Bom L.R. 251, A.I.R. 1923 Bom. 264, 26 Cr.L.J. 751. But where an appeal is heard by the District Magistrate who is himself the officer authorised to receive notice no formal notice to him is necessary—*Krishna v. Narayana*, 44 M.L.J. 172, 22 Cr.L.J. 583, 62 I.C. 823. But in another Madras case, where an appeal was originally heard by the District Magistrate and was ultimately heard by a Joint Magistrate, it was held that this fact did not relieve the Joint Magistrate of his duty of giving notice to the District Magistrate—*Id. Mustafa v. Shanmuga*, 25 Cr.L.J. 1389, A.I.R. 1925 Mad 375

Notice to appellant in jail—If the appellant is in jail and is not represented by a pleader, notice must be given to him—*Kotina Butchayya*, 2 Weir 472 (473), *Lal Bahadur v. Emp.*, 50 All 543, 29 Cr.L.J. 384 (385) (F.B.). The Sind Court is of opinion that no notice is necessary to be given to the appellant in jail—*Loung*, 20 S.L.R. 189, 27 Cr.L.J. 933 (934).

Time and place of hearing:—The notice must specify the exact date of hearing. It is not enough that the Magistrate had directed that the appeal would be heard in a certain month (e.g., in January)—*Wazir Khan*, 1881 A.W.N. 46. So also, a general notice posted in the Court-house that the appeal will be heard on the first Court day next after presentation of the appeal is not sufficient. A particular date must be fixed—*Alalan*, 11 Mad 11

It is imperative on a criminal Appellate Court to hear the appeal at the time and place named in the notice of appeal—*Ratan Chand*, 11 N.L.R. 76, 11 Cr.L.J. 553. Therefore where a notice is issued fixing a particular place for the hearing of the appeal, the Court ought not to hear the appeal at a different place without giving notice of the change of place—*Bahaval*, 1891 P.R. 7. The disposal of an appeal on a date previous to the date fixed for hearing amounts to a material error in procedure—*Shanmugam v. Alagia*, 2 Weir 475. If notice has been issued to an appellant to appear at the headquarters on a particular date, and if on that particular date, the officer who will hear the appeal moves out into camp, he should not dismiss the appeal for default of the appellant's appearance at the camp, but should fix a fresh date and issue a fresh notice. A general order directing appellants to follow officer into camp is not sufficient—*Nihal Singh v. Emp.*, 1905 P.R. 2 Cr.L.J. 66

423. (1) The Appellate Court shall then send for the record of the case, if such record is not already in Court. After perusing such record, and hearing the appellant or his pleader, if he appears, and the Public Prosecutor if he appears, and in case of an appeal under section 417, the accused if he appears, the Court may, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, dismiss the appeal, or may—

(a) in an appeal from an order of acquittal, reverse such order and direct that further inquiry be made, or that the accused be retried or committed for trial, as the case may be, or find him guilty and pass sentence on him according to law;

(b) in an appeal from a conviction, (1) reverse the finding and sentence, and acquit or discharge the accused, or order him to be retried by a Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such Appellate Court or committed for trial, or (2) alter the finding, maintaining the sentence, or with or without altering the finding, reduce the sentence, or (3) with or without such reduction and with or without altering the finding, alter the nature of the sentence, but, subject to the provisions of section 106 sub-section (3), not so as to enhance the same;

(c) in an appeal from any other order, alter or reverse such order;

(d) make any amendment or any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper.

(2) Nothing herein contained shall authorize the Court to alter or reverse the verdict of a jury, unless it is of opinion that such verdict is erroneous owing to a misdirection by the Judge, or to a misunderstanding on the part of the jury of the law as laid down by him.

1138. Powers and duties of Appellate Court :—It is the duty of the Appellate Court, in dealing with an appeal preferred to it, to consider the evidence both oral and documentary, and to apply its mind to the case before recording a judgment therein. Where the Appellate Court fails to do this, the judgment cannot be said to be a judgment in accordance with law—*Narain*, 21 Cr.L.J. 648, 57 I.C. 664, 1 P.L.T. 716. It is the duty of the Appellate Court to look into the evidence of both sides in order to come to a decision. Where the Appellate Court did not think it necessary to deal with the evidence adduced by the defence in the case, because no reference to that evidence was made by the counsel for the appellant, and that evidence was practically ignored by him, held that the Appellate Court acted illegally in doing so—*Fidoi Hossein*, 40 Cal. 376, 14 Cr.L.J. 419. The rule by which a Criminal Appellate Court is to be guided in dealing with a criminal appeal is that it has to come to a conclusion for itself upon the evidence on the record, assisted so far as it might be by such reasons or arguments as it might elicit from the conclusions and reasons contained in the judgment of the original Court. If the Appellate Court entertains any doubt about the correctness of the conviction or the commission of the offence, it should discharge the accused—*Milan v. Sagai Bepari*, 23 Cal. 347, *Maula Baksh*, 1898 P.R. 6, *Ma Ka v. Po Shaw*, 4 L.B.R. 340, 9 Cr.L.J. 25. It is the duty of the Appellate Court in every case to examine the evidence for itself and to give to the accused person the benefit of any reasonable doubt which it may entertain after such examination. Doubtless, an Appellate Court should not lightly disturb the conclusion of a Court of First Instance, and should give due weight to the fact that the witnesses received credit from the Court before which their depositions were given, but in every case it is the duty of an Appellate Court to arrive at an independent opinion—*Yacoub*, 2 Weir 535. In an appeal from a conviction and sentence, it is for the Appellate Court to be satisfied affirmatively that the prosecution case is substantially true and that the guilt of the accused has been established beyond all reasonable doubt. It is not for the appellants to satisfy the Appellate Court that the first Court had come to a wrong finding—*Kanchan v. Emp.*, 42 Cal. 374.

When an inspection of the scene of the occurrence is material either to the case for the prosecution or for the defence, it is desirable that the Appellate Court should inspect the spot—*Bhagwan Kaur*, 1911 P.W.R. 16, 12 Cr.L.J. 412, 11 I.C. 596 (F.B.).

When an Appellate Court does not dismiss an appeal summarily, it must dispose of it in the manner provided by this section. It has no power to refer to the High Court for decision on a question of law arising in an appeal—*Sulaiman*, 7 L.B.R. 251, 15 Cr.L.J. 667.

In dealing with a case under this section, there is no restriction on the powers of the Appellate Court to dispose of the case in any of the manners provided by this section; it can acquit the accused, or order a retrial or order the accused to be committed, etc.—*Taju Pramanik v. Q. E.*, 25 Cal. 711; *Ramprasad v. Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1000 (1091) (Nag.).

Sentence :—The power of an Appellate Court to pass sentence is measured by the power of the Court from whose judgment or order the appeal has been made. Therefore, an Appellate Court when passing a sentence on appeal cannot pass a sentence which the original Court was not competent to pass—*Emp. v. Muhammad Yakub*, 45 All 594; *Mehi Singh v. Mangal*, 39 Cal. 157; *Ramasami*, 2 Weir 487; *Q. E. v. Subbaya*, 12 Mad. 451; *Sitaram v. Emp.*, 11 L.C. 788, 7 N.L.R. 109. Thus, where a second class Magistrate passed a sentence of 4 months' imprisonment, but the District Magistrate on appeal altered the sentence into a fine of Rs 400, held that the sentence passed by the Appellate Court was *ultra vires*, because the second class Magistrate could not have awarded a fine of Rs 400 (sec. 32)—*Emp. v. Muhammad Yakub*, 45 All. 594.

Perusal of record .—The Appellate Court must peruse the whole record, and not merely the judgment of the Lower Court. A decision based upon a perusal of the judgment alone is not valid, and the appeal must be reheard—*Abdash Ali*, 14 Cr.L.J. 182 (183) (Cal). An appeal may be dismissed summarily under sec. 421 without perusal of the record, and upon perusal of the copy of the judgment alone. But under the present section, the records must be called for and perused. If the records of the case are lost, it is the duty of the Appellate Court to order a new trial—*Khimat Singh*, 1889 A.W.N. 55.

No dismissal for default of appearance :—If the appeal is not dismissed summarily under sec. 421, the Appellate Court is bound to peruse the record and consider whether there is any ground for interference with the acquittal or conviction, even though the appellant does not appear. The Appellate Court must dispose of the appeal on the merits, and is not entitled to dismiss an appeal for default of appearance of the appellant—*Q. E. v. Pohpi*, 13 All 171 (187) (F.B.); *Bansi Mirdha*, 50 Cal 972, 27 C.W.N. 947; *Ramchandra v. Emp.*, 24 Cr.L.J. 662, 21 A.L.J. 100; *Ram Bharose v. Emp.*, 14 A.L.J. 327, 17 Cr.L.J. 353; *Shiam Behary v. Emp.*, 20 Cr.L.J. 271 (Pat), *Baldeo v. Emp.*, 24 Cr.L.J. 475 (Pat.); *Newa Lal v. Emp.*, 4 P.L.T. 552, 24 Cr.L.J. 453; *Trimhak v. Emp.*, 50 Bom. 673, 27 Cr.L.J. 1167; *Kuldip v. Emp.*, 6 Pat. 16, 28 Cr.L.J. 351; *Ratan Chand*, 5 N.L.R. 76, 9 Cr.L.J. 553; *Balkaran*, 6 O.L.J. 370, 20 Cr.L.J. 744, 50 I.C. 182.

Adjournment .—If the hearing of the appeal is adjourned to another date, notice of the adjournment should be given to the appellant—*Shambehari*, 20 Cr.L.J. 271 (Pat). Where a Magistrate disposed of an appeal before the day fixed for the adjourned hearing, and without giving notice to the appellant or his pleader, it was held that the procedure was illegal—*Shanmugam v. Alagia*, 2 Weir 475.

Sufficient ground for interference :—An appellant is not precisely in the same position before an Appellate Court as he is before the Court trying him, but must satisfy the Court that there is sufficient ground for interfering with the order of conviction. If no sufficient ground has been shown, it is the duty of the Appellate Court not to interfere—*Sajwan*, 5 All 386.

1139. Dismiss the appeal.—Where an appeal is admitted and dealt with under this section, the Appellate Court can dismiss the appeal only on the merits, and has no power to dismiss it summarily (e.g. without perusing the records and without giving notice under sec 422)—*Q. E. v Gopala*, 1 Bom.L.R. 225, *Ram Hari v Santosh*, 23 Cr.L.J. 733 (Cal.), *Virasami*, 2 Weir 474 (475), *Newa Lal v Emp.*, 4 P.L.T. 552, 24 Cr.L.J. 453, A.I.R. 1923 Pat 363, *Ta Pu v Emp.*, 3 Bur.L.J. 18, 25 Cr.L.J. 933. An appeal can be summarily dismissed only under sec 421, whereas sec 423 contemplates the regular hearing or consideration of the appeal which has not been summarily dismissed under sec 421.

In dismissing an appeal under this section on the merits, the Appellate Court is bound to write a judgment, and the judgment must comply with the requirements of sections 424 and 367. On failure to do so, the judgment may be set aside and the appeal directed to be re-heard—*Q. E. v Gopala*, 1 Bom.L.R. 225.

1140. Right of parties to be heard.—If the appellant is present or is represented by a pleader, the appellant in person or his pleader must be heard—*Q. E. v Pohpi*, 13 All. 171 (187) (F.B.), 20 Cr.L.J. 271. But where the Appellate Court disposed of the appeal on the merits after perusing the records and considering the grounds of appeal, the judgment of the Appellate Court would not be set aside on the mere ground that the pleader for the accused was not heard in the Appellate Court (the pleader being prevented from appearing in time on account of a railway strike)—*Olayel Khan v. K. E.*, 1 Pat. 589 (590), 24 Cr.L.J. 118.

If the appellant is in jail and is not represented by a pleader, he may be heard in person—*Kotina*, 2 Weir 472 (473); and the Appellate Court has power to direct that the prisoner be brought before it—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 473. If the appellant, who is in jail, is not represented by a pleader, and if on receipt of the notice under sec 422, he desires to be heard in person, he must be allowed to appear in person at the hearing of the appeal, and the Appellate Court must arrange for the appellant to be produced in Court—*Lal Bahadur v. Emp.*, 50 All. 543, 26 A.L.J. 275, 29 Cr.L.J. 384 (385) (F.B.), dissenting from *Q. E. v. Pohpi*, 13 All. 171 (F.B.) and *Ram Prasad*, 4 O.W.N. 638, 28 Cr.L.J. 679, where it has been held that an appellant from jail has no right to appear at the hearing of the appeal. The Sind Court is of opinion that an appellate in jail cannot appear in person in Court—*Loung*, 20 M.L.J. 189, 27 Cr.L.J. 933 (934).

A complainant cannot claim as of right to be heard in the appeal. The matter is one which may be left in each case to the discretion of the Court—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 476, 7 M.H.C.R. App. 42. A private prosecutor as such has no right to be heard, but the Court may grant permission in any particular case—*Akbar v. Emp.*, 1886 P.R. 29, *Dowlatram*, 9 C.W.N. 1v.

If the Public Prosecutor does not appear on behalf of the Government, ■ *vakil* privately instructed to support the prosecution may be heard—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 476.

The counsel for the appellant has a right of reply—*Promoda*, 11 C.W.N. xlii. There is nothing in the language of this section to preclude the appellant or his pleader from replying to the arguments of the Public Prosecutor, and as a matter of principle such right of reply should be conceded to him. The practice of the High Court has been uniformly in favour of allowing this right to the appellant or his pleader—*Buta Singh*, 18 Cr.L.J. 3, 1917 P.R. 21; *Amanat v. Nagendra*, 38 Cal. 307. The Oudh Court holds that although the appellant's counsel has no right of reply, still it is a *privilege* which should not ordinarily be refused—*Prag v. Emp.*, 11 O.L.J. 693, 1 O.W.N. 473, 25 Cr.L.J. 1169; *Bahra v. Emp.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 1173 (Oudh).

1141. Clause (a) :—Appeal from acquittal.—*Clause (a)* of this section can apply only to the High Court, because section 417 which provides for appeals against orders of acquittal requires that such appeals shall lie to the High Court—*Rangasami v. Narasimhulu*, 7 Mad 213, 2 Weir 477. Therefore, a Sessions Judge has no power to set aside the order of acquittal and direct the commitment of the accused to the Court of Session—*Baroda v. Karait*, 2 C.W.N. cclvi; or to direct further inquiry to be made in a case of acquittal by a Magistrate. Such a power can be exercised only by the High Court—*Baijanath v. Gauri Kanta*, 20 Cal. 633. So also a District Magistrate has no power to entertain an appeal from an order of acquittal, and is incompetent to reverse a Subordinate Magistrate's order of acquittal and direct a rehearing—*Rangasami v. Narasimhulu*, 7 Mad. 213; *Samu Ayya*, 26 Mad 478.

As to the grounds on which the High Court will interfere with an order of acquittal, see Note 1120 under sec. 417.

An appeal against an order of acquittal in a case tried by jury must be supported by a ground which is covered by sec. 418, which provides, in cases of trial by jury, for an appeal on a matter of law only. Where the Local Government appealed against an order of acquittal, and the grounds upon which the appeal was sought to be preferred were questions of fact, the High Court rejected the appeal—*Parmeshur*, 10 Cal. 1029.

The High Court, in exercising jurisdiction in the matter of appeals against acquittals, should confine its exercise to the particular acquittal complained of by the Government. At the same time it would not be proper for the High Court to consider the appeal on grounds not contained in the objection urged on behalf of the Government—*Q. E. v. Karigowda*, 19 Bom 51 (68).

Acquittal :—This clause confers a power to direct further inquiry only in respect of a case of an appeal from an order of acquittal, and not in a case in which an order of discharge or dismissal may have been passed—*Charoobala v. Barendra*, 27 Cal. 126.

‘Find him guilty’ :—These words do not necessarily mean that the Appellate Court can find the accused guilty only of the offence of which he has been acquitted by the trial Court, and not of any other offence. The Appellate Court can certainly convict the accused of another offence or of a minor offence covered by the offence of which he has been acquitted, under the provisions of sec. 237 or 238, read with sec. 423, provided no prejudice has been caused to the accused—*Emp. v. Ismail*, 52 Bom 385, 29 Cr.L.J. 403 (405), 30 Bom. L.R. 330, *Kauromal*, 25 Cr L J. 1057 (1059), A.I.R. 1925 Sind 105.

1142. Clause (b) :—Appeal from conviction :—If an accused, who is charged with several offences, is convicted of some of the offences and acquitted of the others, and appeals, the case is one of ‘appeal from conviction’ and not of appeal from *acquittal*. consequently sec. 417 does not apply—*Emp. v. Jabanulla*, 23 Cal 975 (978, 980).

In an appeal from a conviction, the Appellate Court may, if it likes, take further evidence (section 428) but cannot direct further inquiry—*Muhammad Ata*, 19 A.L.J. 961, 23 Cr.L.J. 402

‘Reverse the finding and sentence’ —Before an Appellate Court can set aside a conviction, it must be satisfied that the conviction is wrong. It seems a logical consequence of this that when without finding the conviction to be wrong, the Appellate Court sets it aside, the appellate order would be *ultra vires*—*Emp. v. Sheikh Rasul*, 17 C P L R. 97.

An Appellate Court is not competent to set aside a conviction merely on the ground that all the witnesses cited for the defence have not been examined. The proper course in such a case is to have the evidence taken of the other witnesses before disposing of the appeal—*Turaka Pakir*, 2 Weir 481. A conviction ought not to be reversed unless the admission of the rejected evidence would have affected the result of the trial—*Imp. v. Pitambar*, 2 Bom 61.

The proper procedure on appeal in a case where the Lower Court had refused to take the defence of the accused, is to set aside the conviction and sentence passed by the Lower Court, and order the Magistrate to begin the proceedings anew against the accused from the stage when his evidence was refused—*Gohar v Emp*, 1884 P R 28

After reversing the finding and sentence, the Appellate Court can order the accused either to be retried or to be committed for trial. The Appellate Court cannot itself frame a charge against the accused, and hold a regular trial—*G. C Sircar v K E*, 3 Rang 68, 4 Bur L J 29, 26 Cr. L J. 1119

Power to acquit —When an Appellate Court sets aside a verdict of the jury on the ground of misdirection it is open to that Court to acquit the accused. At the same time, as a matter of practice the proper course in such cases is to direct a retrial. It is only in special circumstances that an appellate Court would be justified in acquitting—*Dhiraji v. Akasi*, 24 A L J 506, 27 Cr L J 785

1143. Re-trial :—A Sessions Judge has power to order a new trial when the case comes before him in appeal. This power should however be sparingly exercised and a retrial should not be ordered unless there are grave reasons for doing so—*Mohan Lal*, 13 A L J 477, 16 Cr.L.J. 433, 29 I C 65.

Before quashing a conviction and ordering a new trial on the ground that though the accused was shown by the evidence to have committed some offence, he has been convicted under a wrong section, the Appellate Court must come to a certain conclusion as to the offence which the accused was shown by the evidence to have committed, and it ought to consider whether, if the evidence showed that the accused should properly have been convicted of another offence than that he was charged with, he would be prejudiced by amending the conviction. Before ordering a retrial, the Appellate Court is bound to see what possible object could be served by a fresh trial—*Iyachikone*, 2 Weir 480.

When retrial may be ordered—A retrial may be ordered where the trial is held to be illegal on the ground of want of jurisdiction of the Court that tried the case—*Q. E v Sukha*, 8 All. 14; *Hamdu*, 3 Bur L T. 9, 8 I.C 594, 11 Cr.L.J 684. Thus, where an offence triable only by a Magistrate of the 1st class or Court of Session was tried by a second class Magistrate, the Appellate Court may order the accused to be retried by a 1st class Magistrate or by the Court of Session—*Q E v. Sukha*, 8 All 14 (17). (In *Abdul Gani v Emp.*, 29 Cal. 412, it has been held that where a trial was void for want of jurisdiction, it is not necessary for the Appellate Court to order a retrial; and therefore where the Appellate Court in such a case merely discharged the accused and did not order a retrial, the omission to pass such order would not prevent the Magistrate from taking further proceedings against the accused). The power of the Appellate Court is not confined to cases where the conviction and sentence are set aside for want of jurisdiction in the trying Magistrate. It may order a retrial if it is of opinion that much necessary evidence had not been adduced and much documentary evidence had not been exhibited in the trial Court, and that a full and complete inquiry into the real facts is advisable—*Satish Chandra v Q E*, 27 Cal. 172 (174); *Jeremiah v Vas*, 36 Mad 457 (468). If in an appeal from a conviction the Judge finds that the evidence discloses the commission of a more serious offence, he may set aside the conviction and sentence and order the accused to be retried by a Court of competent jurisdiction or committed for trial, according to the nature of the evidence against him—*Dari Roy*, 11 C.W.N. c. A retrial would be proper where the accused was rightly acquitted of one offence, but the Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that he ought to have been tried for another, or where persons who ought not to have been tried together have been so tried—*Jeremiah v Vas*, 36 Mad. 457 (468). If the Appellate Court is of opinion that the appellant ought to have been convicted of an offence different from that with which he was charged in the Lower Court, the Appellate Court ought to annul the conviction and order a retrial—*Ram Prasad*, 1882 A.W.N. 112. A retrial may be ordered in a case in which the Appellate Court sets aside the conviction

on the ground of misdirection to the jury—*Sadhu Sheikh v. Emp.*, 4 C.W.N. 576 (582). A retrial will be ordered if there was a misjoinder of charges in the trial Court, and the Judge's charge to the jury was defective—*Bircandra v. Emp.*, 30 Cal. 822 (830). An Appellate Court in discharging the accused on the ground of misjoinder of parties has power to add a direction that the accused should be retried—*Kumudini Kanta*, 28 Cal. 104; *Hamdu*, 3 Bur.L.T. 9, 8 I.C. 594. A retrial ought to be ordered if it is found that the accused has not been properly convicted—*Abdool v. Khalir*, 3 C.W.N. 332. An Appellate Court may order a retrial on the ground that the trial Court had omitted to consider an important piece of documentary evidence, and that there was a gross mistake in drawing up the charge—*Sheoparsan*, 28 Cr.L.J. 893 (Pat.) Where the Lower Court has committed an error in procedure in convicting the accused upon evidence which was not given in their presence, the Appellate Court is competent to order a retrial—*Pera Naicken*, 2 Weir 481 (482), so also, a retrial may be ordered if the Appellate Court is of opinion that in the trial Court there was an irregularity in the procedure by which material evidence was excluded—*Sadashir*, Ratanlal 938 (939). A Sessions Judge has power to direct a retrial to be had upon a charge framed in whatever manner he thinks fit, on the ground that the accused has been misled in their defence by the absence of a charge or by a defect in the charge—*Sarat Chandra v. Emp.*, 7 C.W.N. 301, see also *Manna*, 9 N.L.R. 42, 14 Cr.L.J. 230. Where the trial Court has failed to record a judgment in conformity with section 367, the proper procedure for the Appellate Court is to reverse the order of the Court below and to remand the case for a trial *de novo*—*Karuppiah*, 1920 M.W.N. 120, 21 Cr.L.J. 52, 54 I.C. 404.

Where the Sessions Judge on appeal annuls the conviction of the accused on the ground of want of jurisdiction of the Magistrate who tried the case, but omits to order a new trial, the Judge is not precluded from passing such order subsequently. The order of retrial does not amount to an alteration of the judgment annulling the conviction, within the meaning of sec. 369—*In re Ram Reddi*, 3 Mad. 48.

Where the High Court on appeal set aside the verdict of the jury who convicted the accused, and observing that it would be open to the Crown to proceed further with the case if so advised, directed the petitioner to be released on bail until fresh trial if any, it was held that the order amounted to an order of retrial—*Beni Madhab v. Emp.*, 46 Cal. 212, 23 C.W.N. 94, 20 Cr.L.J. 225.

Scope of retrial:—Where an Appellate Court reverses the verdict of a jury and orders a retrial, such retrial, unless the Appellate Court has limited the scope, must be taken to be one upon all the charges originally framed—*Krishna Dhan v. Q. E.*, 22 Cal. 377, *Nizamuddin v. Emp.*, 40 Cal. 163. But it cannot be laid down as a general rule that a retrial necessarily opens up to the whole case. In cases falling within sec. 236 of this Code, where a retrial is ordered without any express limitation, it must be taken to mean the retrial of the whole case. But in cases not falling under sec. 236, that is, where an accused person is charged at one

trial with distinct offences constituted by distinct acts, a different principle would apply—*Krishna Dhan v. Q. E.*, supra. In cases falling within sec 236, there is one set of facts which may be viewed in different ways. When a retrial is ordered, the whole facts are necessarily reopened and nothing can prevent the jury in the second trial from coming to any verdict that they consider right upon the facts proved before them. But where there are two different sets of facts and a verdict has been given on one set which no one impugns, then there is no reason why, when an appeal is brought on the other set of facts, the order for retrial should reopen both—*Abdul Hamid v. Emp.*, 6 Pat 208, 27 Cr.L.J. 1100 (1102).

It is doubtful whether the Appellate Court can order a retrial of the accused for a graver offence than that for which he has been convicted—*Bir Singh*, 28 P.L.R. 166, 28 Cr.L.J. 575. Where an order of remand is passed by an Appellate Court under section 423, the Court cannot restrict the evidence to be taken to that mentioned in its order, but it should order the case to be retried in view of the instructions contained in its order. The accused is entitled to adduce such additional evidence as he may desire—*Mir Sarwarjan*, 3 C.L.J. 303. Thus, where in an appeal from a conviction, the Sessions Judge set aside the conviction and ordered a retrial, but at the same time directed that the evidence already on the record should be treated as evidence in the case, it was held that the direction was contrary to the provisions of secs. 423 and 428 and was therefore illegal—*Bhado*, 3 P.L.W. 224, 19 Cr.L.J. 77, 43 I.C. 109.

When retrial should not be ordered—The mere fact that the Appellate Court finds the decision of the Lower Court not so satisfactory as it should have been does not authorise the Appellate Court to pass an order remanding the case to the Lower Court with instructions to write out a proper judgment—*Tara Chand v. Emp.*, 32 Cal. 1069. Where a Sessions Judge on appeal thinks that the evidence of some more witnesses, who were not examined in the Lower Court, is necessary, he should proceed under sec 428 (1) and cannot order retrial on that ground—*Emp. v. Luchman*, 31 Cal 710, *Iswar Prasad*, 16 A.L.J. 325, 19 Cr.L.J. 485, 45 I.C. 149. Where the prosecution wanted to let in evidence necessary to prove the offence, but the Magistrate refused to take that evidence, stating that it was unnecessary, the case was a proper one in which retrial could be ordered or in which the Court could properly call for additional evidence under sec 428; but as a new trial would involve much unnecessary delay and expense, it is more convenient to order additional evidence to be taken than to order a retrial—*Jeremiah v. Vas*, 36 Mad 457 (470). A retrial should not be ordered with the object of enabling the prosecution to fill up deficiencies in the evidence for the prosecution—*Hamdu Meah*, 3 Bur. L.T. 9, 8 I.C. 594, 11 Cr.L.J. 684. Where the evidence recorded by the Magistrate is as full as the law requires and there is no irregularity in the procedure, it is not competent to a Sessions Judge on appeal to order a retrial. He must consider the case on the evidence before him and proceed to judgment—*Maganlal*, *Ratanlal* 530, *Bondville*, 1 Bur L.J. 32; the mere fact that an inadmissible or irrelevant evidence has been admitted by the Lower Court does not justify a retrial. Such evidence

may be left out of consideration—*Boudville*, 1 Bur.L.J. 32; *Wafadar*, 21 Cal. 955 (970). Where there is no evidence on the record to warrant a conviction for the offence charged, an order for retrial is not justified—*Ramprasad v. Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1090 (Nag.). The Appellate Court ought not to send the case back for retrial, unless there is some material already on the record tending to indicate that the offence has been committed, or unless the Appellate Court was given by the prosecution sufficient assurance indicating that there would be produced practically unimpeachable evidence of the offence if a retrial is ordered—*Mogambara*, 28 M.L.J. 379, 17 Cr.L.J. 193.

By a Court of competent jurisdiction:—Under this section, when an Appellate Court orders a retrial, it can specify the Court by which the appellant is to be retried. There is nothing in this section which prevents such specification of the Court—*Kasturbhai*, *Ratanlal* 367.

If the Appellate Court finds that the accused had committed an offence triable by a Magistrate of the first class but has been tried by a 2nd class Magistrate through oversight or under a misapprehension, the Appellate Court may order the accused to be retried by a Court competent to try the offence i.e., by a first class Magistrate—*Sukha*, 11 All. 14 (17). Even if the Lower Court was competent to try the offence, the Appellate Court may order the retrial by another Court of competent jurisdiction—*Shank Ali*, L.B.R. (1893—1900) 238.

Under the provisions of this section, the retrial, if ordered, must be by a Court of competent jurisdiction 'subordinate to the Appellate Court,' and therefore an Appellate Court cannot direct a case to be retried by itself—*Pakira Ratanlal* 982, *Dhiraji v. Akasi*, 24 A.L.J. 506, 27 Cr.L.J. 785. But in *Manikka*, 30 Mad. 228 and *Vedakadeth Kanaran*, 2 Weir 481, it has been held that the words 'Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such Appellate Court' are not to be taken as words of limitation, and do not exclude the power of the Appellate Court of itself trying the offender when the offence is within the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court. But if the accused has been tried before a jury, and the High Court, on appeal, sets aside the conviction on the ground of misdirection, the accused is entitled to be re-tried before a jury, and as a matter of procedure and in justice to the accused, this course should be adopted. It is doubtful whether the High Court can, under this section, retry the case itself—*Sadhu Sheikh*, 4 C.W.N. 576 (581, 582).

The Appellate Court may order the retrial to be held by any Court of competent jurisdiction. The High Court has power under this section to order a retrial of the appeal by the Lower Appellate Court—1913 P.L.R. 7, 13 Cr.L.J. 737.

1144. Order of commitment—If the Appellate Court finds that the accused has committed an offence which the Lower Court was not competent to try, the Appellate Court may order retrial by a Court of competent jurisdiction; and if there is no Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to the Appellate Court, it ought to direct the commitment of the accused to the Sessions—*Chinna*, 2 Weir 484 (485). Where

the accused who has committed an offence triable solely by the Sessions Court, has been tried by a Magistrate, the Appellate Court is competent to direct a committal to the Sessions—*Q. E. v. Sukha*, 8 All. 14 (17); *Hasan Raza v. Emp.*, 20 A.L.J. 568. In *Q. E. v. Sukha*, supra, Brodhurst J expressed the opinion that an Appellate Court can order a commitment only where the offence committed by the accused is triable exclusively by the Court of Session. But this view has been dissented from in the following cases, where it has been laid down that even if the offence be not exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the Appellate Court is still competent to direct a committal to the Sessions—*Misri Lal v. Lachmi*, 23 Cal. 350 (351); *Q. E. v. Maula Bakhsh*, 15 All 205 (206), *Abdul Rahiman*, 16 Bom. 580 (584). This section gives the Appellate Court the power to order an accused person to be committed to the Sessions, when it considers that that is the procedure which should have been adopted by the Magistrate in the case—*Q. E. v. Abdul Rahman*, 16 Bom 580 (584). Thus, a commitment may be ordered by the Appellate Court, if it is of opinion that the Magistrate, though of competent jurisdiction to try the case, was not competent to punish the accused adequately—*Dani*, 1895 P.R. 16; *Abdul Rahman*, 16 Bom 580 (584).

Where the Appellate Court directs a commitment to the Court of Session, an investigation preliminary to commitment is not necessary. The commitment can be made on the evidence already recorded—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 479

An order of commitment passed by the Sessions Judge on appeal under this clause can be revised by the High Court under sec 439—*Ram Samugh v. Emp.*, 11 O L J. 748, 1 O W.N. 525, 25 Cr.L.J. 1375

Commitment to itself—The Appellate Court has power of ordering the accused appellant to be committed to the Court of Session, even though the Court of session is the Appellate Court itself—*Q. E. v. Maula Bakhsh*, 15 All. 205 (207) But the Appellate Court cannot itself commit a case to itself, but, as a Court of Appeal, can only direct a competent Magistrate to make a commitment to itself. Reading this section with sec. 193 it is manifest that except in cases in which a Court of Session is expressly empowered to take cognizance of an offence as a Court of original jurisdiction, it has no power to do so unless a commitment has been made by a Magistrate duly empowered in this behalf—*Maula Khan*, 1907 A.W.N. 178, 6 Cr L.J. 7.

1145. Alteration of finding :—Where the accused were charged by the lower Court with several offences, and were convicted of the graver offences and acquitted of the minor charges, the Appellate Court can alter the finding of the lower Court and convict the accused of the minor charges, and acquit them of the graver offences—*Golla Hannappa*, 35 Mad 243. An Appellate Court can substitute a conviction for a lesser offence from that which has been held by the Court of first instance to have been committed by the accused—*Jawad Husain v. Emp.*, 2 Luck 503, 28 Cr.L.J. 673. But in convicting an accused of an offence

with which he was *not charged* in the lower Court, the Appellate Court can act only in accordance with the provisions of secs. 237 and 238—*Padmanabha*, 33 Mad 264; *Emp. v. Sakharani*, 11 Bom L.R. 120; *G. C. Sircar v. Emp.*, 3 Rang. 68, 4 Bur.L.J. 29, 26 Cr.L.J. 1119; *Mahabir v. Emp.*, 49 All. 120, 24 A.L.J. 998, 27 Cr L.J. 1118. Thus, where on an appeal from a conviction of murder, the Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that the offence of murder is not proved but that there is evidence on the record to support a conviction for an offence against property, the Appellate Court ought to acquit the accused of murder, but it cannot alter the conviction of murder into a conviction of an offence against property, because the latter offence is so widely different from the former that it is illegal under sec. 237 or 238 to convict the accused of the latter offence when he is charged only with the former—*Walla v. Crown*, 4 Lah. 373; *Ghaus v. Emp.*, 7 Lah. 561, 27 P L R. 610, 27 Cr L.J. 1004, *Q. E. v Yusuf*, 20 All 107. It is not open to an Appellate Court to find a man guilty of the abetment of an offence, on a charge of the substantive offence itself—*Padmanabha*, 33 Mad 264. Where the Court of Session had convicted an accused of an offence under sec. 409 I. P. C. and the High Court on appeal found that the conviction was not sustainable under that section, the Court refused to alter the finding into a conviction for some other offence (e.g., an offence under sec. 161 I. P. C.) for which the accused had not been charged or tried and which was of an entirely different nature from the offence with which he was charged—*Imdad Khan*, 8 All. 120. When the accused was charged with and convicted of an offence under sec. 457, I P C. and on appeal the Sessions Judge altered the charge and recorded a conviction under sec. 411, I P. C., held that the Appellate Court had no power to so alter the charge as to make it necessary for the accused to meet an entirely different case from that with which he was charged in the trial Court—*Mula v. Emp.*, 23 A.L.J. 924, 26 Cr.L.J. 1494. But where the prosecution has established certain acts constituting an offence, and the Court has misapplied the law to those acts by charging and convicting the accused for an offence other than that for which he should have been properly charged, and it appears that in spite of such error of the Court, the accused has by his defence endeavoured to meet the accusation of the commission of those acts, then the Appellate Court may alter the charge or finding and convict him for an offence which those acts properly constitute, if the accused is not at all prejudiced by the alteration of finding—*Lala Ojha v Q E*, 26 Cal 863, *Amrit*, 1890 A W N 86. Such an error is one of form rather than of substance, and the alteration by an Appellate Court of the charge or finding into a more serious offence would not necessitate a retrial for that offence. Therefore, where a person is convicted of an attempt to commit an offence, the Appellate Court, if it thinks that the acts of the accused constitute the substantive offence itself, may convict him of the substantive offence without ordering a retrial—*Lala Ojha v. Q E*, *supra*. Where the accused has been convicted by the trial Court of an offence under sec. 380 I P. C., the Appellate Court can alter the conviction into one under sec. 403 I.

Code, as the two offences are of the same nature and the appellant cannot be taken by surprise by such a procedure—*Biru v. Emp.*, 30 Cr.L.J. 413 (414), 11 Lah.L.J. 113.

The Appellate Court in altering a finding under this clause cannot act in contravention of the provisions of section 239. Thus, the petitioner and four others were tried jointly, the other four being convicted of an offence under section 454 of the I. P. Code and the petitioner was convicted of abetment thereof. On appeal the Appellate Court acquitted the petitioner of the offence of abetment but convicted him under secs 411 and 414 I. P. C. Held, that the conviction by the Appellate Court cannot be maintained, because under sec. 239 the petitioner could not have been tried in the original Court jointly with the four accused under sections 411 and 414 I. P. C., while the latter were being tried under section 454 I. P. C.—*Sahib Singh v. K. E.*, 1905 P.R. 38, 1905 P.L.R. 115.

Where an accused was convicted of a composite offence, the Appellate Court may alter the conviction into one of the elements of the composite offence. Thus, where the accused was convicted of house-breaking by night, under sec 457 I. P. C. and the Appellate Court altered the conviction to one under sec. 414 I. P. C., it was held that sec 457 I. P. C. applied to a composite offence, and under sec 238 of this Code an accused may be convicted of any element of the composite offence, and that under this section it was competent to the Appellate Court to alter the finding—*Balu, Ratanlal* 293

Under clause (b) the Appellate Court can, in an appeal from a conviction, alter the finding of the Lower Court and find the appellant guilty of any offence of which he has been acquitted by that Court. Sec. 417 does not stand in the way, because that section applies only where there has been a complete acquittal and not where an appeal is preferred in a case in which the Magistrate has acquitted the accused of one offence but convicted him of another—*Q. E. v. Jabanulla*, 23 Cal. 975 (979, 980); *Sardar*, 34 All. 115 (117). Thus, where the Magistrate acquitted the accused under sec. 148 I. P. C. and convicted him under sec. 325 I. P. C., it was open to the Sessions Judge to alter the conviction under sec 325 into one under sec. 148 I. P. C.—*Appanna v. Pithani*, 34 Mad. 545. Similarly, where in such a case the Lower Court has found only one of the accused guilty of murder and acquitted the others of murder but convicted them of other offences, an appeal against the conviction of murder opens out the entire case and the Appellate Court may find all the three persons guilty of murder—*Dulli v. Emp.*, 16 A.L.J. 918, 20 Cr.L.J. 22, 48 I.C. 502. Where in the trial Court the accused was charged with murder (sec. 302 I. P. C.) but was convicted of culpable homicide (sec. 304), the appellate Court can convict the accused of murder—*On Shive v. Emp.*, 1 Rang. 436, 25 Cr.L.J. 247.

If the Appellate Court finds that the sentence is illegal or inadequate, and does not think it expedient to order a new trial, he may alter the

conviction in order to legalise the sentence—*K. E. v. Kyaw Hla*, 3 L.B.R. 112, 3 Cr.L.J. 348.

In altering the finding of the Lower Court, the Appellate Court is not bound by any preliminaries of complaint under sec. 108. Thus, on an appeal from a conviction under sec 182 I P. C the Appellate Court is competent to alter the conviction into one under sec. 500 I. P. C. notwithstanding that there was no complaint by the aggrieved party—*Emp. v. Gur Narain*, 25 All 534

The word 'finding' is not limited to a finding upon a point of law, as distinct from a finding upon a point of fact—*Mahangu Singh*, 3 P.L.J 565, 19 Cr.L.J. 735.

1146. Alteration when improper—(1) It is improper for the Appellate Court to alter the finding so as to convict the accused of an offence of an entirely different character. Thus, under the provisions of secs. 237 and 238, it is illegal to alter a conviction under sec. 376 I. P. C. into one under sec. 366 I P. C., because the charge under the later section involves different elements and different questions of fact from the former—*Emp. v Sakharam*, 8 Bom L.R. 120, *G C. Sircar v. K. E.*, 3 Rang 68, 4 Bur.L.J. 29, 26 Cr L J 1119, so also, it is illegal to alter a conviction under sec. 379 I. P. C. into one under sec 143 I P C—*Jatu v Mahabir*, 27 Cal 660. So again, it is improper to alter a conviction under secs 211 and 109 I P. C into one under sec. 193 I. P. C—*Manoranjan*, 3 C.W.N. 367; or to alter a conviction under sec 468 I. P. C into a conviction under 471 I P C—*Akbar v. Emp.*, 8 N.L.J 87, 26 Cr.L.J. 1358; or to alter a conviction under sec. 147 into one under secs. 448 and 323 I. P. C.—*Yakub Ali v. Lethu*, 30 Cal. 288; or to alter a conviction for wrongful confinement into one for assault—*Rameswar v. Jogi*, 5 C.W.N. 296. See Note 1145

(2) It would be improper and unfair to the accused for the Appellate Court to convict him of a more serious offence to which he had never pleaded at the trial, especially if the new offence was not cognate to the offence for which he was tried and convicted, and if there were circumstances of aggravation to which he had not pleaded guilty—*Lala Ojha v Q E.*, 26 Cal. 863, *K. E. v Po Yin*, 3 L B R 232

(3) An Appellate Court is not competent to alter the finding of a Magistrate, so as to convict an accused person of an offence which the Lower Court is not competent to try—*Pershad*, 7 All 414 (F.B)

(4) When a person has been charged with a certain offence and has been convicted of that offence, the Appellate Court cannot, on finding that the conviction is not sustainable, convict the accused of abetment of that offence—*Mahabir v Emp*, 24 A L J. 998, 49 All 120, 27 Cr L J. 1118, *Padmanabha*, 33 Mad. 264; *Rcg v Chand Nur*, 11 B H C.R 240. See Note 771 under sec 238.

Notice to appellant—If a Judge on appeal finds that the evidence recorded discloses a different offence, he may alter the finding of the Court below; but in doing so, he ought to give intimation to the accus

Code, as the two offences are of the same nature and the appellant cannot be taken by surprise by such a procedure—*Buru v. Emp.*, 30 Cr.L.J. 413 (414), 11 Lah.L.J. 113

The Appellate Court in altering a finding under this clause cannot act in contravention of the provisions of section 239. Thus, the petitioner and four others were tried jointly, the other four being convicted of an offence under section 454 of the I. P. Code and the petitioner was convicted of abetment thereof. On appeal the Appellate Court acquitted the petitioner of the offence of abetment but convicted him under secs 411 and 414 I. P. C. Held, that the conviction by the Appellate Court cannot be maintained, because under sec. 239 the petitioner could not have been tried in the original Court jointly with the four accused under sections 411 and 414 I. P. C., while the latter were being tried under section 454 I. P. C.—*Sahib Singh v. K. E.*, 1905 P.R. 33, 1905 P.L.R. 115.

Where an accused was convicted of a composite offence, the Appellate Court may alter the conviction into one of the elements of the composite offence. Thus, where the accused was convicted of house-breaking by night, under sec. 457 I. P. C. and the Appellate Court altered the conviction to one under sec. 414 I. P. C., it was held that sec. 457 I. P. C. applied to a composite offence, and under sec. 238 of this Code an accused may be convicted of any element of the composite offence, and that under this section it was competent to the Appellate Court to alter the finding—*Bala, Ratanlal* 293.

Under clause (b) the Appellate Court can, in an appeal from a conviction, alter the finding of the Lower Court and find the appellant guilty of any offence of which he has been acquitted by that Court. Sec. 417 does not stand in the way, because that section applies only where there has been a complete acquittal and not where an appeal is preferred in a case in which the Magistrate has acquitted the accused of one offence but convicted him of another—*Q. E. v. Jaganalla*, 23 Cal. 975 (979, 980); *Sardar*, 34 All 115 (117). Thus, where the Magistrate acquitted the accused under sec. 148 I. P. C. and convicted him under sec. 325 I. P. C., it was open to the Sessions Judge to alter the conviction under sec. 325 into one under sec. 148 I. P. C.—*Appanna v. Pithani*, 34 Mad 545. Similarly, where in such a case the Lower Court has found only one of the accused guilty of murder and acquitted the others of murder but convicted them of other offences, an appeal against the conviction of murder opens out the entire case and the Appellate Court may find all the three persons guilty of murder—*Dulli v. Emp.*, 16 A.L.J. 918, 20 Cr.L.J. 22, 48 I.C. 502. Where in the trial Court the accused was charged with murder (sec. 302 I. P. C.) but was convicted of culpable homicide (sec. 304), the appellate Court can convict the accused of murder—*On Shive v. Emp.*, 1 Rang. 436, 25 Cr.L.J. 247.

If the Appellate Court finds that the sentence is illegal or inadequate, and does not think it expedient to order a new trial, he may alter the

has no power to alter a sentence in this way—*Lachmi Kant*, 18 All. 301. *Dhansang*, 18 Bom. 751.

(5) Where the Lower Court imposed fine and imprisonment, and the Appellate Court, in lieu of imprisonment, imposed an additional fine, thus increasing the amount of fine imposed by the Lower Court, it amounted to an enhancement of sentence—*Ramasami*, 2 Weir 487.

(6) The addition of imprisonment by the Appellate Court to a sentence of fine only imposed by the Lower Court is an enhancement of sentence. The appellant was convicted of causing simple hurt and was sentenced to fine only; on appeal, the Appellate Court altered the conviction to one of causing grievous hurt (which is punishable with imprisonment and fine) under Sec. 325 I. P. C. and in order to make the sentence legal under that section, recorded a sentence of one day's rigorous imprisonment. It was held that the Appellate Court had no power to so enhance the sentence—*Chandalavada Ramanappa*, 2 Weir 486.

(7) The addition of a sentence of whipping by the Appellate Court, although the sentence of imprisonment is reduced, that is, the alteration of a part of the imprisonment into a sentence of whipping, amounts to an enhancement of the sentence—*Appu* 2 Weir 487. The Rangoon High Court also holds that the alteration of the whole or part of the sentence of imprisonment into a sentence of whipping amounts to an enhancement—*In re Kyang* 30 Cr L J 328 (329). On the contrary it has been held in *Q. v Banda Ali*, 15 W.R. 7, that the alteration of a sentence of whipping into one of imprisonment may amount to an enhancement of punishment. In this case their Lordships expressed a doubt as to which sentence was the more severe. 'The Legislature has not supplied us with any data from which the comparative severity of the two sentences of whipping and rigorous imprisonment can be determined, and it is impossible to say how many lashes would be equivalent to a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a specified period'—Mitter J. In fact the two sentences are of so dissimilar a nature that they do not admit of comparison. Recently a Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court has attempted to find out a standard of comparison, and by applying the provisions of sec 395, has laid down that the substitution of 30 stripes for a sentence of one year's imprisonment, or the substitution of 25 stripes for a sentence of 12 months, would not ordinarily amount to an enhancement of sentence. But a substitution of 30 stripes for a sentence of 3 months' imprisonment is manifestly an enhancement and is therefore illegal—*Chit Pon*, 7 Rang 319 (F 11), 30 Cr L J 986 (989), 1929 Cr C 169. See also *In re Kyang*, supra.

(8) Where in a criminal appeal, the terms of imprisonment are reduced but a punishment of solitary confinement is imposed, the imposition of solitary confinement, though the imprisonment is lessened, amounts to an enhancement of the sentence—*Peman*, 1890 A W N 170.

(9) The substitution of rigorous imprisonment in place of simple imprisonment amounts to an enhancement of sentence—*Emp v Muhammad Yakub Ali*, 45 All 594.

(10) The Appellate Court in altering a sentence, cannot award a sentence which the original Court could not have passed. If it does so, it will amount to an enhancement of sentence. See Note 1138 *ante*.

What does not amount to enhancement—(1) An additional order passed by the Appellate Court directing the accused to furnish security to keep the peace does not amount to an enhancement of sentence—*Miran Bakhsh*, 1905 P.R. 21, 2 Cr.L.J. 190; *Zafar Husain*, 20 Cr.L.J. 302 (All); *Maharaj Singh*, 20 Cr.L.J. 760 (Nag). Such power has been expressly conferred on a Court of Appeal by section 106 (3) and a Judge is competent in appeal to demand such security—*Ibid*.

(2) An order passed by the Appellate Court directing the accused person to pay the costs of the complainant under sec. 31 of the Court Fees Act (now 546A of this Code) does not amount to an enhancement of sentence, because the order of costs is not a penalty or sentence passed in the case but is an incidental order under clause (d) of this section—*Emp. v. Karuppanna*, 29 Mad. 188, *Thimiah v. K. E.*, 47 Mad 914 (915). Although the fees ordered to be paid are to be recovered as if they were fines, still there is no warrant for treating the same as part of the fine imposed as punishment for the offences—*In re Vemuri Seshanna*, 26 Mad 421, *Thimiah v. K. E.*, 47 Mad 914 (915).

(3) Where an Appellate Court adopts the view taken by the original Court as to the acts committed by the accused, and only differs from it in its application of the law, and maintains the sentence, neither the letter nor the spirit of sec. 423 is broken by the Appellate Court in maintaining the sentence. There is no enhancement. Thus, where the accused was convicted by the trial Court for voluntarily causing hurt with a dangerous weapon under sec. 324 I.P.C., and was sentenced to 2 months' imprisonment, and in appeal the Appellate Court altered the conviction into one for simple hurt under sec. 323 I.P.C., but the sentence was maintained, held that it did not amount to an enhancement of sentence—*In re Rangaswami*, 53 M.L.J. 691, 28 Cr.L.J. 824 (825).

If conviction is confirmed, some sentence must be passed.—If the Court of appeal affirms a conviction, it should, if it disapproves of the sentence passed by the Lower Court, pass some other sentence, even though a nominal one. It cannot set aside the sentence absolutely while upholding the conviction. Every conviction must be followed by sentence—*Lakshmbai, Ratanlal* 545.

Clause (c) :—An order requiring a person to furnish security falls under this clause. The Appellate Court can either reverse (i.e., set aside) the order or alter the order, e.g., by reducing the amount of security. But an order remanding the case for fresh inquiry is bad in law. But of course fresh proceedings can be started under sec. 110 on receiving fresh information—*Chandan*, 30 P.L.R. 416, 30 Cr.L.J. 491.

1149. Clause (d)—Amendment :—Under this clause the Court can make any amendment that may be just or proper. Thus, where the accused was convicted under section 325 I.P.C., and on

appeal the parties applied to compromise the case, the High Court acting under section 423 (d) amended the order of conviction by substituting for it an order that the offence should be compromised—*Emp. v. Ram Piyari*, 32 All. 153. Where the Sessions Judge had directed certain property to be handed over to the Magistrate as unclaimed property, the High Court amended the order by directing that the Magistrate should dispose of the property according to law—*Abadi Begam v. Ali Husen*, 1897 A.W.N. 26. The Sessions Judge can amend the order of the Magistrate by directing a greater amount of property to be restored to the complainant than the amount restored by the Magistrate—*Gopi Nath v. Emp.*, 3 A.L.J. 770, 4 Cr.L.J. 370.

'Amendment' means amendment of the main order of the Court below; and the Appellate Court cannot make any amendment when there has not been an appeal against the main order of the lower Court. Thus, where the Magistrate in passing a judgment of acquittal has made some unfavourable remarks about the credibility of certain witnesses, it was held that the High Court could not amend the judgment by directing those remarks to be expunged from the judgment, when there has been no appeal to the High Court against the main order of acquittal—*Emp. v. Dunn*, 44 All 401 (405, 406), 20 A.L.J. 261, 23 Cr.L.J. 349. But this is no longer good law in view of sec 561A which empowers the High Court to pass any orders that may be just, and thus to expunge remarks from the lower Courts' judgments, irrespective of the fact whether there has been an appeal against the main order or not. See Note 1214 under sec. 439, and the report of the Joint Committee cited under sec. 561A. But the ruling in 44 All. 401 would apply to lower Appellate Courts, and those Courts would have no power to expunge remarks from the trial Court's judgment unless there be an appeal from the main order in the case.

1150. Incidental or consequential orders—(1) An order under sec 106 demanding security from the appellant is an incidental order. Sec 106 (3) gives the Appellate Court power to pass such order in appeal, even where the original Court was not competent to do so.

(2) An order under sec. 106 passed by the Original Court may be set aside in appeal, and the appellate order setting aside the order for security is an incidental order within the meaning of this section—*Abdul Wahed v. Amiran*, 30 Cal 101.

(3) On an appeal against an order binding over a person to keep the peace under sec. 107, the Appellate Court can reverse the order of security and order a retrial. The order of retrial is an incidental order under clause (d) of sec 423. It does not fall under clause (b) because the case is not one of 'appeal from conviction,' the person proceeded against under sec 107 not being a person convicted of any offence—*Bhagavat Singh v. Emp.*, 48 All 501, 24 A.L.J. 566, 27 Cr.L.J. 945.

(4) An order under sec 471 (1), directing the accused to be committed to a lunatic asylum, is clearly an order which the acquitting Court,

whether original or appellate, not only has the power to make, but is bound to make under sec. 423 (d)—8 Bur.L.T. 286, 16 Cr.L.J. 670, 30 I.C. 654

(5) An order under sec. 517, 520 or 522 of the Code is a consequential or incidental order within the meaning of this clause and can be passed by the Appellate Court—*Gourhari*, 29 Cal. 724; *Arunachala Thevan*, 46 Mad. 162 (164). Therefore an order in a case of criminal misappropriation, directing restoration of property which is found to have belonged to the complainant, is clearly a consequential or incidental order and one which is under the circumstances just and proper—*Gopi Nath v. Emp.*, 3 A.L.J. 770, 4 Cr.L.J. 370.

An order of the Appellate Court setting aside an order passed by the Lower Court under sec. 522, is an incidental order within the meaning of this clause—*Ujr v. Syed Ali*, 19 C.W.N. 990, 16 Cr.L.J. 607. See also *Gourhari*, 29 Cal. 724. Where the accused was convicted under secs. 352 and 448 I. P. C. and the convicting Magistrate passed an order under sec. 522 of this Code restoring possession of the property (which was the subject matter of the offence under sec. 448 I. P. C.) in the complainant, but the accused was afterwards acquitted on appeal, it was held that the Appellate Court had power, under section 423 (d) and sec. 522 read together, to order restitution of the property to the accused—*Manki v. Bhagwants*, 27 All. 415.

(6) Under this clause, the Appellate Court can exercise the powers conferred by sec. 562 of the Code—*Birch*, 24 All. 306. 'The Court before which he is convicted' in sec. 562 is not limited to the Court of first instance, but includes the Court of appeal—*Narayanaswami*, 29 Mad. 567. This is now expressly provided by sub-section (2) of section 562.

(7) An order by the Appellate Court directing the accused to pay the costs of the complainant under sec. 31 of the Court Fees Act (now 546A of this Code) is no part of the penalty or sentence passed in the case and therefore not an enhancement of sentence, but is an incidental order under this clause—*Emp. v. Karuppana*, 29 Mad. 188; *Thimiah v. K. E.*, 47 Mad. 914 (915). The contrary view taken in *Q. E. v. Tangavelu*, 22 Mad. 153, decided under the Code of 1882 which did not contain clause (d), is no longer correct.

(8) Where a case was tried by a Bench of Honorary Magistrates and the judgment was signed by one of them only, the District Magistrate on appeal, without in any way interfering with the judgment of the Bench of Magistrates, passed an order sending back the case so that the judgment might be signed by the other Magistrates, held that there was nothing wrong in the order of the District Magistrate. It was an incidental order under this clause—*Gopal Das*, 41 All. 217 (219).

Orders which cannot be passed :—The only consequential or incidental orders which fall within the purview of this clause are orders which follow as a matter of course being necessary complements to the main orders passed, without which the latter would be incomplete and ineffec-

tive (such as directions as to the refund of fines realised from acquitted appellants, or on the reversal of acquittals, any direction as to the restoration of compensation paid under sec. 250) for which no separate authority is needed—*Emp. v. Dunn*, 44 All. 401 (405). But an Appellate Court cannot award compensation under sec. 250, because such order is not a necessary complement of the main order of acquittal; only the Magistrate by whom the case is heard in the first instance can pass such order—*Balli Pande v. Chittan*, 28 All 625, *Mehi Singh v. Mangal*, 39 Cal. 157. An order of confiscation under the Indian Forests Act VII of 1878 cannot be regarded as an order incidental on a conviction under that Act, under sec. 54 of that Act, the confiscation is regarded as a punishment in addition to any other punishment prescribed for the offence. Therefore an Appellate Court cannot pass such order—*Ainuddi v Q E.*, 27 Cal. 450. The High Court cannot award the costs incurred in a revision petition filed against an order passed under Ch. XII—*Vcerappa v Avudayammal*, 48 Mad. 262. See this case cited in Note 478 under sec. 148.

1151. Sub-section (2):—Interference with verdict of jury :—The considerations governing an appeal from a trial held with the aid of assessors differ greatly from those governing an appeal from a trial by jury. In the latter case the appeal is restricted by the provisions of sec. 423 (2), whereas in the former case the whole case is before the Appellate Court—*Champa Pasin*, 29 Cr.L.J. 325 (329) (Pat). The High Court cannot alter or reverse the verdict of the jury unless it is of opinion that the verdict is erroneous owing to a misdirection by the Judge or to a misunderstanding on the part of the jury of the law as laid down by the Judge—*Bongiri Pattakadar*, 32 Mad. 179, *Emp v Smither*, 26 Mad. 1 (16), *Shambhu*, 10 Bom L.R. 565; *Waman*, 27 Bom 626. When the Court is of that opinion, it can reverse the verdict, but the power ought not to be exercised lightly, especially when the verdict is one of acquittal and unanimous—*Shambhu*, 10 Bom.L.R. 565. The High Court cannot, on an appeal from the unanimous verdict of the jury, interfere with it, in the absence of a misdirection by the Judge, when there is some circumstantial evidence of the guilt—46 Cal 635. Where there is evidence on the record to justify the jury's verdict, and the Judge's charge to the jury was fair and accurate, and the jury arrived at an eminently reasonable conclusion, the High Court will not interfere—*Babban*, 4 O W N 901, 28 Cr.L.J. 937.

If there has been no misdirection by the Sessions Judge nor a misunderstanding on the part of the jury of the law as laid down by him, the High Court cannot reverse the verdict, but if the High Court is of opinion that the accused should have been acquitted and the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, the High Court can direct a copy of its judgment together with a copy of the paper book to be sent to the Local Government for such action as the latter may like to make—*Ram Charitar*, ■ P.L.T. 691, 28 Cr L.J. 691 (697).

"Alter or reverse" :—The word 'reverse' evidently means to set aside, to make null, the word 'after' is intended to mean the substitution of a

finding of 'guilty' for 'not guilty' or *vice versa*. The verdict may be reversed i.e., set aside, or it may be altered, i.e., another finding may be substituted for that of the jury—*Smither*, 26 Mad. 1 (15).

'Erroneous':—To enable the Appellate Court to interfere with the verdict of the jury, the verdict must be erroneous. The High Court will not set aside the verdict, if it is not erroneous in spite of the misdirection—*Naimuddi*, 22 C.W.N. 572, 19 Cr.L.J. 649. The effect of this clause is to prevent the High Court from reversing the verdict of the jury, on account of any misdirection by the Judge or misunderstanding of the law by the jury, unless such misdirection or misunderstanding is on points material to the verdict, so that the verdict may be said to be tainted with error in the process in which it has been arrived at—*Wafadar v. Q. E.*, 21 Cal 955 (977). The word 'erroneous' is not to be read as meaning 'wrong on the facts'. It must be read in connection with the words that follow, as meaning that the verdict has been vitiated and rendered bad or defective by reason of misdirection or misunderstanding of the law—*Wafadar v. Q. E.*, 21 Cal 955 (977); *Waman*, 27 Bom 626, *Lalsingh*, *Ratanlal* 452 (454). It is the duty of the Appellate Court to ascertain whether the process or method which the Judge directed the jury to follow as to the acceptance or discarding of evidence, or as to the view taken of the law, was erroneous on any material point, but it is not the duty of the Appellate Court to determine for itself whether the verdict is a conclusion of fact was right or wrong. To hold the latter view, would be tantamount to hold that an appeal would lie upon the facts from the verdict of a jury, in the face of the provisions of sec. 418—*Wafadar v. Q. E.*, 21 Cal. 955 (977). When there is no error in matter of law, and there was some evidence to go to the jury, the High Court cannot interfere—*Choonsee*, 5 W.R. 13; *Jaspath v. Q. E.*, 14 Cal 164.

Misdirection:—See notes under sec. 297. Both secs. 423 (2) and 537 require that before the verdict can be set aside on the ground of misdirection, the Court must be satisfied that the misdirection is of such a nature that it may be reasonably supposed that the verdict was erroneous by reason of such misdirection, or in other words, there has been a failure of justice by reason of such misdirection—*Ali Fakir*, 25 Cal 230; *Biru Mandal v. Q. E.*, 25 Cal 561; *Shyam Sundar*, 26 C.W.N. 558. In determining whether the verdict ought to be set aside and a new trial granted, on the ground of a defective summing up of the evidence, the question to be considered is not whether upon a proper summing up of the whole evidence a jury might have given a different verdict, but whether the legitimate effect of the evidence would require a different verdict. If the evidence is such that the High Court would have affirmed the conviction if the trial had been before a Judge and assessors, instead of a trial by jury, the High Court ought not to set aside a verdict given by a jury merely because the Judge has not, in summing up, given a proper caution or advice to the jury as to the weight which they might properly give to the evidence—*Elahee Buksh*, 5 W.R. 80 (*per* Peacock C.J.); followed in *Jamiruddi*, 29 Cal. 782.

In order to set aside a verdict of the jury, it is not sufficient to say that the conviction would be a miscarriage of justice; the appellant must further establish that such failure of justice was the result of a misdirection of the Judge to the jury—*Champa Pasin*, 29 Cr.L.J. 325 (332) (Pat.)

Misunderstanding.—There must be misunderstanding by the jury of the law as laid down by the Judge, the verdict will not be set aside on the ground that the counsel for the accused (and not the jury) had misunderstood the expressions used by the Judge, specially when it appeared that the expression used by the Judge was perfectly intelligible and could not have the meaning suggested by the counsel for the accused—*Q E v Shib Chunder*, 10 Cal. 1079.

Verdict must be set aside in its entirety.—The term 'verdict' in this sub-section means a verdict on all the charges, and not merely the verdict upon each charge separately. Therefore if in a trial there are several charges in which there is an acquittal on some and a conviction on the other charges, and the verdict is found to be erroneous on appeal, the Appellate Court must set aside the verdict in its entirety. Where the Appellate Court in such a case reverses the verdict of the jury and orders a retrial, the retrial, unless the Appellate Court has limited the scope, must be taken to be one upon all the charges originally framed—*Krishna Dhan v. Q. E.*, 22 Cal. 377, *Jamiruddi*, 16 C.W.N. 909, 13 Cr.L.J. 715, *Bhola*, 1904 P.R. 12, 1 Cr.L.J. 942.

1152. Power of High Court after reversal of verdict.—Once the verdict of the jury is set aside under this sub-section there is no restriction on the power of the Appellate Court to deal with the case, of which it has complete seizin, in any of the manners provided in this section. Its power is not restricted to directing a retrial, and it may also reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused, or order him to be retried, or alter the finding and maintain the sentence, or, without altering the finding, reduce the sentence—*Taju Pramanik v. Q. E.*, 25 Cal. 711. Sub-section (2) contains no provision as to what the Court is to do, or has power to do, when it reverses or alters the verdict of the jury. To ascertain that, it is necessary to revert to the language of sub-section (1), and in it no distinction is made between the powers of an Appellate Court in a case tried by jury and in any other case. And so, after reversal of the verdict of the jury, in an appeal against an acquittal, the High Court may under clause (a) order further inquiry or retrial or commitment or may find the accused guilty and pass sentence on him according to law—*Emp. v. E. W. Smither*, 26 Mad. 1 (15).

Power to order retrial.—The High Court, on setting aside a verdict of the jury on the ground of irregularity, has jurisdiction to order a retrial—*Bani Madhab v. Emp.*, 46 Cal. 212. It is open to the High Court to order a new trial of the accused by a new jury, when it is found that the verdict of the jury is tainted with prejudice and is based on rumours as to the prisoner's previous conduct—*Anchula Nallacharla*, 2 Weir 384. But it is not always obligatory on the High Court to order a retrial, whatever may be its view as to the weight to be attached to the evidence.

that the power under sec. 423 is identical with the power under sec. 367, viz., the power of determining the facts or of ordering retrial—*Q. E. v. Ram Chandra*, 19 Bom. 749 (762), dissenting from 21 Cal. 955.

424. The rules contained in Chapter XXVI as to the judgment of a Criminal Court of original jurisdiction shall apply, so far as may be practicable, to the judgment of any Appellate Court other than a High Court:

Judgment of subordinate appellate Courts.

Provided that unless the Appellate Court otherwise directs, the accused shall not be brought up, or required to attend, to hear judgment delivered.

1153. Appellate judgment.—When an appeal is dismissed summarily under sec. 421, no judgment is required to be written. See Note 1132 under sec. 421.

But if the appeal is dismissed not summarily but under sec. 423, after notice given under sec. 422, the Court must deliver a judgment that would fulfil the conditions laid down in sec. 367. Omission to write a judgment is not an irregularity cured by sec. 537 (a) of the Code—*Devendra*, 17 Bom. L.R. 1085, 16 Cr. L.J. 832, 31 I.C. 1008.

Appellate Court.—Judges of Sind Judicial Commissioner's Court, sitting as Sessions Judges for the district of Karachi, should follow closely as possible the provisions of secs. 367 and 424. But the omission to do so cannot nullify the whole proceeding before the Sessions Court. The clause "so far as may be practicable" occurring in sec. 424 would certainly bring the error within the scope of sec. 537—*Fakir Bux v. Emp.*, 20 S.L.R. 261, 27 Cr. L.J. 833.

Contents of judgment.—The judgment must fulfil the requirements of sec. 367; that is, it must contain the point or points for determination raised by the memorandum of appeal, the decision thereon and the reasons for that decision—*Devendra*, supra; *Kalu Mirza*, 37 Cal. 91, *Jawam*, 8 N.L.R. 84, 13 Cr. L.J. 559. See Note 1051 under sec. 367, under heading "Appellate judgment." An appeal under sec. 476B must be dealt with as an ordinary appeal under secs. 424, and cannot be disposed of summarily without giving any reason. If it is so disposed of, the case will be remitted to the Appellate Judge so that he may rehear the appeal and write a judgment in accordance with law—*Hamid Ali v. Madhusudan*, 54 Cal. 355, 31 C.W.N. 281, A.L.R. 1927 Cal. 284 (285).

If the appellate judgment is not in accordance with law, the High Court may remand the appeal for rehearing and delivery of a proper judgment—*Bholanath v. Emp.*, 7 C.W.N. 30; *Ram Lal v. Haricharan*, 37 Cal. 194; *Chanda Singh*, 1913 P.R. 2, 13 Cr. L.J. 737; *Q. E. v. Gopala*, 1 Bom. L.R. 225.

It is improper for an Appellate Court to record in its judgment grave imputations on the motives of the trying Magistrate, when such imputations have no other foundation than suspicion. If the Appellate Magistrate considers that the trying Magistrate is actuated by improper considerations in the performance of his judicial functions, it is his duty to report his opinion to the District Magistrate, but any imputations ought not to find a place in the judgment—*Yacob*, 2 Weir 535.

425. (1) Whenever a case is decided on appeal by

Order by High Court
on appeal to be certi-
fied to lower Court.

the High Court under this Chapter,
it shall certify its judgment or order
to the Court by which the finding,

sentence or order appealed against was recorded or passed. If the finding, sentence or order was recorded or passed by a Magistrate other than the District Magistrate, the certificate shall be sent through the District Magistrate.

(2) The Court to which the High Court certifies its judgment or order shall thereupon make such orders as are conformable to the judgment or order of the High Court; and, if necessary, the record shall be amended in accordance therewith.

426. (1) Pending any appeal by a convicted person,

Suspension of sen-
tence pending appeal.
Release of appellant on
bail.

the Appellate Court may, for
reasons to be recorded by it in
writing, order that the execution of

the sentence or order appealed against be suspended, and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond.

(2) The power conferred by this section on an Appellate Court may be exercised also by the High Court in the case of any appeal by a convicted person to a Court subordinate thereto.

(3) When the appellant is ultimately sentenced to imprisonment, penal servitude or transportation, the time during which he is so released shall be excluded in computing the term for which he is so sentenced.

1154. 'Pending an appeal':—A sentence cannot be suspended until an appeal has been actually preferred and is pending. Where a Magistrate postponed the execution of the sentence for a stated period, at the request of the accused, to allow him to appeal, it was held that the suspension of the sentence was bad in law—*Kishen Soonder*, 12 W R. 47. A

sentence cannot be suspended in the absence of an appeal—*Anonymous*, 5 M.H.C.R. App. 1.

"Appellate Court":—The power conferred by this section to suspend the sentence can be exercised only by the Appellate Court—2 Weir 536. The sentence cannot be suspended by the Magistrate or Judge who passed it—*Kishen Soonder*, 12 W.R. 47; *Anonymous*, 4 M.H.C.R. App. 1. So also, a Sessions Judge has no power to suspend the execution of a sentence passed by a second Class Magistrate, because the appeal from that Magistrate will not lie to the Sessions Judge—*Govt Pleader v. Kodu Moidin*, 2 Weir 536.

Sentence.—An order of detention passed by a District Magistrate under sec. 10 of the Reformatory Schools Act (VII of 1897) is not a 'sentence' within the meaning of this section, nor is it a punishment enumerated in sec. 53 of the Penal Code. A Sessions Judge has therefore no power to suspend its operation under this section—*Krishna Pandaram*, 16 Cr.L.J. 134 (Mad).

Release on bail.—The Appellate Court can exercise the powers conferred by this section and release the accused on bail, whether the offence is bailable or not—*Anonymous*, 5 M.H.C.R. App. 1.

Exclusion of time.—It is only when the convicted person has been released (and not where his sentence has been illegally suspended) that the term during which the sentence is suspended shall be excluded in computing the sentence—*Kodu Moidin*, 2 Weir 536.

427. When an appeal is presented under section 417, the High Court may issue a

Arrest of accused in appeal from acquittal.

warrant directing that the accused be arrested and brought before it or any subordinate Court, and the Court before which he is brought may commit him to prison pending the disposal of the appeal, or admit him to bail.

428. (1) In dealing with any appeal under this

Appellate Court may take further evidence or direct it to be taken.

Chapter, the Appellate Court, if it thinks additional evidence to be necessary, shall record its reason, and may either take such evidence itself, or direct it to be taken by a Magistrate, or, when the Appellate Court is a High Court, by a Court of Session or a Magistrate.

(2) When the additional evidence is taken by the Court of Session or the Magistrate, it or he shall certify such evidence to the Appellate Court, and such Court shall thereupon proceed to dispose of the appeal.

(3) Unless the Appellate Court otherwise directs, the accused or his pleader shall be present when the additional evidence is taken; but such evidence shall not be taken in the presence of jurors or assessors.

(4) The taking of evidence under this section shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter XXV, as if it were an inquiry.

Powers of Civil and Criminal Courts compared :—A Civil Court has ordinarily no power to take evidence of its own motion; it has to decide the case on the evidence adduced by the parties. But a Criminal Court stands on a different footing. Section 540 enables the Magistrate at any stage of the inquiry or trial to examine any witness he may find necessary, in order to come to a proper conclusion. Section 428 also in general terms empowers the Appellate Court to take additional evidence—*Bhami Laxuman*, 1910 M.W.N. 819, 8 I.C. 145, 11 Cr.L.J. 511.

1155. Object and scope of section :—The object of this section is the prevention of a guilty man's escape through some careless or ignorant proceedings of a Magistrate, or the vindication of an innocent person wrongfully accused, where the Magistrate through the same carelessness or ignorance has omitted to record the circumstances essential to the elucidation of truth—*Wooday Chand*, 18 W.R. 31; *Akhtar v. K. E.*, 6 P.L.T. 431, 26 Cr.L.J. 1171, *Varadarajulu*, 42 Mad. 885 (892). The intention of the Legislature in enacting this section is to empower the Appellate Court to see that justice is done between the prosecutor and the person prosecuted, and if the Appellate Court finds that certain evidence is necessary in order to enable it to give a correct finding, it would be justified in taking action under this section—*Dalla v. Emp.*, 7 Lah. 148, 27 Cr.L.J. 463. But this section cannot be invoked to cure an illegality. Thus, where the Magistrate committed an illegality in procedure by not allowing the accused to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses, the Sessions Judge cannot remand the case to the Magistrate with a direction to allow the accused to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and to certify the additional evidence so taken by the Sessions Judge. The proper course for the Sessions Judge, is to set aside the conviction and order the Magistrate to commence from the stage when the illegality occurred or to hold a *de novo* trial—*Lakshman*, 53 Bom. 578, 1929 Cr. C. 130 (134).

The power under this section can be exercised only by the Appellate Court. A Sessions Judge or a District Magistrate not acting as an Appellate Court is not authorised to take additional evidence or order it to be taken—*Monti Mohan*, 6 C.L.J. 251. But the High Court acting as a Court of revision, under Sec. 439, has the power of an Appellate Court to direct evidence to be taken—*Ibid.* The power to take or call for additional evidence given by this section is expressly limited to appeals under this Chapter; see *Krishna*, 33 Mad. 90.

sentence cannot be suspended in the absence of an appeal—*Anonymous*, 5 M.H.C.R. App. 1.

"Appellate Court".—The power conferred by this section to suspend the sentence can be exercised only by the Appellate Court—2 Weir 536. The sentence cannot be suspended by the Magistrate or Judge who passed it—*Kishen Soonder*, 12 W.R. 47; *Anonymous*, 4 M.H.C.R. App. 1. So also, a Sessions Judge has no power to suspend the execution of a sentence passed by a second Class Magistrate, because the appeal from that Magistrate will not lie to the Sessions Judge—*Govt. Pleader v Kodu Moidin*, 2 Weir 536.

Sentence.—An order of detention passed by a District Magistrate under sec. 10 of the Reformatory Schools Act (VII of 1897) is not a 'sentence' within the meaning of this section, nor is it a punishment enumerated in sec. 53 of the Penal Code. A Sessions Judge has therefore no power to suspend its operation under this section—*Krishna Pandaram*, 16 Cr.L.J. 134 (Mad).

Release on bail.—The Appellate Court can exercise the powers conferred by this section and release the accused on bail, whether the offence is bailable or not—*Anonymous*, 5 M.H.C.R. App. 1.

Exclusion of time.—It is only when the convicted person has been released (and not where his sentence has been illegally suspended) that the term during which the sentence is suspended shall be excluded in computing the sentence—*Kodu Moidin*, 2 Weir 536.

427. When an appeal is presented under section

Arrest of accused in appeal from acquittal.

417, the High Court may issue a warrant directing that the accused be arrested and brought before it or any subordinate Court, and the Court before which he is brought may commit him to prison pending the disposal of the appeal, or admit him to bail.

428. (1) In dealing with any appeal under this

Appellate Court may take further evidence or direct it to be taken.

Chapter, the Appellate Court, if it thinks additional evidence to be necessary, shall record its reasons, and may either take such evidence itself, or direct it to be taken by a Magistrate, or, when the Appellate Court is a High Court, by a Court of Session or a Magistrate.

(2) When the additional evidence is taken by the Court of Session or the Magistrate, it or he shall certify such evidence to the Appellate Court, and such Court shall thereupon proceed to dispose of the appeal.

(3) Unless the Appellate Court otherwise directs, the accused or his pleader shall be present when the additional evidence is taken; but such evidence shall not be taken in the presence of jurors or assessors.

(4) The taking of evidence under this section shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter XXV, as if it were an inquiry.

Powers of Civil and Criminal Courts compared :—A Civil Court has ordinarily no power to take evidence of its own motion; it has to decide the case on the evidence adduced by the parties. But a Criminal Court stands on a different footing. Section 540 enables the Magistrate at any stage of the inquiry or trial to examine any witness he may find necessary, in order to come to a proper conclusion. Section 428 also in general terms empowers the Appellate Court to take additional evidence—*Bhami Laxuman*, 1910 M.W.N. 819, 8 I.C. 145, 11 Cr.L.J. 511.

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The power under this section can be exercised only by the Appellate Court. A Sessions Judge or a District Magistrate not acting as an Appellate Court is not authorised to take additional evidence or order it to be taken—*Moni Mohan*, 6 C.L.J. 251. But the High Court acting as a Court of revision, under Sec. 439, has the power of an Appellate Court to direct evidence to be taken—*Ibid*. The power to take or order additional evidence given by this section is expressly limited to cases under this Chapter, see *Krishna*, 33 Mad. 90.

A proceeding under section 125 is neither appellate nor revisional. consequently this section has no application to an order under section 125. Therefore, when a District Magistrate finds that an order directing the furnishing of security is irregular, he should set it aside; he has no jurisdiction to remand the case to the Magistrate for further evidence—*Nasiban*, 20 Cr.L.J. 221, 49 I.C. 221 (Pat).

Enquiry by Police :—This section does not warrant an Appellate Court sending a case to the Police for investigation, if it had been originally started by a complaint in Court—*Maheshri*, 1900 A.W.N. 130.

1156. When additional evidence may be taken and when not:—This section gives a discretion to the Appellate Court, and this discretion is not to be exercised against the accused and in favour of the prosecution, unless in exceptional cases and where the merits are clearly against the accused—*Varadarajulu*, 42 Mad 885 (892). An Appellate Court cannot decide whether it should exercise the discretion under this section unless it has heard the appeal on the merits. Specially in a case involving the consideration of a very difficult question (e.g. a case of sedition) it is almost impossible, before the appeal is heard on the merits, to hold any definite view as to the *prima facie* guilt of the accused or whether his guilt is grave enough to justify the view that it is desirable to allow additional evidence in order to prevent the offence from going unpunished—*Varadarajulu*, *supra*. Additional evidence may be taken under this section only if the Appellate Court thinks it to be *necessary*, and the necessity for taking such evidence must be apparent from something on the record and cannot be derived from external information—*Po Gyi*, 3 L.B.R. 114. The mere fact that some fresh evidence has been discovered after the filing of the appeal does not empower the Appellate Court to allow the fresh evidence to be adduced, unless the Court thinks it necessary—*Gurumurthi v. Read*, 11 M.L.T. 323, 12 Cr.L.J. 40. When the Original Court has taken all the evidence produced by the prosecution which had ample opportunities to do so, and that evidence has failed to sustain the charge, an Appellate Court will not, except in very exceptional circumstances, direct that additional evidence should be taken—*Fateh*, 5 All. 217. This section does not empower an Appellate Court to take additional evidence in a case where there is no evidence legally capable of sustaining the charge. But where the conviction by the lower Court has been based upon some *prima facie* evidence which might legally sustain the charge, but which in the opinion of the Appellate Court is not quite satisfactory, the Appellate Court may under this section direct additional evidence to be taken—*Wooday Chand*, 18 W.R. 31, 9 B.L.R. App 31. Where evidence which should not have been admitted was tendered by the prosecution, and was admitted by the Magistrate, the Appellate Court can discard that evidence, and supply the gap in the prosecution evidence by taking further evidence. Thus, where the report of an excise analyst to the effect that a certain bottle contained cocaine was improperly admitted by the Magistrate, the Sessions Judge on appeal may call in the excise analyst to have him examined as to the contents of the bottle—*Bansilal*, 52 Bom 686, 29

Cr.L.J. 990 (991). Where the Appellate Court thinks that the evidence of some more witnesses who were not examined in the Lower Court is necessary, it cannot order a retrial on that ground, but should proceed under this section by summoning and examining those witnesses—*Ishwar Prasad*, 16 A.L.J. 325, 19 Cr.L.J. 485, 45 I.C. 149; *Luchmun*, 31 Cal. 710 (713). Where the Lower Court has refused to examine certain important witnesses for the defence, and the accused has been prejudiced in his defence by such refusal, the Appellate Court may direct the Lower Court to take the evidence of such witnesses and to certify the same to it—*Virasami*, 19 Mad. 375; *Mahomed v. K. E.*, 3 P.L.J. 632, 19 Cr.L.J. 902. Similarly, where the prosecution was prepared to adduce evidence necessary to prove the offence, but the Magistrate intervened stating that such evidence was unnecessary, and refused to take it, the case was one in which the Appellate Court could properly call for fresh evidence under this section—*Jeremiah v. Vas*, 36 Mad. 457 (470), 22 M.L.J. 75, 12 Cr.L.J. 585. But this section does not apply where the prosecution having had ample opportunities to produce evidence has failed to do so—*Jeremiah v. Vas*, 36 Mad. 457 (467). In other words, this section cannot be utilised for excusing the negligence of the prosecution—*Varadarajulu*, 42 Mad. 885 (894). An Appellate Court can call for additional evidence by directing the Sessions Judge to bring upon his record the statements of witnesses as given in the Court of the committing Magistrate, under sec. 288, after giving notice to the accused—*Nagina*, 19 A.L.J. 947, 27 Cr.L.J. 813 (814). An Appellate Court can admit additional evidence in order to ascertain the value of statements made by a defence witness—*Subramania*, 53 M.L.J. 676, 30 Cr.L.J. 133 (134).

The Appellate Court may take additional evidence to supply a defect in formal proof (e.g., proof as to whether the sanction for prosecution required under sec. 196 was granted by the proper authority), when the conviction for a serious charge such as sedition, which is otherwise sustainable, is likely to be upset for want of such proof—*Varadarajulu Naidu*, 42 Mad. 885 (889).

Recording reason —Before taking additional evidence the Court must record its reason for so doing—*Varadarajulu Naidu*, 42 Mad. 885 (890). *Dulla v. Emp.*, 7 Lah. 148, 27 Cr.L.J. 463. But omission to do so is a mere irregularity curable by sec. 531—*Karnam*, 2 M.L.T. 406, 12 Cr.L.J. 240.

Revision of order allowing additional evidence —The powers of an Appellate Court to take additional evidence should not be unduly restricted. The scope of sec. 428 is *prima facie* not limited by any consideration save that the Appellate Court should be of opinion that additional evidence is necessary and should record its reasons. Accordingly, if any restriction is to be placed upon the power conferred on the Appellate Court by sec. 428, it certainly cannot be that negligence or inadvertence on the part of the prosecution is to be allowed to effect a miscarriage of justice; on the contrary, the enactment is directed to the attainment of justice.

even at a late stage of the proceedings by the introduction of further materials which the Court considers to be essential to a just decision of the case. Consequently the Court of Revision will not interfere with an order allowing additional evidence, even where the Court of Revision might itself, as an Appellate Court, have declined to admit such evidence. To justify interference, the Revision Court must be satisfied that the Appellate Court committed an error of law which has prejudiced the accused on the merits—*Akhtar v. Emp.*, 6 P.L.T. 431, 26 Cr.L.J. 1171.

1157. Procedure :—This section empowers an Appellate Court to merely call for additional evidence and not to call upon the Lower Court to give its finding upon such evidence. Where the Appellate Court calls for such finding of the Lower Court, the order of the Appellate Court will be set aside—*Karnam*, 12 Cr.L.J. 240, 9 M.L.T. 406, 10 I.C. 290, *Muthu Karappan v. Vellayya Kudumban*, 16 Cr.L.J. 79, 1914 M.W.N. 778, 26 I.C. 671. When the subordinate Court is directed to take additional evidence, it shall merely certify the evidence to the Appellate Court and is not entitled to give any finding on such evidence or to retry the case on such fresh evidence, such duty being left to the Appellate Court—*Anonymous*, 3 B.L.R. 62; and if the Magistrate gives any finding on such evidence, the Appellate Court cannot accept such finding but must form its own conclusion upon the evidence so taken—*Muthu Karappan v. Vellayya*, *supra*. But the Magistrate when taking additional evidence under this section can proceed under sec. 195 or 476, if he has reason to believe that any witness has given false evidence—*Bukhtear*, 15 W.R. 64. This section does not empower an Appellate Court to take evidence regarding the proceedings before a Magistrate, such as to examine the accused as to the truth of an allegation that the Magistrate had refused to examine some witnesses—*Subbaya*, 12 Mad. 451. After receiving the additional evidence, the Appellate Court can only try the case as an ordinary appeal, and has no power to enhance the punishment—*Anonymous*, 3 B.L.R. 62.

The accused persons were convicted by the trial Court without any examination under sec. 342, and the Appellate Court directed as follows :—“The Lower Court will examine the accused under sec. 342 and call upon them to adduce any defence evidence, if they choose to give any, and after examination of the defence witnesses, he will re-submit the record to this Court. The appeal will then be heard by me on the merits.” Held that the Appellate Judge’s procedure was erroneous. He appears to have followed the provision of the Civil P. Code rather than of the Crim. P. Code. He should have set aside the convictions and sentences and remanded the case to the first Court for that Court to deal with the case on the merits after compliance with sec. 342, as if it were before that Court again for the first time—*Md. Abdus Samad v. K. E.*, 40 C.L.J. 319, 26 Cr.L.J. 313.

This section does not provide that the accused should be re-examined under sec. 342 after evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution is taken on remand. The examination of the witnesses after remand may

be made even in the absence of the accused, and the provisions of sec. 342 do not apply to sec. 428—*Mohiuddin v. Emp.*, 4 Pat 488, 11 P.L.T. 151, 26 Cr.L.J. 811 (813); *Narayan v. Emp.*, 52 Bom. 699, 29 Cr.L.J. 972 (973).

1158. Power of Appellate Court after taking additional evidence:—The Appellate Court cannot consider and determine a new case disclosed by the additional evidence, except in so far as to affirm or modify or set aside the sentence under appeal or to act as otherwise provided by sec. 423 (b). An Appellate Court cannot under this section pass a fresh sentence, which may be subject to further appeal. Under the 1898 Code the Appellate Court is directed to dispose of the appeal finally and not to pass a new judgment, sentence, etc., (as under the old Code of 1861) which may be further appealed against—*Q E v Isahak*, 27 Cal 372 (overruling *Mohesh*, 2 W R 13)

The Appellate Court can re-hear the appeal after obtaining the additional evidence. Both under the Criminal Procedure Code and under sec. 107 of the Government of India Act of 1915, the High Court has full jurisdiction and power in criminal revision to direct the Lower Appellate Court to re-hear an appeal after obtaining additional evidence certified by the trial Court—*Mahomed v K E.*, 3 P L J 632, 19 Cr L J 902

1159. No further appeal —An appellant whose appeal is dismissed by an Appellate Court, after it has taken additional evidence under this section, has no further right of appeal. According to sec 430, except in certain cases, judgments and orders passed by an Appellate Court upon appeal are final—*Q E. v Isahak*, 27 Cal 372, *Porno*, 11 W R. 59, *Dhunobur*, 15 W.R 33. If additional evidence is taken, it does not entitle a party to appeal from a finding upon such evidence to the High Court upon the merits, treating it in substance as an original judgment—*Nantamram*, 6 B H C R. 64

1160. Sub-section (3) —Where the Appellate Court, acting under this section, directs the Sessions Judge to bring upon the record under sec 288 the statements of certain witnesses made in the Court of committing Magistrate, those statements cannot be properly brought on the record until notice is given to the accused that it is proposed to use those statements against him, and so it will be necessary for the Sessions Judge to take those proceedings in the presence of the accused or his pleader. This is provided for in clause (3) of this section—*Nagina*, 19 A L J 947, 27 Cr L.J 813 (815). Under this clause, a Court of Session is authorised to record the additional evidence in the absence of the jury or the assessors, and this is the only instance in which it can do so. But in no other cases can the presence of the jurors be dispensed with; and therefore, where in a trial for murder the Sessions Judge, relying on a statement made by the deceased, convicted the accused, and the necessary evidence to prove that statement was not recorded by the judge until after the assessors had been discharged, it was held that the error vitiated the trial and was not covered by the provisions of sec. 537—*Q E. v. Ram Lal*, 15 All 136.

429. When the Judges composing the Court of Appeal are equally divided in opinion, the case, with their opinions thereon, shall be laid before another Judge of the same Court, and such Judge, after such hearing (if any) as he thinks fit, shall deliver his opinion, and the judgment or order shall follow such opinion.

1161. Scope of section:—This section applies not only to appeals but to revision-proceedings as well. Therefore, if two learned Judges differ in a Criminal Revision case, section 439 read with sec 429 requires the case to be decided by a third Judge—*Dudikula Lalsahab*, 40 Mad. 976; *Sukdeo Narain*, 27 Cal 892 (at p. 910); *Pandita v. Rahim-ulla*, 27 Cal. 501 (at p. 505), *Ganguly v. Watson*, 53 Cal. 929. See sec. 439 (1).

The principle of this section applies also to a reference under sec 307. In case of difference between the Judges on a reference under sec. 307, the rule of this section is to be followed—*Q. E. v. Dada Ana*, 15 Bom 452

The third Judge to whom a case is referred cannot refer the case to a Full Bench. A Division Bench alone can do it; and a third Judge sitting singly is not a Division Bench—*Ishan Chandra v. Hridoy Krishna*, 29 C.W.N. 475 (483), 26 Cr L.J. 915

"Case"—Where upon a difference of opinion between two Judges, the case is laid before a third Judge, the whole case is referred to the third Judge and not merely the point or points on which the Judges differed, and it is the duty of the Judge to whom the case is referred, to consider all the points involved before he delivers his opinion, and it will be according to the opinion of such Judge that the judgment will follow—*Sarat Chandra*, 38 Cal. 202, *Ganguly v. Watson*, 53 Cal. 929, 27 Cr L.J. 1268 (1272). But in another case of the same High Court it has been held that the third Judge cannot differ from the referring Judges on a point on which both the referring Judges are agreed, unless there are strong grounds for doing so—*Venkataramnam v. Corporation of Calcutta*, 22 C.W.N. 745 (756), 19 Cr.L.J. 753. In other words, it lays down that the third Judge can consider only the points on which the referring Judges have disagreed, and not all the points. To remove this conflict of opinion it was proposed by the Select Committee of 1916 to add the following proviso to this section "Provided that, if either of the Judges composing the Court of appeal so require, the appeal shall be re-heard before them and another Judge or if the Chief Justice so directs, before three other Judges, and the judgment or order shall follow the opinion of the majority of the Judges so re-hearing the case." But the Joint Committee of 1923 deleted this proviso, as it was disapproved of by many Judges and also because the difficulty which the amendment intended to meet was of rare occurrence. A similar proviso was intended to be added to section 378 and it was omitted by the Joint Committee for the

same reason. See clauses 98 and 113 of the *Report of the Joint Committee of 1922*

But there can be no question that where there are two accused, and the Judges are agreed in opinion with regard to one of them but are divided in opinion as regards the other, the case which is laid before the third Judge is only the case of the prisoner with regard to whom the Judges are divided in opinion—*Sarat Chandra*, 38 Cal. 202, 15 C.W.N. 78, 11 Cr.L.J. 515.

430. Judgments and orders passed by an Appellate Court upon appeal shall be final, except in the cases provided for in section 417 and Chapter XXXII.

Finality of orders on appeal.

See 27 Cal. 372 and 6 B H C R 64 in Note 1159 under sec 428.

1162. A sentence is said to be final when it cannot be set aside or interfered with by any Court or authority, whether on appeal or otherwise—*Dular Dat v Nijabat*, 12 Cal. 536

Where the Sessions Judge rejected a criminal appeal on the ground that it was barred by limitation, the rejection was final and the Sessions Judge was not competent, on a later representation by the prisoner, to admit the appeal again—*Bhimappa*, 19 Bom 732, *Clegg*, 1887 P.R. 24. An order of summary rejection of an appeal is final; it is immaterial whether the order is passed before or after the papers are called for—*Emp v Mahomed Yashin*, 4 Bom 101. An order passed by a Sessions Judge declining to interfere with a sanction granted by the Lower Court is final and is not open to review or revision except in the manner laid down in Chapter XXXII—*Ganesh Ramkrishna*, 23 Bom 50. But an order rejecting an appeal summarily for non-appearance of the appellant is an improper order and it is open to the Court to rehear the appeal and deal with it—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 471, 7 M H C R App 29, *Kunhammad*, 46 Mad 382 (403); *Ratan Chand v Emp*, 5 N L J 76, 11 Cr L J 553.

431. Every appeal under section 417 shall finally

Abatement of appeals abate on the death of the accused, and every other appeal under this

Chapter (except an appeal from a sentence of fine) shall finally abate on the death of the appellant.

1163. The Code has made no provision for the continuance of the appeal by the heir or devisee or executor of the deceased convict or by any other person. The appeal abates on the appellant's death—*Dongaji*, 11 Bom 564, *Nabi Shah*, 19 Bom 714. But an exception is made as regards an appeal from a sentence of fine. "An appeal against a sentence of fine should not abate by reason of the death of the accused, because it is not a matter which affects his person, but one which affects his estate"—*Select Committee's Report* (1898). See also *Daulat Ram v.*

Crown, 20 Cr.L.J. 214, 1919 P.R. 8; *Nurudin*, 29 Bom L.R. 701, 28 Cr.L.J. 653 (655).

The principle of this section applies also to revisions; and therefore where a fine inflicted upon an accused was a heavy one and its recovery from the estate would entail hardship on the widow, it was held that the application for revision filed by the accused did not abate on his death as regards the sentence of fine; and the High Court in revision remitted the fine—*Daulat Ram v. Crown*, 1919 P.R. 8, 20 Cr.L.J. 214, 49 I.C. 744

Compensation awarded under section 250 is recoverable as if it were a fine, therefore an application for revision against an order of compensation does not abate on the death of the applicant, but can be prosecuted by his legal representatives—*Prem Singh v. Bhola*, 1908 P.R. 24.

CHAPTER XXXII.

OF REFERENCE AND REVISION.

432. A Presidency Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, refer for the opinion of the High Court any question of law which arises in the hearing of any case pending before him, or may give judgment in any such case subject to the decision of the High Court on such reference and, pending such decision, may either commit the accused to jail, or release him on bail to appear for judgment when called upon.

1164. This section empowers only a Presidency Magistrate to refer a question of law. No other Magistrate has power to make a reference. A District Magistrate cannot refer; he can only bring a case before the High Court by way of revision—*Bakul*, 9 Cr.L.J. 248, 1 S.L.R. 4; *Rahimuddin*, 22 S.L.R. 201, 28 Cr.L.J. 978 (979). A Sessions Judge has no power to refer a case to the High Court on a point arising in an appeal pending before him—*Mohan Lal*, 13 A.L.J. 477, 16 Cr.L.J. 433, 29 I.C. 65.

Under this section there can be a reference to the High Court only on a question of law, and not on a question of fact—*Sheikh Ibrahim*, Ratanlal 838, *Taja*, Ratanlal 539. And the High Court, upon a reference under this section, can deal only with the particular points of law referred to it; it cannot deal with the facts of the case, nor any other objection against the proceeding of the Court of the Presidency Magistrate—*Molla Fuzla Karim*, 33 Cal. 193.

The Magistrate can refer a question which has arisen 'in the hearing of the case'; he cannot make a reference on a question of law where the accused has been merely placed before him and the hearing of the case has not begun—*Q. E. v. Nanu*, 1 Bom.L.R. 521

433. (1) When a question has been so referred, the High Court shall pass such order thereon as it thinks fit, and shall cause a copy of such order to be sent to the Magistrate by whom the reference was made, who shall dispose of the case conformably to the said order.

(2) The High Court may direct by whom the costs of such reference shall be paid.

Direction as to costs.

1165. On a reference by a Presidency Magistrate to the High Court as to whether on the facts stated any offence has been committed by an accused person, the prosecution has to make out that the accused has committed the offence, and therefore the counsel for the prosecution has the right to begin—*Q. E. v. Haradhan*, 19 Cal 380 (385).

The High Court sitting in appeal cannot review an order passed by it under this section—*Canji, Ratanlal* 638

434. (1) When any person has, in a trial before a Judge of a High Court consisting of more Judges than one and acting in the exercise of its original criminal jurisdiction, been convicted of an offence, the Judge, if he thinks fit, may reserve and refer for the decision of a Court consisting of two or more Judges of such Court any question of law which has arisen in the course of the trial of such person, and the determination of which would affect the event of the trial.

(2) If the Judge reserves any such question, the person convicted shall, pending the decision thereon, be remanded to jail, or, if the Judge thinks fit, be admitted to bail; and the High Court shall have power to review the case, or such part of it as may be necessary, and finally determine such question, and thereupon to alter the sentence passed by the Court of original juris-

Procedure when question reserved.

diction, and to pass such judgment or order as the High Court thinks fit.

1166. Reference discretionary :—The words 'may reserve and refer' show that it is in the discretion of the single Judge whether or not he will reserve a point of law for the opinion of the High Court consisting of two or more Judges—*Pestonji*, 10 B.H.C.R. 75; and this discretion of the single Judge is not reviewable under clause 26 of the Letters Patent—*Ibid*.

*When reference can be made :—*A reference can be made when the point of law has arisen in the course of the trial; where a point is raised before the accused is called upon to plead, it cannot be referred to the Full Bench, because the point cannot be said to have arisen in the course of the trial—*Q. E. v. Dolegobind*, 28 Cal 211.

*Right to begin .—*Where, on the application of the prisoner's counsel, a question of law has been reserved for the decision of the Court under this section, the counsel for the prisoner has the right to begin—*Q E v Appa Subhana*, 8 Bom. 200.

1167. Sub-section (2) :—*High Court's power to review the case :—*The High Court in considering a point of law reserved under this section can review the whole case, if it is of opinion that any evidence has been improperly admitted or rejected, and can affirm or quash the conviction—*Q. v. Hurribole*, 1 Cal. 207; *Naoroji Dadabhai*, 9 B.H.C.R. 358; *Q E v. O'Lara*, 17 Cal. 642; *Patrick McGuire*, 4 C.W.N. 433; *Imp v Pitambar*, 2 Bom 61, *Emp. v. Narayan*, 32 Bom. 111, *Falch Chand*, 44 Cal 477

This is the only section which enables the Division or Full Bench of the High Court to review the judgment of a single Judge exercising original criminal jurisdiction. The powers of a single Judge in a matter with which he has jurisdiction to deal are the powers of the Court and cannot be in any way controlled (except as under this section) by a Division or Full Bench of the Court. As no appeal lies, no revision lies—*Hale*, 1903 P.R. 1, 9 Cr.L.J. 306, 1 I.C. 506. In the absence of any reservation of a question of law by the trying judge, the High Court is precluded from re-opening a question which has been decided by the single Judge presiding at the trial—*Emp. v. Narayan*, 32 Bom. 111.

The High Court can review the judgment or order of a Judge passed in the exercise of his original jurisdiction. A Division Bench of the High Court has no power to alter or review the order of a High Court pronounced in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction—*Durga Charan*, 7 All. 672; *Fox*, 10 Bom. 176; *Godai*, 5 W.R. 61; *Ganesh Ramkrishna*, 23 Bom 50; *Emp. v. Nagangowda*, 111 Bom.L.R. 695.

The Code does not make any provision for reviewing the judgment of subordinate Courts. The High Court can only revise such judgment under the ample powers conferred by section 439—*Bhimappa*, 19 Bom 732.

435. (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge or District Magistrate or any Sub-divisional Magistrate empowered by the Local Government in this

Power to call for records of inferior Courts.

behalf may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within the local limits of its or his jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence be suspended and, if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record.

Explanation.—All Magistrates, whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this subsection and of section 437.

(2) If any Sub-divisional Magistrate acting under sub-section (1) considers that any such finding, sentence or order is illegal or improper, or that any such proceedings are irregular, he shall forward the record, with such remarks thereon as he thinks fit, to the District Magistrate.

(3) Omitted.

(4) If an application under this section has been made either to the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate, no further application shall be entertained by the other of them.

Change —The italicised words at the end of sub-section (1) and the Explanation have been added, and sub-section (3) has been omitted, by sec 116 of the Crim Pro Code Amendment Act XVIII of 1923 Sub-section (3) stood as follows —

“(3) Orders made under sections 143 and 144 and proceedings under Chapter XII and section 176 are not proceedings within the meaning of this section.”

The grounds for the omission of sub-section (3) have been thus stated by Dr. Gour “The intention of this amendment is to preserve to the High Courts revisional jurisdiction in cases disposed of under sections 144, 145, etc. Honourable Members are aware that not only the

Chartered High Courts but all the non-chartered High Courts such as the Chief Courts and the Courts of the Judicial Commissioners do, under various local Acts, possess a statutory power of revision in such cases. Now, sir, I ask the House a simple question. If it is a fact that all the Courts, chartered and non-chartered, possess this power, then I say clause (3) of section 435 is superfluous, nay misleading. If it is a fact that they do not possess that power, in that case I ask the House to endorse my opinion that this power is both salutary and necessary. It will not be denied that this power has in fact been exercised under section 107 of the Government of India Act and other Local Acts. If so, this clause conflicts with the express provisions of section 107 of the Government of India Act. It creates utter confusion. If the High Courts have power under section 107 of the Government of India Act to exercise the general power of superintendence over the Subordinate Courts, what object is served by inserting this clause that orders under sections 143, 144 and 145 shall not be open to revision under section 435? I have therefore confidence that this House will vote for my amendment and place the powers of all the High Courts beyond any shadow of doubt, and I hope that the Government out of sheer consistency will accept my amendment.—*Legislative Assembly Debates*, 8th February 1923, pages 2076—2077.

By reason of the omission of this sub-section, the above orders and proceedings are now subject to revision under this Code. See notes under secs. 143, 144, 145—148, and 176.

Object :—The object of this revisional legislation is to confer upon superior Criminal Courts a kind of paternal or supervisory jurisdiction, in order to correct miscarriage of justice arising from misconception of law, irregularity of procedure, neglect of proper precautions or apparent harshness of treatment, which has resulted on the one hand in some injury to the due maintenance of law and order, or on the other hand in some undeserved hardship to individuals—*Nasrullah*, 29 Cr.L.J. 446 (447) (All.) The Courts enumerated in this section have power to call for the records of subordinate Courts for the purpose of satisfying themselves as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the orders passed by the lower Courts. The object of the legislature in this section is to set right some patent defect or error. In the absence of some well founded suspicion it is inexpedient for the High Court to scrutinise orders of discharge or other orders passed by the lower Courts which upon the face of them bear token of careful consideration and appear good and lawful. This section does not give the High Court a roving commission either in the direction of stamping with approval the proceedings of a Lower Court or in the direction of questioning about and looking to see if possibly under a fair review there lies some trace of possible error—*Rimp. v. D.* A.W.N.

1168. 7

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seek his remedy before the lower tribunal and not in the High Court direct. In the matter of applications in criminal revision to the High Court, it is a recognised rule of practice that a previous application to the Lower Court (District Magistrate or Sessions Judge) should be considered an essential step in the procedure, irrespective of whether such lower Court has or has not power to grant the relief claimed; and that failure on the part of the applicant to submit his application to the Lower Court will operate as a bar to the application being entertained by the High Court—*Sheriff Ahmed v. Qabul*, 43 All 497, 22 Cr.L.J. 715; *Q. E. v. Reolah*, 14 Cal. 887; *Emp v. Abdus Sobhan*, 36 Cal. 643; *Rash Behari v. Phani Bhushan*, 48 Cal. 534; *Abdul Mallab v. Nanda Lal*, 50 Cal. 423; *Chagan Dayaram*, 14 Bom. 331; *Jadunandan v. Sheopahal*, 27 A.L.J. 514; *Mansur v. Emp.*, 41 All. 587 (591); *Gullay v. Bakar*, 28 All. 268; *Shafagat v. Wali Ahmed*, 30 All. 116; *Bepin Bihari*, 3 P.L.J. 302, *Md. Ishaq*, 28 Cr.L.J. 815 (Lah.), *Gopabandhu v. Venkatesam*, (1923) M.W.N. 837, 18 L.W. 651; *Sat Narain v. Emp.*, 25 O.C. 37. A person invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is bound, according to the rules of that Court, to apply first to the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate. If the latter considers that a case for revision is made out, he reports the matter to the High Court under section 438, with a view to the High Court exercising its revisional powers under sec. 439. If the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate considers that the application should not be entertained, he rejects it, leaving the aggrieved party to apply to the High Court direct—*Abdulwahid v. Abdullah*, 45 All. 656 (661, 662). Thus, where the District Magistrate dismisses a complaint under the provisions of sec. 203, the High Court will not entertain an application by the complainant asking for further inquiry under sec. 436, when no application for that object has been made to the Sessions Judge—*Gullay v. Bakar*, 28 All. 268. But when an application to the High Court for revision has already been heard and the rule granted, the High Court will not afterwards discharge the Rule on the ground that the petitioner ought to have moved the Sessions Court in the first instance, but will proceed to dispose of the Rule on the merits—*Abdul Mallab v. Nanda Lal*, 50 Cal. 423. So also, the High Court will not allow a point to be raised for the first time before it, when such point was not taken by the petitioner in his revision application presented to the Sessions Judge—*Emp v. Bhure Mal*, 45 All. 526 (528). The object of requiring an application for revision to be presented first to the District Magistrate or Sessions Judge, is firstly to prevent the time of the High Court from being wasted over frivolous and unsustainable applications; and secondly, the High Court in dealing with the matter may have before it an expression of opinion by a Court of superior jurisdiction such as that of the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate, in case the matter should eventually come to the High Court—*Emp v. Mansur*, 41 All. 587 (591), *Sukhraj v. Emp.*, 28 Cr.L.J. 475 (All.), *Bhure Mal*, supra.

Where the petitioners filed an appeal to the District Magistrate, who was sitting as a Court of Appeal, and the appeal having been dismissed,

they moved the High Court in revision, held that although it might have been better if the petitioners had followed the usual rule of practice and moved the Sessions Judge before coming to the High Court, still the High Court entertained the revision petition—*Muhammad Ishaq*, 28 Cr.L.J. 815 (Lah.), *Emp v. Mansur*, 41 All 587 (592). In spite of the above rule of practice, it is competent to the High Court in the exercise of its discretion to entertain an application for revision, even though no petition has been made to the Sessions Judge, and if the High Court admits the application for revision (even though *ex parte*), it is not open to any party to call it in question—*Emp v. Mansur*, supra. But in *Sukhra v. Emp*, 28 Cr.L.J. 475 (All.), where there was an appeal to the District Magistrate, and the appeal having been dismissed, the accused applied to the High Court in revision, it was held that the applicant not having made a previous application for revision to the Sessions Judge, the revision petition to the High Court must be dismissed.

1169. Call for record :—The powers of a Sessions Judge to call for and examine the records under this section are powers which can be exercised at all times—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 538. Records may be called for even after the prisoner has served out his sentence—*Q. E. v. Sinha*, 7 All. 135. Even after the death of the prisoner pending an appeal before the Lower Appellate Court, the High Court has the right to call for the records and make such order thereon as it may deem to be due to justice—*Dongaji*, 2 Bom. 564. When records are called for under this section, the inferior Courts must forward the original records, and not merely copies thereof—*Padmanabha*, Ratanlal 128.

When an order is made by the District Magistrate under this section calling for the records and proceedings pending before a Magistrate with a view to withdrawing the case and transferring it to another Magistrate, the jurisdiction of the former Magistrate is suspended, and he is not therefore entitled to proceed any further in the case, e.g., to allow composition and to acquit the accused under sec. 345, even though the case may not have been actually transferred to some other Magistrate—*In re Maruti*, 49 Bom 533, 26 Cr L.J. 996.

"Any proceeding"—Under the Code of 1872 the words were 'judicial proceedings' and the High Court could call and examine the records of a judicial proceeding only; but now the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceeding e.g., an order by a Magistrate under section 517—*Gangamma*, 2 Weir 538 (539).

It is competent to the High Court to call for the record of any proceeding of an inferior Criminal Court and revise the same, whether it is of a preliminary or final nature—*Jagan Singh*, 1892 A.W.N. 102. Hence, where the District Magistrate passed a preliminary order calling upon a witness who gave evidence before him to show cause why he should not be prosecuted for perjury, the High Court was competent to revise the order—*T. N. Chadha*, 14 A.L.J.—851, 18 Cr.L.J. 46.

1170. Power of revision after prior refusal :—An accused person has no right to come in revision more than once. Where his first application for revision has failed, the Court has a discretionary power not to entertain a second application at all, based on the same point as the first—*Emp. v. Kohna Ram*, 45 All. 11 (12). When a Magistrate has already dealt with a case in revision and decided that there was no cause for interference, he cannot subsequently direct further inquiry, because such an order would be one reviewing the prior order and is prohibited by sec. 369—*Nga Than*, 5 Bur L.T. 37, 13 Cr.L.J. 301. Once a criminal revision case has been dismissed by the High Court for default of payment of printing charges, it is a final disposal and it is not competent to the High Court to rehear the case or entertain a fresh application for revision, because there can be no review of the prior order of dismissal—*Appayya v Venkatappayya*, 44 M.L.J. 27, 23 Cr.L.J. 746, A.L.R. 1923 Mad. 276. So also, if a revision petition is dismissed for default of appearance of the pleader who filed it, the High Court is not competent to restore to its file such a petition—*In re Ranga Rao*, 23 M.L.J. 371, 13 Cr.L.J. 710. But the Calcutta High Court holds that there being no provision in the Code for dismissing a revision petition for default of appearance, the order of dismissal is no 'judgment' at all within the meaning of sec. 369 and the High Court is not debarred from rehearing the revision petition—*Rajjabali v Emp.*, 46 Cal 60, 20 Cr.L.J. 265.

The Allahabad High Court has laid down that if a matter has once come before the High Court in revision not on the application of the accused but on the motion of the Sessions Judge who has referred the matter to the High Court, and the High Court looks into the matter and comes to the conclusion that there is no ground for revision, the accused is not thereby deprived of his right to apply to the High Court in revision—*Emp. v. Kohna Ram*, 45 All. 11 (12), 20 A.L.J. 775, 23 Cr.L.J. 496. The Burma Chief Court likewise holds that where a Sessions Judge of his own motion called for proceedings in which a Magistrate had discharged certain accused persons, but finding on record no cause of interference returned the proceedings to the Magistrate without taking further action, and where subsequently the complainant applied to him to have the case re-opened, it was held that the mere fact that the Judge had declined to interfere *suo motu* on a prior occasion did not preclude him from hearing the complainant, and, if the arguments led him to do so, from altering his view—*Tun Myaing v Kauk San*, 8 Bur L.T. 243, 16 Cr.L.J. 711, 30 I.C. 999.

1171. Inferior Criminal Court :—*Inferior.*—The term 'inferior' must be construed to mean 'judicially inferior,' i.e., a Court over which the Court proceeding under sec. 435 has appellate jurisdiction—*Nobin v. Russick*, 10 Cal 268. 'Inferior' means one who is statutorily incompetent to hold or exercise equal powers; it carries with it the idea of subordination which means 'inferiority in rank'—*Pirya Gopal*, 2 Bom. 100 (103). The term 'inferior' in this section includes the

term 'subordinate' as used in section 436. The reason for the employment of the term 'inferior' in Sections 435 and 437 is that in both these sections the Court of Session and the District Magistrates are combined, and the Magistrates other than the District Magistrate though subordinate to him are not directly subordinate to the Court of Session. It was therefore necessary to employ a term applicable to the relation of the Magistracy both to the supervising authority and to the appellate tribunal—*In re Padmanabha*, 8 Mad 18.

The District Magistrate is competent under this section to call for and deal with the record of any proceeding before any Magistrate of whatever class in his own district—*Opendra v. Dukhni*, 12 Cal 473 (F.B.). A first class Magistrate is subordinate to the District Magistrate for the purposes of this section—*Waryam v. Amur*, 1894 P.R. 10, Q.E. v. *Laskari*, 7 All. 853 (F.B.); *Indar Singh*, 30 Cr.L.J. 490, 30 P.L.R. 448. The District Magistrate can call for and examine the record of any first class Magistrate within the district even though the latter has been appointed as an Additional District Magistrate—*Abdul Karim*, 1908 P.R. 25. In *Nawab Ali*, 12 Bur.L.T. 56, 51 I.C. 478, 20 Cr.L.J. 494, it was held that a District Magistrate could not call for the record of any proceeding before an Additional District Magistrate. But under the new sub-section (3) of section 10 the Additional District Magistrate is deemed to be inferior to the District Magistrate.

A District Magistrate is not competent to refer the proceedings of a superior Court (Sessions Court) to the High Court—*Emp. v. Lobo*, 41 Bom. 47; *Baldeo Prasad*, 46 All. 851 (855); *Emp. v. Jamnabai*, 28 All. 91; *Emp. v. Ganga*, 38 All. 378; *Zor Singh*, 10 All. 148; *Sher Singh*, 9 All. 362; *Hiraman v. Ram Kumar*, 18 Cal. 186; *Karamdi*, 23 Cal. 280; *Mahabirpur*, 2 N.L.R. 149; *Emp. v. Daulat*, 24 A.L.J. 224, 27 Cr.L.J. 327. If, therefore, the District Magistrate considers that there has been a miscarriage of justice in the Sessions Court, he should ask the Public Prosecutor to move the High Court—*Q.E. v. Sher Singh*, 9 All. 362; *Q.E. v. Pirithi*, 12 All. 434; *Shah Nawaz*, 1 S.L.R. 40, 8 Cr.L.J. 161; *Angamuthu v. Vanathrian*, 23 M.L.J. 732, 13 Cr.L.J. 712; *Mahabirpur*, 2 N.L.R. 149; *Emp. v. Krishnaji*, 6 Bom.L.R. 1099. See Note 1199 under sec. 438.

As a Court of revision, the District Magistrate is not inferior to the Sessions Judge. But where he passes an order as a Court of original jurisdiction, he is inferior to the Sessions Judge—*Emperor v. Balwant*, 24 Cr.L.J. 616 (Oudh); *Harkaran v. Harnam*, 17 Cr.L.J. 223, 19 Q.C. 108; *Opendra v. Dukhni*, 12 Cal. 473; *Najib Khan*, 1889 A.W.N. 101. This is now made clear by the Explanation newly added. Even a District Magistrate empowered under sec. 30 is also inferior to the Sessions Judge—*Jalloo v. Crown*, 1904 P.R. 15. The Explanation further makes it clear that "for the purposes of this section a Magistrate exercising appellate jurisdiction is inferior to the Court of Session. The point was previously open to doubt"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914). The District Magistrate sitting as a Court of appeal is an inferior Criminal Court to the

Sessions Judge and the latter can refer an appellate judgment of the former to the High Court—*Kallu v. Crown*, 3 Lah. 23, 23 Cr.L.J. 577; *Darbari v. Emp.*, 23 A.L.J. 894, 26 Cr.L.J. 1282; *Emp. v. Mansur*, 41 All. 587 (591).

The Court of a Presidency Magistrate is an inferior Criminal Court in respect of the High Court, and the High Court can call for the proceeding of such Court—*Malik Pratap v. Khan Mahmed*, 36 Cal. 994 (997); *Charoobala v. Barendra*, 27 Cal. 126 (129). A Municipal Magistrate appointed to deal with offences against the Calcutta Municipal Act is an inferior Court in respect of the High Court—*Ram Gopal v. Corporation of Calcutta*, 52 Cal. 962, 29 C.W.N. 898, 26 Cr.L.J. 1533.

A single Judge of the High Court acting in the exercise of original criminal jurisdiction is not inferior to the Division or Full Bench of the High Court for the purposes of this section—*Press v. K. E.*, 1909 P.R. 4, 11 Cr.L.J. 378, 1 I.C. 747, but he may be so only for the purposes of sec 434. See notes under sec 434.

'Criminal Court'—The High Court, etc., cannot under the provisions of this section, revise an order passed by any Court other than a Criminal Court. A Magistrate hearing an appeal under sec 86 of the Bombay District Municipalities Act is not a Criminal Court within the meaning of this section—*In re Dalsakhram*, 9 Bom L.R. 1347. A Collector acting in butwara proceedings and fining a Mukhtar for making false statements in the course of such proceedings, is not a criminal Court, and is not subject to the criminal revisional jurisdiction of the High Court—*Dianut Hosein*, 10 C.L.R. 14. A Magistrate purporting to act as a Revenue Court is not a criminal Court, and his order cannot be revised by the District Magistrate—*Lachhman*, 11 O.W.N. 953, 1930 Cr. C 154 (156). A Magistrate acting under section 3 of the E. B. & Assam Disorderly Houses Act is a Criminal Court within the meaning of this section, and the High Court has jurisdiction to revise an order passed under that Act—*Rajani Khemlawa v. Pramatha*, 37 Cal 287 (291). The Secretary to the Government of Bengal issuing a warrant under the Goondas Act (Beng. Act I of 1923) as such Secretary is not an officer or Court possessing criminal jurisdiction, and is not an inferior Criminal Court within the meaning of sec 435 of this Code, although under sec 4 (2) of the Goondas Act he is given all the powers of a Presidency Magistrate; therefore the High Court cannot interfere, under sec 439, in the matter of the warrant issued by him—*Bhimraj Benia v. Emperor*, 51 Cal 460 (467, 468), 26 Cr.L.J. 20, A.I.R. 1924 Cal 698. The term 'inferior Criminal Court' in this section does not include a Civil or Revenue Court exercising its powers under sec 476. See Note 1254 under sec 476.

In a Bombay case it has been said that even though the proceedings are of a civil nature, still if they are held in a criminal court, they are subject to revision under sec 435 (e.g. proceedings of a Magistrate under sec 2 of the Workmen's Breach of Contract Act, or under sec. 458 of this Code). The test is not the nature of the proceeding held by the Court,

but the nature of the Court in which that proceeding is held—*Emp v. Devappa*, 43 Bom. 607 (609).

1172. Orders which are not open to revision:—The proceedings which are open to revision are the proceedings of a Court. Therefore executive orders are not liable to revision under this section. Thus—

(1) The High Court cannot, as a Court of revision, interfere with an extra judicial order passed by a Magistrate—*Shere Ali*, 1883 A W N 25

(2) The order of a Magistrate directing the observance of Municipal Bye-laws, and prohibiting the slaughter of votive animals in private houses, is not revisable by the High Court—*Abdullah v. Nanak Chand*, 1885 A W N. 258

(3) The High Court will decline to interfere in revision with an order passed by a District Magistrate whereby he prohibited certain petition writers to carry on their business within the precincts of the District Court—*Sukhdeo Prasad*, 1902 A W N. 175.

(4) An administrative circular issued by a District Magistrate prohibiting uncertificated pleaders from practising in the Criminal Courts in his district, is not open to revision by the High Court. The proper course for the pleader who has been refused appearance in a particular case by a Magistrate in pursuance of such circular, is to apply for revision of the illegal or improper order of the Magistrate refusing to allow him to appear—*Chinnasami v Emp*, 19 M L.J. 566, 4 I.C. 876, 11 Cr.L.J. 69.

(5) Proceedings under the Legal Practitioners Act are neither civil nor criminal, and therefore an order passed under sec 76 of that Act declaring a person to be a tout can not be revised by the High Court either under sec. 439 Cr. P. Code or under sec 115 C. P. Code, but may be revised by virtue of the wide powers of superintendence under sec. 13 of the Punjab Courts Act or sec 15 of the High Courts Act—*Man Singh v. Emp.*, 1909 P.R 11, 3 I.C 977, *In re Kedar Nath*, 11 A L J 22, 11 Cr.L.J 22, 1 I.C 143 (144).

(6) An order passed by a Magistrate under sec. 3 of the Sind Frontier Regulation (V of 1872) is an executive order, and not open to revision by the High Court—*Jaro*, 5 S L.R. 54, 12 Cr.L.J 558, 12 I.C. 646. But an order under sec. 23 of the Sind Frontier Regulation (III of 1892) declaring the forfeiture of a bond entered into by a person under secs 20 and 21 of the Regulation, is revisable by the High Court under sec. 435 Cr. P. Code as the order is a judicial order virtually passed under sec 514 of this Code—*Imambux*, 7 S L R 194, 15 Cr L J 544 (545).

(7) An order passed by a Magistrate under sec 41 of the Bombay District Police Act (IV of 1890) is an executive order, and the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere—*Satan v. Crown*, 15 S.L.R. 126, 23 Cr.L.J. 39, A.I R. 1922 Sind 21. So also, an order passed by a District Magistrate under sec. 44 of the Bombay District Police Act is not a judicial order, but a mere executive order made by him as the head of the Police, and not revisable by the High Court under the present section—*Pandurang*.

12 Bom. L R. 1029, ■ I.C. 747, 11 Cr.L.J. 705. So again, the High Court has no power to interfere with the District Magistrate's order duly made under sec. 43 of the Bombay District Police Act—*Kaji Sultan*, Ratanlal 540; nor can the Court of Session call for the records of proceedings taken by a Magistrate under sec. 46 of that Act—*In re Haibati*, Ratanlal 692.

(8) An order passed by the Collector under the Bengal Alluvial Lands Act (V of 1920) directing that certain huts erected on a disputed *char* should be sold and the sale proceeds credited to the Treasury, is not a judicial order but an executive one, and not subject to revision by the Criminal Bench of the High Court—*Osman v Kader*, 33 C W.N. 836, 1929 Cr. C. 480

(9) A Magistrate's order under sec 17 of the Police Act (V of 1861) appointing certain persons as special constables is an order of an executive nature and not an order made in a criminal proceeding, and cannot be made the subject of revision under this section—*Parmeshar*, 20 O C 229, 18 Cr.L J. 900 (901)

(10) An order by a District Magistrate for execution of a warrant issued by a Political Agent under sec 7 of the Extradition Act—*Gulli Sahu v. Emp*, 42 Cal 793 (798, 799)

See also Note 1207 under sec 439

1173. Orders which are open to revision :—The following orders being judicial orders, are open to revision .—

(1) An order passed by a Magistrate under sec 449 of the Calcutta Municipal Act—*Abdul Samad v. Corporation of Calcutta*, 33 Cal 287; *Chuni Lal v. Corporation of Calcutta*, 34 Cal. 341

(2) The proceedings of a Magistrate under sec. 113 of the Railways Act (IX of 1890)—*Grey v. N. W. My.*, 1891 P.R 13

(3) An order by a Magistrate under E. B. and Assam Disorderly Houses Act—*Rajani v Pramatha*, 37 Cal 287.

(4) An order made by a District Judge under sec 58 of the Forest Act (VII of 1878) on appeal from the order of a Magistrate passed under sec 54 of that Act—*Nathu Khan*, 4 All 417 (419)

(5) An order purporting to have been made under sec 283 of the Cantonment Code (1899)—*Mangi Ram v Emp.*, 1909 P R 9, 4 I C 611, 11 Cr L J 17

(6) An order passed by a Magistrate under sec 161 (2) of the Bombay District Municipalities Act (III of 1901)—*In re Dinbai*, 43 Bom 864 (866), 20 Cr L J 702

(7) An order passed by a Magistrate under sec 2 of the Workmen's Breach of Contract Act (1859), directing either the return of the advance or specific performance of the contract—*Emp v Devappa*, 43 Bom 607 (609), 20 Cr.L J. 316

(8) An order passed by a Magistrate under the Upper Burma Ruby Regulation 1887 is open to appeal or revision under the Cr Pro Code,

although under the Regulation no specific provision appears to have been made for appeal or revision—*Maung Po Leone v. K E.*, 2 Rang 321 (323), 26 Cr L J. 289.

(9) An order of a Magistrate acting under sec. 221 of the Madras Local Boards Act (XIV of 1920)—*Rangesa Rao v. Swaminatha*, 27 L W 320, 29 Cr L J. 389 (390)

(10) An order passed under sec. 7 of the Extradition Act (XV of 1903) is a judicial and not an executive order and can be revised by the High Court under sec. 439, 491 or 561A—*Bai Asha*, 53 Bom 149, 30 Cr L J. 772

See also Note 1206 under 439.

When an order is passed by a judicial officer in a matter coming within the purview of law and justice and within the scope of the authority of the Courts, the mere fact that the officer passing the order states that he is acting not as a judicial officer but in his executive capacity does not oust the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court—*Shiv Nath v Crown*, 1908 P R 4, 7 Cr.L.J 202 (204)

Powers of High Court in revision :—See notes under sec 439.

1174. Powers of other Courts in revision :—A Sessions Judge or District Magistrate cannot, after calling for records under this section, take fresh evidence—*Sanwalia*, 1892 A.W.N. 146; *Mulla Ibrahim*, 3 Bom L.R 677

The powers of a Sessions Judge under this section may be put in force not only on matters coming before the Judge in Court, but also on matters coming to his knowledge on reliable information—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 538

A District Magistrate cannot take cognizance of a case by way of revision against a prisoner who has not appealed. Thus A and B were tried together and convicted of the same offence by a 2nd class Magistrate; A alone appealed but in hearing his appeal the District Magistrate took cognizance of the case against B also and set aside the conviction and sentence of both the accused, and ordered their retrial. Held that the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to reverse the conviction and sentence as regards B or to take cognizance of the case against him except by reporting it to the High Court—*Sheik Mohudin, Ratanlal* 358; *Mulla Ibrahim*, 3 Bom. L.R. 677.

A Magistrate who calls for and examines the calendar of a case tried by a Subordinate Magistrate, under this section, does not act in a judicial proceeding and therefore cannot order the prosecution of any person under sec. 476, as the matter was not brought before him in a judicial proceeding—*Kuppu*, 7 Mad. 560; *Subraya Vathiyar*, 15 M L J. 499. But sec 476 as now amended is not confined to judicial proceedings, and the Court can order prosecution in the course of any proceeding

Sessions Judges and District Magistrates when exercising their powers under this section should pay particular attention to the following points

in the proceedings of the inferior Criminal Courts.—(1) the rash issue of process; (2) the dealing with disputed claims of right under colour of a charge of criminal trespass or mischief, and convictions held of the former offence without a finding as to the criminal intent; (3) the indiscreet imposition of fines beyond the means of offenders; (4) the light punishment by inferior Courts of offences requiring severe punishments in cases which ought to have gone up to a superior Court for enhanced punishment; (5) the imposition of heavy fines in addition to imprisonment, with a view, in default of payment, to extend the term of imprisonment beyond the ordinary powers of the Magistrate to inflict, (6) the exaction of excessive bail or excessive security for keeping the peace or for good behaviour, (7) unnecessary delay in the trial of cases—*Mad H. C. Rul.* 17-12-1884, para 17

Suspension of sentence, Release on bail—By the italicised words added at the end of sub-section (1), "power is given to suspend a sentence or to release an accused on bail pending the examination of the record, thus avoiding the result, should delay occur, that the sentence may have been served before orders are passed"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914).

1175. Sub-section (4)—The intention of the Legislature in enacting this clause is to prevent the Sessions Judge and the District Magistrate from simultaneously exercising their powers of revision, and to prevent them from exercising their powers in such a way as would amount to one of them as it were hearing an appeal from or reviewing an order passed by the other—*Debi Din v K E*, 4 O C. 119

Under this section, the District Magistrate and Sessions Judge have co-ordinate powers; and therefore after an application for revision has been made to the District Magistrate, no further application can be entertained by the Sessions Judge, even though the Sessions Judge was not asked to revise the order passed by the District Magistrate in revision, but only to call for the record and report the Magistrate's order to the High Court—*In re Karpurasundaram*, 17 M L J 153; nor can the Sessions Judge act *suo motu* to call for the records under this section, after an application has been made to the District Magistrate—*IVaryam*, 1912 P R 10, 14 Cr L.J. 134 Where a complaint having been dismissed by the Dy Magistrate under sec 203, a fresh complaint was made before the District Magistrate in revision, who again dismissed the complaint, it was not open to the Sessions Judge to order further inquiry into the complaint—*Sheik Siddiq v. Sheik Chokari*, 17 C W N 451, 17 Cr L J 608. Similarly, the District Magistrate is prohibited by this sub-section from entertaining an application for a direction to commit the accused, after a similar application to the Sessions Judge has been refused, the reason for the prohibition being the avoidance of a conflict between the orders of the two District-authorities having co-ordinate powers in the matter—*Kalumathu v Emp*, 26 Mad 477 But where an application for revision preferred to the Sessions Judge has been dismissed for want of prosecution, the District Magistrate is competent to entertain a second application for revision and exercise his powers under this section—*Debi Din v K E*, 4 O C. 119

Where a District Magistrate called for the record of a case in which the accused had been discharged, and where the complainant subsequently presented an application to the Sessions Judge to have the order of discharge of the accused set aside, and the Sessions Judge sent for the proceedings and after a perusal of them ordered the committal of the accused for trial, it was held that the Sessions Judge's action was not illegal since no application was made to the District Magistrate, and as the District Magistrate's action in calling for the record was not equivalent to entertaining an application—*Po Gyi*, 8 L.B.R. 361, 17 Cr L J. 497

436. On examining any record under section 435

Power to order inquiry. or otherwise, the High Court or the Sessions Judge may direct the District Magistrate by himself or by any of the Magistrates subordinate to him to make, and the District Magistrate may himself make or direct any subordinate Magistrate to make, further inquiry into any complaint which has been dismissed under section 203 or sub-section (3) of section 204, or into the case of any person accused of an offence who has been discharged:

Provided that no Court shall make any direction under this section for inquiry into the case of any person who has been discharged, unless such person has had an opportunity of shewing cause why such direction should not be made.

Change :—This is the old section 437, and the old section 436 has been renumbered as sec 437. The reason is that the words "instead of directing a fresh inquiry" occurring in the old section 436 (now 437) refer to the inquiry which can be directed under the old section 437 (now 436), and it is therefore necessary to put the latter section first

The words "person accused of an offence" have been substituted for the words "accused person" occurring in the old section. "There have been different rulings as to whether the expression *accused person* in this section means any person *accused of an offence*, and it is now made clear that it does"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914). The proviso has been newly added. "We have added a proviso to this section to give effect to the rule laid down by the Courts that a fresh inquiry should not be made into the case of a person who has been discharged unless he has had an opportunity of showing cause"—*Report of the Joint Committee* (1922)

1175A. Scope :—This section does not speak of *Presidency Magistrates*, and the High Court has no power under this section to direct further inquiry into a case of dismissal of complaint or discharge of accused by a *Presidency Magistrate*—*Kedar Nath v. Khetranath*, 6 C.L.J.

705; *Debi Bux v. Jutmal*, 33 Cal 1282; *Charubala v. Barendra*, 27 Cal. 126. But the High Court can exercise such power under sec. 439; see 36 Cal. 994, 28 Cal. 652 and 26 Cal. 746 cited in Note 682 under sec. 203

A Sessions Judge can revise an order of discharge passed by a Magistrate, in a case instituted under sec. 476, even though he is moved by a private person to do so. There is nothing in this Code to limit the persons who can bring the matter (*i.e.*, the order of discharge) to the notice of the Sessions Judge, and it is immaterial how these facts are brought to his notice—*Peary Lal v. Sagar Mal*, 49 All. 230, 25 A.L.J. 42, 27 Cr.L.J. 1130

1176. Who can direct further inquiry :—The mention of the three tribunals together, the High Court, the Sessions Judge and the District Magistrate, shows that the Legislature intended them to have the same power with regard to the matter dealt with under this section—*Haridas v. Saritulla*, 15 Cal. 608, *Narayana Sawmy*, 32 Mad. 220. But though the powers of the three tribunals are co-ordinate, still as a matter of procedure the application should be made at first to the lower tribunal. Thus, where a District Magistrate has dismissed a complaint under sec. 203, the High Court will not entertain an application for revision under this section unless a previous application has been made to the Sessions Judge. The High Court will interfere only as a Court of last resort—*Gullay v. Bakar Husain*, 28 All. 268; *Kali Charan*, 1904 A.W.N. 232. So also, where the District Magistrate and the Chief Court have concurrent jurisdiction, an order under this section will be more conveniently made by the District Magistrate than by the Chief Court—*Rahim Ali*, 1889 P.R. 7.

Since the District Magistrate and the Sessions Judge have co-ordinate powers under this section to direct further inquiry, it follows therefore that where a District Magistrate has directed an inquiry into a case and decided upon it, the Sessions Judge is not competent to order further inquiry under this section—*Shakh Siddiq v. Shaik Chakuri*, 17 C.W.N. 451, 17 Cr.L.J. 608. See Note 1175 under sub-sec. (4) to sec. 435. In like manner, when the Sessions Judge has made an order for further inquiry under this section, the District Magistrate cannot make a contrary order, but should submit the matter to the High Court through the medium of the Public Prosecutor—*Q. E. v. Prithi*, 12 All. 434. When a further inquiry has been refused by one of the officers, it should not be ordered by the other, if the Sessions Judge is of opinion that the order of the District Magistrate for further inquiry is wrong, it is open to the Judge to refer the matter to the High Court, under sec. 438, but he has no power to review the order passed by the District Magistrate under this section—*Darbari v. Jagoo Lal*, 22 Cal. 573.

A District Magistrate can make or can direct a subordinate Magistrate to make, further inquiry into a case in which an order of discharge may have been passed by himself or by a subordinate Magistrate—*Bidhu v. Mafi Sheikh*, 28 Cal. 102, *Munshi*, 1902 P.R. 9.

A Deputy Magistrate placed in charge of the current duties of the

District Magistrate is not thereby invested with the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate under this section—*Ramanand v. Koylash*, 11 Cal 236

Further inquiry after prior refusal:—When a District Magistrate has once decided under this section that there is no case for further inquiry, he cannot subsequently order further inquiry; such an order would be an order reviewing the earlier one and is prohibited by sec. 369—*Ngathan*, 5 Bur L T 37, 13 Cr.L J. 301. So also, where a District Magistrate refuses to direct further inquiry, it is not competent to his successor-in-office, in the face of his predecessor's order, to direct a further inquiry—*Ratta Singh v. Kar Singh*, 4 C.W.N. 100. But a District Magistrate, who has once declined to order further inquiry on the ground that there was no cause for interference, is competent to order further inquiry on a new information being brought to his notice—*Q. E. v. Krishnaji*, Ratanlal 522 (523).

1177. Who can be directed to make further inquiry :

—The District Magistrate may be directed to make further inquiry, even though he exercises enhanced powers under section 30 of the Code—*Jaloo*, 1904 P.R. 15. The District Magistrate may direct a subordinate Magistrate to make the further inquiry under this section. For the purposes of this section, a first class Magistrate is subordinate to the District Magistrate—*Q. E. v. Laskari*, 7 All. 853, *Padmanabha*, 8 Mad. 18. The District Magistrate has a discretion in selecting the particular Magistrate who is to make the further inquiry under this section, and this discretion in selection is vested in the District Magistrate and not in the Sessions Judge. The Sessions Judge has not the power of directing a particular subordinate Magistrate by name to make the further inquiry—*Chundi Churn v. Hem Chandra*, 10 Cal 207. But where in case of a Sessions offence, the Sessions Judge directed the further inquiry to be made by a Magistrate specially empowered under sec. 30, because, having formed an opinion on the evidence he considered that the case should be disposed of by a special-power Magistrate rather than that it should be committed to him (Sessions Judge), held that the action of the Sessions Judge was not improper—*Tun Win*, 4 L B.R. 233, 7 Cr.L J. 493 (494) (distinguishing 10 Cal 207).

The further inquiry should ordinarily be made by the same Magistrate who held the first inquiry (*Brij Kishore v. Gopal*, 11 C.W.N. 316, 319), except in case of death or removal of such Magistrate, in which case it may be conducted by another Magistrate—*Q. E. v. Erramreddi*, 8 Mad. 296; *Q. E. v. Amir Khan*, 8 Mad. 336; see also *Ram Bharose v. Bhan*, 36 All. 129 and *Keymer*, 36 All. 53. But it is not illegal for the Sessions Judge to direct the further inquiry to be made by a Magistrate other than the Magistrate who had discharged the accused—*Tun Win*, 4 L B.R. 233, 7 Cr.L.J. 493 (494). Where the further inquiry involves the taking and weighing of additional evidence, the function will generally be best performed by the same Magistrate who made the previous inquiry; but peculiar or prejudiced views or even the possibility of them, may make it desirable to bring a fresh mind into the facts. Where the further inquiry involves the consideration of the same evidence or of the testimony of the

same witnesses, It is usually desirable that the inquiry should be committed to a different Magistrate from the one who has made the first inquiry and has already formed an opinion on the case—*Balkrishna*, Ratanlal 328 (329). Thus, where the Magistrate who held the first inquiry had already expressed an opinion that it was impossible to affix the guilt to the accused, the High Court directed the further inquiry to be made by another Magistrate—*Q. E. v. Vaman*, Ratanlal 926. Where the Magistrate who had held the first inquiry had dealt with the case in a most unsatisfactory way, it was held to be a good ground for directing the further inquiry to be made by a different Magistrate—*Mad 220*. Where there were many before the Magistrate, the High Court should direct the case to be tried by some other Magistrate—*Brij Krishan v Gopal*, 11 C W N. 316 (320).

But the District Magistrate cannot direct the further inquiry to be held by a Magistrate inferior to the Magistrate who held the first inquiry. Where a case has been tried by a Magistrate specially empowered under section 30, and has ended in a discharge, the District Magistrate should order the further inquiry to be made by the same Magistrate or by another Magistrate equally empowered, but not by a Magistrate who is not empowered under sec 30 and who is therefore in a sense a Court of inferior jurisdiction to the Court which ordered the discharge—*Yado v. Emp*, 12 N L R 94, 17 Cr.L.J. 245.

When the District Magistrate has sent the case to a subordinate Magistrate for further inquiry under this section, the Sub-divisional Magistrate cannot withdraw the case to his own file from that of the subordinate Magistrate—*Santaram*, Ratanlal 315. But when a case is sent to the Sub-divisional Magistrate for further inquiry, he can transfer the case to a 2nd class Magistrate subordinate to him—*Karuppa*, 2 Weir 563.

1178. In what cases can further inquiry be ordered :
—Dismissal of complaint—Further inquiry may be ordered when a complaint is dismissed under sec 203 or 204 (3)—*Sahib Kaur v Md. Kasim*, 1891 P B 41, *Karuppa*, 2 Weir 563, *Md Salamatulla v Sital*, 11 O.C. 261, *Makhatambi v. Hassan Ali*, 1 N L R 18. But if a complaint was made in respect of one offence and the accused was convicted, further inquiry cannot be directed in respect of another offence for which no charge was made in the complaint—*Har Kishore v Jugal*, 27 Cal 658. Where a case was taken up not upon a complaint but upon a police-report, a Magistrate's order directing the case to be struck off is not a dismissal of complaint, and cannot be revised by the Sessions Judge—*Kamru*, Ratanlal 521. No further inquiry can be directed when no complaint was made against a person and no regular process was issued against him—*Ambar Ali v. Anjab Ali*, 39 Cal 238. Where a complaint has been dismissed under sec 203, the revisional jurisdiction of the District Magistrate may be exercised even though there may have been some irregularity on the part of the officer taking cognizance upon the complaint. This section also contemplates that where a complaint has in fact been dismissed

under sec 203, the revisional jurisdiction of the District Magistrate may be invoked irrespective of the consideration whether the dismissal is legal or illegal—*Sadhu Charan v. Balai*, 3 P.L.J. 346, 19 Cr.L.J. 874. Where a complaint which contained several charges was dismissed in respect of one of the charges, and the complaint was dismissed merely on the report of the President of a Panchayet without giving the complainant any opportunity to substantiate his case, it was held that there should be a further inquiry into the complaint—*Purna Chandra v. Ambika*, 23 C.W.N. 575. When ordering a further inquiry in respect of a complaint which has been dismissed under sec. 203, the Sessions Judge cannot direct that the accused be summoned, but his power is restricted to making an order for a further inquiry of the same nature as that which has been already made, i.e., a further inquiry under sec. 202—*Bechu Mian v. Anwar*, 30 C.W.N. 312, 26 Cr.L.J. 305.

This section does not lay down any rule that further inquiry should only be directed when it is found that the judgment of the Magistrate is perverse or foolish. But as a rule of prudence the superior Court should not lightly discard the estimate of the evidence appraised by the Court which heard it, and should not set aside the dismissal of a complaint simply because a different view of the evidence might be taken. Each case has to be decided upon its own merits—*Radha Prasad*, 28 Cr.L.J. 857 (858) (Pat.).

1179. Discharge of accused :—The District Magistrate may direct further inquiry where the accused has been discharged. But it is not in every case of discharge that a further inquiry may be directed. Where the order of discharge is not perverse or foolish, and where the Magistrate has dealt at length with the evidence and recorded what appear as sound reasons for the discharge, interference under this section is illegal—*Nura*, 1902 P.L.R. 101, *Nasiruddin v. Abdul*, 1916 P.W.R. 20, 17 Cr.L.J. 161, *Dani*, 3 Lah.L.J. 97, 22 Cr.L.J. 199, 60 I.C. 55; *Kishan Chand*, 21 Cr.L.J. 591 (Lah.), 57 I.C. 91, *Khan Zaman v. Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1357 (Lah.). Although the word 'improperly' which occurs before the word 'discharged' in sec 437, is omitted in this section, still it is illegal to direct a further inquiry unless the order of discharge was improper, i.e., manifestly perverse or foolish or was based upon a record of evidence which was obviously incomplete—*Emp. v. Kuru*, 1911 P.R. 10, 12 Cr.L.J. 364, *Zahur v. Niadar*, 9 Lah.L.J. 114, 28 Cr.L.J. 238; *Sawan v. Crown*, 26 P.L.R. 291, 26 Cr.L.J. 1393; *Karam Chand*, 24 Cr.L.J. 360 (Lah.); *Bahadur*, 24 Cr.L.J. 622 (Lah.); *Radhe Sham*, 20 Cr.L.J. 592 (Lah.); *Nabi Baksh v. Crown*, 1 Lah. 216; *Gopal Das v. Maphi Ram*, 26 P.L.R. 353, 26 Cr.L.J. 1508, 7 Lah.L.J. 252; *Sheo Charan v. Emp.*, 21 N.L.R. 88; *Yado*, 12 N.L.R. 94, 17 Cr.L.J. 245; *Kaila*, 4 Lah.L.J. 411, 23 Cr.L.J. 693; *Mami v. Emp.*, 27 P.L.R. 397, 27 Cr.L.J. 565. An order of discharge passed by a trial Court after full enquiry and after considering and recording all the evidence produced by the complainant, should not be lightly interfered with—*Faiz Muhammad v. Crown*, 7 Lah.L.J. 216, 26 P.L.R. 193, 26 Cr.L.J. 1328; *Khan Zaman v. Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1357 (Lah.). But the Allahabad High Court is of opinion that

there is no rule that a Sessions Judge cannot interfere with an order of discharge passed by a Magistrate unless the order is manifestly foolish and perverse. The Sessions Judge can revise the order of discharge passed by a Magistrate, where he disagrees with the finding of the Magistrate and points out certain considerations which in his opinion should have led to a different finding—*Peary Lal v. Sagar Mal*, 49 All. 230, 27 Cr.L.J. 1130. The word "improperly" which is to be found in sec. 437 has been omitted from this section, and the omission seems to indicate that it was intended by the legislature to confer a very wide discretion, so as to meet not only the cases in which an improper discharge has been made but also those cases in which upon the facts as they stand the discharge is proper, but in the interests of justice and in regard to the peculiar and particular facts of the case it is right that the inquiry should be reopened—*Q. E. v. Chofu*, 9 All 52 (57, 58) (F.B.).

Where a person has been improperly discharged, no reference to the High Court is necessary, the District Magistrate can himself order a *fresh inquiry*—*Raoia Vishda, Ratanlal 213, Dasiba, Ratanlal 998* The intention seems to be to give revisional jurisdiction to the Sessions Court or District Magistrate in cases of improper discharge concurrently with that of the High Court, and thereby to obviate the expense and inconvenience which the necessity to resort to the High Court might in some cases entail—*Q. E v. Balasinnalambi*, 14 Mad. 334 (338)

No formal order of discharge is necessary, to enable the District Magistrate to direct further inquiry. When an order is one of discharge in substance, though not in form, the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate is competent, upon motion being made by the complainant, to make an order for further inquiry—*Nagendra Nath v. Korb*, 8 C.W.N. 456 Where after the issue of warrant against certain persons, the Magistrate does not think it proper to proceed further and stops further proceedings, the termination of the proceedings is in effect an order of discharge and is therefore subject to revision under this section—*Moul Singh v. Mahabir*, 4 C.W.N. 242 Where a person was charged with offences under secs 323 and 307 I P.C., and the Magistrate framed a charge under sec 323 only and said nothing about sec 307, held that this was equivalent to saying that there was no evidence against the accused of an offence under sec 307 I. P. C., and that in effect the accused was discharged of that offence. The Court of revision could therefore order further inquiry in respect of that offence—*Shco Narain v. Radha Mohan*, 42 All. 129 (130)

This section applies where the accused has been discharged, i.e., discharged under sec. 209, 253 or 259—*Vela v Chidambaram*, 33 Mad 85, therefore, no further inquiry can be directed when the accused has been acquitted by a Magistrate—*Bayanath v. Gaurikanta*, 20 Cal 633; *Erramreddi*, 3 Mad 296, *Panchu v. Umar*, 4 C.W.N. 346, *Jaliram v. Rajkumar*, 5 C.W.N. 72, *Bishun Das*, 7 C.W.N. 493 Thus, where a complaint in a summons case has been dismissed for default, the order is one under sec. 247 acquitting the accused. Such an order does not fall within the purview of sec. 436—*Bindra v. Bhaganta*, 25 Cr.L.J.

359 (Oudh). Even if an order of acquittal was passed in a warrant case without any charge having been framed or evidence for the defence taken, still it cannot be a subject of revision under this section—*Sayid Khan v K E*, 1 A.L.J. 415. If the order is in substance one of acquittal, though the Magistrate styles it an order of discharge, no further inquiry can be ordered—*Dodd*, 1900 P.L.R. 31; *Pothuri Venkataramayya*, 17 Cr L J 95 (Mad). Thus, where in a summons case, the Magistrate follows the procedure of a warrant case and discharges the accused, the order of discharge is one of acquittal, although he styles it as an order of discharge, and no order under this section can be passed—*Venkataramaier*, 8 M.L.T. 78, 6 I.C. 385, 11 Cr.L.J. 350. Similarly, after a charge has been framed in a warrant case, the accused can only be acquitted under sec. 258 and not discharged, and if the Magistrate erroneously passes an order of discharge, still there can be no order for further inquiry—*Sreeramulu v. Veerasalingam*, 38 Mad 585. Where after a full trial the accused persons were discharged, the discharge was for all practical purposes as good as an acquittal, and there should be no order for further inquiry—*Sundar v Bharyan*, 4 Lah.L.J. 331. The discharge of the accused under sec. 494 (a) upon withdrawal of the case by the Public Prosecutor before the frame of charge does not amount to an acquittal, and further inquiry may be directed—*Hata*, 30 P.L.R. 58, 30 Cr L J. 233.

No further inquiry can be directed where the proceedings have been stopped under sec. 249 and the accused has been released—*Achhru*, 1913 P.R. 9, 13 Cr L J 860.

But further inquiry may be directed where the accused has been discharged under sec. 494 (a) upon withdrawal of the case by the Public Prosecutor. Such a discharge is on the same footing as an order of discharge passed on a consideration of the evidence—*Hata*, 30 P.L.R. 58, 30 Cr.L.J. 233.

No further inquiry can be directed in a case where the accused has been convicted. If in fact in such a case the Sessions Judge thinks that further inquiry is necessary, he must report the matter to the High Court, which Court alone can direct further inquiry in such a case—*Valiv*, Ratanlal 407.

Where the order is neither one of dismissal of complaint nor one of discharge of accused, no order for further inquiry can be passed. Thus, where on the acquittal of an accused, the other accused against whom processes of arrest had been issued surrendered before the Deputy Magistrate, and he passed an order directing that the accused should not be proceeded against and that the warrant and other processes issued against him be withdrawn, the order was neither one of dismissal of complaint nor one of discharge of the accused, and the District Magistrate had therefore no jurisdiction under this section to set aside the order and direct the retrial of the accused—*Panchu v. Khoosdel*, 12 C.W.N. 63.

1180. No further inquiry where no accusation of 'offence' :—Further inquiry can be directed only in the case of an accused person, the term 'accused' means a person accused of an offence.

and not a person against whom proceedings are taken under Chapter VIII—*Imam Mandal*, 27 Cal. 662; *Dayanath*, 33 Cal. 1. Therefore section 436 does not enable a Court to order further inquiry to be made in a case of discharge of a person against whom security proceedings were taken under Chapter VIII, because such a person was not in the position of an accused person and could not be said to have committed an 'offence'—*Q. E. v. Imam Mandal*, 27 Cal. 662, *Dayanath*, 33 Cal. 8; *Emp. v. Roshan Singh*, 46 All. 235; *Alid Khan*, 1905 P. R. 42, *Maung Than v. K. E.*, 2 Rang. 30 (31), *Velu v. Chidambaram*, 33 Mad. 85; *Narain v. Durga*, 1911 P. R. 6, 12 Cr. L. J. 232, 10 I. C. 178 (*Contra*—*Q. E. v. Mutsaddi*, 21 All. 107, *K. E. v. Fyazuddin*, 24 All. 148, *Kharga v. Emp.*, 36 All. 147, *Mona Puna*, 16 Bom. 661, *Baba Yeshwant*, 35 Bom. 401, *Ebrahim*, 2 L. B. R. 80). The word 'discharged' in section 119 means only 'permitted to depart' and does not mean the discharge of an accused as contemplated by this section, therefore further inquiry cannot be directed in a case of discharge under s. 119—*Velu v. Chidambaram*, supra. (*Contra*—*Kharga*, 36 All. 147; *Manna*, 1903 P. R. 24, *Desraj*, 52 I. C. 672, 20 Cr. L. J. 704). This is now made clear by the present amendment by the use of the words "accused of an offence". The contrary rulings cited above within brackets are now rendered obsolete. If a District Magistrate, on examining the record of a security case, is of opinion that the person discharged by the subordinate Magistrate ought to be proceeded against, he can, under sec. 438, report the result of his examination of the record to the High Court, which will then pass the necessary orders. But he cannot direct further inquiry under sec. 436—*Emp. v. Roshan Singh*, 46 All. 235, 22 A. L. J. 129, 25 Cr. L. J. 467; *Neur Ahir*, 51 All. 408, 30 Cr. L. J. 63 (64).

This section also does not apply to proceedings under sec. 133 of the Code, since the person proceeded against under that section is not said to have committed an 'offence'. A Sessions Judge or District Magistrate acts without jurisdiction if he directs further inquiry into proceedings under that section—*Srinath v. Anaddi*, 24 Cal. 395, *Indranath*, 25 Cal. 425, *Prithipal v. Emp.*, 2 O. W. N. 549, 26 Cr. L. J. 1251. The only action which a Sessions Judge or District Magistrate can take in such case will be under sec. 438—*Prithipal v. Emp.*, 2 O. W. N. 549. Similarly, proceedings under sec. 144 do not refer to any offence, and no further inquiry can be directed in a case under that section—*Har Kishore v. Jugal*, 27 Cal. 658. So also, this section does not authorise a Magistrate to direct further inquiry into a case under sec. 145, as that section has no reference to any offence at all—*Chathu v. Niranjana*, 20 Cal. 729, *Maung San v. Maung Mye*, 30 Cr. L. J. 709. The proper procedure in such a case is to make a reference to the High Court under sec. 438—*Maung San* supra. So again, the District Magistrate cannot direct further inquiry into cases under sec. 438, since refusal of maintenance is not an 'offence' and the application for maintenance is not a complaint of an offence—*Parbati v. Chotey*, 17 C. P. L. R. 127, *Tokee v. Abdul*, 5 Cal. 536.

1181. When further inquiry may be directed :—
Sessions Judge or District Magistrate has jurisdiction to direct

inquiry or a re-hearing upon the same materials which were before the subordinate Magistrate, though there is no further evidence forthcoming—*Haridas v. Saritulla*, 15 Cal. 608; *Q. E. v. Balasannatambi*, 14 Mad 334, *Dorabji*, 10 Bom 131; *Q. E. v. Chotu*, 9 All. 52 (56) (F.B.); *Dayanand v. Emp.*, 23 A.L.J. 20, 26 Cr.L.J. 736, *Sahib Kaur v. Md Kasim*, 1891 P.R. 14, *Haider Khan v. K. E.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 66 (Oudh); *Po Yin*, 3 L.B.R. 97. The expression "further inquiry" does not mean that additional evidence must be forthcoming. Any mistake of law or irregularity in the proceedings will justify the District Magistrate in setting aside an order of discharge—*Emp. v. Debidas*, 14 C.P.L.R. 161. Further inquiry does not in all cases mean taking of additional evidence, but may mean re-hearing and reconsideration of the evidence already taken—*Dulla v. Q. E.*, 1901 P.R. 2, *Sheocharan v. Emp.*, 21 N.L.R. 88, 26 Cr.L.J. 1537, *Begraj*, 10 S.L.R. 68, 17 Cr.L.J. 349. But in *Harbhaj v. Jowala*, 1887 P.R. 63, and *Q. E. v. Amir Khan*, 11 Mad 336 it has been held that further inquiry means the taking of additional evidence and not a mere re-hearing of the same evidence, which is the same thing as retrial, and therefore where there has been a full inquiry by a competent Court and the accused has been discharged, the Sessions Judge has no power to direct a further inquiry, unless further evidence has been disclosed—*Dodd v. Emp.*, 1900 P.L.R. 31. And the Calcutta High Court has also held that in cases where the trying Magistrate has discussed the evidence carefully and has given sufficient reason for the discharge of the accused, and no fresh evidence is likely to be produced on further inquiry, the superior Court should hesitate before ordering further inquiry, unless there are palpable errors in the decision of the lower Court—*Abdul Rashid v. Momtaz*, 38 C.L.J. 206, A.L.R. 1924 Cal 229, 25 Cr.L.J. 191, *Sulav v. Prafulla*, 50 C.L.J. 284, 1929 Cr. C. 467.

The District Magistrate is not competent to direct further inquiry in any and every case falling under this section. This section is limited by the words "on examining the record under sec. 435" and that section lays down that a Court may call for and examine the record for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed and as to the regularity of any proceeding of such inferior Court. And therefore a District Magistrate cannot set aside an order of discharge and direct further inquiry, if he finds no irregularity, illegality or impropriety in the proceedings—*Pran Khan v. K. E.*, 16 C.W.N. 1078, 13 Cr.L.J. 764.

Where a Magistrate has discharged the accused without considering the necessary evidence, the Sessions Judge ought to direct further inquiry in the case—*Dhanra v. Clifford*, 13 Bom. 376.

Mere lapse of time (e.g. 6 months) is not a sufficient ground for refusing an order for further inquiry, if the Court feels that an offence has been committed which should be inquired into—*Brijbhukhan v. Jaurao*, 23 Cr.L.J. 745 (Nag.). But an order for further inquiry or retrial passed after the lapse of a year and a half from the date of discharge amounts to a travesty of justice—*Bishan v. Abdul*, 29 Cr.L.J. 895 (896) (Lah.).

The power of ordering further inquiry should be used sparingly and with great circumspection. Therefore where an accused person has been three times subjected to a Magisterial inquiry, it would be an oppression on the accused to send him a fourth time before the Magistrate for inquiry on the same evidence which has been thrice pronounced to be insufficient and untrustworthy—*Balkrishna, Ratanlal* 328 (330). Where a complaint has been dismissed by the Magistrate after fully considering the police report and the evidence of the complainant and his witnesses and after finding that no offence has been made out, but the Sessions Judge ordered further inquiry, and upset the order of the Magistrate, *held* that the Judge should not lightly set aside the order of dismissal but should do so only when it is clear that there has been a miscarriage of justice—*Jangal v Radha Kishen*, 26 Cr L.J. 866. Sessions Judges and District Magistrates should use the powers under this section sparingly and with great caution and circumspection, especially in cases where the questions involved are mere matters of fact—*Q E v. Chotu*, 9 All. 52 (59) (F B), *Alam v Emp.*, 49 All. 879, 28 Cr.L.J. 601 (602). The Revisional Court ought not to ordinarily interfere with an order of discharge passed by the trying Magistrate, unless it is possible to come to only one conclusion on the evidence, viz that the accused is guilty—*Karuppa v Palanisamy*, 10 L W 630, 20 Cr L J 817, 53 I C 817, *Dani*, 3 Lah L J 97, 10 I C. 55, 22 Cr L J 199. Further inquiry cannot be directed on the bare possibility of an offence being disclosed on further evidence being taken. There must be something on record to indicate that such an offence was committed or there must be something to show that further evidence is available which has not been taken and which would support a charge for that offence—*In re Arumuga*, 43 M.L.J 564. Further inquiry ought not to be directed where there is no prospect of any public advantage from the case being reopened—*In re Krishna Pillai*, 1923 M W N 56. The powers conferred by this section are not to be exercised promiscuously in all cases wherever the District Magistrate who has not seen the witnesses forms a different opinion of the value of their evidence from that which was formed by the Magistrate who has seen them—*Narainah Venkatish*, 18 Cr L J 646, 19 Bom.L.R 350, *Dani*, supra, *Umrao Khan v Emp.*, 21 A.L.J 194, *Udai Raj*, 44 All 691, *Kallu*, 4 Lah L J 411, 23 Cr L J 693. When the circumstances and the evidence are such that two different Courts might take two different views of the evidence, and the order of discharge is neither perverse nor *prima facie* incorrect, and there is no suggestion that further evidence is forthcoming, no further inquiry should be directed—*Alam v Emp.*, 49 All. 879, 25 A.L.J 703, 28 Cr.L.J 601 (602), *Bindeshri v. Emp.*, 18 A L J 1135, 22 Cr L J 49, *Chandan v Kallu* 8 A L J 45. A District Magistrate cannot set aside an order of discharge passed by a Subordinate Magistrate and direct further inquiry solely on the ground that the latter has misappreciated the evidence—*Lakshminarasappa*, 31 Mad 133. But see *Begraj*, 10 S L R 68, 17 Cr L J 349. and *Kallu*, 4 Lah L J. 411, 23 Cr.L.J 693, A.I.R. 1922 Lah 59.

Further inquiry cannot be directed into an offence (c g under sec 193

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Further inquiry cannot be directed into an offence (e.g. under sec 193

inquiry or a re-hearing upon the same materials which were before the subordinate Magistrate, though there is no further evidence forthcoming—*Haridas v. Saritulla*, 15 Cal 608; *Q. E. v. Balasinnatambi*, 14 Mad 334; *Dorabji*, 10 Bom 131; *Q. E. v. Cholu*, 9 All. 52 (56) (F.B.); *Dayanand v. Emp.*, 23 A.L.J. 20, 26 Cr L.J. 736; *Sahib Kaur v. Md. Kasim*, 1891 P.R. 14; *Haider Khan v. K. E.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 66 (Oudh); *Po Yin*, 3 L.B.R. 97. The expression "further inquiry" does not mean that additional evidence must be forthcoming. Any mistake of law or irregularity in the proceedings will justify the District Magistrate in setting aside an order of discharge—*Emp. v. Debidas*, 14 G.P.L.R. 161. Further inquiry does not in all case mean taking of additional evidence, but may mean re-hearing and reconsideration of the evidence already taken—*Dulla v. Q. E.*, 1901 P.R. 2, *Sheocharan v. Emp.*, 21 N.L.R. 88, 26 Cr.L.J. 1537; *Begraj*, 10 S.L.R. 68, 17 Cr.L.J. 349. But in *Harbhaj v. Jowala*, 1887 P.R. 63, and *Q. E. v. Amir Khan*, 8 Mad 336 it has been held that further inquiry means the taking of additional evidence and not a mere re-hearing of the same evidence, which is the same thing as retrial; and therefore where there has been a full inquiry by a competent Court and the accused has been discharged, the Sessions Judge has no power to direct a further inquiry, unless further evidence has been disclosed—*Dodd v. Emp.*, 1900 P.L.R. 31. And the Calcutta High Court has also held that in cases where the trying Magistrate has discussed the evidence carefully and has given sufficient reason for the discharge of the accused, and no fresh evidence is likely to be produced on further inquiry, the superior Court should hesitate before ordering further inquiry, unless there are palpable errors in the decision of the lower Court—*Abdul Rashid v. Momtaz*, 38 C.L.J. 206, A.I.R. 1924 Cal 229, 25 Cr.L.J. 191, *Sulav v. Prafulla*, 50 C.L.J. 284, 1929 Cr. C. 467.

The District Magistrate is not competent to direct further inquiry in any and every case falling under this section. This section is limited by the words "on examining the record under sec. 435" and that section lays down that a Court may call for and examine the record for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding sentence or order recorded or passed and as to the regularity of any proceeding of such inferior Court. And therefore a District Magistrate cannot set aside an order of discharge and direct further inquiry, if he finds no irregularity, illegality or impropriety in the proceedings—*Pran Khan v. K. E.*, 16 C.W.N. 1078, 13 Cr.L.J. 764.

Where a Magistrate has discharged the accused without considering the necessary evidence, the Sessions Judge ought to direct further inquiry in the case—*Dhanias v. Clifford*, 13 Bom 376.

Mere lapse of time (e.g. 6 months) is not a sufficient ground for refusal to order further inquiry, if the Court feels that an offence has been committed which should be inquired into—*Brijbhukhan v. Jaurao*, 23 Cr.L.J. 745 (Nag). But an order for further inquiry or retrial passed after the lapse of a year and a half from the date of discharge amounts to a travesty of justice—*Bishan v. Abdul*, 29 Cr.L.J. 895 (896) (Lah.).

The power of ordering further inquiry should be used sparingly and with great circumspection. Therefore where an accused person has been three times subjected to a Magisterial inquiry, it would be an oppression on the accused to send him a fourth time before the Magistrate for inquiry on the same evidence which has been thrice pronounced to be insufficient and untrustworthy—*Balkrishna, Ratanlal* 328 (330). Where a complaint has been dismissed by the Magistrate after fully considering the police report and the evidence of the complainant and his witnesses and after finding that no offence has been made out, but the Sessions Judge ordered further inquiry, and upset the order of the Magistrate, *held* that the Judge should not lightly set aside the order of dismissal but should do so only when it is clear that there has been a miscarriage of justice—*Jangal v Radha Kishen*, 26 Cr L J 866. Sessions Judges and District Magistrates should use the powers under this section sparingly and with great caution and circumspection, especially in cases where the questions involved are mere matters of fact—*Q. E. v Chotu*, 9 All 52 (59) (F B), *Alam v Emp*, 49 All 879, 28 Cr L J 601 (602). The Revisional Court ought not to ordinarily interfere with an order of discharge passed by the trying Magistrate, unless it is possible to come to only one conclusion on the evidence, viz that the accused is guilty—*Karuppa v Palanisamy*, 10 L W 630, 20 Cr L J 817, 53 I C 817, *Dani*, 3 Lah L J 97, 60 I C 55, 22 Cr L J 199. Further inquiry cannot be directed on the bare possibility of an offence being disclosed on further evidence being taken. There must be something on record to indicate that such an offence was committed or there must be something to show that further evidence is available which has not been taken and which would support a charge for that offence—*In re Arumuga*, 43 M L J 564. Further inquiry ought not to be directed where there is no prospect of any public advantage from the case being reopened—*In re Krishna Pillai*, 1923 M W N 56. The powers conferred by this section are not to be exercised promiscuously in all cases wherever the District Magistrate who has not seen the witnesses forms a different opinion of the value of their evidence from that which was formed by the Magistrate who has seen them—*Narainah Venkatish*, 18 Cr L J 646, 19 Bom L R. 350, *Dani*, supra, *Umrao Khan v Emp*, 21 A L J 194, *Udai Raj*, 44 All 691, *Kallu*, 4 Lah L J 411, 23 Cr L J 693. When the circumstances and the evidence are such that two different Courts might take two different views of the evidence, and the order of discharge is neither perverse nor *prima facie* incorrect, and there is no suggestion that further evidence is forthcoming, no further inquiry should be directed—*Alam v Emp*, 49 All 879, 25 A L J 703, 28 Cr L J 601 (602), *Bindeshri v Emp*, 18 A L J 1135, 22 Cr L J 49, *Chandan v Kallu*, 8 A L J 45. A District Magistrate cannot set aside an order of discharge passed by a Subordinate Magistrate and direct further inquiry solely on the ground that the latter has misappreciated the evidence—*Lakshminarasappa*, 31 Mad 133. But see *Begraj*, 10 S L R 68, 17 Cr L J 340, and *Kallu* 4 Lah L J 411, 23 Cr L J 693, A I R 1922 Lah 59.

Further inquiry cannot be directed into an offence (e.g. under sec 19

I.P.C.) if the sanction of the Court in which that offence has been committed is wanting—*Meharban v Sitaram*, 27 All. 512, 30 Cr.L.J. 874 (875)

A District Magistrate is not authorised to direct further inquiry under this section, when the essence of the matter between the parties is of a civil nature and the question is in reality one which ought to be fought out in a Civil Court—*Q E. v. Vithu*, 1 Bom L.R. 852.

Effect of order for further inquiry:—An order for further inquiry directed to a subordinate Court means that the case should be taken up again, and that the question of dismissing the complaint or charging the accused, as the case may be, should be again considered, and an appropriate order made as a result of such fresh consideration—*In re Narayanaswamy*, 32 Mad 220 Where a complaint was dismissed under sec. 203 after an investigation held under sec. 202, the effect of an order for further inquiry is to restore the case to the stage under sec. 202, and the inquiry should be taken up from that point—*Radha Prasad*, 28 Cr L.J. 857 (859) (Pat).

1182. Powers of Courts directing further inquiry :

—This section does not authorize a Sessions Judge or District Magistrate to take evidence or direct it to be taken supplementing the evidence given in the Lower Court. He is authorised to direct further inquiry, but not to take evidence or direct evidence to be taken. Under section 428, an Appellate Court dealing with an appeal may direct additional evidence to be taken and itself record such evidence. The High Court under section 439 has all the powers of an Appellate Court and can direct evidence to be taken. But no such powers are given to the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate under the present section—*Moni Mohun v Iswar*, 11 C.L.J. 251.

The District Magistrate directing further inquiry cannot direct that the accused be put on his trial. All that he can do is to direct further inquiry, leaving it entirely to the inquiring Magistrate to determine whether or not the evidence justifies the accused being charged and put on his trial—*Q E. v. Gajan Khan*, 2 Bom L.R. 586; *Sitaram v Kausilia*, 29 Cr L.J. 572 (Pat). An order for retrial should not be made in the guise of an order for further inquiry—*Bhagwanmalee*, 2 C.P.L.R. 82.

The Sessions Judge or District Magistrate cannot himself commit the accused for trial at the Sessions, as that would be an order to be made in the course of the further inquiry and could only be made by the person making the further inquiry—*In re Narayanaswamy*, 32 Mad. 220. When a District Magistrate directs a subordinate Magistrate to make a further inquiry, the whole case is made over to the latter, and the District Magistrate cannot retain seizin of the case in himself. He cannot try the accused or direct process to issue under sec. 204. It is the subordinate Magistrate who has complete jurisdiction to hold the inquiry, to issue process and to try and pass final orders in the case—*Rani Barai v. Ram Pratap*, 5 P.L.J. 47 (55), 21 Cr.L.J. 594. The District Magistrate directing further inquiry cannot even suggest that the accused be committed to the Sessions, he must leave it to the judgment and discretion of the Sub-Magistrate who is to make the inquiry, and cannot fetter the Sub-Magis-

trate's judicial discretion by any suggestion or direction—*Q. E. v. Muni-sami*, 15 Mad 39. The District Magistrate is wholly wrong in directing a Subordinate Magistrate that he should pass such and such order in a case pending judicially before him—*Thakar v. Kirpal*, 1918 P.L.R. 53, 19 Cr.L.J. 436, 44 I.C. 964. In making an order for further inquiry it is improper for the Superior Magistrate to write a judgment which is practically a mandate to the Subordinate Magistrate—*Yado*, 12 N.L.R. 94, 17 Cr.L.J. 245.

The Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate cannot, when directing further inquiry under this section, himself frame a charge or order the Sub-Magistrate to frame the charge and try the accused. He might of course make the inquiry himself and frame a charge in course of it—*Narayanawamy*, 32 Mad 220.

1183. Powers and duties of the Magistrate making the inquiry:—If the inquiry is directed to be held by a Magistrate other than the officer who held the first inquiry, he should take the evidence *de novo*, and cannot proceed on the evidence already taken—*Ram Dial*, 13 Cr.L.J. 255, 9 A.L.J. 310; *Hasnu*, 6 All 367, *Tun Win*, 4 L.B.R. 233, 7 Cr.L.J. 493.

The Magistrate making the further inquiry can take further evidence which he had omitted in the first inquiry—*Dhana v. Clifford*, 13 Bom 376.

The Magistrate is not bound to try the accused for the very offence for which he was originally discharged, but is competent to try him for any other offence which may be established by the evidence—*Papadu*, 7 Mad. 454.

When further inquiry is directed into a complaint dismissed under sec 203, the Magistrate directed to hold the inquiry cannot at once proceed under sec 204 and summon the accused for trial, but must make an inquiry under sec. 202; and then if upon inquiry he is satisfied that the case is one in which the accused should be put up on trial, he will summon the accused (sec. 204); if on the other hand, he is satisfied upon such inquiry that the case is one in which the accused need not be summoned, he will dismiss the complaint (sec. 203)—*Radha Prasad*, 28 Cr.L.J. 857 (859) (Pat), *Sitaram v. Kausila*, 29 Cr.L.J. 572 (573) (Pat). In two other Patna cases it has been held that if the Magistrate directed to hold the inquiry at once summons the accused and proceeds to trial, the procedure is merely irregular and can be cured by sec 537 if no failure of justice has been occasioned—*Janakdhari*, 8 Pat. 537, 1929 Cr.C. 353 (355) *Hema Singh*, 9 Pat 155, 1929 Cr.C. 372 (375, 376) (dissenting from *Radha Prasad*, supra).

A Magistrate holding a further inquiry into a complaint which has been once dismissed under sec 203 can again dismiss the complaint under sec 203—*Nibaran v. Sital Chandra* 25 C.W.N. 312 (313). But if the Sessions Judge orders a further inquiry into two counter cases, and directs that if one of the cases be found false the other should be tried, the effect of the order is that the cases should be decided in the usual

way after trial, and in such circumstances, the Magistrate is not competent to dismiss the case under sec. 203, without holding a regular trial—*Brij Kishore v. Gopal*, 11 C.W.N. 316 (320).

The Magistrate directed to make the inquiry gets the seisin of the entire case, and has jurisdiction to inquire under sec. 202 as to whether a *prima facie* case has been made out against the accused, and if he is satisfied that a *prima facie* case has been made out, he has jurisdiction to issue process to the accused under sec. 204, and to try and dispose of the case himself—*Ram Barai v. Ram Pratap*, 5 P.L.J. 47 (55), 21 Cr.L.J. 594

The Magistrate who is directed to make further inquiry is not competent to question the propriety of the order directing the inquiry but is bound to carry it out—*Q. E. v. Dorabji*, 10 Bom 131

1184. Notice to accused :—See the proviso newly added. Although no notice to the accused was necessary under the old section, still it was held in numerous cases that a Court did not exercise a proper discretion if before proceeding under this section he did not give the accused an opportunity, by service of a notice, to show cause against an order directing further inquiry—*Haridas v. Saritulla*, 15 Cal. 608; *Jayaji v. Suphal*, 2 C.W.N. 196, *Amin Kariadar*, 3 C.W.N. 249, *Dulla v. Q. E.*, 1901 P.R. 2, *Hari Ram*, 1919 P.L.R. 17; *Nabi Bakhsh*, 1 Lah 216; *Kallu*, 4 Lah L.J. 411; *Rango Tinaji*, 5 Bom.L.R. 877; *Fazal Din*, 1895 P.R. 17, *In re Mrs. Ruxmani*, 6 Bom L.R. 479; *Mukund*, 8 Bom L.R. 694, *Abhram*, 19 Bom.L.R. 908, 19 Cr.L.J. 101; *Rambahal*, 4 P.L.W. 220, 19 Cr.L.J. 399; *Venkatesalu v. Durvasa*, 2 Weir 244; *Joy Gopal*, 11 C.W.N. 173; *Brij Kishore v. Gopal*, 11 C.W.N. 316 (319), *Abdul Latif*, 40 All 416, *Umrao v. Emp.*, 21 A.L.J. 194; *Ganapatil*, 19 A.L.J. 71, *Jaswant*, 19 A.L.J. 985, *Dost Muhammad*, 15 A.L.J. 627; *Hasnu*, 6 All. 367; *Kharga*, 36 All. 147; *Ajudhia*, 20 All. 339; *Q. E. v. Chotu*, 9 All. 52 (59) (F.B.); *Bindeshri v. Emp.*, 18 A.L.J. 1135; *Rikh Nath*, 24 O.C. 142, 22 Cr.L.J. 655; *Sanwal v. Dipchand*, 3 S.L.R. 7, 9 Cr.L.J. 446; *Vaidyanath*, 16 Cr.L.J. 696, 11 Bur L.T. 133; *Nga Than*, 5 Bur.L.T. 37, 13 Cr.L.J. 301. This is now expressly laid down in the proviso

The opportunity to show cause may be given even after the accused is arrested and brought before the Court—*Giridhari v. Emp.*, 12 C.W.N. 822; *Wahed Ali*, 32 Cal. 1090, *Sahib Kaur v. Md. Kasim*, 1891 P.R. 14; *Fazal Din*, 1895 P.R. 17.

This proviso applies only where the accused has been discharged, i.e. discharged under secs 209, 253 and 259. No notice would be necessary where further inquiry is directed into a complaint which was dismissed under section 203—*Gajraj v. Emp.*, 47 All 722, 23 A.L.J. 451, 26 Cr.L.J. 1176; *Emp. v. Liaqat Hussain*, 40 All 138; *Appa Rao v. Janakiammal*, 49 Mad 918, 26 Cr.L.J. 129 (F.B.); *Dhondra*, 29 Bom L.R. 713, 28 Cr.L.J. 575 (576); *Daya Ram*, 2 Luck. 573, 28 Cr.L.J. 650; *Nawsher v. Hazratulla*, 49 C.L.J. 422, 30 Cr.L.J. 1030, *Haridas v. Saritulla*, 15 Cal 609; *Grish Chunder*, 29 Cal. 457; *Wahed Ali*, 32 Cal. 1090; *Fazalbi v. Moonshab*, 32 C.L.J. 44; *Ajudhia*, 20 All 339; *Tabarak*, 30 All. 52, K.

E. v. Gajankhan, 3 Bom L.R 586; *Md. Mutagi*, 3 A.L.J. 74; *Sheo Narain v. Ram Pratap*, 4 P.L.J. 456 (459); *Angan v. Ram Pirbhan*, 35 All 78. But where the accused person was given an opportunity of being heard before the complaint was dismissed under sec 203, a further inquiry ought not to be directed without giving notice to him. As he was present from the very commencement of the proceedings, it is proper that he should be given an opportunity of being heard before an order is made under this section—*Jogesh Chandra v. Nikunja Behari*, 27 C.W.N. 552.

When notice is issued under this section, the accused is not legally bound to avail himself of the opportunity given to him to show cause; and he is at liberty either to appear and show cause or to stay away—*Kanwar Singh*, 1893 P.R. 15.

1185. Recording reasons.—Before making an order under this section a Sessions Judge or District Magistrate is bound to record his reasons and to state in what respect the trial Judge's conclusions are unsatisfactory—*Sawan v. Crown*, 26 P.L.R. 291, 26 Cr L.J. 1393, *Lokhia*, 1890 A.W.N. 147; *Abinash v. Emp.*, 13 C.W.N. 76. *Nga Than*, 5 Bur L.T. 37, 13 Cr.L.J. 301. The wide jurisdiction to set aside an order of discharge cannot be properly exercised without having and assigning solid and sufficient reasons for doing so—*Haridas v. Saritulla*, 15 Cal 608, *Thirukonan Kuppachari*, 14 Cr L.J. 572, 1913 M.W.N. 638. The Magistrate should record his reasons for ordering further inquiry, because the High Court in the absence of such reasons cannot exercise supervision over the Magistrate's or Judge's proceedings, and also because it is fair to the person against whom the order is made that the reasons for directing such inquiry should be made explicit to him and that he should have notice of the grounds on which the further inquiry has been directed—*Nga Min Dum*, U.B.R. (1917) 2nd Qr. 16, 19 Cr.L.J. 14, 42 I.C. 926, *Wahed Ali v. Emp.*, 32 Cal 1090. Where the order of the Sessions Judge for further inquiry does not state any proper grounds, it is liable to be set aside by the High Court—*Nagendra v. Korb*, 8 C.W.N. 456. But where the order of discharge passed by the trying Magistrate was *prima facie* improper (e.g. where he discharged the accused without taking any evidence for the prosecution or the defence), the District Magistrate's order for further inquiry without recording reasons was not illegal—*Dhandu*, 29 Bom L.R. 713, 28 Cr L.J. 575 (576). See also *Sitaram v. Kavalia*, 29 Cr.L.J. 572 (573) (Pat.) where the omission to record reasons was excused.

It is not ordinarily desirable that a District Magistrate or Sessions Judge in ordering a further inquiry should make a detailed examination of the evidence and give elaborate reasons, because that might prejudice the trial afterwards, but it is desirable that he should give enough in the shape of reasons to show that his order is proper—*Wahed Ali*, 32 Cal 1090; *Sannal v. Dipchand*, 3 S.L.R. 7, 9 Cr L.J. 446. In a Burma case, where in an order for further inquiry the Sessions Judge simply stated "I have translated and considered the whole of the evidence on the record, and the conclusion I have arrived at is that there should be a further

inquiry", it was held that it contained ample reasons for the order. It would have been improper for the Judge to comment on the evidence in detail, because such a proceeding would tend to prejudice the accused at the trial—*Tun Win*, 4 L.B.R. 233, 7 Cr.L.J. 493 (494).

1186. Interference by High Court:—An order of a Sessions Judge or a District Magistrate setting aside an order of discharge is liable to be reviewed by the High Court or a Court of Revision. If in any case, the High Court were to find that the District Magistrate or Sessions Judge had set aside an order of discharge on insufficient grounds or that while there were good grounds for setting it aside, the District Magistrate or Sessions Judge had made an order inappropriate to the facts of the case, the High Court would be acting properly in revising the order—*Haridas v Saritulla*, 15 Cal. 608. Where the order of the Sessions Judge did not stand on any proper grounds for directing a further inquiry, it was set aside by the High Court in revision—*Nagendra v. Korb*, 8 C.W.N. 456. But where the Sessions Judge after going carefully through the evidence was of opinion that the finding of the trying Magistrate was either perverse or in all probability wrong or manifestly at variance with the evidence which he has recorded, and directed further inquiry after a consideration of all the circumstances, the High Court would not interfere—*Zahur v. Niadar*, 11 Lah.L.J. 114, 28 Cr.L.J. 238; *Karkley v Jagannath*, 11 O.L.J. 611, 1 O.W.N. 302, 26 Cr.L.J. 959.

437. When, on examining the record of any case

under section 435 or otherwise, the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate considers that such case is triable exclusively by the Court of Session and that an accused person has been improperly discharged by the inferior Court, the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate may cause him to be arrested, and may thereupon, instead of directing a fresh inquiry, order him to be committed for trial upon the matter of which he has been, in the opinion of the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate, improperly discharged:

Provided as follows:—

- (a) that the accused has had an opportunity of showing cause to such Judge or Magistrate why the commitment should not be made;
- (b) that, if such Judge or Magistrate thinks that the evidence shows that some other offence has been committed by the accused, such Judge or Magistrate may direct the inferior Court to inquire into such offence.

This is the old section 436. The old section 437 has now been re-numbered as sec. 436. For reason of this transposition see notes under the previous section.

1187. Application of section :—The words 'or otherwise' do not mean 'in any other way whatsoever' but 'in any other way provided by the Code'—*Nobin v. Russak*, 10 Cal 268. The reason for exercising the powers under this section must arise upon materials to be found on the record, and not upon extraneous matter—*Lokhia*, 1890 A.W.N. 147, *Haridas v. Saritulla*, 15 Cal 608.

1188. Who can order commitment :—The Sessions Judge and the District Magistrate have co-ordinate powers to order a commitment under this section—*Q. E. v. Surendra*, 28 Cal 397, *Kalu Sandu*, Ratanlal 837. A Sessions Judge may take action under this section though the District Magistrate has refused to call for the record and to direct a commitment of the case—*Gandi Apparaju*, 43 Mad 330, 21 Cr L J 91.

The District Magistrate may act of his own motion, quite independent of an order from the Court of Session—*Baijoo v. Gangun*, 8 W R 61.

The word 'District Magistrate' in this section includes a District Magistrate specially empowered under sec 30—*Ajjan Singh*, 1904 P L R 231. Also, a District Magistrate can, under this section, revise an order of discharge passed by a subordinate Magistrate of the First Class invested with powers under sec 30 of the Code, in a case which is triable exclusively by the Court of Session—*Yado*, 12 N L R 94, 17 Cr. L J 245.

The Joint Sessions Judge cannot exercise the powers of a Sessions Judge under this chapter, and cannot order a committal to the session in a case discharged by a Magistrate—*In re Musa*, 11 Bom 164.

Secs 436 and 437 do not apply to *Presidency Magistrates*, a Presidency Magistrate can himself revive the complaint after he has discharged the accused without any order of the superior authority—*Opoorba v. Probod Kumary*, 1 C W N 49; *Dwarka v. Benimadhab*, 28 Cal 652.

1189. "Exclusively triable by Court of Session" —To give jurisdiction to the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate, the accused must have been charged with an offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session—*Ajjan Singh v. Emp.*, 1904 P L R 234, *Kanchan* 1 All 413, *Tarachand*, 7 C L R 168, *Bhailu* 1897 P R 3. Therefore a Sessions Judge cannot direct commitment or order fresh inquiry in a case where the accused is discharged of an offence within the Magistrate's jurisdiction—*Ramchand*, Ratanlal 42, *Ma Bakhsh*, 1882 A W N. 105, *Baijanath v. Gauri Kanta*, 20 Cal 633, *Kanchan* 1 All 413, *Nelluri Chenchia* 42 Mad 561, *Thammanna* 15 M L J 373.

If a case is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session the District Magistrate cannot order a commitment under this section, merely because in his opinion the offence could not be adequately punished by a Magistrate—*Debi Prasad* 1908 A.W.N. 189, 8 Cr L J 47. The words "triable exclusively by a Court of Session" are to be construed strictly and it is not competent to the Sessions Judge to direct a commitment

under this section if the offence is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session—*Nelluri Chanchua*, 42 Mad. 561. This is also the view of the other High Courts. See *Ramchand*, Ratanlal 42; *Bayanath v. Gaurikanta*, 20 Cal. 633. But in a Burma case, it has been held that the term "triable exclusively by the Court of Session" means either a case where the District Magistrate considers that the facts constitute an offence which is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, or it might mean a case in which the District Magistrate considers that the sentence which the Magistrate could pass might not be sufficient and therefore it was a case which should be tried by a Court of Session—*Tambi*, 12 Bur L.T. 62, 19 Cr.L.J. 801, 11 L.B.R. 208.

Where an accused is discharged of an offence exclusively triable by a Court of Session, a Sessions Judge can commit him on a charge not exclusively triable by a Sessions Court if it is intimately connected with a charge exclusively triable by the Sessions Court and forms part of the same transaction. But he has no power to commit for such an offence if it is of an entirely different character. Thus, where an accused is discharged of an offence under sec. 436 I.P. Code, he may be ordered to be committed by the Sessions Judge for trial for an offence under sec. 427 I.P.C. but not for an offence under sec. 380 I.P.C. which is totally different from the category of offences under secs. 427 and 436 I.P.C.—*Bijoy Gopal v. Iswar*, 53 Cal. 645, 27 Cr.L.J. 1139. Where the accused was charged with two offences, under sections 477A (triable exclusively by the Court of Session) and 408 I.P.C. (not so triable), of which the principal offence was the latter one and the other was merely secondary, and the subordinate Magistrate refused to commit the accused to the Sessions and discharged him, held that the District Magistrate was competent under this section to direct the commitment of the accused even though the primary offence was not triable exclusively by the Court of Session, because the two offences were intimately connected and formed part of the same transaction—*Gendhal Chumanbhai v. Emp.*, 16 Bom. L.R. 80, 15 Cr.L.J. 292. So also, where an accused person appears to have committed culpable homicide, his conviction by a Magistrate of a minor offence does not prevent his trial for murder, etc. The Sessions Judge, if he thinks there is a *prima facie* case, may call on the accused to shew cause why a commitment should not be ordered, and may thereafter order his commitment under this section if satisfied that there is sufficient cause for it—*Ladkia*, Ratanlal 337.

1190. "Improperly discharged":—A Sessions Judge may direct a commitment even where the District Magistrate himself discharges the accused—*Q. E. v. Laskari*, 7 All 853.

The mere fact that a Magistrate has discharged the accused in a case triable exclusively by the Court of Session, without committing him to the Sessions, is not a ground of interference under this section—*Sankaraya v. Kerala*, 2 Weir 260. The District Magistrate or Sessions Judge, before ordering the committal of the accused to the Sessions Court, must come to a finding, with reference to the evidence that the accused has

been improperly discharged—*Śrīkrishṇa*, 1 P.L.J. 97, 17 Cr.L.J. 330. The mere fact that the charge is in the opinion of the District Magistrate of such an important character that it should be considered by a Court of Session, is not a sufficient reason for interfering with the order of discharge—*Śrīkrishṇa*, *supra*.

It is the duty of the Sessions Judge, in considering whether the accused person has been improperly discharged, to consider all the grounds upon which such order of discharge has been passed, including a consideration of the evidence which has not been believed or held to be sufficient to establish a *prima facie* case. Then only can he pass an order for the commitment of the accused or for further inquiry—*Harbans v. Fakir*, 7 C.W.N. 77. The Sessions Judge has to consider whether it was open to the Magistrate to come to the conclusion to which he did come on the materials before him. That a different view could be taken on the evidence would not justify the Sessions Judge in ordering commitment; he must come to the conclusion that the finding of the Magistrate is not only wrong but perverse—*Ritbhanjan v. Emp.*, 6 P.L.T. 570, 26 Cr.L.J. 886 (889).

The Sessions Judge can direct the committal of an accused person improperly discharged by the sub-Magistrate, though no express order of discharge has been recorded by that Magistrate—*Gandī Apparāṣṇ*, 43 Mad. 330.

The section applies where the accused person has been discharged and not where he has been acquitted—*Baija Nath v. Gauri*, 20 Cal. 633; *Q. E. v. Hanumantha*, 23 Mad. 225. Where the Magistrate has in fact discharged the accused though he has used the expression 'acquitted and released,' the Sessions Judge is competent to order a committal under this section—*Neetai Dulal*, 8 W.R. 41. Where, on a complaint in respect of a sessions offence, the Magistrate finding that no sessions offence had been committed, tried the accused of a non-sessions offence and acquitted him, it was held that this section did not apply, even the acquittal of the accused in respect of the minor offence could not be construed to amount to a discharge in respect of the grave offence, and no order under this section could be passed by the Sessions Judge—*Baija Nath v. Gauri*, 20 Cal. 633. Where the accused was tried and acquitted by a competent Magistrate on a charge of simple forgery under sec. 465 I. P. Code, but the Sessions Judge by an order under sec. 437 Cr. P. Code directed the commitment of the accused on a charge of forgery of a public document under sec. 467 I. P. Code (a sessions offence) with a view to hold the accused should have been charged, held that sec. 437 applied, and the accused not having been properly discharged, the Sessions Judge had no power to direct his committal—*Abdul Hakiri v. Bajrak Ali*, 22 C.W.N. 117 (120), 14 Cr.L.J. 1000 (Richardson J.). But in *Krishna Reddi v. Subbarama*, 21 Cr.L.J. 1000 was held that the acquittal of the accused in respect of the sessions offence was in substance a discharge of the accused in respect of the sessions offence.

offence, and the Sessions Judge was therefore justified in having made an order for further inquiry in respect of the graver offence and for committal to the Sessions. Similarly, in a Sind case, where a Magistrate of the first class acquitted certain persons who were charged under secs 424 and 506 of the I. P. Code, whereupon the complainant made applications to the Magistrate to frame a charge under sec. 395 I. P. Code, but the Magistrate declined to entertain them, and then the District Magistrate, being moved by the complainant, and acting under sec. 437 Cr. P. Code framed a charge against the accused and committed them to take their trial before the Sessions Court, held that the Magistrate's order was in substance one discharging the accused in respect of an alleged offence under sec. 395 I. P. Code, and the District Magistrate had jurisdiction to pass the order in question—*Khanu v. Emp*, 19 S.L.R. 353, 25 Cr.L.J. 1368, A.I.R. 1925 Sind 190 (following 24 Mad. 136).

This section applies not only where the accused has been expressly discharged, but also where he has been *impliedly discharged*. Thus, where on a complaint for an offence under sec 302 I. P. C. the Magistrate disbelieving the evidence did not frame any charge under sec 302 or 304 I. P. C. but framed only charges under secs. 147, 323, 325, held that the action of the Magistrate amounted to an implied order of discharge in regard to secs 302 and 304 I. P. C., and an order directing committal in regard to sec. 304 can be made by the Sessions Judge—43 Mad 330. But the Oudh Court holds that the word 'discharge' means absolute discharge, and not a *partial discharge*. Therefore, where the police challan mentioned offences under secs. 147 and 304 I. P. C., but the Magistrate after hearing the evidence for the prosecution framed a charge under secs 147 and 325, the accused could not be said to have been discharged, and the Sessions Judge was not authorised to order commitment for an offence under sec. 304 I. P. C.—*Bilodar v. K. E.*, 3 O.W.N. 201, 27 Cr.L.J. 417, 13 O.L.J. 490.

'By an inferior Court':—For the meaning of 'inferior,' see Note 1171 under sec. 435.

A Subordinate Magistrate of the First Class, invested with powers under sec. 30 is inferior to the District Magistrate, and the latter can revise an improper order of discharge passed by the former in a case triable exclusively by the Court of Session—*Yado*, 12 N.L.R. 91, 17 Cr.L.J. 245.

1191. Order for commitment:—Under this section the Sessions Judge can himself commit the accused. The words 'order him to be committed' do not mean more than 'pass an order for his committal' and the intervention of a Magistrate for making the commitment is not necessary—*Q. E. v. Krishnabhai*, 111 Bom 319. There is nothing in this section to shew that when a District Magistrate or Sessions Judge directs a discharged person to be committed for trial, the commitment must be made by the discharging Magistrate—*Ibid.* But of course it is not wrong to call upon the discharging Magistrate to make the com-

mitment—*Q. E. v. Priya Gopal*, 9 Bom 100, *Q. E. v. Surendra*, 28 Cal 397

This section enables the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate to commit the accused person for trial only for the offence with which he was substantially charged in the complaint—*Taruck Nath*, 19 W R 30 (31). When the accused has been discharged by the subordinate Magistrate of one offence, the Sessions Judge is not competent to direct the accused to be committed for trial for another offence—*Sundaram*, 2 Weir 549. Thus, where the police charge-sheet on which the subordinate Magistrate took cognisance of a case charged the accused with a minor offence, and the grave offence of rape was not mentioned in it, nor did the prosecution press for the framing by the Magistrate of a charge in respect of that offence, and the Magistrate framed a charge only of the minor offence, it was held that the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to direct the subordinate Magistrate to commit the accused to the Sessions for the higher offence—*Marappa Goundan*, 41 Mad 982, 19 Cr.L.J. 945. If on the evidence it appears that some other offence has been committed by the accused, the proper course is to order an inquiry under proviso (b)

In ordering commitment, the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate should specify the offence for which the accused is to be committed for trial—*Joy Kuru v. Man Patuck*, 21 W.R. 41. The Sessions Court has no power to commit when there is no legal evidence against the accused—*Nowab v. Kokil*, 24 W.R. 70. A Sessions Judge, while directing a Magistrate under this section to make a commitment, has no power to direct the Magistrate to take the accused's defence or ask the accused to make a defence—*Ghasce*, 4 N.W.P. 50.

Order passed after prior refusal—Where some of the accused persons are discharged, and an application being made to the Sessions Judge for revision of the order of discharge, he summarily rejects the application upon a perusal only of the judgment of the Magistrate, the Sessions Judge is not precluded, upon examining the record when the case of the other accused comes to him for trial, from passing an order of commitment of the persons who have been discharged. The first order was a summary order passed without examining the record, whereas the second order was passed after examination of the whole record of evidence; the first order was not properly speaking a judgment at all. Consequently sec 369 is no bar to the subsequent order. Had the first order been passed after calling for the record and perusing the same, there might have been room for controversy that the Sessions Judge had no power to revise or vary that order under sec 369—*Debidas*, 33 C.W.N. 974.

1192. Further inquiry, whether can be ordered:—A

District Magistrate proceeding under this section is not restricted to ordering commitment of the accused who may have been discharged by a subordinate Magistrate; he can also direct a further inquiry, prior to making an order for commitment—*K. E. v. Moniruddin*, 18 Cal. 75

Where, after the discharge of an accused person, fresh evidence comes to light, the District Magistrate should not direct a subordinate Magistrate to commit the accused, for it will amount to a committal for trial on the evidence of witnesses whom the accused has not had an opportunity of cross-examining. The proper course for the District Magistrate is to direct a fresh inquiry—*Lingappa*, 2 Weir 550.

When commitment should be ordered and not further inquiry.—Where in a case triable exclusively by the Court of Session the inferior Court has considered the whole of the prosecution evidence and there is no defect of procedure, and the Magistrate discharges the accused because in his opinion the evidence is insufficient or incredible, then if the District Magistrate comes to a different conclusion upon the evidence, his proper course is to make an order of commitment and not to direct further inquiry—*Yado*, 12 N.L.R. 94, 17 Cr.L.J. 245. Where in a case triable exclusively by the Sessions Court, the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate is satisfied that on the evidence taken there is a clear case for committal, and there is no reason for desiring a further consideration by the Magistrate, it would ordinarily be his duty to commit under this section without ordering a further inquiry—*Haridas v. Saritulla*, 15 Cal. 608.

1193. Proviso (a):—Notice to accused:—It is an essential condition precedent to an order under this section that the accused should have an opportunity of showing cause against his commitment. An order made without issuing such notice is bad in law and not maintainable—*Asif Khan v. Faltu*, 1888 A.W.N. 236, *Dwarkanath*, 1 C.L.R. 93; *Nonab v. Kosi*, 24 W.R. 70; *Thammanna v. K. E.*, 15 M.L.J. 373. Where some of the accused were not made parties to the revision petition to the District Magistrate against the order of discharge, and no notice had been ordered to be served upon them, and they had no opportunity of showing cause against the order of commitment made by the District Magistrate, held that the order of commitment made by the District Magistrate was clearly wrong and must be set aside so far as these accused were concerned—*In re Mania*, 48 Mad. 874, 49 M.L.J. 155, 26 Cr.L.J. 1570. Where, however, a District Magistrate ordered the subordinate Magistrate to make a committal to the Court of Session, without giving the accused any notice, but the committing Magistrate issued a notice before doing so, the defect was cured by sec. 537—*Rabha*, *Ratanlal & Co.* Also, where no objection was taken to the want of notice and the omission has not occasioned a failure of justice, the High Court will not interfere—*Emp. v. Khamir*, 7 Cal. 662.

The opportunity to shew cause mentioned in this proviso does not mean any opportunity but that the accused must have a special opportunity. Where the Sessions Judge who was trying a case of false evidence suddenly asked a witness in the course of his examination to explain why he should not be again committed for a trial for murder in respect of an act for which he had been previously discharged, and on answers given by the witness to the above question, ordered his com-

mitment for trial for murder, held that the order was illegal since the accused had not been properly called upon to shew cause—*Ratanlal* 588.

If a notice is given to the accused under this proviso, he is not under any obligation to appear and shew cause. He may or may not avail himself of the opportunity as he chooses—*Kanwar v. Q. E.*, 1893 P.R. 15.

1194. Interference by High Court.—Under sec. 439, the High Court has power to revise an order of commitment passed under this section by the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate—*Rash Behari v. Emp.*, 12 C.W.N. 117. In the exercise of the powers of revision, the High Court can, on the merits of the case, cancel an order of commitment passed by the Sessions Judge under this section, as for instance, where the order setting aside a discharge and directing commitment is made on insufficient or unreliable evidence—*Prithi Chand v. Sampatia*, 7 C.W.N. 327, or where there is no *prima facie* case for commitment—*Sheobux v. Emp.*, 9 C.W.N. 829.

The order of a Sessions Judge or District Magistrate under this section directing commitment can be quashed by the High Court in the exercise of its revisional powers under sec. 439, and not under sec. 215—*Kalagana*, 27 Mad. 54. Sec. 215 refers only to a commitment actually made, and not to an order directing commitment contemplated by section 437. Therefore the High Court, in considering the order of a Sessions Judge or District Magistrate passed under section 437, may consider the facts as well as the question of law involved and is not limited to points of law only as under sec. 215—*Muthia v. Emp.*, 30 Mad. 224; *Rash Behari v. Emp.*, 12 C.W.N. 117; *Tinkouri v. Emp.*, 1 P.L.T. 153, 21 Cr.L.J. 328, 55 I.C. 600, *Munshi Mander v. Karu*, 8 P.L.T. 146, 25 Cr.L.J. 1089.

But though the High Court possesses the powers to revise orders of commitment, it should exercise those powers most sparingly, and only where it is manifest that the Sessions Judge's order is improper, e.g., where there is no evidence to prove the offence charged—30 Mad. 224; *In re Mania Manika*, 48 Mad. 874, 49 M.L.J. 155. It is evident from this section that the fullest and widest discretion has been given to District Magistrates and Sessions Judges, and when an order of commitment has been duly made, the High Court should be most unwilling to interfere except upon strong grounds and under exceptional circumstances—*Fattu v. Fattu*, 26 All. 564; *Mangat Rai*, 13 A.L.J. 111, 16 Cr.L.J. 139, 27 I.C. 203.

438. (1) The Sessions Judge or District Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, on examining under section 435 or otherwise the record of any proceeding, report for the orders of the High Court the result of such examination, and, when such report contains a recommendation that a sentence be reversed or altered, may

Report to High Court.

order that the execution of such sentence be suspended, and, if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond.

(2) An Additional Sessions Judge shall have and may exercise all the powers of a Sessions Judge under this Chapter in respect of any case which may be transferred to him by or under any general or special order of the Sessions Judge.

Change—The italicised words 'have been added by section 118 of the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act XVIII of 1923 "In order to provide for the absence of a Sessions Judge, we think it is necessary to empower him to make a general order authorising the Additional Sessions Judge to exercise all his powers. We have provided for it specifically by this amendment"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916.*

1195. Who can report :—The only Courts which can make a reference to the High Court are the Court of Session and District Magistrate. An Additional Sessions Judge has jurisdiction to exercise the powers of a Sessions Judge only in respect of cases transferred to him by the Sessions Judge—*Ramchandra*, 1903 A.W.N. 28. In the absence of such transfer, an Additional Sessions Judge has not the powers of a Sessions Judge under this section—*Crown v. Abdul Gaffur*, 1 L.B.R. 119. A Joint Magistrate cannot exercise the powers of the District Magistrate—*Chooramoni*, 14 W.R. 25

'If he thinks fit'.—These words indicate that the District Magistrate or the Sessions Judge is not bound to refer every case in which he may detect an error—*Nidaran*, 20 W.R. 40.

1196. When reference may be made :—A District Magistrate should refer all cases in which he considers the order of the Subordinate Court as illegal—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 564 (565). When a Sessions Judge considers that the judgment or order is contrary to law, or that the punishment is severe or inadequate, he may report the proceedings to the High Court—*Emp. v. Khubi*, 1881 A.W.N. 12. Where a District Magistrate is of opinion that a subordinate Magistrate has no jurisdiction to try a particular case, the District Magistrate has no power to quash the proceedings of the Sub-Magistrate but must report the case for proper orders to the High Court—*Kandasawmi v. Soli Goundan*, 23 Mad. 540. So also, if a Sessions Judge is of opinion that an order of a District Magistrate directing a further inquiry under sec 436 is wrong, a reference to the High Court may be made under this section—*Darbari v. Jagoo Lal*, 22 Cal. 573. A Sessions Judge cannot, upon examining the monthly criminal return of a Magistrate, order further inquiry under sec 436 into the case of a person who has been convicted. If he thinks any further inquiry necessary, he should refer the case to the High Court under this section—*Valav, Ratanlal* 407.

Power of reference after prior refusal:—The fact that a Sessions Judge has once refused to make a reference to the High Court after examination of the case in the ordinary way under sec. 435, does not take away his jurisdiction to make a reference on subsequent facts which come to his knowledge. The words "or otherwise" in this section are wide enough to meet a case where there is clear evidence of some gross miscarriage of justice having occurred, which ought to be brought to the knowledge of the Revisional Court, although in the absence of knowledge of such evidence an application for revision might have been previously rejected—*Sitaram*, 29 Bom L R 480, 28 Cr L J 896

1197. When reference is improper:—This section allows a reference only when the Court of Session is of opinion that the judgment or order is contrary to law, or that the punishment is too severe or inadequate, but not on the ground of the insufficiency or incredibility of the evidence—*Emp v Khubi*, 1881 A W N 12, *Emp v. Ukhid Ali*, 17 C.P.L.R 36; *Shaik Oodla v Barkat*, 18 W R. 7.

A case should not be reported on the ground that a conviction is bad on the merits, unless it is very clear that the conviction is wrong and that there can be no reasonable doubt on the matter. A Sessions Judge should not refer a case to the High Court merely because he considers the conviction of the accused to be bad on the ground that the prosecution witnesses had something in common with the complainant and were on bad terms with the accused—*Sudaman v Emp.*, 49 All. 551, 28 Cr L J 399 (400). A necessity for altering a conviction from one section to another for a cognate offence, when the accused has not been prejudiced by any such error, is not a sufficient ground for a reference to the High Court under this section—*Emp. v Ishan Chandra*, 9 Cal 847

When a District Magistrate or Sessions Judge has himself the power to make the order which he proposes in his letter of reference, a reference under this section is unnecessary—*Bidhu v Moti*, 28 Cal. 102. The High Court will not exercise its revisional powers in a case where the Magistrate making the reference has jurisdiction to dispose of the case himself—*Rahimddino*, 22 S L R 201, 28 Cr L J 978 (979). Thus a case which regularly comes to the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate, on the appeal of a prisoner, cannot be referred to the High Court under this section but must be disposed of by the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate himself—*Sreekissen*, 9 W R 5; *Nussurooddin*, 11 W R 24, *Bega Singh*, 1914 P L R 62, 15 Cr L J 485 (487). A report cannot be made in a case where the proceedings are themselves the subject of a revision case or appeal case pending before the District Magistrate, whose duty it is to pass a judicial order on that case himself—*In re Palani Gownden*, 15 Cr L J 472 (Mad). See also *Rahimddino*, supra. Where an accused has been discharged by a Magistrate, the District Magistrate, if he is of opinion that the discharge is wrong, may take action under sec 436, if he deems it necessary, but cannot make a reference to the High Court—*Shrinivas*, Ratn Lal 290 (291).

This section authorises the District Magistrate or Sessions Judge to make reports to the High Court in respect of proceedings of inferior Criminal Courts, but not in respect of a proceedings pending before his own Court; nor does it authorise him to transfer the decision of a difficult case pending before him to the High Court—*In re Palani Gowden*, 15 Cr.L.J. 472; see also 1914 P.L.R. 62, 9 W.R. 5 and 11 W.R. 24 cited above

A reference by the District Magistrate direct to the High Court for enhancement of sentence is irregular and not warranted by law. The proper course for him to adopt would be to instruct the law officers of the Crown in the High Court to file an application for revision asking for enhancement of the sentence—*Gulab*, 29 Cr.L.J. 235 (236) (Lah.)

Where a Sessions Judge on appeal considers that the conviction and sentence in respect of some of the accused should be altered, and an order under sec. 106 in respect of some of the accused should be set aside, the proper procedure for him is to dispose of the appeal under sec. 423, so far as can be disposed of by him, and to make a reference to the High Court under this section as to necessary matters, and not to let the appeal wait for the reference—*Durga Prasad*, 1884 A.W.N. 120.

A reference can be made if the District Magistrate is of opinion that there is a case for revision, upon examining the record of the Sub-Magistrate's proceeding, and not merely on the representation of the complainant against the Subordinate Magistrate's decision—*Nagoo*, Ratanlal 340, nor merely on the report of a Jail Daroga—*Kunjai*, 1891 A.W.N. 80.

Reference in cases of acquittal—In the case of an acquittal by a Subordinate Magistrate, if the Government does not appeal, the proper course for the District Magistrate, if he is dissatisfied with the order of acquittal, would be to move the Local Government for exercising its powers under sec. 417 and not to make a reference to the High Court under this section. It is not proper and expedient for the High Court as a general rule to exercise its powers of revision in respect of order of acquittal on a reference from the District Magistrate, when the Local Government has not appealed against the order—*In re Sheikh Aminuddin*, 24 All. 346, *Emp v. Madar*, 25 All. 128; *Crown v. Achhar Singh*, 5 Lah. 16 (19), 25 Cr.L.J. 931, *Hrishikesh v. Abadhut*, 44 Cal. 703; *Dabiraddi v. Sakat*, 56 Cal. 924, 30 Cr.L.J. 579; *Q. E. v. Ranga Row*, 15 Mad. 36; *Mogal Beg*, 42 Mad. 109; *Gur Dayal*, 12 A.L.J. 255, 15 Cr.L.J. 304, *Sinnu Gounden*, 38 Mad. 1028; *Ganga v. Ramzan*, 26 Cr.L.J. 337 (Lah.); *K E v. Chandika*, 24 O.C. 4.

In a recent Patna case it has been held that the High Court may justly refuse to interfere on a reference by a District Magistrate only where it is clear that the case is one in which the Local Government would be expected to move on account of its special importance to the administration. But the High Court cannot refuse to entertain a reference in those cases of acquittal which are of no public interest (so that the Government would not move) and in which the High Court would interfere under sec. 439 at the instance of a private party—*Wazir Kunja*.

7 Pat. 579, 30 Cr.L.J. 673 (674). Moreover, a distinction should be drawn between a reference by a District Magistrate and a reference by a Sessions Judge. A District Magistrate has the means of communicating with the Local Government with a view to an appeal under sec. 417, but a Sessions Judge has no such means, and he must either act under sec. 438 or not at all. Further, a Sessions Judge's outlook on the matter is purely judicial. Consequently, a reference made by him ought not to be rejected by the High Court—*Wazir Kunjra*, supra

Reference in Police Proceedings—This section does not empower a District Magistrate to refer to the High Court the proceedings of a Superintendent of Police, as the latter is not a Court subordinate to the Magistrate—*Sankal Chand*, *Ratanlal* 133.

Improper form of reference—Where a reference asked the High Court not to quash the entire order (under sec. 145) passed by a Magistrate, but to confirm a part of the order and to quash the rest, the High Court rejected the reference as improper in form—*Collector of Howrah v. Santak*, 44 C.L.J. 593, 28 Cr.L.J. 210 (212)

1198. Power to refer proceedings of superior Court :

—The powers of the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate under this section are limited by sec. 435, which speaks of proceedings of an inferior Criminal Court, and therefore the District Magistrate has no power in question the propriety of an order of the superior Court (Sessions Judge's Court) and to refer the order to the High Court, for the purpose of having it quashed or modified, especially if the order of the Sessions Judge is one which sets aside or modifies the order of the District Magistrate himself—*Allah Mahr*, 49 All 443, 28 Cr.L.J. 281 (283); *Emp. v. Jamnabai*, 28 All. 91; *Crown v. Wesawi*, 5 Lah. 11 (14), 25 Cr.L.J. 928; *Emp. v. Lobo*, 41 Bom 47, 11 Bom L.R. 796, *Anonymous*, 2 Weir 565; *Q. E. v. Jahandi*, 23 Cal 249; *Q. E. v. Karamdi*, 23 Cal 250, *Hiraman v. Ram Kumar*, 18 Cal 186, *Mahabirpuri*, 2 N.L.R. 149, *Emp. v. Ganga*, 36 All 378, *Baldeo Prasad*, 46 All 851 (855), *Emp. v. Daulat*, 24 A.L.J. 224, 27 Cr.L.J. 327, *Zor Singh*, 10 All 146, *Emp. v. Fazal Dad*, 24 Cr.L.J. 573 (Lah.), *Ishar Singh*, 26 P.L.R. 801, 27 Cr.L.J. 430; *Shah Newaz*, 1 S.L.R. 40, 8 Cr.L.J. 161, *Emp. v. Kassim*, 17 S.L.R. 268, 26 Cr.L.J. 177 (179). *A fortiori*, the District Magistrate has no power to call upon the Sessions Judge to forward the reference to the High Court, and the Sessions Judge can rightly refuse to forward it—*Allah Mahr*, supra. The District Magistrate cannot make a reference to the High Court taking exception to certain remarks made by a Sessions Judge in his judgment, and asking the same to be expunged therefrom—*Khudabux*, 21 S.L.R. 48, 27 Cr.L.J. 1253. The District Magistrate cannot ask the Sessions Judge to report a case to the High Court in which the Magistrate thinks that the acquittal on appeal by the Sessions Judge was wrong—*Gamani*, 1882 A.W.N. 135. It is never intended that a Subordinate Magistrate should have the power of questioning the propriety of an order passed by an Appellate Court, and of reporting it to the High Court, for revision, simply on the ground that

he considers that the original sentence was a proper sentence and should not have been reduced—*Emp. v. Ram Lal*, 8 Cal. 875. If the District Magistrate thinks that there has been a miscarriage of justice in an appeal heard by the Sessions Judge, or if he is dissatisfied with a sentence passed by the Sessions Judge, he should not report the case to the High Court for orders under sec. 438 but should communicate with the Public Prosecutor and invite his attention to it—*Shere Singh*, 9 All. 362 (363); *Baldeo Prasad*, 46 All. 851 (855); *Shah Nawaz*, 1 S.L.R. 40, 8 Cr.L.J. 161; *Hiraman v. Ram Kumar*, 18 Cal. 186, *Krishnaji*, 6 Bom.L.R. 1099; *Fazal Dad*, 24 Cr.L.J. 573 (Lah.); *Karsan*, Ratanlal 601; *Baffo*, Ratanlal 623; *Emp. v. Kassim*, 17 S.L.R. 268, 26 Cr.L.J. 177 (178).

1199. Power to refer question of law :—This section empowers the Sessions Judge and District Magistrate, on examining the record of any proceeding under sec. 435, to report to the High Court for order the result of such examination, which means that the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate is to report the incorrectness or illegality of the sentence or order and not that he should refer abstract points of law to the High Court—*Chouri v. Putai*, 5 O.C. 316. This section was not intended to enable the District Magistrate or Sessions Judge to get the opinion of the High Court on a question of law arising in a case pending before him—*Paloni Gownden*, 15 Cr.L.J. 472 (Mad.); *Rahimino*, 22 S.L.R. 201, 28 Cr.L.J. 978. He cannot make a reference to the High Court on the ground that he entertains some doubt about the correctness of some rulings of the High Court—*Bega Singh*, 1914 P.L.R. 62, 15 Cr.L.J. 485 (487). There is no provision of law which enables a Judge to stop a trial already commenced and to refer to the High Court any questions of law arising on the merits in the case—*Bapuji*, Ratanlal 214. Where a Sessions Judge, after having asked the opinions of the assessors in a case tried before him, made a reference to the High Court on a question whether he had jurisdiction or not, the High Court held that the Sessions Judge ought to have disposed of the question himself and that this section was never intended to be used for the purpose of sending questions to the High Court for opinion—*Bhup Singh*, 2 All. 771; see also *Kallu*, O.S.C. 71.

Where the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate does not really dissent from the actual decision arrived at by the trial Court, a reference to the High Court merely with the object of obtaining a ruling on a question of law ought not to be made—*Emp. v. Madho Singh*, 47 All. 409, 23 A.L.J. 189, 26 Cr.L.J. 865.

Power to take evidence :—Neither section 435 nor this section enables the District Magistrate or Sessions Judge to take further evidence with a view to report the case—*Mulla Ibrahim*, 3 Bom.L.R. 677; *Muhajinia v. Ram Charan*, 12 A.L.J. 461, 15 Cr.L.J. 575.

1200. Contents of the reference :—(1) A Sessions Judge before he refers the case to the High Court is bound to call upon the inferior Court for an explanation of the order passed, and should submit

such explanation to the High Court together with the record—*Mallamdi v. Taripulla*, 8 Cal. 644.

(2) The reasons for the reference should accompany the record—*Kunjal*, 1891 A.W.N. 80.

(3) The order of reference should set forth the points on which orders are required—*Bechan*, O.S.C. 64.

(4) The reference should contain a recommendation that the sentence be revised or altered—*Emp. v. Mohan Lal*, 27 All. 25, and the District Magistrate should also give a brief abstract of the case and the grounds upon which he recommends that the order or sentence he considers to be incorrect should be set aside by the High Court—*Keshava*, 11 Cr L.J. 502 (Mad.).

But the report should not contain any representation of the complainant protesting against the Subordinate Magistrate's decision—*Q. E. v. Nagoo*, Ratanlal 340. So also, a representation made by the Inspector of Police to the District Magistrate in the form of a letter, in which the former expressed his view that a case should be retried (together with the grounds for retrial) should not be forwarded to the High Court along with the reference—*Brahmadin*, 26 A.L.J. 76, 28 Cr L.J. 946 (1947). If the prosecuting Inspector, being dissatisfied with the order of the trial Court, moves the District Magistrate for referring the case to the High Court, the notes of the Inspector should be examined by the District Magistrate, and if there is any portion of them which he considers to be of value, he should embody them in his own order; but it is improper for him to accept *en bloc* the Inspector's criticisms and to attach them to his letter of reference. And it would be more seriously wanting in propriety if the Inspector's notes contain unbecoming language about the trying Magistrate, and the District Magistrate allows a document containing that language to be forwarded to the High Court—*Ram Lal*, 51 All 663, 27 A.L.J. 361, 30 Cr L.J. 562 (566).

1201. High Court's power in dealing with reference :—Where a District Magistrate referred a case with a recommendation that the order of the Sub-Magistrate should be set aside on the ground that the latter did not apply his mind to the actual evidence before him and took a grossly biassed and distorted view of the case held that the High Court would not rely upon the expression of opinion of the District Magistrate, without satisfying itself upon the evidence and upon the conduct of the proceedings generally that that opinion was right, that is, the High Court would investigate the whole of the facts before it would come to the conclusion whether it ought to interfere in revision—*Hrishikesh*, 44 Cal 703, 21 C.W.N. 250. Where the trial Court has fully considered the evidence and discharged the accused, the High Court will not interfere, on a reference by the District Magistrate, unless it is shown that the order of the trial Court was either perverse or unreasonable—*Emp v Jagdamba*, 11 O.L.J. 334, 1 O.W.N. 245, 25 Cr.L.J. 1026.

The power of the High Court to interfere on the merits is undoubted, but this Court will not exercise its power so as virtually to give a right

of appeal, and in reporting a case under this section the Sessions Judge must bear in mind this limitation which exists in practice as regards the exercise of the High Court's power of revision—*Sudaman v. Emp.*, 49 All. 551, 28 Cr.L.J. 399 (400)

439. (1) In the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by itself or which has been reported for orders, or which otherwise comes to its knowledge, the High Court may, in its discretion, exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by sections * 423, 426, 427, and 428 or on a Court by section 338, and may enhance the sentence; and when the Judges composing the Court of Revision are equally divided in opinion, the case shall be disposed of in manner provided by section 429.

(2) No order under this section shall be made to the prejudice of the accused unless he has had an opportunity of being heard either personally or by pleader in his own defence.

(3) Where the sentence dealt with under this section has been passed by a Magistrate acting otherwise than under section 34, the Court shall not inflict a greater punishment for the offence which, in the opinion of such Court, the accused has committed, than might have been inflicted for such offence by a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class.

(4) Nothing in this section applies to an entry made under section 273, or shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction.

(5) Where under this Code an appeal lies and no appeal is brought, no proceedings by way of revision shall be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed.

(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, any convicted person to whom an opportunity has been given under sub-section (2) of showing cause why his sentence should not be enhanced shall, in showing cause, be entitled also to show cause against his conviction.

Change :—This section has been amended by sec. 119 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. In sub-section (1) the figure "195" has been omitted; this is consequential to the amendment made in sec. 195. Sub-section (6) has been newly added. The reasons are stated in proper places.

1202. Scope of section :—The series of sections 435-439 must be read together. Of these, section 435 is the principal section dealing with the grounds upon which revisional jurisdiction may ordinarily be exercised, and sec. 439 must be read along with and subject to the provisions of sec. 435—*Har Prasad*, 40 Cal 477 (F.B.), *Haridas v. Saritulla*, 15 Cal. 608. Section 439 must be read along with and subject to section 435, if a case is outside the scope of section 435, section 439 cannot apply to it—*Moiram v. Mriyan*, 47 Cal 438. Secs 435-438 prescribe the method by which the records of any Criminal case come to the High Court, and the power of the High Court to deal with the record is in Sec. 439. Secs. 435-438 provide the machinery and sec 439 gives the power to dispose of the record—*Kamal Kutty v. Udayavarma*, 36 Mad. 275. The words "the record of which has been called for by itself" refer to sec 435, and the words "which has been reported for orders" refer to sec 438.

'Any proceeding' —Under the old Code of 1872, the words used in this section were 'judicial proceeding' instead of the words "any proceeding," and the High Court could call for and revise the record of a judicial proceeding only; but under the Code of 1882 (as well as under the present Code) the High Court can call for and examine the record of 'any proceeding' e.g., an order by a Magistrate under sec 517 below—*Gangamma*, 2 Weir 538 (539).

High Court should not be moved in the first instance —See Note 1168 under section 435, under heading "To whom application should be made "

1203. Grounds of interference :—The controlling power of revision of the High Court in criminal cases is an extraordinary power and it must be exercised with due regard to the circumstances of each particular case, anxious attention being given to the said circumstances which vary greatly. This discretion ought not to be crystallized, as it would become in course of time, by one Judge attempting to prescribe definite rules with a view to bind other Judges in the exercise of the discretion which the Legislature has committed to them. This discretion, like all other judicial discretions, ought, as far as practicable, to be left untrammelled and free, so as to be fairly exercised according to the exigencies of each case—*Emp v Bankatram*, 28 Bom 533. No hard and fast limitation should be placed on the exercise of the powers of superintendence of the High Court over the proceedings of inferior Courts. There is no species of injustice which the High Court would be powerless to correct, where its interference is called for—*National Bank Ltd. v Kothandarama*, 14 M L.T. 200, 14 Cr L J 529, 1913 M W.N. 728; *Lakhraj v Debi Pershad*, 12 C.W.N. 678. The circumstances which

will justify the interference of High Court have not been and cannot be laid down with precision. While the Judges have repeatedly held that only when exceptional grounds exist the High Court ought to interfere, the decided cases shew that no hard and fast rule can be laid down but that when in the interests of justice the High Court's intervention becomes necessary, it ought not to be refused—*Ramanathan v. Subrahmanya*, 47 Mad. 722 (725).

Section 439 empowers the High Court to revise an order which, in the language of sec 435, is incorrect, illegal or improper. Where a Magistrate passing an order under sec. 449 of the Calcutta Municipal Act (1899) for demolition of a building, has not properly exercised his discretion under that section, or has passed an erroneous order, the High Court can set aside the order in revision—*Abdul Samad v. Corporation of Calcutta*, 33 Cal. 287 (290, 291); *Chuni Lal v. Corporation of Calcutta*, 34 Cal. 341 (345). Sections 435 and 439 give the High Court power to control the propriety as well as the legality of a finding, sentence or order of any inferior Criminal Court. If therefore a sentence has been passed or confirmed by a Court which could not legally try the case by reason of the prohibition contained in sec. 556, or should not properly have tried the case, the High Court has a discretion to interfere and set aside the proceedings—*Faiz Muhammad*, 9 N.L.R. 81, 14 Cr.L.J. 385 (386, 387). When an illegal order is passed and action taken by a Magistrate which involves matters coming within the purview of law and justice and within the scope of authority of the Court, the revisional power of the High Court cannot be ousted by the mere *ipsi dixit* of the Magistrate that he was not acting as a Judicial officer but in his executive capacity; and the High Court can interfere in revision—*Shiv Nath v. Emp.*, 1908 P.R. 4, 7 Cr.L.J. 202 (204).

The High Court can interfere in revision on the ground of misreading of documentary evidence and fundamental errors in principle which vitiate the conduct and disposal of the case—*Emp. v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak*, 28 Bom. 479.

The High Court will interfere with an order of a Magistrate passed without jurisdiction under a certain Act, even though that Act provides that the conviction under it shall not be open to appeal or revision—*Khamiso*, 2 S.L.R. 20, 10 Cr.L.J. 233. Thus, although sec 15 of the Extradition Act ousts the jurisdiction of the High Court to inquire into the propriety of a warrant issued under Chapter III of that Act, yet where the order was made clearly without jurisdiction, it is open to revision by the High Court in the instance of the party whose liberty is affected by it—*Gulli Sahu*, 41 Cal. 400, 18 C.W.N. 869, 14 Cr.L.J. 673; *Fusenality*, 7 Bom.L.R. 463, 11 Cr.L.J. 439.

The High Court will interfere and reduce the sentence where the Magistrate has passed a heavy sentence for non-judicial reasons which have no bearing on the gravity of the offence committed by the accused (e.g., on the ground that the accused falsely blamed the Court for expressing its opinion and for helping the prosecution), although the passing

of a heavy sentence is not by itself a ground of revision at all—*Jawad Husain*, 2 Luck. 503, 28 Cr.L.J. (674). The High Court can exercise its power of revision even after the expiry of the sentence; and though it is not possible to interfere with the sentence because it has expired, the law does not prevent the High Court from interfering with the conviction—*Q. E. v. Sinha*, 7 All 135

The High Court has the power and the right to call for the record of a case and make such order thereon as it deems just even though the applicant is dead—*Dongaji*, 2 Bom 564 [Contra—*Kharana v Q. E.*, 1893 P.R. 6, where it is held that an application for revision abates on the death of the applicant] Sec 431 (as amended in 1898) allows an appeal from a sentence of fine after the death of the appellant, and similarly the High Court can exercise its power of revision, even after the death of the applicant, in a case where compensation has been awarded under section 250, such compensation being in the nature of a fine—*Prem Singh v. Bhola*, 1908 P.R. 24, see also *Daulat Ram*, 1919 P.R. 8, 20 Cr.L.J. 214, (cited under sec 431)

The High Court has ample power to interfere, should it see fit to do so, in any case in which the Magistrate has either refused to exercise a discretion vested in him by the law, or has exercised that discretion in an improper manner or on improper grounds—*Nizam v Jacob*, 19 Cal. 52, *Juggut Chunder*, 2 Cal 110, e.g. where the Appellate Court did not give the appellant's pleader an opportunity of being fully heard on all the points that arose in the appeal—*Basavanappa*, 29 Bom L.R. 488, 28 Cr.L.J. 467 (468)

The High Court can in revision reverse the proceedings of a Magistrate on the ground of disqualification of the Magistrate in a particular case, owing to personal or pecuniary interest or bias—*Chande v. Emp*, 1884 P.R. 40 So also, where the Magistrate acted in his character as Magistrate believing he had power to do so, whereas in fact he had no such power, his act is liable to be set aside in revision upon the application of the party aggrieved—*Gunda Singh*, 1866 P.R. 21, *Crown v. Tokha*, 1870 P.R. 4.

The High Court can interfere in revision where the procedure followed by the Magistrate has been improper and faulty, e.g. where the Magistrate based his decision not upon the evidence recorded but on unrecorded evidence taken verbally subsequently on the spot—*Sreeputtee*, 24 W.R. 14, or where the Magistrate negligently omitted to record the evidence of previous conviction and convicted and sentenced the accused—*Crown v. Santu*, 1874 P.R. 12, *Emp v Yusuf*, 1879 P.R. 28, or where the inquiry in the Lower Court has been faulty—*Bhawoo v Alulp*, 12 Bom 377

The High Court will interfere in revision when there is a material error in the proceedings, which means not an error in decision upon the facts, but some error in law or procedure which affects the decision—*Debi Churn*, 20 W.R. 40 Thus, where there is a substantial doubt as to the guilt of the accused, it is a material error not to give the accused

the benefit of the doubt, and the High Court can interfere and acquit the accused—*Ram Jas*, 1916 P.L.R. 66, 17 Cr.L.J. 303, *Mahabli v Crown*, 1915 P.L.R. 188, 18 Cr.L.J. 699, 30 I.C. 747; *Fazla*, 1875 P.R. 6. Where the Court has taken a wrong view of the facts through an error of law, e.g., where it places the burden of proof on the accused, contrary to the principles laid down in sec. 101 of the Evidence Act, the High Court will interfere.—*Q. E. v. Nagesh*, Ratanlal 794. Where the evidence for the prosecution was weak and biassed and it was possible that the accused did the act complained of (theft) under a bona fide belief that he had the right to the property, it was an error of law of the Magistrate not to have acquitted him; and in revision the High Court set aside the conviction—*Ram Jas*, *supra*; see also *Udai Narain v. Rama Nath*, 18 Cr.L.J. 732 (733) (Cal.) An improper summing up by the Sessions Judge in which the Judge omitted to charge the jury as to the degree of credit to be given to a particular witness, is an error in law which is a good ground for revision—*Elahee Bukhsh*, 5 W.R. 80. It is a material error to convict a person of being in possession of stolen property, in the absence of evidence showing dishonest possession on the part of the accused, especially where the theft is not recent—*Sohna v Crown*, 1875 P.R. 15. Omission to take a very material evidence offered by the accused is a material error which prejudices the accused, and the High Court can interfere—*Huri Pershad*, 24 W.R. 60. Lavity and indifference on the part of the Sessions Judge in weighing and sifting the evidence is a material error which calls for revision—*Emp v. Murlu*, 2 All 338. A defective investigation by the Magistrate is a material error which justifies interference of the High Court in revision—*Reddi Ramaiya*, 2 Weir 570.

The High Court will interfere where the order of the Lower Court was passed without recording sufficient evidence. Where the evidence on record was insufficient to support a conviction, the High Court in revision set aside an order of the Sessions Judge summarily rejecting the appeal, and remanded the case for rehearing on the merits—*Jsswar Chandra*, 10 C.W.N. 446. The High Court will also interfere where the Lower Court has failed to consider important evidence and has accepted certain other evidence without any critical examination—*Nizamaddi*, 23 C.W.N. 488, 20 Cr.L.J. 551.

The High Court can interfere with an order in a criminal case on the ground that inferences unfavourable to the accused and not warranted by the evidence had been drawn to the prejudice of the accused—*Nga Shwe*, 18 Cr.L.J. 116 (Bur.)

1204. How powers of High Court can be invoked:—

The High Court will interfere either by calling for the record under sec. 435, or when the case has been reported to it for orders under sec. 438, or when the case "otherwise comes to its knowledge." The High Court may interfere in revision upon information in whatever way received—*In re Aurokiam*, 2 Mad 38. The powers conferred by this section are at all times to be exercised and they may be put in force not merely on matters coming before the Judge in Court, but also on

matters coming to his knowledge on reliable information—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 538. The High Court can exercise its revisional powers, when a case comes to the knowledge of the Court on an application made by the Government through an official communication instead of through the Law Officers of the Crown—*Mata Din*, 1887 A.W.N. 144. The High Court has power to interfere in revision on a matter being brought to its notice in any manner whatever, not necessarily by means of an application on the part of the person convicted. It can interfere on information contained in a newspaper or a placard on a wall or an anonymous post-card, if it considers that sufficient grounds have been established to justify its so doing. But where the convicted persons who might have appealed did not appeal or apply in revision because they (being non-co-operators) refused to recognize the authority of any Court established by British authority in India, the High Court should be loath to take action on an application for revision presented by a third party on his own responsibility and without authority from the convicts on whose behalf it was presented—*In re Narain Prasad*, 45 All 128 (129).

Although the Court has power under sec 439 of the Code to call for cases not only on judicial information but also to deal with a case which "otherwise comes to its knowledge," yet in most circumstances it is a right practice that the Judges should be moved in open Court—*Q E v Abdul*, Ratanlal 577; *Q E v. Abdul Rahuman*, 16 Bom. 580.

The High Court may exercise its power of revision upon the petition of a private person occupying the position of a complainant in the case in which revision is sought—*In re Auro Kiam*, 2 Mad 38, *Sukho v. Durga*, 2 All. 448; *Teju*, 2 S.L.R. 25, 10 Cr.L.J. 237; *Pheku*, 4 P.L.J. 435, 20 Cr.L.J. 545. When an order of discharge of an accused person has the effect of operating to the detriment of a third person, such person has the right to apply in revision—*G. V Raman*, 56 Cal. 1023, 33 C.W.N. 468 (473).

The High Court may also exercise its power on its own initiative—*Radha Kishen*, 1912 P.L.R. 67, 13 Cr.L.J. 476, *Dongaji*, 2 Bom. 564. The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised *suo motu* even though the accused does not desire it—*Hiranand*, 17 S.L.R. 245, 25 Cr.L.J. 134, A.I.R. 1924 Sind 129.

Interference with acquittal—In case of acquittal, the High Court can exercise its powers of revision on the application of a private prosecutor, when there is a material error in the proceeding in the case—*Hardeo*, 1 All. 139; *Teju*, 2 S.L.R. 25; *Sukho v Durga*, 2 All 448; *Maung Htin v. Mg Po*, 4 Rang 471, 28 Cr.L.J. 219 (221). Any private person may invoke the revisional powers of the High Court under sec 439 to set aside an order of acquittal, or the High Court may of its own motion set aside such an order—*Anwar Ali v Chairman, Deoghar Municipality*, 6 Pat 83, 28 Cr.L.J. 80 (82). Though as a Court of Appeal the High Court can consider an order of acquittal only on an appeal by the Local Government, yet as a Court of revision it can deal with an original or appellate order of acquittal either when reported under sec.

438 or whenever it may otherwise come to its knowledge, It can do so even on the application of a private prosecutor—*Basant Lall*, 27 Cal. 320. See also *Kangali v. Bama Charan*, 38 Cal. 786; *Sheik Bajoo v. Raika*, 18 C.W.N. 1244, 15 Cr.L.J. 722; *Gangadhar v. Reid*, 25 C.W.N. 609 23 Cr.L.J. 41; *Jitan v. Domoo*, 1 P.L.J. 264, 18 Cr.L.J. 151, *Ram Chand v. Jai Dial*, 1915 P.W.R. 18, 16 Cr.L.J. 657; *Tirthdas*, 6 S.L.R. 120, 13 Cr.L.J. 771; and *Allahrakho*, 11 S.L.R. 101, 13 Cr.L.J. 780, where the High Court entertained an application for revision preferred by the private complainant against the order of acquittal. The High Court ought to interfere with an order of acquittal at the instance of a private complainant especially in a case like defamation where the offence is of so personal a nature that the Local Government would seldom be willing to appeal from the acquittal—*Sunderabai v. Kishore*, 20 Cr.L.J. 708 (Nag); *Faujdar v. Kasi*, 42 Cal. 612 (616) (per Jenkins C.J.), *Asutosh v. Purna Chandra*, 50 Cal. 159 (163); so also, in a case of insult—*Rakhal v. Kailash*, 11 C.L.J. 113, 11 Cr.L.J. 213. The High Court will also interfere where the order of acquittal was passed under sec. 247 for non-appearance of the complainant—*Ram Nidh v. Ram Saran*, 26 O.C. 282, 25 Cr.L.J. 794. The High Court interfered on the motion of a private person, in a case where the lower Court proceeded on a wrong view of the law, and where the matter was of great importance to the petitioner in his position as the author of a book, which, if the judgment of acquittal was allowed to stand, would be pirated by another who would secure for himself the gains that ought legitimately to go to the petitioner—*Venkatrao v. Padmanabha*, 53 M.L.J. 529, 28 Cr.L.J. 957 (958).

In some cases, however, it has been held that the High Court has no power to revise an order of acquittal, except at the instance of the Local Government. Where no appeal has been preferred by the Local Government, an application for revision by a private person should be discouraged on public grounds. It has been the settled practice that the High Court will not ordinarily interfere with an order of acquittal at the instance of a private prosecutor, because it is always open to the aggrieved complainant to move the Local Government to appeal under sec. 417—*Thandavan v. Periana*, 14 Mad. 363; *Pahlwan v. Sahib Singh*, 19 A.L.J. 382, 22 Cr.L.J. 597, 62 I.C. 869, *Jota v. Parshottam*, 25 Bom.L.R. 488, 24 Cr.L.J. 734, *Binda Prasad v. Ripusudan*, 5 N.L.R. 4, 9 Cr.L.J. 211, *Miyaji*, 3 Bom. 150; *Fareedoon Cowasji*, 41 Bom. 560 (561); *Sheik Sahib*, 8 Bom. 197, *Heera v. Framji*, 15 Bom. 349; *Ala Bakhsh*, 6 All. 484; *Prag Dat*, 20 All. 459; *Qayyum v. Faiz Ali*, 27 All. 359; *Municipal Committee v. Mingu*, 8 Cal. 895; *Karana*, 22 Cal. 164; *Faujdar v. Kasi*, 42 Cal. 612 (616); *Gulli Bhagat v. Narain*, 2 Pat. 708; *Anant v. Hari Charan*, 26 Cr.L.J. 516 (Pat.); *Rameshwar*, 53 Bom. 564; *Damodar v. Jajharsingh*, 23 N.L.R. 99, 26 Cr.L.J. 1348; *Sher Khan v. Anwar Khan*, 28 Cr.L.J. 523, 23 N.L.R. 40; *Janu, Fakir*, 15 S.L.R. 171, A.I.R. 1922 Sind 22, 23 Cr.L.J. 343; *Bachcha v. Bachcha*, 28 O.C. 384, 12 O.L.J. 63, 27 Cr.L.J. 854. Applications against orders of acquittal are not entertained from private petitioners except it be on some very broad ground of the exceptional requirements of public justice—*Fareedoon*

Cowasji, supra; *Faujdar v. Kasi Chowdhury*, supra, *Rameshwar*, supra; *Sankaralinga v. Narayana*, 45 Mad. 913; where there is no matter of public importance involved, nor are the interests of public justice closely concerned, and the petitioners have the opportunity of obtaining full redress in the Civil Courts, the High Court will not interfere with an order of acquittal on the motion of a private complainant—*Faridoon Cowasji*, 41 Bom. 560 (562); *Sher Khan v. Anwar Khan*, 23 N.L.R. 40, 28 Cr.L.J. 523 (528). A petition for revision of an order of acquittal, preferred by a private complainant will be rejected, where it appears that the complainant is not anxious so much to secure due administration of justice as to serve his personal grudge—*Sher Khan v. Anwar Khan*, supra. In cognizable cases the private prosecutor has no position at all, and if the Crown decides to let an offender go, no other aggrieved party can be heard to object that he has not taken his full toll of private vengeance—*Siban Rai v. Bhagnant*, 5 Pat 25, 6 P.L.T. 833, 27 Cr.L.J. 235 (per Mullick J) (But Macpherson J holds in this case that even in cognizable cases, the private prosecutor, if he has initiated the proceeding, can apply for revision of an order of acquittal). The High Court should not entertain an application by a complainant to revise an order of acquittal, after the Local Government has declined to direct an appeal against it—*Graham v. Elsey*, 9 Bur L.T. 47, 17 Cr.L.J. 91 (92).

It is not proper and expedient for the High Court as a general rule to exercise its powers of revision against orders of acquittal on a reference from the District Magistrate under sec 438, where the Local Government has not appealed from the order of acquittal—*Sheikh Amir-uddin*, 24 All 346; *Hrishikesh*, 44 Cal. 703, *Emp v. Madar Baksh*, 25 All 128, *Ranga Row*, 15 Mad 36; *Gur Dayal*, 12 A.L.J. 255; 15 Cr.L.J. 304, *Sinnu Gounden*, 38 Mad 1028, *Mogal Beg.* 42 Mad 109, *Crown v. Achhar Singh*, 5 Lah. 16 (19). Where no appeal has been preferred by the Local Government against an order of acquittal, the High Court does not ordinarily interfere in revision *suo motu* to set aside the acquittal—*Q. E. v. Maung Aung*, 1 Rang 604. The High Court interfered with an order of acquittal where the applicant in revision was not a private individual but a public body, e.g., a municipality. In such a case interference rested on grounds of public importance or public justice. See *Ahmedabad Municipality v. Maganlal*, 9 Bom L.R. 156, 5 Cr.L.J. 171; *Mukund v. Ladu*, 3 Bom L.R. 854, *Municipal Board v. Vadyadhari*, 24 O.C. 57, 22 Cr.L.J. 638, 63 I.C. 334. As to the grounds on which the High Court will revise orders of acquittal, see Note 1219 *infra*.

An order of *discharge* is not the same thing as an order of acquittal, and the High Court can revise an order of discharge at the instance of a private prosecutor—*Maung Htin v. Mg Po*, 4 Rang 471, 28 Cr.L.J. 219 (221). See also *Protab v. Khan Mahomed*, 36 Cal 994.

1205. When High Court will not interfere—In the exercise of its revisional powers, the High Court will not interfere in revision unless it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so to prevent otherwise irreparable injustice—*Umakant*, 9 Bom L.R. 706; *Narain*,

Prasad, 20 A.L.J. 909; *Kuppuswami*, 39 Mad. 561. The High Court will not interfere in revision if no prejudice is shown to have resulted to the accused—*Aladya*, 1906 P.R. 5; *Tha Byaw*, 4 L.B.R. 315, 9 Cr.L.J. 15. The High Court will not always interfere even though the order of Court below is wrong in law or the trial in the Court below is illegal (and not merely irregular), *Hari Singh*, 1913 P.L.R. 313, 14 Cr.L.J. 599 (600); *Sakharam*, 4 Bom.L.R. 686; *Aladya*, 1906 P.R. 5. An order that proceeds upon an error of law, but which apart from that error is a proper order in the case, ought not to be set aside in revision—*Sri Kishan v Devi Dayal*, 2 O.W.N. 823, 26 Cr.L.J. 1619. The High Court will not interfere unless the error in law has led to a failure of justice. It is not the duty of this Court to correct mere mistakes in law which have no more effect than mistakes in grammar or spelling. The power of interference is to be exercised only for the purpose of correcting injustice, not mere illegality—*Narsinghdas*, 29 Cr.L.J. 86 (87) (Nag). Where a case has been properly disposed of on the merits by the Court below, the High Court will not interfere in revision merely on the ground of some error in procedure, e.g., on the ground that the pleader on behalf of the accused was not heard in the Lower Court—*Olayet Khan*, 1 Pat. 589, 24 Cr.L.J. 118, 4 P.L.T. 98.

The mere fact that the High Court sitting as a Court of appeal might have come to a different conclusion on facts from what the Magistrate arrived at, is not a sufficient ground for entertaining an application for revision—*Damodar v. Jujharsingh*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1348 (Nag); *Narsingh Das* 29 Cr.L.J. 86 (Nag).

The High Court will not interfere when there is no error in law on the face of the record—*Sakharam*, 4 Bom.L.R. 686. Where a discretion has been exercised by a Court of competent jurisdiction which is not on the face of it arbitrary, the High Court in revision will neither inquire into the reasons nor interfere—*Gullu Bhagat v. Narain Singh*, 2 Pat. 708 (710).

Where a Magistrate convicts an accused person of an offence falling within his jurisdiction, though the facts found would also constitute a more serious offence not within his jurisdiction, his proceedings are not void *ab initio*, and the High Court will not ordinarily interfere unless the sentence appears inadequate or unless the accused has been deprived of his right of appeal—*Berhamdeo v. K. E.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1559 (Pat.); *Q. E v Gundaya*, 13 Bom. 502, *Emp. v. Ayyan*, 24 Mad. 675. If the accused has been adequately punished by the trying Magistrate, the High Court will not interfere, even though the proceedings before the Magistrate have been somewhat irregular (e.g., where the accused has been punished under one Act, whereas he ought to have been punished under another Act)—*Bishen Singh v. Ismail*, 6 Bur.L.J. 81, 28 Cr.L.J. 757 (758).

The revisional powers of the High Court will not be exercised until all the other remedies (e.g., appeal) provided by law have been exhausted—*Gulab Singh v. Surat*, 1884 A.W.N. 293; *Emp. v. Rajcoomar*, 3 Cal. 573, *Nilambar* 2 All. 276. *Abdur Rahim*, 1905 A.W.N. 143, 2 Cr.

L.J. 335 See Note 1220 under sub-section (5). So also, the High Court will not interfere in revision while an appeal in respect of the same matter is pending before the Appellate Court—*In re Atakuri*, 44 M.L.J. 366

The High Court will not interfere in revision when the accused has pleaded guilty before the Lower Court, except as to the extent or legality of the sentence—*Puttan Lal*, 1907 A.W.N. 204; *Tha Byaw*, 4 L.B.R. 315, 11 Cr.L.J. 15 Cf. sec 412.

The High Court will not interfere in revision when there has been long delay in applying for revision and the delay is not explained or accounted for by the applicant—*Jagan Nath*, 27 All 468. *Ram Narain*, 8 All. 514; *Ala Bakhsh*, 11 All. 484; *Puttan Lal*, 1907 A.W.N. 204, *Avadh Behari v. Dwarka*, 1 P.L.J. 165.

The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court will not be exercised in such a way that a right of appeal may practically be given in cases where such right is definitely excluded by the Code—*Ahsanullah v. Mansukh*, 36 All. 403, *Sudaman v. Emp.*, 49 All 551, 28 Cr.L.J. 399 (400)

The High Court will not allow a revision application when a remedy can be easily obtained from the Civil Court—*Loke Nath v. Nidu*, 6 C.W.N. 469.

The High Court will not interfere on the motion of a party who is in contempt—*Khairat v. Wahed Ali*, A.I.R. 1928 Cal 241

1206. Orders which are subject to revision :—(1) *Orders of a Presidency Magistrate* :—Under secs 423 and 439 the High Court has jurisdiction to set aside an order of discharge or dismissal of complaint passed by a Presidency Magistrate and to direct that the person improperly discharged should be committed for trial or to direct further inquiry into the complaint—*Emp v. Varjivandas*, 27 Bom 84, *Nanda Gopal*, 20 C.W.N. 1128, 17 Cr.L.J. 428, *Malik Partab v. Khan Mahomed*, 36 Cal 994; *Dwarka v. Beni Madhab*, 28 Cal 652, *Colville v. Krishta Kishore*, 26 Cal 746 In *Charoobala v. Barendra*, 27 Cal 126, *Kedar v. Kheira*, 6 C.L.J. 705 and *Debi Bux v. Jutmal*, 33 Cal 1282 it has been held that the High Court can interfere with an order of dismissal or discharge passed by a Presidency Magistrate, not under this Code, but under sec. 15 of the Charter Act See Note 682 under sec 203. An order made by the Chief Presidency Magistrate of Bombay under the Maintenance Orders Enforcement Act (XVIII of 1921) can be revised by the High Court under sec 107 of the Government of India Act or under clauses 27 and 28 of the Letters Patent, if not under secs 435 and 439 of this Code—*Katti v. Katti*, 52 Bom 262, 29 Cr.L.J. 513 (514)

(2) *Non-appealable orders* :—The High Court's power of revision is not limited to orders from which an appeal would lie. On the other hand, the High Court ought to rectify cases of injustice or illegality when the person affected is unable to appeal. The High Court in revision can exercise its power of appeal with reference to any particular order, whether appealable or not—*Ram Kala v. Ganda*, 1885 P.R. 42, *Bishen*

Das, 1910 P.R. 33, 11 I.C. 1161 (1165), 12 Cr.L.J. 50 (dissenting from *Charoobala v. Barendra*, 27 Cal 126 and *Azim Khan*, 1885 P.R. 45)

(3) *Order granting bail* :—The proceeding in which it has to be determined whether the accused person should be admitted to bail is a judicial proceeding, and is therefore cognizable by the High Court as a Court of Revision—*Manikam Mudali*, 6 Mad. 63. But where a Sessions Judge, finding that there was no reasonable ground for believing that the accused was guilty, released him on bail under sec. 497, the High Court would not interfere with such order in revision, though it has power to do so—*Q v Thimma*, 10 M.L.J. 411; *Badri Prasad*, 5 A.L.J. 419. See notes under sec. 497.

(4) *Order refusing to grant copies* :—Where the Magistrate refused to grant to the accused the copies of papers which were necessary for his defence, the High Court in revision set aside the conviction on that ground—*Sheeb Prasad*, 14 W.R. 77

(5) *Preliminary or interlocutory order* :—It is competent to the High Court to call for the record of any proceeding in an inferior Criminal Court, and if necessary or expedient, to revise an order passed by such Court, whether of a preliminary or final nature—*T. N. Chadha*, 14 A.L.J. 851, 18 Cr.L.J. 46, *Jagan Singh*, 1892 A.W.N. 102; *Thakaria v. Puran*, 23 Cr.L.J. 429 (Lah.) Thus, where a District Magistrate called upon a witness who gave evidence before him to show cause why he should not be prosecuted for perjury, the High Court was competent to revise such order—*T. N. Chadha*, supra. So also, where a Magistrate, after dismissing a complaint without inquiry, passed an order calling upon the complainant to show cause why he should not be prosecuted for bringing a false complaint, the High Court revised the preliminary order, though no final order directing the prosecution of the complainant had yet been passed—*Sheo Balak*, 22 Cr.L.J. 81 (All.) See also Note 1215.

(6) *Orders under Sections 88, 94, 106, 110, 118, 143, 144, 145-149, 250, 344, 386, 476, 488, 514, 515, 517, 520, 522*; see notes under those sections

See also Note 1173 under sec. 435.

1207. Orders which are not open to revision :—(1)

Order under Press Act :—An order under sec. 8 Press Act (Act I of 1910) for the deposit of security by the publisher of a newspaper is an executive order and not revisable by the High Court—*Aga Syed Jalaluddin*, 17 C.W.N. 1245, 15 Cr.L.J. 145, so also an order under sec. 3 (1) of the Press Act—*Annie Besant v. Govt. of Madras*, 39 Mad. 1085, 18 Cr.L.J. 157; or an order of forfeiture passed under section 12 of that Act—*Mahomed Ali*, 41 Cal 466 (F.B.), 11 C.W.N. 1, 14 Cr.L.J. 497.

(2) *Order under the Extradition Act* :—The High Court has no power under this section to interfere in respect of a warrant issued by a Political Agent in a Native State under sec. 7 of the Extradition Act (XV of 1903), either on the ground that there is no *prima facie* case against the petitioner or on the ground that the circumstances under which the

officer was originally moved do not justify him in exercising his power under the said Act—*Giyan Chand*, 1909 P.R. 3, 3 Cr.L.J. 3. Where a warrant is issued by a Political Agent under sec 7 of the Extradition Act, its execution by the District Magistrate in accordance with the Act is an executive act, and the High Court cannot interfere in revision with such execution. But the High Court can interfere otherwise than by way of revision under sec. 491—*Gulli Sahu*, 42 Cal 793, 19 C.W.N. 221.

(3) Order of the Local Government sanctioning prosecution under sec. 197 See Note 649 under section 197.

(4) *Orders of the High Court itself*.—A single Judge of the High Court has no power to revise an order passed by another single Judge in appeal, and to set aside the conviction, even on the ground of discovery of new materials. The only remedy is to refer the matter to the Local Government under Chapter XXIX of this Code—*Emp v Kale*, 45 All. 143 (145). The judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court as well as the sentence is final, and the Court is *functus officio* as soon as the judgment is signed by the Judges, and the High Court or any Bench of it has no power to revise the sentence or interfere with it in any way—*Gibbons*, 14 Cal. 42. So also, a Division Bench cannot revise an order of a single Judge of the High Court—*Press v. K. E.*, 1909 P R 4, 9 Cr. L J 378, 1 I C. 747, *Hale v K E.*, 1909 P R 1, 9 Cr L J 306, 1 I C. 506, *Hira*, 1909 P R 8, 10 Cr.L.J 314, 3 I C 580 (582), *Durga Charan*, 7 All 672; *Kunhammad*, 46 Mad. 382. See notes under sec. 369. The only exception is in a case under sec 434. See notes under that section, and 1909 P.R. 1 cited therein.

For other orders which are not open to revision see Note 1172 under sec. 435

1208. Powers of the High Court in revision :—Powers of an Appellate Court :—Sec. 439 enumerates the powers which the High Court may exercise in revision, and it declares that in any proceeding the record of which has been called for by itself or reported for orders or otherwise comes to its knowledge, or on an application made by the complainant, the Court may in its discretion exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by certain preceding sections, among others, by sec 423—*Emp v Varjivandas*, 27 Bom 84, *Emp v Marli*, 11 All 336, *Phcka*, 4 P.L.J 435, 20 Cr.L.J 545. The nature of the powers that the High Court has in revision is the same as that which a Court of appeal has in the case of an appeal from any order against which an appeal is allowed by the Code—*National Bank v Kothandarama* 14 M.L.T. 200, 14 Cr L J 529. But a Sessions Judge or a District Magistrate cannot while sitting in revision exercise the powers conferred by the Court on an appellate Court. Appellate powers are in revision conferred by sec. 439 only on the High Court—*Bajanath v Gauri Kanta*, 20 Cal 633. But the High Court sitting as a Court of revision will not exercise the powers of an Appellate Court except on very exceptional grounds—*Sheik Sahib*, 5 Bom 197. A High Court undoubtedly

jurisdiction to entertain a revision on *grounds of fact*, but it is equally well established that this power should be very sparingly exercised. There is a well-marked distinction between an application in revision and an appeal. It would be futile for the Legislature to grant the right of appeal in some cases and to withhold it in others, if the High Court under the guise of a revision were to allow conclusions of fact based on evidence to be canvassed and attacked on the footing of an appeal. Broadly speaking, the rule is that the High Court will only entertain a revision on fact where either there is no evidence to support the finding or where the finding arrived at is perverse or such as no reasonable man could have arrived at on the evidence produced—*Abdul Wahid v. Abdullah*, 45 All 656 (661). Specially, in a case where no appeal is allowed by the law, the High Court will not in revision exercise the powers of an Appellate Court except on very exceptional grounds—*Mahomed Husan. Ratanlal* 244, *Umakant*, 3 Bom L.R. 706. The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court may be exercised in order to prevent gross and palpable failure of justice, but it should not be exercised in such a way that a right of appeal may practically be given in cases where such right is definitely excluded by the Code—*Ahsanulla v. Mansukh Ram*, 36 All 403. The High Court must not allow what would virtually be an appeal from the order of the Lower Court, in a non-appealable case—*Sheoshankarpratt*, 10 N L R 177, 27 I C. 545, 16 Cr.L.J. 161.

Power to alter or revise order or to quash proceeding.—The High Court is a Court of revision has the power conferred on a Court of appeal by sec 423 to alter or reverse an order of the Lower Court—*Khepu Nath v. Grish*, 16 Cal 730. The High Court has power, under this section read with sec 423 (c) to alter or reverse any order *i.e.*, to set aside any order, and thus to quash the whole proceedings in the lower Court which terminated in the order—*Official Liquidator v. Kali Charan*, 3 Luck. 287, 29 Cr L J 102 (103). Thus, the High Court can quash the charge and set aside the proceedings against the accused—*Amar Nath*, 10 Lah L.J. 485, 30 Cr L.J. 162 (163), *Bishen Das*, 1910 P.R. 33, 8 I.C. 1161, 12 Cr.L.J. 50; *Tarak Singh*, 29 P L R 237, 28 Cr.L.J. 755 (756); *Tahiru v. Jallu*, 9 Lah L.J. 440, 28 Cr L J 1040, *Gokul v. Devi Prasad*, 23 A L.J. 21, 26 Cr.L.J. 748 (749). The High Court can quash the proceeding where there was an utter want of discretion on the part of the Magistrate in instituting the proceedings—*Umbica Prasad*, 1 C.L.R. 268, or where no advantage would be gained by continuing the proceedings—*Chitan Lal*, 19 Cr L.J. 730, 16 A.L.J. 734.

Power to alter conviction.—The High Court has also power to alter a conviction for one offence into a conviction for another offence, at the same time maintaining the sentence passed—*Joti Prasad*, 1887 A.W.N. 95; *e.g.* where the accused was convicted by a Magistrate for an offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session, the Chief Court interfered in revision and altered the conviction into one for an offence triable by a Magistrate—*Devi Bulsh*, 1869 P.R. 10. The High Court altered a conviction under sec. 186 I P. C. into one under sec. 225B I. P. C., when all the material facts were stated in the complaint and duly deposed

to by witnesses, and the accused was not prejudiced by the alteration of the finding—*Jamna Das*, 11 Lah 214, 28 Cr.L.J. 753 (754).

Power to quash conviction:—The High Court quashed the conviction where it was not supported by any legal evidence, e.g., when the only evidence was the admission of a co-accused—1868 P.R. 14. The High Court can set aside a conviction where it was passed on an erroneous view of the law—*Basant Lall*, 27 Cal 320. But in setting aside a conviction which is bad in law, the High Court is not necessarily bound to go further into the question whether upon the facts established by the evidence a conviction of some lesser offence might not be recorded—*Mansur Hussain*, 41 All 587, 20 Cr.L.J. 209. But the High Court cannot interfere and set aside a valid conviction and sentence passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction after careful consideration—*Ram Doyal*, 21 W.R. 47; *Sham Singh*, 1884 P.R. 36, *Q. v. Bclulios*, 20 W.R. 61.

The High Court cannot direct the Subordinate Court to refrain from trying an accused person against whom such Court has issued process—*Jharu Lal v. Mahanth Madan Das*, 2 Pat 257.

Power to order retrial—The High Court in revision has power to order a retrial. But the High Court cannot, as a Court of revision, set aside the conviction and sentence passed by a Magistrate of competent jurisdiction, with a view to direct a retrial on the ground that subsequent to the conviction it becomes known that the accused was previously convicted—*Sham Singh*, 1884 P.R. 36. Where evidence of the previous conviction of the accused for a similar offence was not adduced at the trial, the High Court refused to interfere in revision and to order a retrial to enable the prosecution to supplement the record by producing fresh evidence bearing on the question of punishment—*Maidhan*, 1905 P.R. 19, *Raji*, 1874 P.R. 13. It would not be proper to order a retrial and thus to allow the prosecution to shape its case afresh, after the whole matter has been thrashed out and the defects in the prosecution case brought to light in the course of prolonged appellate and revision proceedings—*Kedar Nath v. K. E.*, 29 C.W.N. 408, 41 C.L.J. 172, 26 Cr.L.J. 849.

Power to order commitment or set aside commitment—The High Court, when acting as a Court of Revision, can order a committal for trial to the Court of Session after reversing the finding and sentence—*Maula Bakhsh*, 15 All. 205. Where the evidence discloses a more serious offence not within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, the High Court may quash the conviction and sentence for the minor offence and direct a commitment for trial before a tribunal having jurisdiction for the graver offence—*Anonymous*, 11 Weir 569, 7 M.H.C.R. App. 5, *Nishi Kanta*, 20 C.W.N. 732, 17 Cr.L.J. 202, *Moze Ali*, 23 C.W.N. 1031, *Kesavulu*, 2 Weir 569 (570). Where the accused has been improperly discharged, the High Court has power to set aside the order of discharge and to direct that the person improperly discharged be arrested and forthwith committed for trial—*Emp. v. Varivandas*, 27 Bom. 84; *Ram Lal*, 6 All 40, *Ponnusami*, 52 Mad 156, 30 Cr.L.J. 184 (185).

The High Court has power under this section to set aside an order of commitment passed by the Sessions Judge under sec. 423 (1) (b)—*Ram Samujh v. Emp.*, 11 O.L.J. 748, 25 Cr.L.J. 1375; *Emp v. Lachman*, 2 All. 398.

1209. Power to direct further evidence to be taken :

—Under this section the High Court has power to direct further evidence to be taken—*Mulla Ibrahim*, 3 Bom.L.R. 677; *Prasanno*, 19 W.R. 56. The High Court under sec. 439 has power as an Appellate Court to direct evidence to be taken. No such powers are given to the Sessions Judge or the District Magistrate under sec. 436—*Moni Mohan v Iswar*, 6 C.L.J. 251. Where a Magistrate omitted to set out in the charges the previous convictions of the accused, the Chief Court in revision directed that the charge should be amended by adding the previous convictions and also directed that evidence with regard to these convictions should be recorded—*Kasim v. Emp.*, 1879 P.R. 19; *Emp. v. Yusuf*, 1879 P.R. 28.

The High Court has also power under this section to call for additional evidence upon which the High Court can itself come to a conclusion, but this section does not give the High Court power to call for a finding of the Magistrate—*Sudalaimathu v. Enan*, 16 Cr.L.J. 767 (Mad).

1210. Power to go into the facts :—

The High Court in revision is not confined to questions of law alone, but can also deal with questions of fact—*Kallu Mal*, 1894 A.W.N. 207, *Shiam Sundar*, 20 A.L.J. 276, 23 Cr.L.J. 241, A.I.R. 1922, All 122. If the Judges in revision think it right to consider the whole evidence they have power to do so—*Reid v. Richardson*, 14 Cal 361; *Soma Chatur*, Ratanlal 908.

The High Court can go into the facts when the Lower Court has totally misconceived the evidence and come to an obviously wrong conclusion—*Q E v. Maganlal*, 14 Bom. 115. The High Court in revision does not decide the balance of 'credibility' between two conflicting sets of witnesses or two conflicting issues of fact, but it may be compelled to dissent from a finding of fact which is either perverse or has been arrived at contrary to well-established principles of law—*Umed Singh v. Emp*, 21 A.L.J. 765. The High Court will interfere where the finding of fact is contrary to the mass of un-rebutted evidence, and there is a clear case of miscarriage of justice—*Emp. v. Sarju Prasad*, 27 O.C. 290, 11 O.L.J. 330, 25 Cr.L.J. 1066. The High Court can go into the facts of the case, where evidence which is not admissible has been wrongly admitted—*Bim Bahadur*, 55 I.C. 854, 1 P.L.T. 121; *Ramchand*, 28 Cr.L.J. 91 (All); or where the evidence has not been considered from the right point of view, e.g. where the evidence of accomplices was regarded as that of ordinary witnesses—*Rajoni v. Asan*, 11 C.W.N. 672. Where the construction of a document upon which the guilt or innocence of the accused largely depends, is erroneous, the High Court has power to go into the facts fully—*Karim Baksh v. K. E.*, 1905 P.R. 12. The High Court can examine the evidence where the case is not an ordinary one, and it is necessary in the interests of justice to persuade the evidence to see whether the offence of the accused

has been established beyond reasonable doubt—*Thakur Das*, 28 Cr.L.J. 834 (836) (Lah.). Where evidence against the accused is weak, suspicious and inconclusive, the High Court can, on its revision side, examine and discuss the evidence on record and upset the findings of fact of the Lower Courts—*Bhagwan Singh v. K. E.*, 1907 P.W.R. 20. Where the Lower Courts have failed to scrutinize carefully the proof of corroboration of accomplice evidence, the High Court in revision entered into the evidence and set aside the concurrent findings of fact of both the Lower Courts—*Alanna v. Emp.*, 9 I.C. 232, 12 Cr.L.J. 35, 1911 P.W.R. 3. The High Court, as a Court of Revision, has power to re-examine the evidence if there are *prima facie* good grounds for doing so, especially where the accused has been given a non-appealable sentence and has no means of vindicating his character except in revision—*Tikekar v. Piareylal*, 45 I.C. 1002, 19 Cr.L.J. 666 (Nag.). See also *Abdul Wahid v. Abdullah*, 45 All. 656 cited under Note 1208 *ante*.

Where the judgment of the Appellate Court is a meagre one and shows that the Appellate Court has not gone thoroughly into the questions dealt with at the trial by the first Court, the High Court will in revision investigate the original trial to see whether the nature of the procedure and the decision arrived at were such as to leave no doubt that the accused had a fair trial and that the decision was given according to law—*Alay Ahmed*, 20 Cr.L.J. 270 (All.), 50 I.C. 978.

But though the High Court has power to revise findings of fact arrived at by the Lower Courts and the law imposes no limits to this jurisdiction, (*Chagan Dayaram*, 14 Bom. 331, *Nobin v. Rassick*, 10 Cal. 1047) still it is not bound to do so, if it does not think fit, and will not exercise such a discretionary power unless there appears on the face of the judgment or order complained of or on the record some ground to induce the Court to think that the evidence ought to be examined in order to see whether there has been any failure of justice—*Keshab v. Akhil*, 22 Cal. 998, or any material departure from legal principles—*Ram Lal*, 51 Lall 663, 30 Cr.L.J. 562 (564). The High Court is always averse to interfering on facts by way of revision as it would tend to remove the difference specially laid down by the statute between appeal and revision—*Hafiz Khan v. Emp.*, 1 O.W.N. 878. It is unusual in revision to disturb a finding of fact unless it is so manifestly erroneous that a miscarriage of justice would result from its being uncorrected—*Emp. v. Buranshab*, 6 Bom.L.R. 1096, *Chagan Dayaram*, 14 Bom. 331, *Dutt Chand v. Emp.*, 18 Cr.L.J. 437 (441) (Cal.), *Shidoo*, 29 Cr.L.J. 936 (939) (Sind), *Bankatram*, 28 Bom. 533, *Ratanlal* 244, *Md. Zabur v. K. E.*, 9 O.L.J. 488, *Hiranand v. Emp.*, 17 S.L.R. 245, 25 Cr.L.J. 134. Ordinarily, the High Court will not in revision go behind the concurrent findings of the Courts below on a question of fact—*Maruthayee v. Appavu*, 24 Cr.L.J. 476, A.I.R. 1923 Mad. 237, 31 M.L.T. 388, *Tabu v. Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 303, 6 Lah.L.J. 326. It is the settled practice of the High Court to accept the findings of the Lower Appellate Court as correct, unless such findings are based on no legal evidence or are manifestly erroneous—*Lukman*, 21 S.L.R. 107, 27 Cr.L.J. 1233 (1234), *Allahbux*, 23

S.L.R. 216, 30 Cr.L.J. 548. When the Appellate Court has dealt with the evidence carefully and has not omitted to consider any relevant or important portion of the evidence, the High Court will not interfere in revision with the finding of fact of the lower Appellate Court—*Gajo Singh v. Emp.*, 4 P.L.T. 265. The uniform practice of the High Court is not to exercise its power of upsetting a finding of fact, except for some extraordinary reason, and the circumstance that the High Court itself, after examining the evidence, might have come to a different conclusion is not such a reason—*Maganlal*, 14 Bom. 115; *Thakur Das*, 28 Cr.L.J. 834 (836) (Lah.). The High Court can interfere with regard to finding of fact, only on very exceptional grounds, such as a misstatement of evidence by the Lower Court, or the misconstruction of documents, or placing by that Court on the accused the onus of proof contrary to the law of evidence—*Emp. v. Ganesh*, 12 Bom.L.R. 21; or where there has been a conviction of a clearly innocent person—*Emp. v. Nandeyappa*, 11 Bom.L.R. 851. When the High Court sets aside a conviction as being bad in law, it is not necessarily bound to go further into the question whether on the facts established by the evidence a conviction of some lesser offence might or might not be recorded—*Mansur Husain*, 41 All 587.

1211. Power to allow composition :—The High Court as a Court of Revision has power to give effect to the compounding of offences which the parties have agreed to after conviction—*Nidhan v. K. E.*, 1904 P.L.R. 252, *Emp. v. Ram Pyari*, 32 All 153; *Emp. v. Shiboo*, 45 All 17, *Lalla v. K. E.*, 17 O.C. 92, *Bhayalal*, 30 Cr.L.J. 960 (Nag.); *Ram Sarup*, 13 O.C. 161, 7 I.C. 539. This is now expressly provided by the new sub-section (5A) of section 345 added by the Amendment Act of 1923. In *Adhar v. Subodh*, 18 C.W.N. 1212, *Akhoy v. Rameshwar*, 43 Cal 1143, *Andhi v. Emp.*, 3 P.L.T. 458, *S. Rangayya v. S. Ramayya*, 39 Mad 604, *Nga v. K. E.*, 11 A.L.J. 13; *Emp. v. Lala*, 15 A.L.J. 467 and *Crown v. Harnam*, 1918 P.R. 35 II was held that the High Court had no power to allow composition in revision. These cases are no longer good law. The High Court may in revision grant permission to compound the offence and acquit the accused where such permission was wrongly withheld by the lower Court—*Titan v. Chintan*, 55 Cal 1190, 30 Cr.L.J. 484 (485); *Singheswar v. Ali Hasan*, 1929 Cr. C. 272 (Pat.).

1212. Power to order restoration of property :—The High Court in its revisional jurisdiction has the power under section 423 (d) of making any amendment or any consequential or incidental order that may be just and proper. An accused person may upon his acquittal by the High Court in revision be restored to possession of the property of which he has been deprived in favour of the complainant—*Manki v. Bhagwanti*, 27 All. 415. The High Court may in the exercise of its revisional powers pass an order under sec 517 to refund the money received by false pretences—*Nga Than*, 15 Cr.L.J. 555 (Bur.).

1213. Power to consider case of non-appealing accused :—Where two or more persons have been convicted by the Sessions Judge and one of them has appealed, the High Court has power under sec 430

to deal with the case of the accused persons not appealing against their conviction, while considering and trying the appeal preferred by the other accused; clause (5) of this section does not in any way affect the jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with the case of the non-appealing accused—*Braja Rakhal*, 5 C.W.N. 330; *Mir Mouze v. K. E.*, 31 C.L.J. 305, *Ratan Singh*, 1893 A.W.N. 51, *Raghu v. K. E.*, 5 P.L.J. 430; *Bichintz*, 1916 P.W.R. 7, 17 Cr.L.J. 97; *Allah Ditta v. Crown*, 25 Cr.L.J. 435 (Lah); *Champa Pasin*, 29 Cr.L.J. 325 (334) (Pat.). Where four persons were convicted and three of them were awarded non-appealable sentences, and on appeal by the other the conviction of all of them is found to be wrong, the High Court has power under this section to deal with and set aside the conviction even as regards those who have not appealed—*Karam Ali*, 1891 A.W.N. 149, *Bhola*, 39 All. 549; *Mir Mouze*, 31 C.L.J. 305. Similarly, where there are several convicted persons and one only of them has applied for revision, the High Court has power to deal with the convictions of all offenders who were tried together and convicted, though only one person has applied for revision—*Mangi Ram*, 11 Cr.L.J. 17, 4 I.C. 611, 1909 P.R. 9. *Sangli Nadan*, 12 I.C. 215, 12 Cr.L.J. 495, (1911) 2 M.W.N. 170. *Tulsi*, 29 Cr.L.J. 259 (260).

1214. Power to expunge remarks from Lower Court's judgment—In a Bombay case, a Sessions Judge in convicting the accused passed certain remarks about the complainant, a police officer, as a result of which he was dismissed from service. He thereupon applied to the High Court to delete the remarks from the judgment of the Sessions Judge. It was held, dismissing the application, that it would be an extraordinary exercise of the powers of the High Court, to expunge from the Lower Court's judgment the remarks complained of—*Shidramayya*, 19 Bom.L.R. 912, 19 Cr.L.J. 97, 43 I.C. 321. In an Allahabad case it was held that the High Court could not do so even under section 423 (d) read with section 439 because the 'amendment' mentioned in section 423 (d) means an amendment of the main order, and the incidental or consequential order means an order incidental to and consequential upon the main order; that is, the High Court could make an amendment or pass an incidental or consequential order only when there was an appeal or revision-petition against the main order, but where the main order passed by the Lower Court had not been appealed against, the High Court could not entertain an application merely for expunging certain remarks made by the Lower Court in its judgment—*Emp v. Dunn*, 44 All. 401 (405). But where there has been an appeal or revision petition against the order of the Lower Court, the High Court in dealing with the whole evidence of the case and considering the judgment can expunge any improper remarks made in it by the Court below. This will be evident from 2 C.W.N. cclvi; *Lachcha*, 1 O.L.J. 141, 15 Cr.L.J. 420, and *Thomas Pellako*, 14 I.C. 643, 5 Bur.L.T. 20. In *Makaya v. Kin Lat*, 11 I.C. 1000, 4 Bur.L.T. 173 the Chief Court held that it had power to expunge the objectionable passage from the Lower Court's though it refused to do so.

But section 561A (newly added by the Amendment Act of 1923) g:

inherent power to the High Court to make any order to secure the ends of justice, and thus to expunge any objectionable remarks from the Lower Court's judgment, irrespective of the fact whether there has or has not been an appeal or revision petition against the main order. Thus, in *Amar Nath v. Crown*, 5 Lah. 476 (481), 26 Cr.L.J. 463, where a Sessions Judge made certain unwarranted remarks about the testimony of a Police witness, and that witness applied to the High Court in revision to expunge those remarks from the judgment of the Sessions Judge, the High Court directed those remarks to be expunged, although there was no revision petition in the main case in which that witness gave his evidence. So also, where one of two accused tried together by a Magistrate was acquitted, and the Sessions Judge, in an appeal preferred by the other accused against his conviction, passed certain remarks about the acquitted person impugning the correctness of the acquittal, and that person applied to the High Court to expunge those remarks, the High Court ordered the remarks to be expunged, although no revision petition was made in the main case—*Abdul Aziz v. Emp.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 1245 (Lah.). The Bombay and Allahabad cases cited above (19 Bom.L.R. 912 and 44 All. 401) must be deemed as overruled by sec. 561A. See also *Benarsi Das v. Crown*, 6 Lah. 166, 26 P.L.R. 315, 26 Cr.L.J. 1326, where the High Court expunged certain remarks in a Magistrate's judgment about a person who was not a party or a witness in the proceedings. See also Notes under sec. 361A.

1215. Power to interfere in a pending case :—Under section 435, the High Court can call for and examine the records of any proceeding of an inferior Criminal Court not only to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order of such Court, but also as to the regularity of any proceedings of that Court; and for that purpose it has power to interfere at any stage of the proceedings in a pending trial. Thus, it can interfere when the proceedings before the inferior Court have not proceeded any further beyond the issue of summons—*Ramanathan v. Subrahmanya*, 47 Mad. 722 (725), 47 M.L.J. 373, 25 Cr.L.J. 1009, *Q. E. v. Nageshappa*, 20 Bom. 543 (545). But where the trial has not proceeded beyond the stage of examination of only two witnesses, so that there has not been any finding, sentence or order, nor there is any allegation of the proceedings being irregular, the High Court will not interfere—*Sheo Saran v. Jitendra*, 28 Cr.L.J. 814 (Oudh). The High Court can interfere with a case while it is still pending in the subordinate Court, and can quash the proceedings if the materials before the Magistrate disclose no offence and no useful purpose would be served by continuing the proceedings—*Harī Charan v. Girish Chandra*, 38 Cal. 68 (74), 13 C.L.J. 43, 11 Cr.L.J. 525, *Emp. v. Krishna Rao*, 6 N.L.J. 119. The High Court can interfere at as early a stage as when the accused has been summoned to show cause why sanction (under sec. 195) should not be granted for his prosecution—*Q. E. v. Jagan Singh*, 1892 A.W.N. 102; *Chadha v. Emp.*, 14 A.L.J. 851, 18 Cr.L.J. 46. The High Court can interfere with the proceedings of a Magistrate while they are in the interlocutory stage pending investigation.

and may suspend such proceedings, even without having the record before it—*Abdool Kadir*, 20 W.R. 23. The High Court can, pending trial, interfere with the interlocutory order of a Magistrate refusing to summon certain witnesses for the defence—*Rovel Singh*, 1901 P.L.R. 130. The High Court can interfere pending trial when the Subordinate Magistrate improperly declines to take any evidence or to allow cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses and arbitrarily follows a procedure of his own—*Durga Dutt*, 10 A.L.J. 144, 13 Cr.L.J. 443 (444). Where the Magistrate has decided that no evidence for the prosecution is necessary to prove the offence, the High Court can interfere at an interlocutory stage in order to determine whether it is necessary for the prosecution to adduce evidence of the offence—*Lurindaram v Karachi Municipality*, ■ S L R 238, 16 Cr.L.J. 255, 28 I.C. 111. If a charge is framed where no charge should have been framed, the proceeding of the Magistrate becomes irregular, and the High Court has power to interfere, under this section as well as under section 561A, during the pendency of the case to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and to secure the ends of justice by setting aside the charge—*Gokul Prasad v. Devi Prasad*, 23 A.L.J. 21, 26 Cr.L.J. 748 (749). The High Court has power to examine the proceedings of the lower Court at the stage when a charge is framed, and, if necessary, to set aside the charge and quash the proceedings if no offence appears to have been committed—*Tarak Singh*, 29 P.L.R. 237, 28 Cr.L.J. 755 (756); *Harendra v. Jotish*, 40 C.L.J. 283, 26 Cr.L.J. 545 (547), *Amar Nath*, 10 Lah.L.J. 485, 30 Cr.L.J. 162 (163), *Bishen Das*, 1910 P.R. 33, 8 I.C. 1161 (1165), 12 Cr.L.J. 50; *Tahiru v. Jallu*, 9 Lah.L.J. 440, 28 Cr.L.J. 1040. Where the trial was a vexatious and protracted one, and material injury was thereby likely to be caused to the accused the High Court interfered during the pendency of the trial and set aside the charge in order to prevent further harassment of the accused—*In re Kuppuswami*, 39 Mad 561, 28 M.L.J. 505, 16 Cr.L.J. 477, *Chandi v. Abdur Rahaman*, 22 Cal 131, *Shripad*, 52 Bom. 151, 29 Cr.L.J. 317 (318), *Choa Lal v Anant*, 25 Cal 233 (234). Where the notice and the preliminary order of a Magistrate under sec 112 were defective and could not form the basis of a proceeding under sec 110, the High Court interfered and set aside the proceedings so far taken by the Magistrate—1910 P.W. II 18, 11 Cr.L.J. 388.

But though the High Court has power to interfere with pending proceedings at any stage, it will not do so except only under rare and exceptional circumstances—*Choa Lal v Anant Pershad*, 25 Cal 233, *Inamulla*, 2 A.L.J. 673, 2 Cr.L.J. 790, *Salamatrai*, 9 Cr.L.J. 270, 1 S L R 30, *In re Kuppuswami*, 39 Mad 561, 16 Cr.L.J. 477, *Mahomed v Muhammad Idris*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1101 (Sind); *Madhab v Emp*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1093 (Nag). It is only in exceptional instances that the High Court will interfere with the action of a subordinate Court in respect of any pending case, especially when such a case has reached the stage where a charge has been drawn and only the defence of the accused remains to be heard. No hard and fast rule can be laid down on the subject, because the interference of the High Court should be regulated by the particular circumstances of each case;

but speaking generally, it is inadvisable to interfere in a pending case, unless there is some manifest and patent injustice apparent on the face of the proceeding and calling for prompt redress—*Jagat Chandra v. Q. E.* 26 Cal. 786 (790); *Manilal v. Kamberali*, 22 S.L.R. 79, 23 Cr.L.J. 644. The High Court will allow the proceedings in the Subordinate Court to go on and take their course and will not interfere with a pending proceeding, even though it is irregularly conducted, unless there is exceptional ground for interference—*Choa Lal v. Anant*, 25 Cal. 233 (234); *In re Sami Goundan*, 20 L.W. 937, 26 Cr.L.J. 421 422. It is impossible as well as undesirable to lay down any hard and fast rule to determine whether any particular case is of such an exceptional nature as to call for the interference of the High Court during its pendency; but one safe practical test would be this, namely that a bare statement of the facts of the case without any elaborate argument should be sufficient to convince the High Court that it is a fit one for its interference at an intermediate stage. If it is contended by the accused that the offence charged against him is a civil wrong rather than a criminal trespass, obviously that question cannot be determined by the High Court on the bare facts of the case without a lengthy or elaborate argument, and this Court cannot therefore intervene during the pendency of the case and set aside the charge—*Choa Lal v. Anant*, 25 Cal. 233 (235). The High Court will not interrupt the course of a trial by interfering with a decision of a Magistrate that he has jurisdiction in a case. If the High Court has to decide in the midst of the trial held in a Magistrate's Court as to whether he has jurisdiction or not, it would be interfering in a most improper manner on a point which may conclusively have to be decided on appeal—*Kashi Ram v. Dikshit*, 1 Luck 48, 3 O.W.N. 104, 27 Cr.L.J. 191. The High Court will rarely interfere in the midst of a trial and order commitment, unless it is shown that the failure on the part of the Magistrate to commit is extremely improper—*Bilodar v. K. E.*, 13 O.L.J. 490, 3 O.W.N. 201, 27 Cr.L.J. 417 (418). The High Court will interfere with a pending trial only when it is satisfied that an interference is necessary and that any delay in the rectification of the error will cause waste of time or a miscarriage of justice—*Sobha Ram*, 1904 I.R. 8.

1216. Power to enhance sentence :—This is a power which is not conferred by sec. 423, and the High Court can exercise this power not as an Appellate Court but only in revision. Thus, in an appeal against a conviction by a prisoner, the High Court dismissed the appeal as an Appellate Court, but enhanced the sentence as a Court of Revision—*Mehar Ali*, 11 Cal. 530. The effect of secs. 423 and 439 read together is that the High Court when hearing an appeal against a conviction may alter the finding under sec. 423, and then as a Court of Revision may enhance the sentence under this section so as to make the sentence appropriate to the altered finding—*Bali Reddi*, 37 Mad. 119 (123). A District Magistrate or Sessions Judge or the Government Pleader may draw the attention of the High Court to a sentence with a view to its being enhanced. The High Court may also of its own motion send for the record and take action with a like object. But it is not for a private complainant

to apply to the High Court for this purpose. If he considers a sentence unduly lenient, he should draw the attention of the Government to the fact—*In re Nagi Dula*, 43 Bom 358 (360), 26 Bom.L.R. 182, 25 Cr L J 966; *Lakhi v Raju*, 19 S L.R. 64; *Nga San v Nga Ye*, 5 Bur.L.J. 1, 27 Cr.L.J 818. The Calcutta High Court is of opinion that a private complainant may make an application to the High Court for enhancement of sentence where a grossly inadequate sentence has been passed which deserves to be enhanced, and the High Court has power to issue a Rule on such application, but it is a safe practice not to interfere on such applications made on behalf of private complainants. But if a rule has been issued, the High Court should go into the facts and ascertain whether the sentence should be enhanced—*Pramatha v. Ganga Charan*, 33 C W N 395 (398). In this case, the High Court, after considering the facts, enhanced the sentence, even though the Crown did not appear in support of the Rule. But in another case, where a Rule was issued on the application of a private complainant, but the Crown did not appear, the High Court refused to enhance the sentence (although it was considered to be inadequate and discharged the Rule). "Had the application been made at the instance of the Crown, I should have been more inclined to enhance the sentence"—*Ali Akabbar v Kasem* 33 C W N. 605 (608), 1929 Cr C. 439 (virtually dissenting from 33 C W N 395).

Where an accused's revision petition against his conviction has been dismissed, the High Court can entertain a second revision petition from the complainant or a reference from a District Magistrate (sec. 438) for enhancement of the sentence. The disposal of the first revision petition is no bar to the disposal of the second revision petition or reference, though arising out of the same original trial, because the Judges disposing of the revision petition filed by a convicted person against the propriety of his conviction cannot be said to be adjudicating on the question of enhancing the sentence, so that the matter of the second proceeding cannot be said to be of the nature of *res judicata* so as to violate sec 369. It cannot be accepted as a sound principle that once the High Court has passed any order in a criminal revision, it is *functus officio* and is precluded from entertaining any further revision petition or reference or from proceeding *suo motu*, in respect of another aspect of the case—*In re Sayed Anif*, 26 Cr L J. 583 (585, 586), *Jorabhai* 50 Bom 783, 27 Cr L J 1173 (1175).

Generally the cases in which the powers of the High Court to enhance the sentence have been exercised are those in which the records have been called for by the High Court or which have been reported to it, or which otherwise comes to its knowledge on a perusal of the returns from the subordinate Courts. But when the case comes to the knowledge of the High Court by an appeal being filed by the accused against his conviction, it is not desirable, if the appeal is admitted, to issue a notice at the same time for enhancement of the sentence. It is incongruous that the Court should in the same breath admit the appeal, and should call upon the accused to show cause why the sentence should not be enhanced. The proper procedure is to deal first with the appeal, and then to consider

whether a notice to enhance the sentence should issue—*Mangal Naran*, 49 Bom. 450, 27 Bom L.R. 355, 26 Cr L.J. 968 (969).

And conversely, when a Sessions Judge has reported a conviction to the High Court for the purpose of enhancing the sentence, and the High Court rejected the reference, it is not precluded from entertaining a subsequent revision petition presented by the accused against his conviction—*Kohna Ram*, 45 All. 11, 23 Cr L.J. 496

The High Court has power to enhance a sentence so as to alter its nature—*Ram Kuria*, 11 All. 622. Thus, where a Sessions Judge convicted the accused of culpable homicide not amounting to murder and sentenced him to seven years' rigorous imprisonment, the High Court in revision altered the conviction to one of murder and sentenced him to transportation for life—*Gulam Muhammad*, 1871 P.R. 11. Where the Sessions Judge convicted the accused of murder but sentenced him to transportation for life, and the murder appeared to be singularly brutal, the High Court in revision enhanced the sentence of transportation to a sentence of death—*Dwarka v Emp*, 4 O.W.N. 977, 28 Cr.L.J. 980 (982)

An application by a private complainant for enhancement of sentence will not be entertained by the High Court except in extreme cases, e.g. where the sentence passed by the Magistrate is wholly inadequate—*Devi Singh v Ram Charan*, 30 Cr L.J. 219 (All.), *Khuda Baksh v Feroz Din*, 30 Cr L.J. 300 (Lah.)

An enhancement of sentence is a serious proceeding, and the High Court will not interfere as a Court of Revision in order to enhance the sentence if the sentence passed by the Lower Court involves substantial punishment, and should interfere only if the sentence is manifestly inadequate—*Chuni Lal*, 1889 P.R. 7, *Saif Ali*, 1898 P.R. 17, *Dhana Lal*, 29 Cr.L.J. 764 (760) (Lah.), *Sitaram v Emp.*, 12 O.L.J. 421, 2 O.W.N. 550, 26 Cr.L.J. 1364, *Ghura*, 6 O.W.N. 43, 30 Cr L.J. 544; 10 SLR 207. And for this purpose the High Court should see whether there is matter on the record of the case showing that the sentence passed is clearly inadequate to the offence—*Emp. v. Mahadeo*, 26 Cr L.J. 821 (824) (Nag.) *Hurnath*, 20 W.R. 22. The High Court will be reluctant to enhance the sentence passed by the Sessions Court except on very serious grounds. It will not enhance the sentence when the Public Prosecutor in the Sessions Court has allowed that Court to pass the sentence it did without any serious attempt to modify it—*Kassim*, 17 SLR 268, 26 Cr L.J. 177. The mere fact that the High Court would have inflicted a heavier punishment if the case had come before it for trial is not a proper ground for enhancement of sentence, specially if the sentence passed by the Magistrate is a substantial one—*Khana*, 29 Cr L.J. 276 (Lah.); *Budha*, 1919 P.R. 7, 20 Cr.L.J. 212, 49 I.C. 772, *Sitaram v Emp.*, (supra), *Kassim* supra. If a public servant is proved to have taken bribes, exemplary punishment should be awarded. Where, in such a case, the sentence inflicted by the lower Court was inadequate, the High Court would enhance the sentence—*Jehangir*, 29 Bom.L.R. 996, 28 Cr.L.J. 1012 (1018). But the High Court will not interfere in a case where a sentence has been passed by

the Magistrate on a consideration of all the circumstances of the case and no question of principle is involved, even though the sentence appears to be lenient. Even in cases of communal disturbance, the Government should refrain from appealing to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court for enhancement of sentence, unless violence has been done to some general principle which requires immediate and authoritative interference—*Nasrullah*, 29 Cr.L.J. 446 (447) (All)

Where the fact of previous conviction was brought to the notice of the Magistrate at the commencement of the trial, but he paid no attention to it, the High Court would interfere to enhance the sentence, but if the previous conviction was not a recent one but took place nearly 3 years prior to the present offence, and there was nothing against the accused during the period that intervened, the High Court would not think it necessary to enhance the sentence—*Prem*, 27 A L J. 397, 30 Cr L.J. 529 (530). But where the fact of previous conviction which was known to the prosecution was not at all brought to the notice of the Magistrate through the negligence of the prosecution, the High Court would not interfere to enhance the sentence. To permit the prosecution to plead their own negligence and to harass the accused with further proceedings directed towards the enhancement of the sentence would be to put a premium on the negligence of the prosecution—*Bashir* 30 Cr.L.J. 505 (506) (All); *Gul*, 1902 P.R. 21, 1902 P.L.R. 144; *Hyoth Mastan*, 2 Weir 574. *A fortiori*, the High Court would not interfere to enhance the sentence, where the previous conviction was not known to the prosecution at the time of the trial, but was discovered after the conviction—*Maidhan*, 1905 P.R. 19, 2 Cr.L.J. 228; *Nur Mahammad*, 1905 P.R. 43, 3 Cr L.J. 341; *Sham Singh*, 1884 P.R. 36.

The High Court does not generally interfere in revision to enhance the sentence when the convicted person has undergone the full term of his imprisonment or has paid the fine imposed upon him, even though the order of the Court below is clearly wrong in law—*Harī Singh*, 1913 P.W.R. 29, 14 Cr L.J. 599 (600), 1909 P.W.R. 44, *Jagat Singh*, 1 Lah 453, 21 Cr L.J. 557. The High Court is slow to interfere in cases where interference would involve the imprisonment of persons already discharged from jail—*Chuni Lal*, 1889 P.R. 7. But the test in each case is, whether the sentence inflicted by the trying Court involves substantial punishment. The High Court will not interfere if adequate punishment has been inflicted, but if the sentence is manifestly inadequate, it is competent to the High Court to impose an additional punishment, even though the accused has served out the whole of the imprisonment inflicted by the lower Court—*Chuni Lal*, supra, *Shankar Narayan*, 28 Bom L.R. 300, 27 Cr.L.J. 557 (558); *Jagat Singh*, supra, *Shahzad Ahamad*, 30 Cr L.J. 240 (241) (Lah). Where the Magistrate's order was proper on the materials before him, the sentence should not be enhanced in revision on the ground of previous conviction being disclosed, it is not fair to the accused to reverse the conviction and direct him to be committed to the Sessions, after he has undergone the full term of imprisonment inflicted by the Magistrate, merely because his previous convictions were not known at

the time of his trial by the Magistrate—*Crown v. Usman*, 17 Cr.L.J. 3, 9 S.L.R. 95. The High Court will not interfere to enhance the sentence, after a long period has elapsed—*Nasrullah*, 29 Cr.L.J. 446 (447) (All.).

The power of enhancement conferred on the High Court under sec. 439 is limited only by clause (3) of this section. This clause does not regard the difference in the powers of the trying Magistrate under sec. 32, but lays down that in cases of sentences passed by Magistrates not empowered under sec. 34, the limit of enhancement shall be the sentence that might have been inflicted by a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class. Therefore the High Court has power to enhance the sentence of imprisonment to two years—*Crown v. Kamal*, 11 S.L.R. 82, 16 Cr.L.J. 712, 30 I.C. 1000. The High Court has the power to inflict any punishment which might have been inflicted for the offence by a first class Magistrate, and is not limited to the powers of the trying Magistrate—*Jagat Singh*, 1 Lah. 453, 21 Cr.L.J. 557. The words 'enhance the sentence' presuppose that a sentence has been imposed by the Lower Court. Therefore where no sentence has been passed by the trying Magistrate but the accused has been released on probation under sec. 562, the High Court cannot substitute a sentence of imprisonment or whipping in revision—*Nur Khan*, 48 I.C. 979, 20 Cr.L.J. 99 (Oudh), *Ghasite*, 37 All. 31, 12 A.L.J. 1244, 16 Cr.L.J. 43.

Lastly, the power of enhancement of sentence can be exercised under this section where the sentence passed by the Magistrate is a legal one. A retrospective sentence of imprisonment for the period already passed by the accused in the lock-up is not a legal sentence—*Asghar Ali*, 1919 P.R. 27, 20 Cr.L.J. 684, 52 I.C. 604.

1217. Procedure if two Judges differ :—If two learned Judges of the High Court differ in a Criminal Revision case, sec. 439 read with sec. 429 requires the case to be decided by a third Judge, and precludes any further appeal under the Letters Patent or any reference to a Full Bench under the rules of the Court—*Dudikula Lal Sahib*, 40 Mad. 976. But where an application is made to the High Court not under sec. 435, Cr. P. Code, but under sec. 107 of the Government of India Act, section 439 of the Code cannot apply, and consequently sec. 429 (which is referred to in sec. 439) is also not applicable; and therefore if in such a case there is a difference of opinion between the Judges, the provisions of sec. 36 of the Letters Patent will apply, and the decision of the senior Judge will prevail—*Moiram v. Mrijan*, 47 Cal. 438, 21 Cr.L.J. 25, 24 C.W.N. 97.

1218. Sub-section (2) —Notice to accused :—The language of this sub-section is mandatory and it is clearly enacted as an exception to section 440. An order of enhancement of sentence is an order to the prejudice of the accused, and if such an order is passed without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard, it is more than an irregularity and the order so passed is without jurisdiction—*In re Soma Naidu*, 47 Mad. 428 (432); *K. E. v. Romesh Chandra*, 22 C.W.N. 159, *Natha*, Ratanlal 179. Where a case comes to the knowledge of the High

Court by an appeal having been filed against a conviction, it is not desirable, if the appeal is admitted, to issue a notice at the same time to enhance the sentence. It seems to be absolutely incongruous that the High Court in the same breath should admit the appeal of the accused, and issue notice calling upon him to show cause why the sentence should not be enhanced. The notice should issue after the appeal has been dismissed after being dealt with on the merits—*Mangal Naran v. Emp.*, 49 Bom. 450, 27 Bom. L.R. 355, 26 Cr.L.J. 968. Where notice has been issued to the accused to show cause why his sentence should not be enhanced, and at the hearing neither the accused nor his counsel is present, the High Court cannot pass an order enhancing the sentence—*Parasram v. Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 543 (Oudh).

Where a complainant applied to the High Court under sec 439 to revise an order of a first class Magistrate ordering payment of compensation (under sec 250) to the accused, the High Court refused to pass any order where it appeared that the accused was dead and could not therefore be served with notice—*Govinda v. Keshavrao, Ratanlal* 634

A High Court may issue a warrant of arrest without previous notice to the accused, because a warrant of arrest is not an order to the prejudice of the accused within the meaning of this sub-section—*Nga E. Mounq*, 8 Bur L.T. 286, 16 Cr.L.J. 670, 30 I.C. 654

If the High Court makes an order to the prejudice of the accused without issuing notice to him and giving him an opportunity of being heard, the order is a nullity, and the High Court has power to vacate that order and rehear the matter in the presence of both sides—*Ramesh Pada v. Kadambini*, 55 Cal 417, 31 C.W.N. 960, 28 Cr.L.J. 831 (832)

1219. Sub-section (4)—Interference with orders of acquittal :—As to the powers of the High Court to revise orders of acquittal at the instance of a private prosecutor, or on a reference under sec 438, see Note 1204 *ante*

When the Government has not appealed, the High Court will not interfere with an order of acquittal except in extreme cases and under exceptional circumstances, whether it is moved by the District Magistrate or by a private party—*Mogal Beg*, 42 Mad 109, *Jota v. Parshottam*, 25 Bom L.R. 488, 24 Cr.L.J. 734, *Khem Chand v. Lalu*, 3 Bur L.J. 323, 26 Cr.L.J. 511. The High Court will not move in such a case unless there was some glaring defect either in the procedure or in the view of the law taken by the Court below and there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice—*Kamikka Pershad*, 2 Luck 680, 28 Cr.L.J. 788 (790); *Basirulla v. Asadulla*, 33 C.W.N. 576

Though the High Court has jurisdiction to interfere in revision with an acquittal, it shall ordinarily exercise this jurisdiction sparingly and only in serious cases where it is urgently demanded in the interests of public justice, to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice—*Nand Ram v. Khazan*, 19 A.L.J. 589, 22 Cr.L.J. 337, *Foujdar v. Kasi*, 42 Cal 612 (616); *Pramatha v. P. C. Lahiri*, 47 Cal 818 (827), *Natesa v. Emp.*, 28 M.L.J. 690, *Vellayanambalam v. Solai*, 39 Mad 505, *Rameshwar*, 53 Bom. 564;

Parakanakkan v. Amir, 20 L.W. 327, 26 Cr.L.J. 249; *Sankarlinga v. Narayana*, 45 Mad. 913; *Pahelwan v. Sahib, Singh*, 19 A.L.J. 392, 22 Cr.L.J. 597; 6 All. 484, *Fareedoon Cawasji*, 41 Bom. 560 (562), *Mehr v. Nur Md.*, 26 P.L.R. 644, 26 Cr.L.J. 1596; *Panchan v. Upendra*, 49 All. 254, 27 Cr.L.J. 1407; *Siban Rai v. Bhagwant*, 5 Pat. 25, 27 Cr.L.J. 235, 6 P.L.T. 833, *Kamikka Pershad*, 2 Luck. 680, 28 Cr.L.J. 788 (790); *Sher Khan v. Anwar Khan*, 23 N.L.R. 40, 28 Cr.L.J. 523 (528); *Binda Prasad v. Ripusudan*, 5 N.L.R. 4, 9 Cr.L.J. 211, 1 I.C. 238. The High Court will interfere with an order of acquittal only where there has been an error in law, or where the trial has been illegal or so radically and incurably irregular as in fact to have occasioned a failure of justice—*Sher Khan v. Anwar Khan*, supra. Thus, the High Court will interfere where a Magistrate acquitted the accused disregarding the uncontradicted evidence and facts admitted which proved the guilt of the accused, and acted illegally in trying a warrant case as a summons case—*Sabathi v. Kuppusami*, 15 M.L.J. 225. Where the trying Magistrate, in his judgment of acquittal, while laying great stress on all considerations that might affect the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution, omitted to consider what might be advanced in their favour, and also failed to appreciate the corroborative value of an important witness for the prosecution, the High Court set aside the order of acquittal and directed a retrial—*Shalk Bazu v. Raika Singh*, 18 C.W.N. 1244. An order of acquittal will be set aside in revision where the acquittal is the result of an alleged composition which turns out to be invalid—*Harnam v. Sam Das*, 24 Cr.L.J. 120, e.g., where the Magistrate acquitted the accused by allowing the parties to compromise a non-compoundable case—*Zahiruddin v. Nasiruddin*, 24 Cr.L.J. 186 (Oudh). The High Court will not hesitate to interfere where the acquittal is based on a manifest error in law appearing on the face of the judgment—*Ahmedabad Municipality v. Mangalal*, 9 Bom.L.R. 150, 5 Cr.L.J. 171; *Nanhi Bahu v. Dhunde*, 6 A.L.J. 758, *Hardeo*, 1 All. 139. The High Court will in revision set aside an order of acquittal and order a retrial, where in a serious case of rioting in connection with the possession of land, the Magistrate did not come to any finding on the question of possession—*Surendra v. Janaki*, 53 Cal. 471, 27 Cr.L.J. 975. The High Court will interfere where the order of acquittal was not passed on the merits, but was made on account of the death of the complainant, and the complainant's son was not allowed to continue the proceeding—*Jitan v. Damoo Sahu*, 1 P.L.J. 264, 20 C.W.N. 862, 18 Cr.L.J. 151. Where the case was posted for an unusual hour (namely 7 A.M.), and the complaint was dismissed and the accused acquitted for non-appearance of the complainant at that time, the High Court interfered and ordered a retrial, otherwise an offender would escape punishment through sheer accident—*Subbiah v. Inukolobah*, 27 Cr.L.J. 1391 (Mad.). An order of acquittal passed by the Lower Court will be set aside where the judgment of that Court is very summary and contains no discussion of the case or distinct findings on the questions involved—*Nabin Chandra v. Rajendra*, 10 Cr.L.J. 519 (Cal.). The High Court will exercise its power to set aside an acquittal, where there has been no trial, or where there has been a denial of the right of fair trial

—*Siban Rai v. Bhagwant*, 5 Pat 25, 6 P.L.T. 833, 27 Cr.L.J. 235. Where there were grave irregularities in procedure and the trial was conducted in an atmosphere of prejudice, the High Court interfered with an order of acquittal—*Gangadhar v. Reid*, 25 C.W.N. 609 (*Khoreal shooting case*), 23 Cr.L.J. 41. The High Court will interfere in certain exceptional circumstances where a matter of public importance is involved—*Municipal Board v. Vadyadhari*, 24 O.C 57, 22 Cr.L.J. 638, 63 I.C. 334; see also *Ahmedabad Municipality v. Maganlal*, supra. An application for revision against an order of acquittal may appropriately be allowed, when legal points alone are involved—*Crown v. Thamman*, 1918 P.R. 8. But the mere fact that the High Court if it were sitting as a Court of Appeal would have come to a different conclusion of fact is no ground for exercising revisional jurisdiction upon a petition against an order of acquittal—*Vellayanambalam v. Solai*, 39 Mad. 505, *Mellor v. Muthia*, 20 Cr.L.J. 101, 35 M.L.J. 518, *Binda Prasad v. Ripusudan*, 5 N.L.R. 4, 11 C 238, 9 Cr.L.J. 211, *Damodar v. Juharsingh*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1348 (Nag). The High Court should not interfere with an order of acquittal when the question is merely as to the appreciation of doubtful evidence, and there is no patent error or defect in the order of acquittal passed by the Lower Court resulting in grave injustice—*Vellayanambalam v. Solai*, 39 Mad. 505; *Mellor v. Muthia*, 35 M.L.J. 518, 48 I.C. 981. When the acquittal of an accused is based on a finding of fact, the High Court will not interfere in revision—*Crown v. Harphul*, 7 Lah.L.J. 42, 26 P.L.R. 38, 20 Cr.L.J. 689. Where the trial Court has acquitted the accused after giving due weight to all the evidence on the record, the High Court will not interfere—*Mehr Nur Md v. Nur Md*, 7 Lah.L.J. 367, 26 P.L.R. 644, 26 Cr.L.J. 1596. Where the Magistrate took one view of the oral evidence and the Sessions Judge took the opposite view, and there was no legal point or question of jurisdiction involved, held that there was no ground for interference with the order of acquittal—*Khem Chand v. Lalu*, 3 Bur.L.J. 323, 26 Cr.L.J. 511. A mere error of procedure is not by itself a good ground for setting aside an acquittal, thus, a mere error of improper admission of evidence which was not essential to a result which might have been come to wholly independent of it, is not a ground of interference—*Ganga Singh v. Rambhajan*, A.I.R. 1925 Pat. 165, 25 Cr.L.J. 1266 (Pat); so also, an omission by the Appellate Court to serve the notice of appeal on the complainant or on the officer appointed under sec. 422 is not a ground for setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the Appellate Court—*Parakanakkan v. Amir*, 20 L.W. 327, 26 Cr.L.J. 249. The High Court will not interfere in revision with an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate of competent jurisdiction who has taken a correct view of the law, e.g., an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate on a prosecution for an alleged offence under sec. 225B I. P. Code, irregularity instituted on a report sent in by a Munsif which was treated as a complaint—*Emp v. Madho Singh*, 47 All. 409, 23 A.L.J. 189, 26 Cr.L.J. 865.

The above remarks equally apply in cases of revision against an order of discharge under sec. 253; and the High Court would be unwilling or very reluctant to interfere with an order of discharge based on a con-

sideration of all the prosecution evidence, when no evidence has been shut out and there is no illegality or irregularity in the procedure adopted by the trying Court, even if the High Court should on the materials on the record consider that it was a fit case for the framing of a charge and putting the accused on his defence—*Mellor v Muthia Chetty*, 35 M L J 518, 20 Cr.L.J. 101, 48 I.C. 981.

Converting acquittal into conviction:—The High Court may interfere with an order of acquittal, when such interference is urgently demanded in the interests of justice (see supra); but it cannot convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. Thus, it cannot set aside the order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Judge on appeal, and restore the order of conviction of the trial Court—*Rameshwar*, 53 Bom 564, 30 Cr.L.J. 1062 (1064), 31 Bom.L.R. 529. After reversing the order of acquittal, the proper order of the High Court must be one remanding the case to the lower Court and directing the retrial of the accused person—*Rameshwar v Govind*, 23 A.L.J. 433, 26 Cr.L.J. 970; *Q. E. v. Balwant*, 9 All 134; *Har Piari v. Nathe Lal*, 22 Cr.L.J. 97 (All.), 59 I.C. 401; *Nand Ram v Khazan*, 19 A.L.J. 589, 22 Cr.L.J. 337; *Ma Nyen v. Maung Chit*, 7 Rang 538, 1929 Cr. C. 497. Though the High Court, in exercising revisional powers against orders of acquittal, can go into the questions of fact, still it cannot then and there convict but can only order a retrial—*Virumal v Sadhu*, 1908 P.L.R. 157, 8 Cr.L.J. 462. But the High Court will not order a retrial, when such order would be tantamount to converting an acquittal into conviction. Where owing to non-recording of evidence or improper recording of inadmissible evidence the High Court reverses an order of acquittal, it can direct a retrial; but in a case where there is no erroneous recording or shutting out of evidence, if the High Court were to set aside the acquittal and order a retrial on the same evidence, it would be the same thing as sending the case to a Magistrate with directions to convict; in other words, it would be for all practical purposes converting an acquittal into conviction—*Ma Nyen v. Mg. Chit*, 7 Rang. 538, 1929 Cr. C. 497.

The High Court, as a Court of Appeal, is not debarred from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, because sec. 439 (2) limits the powers of the High Court when acting as a Court of Revision, and not as a Court of Appeal. An Appellate Court has no such restriction under sec. 423, cl. (a). But as a Court of Revision the High Court cannot convert an acquittal into conviction—*Bali Reddi*, 37 Mad. 119 (122, 123); *Q. E. v. Jabanulla*, 23 Cal. 975 (979).

The only way of securing conviction in a case of acquittal is by an appeal by the Local Government against the order of acquittal—*Erip v. Sheo Darshan*, 44 All. 332 (333), 23 Cr.L.J. 202.

An order under sec. 471 is not an order of conviction. Therefore where the accused was acquitted by the Lower Court on the ground that he was insane, the passing of an order under sec. 471 by the High Court in revision does not amount to an alteration of an order of acquittal into

one of conviction within the meaning of this sub-section—*Mahammad*, 42 M L J 72, 23 Cr.L J 71, A I R. 1922 Mad. 54.

The High Court is precluded from converting the finding of acquittal into one of conviction, in the absence of a Government appeal. But the High Court can convict the accused person of an offence under another section of the Penal Code upon which he has not been acquitted by the Lower Court. Thus, in a trial for an offence under sec. 302 I. P. C., the trial Court acquitted the accused under sec. 302 I. P. C. but convicted him under sec. 323 I. P. Code. Held that the High Court can in revision convict the accused of an offence under sec. 325 I. P. Code, in as much as the trial Court had not considered the applicability of sec. 325 I. P. C. and there was no acquittal under sec. 325 I. P. Code—*Dulh v Mangli*, 24 A L J. 414, 27 Cr.L J. 564.

Conviction of one offence and acquittal of another:—It was held in some cases that the word 'acquittal' in this sub-section meant a complete acquittal on all the facts and allegations charged, and not an acquittal in respect of one charge and conviction in respect of another; therefore, where the accused was convicted by the Magistrate of one offence and acquitted of another, in the same trial, the High Court had power in revision to convert the acquittal into conviction—*Bhola v. Emp.*, 1904 P R 12, 1 Cr L J 942. Thus, where the accused was charged under sec. 302 I P Code but was convicted under sec. 304 I. P. C., it was held that the High Court was competent to alter the conviction under sec. 304 I P C into a conviction under sec. 302 I. P. C.—*Fazal Khan v. Emp.*, 8 Lah 136, 28 Cr.L J 508 (following *Bhola*, 1904 P R. 12). It was explained in a Madras case that sub-section (4) of sec. 439 refers to a case where the trial has ended in a complete acquittal, and not to a case where the trial has ended in a conviction but the Court has wrongly applied the law or has wrongly found some fact not proved and has in consequence held that the conviction should be under some section of the I P Code other than the section properly applicable—*Bali Reddi*, 37 Mad 119 (123), followed in *Emp v Shahu*, 20 S L R. 352, 27 Cr.L.J. 1121 (1122). In a Patna case, where the accused was convicted by a Magistrate under sec. 205 I. P. C., but the Sessions Judge on appeal altered the conviction into one under sec. 419 I. P. C., the High Court being of opinion that the former offence had been committed and not the latter, altered the conviction into one under sec. 205 I. P. Code. The High Court remarked that the substitution of the conviction under sec. 419 for one under sec. 205 by the Sessions Judge did not amount to an acquittal of the accused with regard to the offence under the latter section and that sec. 439 (4) Cr. P. Code was no bar to the High Court re-altering the conviction under sec. 419 into one under sec. 205 I P. C.—*Ganpat Lal v. Emp.*, 6 Pat 217, 28 Cr.L J. 529 (531). Where the accused was charged under secs. 148 and 326 I. P. C. but the Magistrate convicted him under sec. 148 and acquitted him under sec. 326, the High Court converted the acquittal into conviction under sec. 326 I. P. C., at the same time maintaining the conviction under sec. 148 I. P. C.—*Wazir Kunjra*, 7 Pat. 579, 30 Cr.L.J. 673 (675). But the Bombay High

Court dissented from this view. Thus, where the accused was convicted by a Magistrate under sec. 326 I. P. C. but the Sessions Judge on appeal altered the conviction into one under sec. 323, *held* that the order of the Sessions Judge was to be taken as an acquittal of the offence under sec. 326 I. P. C., and the High Court could not restore the conviction under sec. 326, because it would amount to converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction—*Emp. v. Shivaputraya*, 48 Bom 510 (511), 26 Bom L.R. 438, 26 Cr.L.J. 830 (dissenting from *Bhola v. Emp.*, 1 Cr.L.J. 842, 1904 P.R. 12). The Allahabad High Court also held that an order of acquittal could not be converted into an order of conviction, even though the acquittal was a partial acquittal. Thus, where the accused was charged with both murder and culpable homicide, and the Sessions Judge acquitted him on the charge of murder but convicted him of culpable homicide, the High Court in revision refused to convict the accused of murder—*Sheo Darshan*, 44 All. 332 (333), 20 A.L.J. 190, 23 Cr.L.J. 202. In a very recent Madras case, where the accused was charged with murder (sec. 302 I. P. C.) but the Sessions Judge convicted him under the second part of sec. 304 I. P. C., *held* that the High Court had no power to convict the accused of murder. The order of the Sessions Judge amounted to an order of acquittal in respect of the charge of murder, and the High Court has no power to do what is tantamount to converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The finding of acquittal referred to in sec. 439 (4) does not necessarily mean complete acquittal. The wording of the section says nothing about the acquittal being partial or complete. It includes cases where there has been an acquittal in respect of a particular offence, and a conviction in respect of another—*In re Subba Chukh*, 50 Mad. 259, 52 M.L.J. 707, 28 Cr.L.J. 397 (dissenting from *Bali Reddi*, 37 Mad. 119). These conflicting views have been recently considered in a case coming before the Judicial Committee, and they have laid down that if the accused is charged with murder (sec. 302 I. P. C.) but is convicted by the Sessions Judge of culpable homicide not amounting to murder (sec. 304 I. P. C.), it amounts to an acquittal in respect of the charge of murder under sec. 302 (although the Sessions Judge has not recorded an express finding of acquittal on this charge of murder), and the High Court cannot in revision convict the accused under sec. 302, for that would be tantamount to converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, and that the 'acquittal' mentioned in sec. 439 (4) does not contemplate only a complete acquittal in respect of all charges and offences but includes a case where the accused has been acquitted of the charge of murder but convicted of the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder—*Kishan Singh*, 50 All. 722 (P.C.), 33 C.W.N. 1 (3, 5, 6), 26 A.L.J. 1099, 30 Bom L.R. 1572, 29 P.L.R. 575, 55 M.L.J. 786, 29 Cr.L.J. 828 (approving 44 All. 332, and 48 Bom 510, and overruling the view of 37 Mad 119). The contrary view taken in 8 Lah 136, 1904 P.R. 12, 20 S.L.R. 352, 48 Mad. 774, 6 Pat 217 and 7 Pat. 579 is overruled.

The Rangoon High Court holds that where a man charged with murder has been convicted by the Sessions Judge for a minor offence, the

question whether the High Court can convict the man of murder (of which he has been acquitted by the Sessions Judge) depends on whether the High Court is dealing with the case both as an Appellate and a Revisional Court, or whether it is merely acting in its revisional capacity. If the High Court is acting both as an Appellate and a Revisional Court, it can convict the appellant of murder and sentence him to death (*On Shwe v. Emp.*, 1 Rang. 436, 25 Cr L.J. 247) But if it is acting solely as a Court of revision, it cannot convert the acquittal of murder into conviction—*Emp. v. Kan Thein*, 4 Rang. 140, 5 Bur.L.J. 80, 27 Cr L.J. 1393.

Where the accused was convicted by a Magistrate under secs. 420 and 507 I. P. Code but on appeal the Sessions Judge held that secs. 420 and 507 were not the proper sections applicable on the facts and altered the conviction to one under sections 385 and 508 I. P. C., the High Court can convict the accused under secs. 420 and 511 I. P. Code (attempt to cheat). Such an order would not amount to an alteration of acquittal into conviction, because the Sessions Judge has not considered whether the accused was guilty of an attempt to cheat and has not recorded any finding of acquittal on such a charge, and the prohibition in this clause did not apply to this case. The case is one in which it was difficult to say what the offence committed by the accused was, on the facts proved. In such a case it was doubtful whether the alteration of one section into another by the Sessions Judge could be said to be a case of 'acquittal' under the former section, within the meaning of this clause—*In re Doraisamy*, 48 Mad. 774, 48 M.L.J. 190, 26 Cr L.J. 755, A I R 1925 Mad 480.

1220. Sub-section (5)—No revision where right of appeal exists :—Under this sub-section, the High Court is precluded from exercising the powers of revision at the instance of the accused who had a right of appeal but did not exercise it—*Nandeyappa*, 8 Bom L.R. 851, 4 Cr.L.J. 446; *Dinonath v Rajcoomar*, 3 Cal 537, *Bhagwan Singh*, 1907 P R 20, 6 Cr.L.J. 263; *Emp. v Nilambar*, 2 All 276; *Gurdit Singh*, 1904 P L R 1; *In re Saravayya*, 44 M L J. 366, *Laxman Rangu*, 35 Bom 253, *Jumo v Emp.*, 8 S L R 229, *Harbhagwandas*, 14 S L R 173, 22 Cr L J 313, 60 I C 1001. And therefore it is impossible for an appeal filed beyond limitation to be treated as an application for revision as far as criminal procedure goes—*Gertmal v Shewa Ram*, 20 S.L.R. 90, 27 Cr L J 780 (781) Where the accused who had a right of appeal to the Sessions Judge did not appeal but came in revision before the High Court, this Court would be precluded from hearing the applicant, and in such a case the High Court cannot even interfere *sue motu*, for that would be an evasion of the statute, which the Court cannot permit—*Nuran v Emp.*, 18 S L R. 262, 25 Cr L J 1362, *Jumo v. Emp.*, 8 S.L.R. 229, 19 Cr L J 252 Thus, in an application by an accused person for revision of an order of a Magistrate refusing to allow a private vakil to appeal on his behalf, it was held that the case was not one for interference in revision because the accused could have appealed from his conviction and made it a ground of appeal that he was improperly deprived of legal assistance at the trial—*In re Saravayya*, 44 M.L.J. 366,

A.I.R. 1923 Mad. 494 Where a complaint is made by a Court under sec. 476, the accused has a right of appeal to a superior Court and it is not competent to the High Court to quash the proceedings in revision—*Abdul Karim*, 10 P.L.T. 16f, 30 Cr.L.J. 765 (766). But there is no inflexible rule that where the accused has a right of appeal and does not exercise it, the High Court cannot exercise its revisional powers under this section; but such powers should be sparingly used and in very exceptional circumstances—*Ala Baksh*, 11 All 484. Ordinarily when an accused has a right of appeal but has not exercised the same, the High Court will not permit him to apply in revision instead. But where the effect of not allowing the revision is to make him suffer long periods of imprisonment when under the law a sentence of only a few months could be imposed on him, the High Court will interfere under the general powers of revision—*In re Pavanar*, 20 L.W. 914, 26 Cr.L.J. 747. In as much as this sub-section directs that where an appeal lies and no appeal is brought, no proceedings by way of revision shall be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed, it is clearly desirable that District Magistrates should not place difficulties in the way of persons entitled to appeal by calling for the proceedings and taking action upon them within the period allowed for appeal—*Lakanaw*, 10 Bur.L.T. 166, 18 Cr.L.J. 355.

No appeal after revision:—Where a case has been heard in revision and orders have been passed after the High Court fully went into the facts of the case, the Court cannot afterwards hear an appeal in the same case—1890 A.W.N. 225

Revision after appeal:—Although the High Court is competent to interfere in revision as well as to interfere on appeal, still it could not have been the intention of the Legislature that a person, who had appealed and had the opportunity of advancing any objection he desired to take to the proceedings of the Lower Court, should again have the opportunity of raising any points of law he may have omitted to raise in the appeal, by an application for revision—*Venkatachalam*, 2 Weir 573. But the High Court after it has acted as a Court of Appeal, may act as a Court of revision on special grounds, e.g., to correct an error which cannot be set right by appeal. For instance, if a man should be found guilty of murder and sentenced to 7 years' transportation, then if the prisoner should appeal on the facts the High Court might uphold the finding of guilty of murder on appeal, and afterwards as a Court of revision might set aside the sentence of 7 years' transportation and pass a legal sentence for murder—*Gora Chand*, 5 W.R. 45.

1221. Sub-section (6):—By virtue of this new clause, an accused person, who has been called upon to show cause why a sentence passed upon him should not be enhanced, will have the right of showing not only that the sentence should not be enhanced but that the whole conviction is wrong. This amendment enables the High Court not only to refuse an enhancement of sentence but also to set aside a conviction if the High Court finds that not only the sentence but the conviction also is equally unjustifiable.

The object of the amendment has been thus stated: "Under the Code as it stands, the High Court has been given the power to enhance the sentence in case of persons who have been convicted by Lower Courts. Now, suppose the accused person takes the conviction and he does not care to appeal. Rather than undergo the expense of going to the High Court and appealing against the sentence, he suffers the sentence and keeps quiet. But the police are not satisfied with the sentence imposed by the Magistrate or Sessions Judge who tried the case. They say, he should have been given a longer sentence or a longer punishment, and therefore they drag the poor man to the High Court. When he appears before the High Court, it stands to reason that he should be able to say 'Well, I have been wrongly convicted, but you want to impose a heavier penalty now. I was content to let things alone, but here the police won't leave me alone, they have dragged me to the High Court, now let me establish my innocence, the case is not proved against me, the evidence is false, I want to establish that.' Sir, there are Judges and Judges. Here the luck of the accused depends upon the particular Judge who hears the particular case * * * We must not leave it to the sweet will and discretion of particular Judges to say whether they will hear that point or not. If the man is able to satisfy the revising authority that the man is entitled to acquittal, it is only right that the High Court should do so"—*Legislative Assembly Debates*, 8th February 1923, page 2081

Prior to this amendment, in cases that came up before the High Court for enhancement of sentence, it was the practice to accept the conviction as *conclusive*, and to consider the question of enhancement of sentence on that basis; see *Emp v. Chinto*, 32 Bom 162, 7 Cr.L.J. 119, 10 Bom L.R. 93. But this is no longer correct; the amendment is intended to give the accused person, who has been brought to the bar of the High Court to answer why a sentence passed upon him should not be enhanced, the right of showing by argument *a fortiori* not only that the sentence should not be enhanced but that the conviction itself is wrong and should be set aside—*Emp v. Mahadeo*, 26 Cr L J 821 (Nag), *Jorabhai*, 50 Bom 783, 27 Cr L J 1173 (1174). The effect of the enactment of this sub-section is that the High Court when adjudicating upon an application for enhancement of sentence, is converted into a Court of Appeal against conviction and the accused is entitled to show that his conviction was unjustified—*Emp. v Tej Ram*, 27 P L R 112, 27 Cr L J 380 (381). An accused person when showing cause why his sentence should not be enhanced, is entitled to show that the whole trial was illegal (e.g. as contravening the provisions of sec 234), though the question of illegality was not raised at the trial—*Emp. v Manant* 49 Bom 892, 27 Bom L R 1343, 27 Cr L J 305.

But where a High Court has given a finding on appeal as to the guilt of the accused person, and subsequently a notice is served upon that person to show cause why his sentence should not be enhanced, he is not at liberty under sec 439 (6) to re-open the question of the correctness of his conviction because of the inherent incapacity of a Bench of the

High Court to reconsider a decision given by another Bench (secs. 369 and 430)—*forabhai*, 50 Bom. 783, 28 Bom L.R. 1051, 27 Cr.L.J. 1173 (1175). Similarly, where an accused has filed a petition against his conviction and that petition has been dismissed by the High Court (whether *in limine* or on the merits) and then proceedings are taken against him before the High Court for enhancement of the sentence, the accused would be precluded from re-agitating the question of the legality of the conviction, because the High Court cannot decide again what it has decided once—*In re Sayed Anif*, 26 Cr.L.J. 583 (586) (Mad.), *Sher Singh*, 8 Lah 521, 28 Cr.L.J. 266, *Dhanna Lal*, 10 Lah 241, 30 Cr.L.J. 815 (818).

Power of accused to challenge findings of fact.—Where an accused has been convicted by a Magistrate, and that conviction has been confirmed on appeal by the Sessions Judge, and then a notice is issued to the accused to show cause why the sentence should not be enhanced, the accused is entitled under this sub-section to show that his conviction is wrong, and in doing so he is entitled to challenge the findings of fact of the lower Appellate Court. It is not correct to say that he can show cause against his conviction only on points of law. In showing cause the accused is entitled to argue that the estimate of evidence made by the Courts below is erroneous and that the conviction is against the weight of evidence upon the record; and the High Court can go into the evidence to find whether the conviction can be sustained—*Badan Singh*, 30 Cr.L.J. 933 (935, 936) (All). The Lahore High Court is also of opinion that where an accused person, whose conviction has been confirmed on appeal, applies in revision, and a notice is also issued to show cause why the sentence should not be enhanced, it is competent to him to show from the whole record that he ought to have been acquitted, and he cannot be restricted with any considerations that the application is in revision only and not an appeal. The High Court can therefore go through the facts and consider the whole evidence—*Kala*, 30 P.L.R. 437, 30 Cr.L.J. 699 (700). But the Sind Court is of opinion that while this subsection gives the accused the right to show cause against his conviction, he cannot claim the right to attack the findings of fact, if he has appealed to the lower Appellate Court and that appeal has been dismissed. If he had not appealed but had remained content on account of the light sentence inflicted on him by the trial Court, and then a notice is issued why his sentence should not be enhanced, he should not be denied the opportunity of challenging the findings of fact, while showing cause against his conviction under this sub-section. But he cannot claim the same privilege if he had appealed and lost, and the High Court will not disturb the findings of fact of the lower Appellate Court—*Lulman*, 21 S.L.R. 107, 27 Cr.L.J. 1233 (1234). If he has exercised his right of appeal and the appeal has been dismissed, he cannot, in showing cause under this sub-section, challenge the findings of fact of the Lower Appellate Court, but he can, as in an ordinary revision application, only show cause to the extent that the conviction was based in no legal evidence or was manifestly erroneous—*Shidoo*, 29 Cr.L.J. 936 (937) (Sind). And this principle applies whether the appeal was dismissed on the

merits or was dismissed summarily, because the summary dismissal amounts to an order confirming the findings of fact and law of the trial Court—*Shidoo*, *supra*.

Conviction on plea of guilty:—If a person has been convicted on his plea of guilty he cannot in showing cause against his conviction, question the legality of his conviction or go behind his plea of guilty. He can only question the extent or legality of the sentence (e.g., whether the Court was entitled in law to pass such sentence) or he can possibly show that there was some defect in the proceedings or that the fact to which he confessed by his plea of guilty did not amount to an offence or the offence of which he has been convicted—*Jnanendra*, 33 C.W.N. 599 (604, 605), 49 C.L.J. 432, 30 Cr.L.J. 1038.

1222. Miscellaneous.—Limitation—According to the practice of the Calcutta High Court an application for revision in criminal cases must be presented within 60 days from the date of the order complained of, exclusive of the time necessary for obtaining copies. This is not, however, an inflexible rule, and in exceptional circumstances the rule may be departed from—*Khetra Mohan v Darpa Narain*, 43 Cal 1029. Although there is no law of limitation applicable to revision applications, still it is the settled practice of the Allahabad High Court not to admit them unless they are made within a reasonable time after the order complained of. An application for revision preferred 5 months after the order complained of was passed was therefore rejected—*Emp. v Ram Narain*, 27 Cr.L.J. 1021 (All.).

Finding of fact—It is the practice of the High Court (Allahabad) in revision, unless very strong ground for an opposite conclusion is found to exist, to take the findings of the Lower Appellate Court and not of the first Court, as the facts of the case—*Raghubar Dayal*, 18 Cr.L.J. 435 (All.).

New plea in revision—An accused cannot be heard to urge a new plea entirely inconsistent with the one already raised by him during the trial, unless he could establish that the case for the prosecution would not be believed and there is an element of doubt in it, in which case the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused—*Raghubar Dayal*, 18 Cr.L.J. 435 (All.).

Loss of record—The loss of a record after conviction is no ground for the acquittal of the accused in revision. In serious cases where the accused has been convicted and sentenced to a substantial punishment, it may be that a retrial may be ordered—18 Cr.L.J. 737 (Pat.).

Rule to shew cause—A rule which is issued by the High Court in revision should be read with the judgments which were before the Court at the time it was granted, and should be read reasonably in favour of the accused—*Rakhai Nokari*, 2 C.W.N. 81.

How to shew cause—A Magistrate who is called upon by the High Court to show cause against a rule issued by the High Court must ask the Legal Remembrancer to appear for him, and must not address the Registrar of the High Court by letter—*Hurro Soondery*, 4 Cal. 20.

Duty of Magistrate showing cause :—Though it is open to a Magistrate called upon to shew cause to submit his remarks in answer to the ground urged by the petitioner who obtained the rule, it is not open to him to submit observations with a view to supplement or add to his judgment—*Aladhu Sudan v. Sasti*, 7 C.W.N. 859.

Costs :—If a criminal revision is dismissed, the High Court cannot grant costs to the other party. The Code has made provisions for granting of costs in certain specific instances (*vide* sections 149, 433, 498, 526 and 545), but has made no provision for granting costs of revision; and so the High Court cannot, even by invoking its inherent powers, grant costs in cases of revision. It can grant costs only in those cases where the Code makes express provision, but not in other cases, the maxim *expressio unius est exclusio alterius* applies—*Sankaralinga v. Narayana*, 45 Mad. 913 (919) (F.B.). Even where the revision petition is brought by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, and the petition fails, the High Court cannot award costs to the other party (accused), although it is quite reasonable that he should be granted costs—*Ibid*.

440. No party has any right to be heard either personally or by pleader before any Court when exercising its powers of revision :

Optional with Court to hear parties.

Provided that the Court may, if it thinks fit, when exercising such powers, hear any party either personally or by pleader, and that nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect section 439, sub-section (2).

1223. Scope of section :—The rule in this section is the general rule provided by the Legislature, and it must be taken as a legislative recission of the general principle that persons are entitled to be heard before any order affecting them to their prejudice can be made—*Nobin v. Russick*, 10 Cal 268. Under this section, it is open to the High Court to determine the question raised by a Rule without hearing the counsel or pleader for or against the Rule—*Bibhuti v. Dasmoni*, 10 C.L.J. 80. The High Court can deal with the question whether the District Magistrate has properly exercised his power under sec 437, without giving notice to the accused or allowing him an opportunity of being heard—*Nobin v. Russick*, 10 Cal 268.

The provisions of this section apply only to revision, and do not apply to the summary rejection of an appeal under sec 421—*Raj Kumar v. Tinowri*, 12 C.W.N 248. This section does not apply to sec. 439 (2); that is, if an order is passed to the prejudice of the accused, he must be heard either personally or by pleader.

1224. No right to be heard :—The revisional power of the High Court is exercised at its own discretion and no petitioner has a right

to be heard—*In re Ranga Rao*, 23 M L J 371; *Sripat v. Gahbar*, 25 A.L.J. 1010, 29 Cr.L.J. 88 (89). And the fact that the pleader of a party was not heard when the High Court was exercising revisional powers is not a ground for a second application for revision or for review—*Sripat Narain v. Gahbar*, supra. The accused is not entitled to be heard when an order under sec. 436 is made directing a further inquiry into a summary rejection of complaint—*Haridas v. Saritulla*, 15 Cal 608 (see also the other cases cited in Note 1184 under sec 436). The High Court refused to hear counsel who appeared to support a petition for the revision of an acquittal—*Thandavan v. Perianna*, 14 Mad 363. Where an accused person applied in revision to the High Court, and pending the revision he was let off on bail and thereafter he absconded, held that the High Court would not hear his pleader in the revision application—*Har Narain v. Emp*, 24 Cr.L.J. 240 (All.). In a reference under sec 438 a counsel is not entitled to appear against the report—*Reg v. Devama*, 1 Bom 64. A private prosecutor cannot be allowed to appear on a reference to the High Court under sec. 438. If he is heard at all, he can be heard only with the permission of the Court—*Sudderuddin v. Ram Joy*, 14 W R 51.

But by virtue of the discretionary power given by the proviso, the High Court always hears counsel in matters of importance—*Haradhan*, 19 Cal 380, *Ram Nihore*, 8 A L J 237, 10 I C 740, 12 Cr L.J 231. Whether the matter is a matter of importance must be left to the discretion of the Judge hearing the matter of revision—*Sripat v. Gahbar*, supra. Where a complaint has been dismissed under sec. 203, and the complainant applies in revision, the High Court may, in its discretion, hear the complainant on the subject of his complaint, but to this limited extent, viz. in order to see in effect what his case is about. If, for instance, that case on investigation should tend to show that there has been any denial of natural justice or that some gross and palpable error has been committed in the Court below, then the High Court would direct a rule to issue in order to hear what is to be said on the other side—*Shamdasani*, 31 Bom L R 1144, 1929 Cr. C 555 (556).

441. When the record of any proceeding of any

Presidency Magistrate is called for by the High Court under section 435, the Magistrate may submit with the record a statement setting forth the grounds of his decision

Statement by Presidency Magistrate of grounds of his decision to be considered by High Court.

or order and any facts which he thinks material to the issue; and the Court shall consider such statement before overruling or setting aside the said decision or order.

1225. A statement filed under this section takes away any irregularity in the proceedings of a Magistrate caused by the omission to record reasons before referring a case under sec. 202 or dismissing a complaint under sec. 203—*Rengammal v. Krishnamachari*, 5 M L T. 79.

A statement submitted by a Presidency Magistrate under this section must be regarded as a completion of the record and possesses a conclusive character as against affidavits—*Bhawoo v. Mulji*, 12 Bom. 377.

This section is not enacted to enable Presidency Magistrates to give fresh reasons for their decision contradictory to those already given, but to enable them to supply reasons where in the exercise of their privilege under sec 370 they have given no reasons at all—*Swarnammal v. Muni-swami*, 1929 M.W.N. 893, 1930 Cr C. 120. This section does not abrogate the terms of section 263 or 370. It merely allows the Presidency Magistrate to supplement the reasons which have been already stated under sections 263 and 370. It does not apply where no reasons whatever have been recorded by the Presidency Magistrate. A Bench of Presidency Magistrates imposing a sentence of imprisonment for an offence must record their reasons for the conviction. The omission to do so in a case where no record of the evidence was taken is a grave irregularity. But having regard to the reasons for conviction disclosed in the record submitted by the Presidency Magistrate under this section, the High Court in this case did not set aside the order of the Bench on the ground of the irregularity—*In re Dervish Hossain*, 46 Mad. 253.

442. When a case is revised under this Chapter by

the High Court, it shall, in manner
 High Court's order to be certified to lower Court or Magistrate. hereinbefore provided by section

425 certify its decision or order to the Court by which the finding, sentence or order revised was recorded or passed, and the Court or Magistrate to which the decision or order is so certified shall thereupon make such orders as are conformable to the decision so certified; and, if necessary, the record shall be amended in accordance therewith.

1226. Scope of section :—This section deals with every case which is revised under this Chapter by a High Court, in other words, it applies to all revisions, whether under sec 435 or sec 439; and it provides that it shall certify its decision or order to the Lower Court, but it contains no such provision that it will certify its decision to itself. This shows that the High Court cannot revise any judgment passed by itself—*Press v. K E*, 1909 P.R. 4, 11 C 747, 9 Cr L J 378

PART VIII.

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO CASES IN WHICH EUROPEAN AND INDIAN BRITISH SUBJECTS ARE CONCERNED.

This Chapter has been added by sec 27 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act XII of 1923.

"The procedure for the trial of cases in which racial considerations are involved is included in a new chapter which takes the place of the old Chapter XXXIII of the Code

"As regards the new Chapter XXXIII it will be observed that it applies to offences punishable with imprisonment which are alleged to have been committed outside a presidency-town. The first step to be taken to secure that such a case shall be tried under the provisions of the Chapter is a claim to be made by the accused person before the Magistrate. Unless such a claim is made at one of the stages indicated for the trial of a summons-case or of a warrant case, or for the inquiry preliminary to commitment, the provisions of the Chapter will not apply. The Magistrate then makes such inquiry as he thinks necessary. As a guide to the Magistrate in coming to a finding as to whether the case should be tried under the provisions of the Chapter or not, it is provided that if the complainant and the accused persons or any of them are respectively European and Indian British subjects or Indian and European British subjects, he shall find that the case should be tried under the provisions of the Chapter. For other cases with which both European British subjects and Indian British subjects are connected the Magistrate must be satisfied that it is expedient for the ends of justice that the case shall be so tried. This, it is observed, is the same criterion as that now contained in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to the powers of a High Court to transfer Criminal cases. If the Magistrate rejects the claim, the person has a right of appeal to the Sessions Judge whose decision is final, and if the claim is rejected by the Magistrate, the Magistrate is required to stay the proceedings until the expiration of the period allowed for the presentation of the appeal, or, if an appeal is presented, until it has been decided. The period allowed for the presentation of an appeal is fixed by Article

156A of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, at seven days. The persons who will be included within the term "complainant" for the purpose of these provisions are then defined by the proposed section 444. Incidentally public servants and officers and servants of companies, associations or bodies to which the Local Government by general or special order may declare the provisions of the section to apply, will not be included within the definition merely because they have made a complaint or given information in their official or "quasi" official capacity. The procedure in summons-cases punishable with imprisonment is then laid down. For warrant-cases which would normally be tried under the provisions of Chapter XXI of the Code, if it is found that the case ought to be tried under the provisions of this Chapter a Magistrate is required, if he does not discharge the accused, to commit the case for trial to the Court of Session, whether the case is or is not exclusively triable by that Court. Normally in the Court of Session the case will then be tried by a jury of mixed nationality, the majority of the jurors being either Indians or Europeans and Americans according as the accused person is an Indian or an European subject of His Majesty."—*Statement of Objects and Reasons, Para 11.*

443. (1) *Where, in the course of the trial outside a presidency-town of any offence punishable with imprisonment, the accused person, at any time before he is committed for trial under section 213 or is asked to show cause under section 242 or enters on his defence under section 256, as the case may be, claims that the case ought to be tried under the provisions of this Chapter, the Magistrate inquiring into or trying the case, after making such inquiry as he thinks necessary, and after allowing the accused person reasonable time within which to adduce evidence in support of his claim, shall, if he is satisfied—*

- Determination regarding applicability of this Chapter.*
- (a) *that the complainant and the accused persons or any of them are respectively European and Indian British subjects or Indian and European British subjects, or*
 - (b) *that in view of the connection with the case of both an European British subject and an Indian British subject, it is expedient for the ends of justice that the case should be tried under the provisions of this Chapter,*
record ■ finding that the case is a case which ought to be

tried under the provisions of this Chapter, or, if he is not so satisfied, record a finding that it is not such a case.

(2) Where the Magistrate rejects the claim, the person by whom it was made may appeal to the Sessions Judge, and the decision of the Sessions Judge thereon shall be final and shall not be questioned in any Court in appeal or revision.

(3) Where the Magistrate rejects the claim, he shall stay the proceedings until the expiration of the period allowed for the presentation of the appeal or, if an appeal is presented, until it has been decided.

This section has been framed on the lines recommended in Para 27 of the Racial Distinctions Committee Report

1226A. The old law has been materially altered, and the mere fact that the accused is an European British subject does not *ipso facto* entitle him to a right of any special procedure and does not specially restrict a Magistrate or a Court of Session in his or its power of punishment; nor is it necessary that the Magistrate should be a Justice of the Peace in order to have power to try the case—*Barnsfield v Emp*, 31 Cr L.J. 918 (1920) (Lah.).

No special procedure is prescribed where both the complainant and the accused are European British subjects—*Barnsfield*, *supra*

The mere fact of the accused person being an European British subject does not entitle him to the benefit of Chapter XXXIII. He must claim before the committing Magistrate to be tried under the special procedure, and the Magistrate must find that the necessary ingredients are present. If any such claim is made prior to commitment, but there is no finding by the Magistrate, the question cannot be raised in the Sessions Court. If a claim is made and the Magistrate finds favourably to the accused, the order is final and the Sessions Court cannot go behind it. If the finding of the Magistrate is adverse, the party should appeal, and the decision of the Sessions Judge would be final. The intention of the legislature is clear that the point should not be raised in the 1st Court—*Hay v. Emp*, 28 O C 230, 2 O W N 469, 26 Cr L J 1217

A claim to be tried under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII is different from a claim to be tried as an European British subject under sec 528A. So far as the former claim is concerned, the question of the status of the claimant does not always arise, as is evident from the provisions of clause (b) of sec 443. In a claim to be tried as an European or Indian British subject (under sec 528A), the claimant must prove his own status, but in a claim to be tried under Chapter XXXIII the claimant may or may not have to do so—*Emp*, 52 Cal 347, 29 C W N 447, 26 Cr L J 401.

This chapter does not apply to Presidency Towns. There is no provision in the Code for enabling a person to put forward a claim to be tried under Chapter XXXIII either before a Magistrate holding an inquiry or trial in a Presidency Town, or before the High Court during the trial of a case. It is unreasonable to suppose that the Legislature even intended that when there was no knowing whether there would be a conviction or an acquittal (and both are open to appeal under sec. 449) an inquiry might be asked for and the Court required to decide on the question as to whether if tried outside a presidency-town the case would have been triable under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII. The only object of such an inquiry is that the result of it may be availed of for the purposes of an appeal by the accused in the case of a conviction and by the Crown in the case of an acquittal. The proper time to raise the question is when leave to appeal is applied for under sec. 449 (c)—*Martindale v. Emp.*, (supra).

Proof of status:—A statement in an affidavit by the accused's wife that she heard from their grand-parents while they were all living together that the accused's grandfather was born in England of English parents, though not controverted by the Crown by a counter-affidavit, is merely hearsay evidence and is not sufficient to establish the status of the accused as an European British subject—*Thomas v. Emp.*, 53 Cal. 746, 27 Cr.L.J. 1304 (1306). In an application for leave to appeal under sec. 449 (c), the affidavit of the accused as to his nationality was held to be admissible—*Gallagher v. Emp.*, 54 Cal. 52, 28 Cr.L.J. 481 (482).

444. For the purposes of section 443, "complainant" means any person making a complaint, or in relation to any case of which cognizance is taken under clause (b) of section 190, sub-section (1), any person who has given information relating to the commission of the offence within the meaning of section 154:

Definition of "complainant."
 Provided that a Public Prosecutor, a public servant, a member, officer or servant of any local authority, a railway servant as defined in section 3 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, or an officer or servant of any company, association or other body to which the Local Government may, by general or special order published in the local official Gazette, declare the provisions of this section to apply, shall not, by reason only of the fact that he has made a complaint of, or given information of, an offence in his capacity as such Public Prosecutor, public servant, railway servant, member, officer or servant, be deemed to be a complainant within the meaning of this

section, nor shall a police officer be so deemed by reason only of the fact that a report under section 173 relating to a case has been made by or through him.

This section has been added by the Bill, and did not exist in the Report of the Racial Distinctions Committee

1226B. The proviso lays down that the word "complainant" does not include a person who, although he is an European British subject, is merely an instrument which sets the Court in motion. Thus, where a public servant (who is an European British subject) makes a complaint, under the orders of the Government, as a public servant, this Chapter does not apply—*Emp. v. Zahir Haider*, 7 P L T 367, 27 Cr L J 1041 (1059). The proviso is intended to exclude from the definition of "complainant" such persons as public prosecutors or public servants who make complaints or lodge informations before the police in their official capacity, irrespective of whether or not they have personal knowledge of the facts or a personal interest in the case, i.e. the definition excludes not only those public servants who file complaints as mere automatons of the Government but also those public servants who file complaints as mere automatons and at the same time have personal knowledge of the facts of, and a personal interest, in the case—*Mrs. Burchell v Emp*, 20 S L R 178, 27 Cr.L J 770 (771)

445. (1) *Where a Magistrate or a Sessions Judge decides under section 443 that a*

Procedure in summons cases.

case ought to be tried under the provisions of this Chapter and the

case is a summons case, the Magistrate trying the same shall direct that the case be referred to a Bench of two Magistrates and shall send a copy of such order to the District Magistrate who shall forthwith provide for the constitution of a Bench of two Magistrates of the first class, of whom one shall be an European and the other an Indian, for the trial of the case.

(2) Where the Magistrates constituting the Bench by which a case is tried under this section differ in opinion, the case together with their opinions thereon shall be laid before the Sessions Judge, who may examine any party or recall and examine any witness who has already given evidence in the case, and may call for and take any further evidence, and shall thereafter pass such judgment, sentence or order in the case as he thinks fit and as is according to law.

(3) Any person convicted by a Bench under this section shall have the same right of appeal as if he had been convicted by a Magistrate of the first class, and any person convicted by a Sessions Judge under sub-section (2) shall have the same right of appeal to the High Court as if he had been convicted by the Sessions Judge at a trial held by the Sessions Judge under this Code.

(4) In any case in which it is impracticable to constitute a Bench in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) in any district, the District Magistrate shall transfer the case for trial by a like Bench to such other district as the High Court may, by general or special order, direct.

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, the Local Government may, by notification in the local official Gazette, direct that all summons-cases tried under the provisions of this chapter in any district specified in the notification shall be tried as if they were warrant-cases in accordance with the provisions hereinafter in this Chapter laid down for the trial of warrant-cases.

Sub-sections (1) to (4) of this section embody the recommendations contained in para 28 of the *Racial Distinctions Committee Report*

As regards sub-section (5), the reason is thus stated by the framers of the Bill: "The Local Government and High Courts were consulted on these proposals of the Committee (i.e., as regards the new section 445); from the opinions received it is clear that in many areas in India these proposals will be impracticable, and it is considered that in any case the adoption of the procedure proposed for similar warrant cases (sec 446), namely, commitment to and trial in a Court of Session by jury, would not be more expensive than the proposals of the Committee. Accordingly, it is proposed (in analogy with the powers given to Local Governments by sec 269) to permit Local Governments to direct that in particular districts such cases shall be triable according to the provisions laid down for the trial of similar warrant cases"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons, Para 6*

446. (1) Where a Magistrate or a Sessions Judge decides under section 443 that a

Procedure in warrant cases

case ought to be tried under the provisions of this Chapter and the case is a warrant-case, the Magistrate inquiring into or trying the case shall, if he does not discharge the accused

under section 209 or section 253, as the case may be, commit the case for trial to the Court of Session, whether the case is or is not exclusively triable by that Court.

(2) Where an accused is committed to the Court of Session under sub-section (1), the Court shall proceed to try the case as if the accused had required to be tried in accordance with the provisions of section 275, and the provisions of that section and the other provisions of Chapter XXIII, so far as they are applicable, shall apply accordingly :

Provided that where the trial before the Court of Session would in the ordinary course be with the aid of assessors, and the accused, or all of them jointly, require to be tried in accordance with the provisions of sec. 284A, the trial shall be held with the aid of assessors all of whom shall, in the case of European British subjects, be persons who are Europeans or Americans, or, in the case of Indian British subjects, be Indians.

This section embodies the recommendation of the Racial Distinctions Committee contained in Para. 27 of their Report.

1227. Where the complainant is an Indian, and one of the accused persons is an European British subject, and the Magistrate decides that the case ought to be tried under the provisions of this chapter, and the case is a warrant case, the Magistrate must commit the case to the Sessions. He cannot, after making the above decision, assume jurisdiction in respect of the Indian accused persons by discharging the European accused—*Banarsi Das v Emp*, 51 All 483, 27 A L.J. 188, 30 Cr L J. 218.

Trial to be by jury.—When an European British Subject is committed to the Court of Session under the provisions of section 446 (2) the trial must be in accordance with section 275, that is to say, the accused must be tried by a jury, the majority of whom shall, if before the first juror is called and accepted the accused so requires, consist of persons who are Europeans or Americans. But when the trial before the Court of Session would in the ordinary course be with the aid of assessors, the accused has the right under the proviso to sec 446, to be tried with the aid of assessors, all of whom shall be of the category within which the accused comes. By "ordinary course" is here meant the course which would be followed in the absence of a claim by the accused to be tried under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII or in the absence of a Notification by the Local Government under the provisions of section *Bray v. Crown*, 5 Lah. 515 (517, 518).

447. *If at any stage of an inquiry or trial under this*

Court to inform accused persons of their rights in certain cases.

Code II appears to the Magistrate that the case is or might be held to be a case which ought to be tried under the provisions of this Chapter, he shall forthwith inform the accused person of his rights under this Chapter.

The omission by the Magistrate to inform the accused of his rights to be tried under this chapter is curable by the provisions of sec 534—*Zagriya v. Emp.*, 3 Rang 220, 4 Bur.L.J 44.

448. *For the purpose of the trial in Rangoon of any*

References to Sessions Judge to be construed as references to High Court in Rangoon.

person under the provisions of this Chapter, references to the Sessions Judge shall be construed as references to the High Court of Judicature at Rangoon.

Special provisions relating to appeal.

449. (1) *Where—*

(a) *a case is tried by jury in a High Court or Court of Session under the provisions of this Chapter, or*

(b) *a case which would otherwise have been tried under the provisions of this Chapter is under this Code committed to or transferred to the High Court and is tried by jury in the High Court, or*

(c) *a case is tried by jury in the High Court in a Presidency-town and the High Court grants leave to appeal on the ground that the case would, if it had been tried outside a presidency-town, have been triable under the provisions of this chapter,*

then, notwithstanding anything contained in section 418 or section 423, sub-section (2), or in the Letters Patent of any High Court, an appeal may lie to the High Court on a matter of fact as well as on a matter of law.

(2) *Notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent of any High Court, the Local Government may direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original order of acquittal passed by the High Court in any such trial as is referred to in sub-section (1).*

(3) *An appeal under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall, where the High Court consists of more than one Judge, be heard by two Judges of the High Court.*

See Para. 7 (b) and (c) of the *Statement of Objects and Reasons*.

1227A. Appeal :—*Matter of fact, matter of law :—*The accused, on appearing before the committing Magistrate, asserted his right to be tried as an European British subject, and the Magistrate, being satisfied that he was one, passed an order that he was to be dealt with under sec. 443. In the trial before the Sessions Judge, the prosecution did not take any steps to have the Magistrate's order set aside, but had him charged and tried in the ordinary way. On appeal from the conviction, held that under this section, the appeal lay on a matter of fact as well as on a matter of law, and the accused could question the legality of the conviction, even though there might not be any foundation for his claim to be tried under this chapter—*Singleton v. Emp.*, 29 C.W.N. 260, 41 C.L.J. 87, 26 Cr.L.J. 662. This section lays down that in cases tried by jury, an appeal lies to the High Court on a matter of fact as well as on a matter of law, therefore, in a case tried under this chapter, the finding of a jury on a question of fact is not final, and therefore, to justify an interference by the High Court under sec. 307, the finding of the jury need not be manifestly wrong or perverse—*Crown v. Bimal Parshad*, 6 Lah. 98, 26 P.L.R. 263, 26 Cr.L.J. 1241.

Leave to appeal :—It is desirable that an application for leave to appeal under clause (c) should be made to the Judge who tried the case. The right of appeal depends upon extraneous circumstances which have nothing to do with the guilt of the accused, and the trying Judge is better qualified than any one else to decide whether these circumstances exist or not—*Martindale v. Emp.*, 52 Cal. 347, 29 C.W.N. 447, 26 Cr. L.J. 401. But in another Calcutta case it has been held that, since no appeal would lie against the decision of the Single Judge refusing leave to appeal, it is better in the interests of justice that the application for leave to appeal should be heard by a Division Bench—*Turner v. Emp.*, 52 Cal. 636, 29 C.W.N. 458, 41 C.L.J. 325, 26 Cr.L.J. 835.

Application for leave to appeal should be made with notice to the Crown, but once the leave is granted without such notice, it cannot be revoked on the ground of want of such notice—*Martindale v. Emp.*, (supra).

This section gives the right of appeal against the decision of a High Court in three classes of cases. The first class are the cases tried by jury in a High Court under the provisions of this chapter and can only apply to High Courts outside a Presidency Town. The second class of cases are those which would otherwise be tried under the provisions of this chapter but are committed or transferred to the High Court and tried by jury in the High Court. In these two classes of cases, an absolute right of appeal is given. But in classes of cases referred to in clause (c) the right of appeal is dependent on the condition of granting of leave to appeal. The necessity for this condition appears to be due to the fact that in cases which come under clause (b) the question whether

Chapter XXXIII is applicable or not has been decided before the case is committed or transferred to the High Court. But in cases which come under clause (c) this question has not arisen, and it is to be decided by the High Court before leave to appeal is granted, and if that is decided in accused's favour, he is entitled as of right to an appeal—*Turner v Emp.* (supra).

Limitation :—An appeal to the High Court (Division Bench) from an order passed by a Judge presiding at the criminal sessions of the High Court, under clause (c) of this section is governed by Article 155 of the Limitation Act, and if that appeal is barred, an application for leave to appeal is also barred; and consequently an application for the determination of the status of the accused as to his being an European British subject under sec. 449 (c) read with sec. 443 is necessarily out of time—*Thomas v Emp.*, 53 Cal. 746, 27 Cr.L.J. 1304 (1305).

Practice :—Under the Rules of the Calcutta High Court, a vakil could not appear for a party in an appeal from a trial held on the criminal sessions of the High Court—*Satya Narain v. Emp.*, 55 Cal. 858, 32 C.W.N. 319 (328).

450-463. * * * *

Sections 453, 454, 455 and 459 are now re-enacted as sections 528A, 528B, 528C, and 528D, respectively. Sections 456-458 are incorporated in secs. 491 and 491A, section 460 is included in section 284A, sub-section (2), Section 462 is now merged in section 326. The remaining sections (450, 451, 452, 461) are omitted.

1227B. Under the old Code, an European British subject had a right to claim to be tried by jury; that right was a substantive right and not a mere matter of procedure, and therefore where the commitment was made prior to the coming into force of the Amendment of 1923, but the trial in the Sessions Court was held after its coming into force, held that the accused's right to be tried by jury was not lost, and he was not to be tried by the Judge with the aid of assessors—*Emp. v. Fitzmaurice*. 6 Lah. 262, 26 P.L.R. 415, 27 Cr.L.J. 421.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

LUNATICS.

464. (1) When a Magistrate holding an inquiry or a trial has reason to believe that the accused is of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making

Procedure in case of accused being lunatic.

his defence, the Magistrate shall inquire into the fact of such unsoundness, and shall cause such person to be

examined by the Civil Surgeon of the district or such other medical officer as the Local Government directs, and thereupon shall examine such Surgeon or other officer as a witness, and shall reduce the examination to writing.

(1A) Pending such examination and inquiry the Magistrate may deal with the accused in accordance with the provisions of Section 466.

(2) If such Magistrate is of opinion that the accused is of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence, he shall record a finding to that effect and shall postpone further proceedings in the case.

Change —Sub-section (1A) and the italicised words in sub-section (2) have been added by sec. 120 of the Cr P Code Amendment Act XVIII of 1923. "The first amendment is consequential on the amendment in section 466. The second requires the Magistrate to record a finding if he is of opinion that the accused is of unsound mind and incapable of making a defence"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914).

1228. Application of section :—The provisions of this Chapter are incidental provisions for dealing with exceptional classes of persons. This Chapter is not to be so construed as to override the rules of general procedure, except in so far as the special provision contained in it is clearly incompatible with the general provisions—1894 P.R. 11. When a charge of an offence to which Chapter XVIII applies is made before a Magistrate, he ought in the first place to make an inquiry into the truth of the charge; it is only when he is satisfied after such inquiry that there is a *prima facie* case against the accused that he can make the inquiry prescribed by this section into the question of the unsoundness of mind of the accused person—*Ibid*

The question involved in this section is whether the accused is of unsound mind *at the time of the trial*, and therefore incapable of making his defence, and this question should not be confused with the question raised under sec. 1 P C as to whether the accused was or was not of unsound mind *at the time when he committed the offence* with which he is charged—*Chadani Lal*, 1900 A W N 47. The question whether the accused was of unsound mind at the time of the alleged offence is an entirely separate one to be inquired into in an entirely separate manner (see secs 469-471)—*Santokh v Emp*, 7 Lah 315, 27 Cr.L.J. 552. See *Bahadur*, 9 Lah 371 cited under sec 469. When an issue is raised as to the soundness of the mind of the accused person, the Court is bound to inquire, before it begins to record evidence, whether the accused is or is not incapacitated by unsoundness of mind from making his defence. If it fails to do so, the subsequent inquiry about the soundness or unsoundness of mind does not cure the defect—*Jhabbu*, 42 All 137.

Examination by Civil Surgeon:—A Magistrate cannot consign a lunatic to an asylum or jail on his own unprofessional opinion. He must have before him the deliberate statements of the Medical Officer reduced into writing—*Emp. v. Milan*, 1 Bur. 87.

A mere certificate of a Medical Officer of the District that the prisoner is of unsound mind and incapable of making his defence is not sufficient evidence of the prisoner's insanity. The Medical Officer should be called as a witness and carefully examined—*Ram Rutton*, 11 W.R. 23, 2 Weir 580.

When the evidence of the Medical Officer cannot be considered as decisive on the point of the prisoner's state of mind, evidence must be let in regarding his ordinary habits and behaviour, and his demeanour both before and after the commission of the alleged offence—*Vaimbilee*, 5 Cal. 826.

Postponement of further proceedings:—Where the Magistrate is of opinion that the accused is of unsound mind and therefore incapable of making his defence, he cannot try the accused—2 Weir 581. Nor can he legally acquit him. But he is bound to postpone further proceedings in the case, and either release him on security or detain him in custody and report the case to the Government (sec. 466)—2 Weir 581; *Romon Audheekharee*, 10 W.R. 37; 1882 A.W.N. 106; 1900 A.W.N. 47, 1 W.R. 11. If on examination, the accused person appears to be insane and unable to understand questions and to return intelligible replies, the Magistrate should act under secs. 464 and 466 of the Code and not under section 341—*Ratanlal* 832.

465. (1) If any person committed for trial before

Procedure in case of person committed before Court of Session or High Court being lunatic.

a Court of Session or a High Court appears to the Court at his trial to be of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence, the jury or the Court with the aid of assessors, shall, in the first instance, try the fact of such unsoundness and incapacity, and if the jury or Court, as the case may be, is satisfied of the fact, the Judge shall record a finding to that effect and shall postpone further proceedings in the case, and the jury, if any, shall be discharged.

(2) The trial of the fact of the unsoundness of mind and incapacity of the accused shall be deemed to be part of his trial before the Court.

Change :—The italicised words at the end of sub-section (1) have been added by section 121 of Cr. P. C. Amendment Act XVIII of 1923. "This amendment provides for the discharge of the jury in the event of

the Court of Session or the High Court being satisfied that the accused is of unsound mind and incapable of making his defence"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914).

1229. Fact of insanity must be tried :—The provisions of this section are mandatory, and their non-compliance vitiates the trial. Where a Sessions Judge's mind is in doubt as to the mental state of the accused at the time of trial, it is incumbent upon him to hold an inquiry on the question whether the accused is capable of making his defence when he comes before him on commitment, and to take the opinion of the assessors on that question and to come to a decision before proceeding further with the trial—*Santokh v. Emp.* 7 Lah. 315, 27 Cr.L.J. 552.

The question of unsoundness of mind must be tried by the judge and jury, and not by the Judge himself personally—*Bheekoo*, 19 W R. 15. Where, after a trial has been once adjourned on account of the prisoner's insanity, the Zillah Surgeon reports that the prisoner is capable of making his defence, the Judge should find with the aid of assessors whether the prisoner is capable of making his defence, and cannot act merely on the letter of the Zillah Surgeon—2 Weir 582.

Again, the question of the unsoundness of mind must be tried in the first instance. The issue as to the unsoundness of mind of the accused is a preliminary issue, and must be submitted to the jury first before proceeding with the trial—*Doorjodhun*, 19 W R 26, *Jhabbu*, 42 All 137; *Radhanath v. Emp.*, 27 Cr L.J. 896. Evidence must be led on the point as to whether the accused is of unsound mind or can stand his trial and understand the proceedings. It is not enough to merely put to the jury the question of the insanity of the accused—*Radhanath*, supra. If this procedure is not followed, the trial must be set aside, and the Sessions Judge must hold the trial before a fresh jury—*Radhanath*, supra. Where in the course of his examination under sec 364, the accused said that he was not in his senses when he tried to rob, it was held that the Court of Session should have acted under this section and tried the fact whether on the date the accused was called upon to plead he was or was not of unsound mind and capable or incapable of making his defence—*Jagdeo v. Emp.*, 15 A L.J. 239. When the accused committed to the Sessions appears to be of unsound mind, the Sessions Judge is bound to try the fact of insanity first, and should not try it along with the trial for the offence—1905 A W N 2.

If in a case committed to the Sessions, objection is taken on behalf of the accused that he is of unsound mind, and the Civil Surgeon when examined as a witness on behalf of the accused states that the accused is a person of unsound mind and therefore not in a fit state to understand the proceedings and to stand his trial, the onus lies on the prosecution to prove that the accused is of sound mind. In such a case, it is improper for the Sessions Judge to charge the jury that it is for the defence to satisfy the Court that he is of unsound mind. But such a charge to the jury, though improper, does not amount to a misdirection so as to make

the verdict of the jury on this joint unacceptable, specially if the verdict is unanimous—*Shib Das v. Emp.*, 51 Cal. 584 (586, 587).

In a trial at the Sessions, if a plea is taken on the prisoner's behalf under this section, that he is of unsound mind and incapable of making his defence, it is for the Crown to establish the soundness and capacity of the accused. The inquiry as to the soundness or unsoundness of the mind of the accused is a preliminary inquiry which is conducted for the satisfaction of the Court, and in that view the prosecution ought to commence and give their evidence—*Emp. v. Gopi Mohan Saha*, 51 Cal 827 (828), 26 Cr.L.J. 276 (*Day Murder Case*).

Where a Court entertains doubts as to the sanity of the accused, the Court should not merely put questions to the accused but should try the fact of such unsoundness of mind by examining the Civil Surgeon or some other medical officer, and by taking such evidence as might have been procurable from the village at which the accused resides, with the view of ascertaining whether the accused had at any time prior to the commission of the crime exhibited symptoms of sanity—*Hira Punja*, 1 B.H.C.R. 33

Where the Sessions Judge did not comply with the provisions of this section, but convicted the accused, held that the trial was vitiated, and the High Court set aside the conviction and ordered the Sessions Judge to hold an inquiry under this section before retrial on the charge—*Pala Singh v. K E*, 1905 P.R. 54, 3 Cr.L.J. 80; *Santokh v. Emp.*, 7 Lah. 315, 27 Cr.L.J. 552 Where on a reference for confirmation of a sentence of death, the High Court entertained doubts as to the accused's sanity, the case would be referred to the Sessions Judge for further inquiry—*Arzao Bebee*, 2 W.R. 33

1230. Postponement of trial.—Where the prisoner is found to be insane, the Sessions Judge should postpone the trial and proceed under sections 466 and 467, instead of proceeding with the trial and acquitting the accused—*Ram Rutton*, 9 W.R. 23, *Noor Khan*, 1 W.R. 11, 3 W.R. 70; *Moorali*, 3 W.R. 57.

A Sessions Judge has no power to stay proceedings and direct an inquiry to be made into the state of the accused's mind, where it appears to him problematic whether the accused is capable of making his defence. The proper procedure to be followed is that prescribed by secs 465 and 466—2 Weir 582

1231. Sub-section (2).—The preliminary inquiry held under this section is not a trial in the sense of ascertaining whether the accused is guilty or not of the offence charged—3 P.L.J. 291.

466. (1) Whenever an accused person is found to be of unsound mind and incapable of making his defence, the Magistrate or Court as the case may be, whether the case is one in which bail may be taken or not,

Release of lunatic pending investigation or trial

may release him on sufficient security being given that he shall be properly taken care of and shall be prevented from doing injury to himself or to any other person, and for his appearance when required before the Magistrate or Court or such officer as the Magistrate or Court appoints in this behalf.

(2) If the case is one in which bail may not be taken, or if sufficient security is not given, the Magistrate or Court shall report the case to the Local Government, remanding the accused to custody pending orders, and the Local Government may order the accused to be confined in a lunatic asylum, jail or other suitable place of safe custody, and the Magistrate or Court shall give effect to such order.

(2) If the case is one in which, *in the opinion of the Magistrate or Court*, bail should not be taken or if sufficient security is not given, the Magistrate or Court, as the case may be, *shall order the accused to be detained in safe custody in such place and manner as he or it may think fit, and shall report the action taken to the Local Government.*

Provided that no order for the detention of the accused in a lunatic asylum shall be made otherwise than in accordance with such rules as the Local Government may have made under the Indian Lunacy Act, 1912.

Change :—This section has been amended, as shown by the italicised words, by sec 122 of the Cr. P C Amendment Act XVIII of 1923 "This section is so amended as to allow bail to be granted at the discretion of the Court, in any case in which the accused is a lunatic, and the amendment also permits the accused to be kept in custody. The object in view is to delegate the power of the Local Government, and to do away with the existing distinction in procedure between bailable and non-bailable cases"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914)

1232. Where a Magistrate or Sessions Judge, instead of proceeding under this section, tries the accused and acquits him on the ground of

insanity, the order of acquittal is illegal—1882 A W N. 106; *Romon Audheekharee*, 10 W.R. 37; 11 W.R. 23; *Shah Mahomed*, 3 W.R. 70

When the accused is confined in a lunatic asylum or jail or some other place of safe custody according to the order of the Government, the Magistrate's power over the accused ceases from such confinement, and he cannot release him on security later on. He can deal with the accused only if the accused is sent back to him under sec. 473 on a certificate that the accused is capable of making his defence—*Joy Hari*, 11 Cal 356 But under the present section as amended, the Court itself will have power to detain the insane accused in a place of safe custody, and in such a case it will not cease to have control over the accused, but will be able to release him afterwards on sufficient security being given.

467. (1) Whenever an inquiry or a trial is postponed under Section 464 or Section 465, the Magistrate or Court,

Resumption of inquiry or trial.

as the case may be, may, at any

time, resume the inquiry or trial and require the accused to appear or be brought before such Magistrate or Court.

(2) When the accused has been released under S. 466, and the sureties for his appearance produce him to the officer whom the Magistrate or Court appoints in this behalf, the certificate of such officer that the accused is capable of making his defence shall be receivable in evidence.

When a trial is postponed under sec. 465 on the ground of insanity of the accused, it should not be resumed at the point at which it was previously stopped, but should be commenced *de novo*, when the Court finds him capable of making his defence—2 Weir 582.

468. (1) If, when the accused appears or is again brought before the Magistrate or the Court, as the case may be, the

Procedure on accused appearing before Magistrate or Court.

Magistrate or Court considers him

capable of making his defence, the inquiry or trial shall proceed.

(2) If the Magistrate or Court considers the accused to be still incapable of making his defence, the Magistrate or Court shall again act according to the provisions of sec. 464 or sec. 465, as the case may be, and, if the accused is found to be of unsound mind and incapable of making his defence, shall deal with such accused in accordance with the provisions of section 466.

Change :—The italicised words at the end of the section have been added by section 123 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act XVIII of 1923. This amendment is consequential to the amendment of sec. 466.

The inquiry or trial should commence *de novo*. See 2 Weir 582 cited under sec. 467.

469. When the accused appears to be of sound mind at the time of inquiry or trial, and the Magistrate is satisfied from the evidence given before him that there is reason to believe that the accused committed an act which, if he had been of sound mind, would have been an offence, and that he was, at the time when the act was committed, by reason of unsoundness of mind, incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that it was wrong or contrary to law, the Magistrate shall proceed with the case, and if the accused ought to be committed to the Court of Session or High Court, send him for trial before the Court of Session or High Court, as the case may be.

1232A. "*The Magistrate shall proceed with the case*" etc. —Where the Magistrate is of opinion that the accused is of sound mind at the time of trial but was of unsound mind at the time of committing the offence, the Magistrate cannot discharge the accused on that ground, but should proceed under secs. 470 and 471—2 Weir 582. A Magistrate can commit an accused to the Sessions, whom he finds to be sane at the time of the preliminary investigation, although at the time of committing the offence he was insane—*Ram Rutton*, 9 W.R. 23. This section must not be confused with secs. 464-465. If the committing Magistrate finds that the accused is sane at the time of the preliminary inquiry, but was insane at the time of committing the offence, he has no alternative but to proceed in accordance with this section, and it is not incumbent upon him to order a medical inquiry, or to try the issue of insanity. It is only when the case falls under secs. 464-465, that is, when the accused is insane at the time of the inquiry or trial, that the issue of insanity has to be tried before the trial for the offence is proceeded with—*Bahadur*, 9 Lah. 371, 29 Cr L.J. 204 (206, 207).

Whenever a Magistrate acting under this section shall send for trial before the Court of Session an accused person regarding whose sanity at the time of committing the offence he entertains any doubt, he shall at the same time inform the jail authorities of the supposed state of the accused, in order that he may be placed under careful surveillance prior to his trial before the Court of Session—*Bom. H. C. Cr. Cir.*, p. 18.

If the accused was sane at the time of committing the offence and is sane at the time of the trial, and is convicted, but subsequently becomes insane in jail, the Local Government will take steps to in

into his mental condition. This is a matter for the Local Government and not for the Court—*Bahadur*, *supra*.

Presumption.—The law presumes every person who has attained the age of discretion to be sane, unless the contrary is proved; and where a lunatic has lucid intervals, the law presumes the offence to have been committed during such interval, unless it is proved that the act was committed during mental derangement—*Ratanlal* 172

470. Whenever any person is acquitted upon the ground that, at the time at which he is alleged to have committed an offence, he was, by reason of unsoundness of mind, incapable of knowing the nature of the act alleged as constituting the offence, or that it was wrong or contrary to law, the finding shall state specifically whether he committed the act or not.

1233. Acquittal on ground of lunacy :—The fact of unsoundness of mind must be clearly and distinctly proved before any jury is justified in pronouncing a verdict of acquittal under sec 84 I P. C. It is not because a man commits a horrible murder or because he commits it while labouring under strong passions and feelings that therefore the world is to assume that he must have been insane when he committed the deed. Every man is presumed to be sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes until the contrary is proved—*Q. v. Nobin Chunder*, 20 WR 70 (71), *Ratanlal* 172. Where the prisoner killed his brother-in-law apparently without any enmity or quarrel, and the only motive given out by the prisoner was that he might be hanged by the authorities and go to heaven, it was held that the opinion of a medical witness as to the state of the accused's mind would be necessary—2 Weir 583

If the Magistrate finds that the accused is of sound mind at the time of trial, but was suffering from temporary insanity while he committed the offence, he should not discharge the accused, but acquit him and proceed under this section and sec 471—*Lanka Chinna*, 2 Weir 583, *Katty Kishan*, 17 C.P.L.R. 113 (125), 1 Cr. L.J. 854

471. (1) Whenever the finding states that the accused person committed the act alleged, the Magistrate or Court before whom or which the trial has been held, shall, if such act would, but for the incapacity found, have constituted an offence, order such person to be detained in safe custody in such place and manner as the Magistrate or Court thinks fit, and shall report the action taken to the Local Government :

Person acquitted on such ground to be kept in safe custody.

Provided that no order for the detention of the accused in a lunatic asylum shall be made otherwise than in accordance with such rules as the Local Government may have made under the Indian Lunacy Act, 1912.

(2) The Local Government may empower the officer in charge of the jail in which a person is confined under the provisions of section 466 or this section, to discharge all or any of the functions of the Inspector-General of Prisons under section 473 or section 474.

1234. Change.—The word *finding* has been substituted for the word 'judgment,' and the word *detained* for the word *kept*, the words "and shall report the action taken to the Local Government" and the proviso have been added by sec 124 of the Cr P C Amendment Act XVIII of 1923

Previously the words at the end of sub-section (1) were "and shall report the case for the orders of the Local Government," so that the Court could not itself send the accused to a lunatic asylum or jail but had to report the case to the Local Government, and the latter gave orders for sending the accused to an asylum or jail. See 43 Bom. 134. But those words have been omitted by the Repealing and Amending Act X of 1914, and its effect is that Magistrates and Courts are no longer required to report cases for the order of the Local Government but are themselves competent to direct the detention of the accused in an asylum or jail or some other place prescribed for the reception of criminal lunatics—*Emp. v Nga E*, 8 Bur.L.T 286, 16 Cr L J 670, 30 I C 654; *Emp v Maiku*, 22 O C 260, 21 Cr. L J 46, 54 I C 254. But it does not deprive the power of the Government to detain the accused in some other place of custody, under the provisions of the Indian Lunacy Act (IV of 1912). *The Government have powers, inspite of this section, to decide the future fate of the lunatic*—*Emp v Imam Hasan*, 25 Bom. L J 286, 26 Cr. L J 348

1235. Application of section—This section should be applied not only where the accused are insane persons, but also where the accused persons, though not insane, labour under defects which render their trial impossible. Thus, where a *deaf and dumb* person, who is unable to understand the proceedings of the trial, is found guilty of murder, the proper course to be taken is to treat him as a lunatic and to proceed under section 471—*Crown v Dost Mahammad*, 1911 P.R. 13, 12 Cr L J 613, 12 I C 989, following *Gahna*, 1889 P R 37. This section does not compel the Court to send the accused to the lunatic asylum; all that is necessary is to see that such safe-guards are taken as would keep him from mischief—*In re Mahammad*. 42 M.L J 72, 23 Cr L J 71, A I.R 1922 Mad. 54

Where the Court below while acquitting an accused on the ground of insanity omitted to pass orders under section 471, the High Court in revision can pass the necessary orders. The passing of an order under sec. 471 by the High Court, after an acquittal by the Court below, does not amount to an alteration of a finding of acquittal into one of conviction within the meaning of sec. 439 (4)—*In re Mahammad*, supra.

The words "detained in safe custody" do not mean detained in the custody of friends or relatives; that is, the Magistrate cannot direct that the person acquitted under this section should be kept in the safe custody of his friends or relatives. This is evident from the language of sec. 471. All that the Magistrate can do is to detain the accused in a place of safe custody and report the matter to the Local Government, and it is the Local Government who can deliver the accused to any friend or relative under sec. 475—*Srish Chandra*, 56 Cal. 208, 48 C.L.J. 148, 29 Cr.L.J. 847 (848); *Anonymous*, 2 Weir 580.

Safe Custody :—e.g. a Mental Hospital; see *Karma Urang*, 32 C.W.N. 342 (345).

472. [Repealed by the Indian Lunacy Act, 1912.]

473. If such person is detained under the provisions of section 466, and in the

Procedure where lunatic prisoner is reported capable of making his defence.

case of a person detained in a jail, the Inspector-General of Prisons, or, in the case of a person detained in a lunatic asylum, the visitors of such asylum or any two of them shall certify that, in his or their opinion, such person is capable of making his defence, he shall be taken before the Magistrate or Court, as the case may be, at such time as the Magistrate or Court appoints, and the Magistrate or Court shall deal with such person under the provisions of section 468; and the certificate of such Inspector-General or visitors as aforesaid shall be receivable as evidence.

The word 'detained' has been substituted for 'confined,' and the italicised words added, by section 125 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923.

474. (1) If such person is detained under the provisions of section 466 or section

Procedure where lunatic detained under Section 466 or 471 is declared fit to be released.

471, and such Inspector-General or visitors shall certify that, in his or their judgment, he may be released without danger of his doing injury to himself or to any other person, the Local Government

may thereupon order him to be *released* or to be detained in custody, or to be transferred to a public lunatic asylum if he has not been already sent to such an asylum; and in case it orders him to be transferred to an asylum, may appoint a Commission, consisting of a judicial and two medical officers.

(2) Such Commission shall make formal inquiry into the state of mind of such person, taking such evidence as is necessary, and shall report to the Local Government, which may order his *release* or detention as it thinks fit.

The word 'detained' has been substituted for 'confined,' and the word 'released' for 'discharged,' by sec. 126 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923.

475. (1) Whenever any relative or friend of any person detained under the provisions of section 466 or section 471 desires that he shall be delivered to his care and custody, the Local Government may, upon the application of such relative or friend and on his giving security to the satisfaction of such Local Government that the person delivered shall—

Delivery of lunatic to care of relative or friend.

- (a) be properly taken care of and prevented from doing injury to himself or to any other person, and
- (b) be produced for the inspection of such officer, and at such times and places, as the Local Government may direct, and
- (c) in the case of a person detained under section 466, be produced when required before such Magistrate or Court,

order such person to be delivered to such relative or friend.

(2) If the person so delivered is accused of any offence the trial of which has been postponed by reason of his being of unsound mind and incapable of making his defence, and the inspecting officer referred to in subsection (1), clause (b), certifies at any time to the Magistrate or Court that such person is capable of making his defence, such Magistrate or Court shall call upon the

relative or friend to whom such accused was delivered to produce him before the Magistrate or Court; and, upon such production, the Magistrate or Court shall proceed in accordance with the provisions of section 468, and the certificate of the inspecting officer shall be receivable as evidence.

Change .—The whole section has been re-drafted by sec. 127 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act XVIII of 1923. Clause (c) and sub-section (2) are entirely new. Clause (b) was formerly sub-section (2)

"The new sub-section (2) simplifies the procedure under which a person accused of an offence, whose trial has been postponed by reason of his unsoundness of mind, is again produced before the Court on the certificate of the inspecting officer as to his recovery"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons (1914).*

CHAPTER XXXV.

PROCEEDINGS IN CASE OF CERTAIN OFFENCES AFFECTING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

476.(1) When any Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court is of opinion that there is ground for inquiring into any offence referred to in Section 195 and committed before it or brought under its notice in the course of a judicial proceeding, such Court, after making any preliminary inquiry that may be necessary, may send the case for inquiry or trial to the nearest Magistrate of the first class, and may send the accused in custody, or take suffi-

476. (1) When any Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court is, whether on application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in Section 195, sub-section (1), clause (b) or clause (c), which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks

cient security for his appearance, before such Magistrate; and may bind over any person to appear and give evidence on such inquiry or trial.

necessary, record a finding to that effect and make a complaint thereof in writing signed by the presiding officer of the Court, and shall forward the same to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction, and may take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or, if the alleged offence is nonbailable, may, if it thinks necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate, and may bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate :

Provided that, where the Court making the complaint is a High Court, the complaint may be signed by such officer of the Court as the Court may appoint.

*For the purposes of this sub-section, a * * Presidency Magistrate shall be deemed to be a Magistrate of the first class.*

(2) Such Magistrate shall thereupon proceed according to law, and as if upon complaint made and recorded under Section 200, and may, if he is authorised under Section 192 to transfer cases, transfer the in-

(2) Such Magistrate shall thereupon proceed according to law and as if upon complaint made under Section 200.* * *

quiry or trial to some other competent Magistrate.

(3) *Where it is brought to the notice of such Magistrate, or any other Magistrate to whom the case may have been transferred, that an appeal is pending against the decision arrived at in the judicial proceeding out of which the matter has arisen, he may, if he thinks fit, at any stage adjourn the hearing of the case until such appeal is decided.*

Change —The whole section has been redrafted by section 128 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act XVIII of 1923, but no important change has been introduced. Sub-section (3) is new. "The changes that we have made are not of great importance. We have provided that a Court can act on application made to it or *suo motu* and after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary. For the words "committed before it or brought under its notice in the course of a judicial proceeding" we have substituted the phraseology used in clause (b) of section 195. We have substituted "may make a complaint" for "shall make a complaint" and, in view of the criticism of the words "nearest first-class Magistrate" we have provided that a complaint should be sent to a first-class Magistrate having jurisdiction. In order to give effect to our decision that proceedings under section 476, etc., should be subject to revision, we have introduced words which will make it necessary for the Court to record an order"—*Report of the Joint Committee (1922)*. The proviso to subsection (1) has been added recently by the Cr. P. Code Amendment Act II of 1926. For reasons, see Note 1240. From the third para of subsection (1) the word 'chief' has been omitted by the same Amendment Act, for reason of this omission see Note 1250.

1236. Object and scope of Section.—It is easy to imagine the inconvenience which might be caused if a Munsiff or a Subordinate Judge or a Judge were to appear before a Magistrate and make a complaint on oath under sec. 195 in order to lay the foundation for a prosecution, and this section has been enacted to obviate the difficulty. The Legislature thought it desirable that the procedure to be followed in cases of complaint by a Court should be different from that which has to be observed by an ordinary complainant—*Ishri Prasad v. Sham Lal*, 7 All 871. Under Section 195, it is open to the Court, before which the offence was committed, to prefer a complaint for the prosecution of the offender, and sec. 476 prescribes the procedure as to how that complaint may be preferred—*In re Lakshmidas*, 32 Bom 184, 31 Mad 140, 32 Mad 49; *Ishri Prasad v. Sham Lal*, 7 All 871. The language of this section indicates that when a Court is acting under sec. 195, a complaint in the strict sense of the Code is not required, and the procedure herein laid down constitutes the complaint mentioned in sec. 195 *ante*—*Ishri v. Sham Lal*, 7 All 871. The order of a Court under sec. 476 is in the nature of a complaint under sec. 195—*Kisan Kohalee*, 11 C.P.L.R. 26.

Proceedings taken by a Court under this section operate of themselves to set a prosecution in motion without the necessity of any other complaint, the Court itself being the complainant—*Nageswara*, 2 Weir 589.

The words in sub-section (2) of this section "and as if upon complaint made and recorded under sec 200," have been introduced into the Code in 1898 in order to give legislative effect to the Full Bench ruling in 7 All. 871 in which it was held that the order of the Court under this section was a complaint within the meaning of sec. 195—*Bhup Kunwar*, 26 All. 249. That one of the functions of sec. 476 is to provide the machinery by which a Court is enabled without inconvenience to make a complaint is made very clear by these words introduced in the present section—31 Mad. 140 (per Miller J.). Under sub-section (1) as now amended the Court will have to frame a complaint in writing.

1237. Section 476 is supplementary to sec. 195—The words 'offences referred to in sec. 195' mean not merely the offences covered by the sections of the I. P. C. mentioned in section 195, but they mean the offences covered by those sections and committed under the qualifying circumstances mentioned in section 195. That is, section 476 must be read along with section 195, and the qualifications mentioned in sec. 195 are to be treated as incorporated in the provisions of section 476—*Jadunandan v. Emp.*, 37 Cal. 250 (256), *Govinda Iyer v. Emp.*, 42 Mad. 540. Thus, an offence under sec. 467 I. P. C. does not come within the purview of section 195 unless it is committed by a 'party to the proceeding'; and therefore a Court is not competent to pass an order under sec. 476 directing the prosecution of a person who is not a party to the proceeding, for an offence under sec. 467 I. P. C.—*Ramalingam v. Subramayya*, 40 Mad. 100, 18 M.L.T. 488; 1917 P.R. 10 [Nor is a complaint under this section necessary in order to proceed against such person—21 C.W.N. 950.] So also, where certain documents were put in Court in a pending suit, but not given in evidence, the Court is not competent to order the prosecution of the party, who had put in the documents, for forgery—*Abdul Khadar v. Meera Saheb*, 15 Mad. 224, *Adhar v. Ablakh*, 1895 A.W.N. 145, 1920 P.L.R. ■ So again, if an offence referred to in sec. 195 (b), e.g. false charge, is not committed in or in relation to a proceeding in Court, but is committed before the police, it is not competent to a Court to direct a prosecution under sec. 476—*Jadunandan v. Emp.*, 37 Cal. 250 (256).

But a different view has been taken in the following cases. Thus in *Aiyakannu*, 32 Mad. 49, *Sankaran Nair J.* has held that section 476 must be construed as entirely self-contained, and the power given to the Court under this Chapter to take action regarding the offences specified in sec. 195 is not restricted by the qualifying circumstances mentioned in sec. 195. And therefore it is competent to a Court to order prosecution for forgery of a person who was not a party to the proceeding in Court—*In re Devan*, 18 Bom. 581; *In re Keshav*, 14 Bom. L.R. 968, 13 Cr.L.J. 848; 20 Cr.L.J. 630 (Pat); *Ejaz Ali*, 24 O.C. 367, 23 Cr.L.J. 228, A.L.R. 1922 Oudh 220. It is competent to a Court to proceed under sec. 476 against a party who has filed a forged document, whether

such document has been actually given in evidence or not—1897 P.R. 12; *Akhil Chandra v. Q. E.*, 22 Cal. 1004. The words 'referred to in sec. 195' are merely words descriptive of the class of offences with which a particular Court can deal. They do not mean that sec. 195 governs sec. 476 to any extent other than this—*Emp. v. Khushali*, 40 All. 116; *Ganga Ram v. Emp.*, 40 All. 24; *Narayanshaligram v. Emp.*, 20 Cr. L.J. 426 (Nag.). Sec. 476 is a self-contained section, and the reference made to sec. 195 is only for the purpose of avoiding the enumeration of the sections of the Penal Code mentioned in section 195—*Raj Kumar v. K. E.*, 1 P.L.J. 298, 18 Cr. L.J. 135.

But the intention of the Legislature in making the present amendments is to make this section not independent of, but supplementary to, section 195. In submitting the Report of the Joint Committee before the Council of State in September 1922, the Hon'ble Mr. Moncrieff Smith said: "One of the most weighty changes introduced by this measure (*i.e.*, the Amendment Bill) is in respect of prosecutions for offences committed before or in relation to proceedings of the Court. . . . A glance at any commentary on the Code will give some indication of the difficulties that have arisen in putting sections 195 and 476 into operation. After a long and careful thought, Government have decided on a line of action which, I may say, has met with general approval. The two sections as they stand (under the old Code) provide an alternative procedure for the Courts in dealing with them. Sanction is given to proceedings under sec. 195 or action is directed by the Courts under sec. 476. The sanction proceedings are now omitted, and the two sections will in future supplement each other Section 195 will contain the prohibition of prosecution except upon complaint by the Court, section 476 will lay down the procedure to be followed. It has been suggested that it will be better to bring the two sections together. That is a matter to be considered when the consolidation of the Code will be undertaken"—*Council of State Debates*, September 13, 1922. See also *Diwarka v. Makund*, 24 A.L.J. 122, 26 Cr. L.J. 1506.

"The recent amendments in sections 195 and 476 have resulted in connecting the two sections more closely together. Section 476 gives the Court power with respect to any offence referred to in section 195. The offence referred to in section 195 (c) is not merely an offence under certain sections, but such an offence when committed by a party to the proceeding"—*per Brown J* in *Guruswamy v. Ebrahim*, ■ Rang 374 (381, 382), 26 Cr. L.J. 295. "By the recent amendment of the Cr. P. Code, the words 'offence referred to in section 195 (c)' in sec. 476 must be read in conjunction with the wording of section 195 (c). The only offence which sec. 195 (c) bars from the cognizance of the Magistrate without a complaint by the Courts is when such offence is "alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding before that Court" and it is not right to divorce these words or take only a part of the section in endeavouring to discover what the offence referred to in section 195 is"—*per Robinson C.J.* in *Ibid* (p. 380). Therefore, the Court has jurisdiction to file a complaint only against parties to the

suit—*Shree Pwe v. Ma Me Hmoke*, 3 Rang. 48, 3 Bur. L.J. 344, 26 Cr. L.J. 500. So also, where there is no evidence to suggest that a forged document was produced or given in evidence in a Court, a complaint under sec. 476 Cr. P. Code by the Court is not justified—*Bahir-uddy v. Emp.*, 28 C.W.N. 880, 25 Cr. L.J. 1095.

1238. Civil, Criminal and Revenue Court :—As to what are Courts, and what are not, see Note 622 under sec 195. *

An Income Tax Collector is a Revenue Court within the meaning of this section—*Nataraja*, 36 Mad 72, 1905 P.R. 44, *Panamchand*, 38 Bom. 642. *Contra*—*Kalidas*, 8 Bom. L.R. 477. A Collector or Deputy Collector holding an inquiry for the purpose of determining who should be called upon to pay the stamp duty of an insufficiently stamped document is not a Court, as he is not holding a judicial enquiry—*Kedarnath*, 7 C.W.N. 795. A certificate officer acting under the powers conferred upon him by secs 57, 58 and 66 of the Behar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act 1914, is, while acting in that capacity, a 'Court,' and where such officer inquires into the question of an alleged payment where a certificate has been issued, the proceeding before him is a judicial proceeding—4 P.L.J. 475. A Commissioner sitting as an election tribunal is a Civil Court—*Ram Nath v. Emp.*, 46 All 611 (613), but see *Bilas Singh v. K. E.*, 23 A.L.J. 845, 47 All. 934. A Judge receiving and dealing with a petition under sec. 83 of the Transfer of Property Act (for deposit of mortgage money) is a Court, and he can therefore start a prosecution under this section against the person depositing the money, if the mortgage-deed is found to be forged—*Chamari*, 4 Pat. 24, 11 P.L.T. 225, 26 Cr.L.J. 170. An Assistant Collector concerned in mutation proceeding is acting as a Revenue Court—*Lachman*, 6 O.W.N. 953.

A Revenue Officer preparing a record of rights but not authorised to take evidence on oath is not a Court—*Hanumantha*, 39 Mad. 414. An officer acting in an executive, and not in a judicial capacity cannot exercise the powers conferred under this section—15 A.L.J. 654. See Note 1244 below under heading "Proceeding in Court."

A District Registrar (before whom a forged document was produced for registration) is not a Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court within the meaning of this section, but in his capacity as District Magistrate he can take cognizance of the offence (sec 471, I P C) under sec 190 (1) (c) of this Code—*Cheta Mahto*, 2 Pat 459, 26 Cr L J 1482.

Power after transfer.—A Magistrate, who after trying a case has been transferred from the charge of the particular Court in which the case was tried to some other duty in the same district, is not competent to make an order under this section in respect of a case which he tried as the presiding officer of that Court—*Chunni Lal v. Harbans*, 1 A.L.J. 315, *Emp. v. Baldeo*, 46 All 851 (854). In such an event, the only officer who can order the prosecution is his successor-in-office in that Court—*Emp. v. Baldeo*, 46 All 851 (855). A Joint Magistrate after dismissing the complaint in a case became the District Magistrate, then ordered the prosecution of the complainant for perjury under sec.

I. P. C. It was held that the order of the Joint Magistrate as a District Magistrate was bad and should be set aside—*Mallu Khan v. K. E.*, 1 A.L.J. 388.

1239. What Court can take action.—See pp. 528-530

The words "in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court" show that the Court which can take action under this section is only the Court before which, or in relation to whose proceeding, the offence has been committed. Under the old section also, the words "committed before it or brought under its notice in the course of a judicial proceeding" indicated that it was the Judge alone who tried the case who could take action for prosecution, and it was not competent for another Judge who had not tried the case to exercise the powers under this section—*Begu Singh v. Emp.*, 34 Cal. 551 (555) (F.B.). Therefore, where an offence was committed before a Provincial Small Cause Court, neither the District Judge nor the High Court could take action for directing the offender's prosecution—*In re Ram Prosad*, 37 Cal 13 (21). But where a person gave false evidence before the committing Magistrate and that evidence, on account of his inability to attend the Sessions Court owing to illness, was read out as evidence at the sessions trial, the Sessions Judge would be competent to direct the prosecution of that person for giving false evidence, as the offence was brought under the notice of the Sessions Judge in the trial before him—*Attar Singh*, 1916 P.R. 29, 18 Cr L J 337.

Transfer of proceedings taken under this section:—Section 476 is self contained and exhaustive, and the intention of the Legislature is that the power of making a complaint should not be exercised by any Court except the Court before which the offence has been committed or the Court to which appeals from that Court ordinarily lie. Therefore, while proceedings under this section are going on in a Civil Court before which the offence has been committed, it is not in the power of the District Judge under sec 24 C. P. Code, to transfer the proceedings from the Civil Court to another Civil Court—*Rameshwar v. Rajdhari*, 49 All 400, 25 A.L.J 433, A.I.R. 1927 All 469 (470). The order of transfer is invalid, and the original Civil Court should conclude the proceedings—*Ibid*.

Transfer of Case:—Where a case which has been partly heard by one Court is transferred to another Court, the former Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to take proceedings against a witness in respect of a perjury committed before it, nor is that jurisdiction taken away by the circumstance that the second Court may have formed a different view as to the veracity of the witness—44 All. 642. But where a criminal case is transferred or withdrawn from the Court of one Magistrate to that of another, and the second Magistrate dismisses the complaint as false, under sec. 203, it is the second Magistrate who can take action under sec. 476 for prosecution of the complainant for the offence under sec 211 I. P. Code, the Magistrate in whose Court the complaint was originally filed is not competent to proceed under sec. 476—*Tarakeshwar v. Emp.*, 53 Cal. 488, 30 C.W.N. 504, 27 Cr.L.J. 648, *Amanat Ali*

33 C.W.N. 1058 (1061), 1929 Cr. C. 360. The principle is, that the Court which tries a case on the merits rather than the Court before which the case is originally instituted, even though process may be issued by it, is the proper Court to make a complaint under sec. 476—*Amanat Ali*, supra; Cf. *Jiban v. Benoy*, 11 C.W.N. 35, *Putram v. Md. Kasem*, 3 C.W.N. 33. See p. 529

Where a suit was at first filed at S, but a new Court having been established at SH, the suit was transferred to the latter Court, because the cause of action arose within the limits of that Court, held that the Court at SH and not the Court at S had jurisdiction to take action under sec. 476 in respect of the offence of perjury committed in that suit. The only Court which can exercise the power conferred by sec. 476 is the Court which has jurisdiction over the suit in which the alleged offence has been committed, whether such suit was instituted in such Court or came to its file by transfer from any other Court or otherwise—*Gerimal v. Shewa Ram*, 20 S.L.R. 90, 27 Cr. L.J. 780

Power of successor-in-office to act under this section—The power to direct prosecution is conferred on the "Court" and not on the particular officer who fills the judicial office at a particular time, and therefore the successor-in-office is competent to make an order under this section in respect of an offence committed before his predecessor-in-office—*In re Nawal Singh*, 34 All 393, 19 A.L.J. 819, *In re Lakshmidas*, 32 Bom. 184 (189), *Runga*, 29 Mad 331, *Daulat*, 14 N.L.R. 16, 18 Cr.L.J. 1015, 1919 M.W.N. 112, 4 Lah. 58, *Behram v. Emp.*, 7 Lah. 108, 27 Cr.L.J. 776; 4 Bur.L.T. 246; *Shwe Pwe v. Ma Me Hmoke*, 3 Rang. 48, 3 Bur. L.J. 344. But in *Begu Singh v. Emp.*, 34 Cal. 551 (F.B.); *Kartik Ram v. Emp.*, 35 Cal. 114, *Krishna Gobinda*, 9 C.W.N. 859 (860); *Dauli*, 2 I.C. 812, 10 Cr. L.J. 158, 1909 P.R. 6, *Ramakrishna*, 2 Weir 597, and 17 Cr.L.J. 40, it has been held that a succeeding Magistrate has no jurisdiction to institute proceedings under this section, where an offence was neither 'committed before him nor was brought under his notice in the course of a judicial proceeding' (see the words of the old section). These words have now been replaced by the more general words 'committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court' and in this view of the law, the ruling in 34 Cal. 551, etc. is no longer correct. Moreover, the new section 559 expressly lays down that all the powers of a Judge or Magistrate may be exercised by his successor-in-office.

Where proceedings under this section have been commenced by a particular officer, it is competent for his successor-in-office to continue the proceedings—*Bahadur v. Eradatullah*, 37 Cal. 642 (648) (F.B.), 7 A.L.J. 991. If an officer orders a preliminary inquiry, but before he can hold that inquiry, is transferred, his successor would be competent to hold the inquiry, and, as a result of that inquiry, to direct a prosecution—*Begu Singh*, 34 Cal. 551 (562). But where the preliminary inquiry has been commenced by the proper officer who issued the notice, and after his transfer, is continued by another officer who is not the successor of the former officer but to whom the District Judge makes over the case for disposal, the latter officer is not competent to complete

the inquiry and pass an order under this section—*Muhammad Munir Khan*, 10 P.L.R. 1911, 12 Cr L.J. 68, 9 I.C. 389 (390).

Power of superior (Appellate) Court to take action:—See secs 476A, 476B. An Appellate Court can make a complaint only when the case in which the offence has been committed is before that Court in appeal, or when the original Court has omitted to make a complaint (sec. 476A) or when the original Court has refused to make a complaint and the order of refusal is appealed from to the Appellate Court (sec. 476B) But when proceedings for making a complaint are already going on before the original Court, the Appellate Court cannot step in and deal with the matter—*Rajdhari v Rameshwar*, 49 All. 460, 25 A.L.J. 433, A I R 1927 All. 469 (470)

1240. Power of High Court:—The old section did not apply to proceedings in High Court or Courts in Presidency towns; consequently, it was not competent to the High Court, acting under this section, to direct the prosecution of a person for the offence of forgery or abetment of forgery brought to its notice in the course of hearing an appeal in a Probate case—19 Cr.L.J. 638 (Cal.); see also 9 Bom L R 1160 This ruling is no longer correct in view of the second para (newly added) of sub-section (1).

A High Court sitting to exercise the revisional powers under this Code can lay a complaint under sec. 476—*Emp v. Syed Khan*, 3 Rang 303, 27 Cr.L.J. 4.

The proviso newly added in 1926 lays down that a complaint by a High Court need not be signed by the Judge himself but may be signed by an officer of the Court "The Lahore High Court (see 6 Lah. 34 below) has represented that it is a needless waste of time of the Judges of a High Court that they should be required to sign all complaints under sec 476. The proposed change enables any officer of such a Court whom the Court may appoint to sign the complaint"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (Gazette of India, 1925, Part V, p. 215). Before this proviso was added it was held by the Lahore High Court that the procedure of the new section 476 in its application to High Court was open to serious objections; it was inconsistent with the dignity of a High Court Judge that he should have to make and sign a complaint which was to be inquired into by one of his subordinates, and that he should be treated and recorded as a complainant throughout the proceedings; nor was it fair to the accused that he should be arraigned in a case instituted on a complaint made by a Judge of the highest tribunal and was to be tried by a judicial officer who was subordinate to the complainant There could be little doubt that by reason of the circumstance that the complaint was preferred by a High Court Judge, the accused person was likely to entertain an apprehension, not altogether without justification, that his conviction was a foregone conclusion—*Emp v. Qadir Baksh*, 6 Lah 34, 26 P.L.R 158, 27 Cr.L.J. 98, A.I R. 1925 Lah 312. The proviso has been added in deference to these remarks.

The usual practice of the High Court in making a complaint is to

give a direction that the judgment in the suit out of which the matter arises shall be treated as a complaint, in which case a copy of this judgment signed by the Judge will be sent by the Registrar to the Magistrate. But ■ sec. 476 requires a finding and a complaint, the better course is ■ make a separate order containing the requisite finding, setting out in detail specific matters extracted from the proceedings, and directing a complaint to be made in respect thereof, this being followed by ■ complaint which conforms to the term of the previous order—*Ramjan v. Moolji*, 56 Cal 932, 33 C.W.N. 329 (332), 30 Cr.L.J. 974.

A Judge of the High Court can grant a direction to prosecute, under sec 476, although the matter out of which the action arose was heard by another Judge of the Court, because any Judge of the High Court has power to exercise the powers of the High Court. But as a matter of convenience the prosecution must be directed by the same Judge, unless it becomes impracticable by reason of that Judge ceasing to hold office—*Bai Kasturba v. Vanmalidas*, 49 Bom. 710, 27 Bom L.R. 616, 26 Cr.L.J. 1189.

1241. Duty of Court—Whether the Court acts on its own motion or on the application of a party, the responsibility for directing the prosecution rests entirely on the Court, and the power given by this section should be exercised with great care and caution—*Begu Singh*, 34 Cal 551 (558), *Jadunandan*, 37 Cal 260 (258). It is not in every instance in which a party fails to prove his case that the Judge who has decided against him is justified in exercising the powers conferred by this section. Judges should bear in mind that criminal prosecutions are frequently suggested by successful litigants merely to prevent an appeal in the civil suit, and they should be careful not to lend themselves to such suggestions too readily. The Judges should also recollect that when they proceed under this section, the responsibility for the prosecution rests upon them entirely—*Bayoo*, 1 Cal 450. As prosecutions ending in failures are ■ be deprecated as being calculated to do harm rather than good, they ought not to be undertaken without considerable circumspection and care. The offences contemplated by this section are offences against public justice, whence it follows that they ought to be pressed primarily in the interests of public justice, and never as ■ means of satisfying a private grudge—*In re Ram Prasad* 37 Cal 13 (20), 13 C.W.N. 1038, 10 Cr.L.J. 454. In cases under the old section, it has been held that proceedings should not be taken under this section where the case is at best doubtful. There must be a *reasonable foundation* for the charge in respect of which prosecution is directed, before the criminal law is set in motion—*Jadu Nandan v Emp*, 37 Cal 250 (258), 14 C.W.N. 330. It has also been said that before a Court is justified in directing ■ prosecution under section 476, there must be some *direct evidence* fixing the offence upon the persons whom it is sought to charge, either in the preliminary inquiry or in the earlier proceedings out of which the inquiry arises. It is not sufficient that the evidence in the case may induce some sort of *suspicion* that these persons have been guilty of an offence, but there must be distinct evidence of the com-

mission of an offence by such persons—*Khepunath v. Girish*, 16 Cal 730 (740), 21 Cr L.J. 601 (Lab.). In a Nagpur case also it has been held that the words “ground for inquiring” (in the old section) mean that there must be a *reasonable prospect of a conviction*, in order to justify a Court in taking action—*Abdul Husen*, 9 N.L.R. 184, 15 Cr.L.J. 33 (35). But the wording of the section has now been changed. The Madras High Court holds that under the present section it is not the duty of the Court to see that there is a reasonable probability of the prosecution ending in a conviction, though the Court acting under this section should not act capriciously or without proper grounds—*Seshamma v. Venkamma*, 22 L.W. 863, 27 Cr.L.J. 280 (283). Under sections 195 and 476, all that a Court has to see is that a *prima facie* case has been made out upon the evidence before it for inquiring further into the question whether any of the offences punishable as set out in sec. 195 has or has not been made out. The Court has not to see that the case must necessarily lead to conviction. The Court can take action if a suspicion is raised as to the commission of an offence—*Kidha Singh*, 13 A.L.J. 1111, 16 Cr.L.J. 817, 31 I.C. 993 (994) (dissenting from *Jadunandan*, 37 Cal 250). Moreover, the Court taking action under this section must be *prima facie* satisfied that the offence has been committed by some definite individual or individuals against whom proceedings in the Criminal Court are to be taken—*Mahommed*, 23 Cal 532. It must come to a finding as to which of the individuals sent for trial has committed the offence—*Amar Nath v. Mam Raj*, 2 Lah. 63, 22 Cr.L.J. 329. Where a District Judge being of opinion that the forgery of a document produced before him was committed either by the plaintiff or by the defendant, sent both of them to a first class Magistrate so that the guilty party might be proceeded against, it was held that the order was illegal and must be set aside in revision—1905 P.L.R. 163, *Amar Nath*, *supra*.

“*Is of opinion*” —There must be an *opinion*, as distinguished from a mere surmise or assumption, that is, the Court should act on evidence and not perversely—*Karri Venkanna*, 31 M.L.J. 440, 17 Cr.L.J. 515; but it is not possible to fix the quantity or nature of the material on which the Court’s opinion is to be formed, or to restrict the exercise of the general discretion which the Legislature has conferred on the Court—*Ibid*. The opinion must be the opinion of the Court taking action under this section and not the opinion of any superior Court—*In re Alamdar*, 23 All 249. The Court must form its own opinion and should not take opinion from others. Where the High Court directed the Sessions Judge to take action under this section, held that it was the duty of the Sessions Judge to apply his mind to the matter on the merits and then only decide whether a prosecution was necessary or not—*Ghansam v. Emp.*, 21 A.L.J. 930. Where a Munsiff in making an order under this section purported to act not of his own accord but at the direction of the District Judge, it was held that the order of the Munsiff was bad, in as much as it was only nominally his, while the opinion was the opinion of the District Judge—6 A.L.J. 924. *Contra*—In 20 Cr.L.J. 274 (Pat.) it was held that the proceedings were not vitiated by

the mere fact that the District Judge had directed the Munsiff to institute the proceedings

'Expedient in the interests of justice' :—It is not necessary that the Judge should expressly record that it is expedient in the interests of justice to make an inquiry and complaint. When the Judge's order shows that in his opinion the accused has given false evidence before him, that order by itself carries the implication that the Judge must have felt that the ends of justice require that an inquiry before a Magistrate should take place—*Bhuban Chandra*, 31 C.W.N. 828, 28 Cr L J 783 (784)

If the Court is satisfied that it is expedient in the interests of justice to make a complaint, it has jurisdiction to do so, inspite of the fact that in the Appellate Court the parties agreed to compromise the matter or to get it decided by a reference to arbitration or in accordance with the statement of a referee—*Narain Das*, 49 All. 792, 28 Cr L J. 549 (551), 25 A L J 559.

'Whether on application or otherwise' —A complaint under sec 476 may be made by a Court either on application or otherwise. It is immaterial whether the application is made by a person who was not a party in the original suit—*Harekrishna*, 8 Pat 736

1242. Power to take action in a pending case or appeal :—It has been held in some cases that proceedings under this section should not be taken until *after the close of the case* in which the false evidence was given or forged document was used as genuine etc. Thus, it is improper for a Magistrate to order the prosecution of a witness for perjury, while the proceedings in which the witness has given his deposition are pending before him—*Emp v. Rustomji*, 4 Bom L J 778, 21 Cr L J. 29 (Pat.), *Kalu v. Tikaram*, 26 Cr.L J. 1350 (Nag) Such a hasty proceeding, as placing a witness on his trial as an accused immediately after he has given his evidence, and before the close of the case, is bad, because the necessary result of such a step would be to frighten the remaining witnesses and seriously affect the case of the party who called him as witness—*Sikandar Lal*, 10 Lah 778, 30 Cr L.J 129 (131), *Bhogilal*, Ratanlal 477, *Kashinath*, 8 B H C R. 126; 21 Cr L.J. 29, *Nadershah*, 9 S L R 176, 17 Cr L J 77 But it should not be accepted as an invariable rule that no proceedings should be taken under sec 476 till the conclusion of the case. In most cases it would be improper to take action under this section before the close of the original case, in exceptional cases (e.g. in cases of bare-faced perjury) the Court can at once send the witness to a Magistrate. At any rate the action of the Court in taking proceedings under sec 476 during the *pendency* of the case would be *improper* or premature, but not *illegal* or without jurisdiction, and does not constitute any material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction—*K E v Karri Venkanna*, 31 M.L J 440 (F B), 17 Cr L J 515 (522) The object of this section would be entirely frustrated if the proceedings were invariably allowed to be delayed pending the disposal of the civil litigation which might be indefinitely protracted even up to a final decision on appeal to the Privy

Council—*Bal Gangadhar Tilak*, 26 Bom. 785 (791), followed in *Lakhmichand v. Emp.*, 21 S.L.R. 43, 27 Cr.L.J. 1249 (1250). If there is a delay in the disposal of the suit in which the offence has been committed, there is no reason why the Court should delay proceedings under this section until the suit is disposed of, which disposal may not occur until months or years later—*In re Perumalla*, 44 M.L.J. 74, A.I.R. 1923 Mad. 228, 23 Cr.L.J. 712.

Since an appeal is a continuation of the trial, proceedings under this section should not be taken during the pendency of the appeal in the case in which the petitioner is alleged to have given false evidence or produced a fabricated document—*Gandan Singh*, 3 Cr.L.J. 303, 3 C.L.J. 302, 16 Bom 729, 6 Cal 308; *Attar Singh*, 1916 P.R. 29, 18 Cr.L.J. 337 (338); *Harnam Singh v. Atri*, 7 Lah L.J. 73, 26 Cr.L.J. 1168. If the same question of fact is in issue in the appeal it is undesirable to allow proceedings to be taken under sec. 476 during the pendency of the appeal. But where a second appeal has been preferred to the High Court, in which no question of fact is in issue, but only a question of law, it is not improper to take action under this section during the pendency of the second appeal—*Rajkumar*, 1 P.L.J. 298, 18 Cr.L.J. 135 (136). The new sub-section (3) now provides that if a proceeding has already been taken, it may be adjourned till the decision of the appeal.

1243. "In or in relation to a proceeding in that court" :—Under the old law, the offences which fell under this section were those which were "committed before the Court or were brought under its notice in the course of a judicial proceeding." The wording of the present section is different, and follows the language of clause (b) of sec 195. Where an offence committed in a case instituted before a 2nd class Magistrate was brought to the notice of the District Magistrate through a report from a Forest Ranger (who was the prosecutor in the case before the 2nd class Magistrate) it was held under the old section that the District Magistrate was not competent to act under this section as the offence was not brought to his notice in the course of a judicial proceeding—*Subbaraya*, 18 Mad 487. Under the present law, the District Magistrate would be competent to take action under sec. 476A.

During the trial of a case by a jury, a certain person informed the Sessions Judge that he had seen the foreman of the jury talking to one of the accused. Thereupon the Judge held an inquiry, and that person made the same statement before the Judge, who afterwards found the statement to be false and took action against that person under this section. Held that the action of the Judge was not without jurisdiction—*Bhuban Chandra*, 31 C.W.N. 828, 28 Cr.L.J. 783 (784).

Where an affidavit containing a false statement was filed by a person before a *Munsif* of Court, it was held under the old section that the Judge could not direct the prosecution of that person, because the offence of perjury was not committed before the Judge himself—15 A.L.J. 517. But this is no longer correct, and the above case would be covered by the present section which contemplates an offence committed 'in relation

to a proceeding in the Court.' See also *Rameshwar Lal*, 49 All. 898, 25 A.L.J. 555, 28 Cr.L.J. 668 (670), where it has been held that a document produced before the *Munsarim* of the Court may be said to be a document produced in Court, and the Judge can take action under sec. 476 in respect of an offence committed in relation to the document. The old section was wide enough to enable a Court to take action in respect of an offence committed in another forum (even in another province) and on some previous occasion, provided it was brought to the notice of the Court in the course of a judicial proceeding—*Girwar v. K. E.*, 11 Cr.L.J. 219, 1 I.C. 306, 5 A.L.J. 392; *Khushali*, 40 All. 116; *Raj Kumar*, 1 P.L.J. 298, 11 Cr.L.J. 135 (136); *Kampla Prasad*, 33 All. 396. See also 43 Cal. 542. The present section is confined to offences committed 'in relation to a proceeding in that court'.

Where the offence is not committed in or in relation to a proceeding in Court, this section does not apply. Thus, if a false charge is made before the Police, a Court cannot direct prosecution—*Nandkishore v. Emp.*, 11 P.L.T. 300, *Dharmadas v. K. E.*, 7 C.L.J. 373, *Abdul Rahman v. Emp.*, 7 C.L.J. 371, *Haibat Khan v. Emp.*, 33 Cal. 30, *Jadunandan v. Emp.*, 37 Cal. 250 (256), but if the person making the false charge before the police, subsequently makes a false complaint before a Magistrate in respect to the same matter, he commits an offence before a Court, and the Court can take action under this section—*Jadunandan*, supra. In fact, in such a case, the complaint of the Court under sec. 476 is essential—*Murugan v. Gutha Ramu*, 53 M.L.J. 455, 28 Cr.L.J. 849 (850). Compare also the cases cited in Note 620 under sec. 195. So also, if the Magistrate himself makes an inquiry into the truth or falsity of the charge made before the police and finds the charge to be false, he may proceed under sec. 476—*Haibat Khan*, supra.

"Offence referred to in sec. 195"—As the offences contemplated by this section are offences described in section 195 *ante*, a Magistrate cannot direct a prosecution for an offence under section 421 I. P. C. because this offence is not mentioned in sec. 195—18 A.L.J. 50.

For the offences referred to in sec. 195 (b) (c) see fuller notes under that section.

If the offence referred to in clause (c) of sec. 195 is committed by a person who is not a party to the proceeding, no complaint of the Court is necessary. See Note 629 under sec. 195.

Where the offence committed by the accused is one which falls under the enumeration of clauses (b) and (c) of sec. 195 (e.g. an offence under sec. 471 I. P. C.), the Court cannot reduce the charge to a different offence not requiring complaint (e.g. one under sec. 474 I. P. C.) to avoid the necessity of proceeding under sec. 476 of this Code—*Ibrahim*, 29 Cr.L.J. 849 (850); for if this were allowed to be done, then the provision of sec. 195 might just as well be wiped out—*Prafulla v. Harendra*, 44 Cal. 970.

The jurisdiction to make a complaint under this section is limited to the offences mentioned in clauses (b) and (c) of sec. 195. Section 476

mitted need not be of a judicial character, the Public Prosecutor again moved the Court for taking the same action against the same person, held that the petitioner could be proceeded against. The dropping of the previous proceeding was no bar to the institution of the present proceeding—*Chamari v Public Prosecutor*, 4 Pat. 24, 6 P.L.T. 225, 26 Cr.L.J. 170.

1245. Preliminary inquiry :—Where not necessary :—The words "such preliminary inquiry as it thinks necessary" show that a preliminary inquiry is not always indispensable—*Durpa Narain v. Bepin*, 15 C.W.N. 691 (692); *In re Jyabhai*, 7 Bom.L.R. 84. This section does not make it imperative on a Court to hold a preliminary inquiry before taking action under this section. To justify the Court in instituting a prosecution, it is necessary only to hold that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into an offence referred to in sec. 195—*Emp. v Qadir Buksh*, 6 Lah. 34, 26 P.L.R. 158, 27 Cr.L.J. 98; *Baperam v. Gouri*, 20 Cal 474; *Matabadal*, 15 All. 392; 34 All. 267. It is for the Court acting in the matter to determine in the exercise of its discretion, whether or not to make a preliminary inquiry—*Ch. Md. Izaharul Huq*, 20 Cal. 349, *Baperam v. Gouri*, 20 Cal 474. And an order under this section will not be set aside on account of omission to make a preliminary inquiry, unless the accused has been prejudiced by reason of such omission—*Durpa Narayan v. Bepin Behari*, 15 C.W.N. 691 (693). Where a Munsiff sent a case under this section to the nearest first class Magistrate without making any inquiry, and where there was nothing to show that any inquiry the Munsiff could have made would have put the Magistrate in a better position, the omission to hold a preliminary inquiry was not bad—5 All 62. If in the course of a proceeding, either civil or criminal, the Judge or Magistrate finds clear grounds for believing that either the parties or their witnesses have committed perjury, he is justified in directing criminal proceedings against such persons, without any further inquiry than that which he had already held in his Court—*Mutty Lal*, 6 Cal 308. In a prosecution for making a false charge under Sec. 211 I. P. C., it is not always necessary that there should be a preliminary inquiry under this section—*Surjya Hariani*, 6 C.W.N. 295. A preliminary inquiry is not necessary in all cases, if there are materials on record on which a definite charge can be grounded—*Ratanlal* 895. Where an order was made under this section directing the prosecution of a witness under Sec 193 I. P. C., on the very day or the day after the witness's cross-examination had been finished, and upon a clear statement by the witness and after an opportunity having been given him to explain the inconsistency in his statements and in the cross-examination, it was held that it was not incumbent on the Magistrate to institute a fresh inquiry or to give any notice to the accused—4 P.L.W. 44, 19 Cr.L.J. 169. The successor-in-office of the officer before whom the offence was committed, can pass an order under this section upon considering the evidence on record and hearing the parties, without holding any preliminary investigation—*Durpa Narain v. Bepin*, 15 C.W.N. 691 (693).

Where necessary :—Where a Magistrate dismissed a complaint without calling evidence, he should make an inquiry before charging the complainant with the offence of making a false charge—16 W.R. 44. Where a Subordinate Judge acting upon the report of a bailiff ordered the prosecution of persons who obstructed him in executing a warrant of attachment, without making an inquiry of his own, it was held that the Subordinate Judge would have done well if he had complied with the requirements of this section—Ratanlal 701. Where in a civil suit, settled without any evidence being gone into, by confession of judgment, the Court had grounds for supposing that an offence of false personation under Sec. 205 I. P. C. had been committed before it, the Court before directing a prosecution would be competent to hold a preliminary inquiry to satisfy itself whether a *prima facie* case has been made out for directing the prosecution—Shashi Kumar, 19 Cal. 345. The Court directed the prosecution of a person under sec 174 I. P. C. for the disobedience of summons to attend the Court and give evidence, and that person appeared *and denied the service of summons on him, held that before prosecution* a preliminary inquiry should be held as to the service of summons, and the said person should be given an opportunity to cross-examine the persons who had deposed to the service of summons on him—19 A.L.J. 56

1246. Procedure in preliminary inquiry :—The preliminary inquiry is a judicial proceeding, and oath can be administered to the suspected person—8 Bom. L.R. 589; or to any person examined as a witness in the preliminary inquiry, and if such witness gives false evidence, he may be prosecuted for an offence under sec. 193 I.P.C.—Abdullah, 37 Cal. 52 (55), 14 C.W.N. 132 (134).

The inquiry must be on evidence; one mode of making inquiry is certainly to take evidence—Abdullah, 37 Cal. 52, *Raghubar v. Kokil*, 17 Cal. 872. But it is not necessary to go minutely into the evidence or to see whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction. It is sufficient if the evidence discloses a reasonable foundation for a criminal charge—2 Weir 587. The law does not require a minute or detailed or exhaustive inquiry, but only such preliminary inquiry as may be necessary to make out a *prima facie* case. The extent of the preliminary inquiry is left to the discretion of the Court—*Chamari v. Public Prosecutor*, 4 Pat 484, A.I.R. 1925 Pat 677, *Bhuban Chandra*, 31 C.W.N. 828, 28 Cr L.J. 783 (784), 5 All 62. The object of the preliminary inquiry is merely to decide whether an offence of the kind contemplated *appears* to have been committed, and whether it is expedient in the interests of justice it should be further inquired into. The nature, method and extent of the inquiry are entirely in the discretion of the Court. The inquiry need not take the form of a full-dress trial, so as to satisfy the Court that an offence has *actually* been committed. Nothing more is necessary than to find that an offence *appears* to have been committed and a long discussion or a decision on the merits is as undesirable as it is unnecessary—*In re Raja Rao*, 50 Mad. 660, 27 Cr L.J. 1149 (1150), 51 M.L.J. 331. The authority which is called upon to take action under this section need

not, and should not, decide the question of the guilt or innocence of the party against whom proceedings are to be instituted—*Jadunandan v. Emp.*, 37 Cal. 250 (258). The section does not say that before a Court orders a prosecution, it must try the whole case and be absolutely satisfied that the accused cannot by any possibility escape a conviction—*Abdul Husen v. Emp.*, 5 N.L.R. 84, 15 Cr. L.J. 33 (35). The Code does not contain any provision as to the manner in which the evidence in the inquiry should be recorded, but for future reference the Court should make a summary of the statement of the witnesses examined—42 Cal 240

It is not necessary that the preliminary inquiry should be conducted in the presence of the accused. All that the Court making the inquiry has to do is to satisfy itself that there are *prima facie* grounds for sending the case for investigation to a Magistrate—*Chota Sadoo v. Bhoobun*, 9 W R. 3. The accused has no right to cross-examine any witness in the preliminary inquiry—18 Bom L.R. 284; *Abdul Ghaffoor v. Razu*, 34 All. 267, *In re Raja Rao*, *supra*; but see *contra*—*Ganeshwar v. Emp.*, 11 P.L.J. 146, 22 Cr.L.J. 488, 19 A.L.J. 56; and *Perumalla Venkata Subbiah*, 44 M L J 74, A.I.R 1923 Mad 228, 23 Cr. L.J. 712

The person proceeded against under this section is in the position of an accused person, and cannot be examined on oath as a witness in the course of the preliminary inquiry. He can only be examined in accordance with the provisions of section 342—*Maung Po v. Muta Kurpen*, 10 Bur L.T. 32, 17 Cr L J 316 (317); *Sami Sastri*, 2 Weir 598 (599) The person proceeded against in the preliminary inquiry can be called upon to produce a necessary document in his possession (sec 94)—*Damri Ram*, 19 Cr. L J 217, 43 I.C. 793 (794)

Who can hold the inquiry—The preliminary inquiry must be conducted by the officer who directs prosecution under this section, and cannot be delegated to any other officer—20 Cr.L.J 245 (Pat.). It is for the complaining Court to make any inquiry that is necessary, and then to make a complaint. This section does not contemplate that the Court should send the case to a Magistrate for preliminary inquiry, asking the Magistrate to make the inquiry and to prosecute if he is satisfied that the offence has been committed. It is the complaining Court that must be satisfied that there is a *prima facie* case against the person sent to the Magistrate—*Chamari v. Public Prosecutor*, 4 Pat 24, 6 P.L.T. 225, 26 Cr.L.J 170; *Shabir Hasan*, 26 A.L.J. 46, 28 Cr.L.J. 986 (987)

It is not necessary that the whole of the preliminary inquiry ought to be conducted by the Court directing the prosecution. He can apply to the District Magistrate or the Head of the Police, for the assistance of the C. I. D., and the fact that he takes the assistance of the District Magistrate does not make him *functus officio* and deprive him of his jurisdiction to pass an order under this section—*Waman*, 43 Bom. 300. The complaining Court may order the inquiry to be made by the Police, but in that case, when the police papers arrive, the Court has to determine whether it is necessary to take action—*Shabir Hasan*, *supra*.

The preliminary inquiry should not be unduly protracted Action

under this section should be prompt and expeditious. Where the Court passed the order for prosecution of the offender, nearly a year after the offence was brought to its notice, the High Court expressed disapproval of the undue protraction of the proceeding—*Bahadur v. Eradatullah*, 37 Cal 642 (649) (F.B.).

"May take sufficient security . . . custody to such Magistrate":—
 "The object of this is not to make it compulsory on the Magistrate to send the accused in custody even in non-bailable cases. I want to leave a discretion to the Magistrate to come to a conclusion that it is necessary for him to do so. Otherwise he may take security for his appearance."—
per Mr. Rangachariar (Legislative Assembly Debates, 8th February, 1923, page 2087)

1247. Notice to accused :—This section nowhere says that notice shall be given to the person intended to be proceeded against, and the want of notice is at best a mere irregularity in procedure—10 A.L.J. 247; 2 Bur.L.J. 153; U.B.R. (1915) 3rd Qr 83. For a proceeding under this section, neither notice to show cause why the party should not be sent before a Magistrate, nor a preliminary inquiry is indispensable—*In re Jyabhai*, 7 Bom. L.R. 84, *Durpa Narain v. Bepin*, 15 C.W.N. 691 (692). But although as a matter of strict law, no notice would be necessary to the accused before taking proceedings under this section, still it is but right that he should have notice—*Bai Kasturbai v. Vanmalidas*, 49 Bom 710, 27 Bom.L.R. 616. If a preliminary inquiry is started, it must be a real inquiry and not merely a formal one, and the accused must be given ample opportunity to show cause why he should not be prosecuted—1 P.L.T. 342, 21 Cr.L.J. 29 (Pat.); 21 Cr.L.J. 158 (Pat.), 1 P.L.J. 135; 10 A.L.J. 247; U.B.N. (1915) 3rd Qr 83; 4 P.L.J. 475; 25 Cr.L.J. 488 (All.), 2 Weir 587; *Perumalla*, 44 M.L.J. 74, 23 Cr.L.J. 712. Where the prosecution has been ordered by a Court on evidence given by witnesses whom the accused had no opportunity to cross-examine, and whose evidence had thus not been tested, the Court acts with material irregularity in directing a criminal prosecution in the matter without giving the petitioner any chance to know and meet the case against him—*In re Perumalla*, 44 M.L.J. 74, 23 Cr.L.J. 712, A.I.R. 1923 Mad 228. When a Magistrate dismisses a complaint and takes action under this section against the complainant for preferring a false charge, he should give the complainant an opportunity of showing the truth or bona fide character of his complaint—*Yendava*, 7 Mad. 189, 21 M.L.J. 795, 5 C.W.N. 106, *Karimdad*, 6 Cal 496, *Girish Chunder*, 7 Cal. 87. So also, where a Civil Court directed the prosecution of the defendant in a civil suit for fabricating false evidence, without calling upon the defendant to shew cause, it was held that the Court acted wrongly in ordering the prosecution without giving the person concerned an opportunity to shew cause against such order—*Thakur Das*, 17 O.C. 25, 15 Cr.L.J. 217. But the proceedings would not be irregular merely because the accused was not given an opportunity of substantiating his case—, 7 Cal. 208; 7 Mad. 292; 4 All. 182.

1248. Order under this section :—An order under this section must specify the person alleged to have committed the offence. Where a District Judge, being of opinion that the forgery of a document produced before him was committed either by the plaintiff or by the defendant, and sent both of them to the nearest first class Magistrate so that the guilty party might be proceeded against, it was held that the order was illegal and must be set aside in revision—1905 P.L.R. 163. A finding has to be recorded in respect of each individual accused specifically—*Shabir Hasan*, 26 A.L.J. 46, 28 Cr.L.J. 986 (987).

The order must specify the offence committed—8 S.L.R. 179. The complaint must set forth the offence, the precise facts on which it is based, and the evidence available for proving it—*Ram Prosad v. Emp.* 49 All. 752, 25 A.L.J. 639, 28 Cr.L.J. 543. A District Magistrate passed an order directing prosecution for perjury or in the alternative for an offence under Sec. 182 I. P. C. It was held that the option of that kind was not an order at all and therefore not valid—25 All. 234. If the offence is perjury, the Court directing the prosecution should specify the false statement in regard to which the prosecution is directed, and should not leave it to the Magistrate to fish about and find it; if the offence is in respect of a forged document, the Court should mention the forged portion of the document. Omission to specify these particulars amounts to a material irregularity calling for interference by the High Court in revision—38 All. 695; *Kalyanji v. Ram Deen*, 48 Mad. 395, 48 M.L.J. 290; 4 P.L.W. 44; 19 Cr.L.J. 169; *Kalisadhan v. Nani Lal*, 38 Cal. 478, 26 Cr.L.J. 1307. It is preferable that a Court making a complaint for perjury should quote the passages in the witness' evidence which form the basis of the complaint—*Dwarka v. Makund*, 24 A.L.J. 122, 26 Cr.L.J. 1506.

A mere clerical mistake in stating the offence does not make the complaint illegal, e.g., where the Magistrate in his complaint wrote by mistake "sec. 477 I. P. C." instead of sec. 465 I. P. C.—*Bal Makund*, 11 Lah. 678, 29 Cr.L.J. 652 (655).

An order under this section should disclose the materials upon which it is based; such an order is a judicial order; if it does not show the basis upon which it is passed, it is liable to be set aside in revision by the High Court—1 P.L.T. 717. The complaining Court must hold such inquiry that its order when sent to the Magistrate will amount to a complaint under sec. 200. For that purpose the complaining Court must decide upon and name the witnesses to be examined by the Magistrate; otherwise the complaint is liable to be dismissed on the ground that there are no witnesses. The Court must not leave it to the Magistrate to inquire and find out for himself who the witnesses may be—*Kalyanji v. Ram Deen*, 48 Mad. 395, 48 M.L.J. 290, 26 Cr.L.J. 801.

A Magistrate is competent under sec. 250 to order the complainant to pay compensation to the accused and also to direct the prosecution of the complainant under this section for bringing a false charge—*Adikhan v. Alagan*, 21 Mad. 237; *Tani Reddi*, 27 Mad. 59; *Bani Madhab v. Kumad*.

30 Cal. 123; *Allabux*, 10 S.L.R. 162. (*Contra—Bachu v. Jagdam*, 26 Cal. 181; *Shib Nath v. Sarat*, 22 Cal. 586). See page 719 *ante*. But the two orders must be simultaneous, where the Magistrate ordered the complainant to pay compensation to the accused under Sec 250, and three weeks later he passed an order under this section directing the issue of notice to the complainant to show cause why he should not be prosecuted for an offence under Sec 211 I. P. C., it was held that this latter order was not proper under the circumstances—*Lalu Hari*, 20 Cr. L.J. 226 (Pat.).

An order under this section which merely directs the prosecution of the accused, but omits to direct the accused to be taken before the First Class Magistrate, was held to be at most an irregularity cured by section 537 (b) of this Code—37 Mad 317. But it would not be so now, because clause (b) of section 537 which cured irregularities under section 476 has been omitted by the Amendment Act of 1923

A Magistrate passed the following order. "Whereas D instituted a false case before the S. I. of Police, I therefore sanction the prosecution of D under sec. 211 I. P. C. and send the proceeding to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate for favour of disposal. The prosecution is sanctioned under sec. 476 Cr. P. Code." Held that the order could not be treated as a complaint in proper form under this section. The proceeding against D based on such a complaint must be quashed—*Durjodhan v. Emp*, 52 Cal. 666, 22 Cr.L.J. 1459, A.L.R. 1925 Cal. 1226

Recording Reasons:—This section merely states that the Judge should record a finding; it does not state that the finding should be supported by reasons, or that it should contain issues for decision—*Lakhmichand*, 21 S.L.R. 43, 27 Cr.L.J. 1249 (1250).

Second Complaint.—Where a previous application by a party asking the Court to make a complaint was dismissed for non-prosecution, the Court is not thereby precluded from itself making a complaint, if it is expedient in the interests of justice—*Harekrishna*, 1 Pat 736

1249. Effect of reversal of the order directing prosecution :—If an order under section 476 (1) directing an inquiry by a Magistrate of the First Class is set aside, it is just and proper that proceedings under sub-section (2) before that Magistrate must also cease; the Magistrate cannot proceed with the inquiry any further—6 L.B. 49. Thus, where in a suit on a registered bond alleged to have been executed by the defendant, the Munsiff held that the bond was genuine, and directed the prosecution of the defendant, who had denied the execution of the bond, for an offence under section 193 I. P. C. and sent the defendant to the nearest First Class Magistrate to be tried for the offence, but on appeal the judgment of the Munsiff was reversed by the Sub-Judge who held that the bond was not genuine and that the defendant had not executed it, it was held that the result of the judgment of the Appellate Court must be taken to be that the order for the prosecution of the defendant was not maintainable and that the inquiry into the case of the defendant by the First Class Magistrate must be stopped and should proceed no further;

and that if the defendant had been convicted by the Magistrate, the conviction would be set aside by the High Court, although the defendant did not move the High Court to quash the proceeding taken against him—*Kanullah*, 12 C.W.N. 1. But where a Magistrate dismissed a complaint and directed the prosecution of the complainant under this section, and the Sessions Judge directed further inquiry setting aside the order of dismissal, but passed no order in respect of the order of prosecution, it was held that the order of prosecution remained good until it was quashed and the Magistrate to whom the case was sent was competent to continue the inquiry—21 M.L.J. 795. If an order directing prosecution is set aside by the High Court as not being in proper form, it does not debar the Court from instituting fresh proceedings by making a complaint in proper form—*Durjodhan v. Emp*, 52 Cal. 666, 26 Cr.L.J. 1459.

1250. First Class Magistrate:—Under the old section, the Court before which an offence was committed had to send the case for inquiry or trial to the nearest First Class Magistrate; and it was not necessary that such Magistrate should be a Magistrate having jurisdiction over the offence. The order making the transfer was of itself sufficient to confer jurisdiction on such Magistrate—*Nagappa*, 16 Mad. 461, 20 Cr. L.J. 202 (Pat). The power to send the case to the nearest Magistrate of the First Class was quite irrespective of the local jurisdiction of the Magistrate to whom the offender was forwarded; section 177 in no way curtailed the power under this section—*Ratanlal* 88. See also 43 Cal. 542 where the High Court sent the case to the nearest first class Magistrate who had no local jurisdiction over the case. But in a Sind case, it was held that the word 'nearest' was merely directory; it did not confer jurisdiction, and the Magistrate to whom an accused had to be sent under this section must be a Magistrate having local jurisdiction over the offence—1 S.L.R. 84. To remove this conflict of opinion, it has now been expressly laid down that the Magistrate to whom the accused is to be sent must be a Magistrate having jurisdiction, thus adopting the view of the Sind case.

If a High Court or Chief Presidency Magistrate takes action under this section, he shall send the case to a Presidency Magistrate, see para 3 of sub-section (1). In this para as originally framed by the Amendment Act of 1923, the words were "Chief Presidency Magistrate;" but the word 'Chief' has been omitted by the Cr.P.C. Amendment Act II of 1926. "This amendment proposes to make all Presidency Magistrates Magistrates of the first class for the purpose of sec. 476 (1). At present, if a Chief Presidency Magistrate wishes to take action, it is necessary for him to send the case to the first class Magistrate outside the Presidency town, because the other Presidency Magistrates are not first class Magistrates for the purpose of this section"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (Gazette of India, 1925, Part V, p. 215). Such a difficulty arose in the case of *Emp. v. Mackay*, 53 Cal. 350 (F.B.), 30 C.W.N. 276, 27 Cr.L.J. 385. In this case the accused gave false evidence before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, whereupon he drew up a complaint for an offence under sec. 193 1. P. Code. This complaint he preferred in his own Court (*i.e.*

to himself), because the other Presidency Magistrates were not first class Magistrates; then he transferred the complaint under sec. 192 Cr. P. Code to the Third Presidency Magistrate. The Full Bench decided that the procedure adopted by the Chief Presidency Magistrate in making the complaint to himself was irregular, though not absolutely illegal. The present amendment, however, has removed this difficulty.

This section authorises the Court to send the accused to the First Class Magistrate; it does not permit the Court to *commit him to the Sessions*—3 Bom.L.R 185

The Court should *specify the Magistrate* to whom the case is sent; an order that the case be sent to the Magisterial authorities for investigation is not sufficient—*Nurpat*, 4 N.W.P. 86.

1251. Power of Magistrate to whom case is sent :— The Magistrate to whom the case is sent under this section must proceed according to law, and dispose of the case—*Amruta*, 7 B.H.C.R. 29; *Bal Gangadhar Tilak*, 26 Bom 785; *Arjan Paramanik*, 31 Cal 864. He cannot stop the inquiry and refuse to take cognizance of the offence—*Q. E. v. Rachappa*, 13 Bom 109, and cannot return the case to the Court which sent it—12 W.R. 41

The Magistrate receiving a case under section 476 cannot act under section 202. The latter section enables a Magistrate *who is not satisfied as to the truth of the complaint* to postpone the issue of process and to direct a local investigation. Now, section 476 presupposes that the Court (Civil, Criminal or Revenue) making the reference to the Magistrate must be of opinion that *there is ground for inquiry* into the offence in respect of which the case is sent to the Magistrate. This shows that section 476 precludes the application of section 202, and that there can be no room for the investigation which is contemplated by that section—21 Cr L.J. 310 (Nag.).

The expression 'proceed according to law' in sub-section (2) requires the Magistrate receiving the reference to proceed under Chapters XVIII to XXI of the Code according to the nature of the offence supposed to have been committed. Chapter XVII has of course no application, in as much as the accused must necessarily appear before the Magistrate as a consequence of the reference itself—21 Cr L.J. 310

The Magistrate to whom a case has been sent is competent to discharge the accused person, if in his opinion the evidence against the accused is insufficient—*Rachappa*, 13 Bom 109 (113). He has power to dismiss the complaint under sec. 203—*Gopal Barik*, 34 Cal 42 (46). If the Magistrate passes an order of discharge, the Sessions Judge can order further inquiry under sec. 436—*Peary Lal v Sagar Mal*, 49 All. 230, 27 Cr L.J. 1130.

If the complaint under this section is made without jurisdiction, the Magistrate to whom the case is sent is competent to dismiss the complaint—*Kulandai v Ramasami*, (1911) 2 M.W.N. 431, 12 I.C. 644. The Magistrate while dismissing the case and acquitting the accused cannot direct compensation to be paid to the accused. Thus, wh

decree-holder complained to the Civil Court of obstruction by the judgment-debtor under this section, and after the trial and acquittal of the accused the Magistrate directed the decree-holder to pay compensation, it was held that the order was not valid, since the decree-holder was not the complainant. The real complainant was the Civil Court which directed the prosecution of the accused—14 Bom.L.R. 1166.

The Magistrate is competent to proceed against persons not named in the order of the Court directing the prosecution under this section. The Code provides for taking cognizance of offences and not of offenders, and a Magistrate who has legally taken cognizance of an offence on an order under section 476 has jurisdiction to proceed against any one who may be proved by the evidence to be concerned in the offence, whether he was mentioned in the order or not—21 C.W.N. 950; 1917 P.R. 34; *Waman*, 43 Bom. 300.

1252. Limit of time for taking action :—This section does not limit the time within which action should be taken, and there is no legal necessity to proceed under this section immediately after the original trial or proceedings in which the offence complained of is said to have been committed—19 A.L.J. 819, *Waman*, 43 Bom. 300, 7 S.L.R. 187; *Atiar Singh*, 1916 P.R. 29, 18 Cr.L.J. 337 (339); 19 Cr.L.J. 981, 5 O.L.J. 622, 20 Cr.L.J. 724 (Pat.); *Seshamma v. Venkamma*, 22 L.W. 863, 27 Cr.L.J. 280 (282), *Tilak Panday*, 37 All. 344, 13 A.L.J. 466, *Lakshmidas*, 32 Bom. 184 (190, 191). But still it is desirable that an order under this section should be made either at the close of the proceeding or so shortly thereafter that it may be reasonably said that the order is a part of the proceeding—*In re Rahimadulla*, 31 Mad. 140, 20 Cr.L.J. 184, 20 Cr.L.J. 286; 1916 P.W.R. 53; *Maung Ba Hla*, 18 Cr.L.J. 331 (332) (Bur.), *Aiyakannu v. Emp.*, 32 Mad. 49, 42 Mad. 422. If the Court thinks that action should be taken under this section, it ought to pass such order at or immediately after the termination of the original trial (and should not delay it by several months)—*Begu Singh*, 34 Cal. 551 (556) (F.B.), *Bhim Lal v. Bisu*, 40 Cal. 444, 17 C.W.N. 290, *Kashi Shukul*, 38 All. 695; *Subbaraya*, 15 M.L.J. 489, 2 Weir. 601 a, 3 Cr.L.J. 118. But no hard and fast rule can be laid down that delay is a ground for setting aside an order for prosecution. It may, under certain circumstances, be almost a sufficient ground in itself, but in other cases it may be no ground at all. It is possible to imagine a case in which the commission of an alleged offence may not have actually come to light for many months or even years after it had been committed. But a prosecution for false complaint under sec. 211 I. P. C. should be ordered as soon as the complaint is dismissed as false, and not many months afterwards, because the facts justifying the prosecution are known to the Court at the time when the complaint is dismissed—*Emp. v. Baldeo Prosad*, 46 All. 851 (852). A delay of three months was considered too long—*Maung Ba*, 18 Cr.L.J. 331 (332). In 20 Cr.L.J. 226 (Pat.) a delay of three weeks was held to be too much under the circumstances of the case. In fact, each case would depend upon its own circumstances, so that no hard and

fast rule can be laid down as to within what time a complaint should be made under sec. 476, and in view of the amendment made in this section and the enactment of the two new sections 476A and 476B it is no longer necessary that the proceeding under sec. 476 should be taken immediately after the termination of the original proceeding. But, of course a complaint made after the lapse of a considerable time would be open to the objection that it was made after an undue delay—*Seshamma v. Venkamma*, 22 L.W. 863, 27 Cr.L.J. 280 (282).

Where an appeal is preferred against the original case, the Court is justified in waiting till the disposal of the appeal, before directing a prosecution under this section—*Attar Singh*, 18 Cr L J 337 (338), 1916 P.R. 29; *Gendan Singh*, 3 C L.J. 302, *Shri Nana Maharaj*, 16 Bom. 729, 6 Cal 308, 4 Lah. 58. See sub-section (3)

Where proceedings for directing a prosecution are commenced in the course of a judicial proceeding or so soon thereafter as to make the former substantially a continuation of the latter, the final order directing the prosecution will not be vitiated by the fact that it was passed more than a year afterwards—1919 M.W.N. 112. But the Court will set aside an order directing a prosecution if it is passed so long after the offence that the delay is oppressive or scandalous—Ibid

1253. Revision:—*Power of Sessions Judge*—A Sessions Judge has no power to interfere with an order under section 476, nor with a complaint under section 195 made by a Magistrate—*Ankanna*, 23 Mad. 205 (206), *Gopal Barik*, 34 Cal. 42 (45). If the Sessions Judge is of opinion that the order should be set aside, he should refer the matter to the High Court—*Kanhu v. Natabar*, 15 Cr L.J. 1 (Cal), *Arjun v. Bira*, 15 Cr L.J. 16 (17). It is the High Court which alone has the power to interfere with an order under sec 476; a Sessions Judge has no such power—*Gopal Barik*, *supra*.

Power of High Court:—In *Eranpoli Athan*, 26 Mad 98, it was held that the effect of the words “as if upon complaint made and recorded under section 200” was that the order under this section was merely a complaint and not an order, and, as such, was not subject to revision by the High Court. Whereas in various other cases it was laid down that these words did not mean that the proceedings of the Court directing prosecution were to be taken merely as a complaint and not as an order; the order of prosecution was therefore subject to revision—*Ottupura Narayanan*, 33 Mad 48 (F.B.), *Srinivasalu*, 21 Mad 124; *In re Bal Gangadhar Tilak*, 26 Bom 785, *Nusserwanji Ratanlal* 895; *Gopal Barik*, 34 Cal. 42 (46), 20 Cal. 349, *Mithura Das*, 16 All. 80. The decision in 26 Mad 98 (*supra*) must be deemed as overruled by the Full Bench case of 33 Mad 48. In *Q. E. v. Narakla*, 13 Mad. 144, it was held that the High Court had no power to interfere on appeal with a complaint duly made by a Court under sec. 476, but the Judges indicated that they were of opinion that it sufficient cause were shown they might have interfered on revision. Further, it is the intention of the Legislature that an order under this section is subject

to revision. This will be evident from the amendment made in 1923 to the effect that the Court shall record a finding. "In order to give effect to our decision that proceedings under sec. 476 should be subject to revision we have introduced words which will make it necessary for the Court to record an order"—*Report of the Joint Committee (1922)*.

1254. When High Court will interfere and when not :—Orders purporting to be made under this section are open to revision by the High Court when they have been made during proceedings held entirely without jurisdiction—*Suryanarayana*, 29 Mad 100. When the Lower Court has proceeded upon merely fanciful grounds or grounds so obviously wrong that it could not be said to have formed a serious judicial opinion at all, then the High Court will interfere and set aside the order of the Court below—*In re Alamdar*, 23 All 249; *In re Parshotamdas*, 25 Bom L.R. 282; 10 N.L.R. 177; *Abdul Husen*, 11 N.L.R. 184, 15 Cr L.J. 33 (34), but where the Lower Court has arrived at a judicial opinion on substantial grounds and the order shows that the Court has acted with circumspection and mature deliberation, the order should not be interfered with merely because the High Court disagrees with that opinion—*In re Alamdar*, 23 All 249; 4 A.L.J. 803; *Abdul Husen*, supra, *Daulat*, 14 N.L.R. 16, 18 Cr.L.J. 1015 (1016), where the undisputed and indisputable facts speak for themselves, and on those facts a responsible officer of the Government after obviously careful consideration, has sought to prosecute the petitioner in order to vindicate public justice, and the conditions laid down in secs 195 and 476 have been observed, mere technicalities should not be permitted to interfere with the course of justice—*In re Ram Prasad*, 37 Cal. 13 (21). The question whether a complaint should be made under sec 476 is almost invariably a matter of discretion, and the High Court is always loath to interfere except in extraordinary cases—*Ranjit Narain v. Ram Bahadur*, 5 Pat 262, 7 P.L.T. 114. If the trial Court or the Court to which it is subordinate thinks that no complaint should be made, then it is not desirable that the High Court should interfere—*Somabhai v. Aditbhai*, 48 Bom 401, 26 Bom.L.R. 289. Revision should be granted if there be some error of law, some irregularity, some abuse or failure to exercise jurisdiction, and not simply because the Revisional Court has formed a different opinion from that of the Court below about the case—*Ganda Singh v. Bisali*, 1902 P.R. 18. Where an order was made on insufficient grounds and no further action was taken by the Court for more than a year, it was held that this was a case in which the revisional powers of the High Court might properly be exercised and the order set aside—*Zahm Singh*, 1901 A.W.N. 177.

Formerly, when sec. 195 enabled a private person to obtain sanction to institute a prosecution, and when no appeal was provided for from an order by a Magistrate under sec. 476, it was sometimes desirable for the High Court to interfere in revision, because sanction was frequently used merely as a means of blackmail, and orders under sec. 476 were passed occasionally by inexperienced Magistrates. Now, after the change effected in 1923, the choice of instituting a prosecution is not placed

in the hands of private persons, but is left to the Court, and the person who is the subject of the complaint has a definite right of appeal to a superior Court. This being the situation, it does not seem to be the function of the High Court, unless the circumstances are altogether outside the ordinary, to examine in revision the merits of the complaint with a view to discovering whether it is likely to result in a conviction. Moreover, when a Magistrate presiding over a Court and a responsible Court of Appeal are agreed that a prosecution is necessary in the interests of justice and in accordance with public policy, it would be extremely difficult for the High Court to interfere in revision and to declare that the prosecution is not in the interests of public policy—*Behram v. Emp.*, 7 Lah. 108, 27 Cr.L.J. 776

Revision of proceedings of Civil and Revenue Courts:—When a Munsif or Sub-Judge or District Judge takes proceedings under this section, he acts as a Civil Court, and the proceedings cannot be interfered with by a Criminal Bench of the High Court in Revision under sec. 439. The power of revision under sections 435-439 is confined to the records of inferior criminal Courts. When an order is passed by a Civil Court making or refusing to make a complaint under this section, the High Court can interfere only under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code—*Emp. v. Har Prasad*, 40 Cal. 477, 17 C.W.N. 647, 14 Cr.L.J. 197, *In re Bhup Kanwar*, 26 All. 249, *Salig Ram v. Ramji*, 28 All. 554; *Kashi Shukul*, 38 All. 695; *Banwari Lal v. Jhunka*, 24 A.L.J. 217, 27 Cr.L.J. 278, *Ram Narain*, 27 Cr.L.J. 1021 (All.), *Kali Prasad v. Bhuban*, 8 C.W.N. 73; *Babu Lal*, 21 Cr.L.J. 270, 16 N.L.R. 23, *Nga San v. Sookaram*, 17 Cr.L.J. 82; *Maung Po v. Mutu Kurpen*, 10 Bur.L.T. 32, 17 Cr.L.J. 316 (317); *Ko Maung v. Ma*, 10 Bur.L.T. 13, 18 Cr.L.J. 121; *Bismilla v. Shakir Ali*, 4 Luck. 155, *Karimulla v. Rameshwar*, 51 All. 344; *In re Chennanagoud*, 26 Mad. 139; *Abdul Haq v. Sheo Ram*, 49 All. 536, 24 O.C. 367, *Nawab Ali v. Madhuri*, 3 O.W.N. 905, 28 Cr.L.J. 16, *Thakur Das v. Emp.*, 17 O.C. 25 (31), 15 Cr.L.J. 217 (219). If the Civil Court (e.g. Munsif) refuses to institute a prosecution under this section, and this order of refusal is upheld by the Civil Appellate Court (e.g. Subordinate Judge), the High Court cannot interfere with the appellate order under sec. 439 of this Code but can do so only under sec. 115 of the Civil Pro. Code—*Nawab Ali v. Madhuri*, supra. An order of the Small Cause Court under sec. 476 of this Code directing a prosecution for perjury can be interfered with only under sec. 25 of the Pro. Small Cause Courts Act—*Valab Das v. Maung Ba Than*, 1 Rang. 372

Similarly, the High Court has no power in revision to interfere with an order passed by a Revenue Court under this section, the application for revision should be filed before the Board of Revenue—*Abdool Raoof*, 4 A.L.J. 701, 6 Cr.L.J. 350, 1902 A.W.N. 202, 39 All. 91, 15 Cr.L.J. 2 (Oudh); 36 Mad. 72 (per *Sundara Ayyar J.*)

In a Bombay case, however, the High Court, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under secs. 435 and 439, interfered with an order

ultra vires, but that does not prevent the Sessions Judge from making a complaint on his own initiative—*Gulab v Emp*, 26 Cr.L.J. 923 (924) (All.).

Sec. 476A must be distinguished from sec. 476B. If the subordinate Court has *neither made a complaint nor rejected an application* for the making of a complaint under sec. 476, then the superior Court can take action and make a complaint under sec. 476A. But where the subordinate Court *has rejected* an application for the making of a complaint, then the procedure which is contemplated by this Code is by way of an appeal to the superior Court under sec. 476B—*Chandra Kumar v. Mathuriya*, 52 Cal. 1009, 29 C.W.N. 1035, 26 Cr.L.J. 1569 (1570).

The word "rejected" means rejected on the merits; merely to allow the application to be withdrawn without consideration of the merits does not amount to rejection—*Vasudevmal*, 23 S.L.R. 37, 29 Cr.L.J. 1051.

476B. *Any person on whose application any Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court has refused to make a complaint under section 476 or section 476A, or against whom such a complaint has been made, may appeal to the Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of section 195 sub-section (3), and the superior Court may thereupon, after notice to the parties concerned, direct the withdrawal of the complaint or, as the case may be, itself make the complaint which the subordinate Court might have made under section 476, and if it makes such complaint, the provisions of that section shall apply accordingly.*

This section has been newly added by section 128 of the Cr. P. Code Amendment Act XVIII of 1923. Under the old law, when an application was made to a Munsiff asking him to take action under sec. 476, and the Munsiff refused to do so, it was held that no appeal lay to the District Judge against the order of the Munsiff—12 A.L.J. 684. This ruling is now rendered obsolete by the present section.

1257. Scope:—This section applies where a complaint has been made under sec. 476, which again refers to offences under clauses (b) and (c) of sec. 195. An offence under sec. 174 or 182 I. P. Code falls under clause (a) of sec. 195 and is therefore not an offence for which the Court can make a complaint under sec. 476. So, an order of a Magistrate or District Judge (as a public servant) making a complaint for an offence under sec. 174 or 182 I. P. Code is not appealable under sec. 476B—*P. J. Money v. Emp*, 6 Rang. 529, 29 Cr.L.J. 912; *Brijendra*, 28 Cr.L.J. 547 (All.). But the Appellate Court can withdraw the complaint under sec. 195 (5)—*Brijendra*, *supra*.

The right of appeal under this section does not survive on the death

of the appellant before hearing, the appeal abates—*Nihal v. Ramji*, 47 All. 359, 26 Cr.L.J. 1008, A I.R. 1925 All. 620.

To which Court appeal will lie:—The appeal will lie to the Court to which the trial Court is subordinate. For the meaning of the term 'subordinate' see Note 631 under sec. 195

This section indicates with sufficient clearness that the Court to which the appeal lies is one to which the Court making or filing the complaint is subordinate; in other words, if it is a Civil Court which has made an order under sec 476, the appeal against such an order must lie to and be heard by the authority or tribunal to which such Civil Court is subordinate. Thus, if the order is made by a Munsif, the appeal would lie to the District Judge (i.e. the Appellate Court exercising Civil appellate jurisdiction) and the procedure of the appeal will be governed by the provisions of the Civil P. Code (and not of the Criminal Procedure Code)—*Nasaruddin v. Emp.*, 53 Cal. 827, 28 Cr L.J. 92 (93).

Procedure in appeal:—In *Hamid Ali v Madhusudan*, 54 Cal. 355, 31 C W N. 281, A I.R. 1927 Cal 284, there was a difference of opinion among the Judges as to the procedure governing an appeal under sec 476B, Cr P. Code, from the order of a subordinate Civil Court (Sub-Judge) to a superior Civil Court (District Judge), Duval J., held that the appeal must be dealt with as a miscellaneous Civil appeal regulated by the procedure of O. XLI, Civil P Code; but Chotzner J was of opinion that the appeal must be dealt with as an ordinary Criminal appeal governed by the procedure of secs 422-424 Cr P Code. The opinion of Duval J has been followed in *Mahendra v. Emp*, 49 C L J 374, 1929 Cr. C. 54 (55)

The Appellate Court has no power to take any additional evidence under sec 428, for that section applies only to an appeal under Ch XXXI, and not to an appeal under sec 476B—*Sam Vannia v Periaswami*, 51 Mad. 603, 29 Cr.L.J. 445

If the Appellate Court accepts an appeal against an order refusing to make a complaint, it should itself make the complaint; an order directing the subordinate Court to file a complaint is illegal—*Manur Ahmed v Jogesh*, 55 Cal 1277, A I.R. 1929 Cal. 195.

Limitation —For the purposes of limitation, an appeal under this section is an "appeal under the Criminal Procedure Code" within the meaning of Articles 154 and 155, and not an "appeal under the Civil Procedure Code" under Article 152 or 156. See *Chandra Kumar v. Mathuriya*, 52 Cal. 1009, 29 C W N 1035, 26 Cr L.J 1569, *Rajani v. Bistoo*, 46 C.L.J. 40, 28 Cr L.J 840 (841); *Sheo Prosad v Sheo Bans*, 24 A.L.J 368, A.I.R. 1926 All 211 (212)

Transfer of appeal—An appeal made to the District Judge may be transferred by him to the Additional District Judge, and as the latter is competent to discharge any of the functions of a District Judge, under sec. 11 of the Civil Courts Act (XII of 1887), the Additional Judge can

make a complaint under this section—*Narain Das*, 49 All 792, 28 Cr. L.J. 549 (552) See also *Karimulla v Rameshwar*, 51 All 344, A I R. 1929 All. 774. In an Oudh case, it has been held that that under the provision of sec. 40 of the Oudh Courts Act, an appeal made under this section to a District Judge from the order of a Munsif refusing to make complaint cannot be transferred to a Subordinate Judge—*Bismilla v Shakir Ali*, 4 Luck. 155, 30 Cr.L.J. 382 (384).

Notice of appeal.—In an appeal against a refusal to make a complaint, the party entitled to receive notice is the accused person. But in an appeal against an order making a complaint, the party entitled to receive notice is the Crown, and not the person on whose application the complaint was made—*Labha Mal v Wasawa*, 29 P.L.R. 128, 29 Cr.L.J. 72.

Duty of Appellate Court.—The Appellate Court, in the case of appeals under this section, should reconsider the entire matter on the merits, and while allowing reasonable weight to the opinion of the Court below, should nevertheless reconsider the question of the propriety of the order appealed against, upon a complete review of the entire facts. If the Appellate Court is not satisfied that a *prima facie* case has been made out, the order appealed against must be set aside—*Ram Charan v. Emp.*, 23 A L J 515, 26 Cr.L.J. 1126; *Jagabandhu v. Abdul*, 33 C.W.N. 945. Where the Court below has refused to make a complaint under sec 476, the superior Court in reversing the order of the Court below must give sufficient reasons for such reversal—*Kalishadhan v. Nani Lal*, 52 Cal 478, 26 Cr.L.J. 1307.

Where the subordinate Court (Munsif) refused to make a complaint under sec 476 on the ground that he had no jurisdiction, as the offence was not committed in relation to any proceeding in his Court, and the Appellate Court made a complaint under sec. 476B, without deciding whether the Munsif had jurisdiction or not to make the complaint, held that the complaint made by the Appellate Court was illegal and must be set aside. For, it is quite clear that if the Munsif had really no jurisdiction to make the complaint, the Appellate Court also had no power to make the complaint and ought to dismiss the appeal. For this reason, it was incumbent on the Appellate Court first of all to decide whether the Munsif had no jurisdiction—*Kanai v. Mahan*, 55 Cal. 836, 29 Cr.L.J. 483 (484).

Second Appeal from order under this section.—If the original Court has made or refused to make a complaint under sec 476, but on appeal the Appellate Court withdraws or makes a complaint under sec. 476B, no further appeal lies. Sec. 476B does not provide for a second appeal to the High Court from an order passed by the Appellate Court under sec 476B itself. It only contemplates an appeal from an order passed by the original Court under sec. 476, or from an order passed by a superior Court under sec. 476A—*Mo On Khin v. N. K. M. Firm*, 5 Rang 523, 28 Cr.L.J. 937 (938); *Moldeen v. Miyassa*, 51 Mad. 777, 55 M.L.J. 444, 29 Cr.L.J. 786; *Somabhai v. Adibhai*, 43 Bom. 401

(403), 26 Bom.L.R. 289; *Mohim*, 56 Cal. 824, *Kanai Lal v. Makhan*, 55 Cal. 836, 29 Cr.L.J. 483 (484); *Ahmadar v. Dwip Chand*, 55 Cal. 765; *Mahomed Idris*, 6 Lah. 56, 26 P.L.R. 199, 26 Cr.L.J. 1168; *Bismulla v. Shakir Ali*, 4 Luck. 155, 30 Cr.L.J. 382 (383); *Chinat*, 25 N.L.R. 192. But the Patna High Court holds that if the original Court refuses to make the complaint, but on appeal the Appellate Court makes the complaint, a second appeal lies—*Foujdar*, 7 P.L.T. 199, 26 Cr.L.J. 1565; *Ranjit Narain v. Ram Bahadur*, 5 Pat. 262, 7 P.L.T. 114, 27 Cr.L.J. 641 (645). In the last mentioned case (5 Pat. 262), sec. 476B has been thus analysed: "(a) Where a Munsif has refused to make a complaint, and an appeal has been made to the District Judge, under sec. 476B, but the District Judge dismisses the appeal and makes no complaint, there is no provision in this Code for a second appeal to the High Court. (b) But if, on the other hand, the District Judge allows the appeal and himself makes a complaint, the complaint falls under sec. 476; and so according to the words of sec. 476B 'the person against whom such a complaint has been made may appeal to the Court to which such former Court is subordinate', that is, the person proceeded against by the District Judge may take a second appeal to the High Court, to which the District Judge's Court is subordinate. (c) Where the Munsif has done nothing and has been asked to do nothing, and the District Judge has, either *suo motu* or on application, made a complaint, the complaint falls under sec. 476A, and the person against whom the complaint is made may appeal to the High Court. (d) Where the Munsif has made a complaint, and an appeal is made to the District Judge under sec. 476B, but the Judge upholds the Munsif's view and dismisses the appeal, but makes no complaint himself there is no further right of appeal, so also if the Judge allows the appeal and directs the withdrawal of the complaint, there is no appeal to the High Court; for it should be observed that it is only when the District Judge makes the complaint, that the provision of sec. 476 applies and a right of appeal to the High Court is given." In a later case of the same High Court, *Ram Chandra v. Emp.*, 8 Pat. 428, it has been said that since the ruling of 5 Pat. 262 is not accepted by the other High Courts, it may require reconsideration.

If a second appeal is made to the High Court, that Court may treat it as an application for revision—*Kanai Lal v. Makhan Lal*, 55 Cal. 836, 29 Cr.L.J. 483 (484).

Revision of order under this section:—The High Court will not ordinarily interfere in revision with an order of withdrawal of complaint passed under this section, except in extraordinary cases. The question whether a complaint should be made under sec. 476 is almost invariably a matter of discretion, and if the trial Court or the Court to which it is subordinate thinks that no complaint should be made or that the complaint should be withdrawn, then it would not be desirable that the High Court should interfere—*Somabhai v. Adibhai*, 48 Bom. 401 (403, 404), 26 Bom.L.R. 289, 25 Cr.L.J. 1123, A.L.R. 1924 Bom. 347. If an order under sec. 476B is passed by a Civil Appellate Court, the application for

revision is governed by sec. 115, C. P. Code and not by sec. 439 Cr P. Code. See 49 All 536 cited in Note 1255 under sec 476 ■ to the High Courts power of revision under sec. 115 C. P. Code.

477. (Repealed).

Section 477 which has now been repealed by sec. 129 of the Cr. P.C. Amendment Act XVIII of 1923, ran as follows :—

"477. (1) Subject to the provisions of section 444, a Court of Session may charge a person for any offence referred to in section 195 and committed before it or brought under its notice in the course of a judicial proceeding, and may commit, or admit to bail and try, such person upon its own charge.

(2) Such Court may direct the Magistrate to cause the attendance of any witnesses for the purposes of the trial."

The reason of omitting this section has thus been stated by the Joint Committee (1922). "Section 477 is inconsistent with section 476 as proposed by the Bill because the latter section made it obligatory on the Court to make a complaint and send it to a first-class Magistrate. This defect has been removed by one of the amendments we have made in section 476, but we are doubtful whether section 477 should stand. We considered a proposal to enable a Court of Session to try a case committed to it after a complaint had been made by itself, but we do not think it desirable that a Court which has instituted the proceedings should dispose of the case and we have therefore repealed section 477."

478. (1) When any such offence is committed

Power of Civil and Revenue Courts to complete inquiry and commit to High Court or Court of Session.

before any Civil or Revenue Court, or brought under the notice of any Civil or Revenue Court in the course of a judicial proceeding, and the case is triable exclusively by the High Court or Court of Session, or such Civil or Revenue Court thinks that it ought to be tried by the High Court or Court of Session, such Civil or Revenue Court may, instead of sending the case under section 476 to a Magistrate for inquiry, itself complete the inquiry, and commit or hold to bail the accused person to take his trial before the High Court or Court of Session, as the case may be.

(2) For the purposes of an inquiry under this section the Civil or Revenue Court may * * exercise all the powers of a Magistrate; and its proceedings in such inquiry shall be conducted as nearly as may be in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XVIII and of

Chapter XXXIII in cases where that Chapter applies, and shall be deemed to have been held by a Magistrate.

Change :—In sub-section (2), the words "subject to the provisions of section 443" have been omitted after the word "may," and the italicised words have been added, by section 28 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act XII of 1923. As a result of this Amendment, this section has been made applicable to European British subjects.

1258. Sections 476 and 478 —If a Sessions offence has been committed, the Civil Court taking proceedings under sec 476, has the option either to continue the proceedings under that section and send the case to a first class Magistrate, or to hold an inquiry under Ch. XVIII and pass an order of commitment under sec. 478. And if the Civil Court in the exercise of this option elects to proceed under sec. 478, the accused cannot object on the ground that the Civil Court has by proceeding under sec 478 deprived him of his right of appeal (there being no appeal from an order under sec 478) which he would have had (under sec. 476B) if the Court had proceeded under sec 476—*Rameshwar Lal*, 49 All 898, 25 A L J 555, 28 Cr L J 668 (669). The procedure of this section is only alternative to that prescribed in section 476 as indicated by the words "*instead of sending the case under section 476*" But this section does not give any power to a Court on failure of one to adopt the other method of procedure; and therefore if the accused has been sent by the Civil Court to a First Class Magistrate under section 476, and has been discharged by the Magistrate, the Civil Court has no power to revive the case against the accused and adopt the procedure prescribed by this section—*Raoji Moreshwar*, Ratanlal 959 (960). In the Allahabad case (49 All 898) the Court acted under sec 478 before sending the case to a Magistrate.

Section 476 merely lays down the procedure that may be followed in certain cases, and does not confer any new jurisdiction on a Court. That section does not by itself give to the Civil Court the powers of commitment in the cases referred to in that section, and that is why section 478 has been enacted—*Imp v Popat*, 4 Bom. 487.

An order passed under sec 476 is open to appeal (see sec 476B), but there is no right of appeal against an order under sec 478—*Rameshwar Lal*, *supra*.

1259. Scope :—The power of a Civil Court to commit is limited to cases which are triable exclusively by the Court of Session or which ought to be tried by such Court, and to such cases only when the offence charged has been committed before the Civil Court or brought under its notice—*Popat*, 4 Bom 287. The Court has power to commit under this section, even if some of the offences imputed to the accused are triable exclusively by the Court of Session, and the others are not so triable—*Rameshwar Lal*, *supra*.

An Assistant Collector concerned in mutation proceeds is acting as a Revenue Court—*Lachman Prosad*, 8 O.W.N. 953.

This section, like section 476, must be taken as supplementary to section 195. The expression "any such offence" means an offence referred to under section 195 and committed under the circumstances mentioned in section 195. And therefore a Civil Court cannot direct a committal for offences under sections 463 and 471 I.P.C. unless the documents have been *given in evidence*, as mentioned in clause (c) of section 195. If the documents have been merely put in Court but not given in evidence, section 195 cannot apply and section 478 also will not apply—*Abdul Khadar v. Meera Saheb*, 15 Mad. 224. But in *In re Devji*, 18 Bom. 581, *Akhil Chandra v. Q. B.*, 22 Cal 1004 and *Khushali*, 40 All. 116 it has been held that the words "any such offence" in this section simply mean an offence referred to in section 195 and not an offence qualified by the circumstances mentioned in section 195. But this view is no longer correct. See this subject fully discussed in Note 1237 under section 476.

Procedure :—Sub-section (2) lays down that the procedure of Chapter XVIII must be followed as nearly as possible. Where the Court recorded very brief statements of the accused, and passed a commitment order without examining the witnesses in the presence of the accused and without explaining the charge, *held* that the Court not having followed the procedure as laid down in Ch XVIII, the order was illegal—*Babu Prasad*, 40 All 32. A Civil Court has no power to order a commitment merely on proceedings held in the civil suit, without holding the preliminary inquiry required by this section—*Rangatoonee*, 22 W.R. 52.

If an Assistant Sessions Judge before whom a false deposition is given transfers the case to himself as District Magistrate under sec. 190(c) for inquiry, he virtually takes action under sec. 478—*Emp. v. Rashid*, 8 Bom L.R. 212, 5 Cr.L.J. 202.

No appeal :—There is no appeal from an order passed under this section. "It is not for me to speculate why no right of appeal has been given against an order passed under sec 478. The fact remains that there is no right of appeal against such order"—*Rameshwar Lal*, 49 All. 898, 28 Cr.L.J. 668 (669).

1260. Revision :—Though certain Magisterial powers have been given to the Civil Court under this section for the purpose of investigating cases of contempt of Court, it still remains, while exercising those powers, a Civil Court, and is not an 'inferior Criminal Court' within the meaning of section 435. It is not therefore competent to the Sessions Judge to revise the proceeding of the Civil Court—*Ramachandra v. Subramania*, 5 M.L.J. 226. In *Salig Ram v. Ramji Lal*, 28 All 554 (561), Knox J. has expressed an opinion (*obiter*) that the express language of sub-section (2) of this section shows that the Civil Court is converted into a *Criminal Court* for the time.

479. When any such commitment is made by a Civil or Revenue Court, the Court shall send the charge with the order of commitment and the record of the case to the Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or other Magistrate authorized to commit for trial, and such Magistrate shall bring the case before the High Court or Court of Session, as the case may be, together with the witnesses for the prosecution and defence.

480. (1) When any such offence as is described in section 175, section 178, section 179, section 180 or section 228 of the Indian Penal Code is committed in the view or presence of any Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court, the Court may cause the offender * * * to be detained in custody and at any time before the rising of the Court on the same day may, if it thinks fit, take cognizance of the offence and sentence the offender to fine not exceeding two hundred rupees, and in default of payment, to simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, unless such fine be sooner paid.

(2) Nothing in Section 29A or in Chapter XXXIII shall be deemed to apply to proceedings under this section.

Change —The words “whether he is an European British Subject or not” have been omitted in sub-section (1), and the words “section 29A or in Chapter XXXIII” in sub-section (2) have been substituted for the words “section 443 or 444,” by section 29 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act XII of 1923.

1261. Scope and application of Section.—This section and the next deal with what is known in English law as direct contempt, that is, contempt committed in the view or presence of the Court. The High Court has got greater powers (not by virtue of this Code or the Penal Code but by virtue of the common law of England) to punish for contempts committed *out of Court*, e.g., comments in newspapers on proceedings pending in the High Court—*Surendra Nath Banerjee*, 10 Cal 109 (P.C.) See also *In re Claridge*, 14 Bom L.R. 231, 13 Cr.L.J. 461; *In re Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 45 Cal 169 (F.B.), 21 C.W.N. 1771; 19 Cr.L.J. 530, *Weston v Editor, Bengalee*, 15 C.W.N. 771; *In re Banks*, 20 C.L.J. 401; 19 Cr.L.J. 449; *In re Satyabodha*, 24 Bom.

928, 23 Cr.L.J. 644; *In re Taylor*, 26 C.L.J. 245, 19 Cr.L.J. 402, 44 I.C. 930

As to the power of the High Court to punish for contempts of subordinate Courts, see the Contempt of Courts Act XII of 1926, recently enacted. See also *Balakrishna*, 46 Bom. 592, 24 Bom L.R. 16; *In re Venkat Rao*, 21 M.L.J. 832 (F.B.); and *In re M. K. Gandhi*, 22 Bom L.R. 368, 21 Cr.L.J. 835, 58 I.C. 915 (F.B.). The rulings in *Moti Lal Ghosh*, 41 Cal 173 (*A. B. Patrika* case) and in 17 C.W.N. 1285 (where it was held that the High Court had no power to punish for contempts of mofussil Courts) are no longer good law in view of the above new Act.

This section empowers a Magistrate to deal with the accused only when he is shown to have committed one of the offences enumerated in this section—*In re Davuluri Veerayya*, 5 M.L.T. 286.

The offence of contempt must be committed during a judicial proceeding, in order to come under this section. An inquiry by a Magistrate into a case of breach of the peace in order to ascertain whether he should make a report to his official superior and to satisfy himself whether he should act under section 108, is not a judicial proceeding, and a person behaving insolently to the Magistrate in such proceeding cannot be proceeded against under this section—2 Weir 605.

A Tahsildar or a Naib-Tahsildar has to perform various miscellaneous duties, most of which are of a non-judicial character, and the mere fact that on a particular day he has to try a case does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that he is doing judicial business during the whole of that day. If it appears that at the time when the incident took place, he was engaged in conversation with two persons who were sitting in his room, it is doubtful whether it can be said that he was sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding, and it is therefore doubtful whether he can take summary action under this section—*Dalip Singh v. Crown*, 2 Lah. 308 (312), 23 Cr.L.J. 9.

The offence must be committed in the view and presence of the Court, to attract the provisions of this section. The plaintiff in a suit was directed to appear with certain account books on a specified date and to give his deposition before a Small Cause Court, failing which the suit was to be decided against him. The plaintiff did not appear as directed and the Munsiff called upon him to show cause why he should not be fined for disobedience. Cause was shown by a petition but there was no appearance, and he was fined for contempt of Court. It was held that the case did not come under this section, as there was no offence committed in the view or presence of the Court, and the order was therefore without jurisdiction—*Chagmal v. K. E.*, 23 C.W.N. 389, 20 Cr.L.J. 373.

The provisions of this section must be applied then and there, or at any rate before the rising of the Court in whose view or presence a contempt has been committed, if it considers that it can be properly and adequately dealt with under this section. Therefore, where a Magistrate in whose presence a contempt was committed, after taking cognizance of

the matter, postponed passing final orders in order to afford the accused an opportunity of showing cause why such order should not be passed, and eventually fined him several days after, it was held that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was irregular, and that the proper procedure would have been to detain the accused and to deal with the matter at once or before rising—11 All. 361. But rising for a short time in the middle of the day (for luncheon) does not amount to 'rising of the Court' for the day—*Emp. v Venkat Rao*, 46 Bom. 973 (1979), 24 Bom L R. 386

Where the Court deals with the offence of contempt of Court under this section, it cannot pass the sentence prescribed by sec. 228 I.P.C. but should under this section limit the punishment to Rs 200 or with imprisonment in default for 30 days—2 Weir 603. If it considers the fine of Rs. 200 too light a sentence for the offence, it ought to refer the case under section 482 to some competent Magistrate—*Buhram Khan*, 10 W R. 47; 6 M.H.C.R. App 16

A substantive sentence of imprisonment cannot be passed under this section in a case under section 228 I P C—10 W R 47. The imprisonment will be only in default of fine

1262. Contempt.—An application for transfer of a case from a particular Court on the ground of probable miscarriage of justice is not a contempt of that Court—*Sirdar Buksh*, 1869 P R 34, *Emp v. Venkat Rao*, 24 Bom L R 386, 46 Bom 973 (1976). Even if in such an application the accused uses certain unhappy remarks concerning the Magistrate from whose Court the case is sought to be transferred, it cannot be presumed that the accused intended to insult that Court—38 All. 284; 1898 A W.N. 145. A refusal by a witness to affix his thumb-mark to the record of his deposition is not an offence under sec. 180 I.P.C.—*Crown v. Fateh Ali*, 1912 P.R. 8. A witness on being asked the name of his grandfather replied that he did not remember it. Held that it did not amount to a refusal to answer a question (sec 179 I P C) and he could not be proceeded against under sec 480 Cr P C—*Kallu v Emp*, 27 Cr. L J 252 (Lah). But a refusal by an accused to sign a statement under sec 364 of this Code is punishable under sec 180 I P C—39 All. 399, (contra—*Sirsapa*, 4 Bom 15; 3 L B R 199). Walking with creaking shoes near the Court-room does not *ipso facto* lead to the conclusion that the accused intended to insult or interrupt the Court in its work—*In re Davuluri Veerayya*, 5 M L T 286. Courts should not be unduly sensitive about their dignity, and a mere audible remark by the accused which interrupted the proceedings of a Court is not enough to sustain a conviction unless the accused intended to interrupt the Court—29 M L J 274, *Dalip Singh v Crown*, 2 Lah 308 (312). In the absence of any intention to insult the Court and of any interruption to the Court, a person accused of a scuffle in the verandah of a Court is not guilty of an offence under sec 228 I P C.—20 Cr L J 777 (All). Prevarication by a witness may, though it does not necessarily, amount to contempt of Court—*Reg v. Jaimal*, 10 B.H.C.R 69. See also 15 W R 5, *Auba*, 4 B H C R. 6; *Pandu*, 4 B H C.R 7. Where a witness refused to answer the questions put to him in his examination-in-chief and cross-examination unless

an application made by him for stay of proceedings was granted, held, that this conduct amounted to contempt—1918 P.R. 14. An accused person who during the hearing of a case makes an impertinent threat to a witness in the box commits an offence under sec. 228 I.P.C.—45 All 272. An irrelevant question put by a pleader to a witness cannot amount to contempt, though a persistence in vexatious or irrelevant questions after warning might amount to contempt—*Azeemoola*, 1867 P.R. 44. But every little insistence on the part of a pleader in the conduct of his case should not be turned into an occasion for a criminal trial, unless the pleader's conduct is so clearly vexatious as to lead to an inference that his intention is to interrupt or insult the Court—*Dattatraya*, 6 Bom L.R. 541; 15 W.R. 62; *Surendra Nath Banerjee*, 10 C.W.N. 1062. Any trivial incident such as laugh or hesitation in speaking is not a contempt—4 M.H.C.R. 146. A witness who having a document in his possession will not produce it, is guilty of contempt, and can be dealt with under this section—*Premchand Dowlatram*, 12 Bom. 63. An accused who in the course of his statement under section 342 calls the Judge a 'prejudiced Judge' and being called upon by the Judge to withdraw the remarks refuses to do so, is guilty of contempt, and can be proceeded against under this section—*Emp. v. Venkat Rao*, 46 Bom. 973, 24 Bom.L.R. 386, 23 Cr.L.J. 325.

A comment on a pending case, if it has or may have the effect of prejudicing the fair trial of an accused person, amounts to a contempt of Court—*In re Claridge*, 14 Bom L.R. 231, 13 Cr.L.J. 461. An article in a newspaper reflecting on a party to a suit, more especially when he is under cross-examination, is a contempt of Court—*Veston v Editor, Bengalee*, 15 C.W.N. 771. But such contempts can be punished only by the High Court. See Note 1261 above.

1263. Appeal:—A summary order under this section by a Sessions Judge for an offence under section 228 I.P.C. imposing a fine on a person for intentional insult to the Judge when sitting in a stage of judicial proceeding, amounts to a trial, though by a summary mode, and is therefore, appealable—*K. Chappu Menon*, 4 M.H.C.R. 146. A Sessions Judge cannot refuse to hear an appeal against an order under this section, because in his opinion the matter is a mere trifle. He is bound to hear the appeal and come to a finding whether the conviction is legal or not—*Ratanlal* 978.

481. (1) In every such case the Court shall record the facts constituting the offence, with the statement (if any) made by the offender, as well as the finding and sentence.

(2) If the offence is under section 228 of the Indian Penal Code, the record shall show the nature and stage of the judicial proceeding in which the Court interrupted

or insulted was sitting, and the nature of the interruption or insult.

1264. Record :—The procedure prescribed by sec. 480 for punishing a contempt committed *in facie curiae* is of a summary character, and the Court taking action under that section is therefore required to record certain particulars mentioned in sec. 481. When the guilt or innocence of a person depends upon the exact words used by him, it is the duty of the Magistrate to record them with a reasonable degree of precision, and his omission to record the nature of the insult constitutes a great defect in the procedure—*Dalip Singh v. Crown*, 2 Lah 308 (311). A Criminal Court inflicting a fine for contempt of Court should specifically record its reasons, and the facts constituting the contempt, with any statements the offender may make, as well as the finding and sentence—*Panchanada*, 4 M.H.C.R. 229. The directions contained in this section are mandatory, and the omission to record the particulars as directed by the section is fatal to the proceedings—*Surendra Nath Banerjee*, 10 C.W. N. 1062. No person can be punished for contempt unless the specific offence charged against him be distinctly stated and an opportunity given him of answering the charge. The omission to record the statement of a legal practitioner charged for contempt is a fatal defect to the prosecution—*Krishna Chandra v Emp*, 37 C.L.J 535, 24 Cr L.J 798.

Subsection (2) lays down that where a person is charged with an offence under section 228 I.P.C., the record convicting him must show the stage of the judicial proceeding interrupted, and the nature of the interruption, and the evidence must establish that such interruption was intentional; omission to do so is a vital irregularity in procedure not curable by sec 537, and the conviction is not proper—*Jattu Mal*, 29 P.L.R 653, 29 Cr.L.J. 880, *In re Kukati*, 15 Cr.L.J 621 (Mad); *Khushal Singh v Emp.*, 1886 P.R. 36

482. (1) If the Court in any case considers that a person accused of any of the offences referred to in Section 480 and committed in its view or presence should be imprisoned otherwise than in default of payment of fine, or that a fine exceeding two hundred rupees should be imposed upon him, or such Court is for any other reason of opinion that the case should not be disposed of under Section 480, such Court, after recording the facts constituting the offence and the statement of the accused as hereinbefore provided, may forward the case to a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the same, and may require security to be given for the appearance of such accused.

before such Magistrate, or if sufficient security is not given, shall forward such person in custody to such Magistrate.

(2) The Magistrate, to whom any case is forwarded under this section, shall proceed to hear the complaint against the accused person in manner hereinbefore provided.

1265. Scope:—Under section 480 the Magistrate can award a fine up to Rs. 200, or a sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of fine. If, however, the Magistrate considers that a substantive sentence of imprisonment or a heavier fine is demanded by the circumstances of the case, he ought to forward the case to another Magistrate under this section—6 M.H.C.R. App. 16, *Buham Khan*, 10 W.R. 47.

Section 482 need not be read along with section 480, and section 482 does not require a Magistrate to draw up proceedings on the same day that the offence is committed—*Bepin Chandra Pal v Emp*, 35 Cal 161.

Procedure—If a Court considers a substantive sentence of imprisonment necessary, it should record a statement of the facts constituting the contempt and the statement of the accused, and forward the case to another Magistrate—*Rutton Sahoo*, 11 W.R. 49.

A Barrister in the course of the trial of a case in which he was the complainant, used insulting language to the Sub-Magistrate. The Magistrate then recorded proceedings required by this section but failed to take any statement from the accused explanatory of his conduct, as the accused left the Court at once. It was held that the omission to take such statement was not fatal to the proceedings, and the case ought not to be dismissed on that ground—2 Weir 604.

483. When the Local Government so directs, any

Registrar or any Sub-Registrar appointed under the Indian Registration Act, 1908, shall be deemed to be a Civil Court within the meaning of Sections 480 and 482.

When Registrar or Sub-Registrar to be deemed a Civil Court within Ss. 480 and 482.

1266. A Registrar or Sub-Registrar may be deemed to be a Court only for the purposes of secs. 480 and 482; and it cannot be implied that he is to be deemed a Court for ordinary purposes. A provision that a particular officer may for a particular purpose be deemed a Court does not warrant the extension of that provision so as by inference to produce a group of rules in conflict with the general system. A provision such as that contained in this section is an excrescence on the general system; such an exceptional provision should not be drawn out into all its logical consequences—*Q. E. v. Talja*, 12 Bom. 36

484. When any Court has under Section 480 or Section 482 adjudged an offender on submission or apology to punishment or forwarded him to a Magistrate for trial for refusing or omitting to do anything which he was lawfully required to do, or for any intentional insult or interruption, the Court may, in its discretion, discharge the offender or remit the punishment on his submission to the order or requisition of such Court, or on apology being made to its satisfaction.

1267. Discharge on submission or apology :—Too much notice should not be taken of a hasty language used by rustic litigants during a moment of excitement, without any serious intention of insulting the Court. If the offender offers an apology or adopts a submissive attitude, an admonition by the Court, or at the most a petty fine, would be sufficient—*Jit Singh v Crown*, 1912 P.W.R. 23

Power of High Court to interfere —A pleader was tried and punished for contempt by a Munsiff for having used certain words which the latter thought to be derogatory to his position. The pleader gave an assurance that the words in question had no reference to the Court, but the Munsiff declined to accept the assurance. The District Judge refused to interfere on appeal by the pleader. The High Court on revision directed the Munsiff to consider whether it was not a case in which he himself should take action under section 484 of the Code. Upon the Munsiff declining to do so because the pleader had not withdrawn the words in question, the High Court held that the assurance given by the pleader should be taken as sufficient, and remitted the punishment—*Ram Bali v. K. E.*, 11 A.L.J. 955, 14 Cr.L.J. 687.

485. If any witness or person called to produce a document or thing before a Criminal Court refuses to answer such questions as are put to him or to produce any document or thing in his possession or power which the Court requires him to produce, and does not offer any reasonable excuse for such refusal, such Court may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, sentence him to simple imprisonment, or by warrant under the hand of the presiding Magistrate or Judge commit him to the custody of an officer of the Court for any term not exceeding seven days, unless in the meantime such person consents to be examined and to answer, or to produce the document or thing. In the event of his persisting in his refusal, he may be dealt

Imprisonment or committal of person refusing to answer or produce document.

with according to the provisions of section 480 or section 482, and, in the case of a Court established by Royal Charter, shall be deemed guilty of a contempt.

1268. Witness :—A complainant is not a witness and therefore not punishable under this section—*In re Ganesh*, 13 Bom. 600.

A witness cannot be punished for not answering a question which is irrelevant to the real issue or which he is not legally bound to answer—*In re Ganesh*, 13 Bom. 600. Where the question is asked with a view to criminal proceedings being taken against the witness, he is not legally bound to answer it and he cannot be punished for refusing to answer—*Hari Lakshman*, 10 Bom. 185.

'Any term not exceeding 7 days' :—It is advisable, but not necessary, to limit the period of detention in custody to a fixed time—1 Ind. Jur N. S. 23

An application for the release of the accused should be made to the committing Judge—*Ibid.*

486. (1) Any person sentenced by any Court under section 480 or section 485 may, notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, appeal to the Court to which decrees or orders made in such Court are ordinarily appealable.

(2) The provisions of Chapter XXXI shall, so far as they are applicable, apply to appeals under this section, and the Appellate Court may alter or reverse the finding, or reduce or reverse the sentence appealed against.

(3) An appeal from such conviction by a Court of Small Causes in a presidency-town shall lie to the High Court, and an appeal from such conviction by any other Court of Small Causes shall lie to the Court of Session for the sessions division within which such Court is situate.

(4) An appeal from such conviction by any officer as Registrar or Sub-Registrar appointed as aforesaid may, when such officer is also Judge of a Civil Court, be made to the Court to which it would, under the preceding portion of this section, be made if such conviction were a decree by such officer in his capacity as such Judge, and in other cases may be made to the District Judge or, in the presidency towns, to the High Court.

See 4 M.H.C.R. 146 and Ratanlal 978 cited in Note 1263 under section 480, under heading "Appeal."

487. (1) Except as provided in Sections * * 480 and 485, no Judge of a Criminal Court or Magistrate, other than a Judge of a High Court, shall try any person for any offence referred to in Section 195, when such offence is committed before himself or in contempt of his authority, or is brought under his notice as such Judge or Magistrate in the course of a judicial proceeding.

(2) Nothing in Section 476 or Section 482 shall prevent a Magistrate empowered to commit to the Court of Session or High Court from himself committing any case to such Court.

Change :—The word "477" has been omitted in Sub-section (1) by section 130 of the Cr. P. C Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. This is consequential to the repeal of sec 477.

1269. General rule—A Magistrate cannot convict a person for contempt of Court committed in respect of his own authority. A commitment to another Magistrate is necessary in all such cases—Ratanlal 64; *Emp. v. Kashmiri*, 1 All. 625, *Q. E. v. Seshayya*, 13 Mad. 24. The Court before which an offence was committed, and by which the preliminary inquiry was held under sec. 476, should not be the Court to try the case—*Taraproshad*, 15 W.R. 88. The fundamental rule in the administration of justice is that no man can be a Judge in a case wherein he is interested—*Chander Seekur*, 12 W.R. 18.

Thus, where a Sessions Judge has directed the trial of a person for the offence of giving false evidence committed before him in the course of a judicial proceeding of a criminal nature, he cannot try the case himself.—*Q. E. v. Mahdum*, 14 All. 354. If the facts alleged to constitute the offence came to the knowledge of the Magistrate in the course of judicial proceedings, he has no jurisdiction himself to try the case—*Emp. v. Kunwar Bahadar*, 23 O.C. 138, 21 Cr.L.J. 696. A Magistrate whose summons was disobeyed has no jurisdiction to try the offence of disobedience of summons—2 Weir 612, 111 A.L.J. 432, *Pahalwan*, 27 Cr.L.J. 1344 (All.). A Magistrate who issued an order under section 144 of this Code cannot himself try the disobedience of that order—*Ranchod Dayal*, 10 B.H.C.R. 424; *Q. E. v. Abdulla*, 24 Mad 262, Ratanlal 904. A Magistrate, who makes an order under sec 133 for the removal of a nuisance, cannot himself try and convict the person to whom such order was directed and who has disobeyed it—*Emp. v. Hira Lal*, 1883 A.W.N. 222. If the Magistrate holds a trial for an offence committed in contempt of his authority, the whole proceedings of the trial are invalid, and a

with according to the provisions of section 480 or section 482, and, in the case of a Court established by Royal Charter, shall be deemed guilty of a contempt.

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486. (1) Any person sentenced by any Court under section 480 or section 485 may, notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, appeal to the Court to which decrees or orders made in such Court are ordinarily appealable.

Appeals from convictions in contempt cases.

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viction but only against the severity of the sentence—*Hukmalwe*, 2 L.B.R. 302 Where a District Magistrate procured the initiation of a number of prosecutions against the same person, and one of them which resulted in conviction came before him in appeal, the High Court considering that it was not altogether proper that he should hear the appeal, ordered its transfer to the Sessions Judge—24 W.R. 58 The Nagpur Court also holds that the word “try” as used in this section includes the hearing of an appeal—*Krishnapra v Emp.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 713.

Judicial Proceeding.—The proceeding of a Magistrate granting or revoking or refusing a sanction under sec 195 is a judicial proceeding. Therefore a Magistrate who has declined to revoke a sanction granted to a person on a charge of forgery, is precluded from himself trying the case—*Q. E. v Seshadri*, 20 Mad 383

1271. “As such Judge or Magistrate”—These ambiguous words have given rise to two sets of conflicting rulings. On the one hand, it may be asked, does this expression mean that the Judge or Magistrate is precluded from trying the case only when the offence was committed before him or brought to his notice while acting in his capacity as Judge or Magistrate? In other words, does this section empower the Magistrate or Judge to try an offence which was committed before him or brought under his notice in another capacity? In *Q. E. v Sarat Chandra*, 16 Cal 766 (F.B.), it has been held that a Sessions Judge may a Sessions Judge try the accused for an offence which was committed before him in another capacity as District Judge, that is, the prohibition is restricted to a ‘Judge’ of a criminal Court, and that being so, a strict construction must be placed upon the words ‘as such Judge’ and it must be held that they do not include a Judge of a Civil Court or a District Judge. The same view has been taken in *Gaspur*, 6 Bom. 479 (481), *Banka Behari*, 7 C.W.N. 708; U.B.R. (1897-1901) 127, *Rajit*, 18 Bom. 380. Thus, it is held that a Magistrate is not debarred from trying an accused person for disobedience of summons issued by him in his capacity as Mamlatdar—*Q. E. v Rajit Daji*, 18 Bom. 380. Where sanction is given by a Deputy Collector and Magistrate in his capacity as Revenue Officer, he is not debarred from trying the case himself as a Deputy Magistrate—2 Weir 613.

But if this view be adopted, does not this section run counter to the fundamental principle of law that no man ought to be a Judge in a case in which he is interested? The prohibition in this section is a personal one, the mischief to be prevented being that the same person should not decide a matter which he may have already prejudged. It does not refer to the office of the Magistrate or Judge before whom an offence of the class described in the section is committed, but refers to the person of the Judge or Magistrate—*Anonymous*, 1 Mad 305. An officer before whom, while acting in a particular capacity, an offence has been committed, punishable under sec 328 I.P.C., cannot in another capacity take up and try the offence—an offence committed against himself. If he could do so, it would be in violation of that fundamental rule in the administration of justice that no man can be a Judge in a case wherein he is interested—*Chander Seelur*, 12 W.R. 118. When a Judge on the Civil

side has already formed an opinion that a document has been forged or a perjury has been committed, he should not try the case as a Sessions Judge, and it is proper for the High Court to transfer the case to another Judge, as a means of relieving the former Judge from a position which he himself would desire to avoid—*In re Arunachella*, 5 M.H.C.R. 212. In *Q. E. v. Gaspar*, ■ Bom. 479 (481), it has been said that it is desirable that a trial should not be held before an officer who has already prejudged the guilt of the accused, and on this ground the case should be transferred; but in the case of an offence exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, great inconvenience would be caused if the case has to be transferred; and if the accused is perfectly willing to be tried by the Sessions Judge, no transfer is necessary.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

OF THE MAINTENANCE OF WIVES AND CHILDREN.

Sir James Fitz James Stephen describes this chapter as "a mode of preventing vagrancy or at least of preventing its consequences." The object of maintenance proceedings is not to punish a parent for his past neglect, but to prevent vagrancy by compelling those who can do so to support those who are unable to support themselves and who have a moral claim to support—*Sardar Md. v. Nur Md.*, 1917 P.R. 22. The scope of this chapter is limited and the Magistrate may not, except as herein provided, usurp the jurisdiction in matrimonial disputes possessed by the Civil Courts—16 Bom. 269.

488. (1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain his wife or his legitimate or illegitimate child unable to maintain itself, the District Magistrate, a Presidency Magistrate, ■ Sub-divisional Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make ■ monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child at such monthly rate not exceeding one hundred rupees in the whole, as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate from time to time directs.

(2) Such allowance shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the application for maintenance.

(3) If any person so ordered *fails without sufficient cause* to comply with the order, any such Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in manner hereinbefore provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each month's allowance remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made :

Provided that, if such person offers to maintain his wife on condition of her living with him, and she refuses to live with him, such Magistrate may consider any grounds of refusal stated by her, and may make an order under this section notwithstanding such offer if he is satisfied that there is just ground for so doing :

Provided, further, that no warrant shall be issued for the recovery of any amount due under this section unless application be made to the Court to levy such amount within a period of one year from the date on which it became due.

(4) No wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance from her husband under this section if she is living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent.

(5) On proof that any wife in whose favour an order has been made under this section is living in adultery, or that without sufficient reason she refuses to live with her husband, or that they are living separately by mutual consent, the Magistrate shall cancel the order.

(6) All evidence under this Chapter shall be taken in the presence of the husband or father, as the case may be, or, when his personal attendance is dispensed with, in the presence of his pleader, and shall be recorded in the manner prescribed in the case of summons-cases :

Provided that, if the Magistrate is satisfied that he is wilfully avoiding service, or wilfully neglects to attend the Court, the Magistrate may proceed to hear and determine

the case *ex parte*. Any order so made may be set aside for good cause shown on application made within three months from the date thereof. .

(7) (Omitted.)

(7) The Court in dealing with applications under this section shall have power to make such order as to costs as may be just.

(8) Proceedings under this section may be taken against any person in any district where he resides or is, or where he last resided with his wife, or, as the case may be, the mother of the illegitimate child.

This section has been amended by section 131 of the Cr. P. Code Amendment Act XVIII of 1923, and the changes introduced are the following.—*First*, in sub-section (1), the words 'one hundred' have been substituted for 'fifty', in order to suit modern conditions in life. *Secondly*, in sub-section (2) the words 'fails without sufficient cause' have been substituted for the words 'wilfully neglects' owing to the difficulties which have been felt in the interpretation of the word 'wilfully' (*Statement of Objects and Reasons*, 1914). *Thirdly*, a proviso has been added to sub-section (3) to provide a period of limitation for the recovery of outstanding arrears. *Fourthly*, sub-section (7) has been omitted; it ran thus: "The accused may tender himself as a witness and in such case shall be examined as such." This is now expressly provided by sub-section (2) of sec. 340. The old sub-sections (8) and (9) have been re-numbered as (7) and (8). *Fifthly*, in the present sub-section (8) the words "any person" have been substituted for the words "the accused" in order to make it clear that the person proceeded against under this section is not in the position of an *accused* person.

1272. Section not affected by personal law :—The right to maintenance conferred by this section is a Statutory right, which the Legislature has created irrespective of the nationality or creed of the parties, the only condition precedent to the possession of that right, in the case of a wife, being the existence of the conjugal relation—*In re Din Mahomed*, ■ All. 226. Thus, a *mulla* wife is not, under the Muhammadan Law of the Shia sect, entitled to maintenance; but this disability arising from her personal law is different from her statutory right to maintenance under this Code. In other words, she is entitled to maintenance under this section, irrespective of the fact that she is not entitled to maintenance under her personal law—*Laddan Sahiba v. Mirza Kaman*, 8 Cal. 736. The right of illegitimate children to be maintained by their actual father is a statutory right, and the duty is created by express enactment independent of the personal law of the parties—19 Mas 461. There is no text of Hindu law under which an illegitimate son of a Hindu by a woman who is not a Hindu can claim maintenance; but under this section such illegitimate child is entitled to claim maintenance from his

putative father—*Lingappa v. Esudason*, 27 Mad. 13. Apart from the Hindu Law, maintenance is awardable in such cases on general principles; the defendant having begotten the child is bound to provide for its maintenance—*Ghana Kanta v. Gereli*, 32 Cal. 479. The father of an illegitimate child cannot get rid of his statutory obligation under this Code to maintain that child by pleading that he is a Buddhist monk. The Criminal Procedure Code must override his personal law if it conflicts with it—(1922) U.B.R. 2nd Qr. 138.

On the other hand, the provision in the Cr. P. Code does not take away any right conferred by the Hindu Law. Thus, under this Code, the illegitimate daughters are entitled to claim maintenance only from their father, but under the Hindu law, they can claim maintenance not only from their father but also from his co-parceners who took his property by survivorship—*Natarajan v. Muthia*, 22 L.W. 650, A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 261.

1273. Who can be ordered—An undivided son living with his father can be ordered to maintain his wife under this section—*Ramasami*, 13 Mad. 17. The mere fact that the defendant is 16 years of age only and studying at school will not by itself be a sufficient cause for his being relieved of the liability imposed by this section of providing for his illegitimate child—4 N.W.P. 123.

The order may be passed only against the father or husband, as the case may be. This section does not authorise a Magistrate to order the father-in-law to pay maintenance to his daughter-in-law—*Crown v. Miran*, 1903 P.R. 26, 1914 P.L.R. 115, *Ghulam Md v Ghulam Fatima*, 30 Cr.L.J. 135 (Lah.).

'Of sufficient means':—Before an order is passed under this section it must be proved that the person ordered has sufficient means to support his wife and children—1882 A.W.N. 179. If he has sufficient means, he is not relieved of the obligation to maintain his wife on the ground that the wife has means of earning money by her own labour—1887 A.W.N. 107; or that the wife has relations able and willing to maintain her—2 Weir 615, 16 Cr.L.J. 80 (Mad.), or that the wife has sufficient earning of her own (including her husband's earnings)—10 Bur L.R. 166.

A Magistrate is not justified in absolutely refusing to order maintenance to be paid to the wife on the ground that the husband is a man of slender means—2 Weir 617. In such a case, only a small amount will be ordered. So also, the fact that the father is a professional beggar does not relieve him from his obligation to maintain his illegitimate child. If a man is capable of labour, and the Magistrate is satisfied that the child is his child, he should order the payment of a reasonable sum—2 Weir 616. The word 'means' in this section does not signify only visible means, such as real property or definite employment. If a man is healthy and able-bodied he must be held to have the means to support his wife; and he cannot be relieved of this obligation on the ground that he is only 19 years old and unemployed—*In re Kandasamy*, 50 M.L.J. 44, 27 Cr.L.J. 350. So also, the mere fact that the husband is a young boy

16 is not a ground for granting merely nominal maintenance. He must make serious endeavour to find work, and must pay sufficient maintenance to his wife—*Ma E. San v. Mg Hla*, 4 Bur.L.J. 258, 27 Cr.L.J. 725. In a Burma case it has been held that in the case of a Pongyi or Buddhist priest, the presumption is that he possesses no property except such as is necessary for his religious life and which is held under conditions which do not make it available for other purposes; and a woman who allows herself to be seduced by a member of the priesthood cannot obtain any maintenance for her child; she ought to have known beforehand that a priest has no money—1 Bur.L.J. 97. But in another Burma case it has been held that a Buddhist monk cannot get rid of his statutory obligation under this Code to maintain his illegitimate child. If he is an able-bodied man, the presumption is that he has sufficient means to maintain himself and his child, and it is for him to prove the contrary. If he cannot pay the maintenance ordered if he remains a monk, it is his duty to throw off the yellow robe and work—(1922) U.B.R. 2nd Qr. 138.

The onus is on the husband or father to show that he has no sufficient means to support his wife and children. An able-bodied man who is suffering from no physical infirmity will be presumed to have sufficient means to support himself and his family—1911 U.B.R. 1st Qr. 96.

1274. Neglect or refusal to maintain:—The first essential for proceedings under this section is that the person proceeded against should have neglected or refused to maintain his wife or children. If there is no evidence as to the neglect or refusal, an order for maintenance passed by the Magistrate is bad in law—*Intazar v. Samidan*, 27 O.C. 271, 1 O.W.N. 150, 26 Cr.L.J. 128, 16 W.R. 62, *Gulabdas Bhaidas*, 16 Bom. 269. Where the evidence was that since the separation had taken place, the husband was regularly paying Rs. 92 for the maintenance of his wife and children, it was held that the Magistrate was wrong in having entertained the petition at all—*Graham v. Graham*, 4 Bur.L.J. 11, 26 Cr.L.J. 831.

The neglect or refusal to maintain wife and children may be expressed or implied. The Court may infer the neglect or refusal from the conduct of the husband—9 Bom.L.R. 359. To give jurisdiction to a Magistrate, it is not necessary to prove express refusal to maintain; if the husband or father does not in fact maintain his wife or children, he is said to 'neglect or refuse' to maintain them—*Emp. v. Ho Han*, 11 Bur.L.R. 96. Where the father has denied his paternity, that is a fact from which the Court can infer neglect to maintain—6 S.L.R. 209. But where the husband is willing to maintain his wife and the wife is willing to live with her husband, i.e., where both parties are willing to live together, the fact that the wife deposes that though she is willing to live with her husband, the latter refuses to maintain her, will not lead the Court to infer that the husband is unwilling to maintain his wife—1914 P.W.R. 46. When there is no proof of refusal or neglect to maintain the wife, the husband ought not to be ordered to pay maintenance on the ground that he has been guilty of cruelty to her—1814

This section is based on the principle that there is a *continuing* obligation upon a father, who has sufficient means, to support his child. If a man who is bound to maintain his child continuously does not do so, he is deemed to have neglected to maintain, and proof of actual refusal to maintain is not necessary. The fact that the child is not in a starving condition is no answer to an application for maintenance—*Ma Hnin v. Maung Myat*, L.B.R. (1900-1902) 189; *Baran v. Ma Chan*, 2 Rang. 682, 26 Cr.L.J. 535; *Emp v. Ha Han Bya*, 8 Bur. L.R. 96.

The fact that a lump sum has been paid to the wife in final settlement of all her claims is no answer to an application for maintenance, if in fact the money has been spent or lost or does not yield a sufficient income—*Mr Le v. Nga Paw Din*, 1905 U.B.R. (Cr. P C) 45, *Ma Hnin v. Maung Myat*, L.B.R. (1900-1902) 189. But where the father has given certain property to the mother for the maintenance of the child, which yields sufficient monthly income and furnishes means of support, he cannot be said to have neglected to maintain his child and an order cannot be made under this section—*Maung Mya v Ma Bok*, U.B.R. (1897-1901) 108; 2 Weir 648.

A father's neglect to sue for the custody of a girl who has chosen to live with her mother who is living in adultery, cannot be deemed to be a neglect on his part to maintain the daughter—*Parvathi v. Ramaswami*, 2 Weir 630 (631). Where the father is entitled to the custody of children, and the mother who takes them away does not allow them to return to him, there is no such neglect or refusal to maintain them as is contemplated by this section—2 Weir 632. Where the children who were being properly maintained while in the custody of their father, were dissuaded by their mother from his custody and went away to live with their mother, the refusal of the father to maintain them unless they returned to his custody, was not a refusal to maintain within the meaning of this section—*Ma Shwe v. Mg Po Chat*, 8 L.B.R. 105, 16 Cr.L.J. 217, 27 I.C. 841.

Before passing an order under this section, the Magistrate ought to ascertain whether the husband has been called upon to maintain his wife. Where the husband has not been called upon to do so, and the wife was living with her father who refused to allow her to live with her husband without a money payment from him, the Magistrate cannot make an order for maintenance—2 W.R. 30.

The neglect or refusal must be *present* neglect or refusal. Where a wife, subsequent to her application for maintenance, came to live with her husband and compromised her claim, but prayed for an order of the Magistrate to the effect that if her husband failed to maintain her *in future*, he should pay her a certain allowance, it was held that the Magistrate could not pass such order but must dismiss the application, as no *present* refusal or neglect was established—2 Weir 630.

1275. Right of wife to maintenance—To justify an order under this section, it must be shown that the complainant is wife of the defendant—*Gulabdas*, 16 Bom. 269. The condition

to a right of maintenance, in the case of a wife, is the existence of a conjugal relation—*In re Din Mahomed*, 5 All 226. It is only on proof of the relationship of husband and wife that an order for maintenance should be made; but where such relationship has ceased to exist, an order already made may be stayed—*Sobhan v. Subraton*, 5 Cal. 558. No order for maintenance can be passed under this section ■ against the husband, in favour of the wife, where there is no proof that the latter is the lawfully married wife of the former, according to his personal law—7 Bur. L.T. 71; 7 L.B.R. 270. Among Jats, Karoo marriage is ■ valid marriage, and the woman is entitled to maintenance—4 N.W.P. 128. A *muta* wife is entitled to maintenance under this section, though she is not entitled under the Mahomedan law—*Luddun Saheba v. Mirza*, 8 Cal 736

Effect of divorce:—A Muhammadan wife is entitled to maintenance up to the date of divorce—*Shah Abu v. Ulfat Bibi*, 19 All. 50. Even after divorce, she is entitled to maintenance during the *iddat*—*Ghulam v. Niaz*, 1905 P.R. 5, 2 Cr.L.J. 40; 2 Weir 617; 20 M.L.J. 12. But an order for maintenance subsequent to the expiration of the *iddat* is illegal, unless pregnancy is alleged—2 Weir 617; 1888 A.W.N. 116; 13 Bur.L.T. 43; *Mariam v. Kadir*, 6 O.W.N. 942, 1929 Cr. C. 625

When a husband pleads non-liability to maintain his wife on the ground of his having divorced her, the Magistrate is bound to entertain and enquire into such plea, and determine on such evidence as may be adduced before him whether the plea is a valid one. Unless the relation of husband and wife exists between them, the Magistrate has no authority to pass an order for maintenance as between husband and wife. If he finds the plea established, he cannot order maintenance—*Shah Abu v. Ulfat*, 19 All. 50; 1894 P.R. 21; 2 Weir 620; 1915 U.B.R. 1st Qr. 53. Where ■ Magistrate makes an order under this section, the order becomes *functus officio* on a subsequent divorce of the wife by the husband—*Emp v. Jadi*, 17 O.C. 260, 15 Cr.L.J. 646

1276. Right of children to maintenance:—The child must be born; no order can be passed under this section for the maintenance of a foetus, when it is believed that a woman is pregnant. Until it is born, it can hardly be regarded as a child—3 N.W.P. 70; 2 Weir 618

The word 'child' in this section simply means son or daughter. Reference to age is purposely omitted, the object being that any son or daughter is entitled to maintenance so long as he or she is unable to maintain himself or herself—1910 P.W.R. 28. In 37 Mad 565 and 23 Cr.L.J. 167, it has been held that the word "child" means one who has not attained majority.

The defendant may be ordered to pay maintenance for his own children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, but not for the child of another person, e.g. for a daughter of his wife by her first husband—*Abdul Rahim v. Amir Begum*, 7 Lah. 365, 27 Cr.L.J. 610

Legitimate children:—A child born during the continuance of the form of marriage known as *Sambandhan* and prevalent among the Nayar community in Malabar, is entitled to maintenance under this section—

Venkatakrishna v. Chimmukuttee, 22 Mad. 246, 22 Mad. 247 (foot-note). Children of a Nikah wife are legitimate and entitled to maintenance—18 W.R. 28

Illegitimate children:—An order under this section may be passed for the maintenance of legitimate as well as *illegitimate* children. The basis of an application for the maintenance of a child under this section is the paternity of the child irrespective of its legitimacy or illegitimacy—*Nur Mahomed v Bismulla*, 16 Cal. 781. But before an order for the maintenance of illegitimate children is passed, it must be proved that the man against whom the woman proceeds was the father of the children—*Hira Lal v. Saheb Jan*, 18 All. 107. Where maintenance is claimed for an illegitimate child from an alleged father, it is not enough that the defendant may have been the father, but the Magistrate must be able to find that in all reasonability no one else can have been the father—2 Weir 621. The Magistrate is not justified in holding that the child is the child of the defendant on the ground of the similarity of the features and the name of the child with those of the defendant—*Nur Mahomed v Bismulla*, 16 Cal. 781.

Children in custody of mother—Where a mother has the custody of a child and has to maintain it, she is entitled to claim maintenance on its account—*Vaithilinga*, 2 Weir 630. And the father cannot refuse to maintain his children on the ground that they are living with their mother. If he wants to have them in his custody, he must enforce his right, if any, in the Civil Court—*Murugesu v Sodiamma*, 8 Bur.L.T. 134, 16 Cr.L.J. 656; *Mi Saw v. S.*, 7 I.C. 460, (1910) U.B.R. 1. Under the Mahomedan law, the mother is the lawful guardian of her minor daughter, and is entitled to her custody; consequently the daughter living with her mother can claim maintenance from her father; and the order cannot be refused on the ground that the father is willing to maintain her daughter if her custody is given to him—*Sarfriz v Miran*, 11 Lah 313, 29 Cr.L.J. 1052 (1053). A divorced wife is under the Mahomedan law, as well as under the Marumakatayam law, entitled to the custody of her children, and the father is not thereby relieved of his liability to maintain them—*Emp v. Ayshabas*, 1 Cr.L.J. 599, 6 Bom.L.R. 536; *Kariyadan v. Kayat Beeran*, 19 Mad 461; *In re Parathy*, 25 M.L.J. 355, 14 Cr.L.J. 597 (598). But where a child has left its father and has chosen to live with its mother who is leading a life of adultery since she left her husband, the father cannot be directed to pay an allowance to the child under this section—*Parvathi v Ramaswami*, 2 Weir 630 (631). See also 2 Weir 632 and 8 L.R. 105 cited in Note 1274 ante.

Children in custody of guardian—If the father is entitled to the custody of his children as their lawful guardian, he cannot be compelled to pay for their maintenance, if they live separately from him. But if another person is appointed guardian of the children, then the father is liable to maintain them while they are living with such guardian—*Sardar Muhammad v Nur Muhammad*, 1917 P.R. 22, 18 Cr.L.J. 811 (815).

Offer to maintain children:—It, at the trial, the father makes an offer to maintain his children on condition that they live with him, the offer is not sufficient to oust the Magistrate of his jurisdiction, if as a matter of fact the father has paid nothing for the maintenance of his children for several years—*Kent v. Kent*, 49 Mad. 891, 49 M.L.J. 335, 26 Cr.L.J. 1597; *Kambu Ammal v. Ranganathan*, 1924 M W N. 465, 25 Cr.L.J. 94. If in fact the father has neglected or refused to maintain his children in the past, the Magistrate can make an order for the payment of monthly allowance for the maintenance of the children, in spite of his offer to maintain the children. Otherwise in those cases where the children are very young, a man, knowing full well that no mother would part with such children, has simply to make an ostensible offer to keep the children with him, and he can thus defeat an application for maintenance. The Magistrate will be entitled to consider the circumstances in which the offer was made, and whether it is right and proper that the children, if not in the custody of the father, should be handed over to him—*David Sasson v. Emp*, 49 Bom 562, 27 Bom.L.R. 359, 26 Cr.L.J. 975; 1905 U.B.R. (Cr.P.C.) 39. If the children are too young (e.g., daughters aged 5 to 10), it is in their interests that they should remain with their mother: and a separate maintenance will be granted to them, in spite of the father's offer to maintain them—*In re Bai Manek*, 52 Bom. 763, 29 Cr.L.J. 1049 (1050). But the Punjab Chief Court has held that if the father offers to maintain his children on condition that they should live with him, the Magistrate should refrain from passing an order against him—*Sardar Muhammad v. Nur Muhd.*, 1917 P.R. 22, 18 Cr.L.J. 811 (815); *Ralla v. Atti*, 1914 P.L.R. 115, 15 Cr.L.J. 529; *Sultan v. Mahtab*, 27 P.L.R. 233, 27 Cr.L.J. 1319; *Man Singh v. Dharman*, 1894 P.R. 18. The Chief Court further holds that although past neglect by a father to support his children may be a cogent factor in deciding that at the time of the application the father is neglecting or refusing to maintain his children, still it should not be considered as sufficient by itself to hold that the offer is not made in good faith. If a father offers to maintain his children on condition that they live with him, the Magistrate should refrain from passing an order for maintenance until the father has had an opportunity of proving that his offer is made in good faith—*Sardar Muhammad*, supra.

Effect of agreement:—Obligation to maintain a child is a statutory obligation and the parties cannot contract themselves out of it—L.B.R. (1900-1902) 126. The father cannot divest himself of his liability to maintain his child, by an agreement with his wife—2 Weir 648. The language of this section is inconsistent with the capacity of a wife to make a contract absolving her husband from his statutory liability—U.B.R. (1905) 45. But it has been held in 2 Weir 631, that where the mother of the illegitimate children renounced on their behalf all future claims of maintenance by a document on payment of a certain sum by the father, the Magistrate was not competent to pass any further order for maintenance unless there was proof of fraud in the execution of the document, or unless it was proved that there was a valid subsequent oral

agreement in supersession of the document. A compromise by the lawful guardian of a minor acting *bona fide* for his benefit cannot be set aside even at his instance, except upon proof of fraud—2 Weir 630.

But there can be no doubt that when a compromise made by the guardian of a minor does not appear to be for his benefit, and it is very likely that he would be materially injured by a manifestly inadequate adjustment of his maintenance-claim under the section, the compromise will not bind the minor nor any one acting as guardian after the mother's death—*Hildephonsus v Malone*, 1885 P R 13

1277. 'Unable to maintain itself' —The words 'unable to maintain itself' refer to the child and not to the wife—10 Bur L.R. 166.

The father is bound to maintain the child if it is unable to maintain itself, even though its mother may be able to maintain it. The question as to the means of the mother is not to be taken into account; the true criterion is the inability of the child to support itself—7 Bur.L.T. 34. The fact that the child belongs to a well-to-do *tarwad* does not relieve the father from his liability to maintain it. The inability referred to in this section relates to the absence of sufficient maturity of physical and mental development in the child rendering it in consequence unable to earn its living by its own efforts, and does not refer to inability through poverty or absence of all means—*In re Parathi*, 25 M.L.J. 355, 14 Cr L.J. 597 (598). But in 39 Mad 957 and *Kartyadan v. Kayat Beeran*, 19 Mad. 461 it has been held that this section has no application to cases where the children are being maintained by a *tarwad* which is bound by law to maintain them. The words 'unable to maintain itself' cannot be confined to the tender age of the child but have also reference to its financial position. Therefore where there are enough funds to support the child in the *tarwad* to which it belongs, it cannot be said to be unable to maintain itself—37 M.L.J. 361. The offspring of a *sambandham* marriage are entitled to maintenance from their *tavazhi*, and if the *tavazhi* or *tarwad* has sufficient means to maintain them, they are not entitled to an order of maintenance under this section—*In re Bharata Aiyar*, 46 M.L.J. 324.

A child who is deaf and dumb and unable to maintain itself is entitled to maintenance even though it may have attained majority—*In re Todd*, 5 N.W.P. 237. A minor girl earning her living by prostitution will still be considered as 'unable to maintain herself' because prostitution is not to be treated as a profession by which a girl can maintain herself for the purpose of this section—37 Mad 565. But a minor married girl, whose husband is willing to maintain her, cannot be regarded as a person unable to maintain herself, and her father cannot be ordered to maintain her—2 Weir 650. But in spite of her marriage the girl still remains unable to maintain herself either because her husband is too poor to maintain her or for any other good reason, the father's liability to maintain the child would still exist—*Meenakshi v. Karupanna*, 48 Mad. 503, 48 M.L.J. 183, 26 Cr L.J. 732. The child is entitled to get maintenance until it is able to maintain itself; the Magistrate is not justified in

ordering maintenance 'till the child attains the age of 14'; ■ Magistrate has no power to fix an arbitrary age limit up to which the child will get maintenance—2 P.L.T. 109. Where a boy is aged 17 or 18 and is able to work and earn his living, he cannot be said to be 'unable to maintain himself,' and he cannot compel his father to educate him in ■ college and thus better his prospects—1 Bur.L.J. 123. But a boy of 11 years must be deemed to be a child 'unable to maintain itself,' and is entitled to maintenance, it would be contrary to public policy to encourage child labour by holding that a boy of 11 years should contribute towards his own support by work, when he should be in school—*Baran Shanta v. Ma Chan*, ■ Rang 682, 26 Cr.L.J. 535.

1278. Order for maintenance :—The only order that can be passed under this section is either an order allowing maintenance or an order dismissing the application for maintenance. He cannot pass any other order. Where a claim for maintenance is compromised by the consent of parties, the Magistrate is not competent to pass an order in accordance with the terms of the compromise. He can only dismiss the petition and strike it off the file. To pass a decree in terms of the compromise would be to assume the functions of the Civil Court—2 Weir 629; 2 Weir 630.

Under this section, the Magistrate can award maintenance only and nothing else, e.g. a house to live in—*Makhan v. Harnamo*, ■ Cr.L.J. 909 (910) (Lah.)

The order under this section must not be *conditional* and must not have reference to any future circumstances. When the wife, after compromising the claim for maintenance, prayed for an order by the Magistrate that if her husband failed to support her in future, he should pay her a monthly allowance, it was held that the Magistrate could not pass an order of this nature, he must dismiss the application—*In re Kupru Mudali*, 2 Weir 630. An order directing the husband ■ take away his wife with him, and maintain her, and in the event of his failing to do so or turning her out, to pay a fixed sum to her for maintenance, is a conditional order and hence illegal—*Natha Singh v. Harnam*, 7 Lah 313, 27 Cr.L.J. 556. An order for maintenance passed on condition that the woman must reside in her husband's house is illegal—*Emp. v. Jamiet*, 1917 P.R. 14, 18 Cr.L.J. 528.

Who can order :—Only the Magistrates enumerated in this section can inquire into the case and pass an order for maintenance. An inquiry under this section cannot be delegated by a First Class Magistrate to a Magistrate of a lower rank—2 Weir 617. A First Class Magistrate cannot refer an application under this section to a Subordinate Magistrate of lower grade and act upon his report—*Sardaran v. Amir*, 1905 P.R. 29; *Venkata v. Paramma*, 11 Mad 109.

Monthly allowance :—The law empowers a Magistrate only to direct payment of a monthly maintenance. An agreement between a husband and wife whereby the husband agreed that he would furnish his wife with certain ornaments, build a house for her, deliver to her annually a certain

amount of grain, and pay her a certain sum in cash, is not an agreement which can be made the basis of an order under this section, and therefore cannot be enforced under its provisions—6 Mad 283; 21 Cr.L.J. 612 (Lah). The payment ordered must be a *monthly* payment. An order for the payment of a certain sum *annually* for the value of clothes is not legal—2 Weir 627. But where a *razinamah* entered into between the parties contains an agreement for the payment of a certain sum annually for value of clothes, the wife is entitled to ask the Court to give effect to the general intention of the parties as disclosed by the *razinamah*, by allotting in the monthly allowance the value of the clothes agreed to be paid annually—2 Weir 634.

The payment of maintenance must be in *money*, an order for payment of maintenance in grain is not in accordance with this Code—2 Weir 626; 2 Weir 627; 1911 P R 19; 1887 P.R. 3, *Atru v. Mabon*, 25 Cr. L.J. 1271 (Lah). So also, an order directing a mixed payment in kind and cash is contrary to the terms of this section—*Mukta v Dattu Mahadev*, 26 Bom.L.R. 186

An order under this section fixing the duration of the period for which the maintenance is to be paid, is illegal—2 Weir 634

1279. Amount of maintenance—In determining the amount of maintenance, no luxury should be allowed, but only the necessities of life should be considered according to the station in life of the applicant and the means of the respondent—4 Bur L.T. 269. The maximum amount which can be awarded for the maintenance of *each person* is now Rs 100; under the old law it was Rs. 50. The words 'in the whole' mean that a sum of money not exceeding Rs. 100 should be ordered to be paid, and no other payment either in the shape of school fees or medical expenses etc., should be ordered to be paid. The words do not mean that when a woman makes an application for herself and for her children, she can only be awarded Rs 100 for the maintenance of herself and of her children whatever be the number. The Magistrate can order a sum not exceeding Rs 100 to be paid for the wife and for *each* of the children unable to maintain itself—*Kent v. Kent*, 49 Mad 891, 49 M.L.J. 335, 26 Cr.L.J. 1597 (But see *Palmerino v. Palmerino*, 28 Bom.L.R. 1299, 28 Cr.L.J. 49 (50) where an order awarding a total sum of Rs 150 for the wife and child was held to be in excess of the Magistrate's jurisdiction). Where a wife applied for maintenance of herself and her four children and the Magistrate ordered the husband to pay Rs. 50 (under the old section) for maintenance of the wife and Rs. 10 for each child, every month, it was held that the order was legal. The husband was liable to maintain his wife and each of his children, and the Magistrate might order him to pay as much as Rs. 50 for each of them, if each child was living with a different person. And the fact that all the children were at the time in the custody of the mother could not affect the question of what should be paid to each child—4 Bur L.T. 139

A prospective order, providing for increase being made in the amount awarded for the child's maintenance hereafter as the child grows

older, is not justified by law—2 N.W.P. 454. A Magistrate cannot, under this section, make an order for maintenance at a progressively increasing rate. He may, however, under sec. 489, from time to time alter the rate of monthly allowance granted under this section, as the child grows older—12 Cal 535; *Ramayee*, 14 Mad. 398.

The Magistrate shall order the amount to be paid to the wife or child as the case may be. An order for the payment of the amount of maintenance at the Taluk Kutchery is not authorised by law—2 Weir 627.

Order should specify amount payable to each person:—An order under this section awarded Rs. 42 for the maintenance of the wife and son; but nothing was said as to what portion was to be for the wife and what portion for the son. At the time the wife applied for enforcement of the order, the son was over 19 years of age and earning sufficient for him to live on. The Magistrate altered (under sec. 489) the monthly allowance into Rs. 25 payable to the wife only. It was held that as regards the son the foundation of the order was taken away when he was able to maintain himself, and it became spent so far as he was concerned and was not enforceable, and that the Magistrate in the original order not having allotted any particular portion to the wife, the order could not be partially enforced in favour of the wife, but that she should make a fresh application for maintenance for herself alone—9 L.B.R. 49.

Sub-section (2).—The maintenance allowance is payable only from the date of the order (or at most from the date of the application). A direction to pay maintenance from a date prior to such date is opposed to this section—2 Weir 635, *Abdul Rahim v. Amir Begum*, 7 Lah 365, 27 Cr L J 810, *Omree v. Elahi*, 1870 P R 5. But where an order for such retrospective payment was made with the consent of the parties, the High Court did not interfere—2 Weir 635.

1280. Sub-section (3)—Enforcement of order.—In this sub-section, the words "fails without sufficient cause" have been substituted for the words "willfully neglects," because of difficulties which have arisen in the interpretation of the word 'willfully.' Under the old law it was held that before an order for imprisonment could be made on default of payment of maintenance, strict proof was necessary that the non-payment was due to wilful neglect on the part of the defendant, and mere omission to pay the arrears was not sufficient—*Sidheswar v. Gyanada*, 22 Cal. 291; 5 O.C. 318; *Bhiku v. Zakuran*, 25 Cal. 291. Under the present law, no such proof is necessary; the simple fact of non-payment without sufficient cause is sufficient to bring this sub-section into operation.

When execution of a maintenance order is applied for and the counter-petitioner files a counter-petition setting out certain grounds on which he contends that the order should not be executed, the Court is bound to consider the sufficiency of the cause alleged by him, and to refuse the execution if the Court is satisfied that the cause is sufficient and to grant execution if the Court is not satisfied with the cause alleged. The Legislature has used the expression "sufficient cause" obviously in-

tending that the Magistrate before whom the matter comes up should be in a position to use his judicial discretion having regard to all the circumstances, and that such judicial discretion should not be fettered or limited by any definite rules. The expression 'sufficient cause' is wide enough to include all possible considerations that may be submitted to the Magistrate in the circumstances of the case—*Teetharappa v Meenakshi*, 48 M.L.J. 494, 26 Cr.L.J. 953.

Under this section, the Magistrate can *imprison* the person proceeded against after default is made; but he cannot take *security* from that person in anticipation of default—24 W.R. 72

Warrant:—A warrant in respect of the breach of the order is a condition precedent to the inflicting of imprisonment—*Q. E. v. Narain*, 9 All 240. A Police officer when executing a warrant for the levy of the amount of maintenance recoverable under this section, can break open an inner door of the house of the person against whom it is executed—*Ratanlal* 431

The law contemplates only a single warrant of commitment regarding the arrears due at the time of issue. Where six months' arrears are due, a separate warrant of commitment for each month's arrears is bad in law—*Bhiku v Zahuran*, 25 Cal 291. The levy of accumulated arrears of maintenance by a single warrant and in one proceeding is not illegal—7 M.H.C.R. App. 38; 6 M.H.C.R. App. 22

Second proviso—The second proviso (newly added) to this subsection provides a period of limitation (one year from the date of default) within which the application is to be made for the issue of the warrant for realisation of the outstanding arrears

Under this proviso, the Court's power extends to the recovery of arrears falling due for a period of one year next before the date of application, but it does not follow that that power should be fully exercised, and the petitioner may ask for the recovery of arrears for less than a year—*Kanagammal*, 50 Mad 663, 28 Cr.L.J. 271 (272).

1281. Imprisonment—The imprisonment may be awarded only after default is made. Where it was provided in the order of maintenance itself that in case of the defendant failing to pay the monthly allowance, he should be imprisoned for a term of 16 days for every breach of the order, it was held that the order was in *anticipation* of the procedure to take place on a wilful default, if such should occur, and was therefore illegal—5 M.H.C.R. App. 34. Imprisonment is a means of enforcing payment, and an order for imprisonment can be passed only after there has been negligence to pay the amount of maintenance—*Sidheswar v Gyanada*, 22 Cal 291

Release on payment.—The imprisonment awarded under this section is not a punishment for contempt of the Court's order, nor is it an absolute sentence. It is passed only for the unpaid portion of maintenance, or in other words, it is owing to default of payment of the unrealised portion of the maintenance. Therefore, the impri

older, is not justified by law—2 N.W.P. 454. A Magistrate cannot, under this section, make an order for maintenance at a progressively increasing rate. He may, however, under sec. 489, from time to time alter the rate of monthly allowance granted under this section, as the child grows older—12 Cal. 535; *Ramayee*, 14 Mad. 398.

The Magistrate shall order the amount to be paid to the wife or child as the case may be. An order for the payment of the amount of maintenance at the Taluk Kutchery is not authorised by law—2 Weir 627.

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When execution of a maintenance order is applied for and the counter-petitioner files a counter-petition setting out certain grounds on which he contends that the order should not be executed, the Court is bound to consider the sufficiency of the cause alleged by him, and to refuse the execution if the Court is satisfied that the cause is sufficient and to grant execution if the Court is not satisfied with the cause alleged. The Legislature has used the expression "sufficient cause" obviously in-

But the defendant's *inability to pay* is not a ground for the Magistrate's refusal to enforce the order for maintenance. If the allowance granted is too excessive, he may revise the rate of maintenance on further inquiry, and the order will take effect from the date of such inquiry—2 Weir 636.

1283. Offer to maintain wife:—Where the husband offers to receive his wife to live with him, an order for maintenance should not be made except on proof of adultery or cruelty on the part of the husband—*Makhan v. Harnamo*, 29 Cr L J 909 (910) (Lah). Where the husband offers to maintain his wife and the wife states that she is willing to live with him, the Magistrate cannot make an order under this section, unless the complainant (wife) satisfies him that notwithstanding such offer there is a just ground for making such order—*Hakimi v. Mouze*, 1 C.L.J. 214.

The offer to maintain must be a *bona fide* offer, and not made with the object of escaping obligation—13 Cr.L.J. 55. If it is found that the husband had formerly turned his wife out of his house, his subsequent offer to keep her in his house cannot be taken to be *bona fide*; and he cannot escape his liability to maintain her under this section merely by such an offer, because he may break his promise as soon as she gets home—*Aishan v. Sher Muhammad*, 22 Cr L J 149 (Lah.), 59 I C 853.

The offer must be to maintain wife as wife. It has been however held in *In re Gulabdas*, 16 Bom 269 that where the husband offered to keep the complainant in his house, not as wife but as a servant or dependant, the offer was a sufficient offer within the meaning of this section. But this decision does not seem to be just. The Madras High Court rightly lays down that an offer to maintain wife must be one to maintain her with the consideration due to her position as wife—*Mannatha*, 17 Mad. 200; 2 Weir 641. And therefore where a Hindu husband having two wives offered to maintain his first wife in his own house, adding that he would not live with her, but would supply grain for her to cook her own food and eat it separately in the house, such an offer was not a sufficient offer within the meaning of this section—*Marakkal v. Kandappa*, 6 Mad. 371, *Sakrulla v. Fatma*, 25 Cr.L.J. 453 (Nag.). The offer must be an offer by the husband to maintain the wife in his own house. An offer of maintenance in a separate residence even though the residence be one befitting the status of the wife is not sufficient. The wife is entitled to be kept in the house where her husband lives, and so she may refuse the offer of her husband to provide her with a separate house, and may claim maintenance—*In re Bai Manek*, 52 Bom 763, 20 Cr L J 1049 (1050).

1284. Grounds of wife's refusal to live with husband:—An order for separate maintenance in favour of the wife may be made under this section if the wife has some just ground for living apart from her husband—*Bal Parvati v. Ghanchi*, 44 Bom 972 (975). Inability of husband and wife to agree to live together is not a ground for ordering separate maintenance for wife—6 W R 59. A Magistrate

cannot pass an order for maintenance, where the husband has neither ill-treated his wife nor has refused or neglected to maintain her but she of her own accord and without any just ground left her husband's house and protection and refuses to live with him unless he gives her a separate house—*Tota v. Durgi*, 30 P.L.R. 367, 30 Cr.L.J. 861 (862). When the wife voluntarily leaves her husband's house without sufficient justification, she is not entitled to any order under this section, unless the husband refuses to maintain her, or turns her out or ill-treats her, so as to make it impossible for her to live with her husband—5 Bom L.R. 614

If the husband is willing to maintain his wife, but the wife refuses to live with him, the Magistrate should make an inquiry as to why she is not willing to go and live with her husband. The omission of the inquiry vitiates the proceedings—*Sultan v. Mahtab*, 27 P.L.R. 233, 27 Cr.L.J. 1319; *Sabbayya v. Amdammas*, 9 Cr.L.J. 501, 2 I.C. 155

The following are proper grounds for the wife's refusal to live with her husband:—

(1) *Cruelty*—If the husband so ill-treats his wife (e.g., drives her out with blows) that she is compelled to leave his house, she is justified in refusing to live with her husband and in claiming maintenance—*Rajpati v. Deoli*, 46 All. 877 (878); *Kalviya v. Hira*, 27 A.L.J. 1208, 1929 Cr. C. 593; and the fact that the parties belong to a low class makes no difference—*Kalviya*, supra. Under the Code of 1882, cruelty was the only ground on which a wife was justified in living separately from her husband and demanding maintenance. But the words "that he habitually treated his wife with cruelty" which occurred in the Code of 1882 have been substituted by the words "that there is just ground for so doing." This alteration gives the Magistrate larger discretion in giving maintenance. The present Code does not restrict the payment of maintenance, when the wife is living separately, only to cases of cruelty—4 Bur. L.T. 269. There are other grounds on which the wife may live separately and claim maintenance:—

(2) If a Christian husband reverts to Hinduism and marries a second (Hindu) wife, the Christian wife may refuse to live with her husband, and apply for maintenance—4 M.H.C.R. App. 3

(3) *Adultery* on the part of the husband, although not punishable under the I. P. C., may nevertheless constitute sufficient cause for the wife living separately from her husband and enable her to claim maintenance under this section—*Gantapalli v. Gantapalli*, 20 Mad 470 (472); *Malcolm De Castro*, 13 All. 348. Where the husband is living with a mistress in the house at the time of application, the wife is entitled to refuse to live with him, and a subsequent offer made by the husband in Court to give up his mistress does not deprive the wife of her right of refusal to live with her husband—14 Bur. L.R. 240. But in such cases, the Magistrate should take into consideration the social habits of the particular community to which the parties belong. If that community does not completely disapprove of concubinage and tolerates it so far as to give kept women some status and rights, the fact that the husband

keeps a concubine ought not by itself to entitle the wife to claim separate maintenance—*Gantapalli v. Gantapalli*, 20 Mad 470 (475). The circumstance that a Hindu husband keeps a concubine in the house will not entitle a wife to an allowance for maintenance if her husband is willing to receive her and treat her with the consideration which is due to her position—2 Weir 641, *Q E v Mannatha*, 17 Mad. 260

(4) Where the breach between the husband and wife is irremediable and it is quite impossible for the latter to return to the former after many years' separation without leading to fresh trouble and dispute, she is entitled to maintenance by living separate from him—1914 P.W.R. 26.

(5) The marriage of a Mahomedan with the step-mother of his wife is not valid under the Mahomedan law. The wife is entitled in such a case to say that she would not live with her husband during the continuance of such marriage—2 Weir 647.

(6) Where a Burmese Buddhist has taken a lesser wife without the consent of the chief wife, the latter can refuse to live with her husband and at the same time can claim maintenance—4 L.B.R. 340 Also, according to Burmese Buddhist law, the fact that the husband took a second wife might be a good reason for the first wife's refusal to live with him, unless he provided her with a separate residence—11 Bur. L T 105

The following are not sufficient grounds for the wife's refusal to live with her husband .—

(1) The fact that the husband has married again does not entitle the first wife to separate maintenance, if the husband is willing to maintain her in his house—*Arumugam v Tulukanam*, 7 Mad, 187; 1880 P.R. 27; 1882 P R 31, *Dhera v. Nando*, 1878 P.R. 2; *Purushotam*, Ratanlal 7, 1914 P R 12; *Sukrulla v Fatma*, 25 Cr.L.J 453 (Nag.). The existence of a co-wife with whom the complainant had quarrels, or the husband's want of affection for the complainant or his greater affection for the co-wife, is not a valid ground of the complainant's refusal to live with her husband—*Ganda Singh v Atma Devi*, 1901 P.R. 14. The fact that the younger wife will suffer annoyance from the elder wife and that the husband may not protect her from such annoyance, is not a proper ground for the younger wife's refusing to live with her husband and claiming maintenance—*Maung Waing v. Ma Chit*, 1904 U.B.R. 1st Qr. (Cr.P.C.) 10

(2) Minority of the wife is not a ground for her not living with her husband, if the husband offers to maintain his wife in her house—1882 P.R. 1; though in such a case, having regard to her tender age, it might be better that she should live with her parents.

(3) Where the husband is willing to maintain his wife, the fact the prompt dower has not been paid is not a ground for separate dence and maintenance—*Sadar Din v. Suban*, 1888 P.R. 6; *Meh Dina*, 1880 P.R. 15.

1285. Sub-section (4) :—“Living in adultery”—Living in adultery means following a course of adulterous conduct more or less continuous; a single act of adultery cannot be considered as living in adultery—*Gantapalli v. Gantapalli*, 20 Mad. 470; 5 N.L.R. 19; *Patala Atchamma v. Patala Mahalakshmi*, 30 Mad. 332; *In re Fulchand*, 52 Bom. 160, 29 Cr.L.J. 314 (315); *Ram Aular v. Raghurai*, 13 O.L.J. 802, 3 O.W.N. 717, 27 Cr.L.J. 1190. The words “living in adultery” refer to a course of conduct or at least to something more than a single lapse from virtue. Where the wife, two years prior to the application for maintenance, had given birth to an illegitimate child, but since that time she had been living with her parents leading a chaste and respectable life, she cannot be said to be living in adultery so as to disentitle her to maintenance—*Kallu v. Kaunsilia*, 26 All. 326, 1 A.L.J. 18, 1 Cr.L.J. 84.

Under certain circumstances, past adultery of the wife would disentitle her to maintenance, although she was not living in adultery at the time of the application. Thus, where a woman committed adultery with a man of low caste and was expelled from her caste, thereby making it impossible for her husband to live with her, she could not claim maintenance, although at the time of application she was not living in adultery—*Ponnajee v. Peria Moopan*, 31 Mad. 185; *Ram Aular v. Raghurai*, 3 O.W.N. 717, 13 O.L.J. 802, 27 Cr.L.J. 1190. Where the wife deserted her husband many years ago and led a life of adultery and has not attempted to seek her husband's pardon for past misconduct, the wife was not entitled to maintenance, merely because she was not living in adultery at the time of making the application for maintenance—*In re Shivram*, *Ratanlal* 506 (507). But the fact that the wife does not seek the husband's pardon for her past misconduct is not, by itself, a sufficient reason for excluding a wife who has committed only a single act of adultery from the benefit of sec. 488—*In re Fulchand*, 52 Bom. 160, 30 Bom.L.R. 79, 29 Cr.L.J. 314 (315).

There must be clear proof of adultery. The mere fact that the husband considers the wife's conduct open to suspicion is not sufficient—2 Weir 647. A mere suspicion by the husband that the child of the wife was the result of her intimacy with another man is not a ground of refusing maintenance—1881 A.W.N. 37. The mere fact that the patriarch of the brotherhood condemned the wife's conduct is not a ground for dismissing an application for maintenance, and the Magistrate should have inquired whether the wife was living in adultery—1881 A.W.N. 62.

“Refuses to live with her husband”.—See Note 1284 ante. If a Civil Court has passed a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, ordering the wife to live with her husband, and she refuses to do so, she is debarred from making any claim to maintenance—*Bai Parwati v. Ghanchi*, 44 Bom. 972 (975, 977). Where a Hindu wife leaves her husband's house without good cause, her right of maintenance is only suspended, and she has the right to return to her husband's house and claim maintenance—*Janaki v. Shivram*, 12 S.L.R. 90, 20 Cr.L.J. 98, 48 I.C. 978.

"Living separately by mutual consent":—A wife is not entitled to maintenance from her husband when both have entered into an agreement which provides for their living separately by mutual consent, and they are actually living separately in terms of that agreement—*Ratanlal* 870. Where it appeared that by mutual consent, the husband and wife had been living separately for a number of years, and that the maintenance of the wife was, by arrangement made at the time they began to live separately, provided for by the assignment to her of some land, the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to make an order under this section—2 Weir 648.

To bring the case within sub-section (4) it must be shown that the husband and the wife are living apart by a definite contract mutually made between them. A contract *voluntarily* and *freely* made and entered into between the parties is essential. Where therefore a husband and wife are living apart in obedience to the decree of a Panchayet of their castemen by which the wife is awarded maintenance, it cannot be said that they are living apart by mutual consent—*Nathan v Maturwa*, 4 P.L.J. 109, 20 Cr L.J. 154

1286. Sub-section (5):—Cancellation of order:—Under this sub-section, an allowance granted to the wife only can be cancelled; an allowance granted to a child cannot be cancelled, though it may be altered under sec. 489—*Mehtab v. Allah Baksh*, 1885 P.R. 17. An order for maintenance of the child of a divorced Mahomedan wife, who has married again, cannot be cancelled under this section. Such an order can be cancelled only on the ground of change of circumstances mentioned in sec. 489—*Budhm v. Dabal*, 27 All. 11

'Is living in adultery':—An order granting maintenance to a wife can be cancelled under this sub-section upon proof that the wife is living in adultery subsequent to the order—*Totaram*, *Ratanlal* 353, *Larati v Ram Dial*, 5 All. 224. But adultery previous to the order of maintenance is not admissible in evidence to cancel the order. Specially, where a Magistrate had awarded maintenance to the wife after adjudicating upon all the facts antecedent thereto and connected with the objection of the husband as to his wife leading an adulterous life, held that on the principle of *res judicata*, another Magistrate would be wrong in re-opening the same antecedent facts as to adultery of wife, and in discontinuing the maintenance on those facts—*Larati v. Ram Dial*, 5 All. 224. Evidence of past adultery is admissible under sub-section (4) before passing an order of maintenance; but after an order is passed, such past adultery cannot be considered for the purpose of cancelling the order. The ruling in 5 All. 224 has been dissented from in 5 Rang 697. See Note 1291 *infra*.

There must be sufficient evidence of adultery. The fact that the wife continually went to the bazar, or that men went to the house where she lived (especially when other people including the wife's mother lived in that house) is not sufficient evidence to lead to the conclusion that

wife was living in adultery—1893 A.W.N. 56. The words 'living in adultery' mean a continuous course of misconduct; and unless this continuity is established it cannot be inferred from a single act of adultery that the woman is living in adultery. Therefore, where a woman to whom maintenance had been awarded under this section gave birth to an illegitimate child, held that this single instance of misconduct did not show that she was living in adultery, so as to enable the Magistrate to cancel the allowance—*Jatindra v. Gouribala*, 29 C.W.N. 647, 26 Cr.L.J. 1184. Where the husband alleges adultery, the Magistrate should make an inquiry and adjudicate upon such allegation—*Uttam Chand*, 1902 P.R. 36; *Sohni v. Manohar*, 1882 A.W.N. 168.

'Living separately by mutual consent':—Where after an order for maintenance has been passed, both the husband and wife while temporarily living together presented a petition by which they agreed that the husband should pay his wife Rs. 10 a month so long as she stayed in the house of her father, and the petition asked for a decree on the said terms, held that the intention of the parties was, when they filed the petition, that the wife should abandon all claims for arrears due till then—*Parul Bala v. Satish*, 37 C.L.J. 180, 24 Cr.L.J. 945, A.I.R. 1923 Cal. 456.

Where the wife denied the validity of an alleged deed of compromise by which the parties agreed to a reduction in the rate of the allowance ordered by the Magistrate, it was held that the Magistrate was not competent to cancel the order for maintenance until the agreement had been declared by a competent tribunal to be binding on the wife—2 Weir 649.

Other cases.—Sub-section (5) is not exhaustive of the grounds on which an order for maintenance may be cancelled. Thus, an order can be cancelled on the ground of divorce. Where the husband pleads in answer to an application for enforcement of the order of maintenance, that he has lawfully divorced his wife, and such plea is proved, the Court will decline to enforce the order, for the period subsequent to the date when the marriage ceased to exist—*Shah Abu v. Ulfat*, 19 All. 50; *Shaikh Daud*, 17 N.L.R. 92, 63 I.C. 329, 22 Cr.L.J. 633. On a valid divorce actually taking place, the Magistrate's order ceases to have operation—*In re Abdul Ali*, 7 Bom. 180. The apostacy of a Mahomedan wife *ipso facto* dissolves the marriage and the wife therefore is not entitled to maintenance from her husband—9 L.B.R. 206. In case of Mahomedans the order becomes inoperative on the expiry of the period of *iddat* after divorce—*Mahomed Hosein v. Ma Pwa*, 13 Bur.L.T. 43, 21 Cr.L.J. 503, 56 I.C. 663. Similarly, where the father was ordered to pay maintenance to his daughter, the marriage of the daughter makes her maintenance a charge on her husband and not on her father, and the father may apply for cancellation of the order—2 Weir 650.

Suspension of Order.—If a wife who has obtained an order for maintenance, returns to her husband, and lives with him for some time (and even bears a child), the order for maintenance will not come to an end, but will only remain in suspense; so that if she leaves him again, she will be entitled to enforce the order—*Kanagammal v. Pandara*.

50 Mad. 663, 52 M.L.J. 176, 28 Cr.L.J. 271 (272); *Narayana Swami v Mangayarkarasammal*, 28 Cr.L.J. 237. A mere temporary stay of this kind, though it may have suspended the operation of the order, has not the effect of *cancelling* it in the way in which it can be cancelled under sec. 488 (5)—*Parul Bala v. Satish*, 37 C.L.J. 180, 24 Cr.L.J. 945. In an Allahabad case, however, it was held that upon a wife voluntarily returning to her husband, the order for maintenance would become permanently ineffectual, notwithstanding that afterwards she left him again, and that she would have to obtain a fresh order for maintenance—*Phulkali v. Harnam*, 1888 A.W.N. 217.

Application for Cancellation is essential—Sub-section (5) provides that in certain specific circumstances the Magistrate shall cancel the order. In such cases it will be incumbent upon the counter-petitioner to make an application for cancellation of the order, until he does so, the order will remain in force. Thus, the mere fact that a wife is living in adultery will not bring the order to an end automatically. So also, the mere fact that the wife has returned to live with her husband will not put an end to the order—*Kanagammal v Pandara*, 50 Mad 663, 28 Cr L.J 271 (272); *Narayanaswami*, 28 Cr.L.J 237.

Application to whom to be made.—An application for the cancellation of an order of maintenance must be made to the Magistrate who made the original order or to his successor-in-office—*Bhagwanta v. Sheo Charan*, 25 All. 545.

Magistrate can go into question of Divorce.—The Magistrate can go into the question of divorce, even in a summary proceeding under sec 488, if the husband applies for cancellation of the order of maintenance on the ground that he has divorced his wife. If the husband is able to adduce satisfactory evidence that there has been a valid divorce, the Magistrate would be justified in acting upon that evidence. It is not necessary for the husband to produce a decree of a civil court declaring that he has divorced his wife—*In re Punjalal*, 30 Bom L.R. 617, 29 Cr L.J 908 (909). Cf. also *Shah Abu v. Ulfat*, 19 All 50, *In re Abdul Ali*, 7 Bom 180.

1287. Sub-section (6):—Evidence.—An order under this section must be passed on proof in the proceedings, and not upon knowledge acquired by the Magistrate in some other case—*Lopotee v. Tikha*, 11 W.R. 67, and the various elements required to sustain an order under this section must be strictly proved by evidence recorded on oath—13 W.R. 19. An order for payment of maintenance without recording evidence and without examining any witnesses is illegal—2 Weir 628. Where a Magistrate, instead of examining the applicant at length and her witnesses, got her only to verify on oath the truth and correctness of her application, and treating her application as legal evidence against the husband, passed an order for maintenance, held that the order was bad—*Kamla v. Mangal Dei*, 23 M.C. 237, 25 Cr.L.J 302. Proceedings under this Chapter are judicial in their nature and should not be conducted as if they were ministerial matters. The notes of evidence therefore should not be vague or inadequate and the order recorded must

Issued on distinct findings of fact—*Laraiti v. Ram Dial*, 5 All. 224. If however an order is made with the consent of parties, the necessity of evidence may be dispensed with—2 Weir 629.

The evidence must be recorded as provided by sec. 355. Proceedings under this Chapter cannot be conducted as in a summary trial under Chapter XXII—*Kali Dasi v. Durga*, 20 Cal. 351.

Presence of the defendant :—As directed by this sub-section, the inquiry should be conducted in the presence of the person proceeded against. A proceeding under this section should not be conducted *ex parte*. Evidence should be taken in the presence of the defendant or his pleader; unless the Court is satisfied that the defendant is willingly avoiding service of summons or neglecting to attend the Court, proceedings should not be taken *ex parte*—1 C.L.J. 102. Proceedings can be conducted in the presence of the pleader, only when the personal attendance of the defendant has been dispensed with. Where his attendance has not been dispensed with, the Court is justified in refusing to hear the Mukhtear by whom he is represented, and the Court ought to insist upon the presence of the defendant and should not proceed *ex parte*—*Hormuzshah v. Perozbai*, 2 Bom.L.R. 700.

Under the proviso to this sub-section, the Magistrate may proceed *ex parte*, if he is satisfied that the defendant is willingly avoiding service and neglecting to attend the Court. But in every case of absence of the defendant the Court ought not to treat the absence as due to wilful neglect—*Hormuzshah v. Perozbai*, 2 Bom.L.R. 700. A Court ought not to infer that the defendant was neglecting to attend the Court, when the inability to attend was due to the absence of specification in the summons of the place where he was to appear—7 M.H.C.R. App 43.

Where, no notice having been served on the person against whom the proceedings were taken, the order was passed *ex parte*, and within three months he applied to the Magistrate's successor to have the order revised, stating that he had no notice of the application, such succeeding Magistrate had jurisdiction under sec. 488 (6) to have the case re-opened and disposed of according to law—*Maung Tun v. Ma Thein*, 2 Bur.L.J. 61, 24 Cr.L.J. 928, A.I.R. 1923 Rang 159.

Presence of complainant :—This section does not require the personal attendance of the complainant. If the complainant be a *pardanashin* lady, her presence may be dispensed with—*Ghulam v. Niazali*, 1903 P.R. 19. In *Hakim v. Mouzi*, 1 C.L.J. 214 and *Ma Su v. Paul Sassoon*, U.B.R. (1892-96) 64, however, the Magistrate dismissed an application for maintenance for default of appearance of the complainant.

1288. Sub-section (8) :—Forum :—This sub-section did not occur in the 1872 and 1882 Codes and it was therefore held that the application must be heard by the Magistrate within whose jurisdiction the wife resided—*Malcolm De Castro*, 13 All. 348; *In re Todd*, 5 N.W.P. 237. These decisions are no longer good law. Under the present Code, the proper Court to take cognizance of a petition by the

wife under this section is the Court within whose jurisdiction the husband or the father, as the case may be, resides—See *Benbow v Benbow*, 24 Cal. 638, *Shaik Fakruddin*, 9 Bom. 40; *Hildephonsus v. Malone*, 1885 P.R. 13, *Bishen Das v. Nanaki*, 1893 P.R. 3. This sub-section does not give the wife or child to select a *forum* other than that where the husband or father is then residing or last resided with the complainant—1904 U.B.R. 1st Qr. (Cr.P.C.) 10

The words "last resided" do not contemplate a mere casual residence in a place for a temporary purpose with no intention of remaining there. Such residence does not give jurisdiction to the Magistrate of that place—*Ramdei v. Jhunni Lal*, 1 Luck. 343, 3 O.W.N. 231, 27 Cr.L.J. 820, *Cl. Flowers v. Flowers*, 32 All. 203 (F.B.). Where the husband has a fixed place of residence, it is the Magistrate of that place who has jurisdiction, and an occasional visit to the wife at another place where the wife resides, does not give jurisdiction to the Magistrate of the latter place. See *Flowers v. Flowers*, 32 All. 203, *Khairunnissa*, 53 Bom. 781, 1929 Cr. C. 462. Therefore, where the husband who was a permanent resident of Lahore for 11 years, took his wife to Lucknow at her brother's house and left her there declaring that he would support her no longer, and his stay at Lucknow did not exceed a week, held that as the residence at Lucknow was a mere flying visit, the application for maintenance should be made at Lahore and not at Lucknow—*Ramdei v. Jhunni*, (supra). Where the husband pays only occasional visits to his wife, who lives apart from him, he cannot be said to reside at the place where the wife resides, so as to give jurisdiction to the Magistrate of that place—*Ram Kumar v. Rukmin*, 24 O.C. 249, 13 I.C. 870, 22 Cr.L.J. 710. But if the parties have no fixed place of residence, the application should be made to the Court within whose jurisdiction the husband and wife last resided, even though temporarily. See *Bright v. Bright*, 36 Cal. 964 (1966), *Murphy v. Murphy*, 45 Bom. 547 (550); *Khairunnissa*, 53 Bom. 781. Where a man has no fixed dwelling, any place where he is staying at any particular time may be treated as his residence—*Fernandez v. Wray*, 25 Bom. 176. (The cases of 32 All. 203, 36 Cal. 964 and 45 Bom. 547 were decided with reference to the meaning of the word "resided" in sec. 3 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869). In a recent Allahabad case, it has been held that though a mere flying visit do not amount to residence (as in 3 O.W.N. 231), still the residence contemplated by this sub-section does not necessarily mean permanent residence, but includes a temporary residence. And so where a husband and wife left their permanent place of residence (Bhatgaon) and stayed for two months at Agra, the husband paying occasional visits to his permanent place of residence, held that the temporary residence at Agra was sufficient to give jurisdiction to the Magistrate at Agra—*Sher Singh v. Amir Kuer*, 49 All. 479, 25 A.L.J. 435, 23 Cr.L.J. 494. The same view has been taken in *Allah Ditta v. Sakina*, 29 Cr.L.J. 657 (Lah.), and in *Jolly v. Jolly*, 21 C.W.N. 872.

In the case of a kept mistress, a man is said to reside with her

if he visits her only occasionally at her settled abode, so long as he has the intention of continuing to so visit her. If the woman has no settled abode, her stay for two months at a place where she is occasionally visited by the man would give jurisdiction to the Magistrate of that place—*Hidayat v. Mahomed*, 5 S.L.R. 220, 13 Cr.L.J. 522 (523).

An order passed by a Magistrate who is empowered to try maintenance-cases under this section would not be bad merely because the proceedings were taken in a wrong Court. To such a case, sec. 531 is applicable and not sec. 530 (n)—*Sitram v. Sukia*, 49 C.L.J. 205, 30 Cr.L.J. 525.

1289. Whether civil suit lies :—Where the right to maintenance is conferred by this section as well as by the personal law of the parties, the right can be enforced not only under this section but also by a civil suit for maintenance. But where the right is not conferred by the personal law of the parties (e.g. the right of the illegitimate children of a Hindu by a non-Hindu woman, to get maintenance from their putative father), such right cannot be enforced by a civil suit, and the only remedy is that provided by this section. The distinction between a remedy under the common law and a remedy under this section is that the right under the common law may be enforced not only against the father during his life-time, but also against his estate after his death, but a right under this section does not survive the death of the father—*Lingappa v. Esudason*, 27 Mad 13.

Order does not bar civil suit .—An order under this section passed by a Magistrate does not take away the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts—*Derao Mahinga v. Maratikarim*, 30 Mad 400. A Magistrate's order for maintenance does not bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to make a declaration that the husband is not liable to pay separate maintenance to his wife—2 Weir 615. In spite of an order for maintenance of illegitimate children passed by a Magistrate, a civil suit is maintainable for a declaration that the children are not the children of the plaintiff—*Kailasa v. Raghubar*, 17 O.C. 331, 26 I.C. 526; 1 Bur.L.J. 82. Similarly, an order of a Magistrate refusing maintenance does not bar a suit in a Civil Court for maintenance—*Ghana v. Gereli*, 32 Cal 479. Contra—*Subhadra v. Basdeo*, 18 All. 29 and *Anonymous*, 2 Weir. 614 where it has been held that a Magistrate's order for maintenance of wife duly made under this section cannot be superseded by a decree of the Civil Court declaring that the wife is not entitled to any maintenance.

1290. Effect of Civil Court decree .—Effect of previous decree .—A Civil Court's decree cannot be disturbed by an order of the Magistrate. Where a decision for a monthly allowance for maintenance has been obtained in the Civil Court and is in force, the Magistrate is not competent to order a further and separate maintenance—*Subburamkamma*, 2 Weir 615. The jurisdiction vested in the Magistrate being auxiliary to that of the Civil Court, it is not open to a Magistrate to ignore a Civil Court decree on the ground that it rests on reasons which do not appear to him satisfactory—*Veeran v. Ayyammah*, 2 Weir 615. Where the husband has obtained a decree for restitution of conjugal

rights, and the decree is in force, no application for maintenance by the wife ought to be entertained by the Magistrate—U.B.R. (1910) 1st Qr. 34. Where a Civil Court has declared that the child is not the child of the defendant, the Magistrate should treat the decree as conclusive on the question of relationship and should refuse to pass any order for the maintenance of the child—*Narayanan Itticherry*, 33 M.L.J. 449, 18 Cr.L.J. 971. But the weight to be attached to a decree must depend upon the particular circumstances of the case; and no hard and fast rule can be laid down that a decree of a Civil Court is for ever binding on the Magistrate. If, after the husband had obtained a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, he ill-treated his wife so much that she had to leave his house, and she applied to the Magistrate for an order of maintenance, and the Magistrate granted the application on the ground that she was justified in refusing to live with her husband, held that the Magistrate was justified in ignoring the decree and in exercising his discretion in favour of the wife by absolving her from the condition that she must live with her husband. Otherwise the husband can at first get a decree for restitution of conjugal rights and then turn his wife out without any allowance at all—*Rajpati v Deoli*, 46 All 877 (878).

The existence of an order of the Probate Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court in England whereby the husband is directed to pay his wife so much alimony per month, is no bar to an application by the wife under sec 488 Cr.P.C., if in fact the husband has neglected to maintain his wife. The existence of the order is not sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, for a mere order for maintenance is not equivalent to maintenance. Sec 488 gives jurisdiction to the Magistrate to award maintenance if he is satisfied that a person has neglected to maintain his wife—*Kent v Kent*, 49 Mad. 891, 49 M.L.J. 335, 26 Cr.L.J. 1597.

Effect of subsequent decree—See the new sub-section (2) of sec 489. Where an order is passed by a Magistrate under this section for maintenance against the husband, and in a subsequent suit by the husband in the Civil Court for restitution of conjugal rights a consent decree is passed allowing the wife maintenance and residence, held that the decree of the Civil Court will supersede the Magistrate's order—*Nur Muhammad v Ayesha*, 27 All 483. The decree of a Civil Court for restitution of conjugal rights supersedes any previous order of a Magistrate for maintenance, if the wife should persist in refusing to live with her husband. The Magistrate ought to cancel his order or rather to treat it as determined if the wife failing to comply with the decree for restitution refuses to live with her husband—*In re Bulakidas*, 23 Bom 484, *Maung Tha v Ma Mya* 9 Bur L.T. 162, 17 Cr.L.J. 412; *In re Chandulal* 43 Bom 885, 21 Bom L.R. 766 20 Cr.L.J. 687. But a decree of a Civil Court ordering restitution of conjugal rights does not *ipso facto* cancel a maintenance order passed under the Cr. P.C. In considering any application for cancellation of a maintenance the Magistrate is not necessarily bound to follow the order of the Court, but must consider it along with any other circumstances

may be brought before him—*Maung Dun v. Ma Sein*, 3 Rang. 150, 26 Cr.L.J. 1341. A decree for restitution of conjugal rights does not necessarily debar a wife from claiming separate maintenance. Sec 489 (2) gives a certain amount of discretion to the Magistrate as to whether he should cancel the order, and this discretion must be exercised judicially—*Ali Mahomed*, 20 S.L.R. 145, 27 Cr.L.J. 876 (877). Where a decree for restitution of conjugal rights imposing certain conditions on the husband is passed against a wife, who had obtained an order for maintenance, non-compliance by the husband with the conditions of the decree would revive the right of the wife to claim maintenance and to have the order enforced—*Devi Ditta v. Ganga Devi*, 1906 P.R. 4, 4 Cr.L.J. 73. See also 3 P.L.T. 51. A husband against whom an order for maintenance was passed obtained subsequently a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. Two execution petitions filed by him were dismissed as he failed to prosecute the same diligently, and it was clear from his conduct that he was not at all anxious to get back his wife to live with him on the ordinary terms of husband and wife. Held that as the object in getting the decree for restitution of conjugal rights was merely to get the maintenance order cancelled, and not a *bona fide* wish to live amicably with her, the Court should not exercise its discretion under clause (2) of sec. 489 and cancel the order for maintenance—*Pavakkal v. Athappa*, 49 M.L.J. 269, 27 Cr.L.J. 30. But if the husband, who has obtained a decree for restitution makes a *bona fide* attempt to live with his wife, but the latter flatly refuses to live with him, she is not entitled to claim maintenance, and the order for maintenance must be cancelled—*Ali Mahomed*, 20 S.L. 145, 27 Cr.L.J. 876 (878).

When the Civil Court finds that the relationship of husband and wife has ceased to exist, the husband is entitled to ask the Magistrate, who is enforcing the order of maintenance, to abstain from giving further effect to the order—*Mahomed Abid v. Luddon Saheba*, 14 Cal 278. Where a Civil Court has decided any points which would disentitle the wife to maintenance, the Magistrate who had previously passed an order for maintenance, will be bound, in the interests of justice, to take the judgment into consideration before proceeding to pass a fresh order enforcing payment of the allowance—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 614. Similarly, where the relationship on which the maintenance order is based has been declared by a final decree of a competent Civil Court not to exist, it is open to the person adversely affected by the order to ask the Magistrate to abstain from giving any further effect to the order of maintenance. Therefore a Civil Court decree declaring that A is not the child of B supersedes a Magistrate's previous order for A's maintenance, and the Magistrate cannot enforce the Criminal Court's order after the Civil Court decree is passed—*Venkayya v. Padamma*, 48 Mad. 721, 45 M.L.J. 104, 24 Cr.L.J. 720; 16 Cr.L.J. 609 (Oudh), 13 Bur.L.T. 104.

1291. Miscellaneous—Second application:—It is not competent for a Magistrate to hold a second inquiry into the same allegations which have once been already inquired into and dismissed by a competent Court—1916 P.R. 124; 17 Cr.L.J. 106 (Cal.). On the general principle

of *res judicata*, a Magistrate is wrong in law in reopening a matter of maintenance which had already been adjudicated on by another Magistrate—*Laraiti v. Ram Dial*, 5 Ali. 224. But the Rangoon High Court, dissenting from this view, has said that the Magistrate is not wrong in law in entertaining the second application, nor are his proceedings bad or void regardless of merits, but of course the Magistrate ought not to act on the second application without considering the previous decision—*Po So v. Ma Kyin*, 4 L.B.R. 337, 9 Cr.L.J. 21; *Maung Hla v. Ma On Kin*, 5 Rang. 697, 28 Cr.L.J. 912. But the Magistrate can entertain a subsequent application for fresh cause shown. There may be change of circumstances which would enable the applicant to come into Court again, not on the same ground, but on a new ground—*Maung Hla v. Ma On*, 5 Rang. 697, 28 Cr.L.J. 912, *Ma Su v. Paul Sassoon*, U B R (1892-96) 64; *Ayudai v. Subramania*, 2 Weir 633.

But if the previous application has been dismissed for default of appearance and there was no adjudication regarding the merits, a second application is entertainable—*Monmohan v. Surabala*, 24 C.W.N. 32, 21 Cr.L.J. 3, 30 C.L.J. 128; *Maung Hla v. Ma On*, supra. Contra—*Hakimi v. Mouze*, 1 C.L.J. 214, where it has been held that if an application under this section is dismissed for default, the law does not empower the Magistrate to re-hear the application.

Insanity of defendant—If the defendant in a proceeding under this section is alleged to be insane, the Magistrate has no power to appoint a guardian *ad litem*, but he should hold a judicial inquiry into his sanity and put him under medical observation, if necessary. If, as a result of such inquiry he comes to the conclusion that the defendant is insane, he must follow the procedure laid down in Ch XXXIV and postpone the proceedings until the Magistrate is satisfied that the defendant is capable of understanding the proceedings—*Appichi v. Kuthu Jammal*, 48 Mad. 388, 48 M.L.J. 187, 26 Cr.L.J. 701.

No limitation:—A wife does not lose her right of maintenance because she has delayed in making the application—*Kunnath v. Veluth*, 2 Weir 616. The law has not fixed any time within which a claim of maintenance is to be made. The fact that the wife has not advanced her claim immediately on her husband's desertion of her does not disentitle her to maintenance—*Veluth*, 2 Weir 615. The second proviso to sub-section (3) provides a period of limitation for an application for the issue of a warrant for enforcement of the order, but not for an application for maintenance.

1292. Nature of proceedings under this section:—A proceeding under this section is of a criminal nature, and therefore it is a criminal case within the meaning of sec 528, and the District Magistrate may withdraw a case instituted under this section from the file of a first class Magistrate to his own file—1905 P R 5. As the order is one passed in a criminal trial, no appeal lies under clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the order of a single Judge made on a revision petition against the order of a Magistrate under this section—*Ravana Appadu v. Rayana Appanna*, 39 Mad 472. If the parties to the pro-

ceedings compromise the claim for maintenance, the Magistrate cannot pass an order in accordance with the terms of the compromise; because to do so would be to assume the functions of a Civil Court—*Lingadu v. Labbakka*, 2 Weir 629. He can only dismiss the petition for maintenance and strike it off the file—*Lingadu*, supra.

The Calcutta High Court holds that proceedings under this section are civil proceedings and the defendant thereto may give evidence on his own behalf—*Nur Mahomed v. Bismulla*, 16 Cal. 781. This is now expressly provided by sub-section (2) of sec. 340. A proceeding under this section being a proceeding of a civil nature, the parties can be examined as witnesses. Thus, the wife may be examined as to the non-access of her husband during her married life, in order to prove the illegitimacy of her children—*Rozario v. Ingles*, 18 Bom. 488. The person proceeded against under this section is not an accused—*Parbati v. Chotey*, 17 C.P.L.R. 127, 1 Cr.L.J. 864. The word 'accused' was formerly inadvertently used in sub-section (9). The Legislature has now corrected the error by substituting the words "any person" for the word 'accused.' This section is not intended to be punitive but a preventive one, and hence the neglect or refusal to pay maintenance is not an 'offence' within the meaning of section 4—1893 P.R. 15, ■ application for maintenance is not a complaint of an offence, and the provisions of sec. 177 are not applicable to determine the jurisdiction of the Court competent to entertain the application—*Hildephonsus v. Malone*, 1885 P.R. 13; Compensation cannot be awarded under section 250 to the person proceeded against if the application for maintenance is dismissed as false and frivolous or vexatious—6 M.L.T. 261. The Magistrate cannot send the case under sec. 202 for inquiry—*Makhan v. Harnamo*, 29 Cr.L.J. 909 (910) (Lah.) The defendant cannot be examined under sec. 342, as he is not an accused. See page 899 ante.

Further inquiry.—When an application under this section is dismissed by ■ Magistrate, the District Magistrate cannot order further inquiry under sec. 436, because it cannot be said that a complaint has been dismissed or the accused has been discharged—*Parbati v. Chotey*, 17 C.P.L.R. 127, 1 Cr.L.J. 864.

Appeals.—When a Magistrate orders maintenance under this section, no appeal lies as there is no conviction of an offence—*Golam Hossein*, 7 W.R. 10; *Thaku*, 5 B.H.C.R. 81.

1293. Revision.—The High Court has jurisdiction to set aside or modify the Magistrate's order, if the rate of maintenance awarded appears to be excessive, or to order further inquiry with a view to decide what amount should be allowed—*Mad H. C. Pro*, 29—7—1887. But the High Court is not disposed to interfere with the discretion of a Magistrate when he has fixed an amount after considering all the circumstances of the case—*In re Bai Manek*, 52 Bom. 763, 29 Cr.L.J. 1049 (1050). The High Court can set aside in revision ■ previous order of a Criminal Court passed under this section in view of a subsequent decree of ■ Civil Court—16 Cr.L.J. 609 (Oudh).

But the High Court does not interfere in revision when other issues are raised which should be settled in the Civil Courts, and when nothing is to be gained by protracted litigation in the Criminal Court. In such cases, the persons aggrieved by Magisterial orders should take their case to the Civil Courts—*In re Kandasami*, 50 M.L.J. 44, 27 Cr.L.J. 350.

Where the husband applied in revision for cancellation of the order of maintenance on the ground that the marriage had become null and void on account of the first husband of the wife being alive, held that the High Court could not, in a revision application of this kind, properly deal with that question, but that the petitioner must apply to the Court of matrimonial jurisdiction to have the marriage declared null and void—*Palmerino v Palmerino*, 28 Bom L.R. 1299, 28 Cr.L.J. 51 (52).

489. (1) On proof of a change in the circumstances of any person receiving under Section 488 a monthly allowance, or ordered under the same section to pay a monthly allowance to his wife or child, the Magistrate may make such alteration in the allowance as he thinks fit:

Provided that if he increases the allowance the monthly rate of one hundred rupees in the whole be not exceeded.

(2) Where it appears to the Magistrate that, in consequence of any decision of a competent Civil Court, any order made under section 488 should be cancelled or varied, he shall cancel the order, or, as the case may be, vary the same accordingly.

Change—In sub-section (1) the words 'one hundred' have been substituted for the word 'fifty,' and sub-section (2) has been newly added, by section 132 of the Cr. P. Code Amendment Act XVIII of 1923.

1294. Scope :—This section furnishes the ground on which the Court passing an order under sec. 488 can modify that order. An order of a competent Court under sec. 488 for the maintenance of a child can be modified under this section—*Budhuni v Dabal*, 27 All. 11. When a maintenance order is made with reference to the means of the husband, he should apply under this section, if he is aggrieved, for reduction of the allowance—9 W.R. 1. The revision of an order of maintenance and the grant of it on a lower scale than that of the original order is not legal, without an application under this section from one of the parties and without proof of change of circumstances—2 Weir 628.

An application under this section can be made so long as there is a subsisting order under section 488. Thus, an order awarding maintenance to the wife was passed in 1910; afterwards in 1912 she obtained a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, but he never

He and went on paying the maintenance to his wife as before. In 1918, the wife applied for increase of the amount of maintenance under sec. 489. Held that this application could not be granted because there was no subsisting order under section 488, the same having been put an end to by the decree of 1912. The fact that the husband continued to pay the maintenance in spite of the decree of 1912 did not keep the order of 1910 alive—*Chandulal*, 43 Bom. 885, 20 Cr.L.J. 687, 52 I C 607.

It is only on a change of circumstances of the kind mentioned in this section that the Magistrate can make an alteration in the maintenance allowance that has to be paid. He cannot inquire whether at the time when the husband was directed to pay the allowance he had sufficient means, because that in effect would be a review of the previous judgment of the Court, which is prohibited by sec. 369—*In re Punjalal*, 30 Bom L.R. 617, 29 Cr L.J. 908.

1295. Change of circumstances:—The expression 'change in the circumstances' in this section means not merely a temporary or accidental change in one of such circumstances (such as salary) but a change in all the circumstances connected with the condition of the person—*Rukmini v. Piarl*, 1891 A.W.N. 32.

The change of circumstances in this section is a change of pecuniary or other circumstances of the party paying or receiving the allowance, which would justify an increase or decrease of the amount of the monthly payment originally fixed, and not a change in the status of the parties, which would entail stoppage of the allowance—*Shah Abu v. Uljat*, 19 All 50. The words 'alteration in the allowance' clearly indicate that the section refers to such change of circumstances as would necessitate only an alteration in the amount of allowance, and not to circumstances (e.g., divorce) which entail the discontinuance of the allowance altogether—*Din Mahamad*, 8 All. 226 (per Mahmood, J.); *In re Punjalal*, 30 Bom L.R. 617, 29 Cr.L.J. 908 (909). Circumstances which necessitate not merely an alteration in the allowance but a cancellation of the order of maintenance do not come under this section but under sub-section (5) of section 488; or can be pleaded by the husband when the order is being enforced under sub-section (3) of that section—*In re Punjalal*, 30 Bom L.R. 617, 29 Cr.L.J. 908 (909). But the Madras High Court has held in a recent case that the word 'alteration' includes cancellation. The reduction of the maintenance allowance is nothing (which is the same thing as cancellation of the order granting maintenance) would come within the meaning of the word 'alteration'. Therefore a Magistrate can under this section, cancel the allowance granted to the daughter, if she has since been married and has thus become able to maintain herself by reason of her marriage—*Meenakshi v. Karuppanna*, 48 Mad 503, 48 M L J. 183, 26 Cr.L.J. 732.

The growth of the child, or the birth of another child, or the death of a child is a change in the circumstances—*Ramayee*, 14 Mad. 393; *Upendra v. Soudamini*, 12 Cal. 535. The fact that the children are grown up and are no longer unable to maintain themselves amounts to

a change in the circumstances—*Ma Yu v. Coloquhoun*, 19 Cr.L.J. 160; *Thambuswamy*, 10 Bur.L.T. 209, 18 Cr.L.J. 103, 9 L.B.R. 49. Where a divorced Mahomedan wife has married again, the fact that the second husband has merely undertaken to maintain her child by the first husband, does not empower the Magistrate to cancel the order of maintenance passed against the first husband to maintain his child. There is no such change of circumstances as is contemplated by this section—*Budhni v. Dabal*, 27 All. 11. The second husband is not bound by law to maintain the child, perhaps he may refuse to maintain it any day. So the change of circumstances in this case is not such as can be relied upon.

The change of circumstances must be actual and of such a nature that the law would recognise it. The mere fact that the wife might possibly be able to earn something by her own labour is not a ground on which the husband may apply for reduction of the rate of allowance—1887 A.W.N. 107, because the law does not compel a wife to work for her livelihood, while her husband is living and has sufficient means to maintain her. If the parties, subsequent to an order under sec 488, make an agreement modifying its terms, such agreement would amount to a change in the circumstances, and the party interested can apply under this section and get the order modified—*Prabhu v. Ram*, 25 All. 165.

1296. Alteration of allowance—An order of alteration of allowance under this section cannot take effect retrospectively. The Magistrate has no power to reduce the rate of maintenance which has already accrued due; his order will take effect in respect of the allowance that will fall due after the date of the order—2 Weir 650. The arrears which have fallen due will be enforced at the rate originally fixed.

When an application for modification of the allowance has been preferred under this section, the Magistrate cannot inquire into the propriety or otherwise of the previous order of maintenance—2 Weir 650.

An application for alteration of allowance is no ground for staying the execution of an order of maintenance already granted, as that order carries with it all the proper consequences so long as it remains in force—*Sidheswar v. Gyanada*, 22 Cal 291.

The amount of maintenance payable to each person must be specified; otherwise it cannot be altered. See *Thambuswamy*, 9 L.B.R. 49 cited under sec. 488 under heading 'Amount of maintenance.'

Sub-section (2) :—See Note 1290 under section 488, under heading "Effect of subsequent decree."

490. A copy of the order of maintenance shall be given without payment to the person in whose favour it is made, or to his guardian, if any, or to the person to whom the allowance is to be paid, and such

Enforcement of order of maintenance.

order may be enforced by any Magistrate in any place where the person against whom it is made may be, on such Magistrate being satisfied as to the identity of the parties and the non-payment of the allowance due.

1297. Who can enforce order :—The order can be enforced by a second class Magistrate, if the person against whom the order is passed resides within his jurisdiction—*Ubhai, Ratanlal* 288

The words 'any Magistrate of any place where the person against whom it is made may be' do not deprive the Magistrate who has made the order of his power to enforce the order under Sec. 488 (3), even though the defendant no longer resides within his jurisdiction. It was not intended by the Legislature that the poor wife would have to rush about the country pursuing her absconding husband in wherever he chooses to go. When the defendant is beyond the jurisdiction of the Magistrate who made the order, he may issue a warrant for collection of the arrears of maintenance—*Gnanambalammal*, 52 Mad 77, 55 M L J 516, 29 Cr.L.J. 932, *Karri Papayamma*, 4 Mad. 230. The application for an order to enforce the recovery of maintenance may be made either to the Magistrate who passed the original order or to the Magistrate having jurisdiction over the place where the person resides. It is left in the applicant to choose where she will apply. The provisions of this section cannot be held to derogate from the provisions of sec. 488 (3)—*Ma Thaw*, 7 L.B.R. 116, 15 Cr.L.J. 701 (702), dissenting from *Karri Papayamma*, 4 Mad. 230, in so far as it held that if the defendant had left the jurisdiction of the Court passing the order, the Court had a discretion to refer the applicant to the Magistrate having jurisdiction at the place where the defendant was to be found.

Powers and Duties of the Magistrate :—It has been held in *Prabhu v Rami*, 25 All 165 that a Magistrate to whom an application has been made to enforce an order of maintenance, should not take into consideration anything further than the identity of the parties and the nonpayment of the allowance. He may also consider whether the person (in case of a Mohamedan) to whom maintenance is ordered still holds the position of wife. But no further steps relaxing the clear words of Sec. 490 should be allowed. The fact that the parties had made an agreement subsequent to the order modifying its terms is not a matter for the consideration of the Magistrate enforcing the order. If the person against whom an order for maintenance is made considers that such order should no longer be in force against him, it is for him to apply under Sec. 489 and get the order altered. It is not suitable or expedient that it should be open to a second Magistrate to call in question an order duly given upon proof.

But a wider view has been taken in 10 Mad. 13. In this case it has been held that where in answer to an application for enforcement of an order of maintenance, the husband pleads that the claim has been released, the wife having received a lump sum in satisfaction of her claims for maintenance, the Magistrate enforcing the order is competent to consider such plea, and if it is proved, to refuse to enforce the order.

But there can be no doubt that the Magistrate enforcing the order should take into consideration the question whether the person to whom the order has been given is, at the time she makes the application, still holding the position of wife (i.e., has not been divorced); on this point, there is no conflict of opinion between the High Courts. See *Prabhu v. Rami*, 25 All. 165; *Shah Abu v. Ulfat*, 19 All 50, *Baji v. Nawab*, 1894 P.R. 21; *Daulat v. Jadu*, 17 O.C. 260, 15 Cr.L.J. 646; *Hasan v. Mi Sin*, 1915 U.B.R. 1st Qr. 53, 29 I.C. 659, 16 Cr.L.J. 531.

The Magistrate enforcing the order is also bound to consider a Civil Court decree passed subsequent to the order of maintenance. If the Civil Court has decided that the complainant is not and never had been the wife of the defendant, the Magistrate must refuse to enforce the order for maintenance—*Nawab Zulfikar v. Zainal*, 11 O.C. 49. For further notes as to the effect of Civil Court decree, see Note 1290 under sec. 488.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

DIRECTIONS OF THE NATURE OF A HABEAS CORPUS.

491. (1) *Any High Court* may, whenever it thinks fit, direct—
Power to issue directions of the nature of a habeas corpus.

- (a) that any person within the limits of its *appellate criminal jurisdiction* be brought up before the Court to be dealt with according to law;
- (b) that a person illegally or improperly detained in public or private custody within such limits be set at liberty;
- (c) that a prisoner detained in any jail situate within such limits be brought before the Court to be there examined as a witness in any matter pending or to be inquired into in such Court;
- (d) that a prisoner detained as aforesaid be brought before a Court-martial or any Commissioners acting under the authority of any commission from the Governor-General in Council for trial or to be examined touching

any matter pending before such Court-martial or Commissioners respectively;

(e) that a prisoner within such limits be removed from one custody to another for the purpose of trial; and

(f) that the body of a defendant within such limits be brought in on the Sheriff's return of *cepi corpus* to a writ of attachment.

(2) The High Court may, from time to time, frame rules to regulate the procedure in cases under this section.

(3) No person shall be detained under this section after the 1st January 1818, Madras Regulation XXV of 1827, or the State Prisoners Act, 1850, or the State Prisoners Act, 1858.

1298. Scope :—This section has been amended by sec. 30 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, XII of 1923. Under the old law, power under this section was given only to the High Courts at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, under the present section power is given to all High Courts. Under the old law, the jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of proceedings under this section was confined to the limits of its original jurisdiction (*In re Charu Chandra*, 44 Cal. 76 and *Tops*, 46 Cal. 52), under the present section the jurisdiction has been extended to mofussil places. See also *Govindan Nair*, 45 Mad. 922 (F.B.), 43 M.L.J. 396. So also, the Criminal Appellate Bench of the High Court has power to dispose of applications under this section—*Subodh Chandra v. Emp.*, 52 Cal. 319, 29 C.W.N. 98, 26 Cr.L.J. 625.

The proceedings by way of *habeas corpus* are proceedings calling upon a person having custody of another person to produce him and demonstrate under what authority he holds him in custody. If the authority is a legitimate authority, the High Court cannot interfere. All that this Court can do is to see that there is no patent defect visible in the authority by which the person having custody detains any person—*Jamna*, 20 S.L.R. 128, 27 Cr.L.J. 37 (38). It is doubtful whether the exercise of jurisdiction under sec. 491 is necessary where the person detained is on bail.—*Ibid.*

The investment of the extraordinary powers of *habeas corpus* in a High Court does not take away from the litigants their ordinary rights which they have under the Civil Law. Therefore a refusal by the High Court to exercise the powers under this section to recover the custody of a child will not deprive the applicant of his right to seek his remedy either by means of an application under the Guardians and Wards Act or by a regular suit—*Swa Lay v. Yeo Boon*, 4 Bur.L.J. 269, 27 Cr.L.J. 737.

This section does not apply to a case where there has been a conviction and sentence. Where there has been a conviction and sentence, the proper course, if there is a miscarriage of justice, is to take the matter to the Crown for remedy—*Bonomally*, 44 Cal. 723 (P.B.).

High Court's power not taken away by the Extradition Act:—The High Court's power to issue a writ of *habeas corpus* has not been taken away from the procedure provided in the Indian Extradition Act, sec. 3, sub-sections (6) and (7)—*Tops*, 46 Cal. 52. The High Court has power to issue an order and to examine whether a person detained in public custody under the Extradition Act is legally detained, and this power is not taken away merely because the Government have already issued a warrant for surrender under sec. 3, sub-section (8) of that Act.—*Ruddolf Stallmann*, 39 Cal. 164.

1299. Clause (b) :—Custody of children.—The High Court before passing an order in respect of a minor child, ought to take into consideration the interest and welfare of the child.—*Zarabibi v. Abdul*, 12 Bom. L.R. 891; *Swa Lay v. Yeo Boon*, 4 Bur.L.J. 269, 27 Cr.L.J. 737. The Court will not ordinarily force a child to remain in a custody to which the child objects, and before deciding as to its custody, the Court will take account of the wishes of the child, if it is old enough to form an intelligent preference—33 Mad. 288. Where a mother had for eight years neglected her child who had been educated at a mission school, the High Court refused her application for custody of the girl aged 15 years, on the ground that, if granted, it would be detrimental to the welfare of the child.—*In re Saifuri*, 16 Bom. 307. Where the father has delegated the guardianship of his children to another person, the question whether the father is entitled to resume the guardianship depends on the children's interests and welfare.—*Annie Besant v. Narayanah*, 38 Mad. 807 (P.C.). Where a Hindu mother, who has custody of her minor children, is inclined towards Christianity and is likely to be converted to that religion and to bring up her children in such a way that they will ultimately express a desire to be converted to Christianity, the proper course is to remove the mother from guardianship and appoint another person as guardian, under the provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act. The High Court will not take action under sec. 491.—*Veeraswami v. Painamma*, 29 Cr. L.J. 1048 (1049).

The High Court of Judicature has, under its Common Law powers, jurisdiction to issue a writ for the production of children outside British India, provided it is satisfied that they are in the custody or control of a person within its jurisdiction. Sec. 491 cannot be said to have affected this Common Law jurisdiction of the High Court.—*Mahomedali v. Ismailji*, 50 Bom. 616, 27 Cr.L.J. 721. But section 491 cannot apply if the person is in custody outside British India, and the person having the custody or control of that person is also outside British India.—*Shiva Prasad*, 27 A.L.J. 520, A.L.R. 1929 All. 347 (348).

Detention:—Where a boy, who had been under the guardianship of his uncle, went to his sister's house to attend her marriage, and

refused to return on the ground that he intended to discontinue his studies and to get some work, and he also said that he was kept back to stay with his sister because she was left alone when her husband was out on work, held that there was nothing to show that he was *detained* against his will, and as there was no suggestion that his sister and her husband were not proper persons to live with, it could not be said that he was *improperly detained*—*Paul v. Hunt*, 111 Bur.L.J. 111, 28 Cr.L.J. 865.

Appeal :—When a petitioner obtains a rule calling upon the other side to show cause why a child should not be delivered to her, and the rule is discharged, the order discharging the rule is a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent, and is therefore appealable—*In re Narrondas*, 14 Bom. 555. An order by a Judge directing a writ of *habeas corpus* to issue is not an order made "in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction" within the meaning of cl. 15 of the Letters Patent, and is open to appeal—*Mahomedali v. Ismailji* (supra).

491A. Any High Court established by Letters Patent may exercise the powers conferred by section 491 in the case of any European British subject within such territories, other than those within the limits of its appellate criminal jurisdiction, as the Governor-General in Council may direct.

This section has been newly added by Sec. 31 of the Cr. Law Amendment Act, 1923. By this section, European British Subjects, even when outside the limits of British India, will get the privilege of obtaining writs in the nature of *Habeas Corpus* from the High Courts.

PART IX.

SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR.

492. (1) The Governor General in Council or the Local Government may appoint, generally, or in any case, or for any specified class of cases, in any local area, one or more officers to be called Public Prosecutors.

Power to appoint
Public Prosecutors.

(2) * * The District Magistrate, or, subject to the control of the District Magistrate, the Sub-divisional Magistrate, may, in the absence of the Public Prosecutor, or where no Public Prosecutor has been appointed, appoint any other person, not being an officer of police below such rank as the Local Government may prescribe in this behalf, to be Public Prosecutor for the purpose of any case.

Change :—This section has been amended by section 13 of the Cr.P C Amendment Act XVIII of 1923. The following changes have been made —*Firstly*, the words "In any case committed for trial to the Court of Session" in the beginning of sub-section (2) have been omitted, because the necessity of appointing a Public Prosecutor in the absence of that officer may arise not only in Sessions Courts but in all other instances. *Secondly*, the italicised words have been substituted in place of the words "the rank of Assistant District Superintendent," because "as there is a variety of nomenclature of the Police officers, we think it better to leave it to the Local Governments to prescribe the rank of police-officers who may be appointed Public Prosecutors for the purposes of a particular case"—*Report of the Joint Committee (1922)*.

In U. P., all Joint Magistrates and Assistant Magistrates exercising first class powers have been empowered to prosecute in sessions trials—*Govt. Notification, 31st December 1870*.

But it is highly objectionable to appoint the Magistrate, who in the first instance tried and convicted the accused, to be Crown Prosecutor to

conduct an inquiry subsequently directed in the same case. To convert a Judge into an Advocate seeking to uphold his decision before another tribunal is quite unprecedented and most objectionable, as he has an interest in the case which a Public Prosecutor should not have—*Reg. v. Kashinath*, ■ B.H.C.R. 126.

1300. Duty of Public Prosecutor :—The purpose of a criminal trial is not to support a theory but to investigate the offence and to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused, and the duty of a Public Prosecutor is to represent not the Police but the Crown, and this duty should be discharged by him fairly and fearlessly and with a full sense of the responsibility that attaches to his position. The guilt or innocence of the accused is to be determined by the tribunals appointed by law and not according to the tastes of any one else—*Ram Ranjan v. Emp.*, 42 Cal. 422, 19 C.W.N. 28, 16 Cr.L.J. 170; *Kunja Subudhi v. Emp.*, 8 Pat. 289, 30 Cr.L.J. 675 (683). There should be no unseemly eagerness on the part of the Prosecutor at securing a conviction. His object must be the furtherance of justice and not to act as counsel for any particular person or party—*Reg. v. Kashinath*, ■ B.H.C.R. 126.

493. The Public Prosecutor may appear and plead
 without any written authority before any Court in which any case in which he has charge is under inquiry, trial or appeal, and if any private person instructs a pleader to prosecute in any Court any person in any such case, the Public Prosecutor shall conduct the prosecution, and the pleader so instructed shall act therein under his directions.

1301. Pleader privately instructed :—The Counsel instructed and retained by a private individual can watch the case on behalf of his client, but he cannot, without being especially empowered by the District Magistrate, conduct the prosecution—*Chaitan Lal*, O.S.C. No 31. Where in a criminal appeal pending before the Chief Court of Panjab, the brother of the murdered man appointed a pleader to support the conviction, held that the pleader so appointed was not a Public Prosecutor—*Akbar v. Emp.*, 1886 P.R. 29.

Where the Public Prosecutor has charge of the prosecution, the pleader instructed by a private person must act under the directions of the Public Prosecutor and is not entitled to conduct the prosecution in preference to the Public Prosecutor—*B. N. Ry. Co. Ltd. v. Shaikh Makbul*, 7 P.L.T. 343, 27 Cr.L.J. 315. The Public Prosecutor may always avail himself of the services of the counsel retained by a private individual, but in doing so he does not deprive himself of the management of the case—*In re Narayan*, 11 B.H.C.R. 102.

494. Any Public Prosecutor appointed by the Governor-General in Council or the Local Government may, with the consent of the Court, in cases tried by jury before the return of the verdict, and in other cases before the judgment is pronounced, withdraw from the prosecution of any person, and upon such withdrawal,—

(a) if it is made before a charge has been framed, the accused shall be discharged;

(b) if it is made after a charge has been framed, or when under this Code no charge is required, he shall be acquitted.

494. Any Public Prosecutor * * may, with the consent of the Court, in cases tried by jury before the return of the verdict, and in other cases before the judgment is pronounced, withdraw from the prosecution of any person *either generally or in respect of any one or more of the offences for which he is tried*, and upon such withdrawal,—

(a) if it is made before a charge has been framed, the accused shall be discharged *in respect of such offence or offences*;

(b) if it is made after a charge has been framed, or when under this Code no charge is required, he shall be acquitted *in respect of such offence or offences*.

Change :—This section has been amended by section 134 of the Cr P C Amendment Act XVIII of 1923. The reasons are stated below.

1302. Scope of Section —Under the old law this section applied only to Public Prosecutors *appointed by Government*. A Prosecutor especially appointed by the Magistrate, under sec 492 (2) to conduct a case had not the power to withdraw from the prosecution under this section—*Q E. v Madhoo*, 8 All 291; *Ramakrishna*, 11 Weir 653. A Government Pleader who was not appointed a Public Prosecutor under the provisions of sec 492 (1) could not withdraw from the prosecution under this section. He could withdraw only under section 240, *i.e.*, only in cases where several charges had been preferred against the same person and he had been convicted on one of those charges—2 Weir 258. The present section as now amended will confer the power of withdrawal on *all* Public Prosecutors.

No person other than the Public Prosecutor can withdraw from the prosecution; even a Vakil acting under the directions of the Public Prose-

cutor cannot do so. But if the prosecution is withdrawn by the Public Prosecutor and the Vakil, and the application for withdrawal of the case is signed by both the persons, the withdrawal is not invalid—*Sita Singh*, 46 Cal. 700, 30 C.L.J. 255, 21 Cr.L.J. 5.

This section (as well as section 495) does not apply to security proceedings. It applies only to proceedings which can end in a discharge or acquittal of the accused; but security proceedings do not contemplate the frame of a charge at all, and as a result of the proceedings neither an order of discharge nor one of acquittal is passed therein. Hence sections 494 and 495 cannot apply to security proceedings—36 Mad. 315.

This section contemplates the case of withdrawal of a prosecution in cases tried by jury, before the return of the verdict, and in other cases, before the judgment is pronounced. It does not contemplate the case of withdrawal of prosecution after the conviction of the accused by the first Court, and in the Appellate stage of the case. Withdrawal at that stage is illegal, and the appeal must be heard and judicially determined—*Ananta Lal v. Jahiruddin*, 46 C.L.J. 121, 28 Cr.L.J. 833.

Secs. 1337 and 494 :—As to the distinction between these sections, see Note 950A under sec. 337.

1303. Withdrawal from prosecution :—The Public Prosecutor cannot withdraw a case on the ground that the complainant was keeping out of the way and could not be served with summons. He should take steps to enforce his attendance—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 655. But the Court can allow the Public Prosecutor to withdraw the prosecution against an accused in order that he may call him as a witness for the prosecution against the other accused persons—*G. V. Raman*, 56 Cal 1023, 33 C.W.N. 468 (471). In fact, when it is necessary to take the evidence of one accused against the others, the usual practice is either to tender pardon to the accused under sec. 337, or to withdraw the prosecution against him under sec. 494, or to enter a *nolle prosequi* under sec. 333 (in cases before High Courts). See *G. V. Raman*, *supra*; *Regina v. Lyons*, (1840) 9 Carr. & Payne 555; *Queen v. Owen*, 9 Carr. & Payne 83; *R. v. Rowland*, Ry & M 401. In all cases, where two persons are joint in the same indictment, and it is desirable to take the evidence of the one against the other, it is desirable for the purpose of insuring the greatest possible amount of truthfulness in the person coming to give evidence, to take a verdict of not guilty as to him, so that the witness may give his evidence with a mind free of all the influence which the fear of impending punishment might otherwise produce—*Winson v. Queen*, (1866) L.R. 1 Q.B. 289 (312).

The complainant has no *locus standi* in the matter of withdrawal of a prosecution. When a case has been started upon a police report, and the Court Sub-Inspector (who is the Public Prosecutor) wants to withdraw the case, the Court cannot reject the application for withdrawal simply because the complainant wants to proceed with the case—*Gopi Bari*, 1 P.L.T. 400, 57 I.C. 657, 21 Cr.L.J. 641.

Consent of Court:—Consent of the Court is necessary to the withdrawal of the prosecution. The Court in coming to a decision as to whether it would give consent should not take into consideration any extraneous circumstance. The discretion as to whether the Magistrate should give consent to the withdrawal is to be exercised not arbitrarily but must be based on correct legal principles—*G. V. Raman*, 56 Cal. 1023, 33 C.W.N. 468 (473)

Withdrawal of some of the charges:—Under the old section, a Public Prosecutor was not competent to withdraw only one or some of the charges. If he withdrew at all, he had to withdraw all the charges. Where one of the charges was withdrawn, and the accused was tried on the other charges, the High Court ordered the trial on the charge withdrawn—2 C.L.J. 18 (n). But the law has now been changed, and this section empowers the Public Prosecutor to withdraw one or some of the charges.

Record of reasons:—When a Court, acting under this section gives its consent to a withdrawal from a prosecution, the order passed is a judicial order, and the Court should record its reasons in order that the High Court may be in a position to say whether the discretion vested in the Court has been properly exercised—*Umesh v. Satish*, 22 C.W.N. 69; *Rajani v. Idris*, 48 Cal. 1105, *Jagat v. Kalimuddi*, 26 C.W.N. 880; *G. V. Raman*, 56 Cal. 1023, 33 C.W.N. 468 (471), *Sugan Chand v. Chunilal*, 6 N.L.J. 177, 24 Cr.L.J. 361, *Abdul Gani v. Abdul Kadir*, 1 Rang. 756, 2 Bur.L.J. 287; *Rajula*, 25 N.L.R. 6, 30 Cr.L.J. 872. The Madras and Patna High Courts hold that it is not necessary that the reasons are to be recorded by the Judge—5 M.L.T. 216; *Gullit Bhagat v. Narain Singh*, 2 Pat. 708.

1304. Acquittal:—If the Public Prosecutor withdraws from the case after a charge is framed, he must be acquitted under clause (b), and not discharged—*Sivarama*, 12 Mad. 35. Where therefore a prisoner, the charge against whom was withdrawn by the Public Prosecutor, was discharged, instead of being acquitted, and was again committed to the Sessions on a second charge for the same offence, it was held that the conviction was bad in law—*Sivarama*, 12 Mad. 35. In a summons case, an order of discharge under this section amounts to an order of acquittal—*Mul Singh v. Emp.*, 24 Cr.L.J. 433 (Lah.)

Where a person is acquitted, on the charge being withdrawn by the Public Prosecutor, the acquittal should be recorded without taking the opinions of the assessors. An acquittal is a matter of right to the accused, whatever might be the opinions of the assessors—*Ratanlal* 307.

Retrial—An order of acquittal under this section bars a retrial for the same offence by virtue of sec. 403—9 N.L.R. 26, 40 Mad. 976; 18 Cr.L.J. 329 (Mad.); 23 Cr.L.J. 305 (Sind). If a case is withdrawn against an accused in order that his evidence may be available against his co-accused, and he is acquitted, he cannot be retried, even though he refuses to give his evidence for the prosecution. In this respect this section differs from secs. 337 and 339—*G. V. Raman v. Emp.*, 56 Cal. 1023, 33 C.W.N. 468 (474).

Accused ■ competent witness against co-accused :—When a prosecution against a person has been withdrawn under this section, he can be examined as ■ witness in the case against his other co-accused—*Hussein Haji*, 25 Bom. 422; *Banu Singh*, 33 Cal 1353; *Kasem Ali*, 47 Cal. 154. See also *G. V. Raman*, 56 Cal. 1023 and the English cases cited in Note 1303.

But the prosecution must be withdrawn and the accused discharged under this section, before he can be examined as a witness against his co-accused; because so long as he is in the position of an accused, no oath can be administered to him under sec. 342 (4), and he cannot therefore be examined as a witness. Where the Court sanctions the withdrawal of ■ prosecution but omits to record an order of discharge, and the accused continues to be kept in custody, his position is in no way changed from that of the accused, and he cannot be examined as ■ witness—*Banu Singh*, 33 Cal 1353. But if the accused was in fact discharged from custody by virtue of withdrawal from prosecution, the omission to record a formal order of discharge would be cured by sec 537, and the accused would be ■ competent witness against the other accused—7 A.L.J. 86; *Sherati*, 18 C.W.N. 1213, 15 Cr.L.J. 693

1305. Revision :—The High Court is in a position to consider whether the discretion vested in the Magistrate to give consent in the withdrawal of a prosecution has been rightly exercised—*Rajani v Idris*, 48 Cal. 1105, 25 C.W.N. 615, *Jagat v Kalimuddi*, 26 C.W.N. 880; *Gopi Bari*, 1 P.L.T. 400, 57 I.C. 657, 21 Cr.L.J. 641.

But where good reasons have been shown by the Court below for allowing the withdrawal of a prosecution, the High Court will be slow to interfere in revision against the order allowing the withdrawal—*Bepin Behari v. Haripada*, 24 Cr.L.J. 5 (Cal.). Where the Sessions Judge has exercised his discretion in refusing permission to withdraw ■ case, and he has not improperly exercised that discretion, the High Court would be very reluctant to interfere with his discretion—*In re Kaliappa*, 23 L.W. 101, 27 Cr.L.J. 334. Where a discretion has been exercised by a Court of competent jurisdiction, which is not on the face of it arbitrary, the practice of the High Court is that as a revisional Court it will neither inquire into the reasons nor interfere. Specially where the Court has acquitted the accused upon withdrawal of the charges, the High Court would not be right in interfering except upon a properly constituted appeal preferred by the Local Government under sec. 417—*Gulli Bhagat v Narain Singh*, 2 Pat. 708 (710), 5 P.L.T. 404, 25 Cr.L.J. 446; 5 M.L.T. 216; *Abdul Gani v. Abdul Kadir*, 1 Rang. 756, 2 Bur L.J. 287.

Where a charge is withdrawn, and the accused ■ acquitted, it is not competent to the revisional Court to consider the question of the legality of the charge. A number of persons were charged before the Magistrate with the offence of robbery. The Public prosecutor withdrew the charge, and the Magistrate recorded an order of acquittal. On revision, it was contended that the charge of robbery was wrong, in as much as more

than five persons were implicated in the act, and the Magistrate ought to have framed a charge of dacoity, and therefore the acquittal on the charge of robbery was wrong. The High Court refused to enter into the question as to the legality of the charge, and held that the Magistrate's procedure was right. There being a charge before him, and that charge having been withdrawn, he acted rightly in recording an order of acquittal—*Sheobaran v. Shibi*, 2 A.L.J. 30.

The High Court will not interfere with the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court under this section, at the instance of a private prosecutor. If the Court has allowed the Public Prosecutor to withdraw the case upon insufficient or improper grounds, and has passed an order of acquittal, the private prosecutor cannot be heard to object to it in revision. The Local Government is the only authority who can take action for the correction of that error—*Gullu Bhagat v. Narain*, 2 Pat. 708 (711), 5 P.L.T. 404, 25 Cr L.J. 446.

Further inquiry:—If the case is withdrawn under clause (a), the accused will be discharged, and further inquiry may be directed under sec. 436—*Hata*, 30 P.L.R. 58, 30 Cr L.J. 233. Where the order of discharge under this section is a proper one, no further inquiry should be directed under sec. 436—*Sitaramayya v. Emp.*, (1911) M.W.N. 74, 12 Cr L.J. 440, 11 I.C. 624. But a fresh complaint can be made on fresh materials.

495. (1) Any Magistrate inquiring into or trying

Permission to conduct
prosecution.

any case may permit the prosecution to be conducted by any person other than an officer of police below a rank to be prescribed by the Local Government in this behalf, * * * but no person, other than the Advocate General, Standing Counsel, Government Solicitor, Public Prosecutor or other officer generally or specially empowered by the Local Government in this behalf shall be entitled to do so without such permission.

(2) Any such officer shall have the like power of withdrawing from the prosecution as is provided by Section 494, and the provisions of that section shall apply to any withdrawal by such officer.

(3) Any person conducting the prosecution may do so personally or by a pleader.

(4) An officer of police shall not be permitted to conduct the prosecution if he has taken any part in the investigation into the offence with respect to which the accused is being prosecuted.

The words "with the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council," have been omitted by the Devolution Act (XXXVIII of 1920).

1306. Permission to conduct prosecution :—The permission of the Magistrate is discretionary, and the High Court will not interfere with such discretion. Where a Magistrate has, after due consideration, exercised the discretion and allowed counsel to appear on behalf of the prosecution, the High Court cannot, — a Court of Revision, overrule the order of the Magistrate and direct him to refuse to allow counsel to appear—*Mangiah v. Dakshina Murthi*, 2 Weir 655. Similarly, where the District Magistrate considers that the too frequent appearance of pleaders for the prosecution in petty criminal cases is detrimental to the interests of justice, he can refuse to permit the prosecution to be conducted by a pleader, and the Chief Court will decline to interfere with the order of the District Magistrate—*Rala Ram v. Buta*, 1905 P.R. 6.

Who can be permitted —The Magistrate is not precluded from exercising in exceptional cases his discretion by allowing private Vakils of good character to conduct the prosecution—*Krishnamachariar*, 12 M.L.J. 354. The words 'any person' include persons other than certified pleaders. It is however discretionary with the Criminal Courts in each case to permit such persons to conduct the prosecution—*Mad. H. C. Pro* 2-9-1882.

The fact that a certain person is also a Prosecuting Inspector does not deprive him of his right as a private citizen, and he may in his private capacity ask for permission to prosecute in his case—*Maung Pu*, 10 Bur.L.T. 213, 17 Cr.L.J. 486. So also, the fact that a particular person is a complainant is not a sufficient ground for not permitting him to prosecute the case—*Ibid*. But it is doubtful whether the words 'any person' would include an absolute stranger who had no connection in the remotest degree with the prosecution and whose desire to help the prosecution was based on a personal grudge only—*Darsan v. Atmaram*, 11 A.L.J. 313, 14 Cr.L.J. 389.

If the offence be of a nature affecting the public (e.g., rioting or unlawful assembly) which the Crown alone in the interests of public peace and security has a right to conduct, a private person should not be permitted to conduct the prosecution—*Malaysi Kottagil*, 18 Cr.L.J. 329 (Mad).

Under a notification of the Madras Government, all superior police-officers above the rank of a first class Head constable in charge of a police station are generally empowered to conduct the prosecution without even the permission of the Magistrate under sub-section (1); such officers would be entitled under sub-section (2) to withdraw from the prosecution with the permission of the Court as mentioned in section 494—*Anantharama v. Muthia Thevan*, 1914 M.W.N. 776, 15 Cr.L.J. 614.

Sub-section (2) :—'Any such officer'—These words refer only to the Advocate General, Standing Counsel etc., mentioned in sub-section (1). If any person other than these officers (e.g., an Advocate privately engaged by the complainant and permitted by the Magistrate) withdraws

from the prosecution, the effect provided in sec. 494 does not follow; in other words, the trial will proceed—*Nga Maung v. Nga Lu*, 10 Cr L.J. 14, 1908 U.B.R. 1st Qr. (Cr.P.C.) 15; see also *Lakshmana v. Keelan Peria*, 1911 M.W.N. 106, 11 Cr.L.J. 722, 8 I.C. 867.

Sub-section (3) :—A person, whether a private complainant or not, when he is permitted to conduct the case as prosecutor, may instruct a counsel to appear—11 H.C.R. 102.

It is not open to a Magistrate to decline to allow the complainant, who is conducting the prosecution, to have a particular pleader of his own choice. The section does not authorise the Magistrate to take the prosecution out of the hands of the pleader of the complainant and to assign it to some other person who is not the Public Prosecutor—*Ghadially v. Emp.*, 18 S.L.R. 30, 25 Cr.L.J. 571

1307. Sub-section (4) :—Exclusion of Police officer—In all important cases and specially in cases of murder and dacoity, the police-officer making the investigation should be examined as a witness, regarding the circumstances of the investigation. For this reason he is debarred from conducting the prosecution—*Ratanlal* 173 Where the police-officer who conducted the investigation by arresting the accused and seizing the property found, was allowed to conduct the prosecution, it was held that such a procedure was highly improper; but since in this case the accused were not prejudicated thereby, the irregularity did not vitiate the trial but was cured by section 537—26 Bom. 533.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

OF BAIL.

496. When any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police-station, or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer, or at any stage of the proceedings before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail: Provided that such officer or Court, if he or it thinks fit, may, instead of taking bail from such person, discharge him on his executing a bond without sureties for his appearance as hereinafter provided:

Provided, further, that nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the provisions of Section 107, sub-section (4), or Section 117, sub-section (3).

Change :—The second proviso has been added by section 135 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act XVIII of 1923. For notes relating to this proviso, see Note 240 under sec. 107.

1308. Grant of bail :—This section is imperative in its terms and the Court is bound to comply with its provisions. In every bailable offence, bail is a right and not a favour. Detention in the lock up is the alternative, not the original, order—*Raghunandan*, 32 Cal. 80; *Sheolalsing*, 11 C.P.L.R. 31. When a man who is arrested is not accused of a non-bailable offence, no needless impediments should be placed in the way of his being admitted to bail. The intention of the law is that in such cases the man is ordinarily to be at liberty, and it is only when he is unable to furnish such moderate security, if any is required of him, as is suitable for the purpose of securing his appearance before a Court pending inquiry, that he should remain in detention—*Emp. v. Mir Hashamali*, 20 Bom.L.R. 121. The Magistrate cannot refuse to pass an order of bail on the ground of expediency and of the inability of the accused's pleader to show a provision in the Code how he could claim a bail—*Sheolalsing*, 6 C.P.L.R. 31. If a case is proceeding in an extremely tardy manner, the Magistrate should enlarge the accused on bail, instead of insisting upon his rotting in jail during the time the Crown is collecting evidence in support of the prosecution—*Tularam*, 27 Cr.L.J. 1063 (1065). Where the accused has surrendered himself before the date of hearing, that is a circumstance to show that the accused is not likely to abscond, consequently he may be granted bail—*Tularam*, *supra*.

When the Police arrests a person under sec 55, he should be given the option of bail—*Daulat Singh*, 14 All. 45.

Where a person arrested under Chapter VIII claims a bail, he is entitled to bail as a matter of right—*Sheolalsing*, 11 C.P.L.R. 31; *Raghunandan*, 32 Cal. 80; 36 Mad. 474; *Hashamali* 20 Bom.L.R. 121; *Jatoi v. Emp.*, 20 S.L.R. 122, 27 Cr.L.J. 935 (936).

Refusal of bail.—If the Magistrate refuses to grant bail, he must record his reasons for such refusal. In the absence of any record of reasons the High Court in revision granted bail—14 C.W.N. cxxxviii. If the Magistrate improperly refuses bail, no action is sustainable against him for such improper refusal. The duty of a Magistrate in accepting or refusing bail is not merely a ministerial but a judicial duty. A mistake in the exercise of that duty, without malice, will not sustain an action—*Paran Kusam v. Stuart*, 2 M.H.C.R. 396.

Court to decide sufficiency of bail.—When the bail is ordered by the Court, the duty of deciding as to the sufficiency or otherwise of the bail is with the Court itself, and not with the police. If such duties are irregularly entrusted to police, two dangers are likely to arise. First, a police officer may sometimes be unscrupulous enough to take advantage of the power entrusted to him, for the purpose of extortion; and secondly,

the bringing of false charges against the police. But the Court, when it admits a man to bail, is at liberty to call for a report from the police as to the sufficiency of the bail—*Gaytri Prosunno*, 15 Cal. 455.

1309. Bond :—Bail means security with sureties, whereas the bond referred to in the first proviso is a simple recognizance of the principal without any surety.

Under this section, a Police officer can either demand a bail from an accused or accept his own bond without sureties, but under no provision of the law can he take a *third party's* bond for the appearance of the accused without taking an undertaking from the accused himself—*Wadhawa Singh*, 29 Cr.L.J. 491 (492) (Lah). Such bond is invalid, and the person executing it incurs no legal liability if the accused absconds—*Ibid*.

Bond of agent :—Where the personal attendance of the accused is dispensed with, a recognizance bond, if deemed necessary, should be taken from him (and not from his agent) binding him to appear, either in person or by agent. A Magistrate has no legal authority to secure the attendance of the agent, by a bond taken from the agent—5 B.H.C.R. 64

497. (1) When any person accused of any non-

When bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offence.

bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station

or appears or is brought before a Court, he may be released on bail, but he shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or transportation for life :

Provided that the Court may direct that any person under the age of sixteen years or any woman or any sick or infirm person accused of such an offence be released on bail.

(2) If it appears to such officer or Court at any stage of the investigation, inquiry or trial, as the case may be, that there are not reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed a *non-bailable* offence, but that there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry into his guilt, the accused shall, pending such inquiry, be released on bail, or, at the discretion of such officer or Court, on the execution by him of a bond without sureties for his appearance as hereinafter provided.

(3) *An officer or a Court releasing any person on bail under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall record in writing his or its reasons for so doing.*

(4) *If at any time after the conclusion of the trial of a person accused of a non-bailable offence and before judgment is delivered, the Court is of opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of any such offence, it shall release the accused if he is in custody, on the execution by him of a bond without sureties for his appearance to hear judgment delivered.*

(5) *A High Court or Court of Session and in the case of a person released by itself, any other Court, may cause any person who has been released under this section to be arrested and may commit him to custody.*

Change.—This section has been amended by section 136 of the Criminal Pro. Code Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. In sub-section (1) the words "an offence punishable with death or transportation for life" have been substituted for the words "the offence of which he is accused"; the proviso and sub-sections (3) and (4) have been newly inserted; and the italicised words in sub-section (5) have been added. "It was pressed upon us that the provisions as to bail in non-bailable cases are much too stringent. One suggestion made to us was that in section 497 we should delete all words after "may be released on bail" in sub-section (1) and the whole of sub-section (2). The result would have been to give all Courts full discretion in the matter of allowing bail in non-bailable cases, and we felt generally that this was going too far. What we have done is to allow the Court or police-officer to release on bail a non-bailable case unless there appear to be reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or transportation, and, as some safe-guard against this, we have provided in sub-section (5) for a review by the Sessions Court or the High Court of any order admitting to bail in a non-bailable case."—*Report of the Joint Committee* (1922).

1310. Principle:—Under the old section the general rule was that bail was not to be taken in respect of non-bailable offences—*Nensî Hansraj*, 11 Bom.L.R. 420; *Narendra Lal*, 36 Cal. 166; *Har Chand*, 10 S.L.R. 208; 2 Weir 857. Under the present section, the Legislature by defining the offences under which bail is not to be granted (*viz.* offences punishable with death or transportation) has practically laid down that bail should ordinarily be granted, and that only in respect of the heinous offences mentioned above it will be refused. "This cannot but be regarded as the result of a liberalising influence on the policy of the Legislature, and the discretion of the Courts will henceforth be less fettered than before"—*In re Nagendra Nath*, 51 Cal. 402 (417). In view of the express provision contained in this section, it is not open to Courts in India to follow the principles laid down in the decisions of English Courts in determining matters of bail—*Narendra Lal*, 36 Cal. 166, 13 C.W.N. 43, *Gul*, 29 Cr.L.J. 470.

As the law stands now, it is no longer the case that bail ought to be refused merely because the offence is a non-bailable one. That rule is now restricted to offences punishable with death or transportation—28 O.C. 220. The mere fact that the offence is a serious one is not a ground for refusing bail. However serious an offence may be, if it is bailable and there is no likelihood of the accused absconding if released on bail, the seriousness of the offence would not alone justify a Court in refusing bail—*Abdul Habib*, 26 A.L.J. 363, 29 Cr.L.J. 450. Where the accused charged with a serious non-bailable offence is an old man and is a Government servant, and it is found that if he is not released on bail there would be nobody to instruct his counsel in going through the documentary evidence and that he would not be able to make a proper defence, held that bail should be granted—*Abhram Bali v. Emp.*, 28 O.C. 220, 12 O.L.J. 394, 26 Cr.L.J. 1286. But this matter is left to the discretion of the Court, and the Magistrate may in the exercise of this discretion refuse to grant bail to a person accused of a non-bailable offence—*Jumo v. Emp.*, 20 S.L.R. 136, 27 Cr.L.J. 859 (860). If a person who has been discharged after executing a security bond is re-arrested for a non-bailable offence, he should be granted bail—*Nathan*, 10 P.L.T. 801, 30 Cr.L.J. 809.

The discretionary power of the Court to admit to bail is not arbitrary but is judicial and is governed by established principles. In deciding whether bail should be granted, Courts should consider the seriousness of the charge, the nature of the evidence, the severity of the punishment prescribed for the offence, and in some instances the character, means and standing of the accused—*In re Nagendra Nath*, 51 Cal 402 (416), 38 C.L.J. 388, 25 Cr.L.J. 732, *Tularam*, 27 Cr.L.J. 1063 (1066).

Magistrates are bound to consider the nature of the offence charged, the character of the evidence against the prisoner, and the punishment which in the event of conviction is likely to be inflicted on the prisoner. The Magistrate may well refuse to enlarge on bail where the prisoner is likely to intimidate witnesses or where there are reasonable grounds for believing that he will use his liberty to suborn evidence—*Md. Eusoof v. Emp.*, 3 Rang. 538 (542), 27 Cr.L.J. 401, followed in *Emp. v. Nga San Htiwa*, 5 Rang. 276 (F.B.), 28 Cr.L.J. 773, *Achhaibar*, 27 A.L.J. 927, *Krishna Chandra*, 6 Pat 802, 28 Cr.L.J. 621. Where the accused was charged under sec. 307 I.P.C., and it was alleged that the accused might, if let on bail, assail the complainant, he should not be released on bail—*Naranji*, 30 Bom.L.R. 622, 29 Cr.L.J. 901.

'Reasonable grounds for believing' etc.—This section lays down that a person accused of a heinous offence like murder shall not be released on bail if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of the offence with which he is charged—*Nga San*, 5 Bur.L.J. 170, 28 Cr.L.J. 188. The section says nothing about taking into consideration the likelihood of the accused person absconding. All that the Court has to consider is whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is guilty—*Henderson*, 11 L.B.R. 172, 14

Cr L.J. 171. Other considerations may arise in deciding the question as to granting bail, and one of those considerations is whether there are any grounds for supposing that the accused would abscond. But the main question for consideration in determining matters of bail is whether there are reasonable grounds for believing the accused to be guilty—*Jamini v. K E.*, 36 Cal. 174; *Gul*, 29 Cr.L.J. 470 (471). Whether there are reasonable grounds or not for believing that the accused is guilty must be decided judicially, that is to say, there must be tangible evidence on which, if un rebutted, the Court might come to the conclusion that the accused might be convicted—*Jamini*, 36 Cal 174.

In determining matters of bail, the Appellate Court also should be guided by this principle. That Court should not refuse bail on the ground that the accused has been sentenced to a long term of imprisonment by the trying Court, or that the granting of bail has a tendency to increase the number of appeals and of protracting the appellate proceedings. The main question for consideration by the Appellate Court is whether there are reasonable grounds for believing the accused to be guilty of the offences charged—*Gul*, 29 Cr.L.J. 470 (471).

The phrase "an offence punishable with death or transportation for life" covers not only offences which are punishable with death as well as in the alternative with transportation for life, but also covers an offence which is punishable with transportation for life but not in the alternative with capital punishment. The phrase must be read *disjunctively*, as if it ran, "offence punishable with death, or punishable with transportation for life"—*Emp v. Nga San Hwa*, 5 Rang. 276 (F B), 28 Cr.L.J. 773 (overruling *Md Eusoof v Emp*, 3 Rang. 538, 27 Cr.L.J. 401), *Naranji*, *supra*.

Proviso.—"This clause provides for the grant of bail in any case at the discretion of the Court, if the accused is a minor, female, sick or infirm person"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914).

1311. Sub-section (2)—Bond for appearance:—When a Police officer takes a bond under this section, he has power to make it a condition of the bond that the accused person shall appear *before the police*; the law does not require that the accused person shall always be directed to appear before a Court. When the law enables a Police officer to take bonds, that officer can certainly direct the accused to appear before the police. To hold otherwise would be to render secs. 499 and 514 meaningless—*Kansai Ram*, 1913 P.R. 22, 14 Cr.L.J. 631. But in 11 Cal. 77 it has been held that a bond for appearance before a Police officer is void.

1312. Sub-section (4):—The reason for adding this sub-section has been thus stated by Mr Rangachariar (the mover of the amendment) "The reason for this amendment is this. As Honourable Members are aware, at the conclusion of the trial in the original Court, oftentimes judgment is not ready for delivery at once, but the Court has come to the conclusion, after taking the verdict of the assessors or the jury in a Sessions trial, or the Magistrate has made up his mind, that the

accused is not guilty and therefore proposes to acquit him. As sections 366 and 367 stand, a doubt has been expressed whether really the accused could be set at liberty before judgment is actually pronounced. In fact an unfortunate client of mine was acquitted like this and judgment was delivered a week later. The complainant took the matter up to the High Court and a Full Bench had to sit to consider the question whether the whole trial was not vitiated by such a procedure. In order to avoid such things, this provision is necessary"—*Legislative Assembly Debates*, 12th February 1923, page 2206

The Full Bench case referred to by Mr Rangachariar is *Sankaralingu v. Narayan*, 45 Mad. 913 (F.B.) In this case a trial was held with the aid of assessors, and they gave their opinions that the accused were not guilty. The Sessions Judge then wrote a short note setting forth the findings of the assessors, and adding his own finding agreeing with the assessors that the accused were not guilty, and they were acquitted. At a later date he wrote a full reasoned judgment. Held by the Full Bench that the procedure was a mere irregularity curable by section 537

The present sub-section validates such procedure, making it conditional on the accused to execute a bond for his appearance when judgment is to be delivered.

1313. Sub-section (5) —*Cancellation of bail*.—The Magistrate can cancel any bail allowed to an accused person and direct him to surrender, if it appears on the production of further evidence that a case is made out against him—*Johur Mull*, 10 C.W.N. 1093; *Jamini* 36 Cal. 174. The High Court and the Court of Session can cancel a bail granted by the Subordinate Court

But the District Magistrate has no power to cancel a bail and order the re-arrest of a person released on bail by a Subordinate Magistrate—4 Bur.L.T. 70. Sub-section (5) gives that power only to the High Court and the Court of Session

Under this clause, the powers of the High Court are confined to cases of persons released by the Trial Magistrate. Therefore, there is no jurisdiction in the High Court to entertain an application under this clause against an order granting bail passed by a Sessions Judge in a case pending before a sub-Magistrate. But under sec 561A the High Court has inherent power to interfere with an order granting bail passed by a Sessions Judge—*Local Govt. v. Gulam Jilani*, 25 Cr L J 1363 (Nag)

1314. Revision :—The proceedings in which it is, or has to be, determined whether bail from an accused person should be taken or not, fall within the definition of "judicial proceedings" and the High Court has power to interfere with the orders made in such proceedings when they prove to be illegal—*Manikam*, 11 Mad 63. But the District Magistrate cannot revise any order as to bail passed by a subordinate Magistrate under this section. If the District Magistrate considers the subordinate Magistrate's order to be wrong, he should report it to the High Court—*Sadashiv*, 22 Bom. 549

Even the High Court's power of interference is limited. The High Court has jurisdiction to interfere in revision, only if the Judge has passed an illegal order. Where a Sessions Judge after considering the evidence thinks that there are no reasonable grounds for believing the accused to be guilty of the offence of which he is accused, and releases him on bail, the High Court will not go behind this finding and cancel the order of the Judge releasing the accused on bail—*Thimma Reddi*, 10 M.L.J. 411; *Badri Prasad*, 5 A.L.J. 419, 8 Cr.L.J. 49. Similarly, if the Sessions Judge, after considering all the grounds of objection, has in his discretion refused to grant bail in case of a non-bailable offence, the High Court will not interfere and admit the accused to bail under sec. 493—*Nga San*, 5 Bur.L.J. 170, 28 Cr.L.J. 188. The High Court will be very cautious in interfering with the discretion of a Magistrate in case of bail under sec. 497, especially where the prosecution has not tendered evidence to connect the accused with the offence—*Ratanla* 892.

498. The amount of every bond executed under

Power to direct admission to bail or reduction of bail.

this Chapter shall be fixed with due regard to the circumstances of the case, and shall not be excessive; and the High Court or Court of Session may, in any case, whether there be an appeal on conviction or not, direct that any person be admitted to bail or that the bail required by a police officer or Magistrate be reduced.

Scope of section :—Under this section the High Court can only release the accused on bail or reduce the amount of bail, but cannot order the arrest or commitment to custody of any person who has been released on bail by the lower Courts—*Gulam Jilani*, 25 Cr.L.J. 1363 (Nag). The High Court can grant bail in cases pending anywhere in the Presidency—*Jumna v. Ramanathan*, 55 M.L.J. 690, 52 Mad. 52, A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 29 (30).

Amount of bond :—The amount of bond should be fixed with reference to the social status of the party concerned—*K. E v Kaung Nga*, 2 L.B.R. 235.

Granting of bail by Appellate Court :—When an accused person has been convicted of a non-bailable offence by a competent Court after a regular trial, the Appellate Court should not ordinarily release the accused on bail unless there is an error of law or a mistake or misstatement of fact apparent on the face of the record, or unless there exists any of the reasons mentioned in the proviso to sec 497 (1). But the Appellate Court should not refuse to grant bail merely on the ground that the accused has been sentenced to a long term of imprisonment by the trial Court, or that the granting of bail has a tendency to increase the number of appeals and of protracting the appellate proceedings—*Gul*, 29 Cr.L.J. 470 (471, 472).

1315. Powers of High Court and Sessions Court :—This section gives the High Court and the Court of Session very wide powers to admit an accused person to bail in any case even when he is charged with a non-bailable offence—*K. E. v. Badri Prasad*, 5 A.L.J. 419, 8 Cr.L.J. 49; 2 Weir 657; 7 Bur.L.R. 86. The powers of the High Court or the Court of Session given by section 498 are not controlled by the statutory limitation laid down in sec. 497 of refusing bail if there appear reasonable grounds for believing the accused to be guilty of an offence punishable with death or transportation for life. The powers in sec. 498 are not fettered by any rules defining the limits within which they would be exercised, as the powers under sec. 497 are—*Bishambhar Nath v. Emp.*, 11 O.L.J. 527, 1 O.W.N. 281, 25 Cr.L.J. 1132; *Fateh Singh*, 51 All. 603, 30 Cr.L.J. 697; *Achnaibar*, 27 A.L.J. 927, 30 Cr.L.J. 718 (719). But the Calcutta High Court holds that although the power of the High Court under this section to grant bail 'in any case' is quite unfettered, still in exercising its discretion the High Court ought to take into consideration the limitations imposed by Sec. 497—*Sourindra*, 37 Cal. 412, 14 C.W.N. 512. This case has been followed by the Nagpur Court in *Sh. Karim v. Emp.*, 27 Cr.L.J. 319. (But now the limitations imposed by Sec. 497 are very few). The rule laid down in sec. 497 for the guidance of Courts other than High Courts is a rule founded upon justice and equity, and one which should be followed by the High Court as well as by every other Court, unless anything appears to the contrary. The extended powers given to the High Court under Sec. 498 are not to be used to get rid of this very reasonable and proper provision of the law—*Ashraf Ali*, 42 Cal. 25, 16 Cr.L.J. 1215. In another case the Calcutta High Court has held that in exercising its discretion under sec. 498 the High Court should not confine its attention to the question whether the prisoner is likely to abscond or not. Other circumstances may also affect the question of granting bail to accused persons charged with crimes of a grave character—*Narendra Lal Khan*, 36 Cal. 166, 13 C.W.N. 43, 9 Cr.L.J. 375. The Rangoon High Court holds that although the High Court has absolute discretion in the matter of granting bail, and is not bound by the provision of sec. 497, still the Legislature having placed the initial stage of dealing with crimes with Magistrates and having in fact enacted that persons accused of non-bailable offences shall not be released on bail except under the terms of sec. 497, the High Court is bound to follow the general law as a rule, and not to depart from it except under very special circumstances—*Boudville v. K. E.*, 2 Rang. 546 (547); *Emp. v. Nga San Htwin*, 5 Rang. 276 (F.B.), 28 Cr.L.J. 773, *Henderson v. K. E.*, 11 Bur.L.T. 73, 14 Cr.L.J. 171. In an earlier Sind case it was held that the High Court when passing order under Sec. 498 was not limited by the restrictions imposed by Sec. 497, that bail should not as a matter of principle be granted in non-bailable cases except in special circumstances; and that the discretion given under Sec. 498 was one that should be exercised according to the exigencies of each case—*Harchand v. Crown*, 18 Cr.L.J. 642, 10 S.L.R. 208. But in a recent Sind case it has been held that though sec. 498 gives wide powers to

the High Court granting bail, it should be interpreted as controlled by the provision of sec. 497—*Gul*, 29 Cr.L.J. 470 (471) (following 37 Cal. 412 and 42 Cal. 25). When the High Court is concerned with persons who have been actually convicted, the principle which will necessarily guide the High Court in granting bail will be whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the convicts committed the offences in question—*Sh Karim v Emp*, 27 Cr.L.J. 319 (Nag.).

The High Court and the Court of Session can exercise their power of granting bail, as soon as the Police have arrested the accused and even before the case is sent up to the Magistrate—7 Bur.L.R. 86. They can admit a person to bail even where he has been convicted and has not appealed—*Badri Prasad*, 8 Cr.L.J. 49, 5 A.L.J. 419. Where the accused relies merely on a technical ground against the probability of his conviction, he should not be admitted to bail—*Ratanlal* 480. The High Court refused to grant bail, where the application for bail contained defamatory statements and allegations consisting of attacks on the trying Magistrate and on the public and private conduct of other officers of high rank—*Clive Durant*, 15 Bom. 488.

Grant of bail pending appeal to Privy Council:—Where the accused obtained special leave from the Privy Council to appeal to that tribunal, and applied for bail to the Judicial Committee, and the Judicial Committee expressed an opinion that the matter should be decided by the High Court, whereupon the petitioner applied to the High Court for bail, held that the High Court had jurisdiction to make an order in the case releasing the accused on bail, pending the decision of the Privy Council—*Q. E. v. Subrahmanya Ayyar*, 24 Mad. 161. But when in a case the petitioner has no right to appeal to the Privy Council, and the High Court has no power to give leave to appeal to that tribunal, the High Court cannot, after it confirms the conviction of the Court below, admit the petitioner to bail, simply because he *proposes to apply* (but has not yet applied) to the Judicial Committee for leave to appeal to the Privy Council. It cannot do so even under clause 41 of the Letters Patent. As soon as the High Court confirms the conviction on appeal or revision, it becomes *functus officio*, and has no jurisdiction afterwards to grant bail in order that a petition for leave to appeal may be made to His Majesty in Council, or until the petition for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council is disposed of—*Tulsi Telini v Emp*, 50 Cal. 585; *Diwan Chand v. K. E.*, 1908 P.R. 15; *Hanmantao v Emp*, 21 N.L.R. 161, 27 Cr.L.J. 185. The High Court has inherent jurisdiction (under sec. 561A) to grant bail to an accused who has filed an application to the Judicial Committee for special leave to appeal to the Privy Council, but has not yet obtained the leave; but it would be proper for the High Court to wait till the Privy Council has granted the special leave, and then to grant bail on a fresh application being made—*Ram Saroop v. Emp*, 49 All. 247, 25 A.L.J. 97, 27 Cr.L.J. 1377.

1316. Power of Sessions Judge:—The Sessions Judge can grant bail to 'any person' who has been wrongly convicted by the Magistrate, and whose case he can either deal with himself or can refer to the

High Court. But the words 'any person' do not include a person convicted by the Sessions Judge himself. When a Sessions Judge, after convicting the accused, released them on bail pending their appeal to the High Court, it was held that he had no jurisdiction to do so. This section does not give him power to alter or vary his own order—*Basappa*, 4 Bom. L.R. 55.

The Sessions Judge has power to admit the petitioners to bail in any case, e.g., on a reference under section 123 (2). It stands to reason that if in the case of a person who is convicted and who has preferred an appeal, bail is allowable, bail can similarly be allowed in the case of a person against whom an order has been made under sec 118, which order is liable to be revised by the Sessions Judge under section 123, sub-section (2)—*Ahmed Ali Sardar v Emp*, 50 Cal 969.

The admission to bail is a matter within the discretion of the Sessions Judge, and where the Judge uses his discretion with proper care, the High Court will decline to interfere—*K E. v Badri Prasad*, 5 A L J. 419, 8 Cr.L J 49; *Sh Karim v Emp*, 27 Cr L J 319 (Nag).

499. (1) Before any person is released on bail or released on his own bond, a bond for such sum of money as the police officer or Court, as the case may be, thinks sufficient shall be executed by such person, and, when he is released on bail, by one or more sufficient sureties conditioned that such person shall attend at the time and place mentioned in the bond, and shall continue so to attend until otherwise directed by the police-officer or Court, as the case may be.

(2) If the case so require, the bond shall also bind the person released on bail to appear when called upon at the High Court, Court of Session or other Court to answer the charge.

1317. Time and place—A bail-bond must contain the time and place of appearance—1885 A W N 44

There is nothing illegal in requiring the accused to bind himself to appear from the date of the execution of the bail-bond on every day until the case is disposed of. No notice is necessary before proceeding to enforce the penalty if default is made—6 M H C ■ App 38.

Verbal direction to appear—By the terms of a bail-bond the defendant bound himself to appear 'on the first inquiry or at other time required'. He appeared on the first day of the inquiry and was verbally directed to appear on a subsequent date, but failed to do so. It was held that the amount secured by the bond could be legally forfeited by of such non-attendance—*Haslavaram-Subba Reddi*, 2 Weir 658. ✓

Omission of date by surety:—In a bail-bond, the accused person bound himself to appear on a specified date, and below his signature was the undertaking by the surety that he would cause the accused's appearance, but this declaration did not mention the date for the accused's appearance. The accused having made default, the security was forfeited. It was held that the bail-bond and the undertaking by the surety should be read as one document, and the undertaking should be read as referring to the date mentioned in the portion of the bond signed by the accused, that the omission of date by surety was immaterial, and that therefore the security was rightly forfeited—*Mappillai Kader*, 19 Cr.L.J. 687 (Mad.).

Appearance before Police:—The words 'until otherwise directed by the Police officer' shew that a bond under sec. 497 may require the accused to appear before the Police, the direction as to appearance is not limited to appearance before a Court—*Kansai Ram*, 1913 P.R. 22, 14 Cr.L.J. 631.

500. (1) As soon as the bond has been executed, the person for whose appearance it has been executed shall be released; and, when he is in jail, the Court admitting him to bail shall issue an order of release to the officer in charge of the jail, and such officer on receipt of the order shall release him.

(2) Nothing in this section, section 496 or section 497 shall be deemed to require the release of any person liable to be detained for some matter other than that in respect of which the bond was executed.

501. If, through mistake, fraud or otherwise, insufficient sureties have been accepted, or if they afterwards become insufficient, the Court may issue a warrant of arrest directing that the person released on bail be brought before it and may order him to find sufficient sureties, and, on his failing so to do, may commit him to jail.

1318. Scope:—This section applies only to a case where there were sureties; it does not apply where the accused was let out on his own bond, without any surety—*Karathan Ambalam*, 33 Mad 1088, 17 Cr L J. 132

Insufficient sureties—A Magistrate is justified in increasing the amount of bail if by further inquiry the case turns out more serious than he at first imagined—*Sita Ram v. Govind*, 1912 P.L.R. 66, 13 Cr.L.J. 474.

502. (1) All or any sureties for the attendance and

Discharge of sureties appearance of a person released on bail may at any time apply to a Magistrate to discharge the bond, either wholly or so far as relates to the applicants.

(2) On such application being made, the Magistrate shall issue his warrant of arrest directing that the person so released be brought before him

(3) On the appearance of such person pursuant to the warrant, or on his voluntary surrender, the Magistrate shall direct the bond to be discharged either wholly or so far as relates to the applicants, and shall call upon such person to find other sufficient sureties, and, if he fails to do so, may commit him to custody

Where a surety has applied for cancellation of the bail-bond and the Magistrate has received the application, there is no other alternative left to the Magistrate than to cancel the bail-bond. There is no need to hear the application on the merits, and the Magistrate cannot dismiss it because of the applicant's failure to attend and plead - *Narayan Shivram*, 9 Bom L.R. 1285, 7 Cr L.J. 24.

CHAPTER XL.

OF COMMISSIONS FOR THE EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES.

503. (1) Whenever, in the course of an inquiry, a

When attendance of witness may be dispensed with. trial or any other proceeding under this Code, it appears to a Presidency Magistrate, a District Magistrate, a Court of Session or the High Court that the examination of a witness is necessary for the ends of justice, and that the attendance of such witness cannot be procured without an amount of delay, expense or inconvenience which, under the circumstances of the case, would be unreasonable, such Magistrate or Court

may dispense with such attendance and may issue a commission to any District Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such witness resides, to take the evidence of such witness.

(2) When the witness resides in the territories of any Prince or Chief in India in which there is an officer representing the British Indian Government, the commission may be issued to such officer.

(3) The Magistrate or officer to whom the commission is issued, or, if he is the District Magistrate, he or such Magistrate of the first class as he appoints in this behalf, shall proceed to the place where the witness is or shall summon the witness before him, and shall take down his evidence in the same manner, and may for this purpose exercise the same powers, as in trials of warrant cases under this Code.

(4) Where the commission is issued to such officer as is mentioned in sub-section (2), he may delegate his powers and duties under this commission to any officer subordinate to him whose powers are not less than those of a Magistrate of the first class in British India.

1319. Scope of section.—This section provides for the issue of a commission to examine a witness in British India or in the territories of any Prince or Chief in India in which there is an officer representing the British Government. This section does not provide for the examination of a witness residing outside India—5 Bom. 338, *Emp. v Abdul*, 49 Bom. 878, 27 Bom L.R. 1373, 10 Cr.L.J. 571 (All).

This section relates to the issue of a commission and does not empower the trying Magistrate himself to go to the house of a witness to examine him—2 S.L.R. 8, 10 Cr.L.J. 211.

'In the course of inquiry' :—A committing Magistrate is competent to examine a witness in the course of the inquiry before himself. But after making the order of committal, he has no jurisdiction to issue a commission for taking evidence so that it might be available at the trial before the Court of Session or High Court. After a commitment is made, applications for the examination of witnesses on commission must be made to the High Court or to the particular Judge exercising original criminal jurisdiction in the High Court or to the Court of Session, as the case may be—*Jacob*, 19 Cal 113; *Ramchandra*, 19 Bom. 749.

the fact that she avoided the civil remedy and chose to set the criminal law in motion materially altered her position as regards the question whether she should be exempted from personal appearance, and the accused had a right and a privilege to have her evidence taken in his presence in the Court—*Faridunnissa*, 5 All. 92.

1321. Delay, expense or inconvenience :—The taking of evidence on commission in criminal cases ought to be most sparingly resorted to. Such a procedure may be adopted only in extreme cases of delay, expense or inconvenience—*Faridunnissa*, 5 All. 92. If a witness is unable to attend the Court owing to illness (e.g. weak heart and a painful internal malady) the proper course for the Magistrate would be to first ascertain whether it would be possible for the witness to come to Court within a reasonable time, and if not possible, then the Magistrate will have to reluctantly come to the conclusion that his evidence should be taken on commission—*Jamuna Singh v. K. E.*, 3 Pat. 591 (594). Where the evidence of two witnesses was a most material one in the case, in as much as they deposed to the identification of the stolen property, on which deposition the whole case depended, the witnesses ought not to have been examined on commission but their attendance before the Court ought to have been procured, and the expense of Rs 500 in procuring their attendance was not considered to be unreasonable or excessive, having regard to the circumstances of the case—*Burke*, 6 All. 224.

'May issue'—Discretion of Court :—The issue of a commission for examination is entirely in the discretion of the Court. In criminal cases, the issue of a commission would be a most unsatisfactory course of proceeding, and one dangerous to the interests of the community—8 Cal. 896. The issue of commission is an unsatisfactory proceeding, because on the one hand the Court has no opportunity of noting the demeanour of witness, and on the other hand, of controlling irrelevant and unnecessary or harassing cross-examination of the witness. The discretion to issue a commission should be sparingly exercised, and only in cases of real hardship and inconvenience, having due regard to the prejudice which is likely to be thereby caused to the opponent—*Vishnoo v. Dipchand*, 20 S.L.R. 28, 27 Cr.L.J. 89.

Sub-section (3) :—Where the Magistrate issues commission for the examination of a witness in a Native State, the officer representing the British Indian Government is bound either to proceed where the witness is, or to summon such witness before him; or he may delegate his functions to any officer subordinate to him. But he cannot decline to execute the commission on the ground of inconvenience or some other similar reason. The provisions of sub-section (3) are mandatory in this respect. Thus, the officer cannot refuse to execute the commission on the ground that there is no Resident Political Officer in that State who can execute the commission, for the Cr. P. Code nowhere speaks of a 'Resident Political Officer'—*Sikandar*, 11 Lah. 347, 29 Cr.L.J. 202.

1322. Sub-section (4)—Delegation :—This sub-section has been newly added to the Code in 1899. Under the Code of 1852, when a commission was issued to an officer representing the British Indian Government for the examination of a witness residing in a Native State, he could not delegate his powers and duties under the commission to his sub-ordinate, but had to personally execute such commission—1890 A.W.N. 106. The present sub-section provides for such delegation.

Commissioner cannot make complaint under sec. 195 .—Although the commissioner appointed under this section may be a 'Court' for the purpose of issuing process against the witness and for recording evidence, still he is not a 'Court' within the meaning of sec. 105. Therefore where a witness gives false evidence before such commissioner, the proper authority to make a complaint for the prosecution of the witness for perjury is not the commissioner but the Court which issued the commission—*Saddul Ali*, 11 C.W.N. 909, 6 Cr.L.J. 160.

504. (1) If the witness is within the local limits of the jurisdiction of any Presidency Magistrate, the Magistrate or Court issuing the commission may direct the same to such Presidency Magistrate, who thereupon may compel the attendance of, and examine, such witness as if he were a witness in a case pending before himself.

(1A) When a commission is issued under this section to a Chief Presidency Magistrate, he may delegate his powers and duties under the commission to any Presidency Magistrate subordinate to him.

(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the power of the High Court to issue commissions under the Slave Trade Act, 1876, section 3.

Change —In sub-section (1) the word 'such' has been substituted for "the said," and sub-section (1A) has been newly added, by section 137 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act XVIII of 1923. "This clause enables a Chief Presidency Magistrate to delegate to a subordinate Presidency Magistrate his powers and duties under any commission issued in his name"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914)

505. (1) The parties to any proceeding under this Code in which a commission is issued, may respectively forward any interrogatories in writing which the Magistrate or Court directing the commission may think relevant to the issue, and the Magistrate or

Parties may examine witnesses.

to whom the commission is directed or to whom the duty of executing such commission has been delegated, shall examine the witness upon such interrogatories.

(2) Any such party may appear before such Magistrate or officer by pleader, or if not in custody, in person, and may examine, cross-examine and re-examine (as the case may be) the said witness.

Change :—The italicised words have been added by section 138 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act XVIII of 1923. This amendment is consequential to the amendment made in sec. 504.

506. "Whenever, in the course of an inquiry or a trial or any other proceeding under this Code before any Magistrate other than a Presidency Magistrate or District Magistrate, it appears that a commission ought to be issued for the examination of a witness whose evidence is necessary for the ends of justice, and that the attendance of such witness cannot be procured without an amount of delay, expense or inconvenience which, under the circumstances of the case, would be unreasonable, such Magistrate shall apply to the District Magistrate, stating the reasons for the application; and the District Magistrate may either issue a commission in the manner hereinbefore provided or reject the application.

1323. Where a case is pending before a subordinate Magistrate, the District Magistrate cannot issue a commission for the examination of a witness in that case, without a reference by the subordinate Magistrate under this section—2 S.L.R. 8, 10 Cr.L.J. 211. A Magistrate can take action under this section if the evidence of the witness is necessary, but not otherwise—*Dinabandhu v. Hasan Ali*, 33 C.W.N. 1088.

507. (1) After any commission issued under Sec. 503 or Sec. 506 has been duly executed, it shall be returned, together with the deposition of the witness examined thereunder, to the Court out of which it issued; and the commission, the return thereto and the deposition shall be open at all reasonable times to inspection of the parties, and may, subject to all just exceptions, be read in evidence in the case by either party, and shall form part of the record.

(2) Any deposition so taken, if it satisfies the conditions prescribed by Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, may also be received in evidence at any subsequent stage of the case before another Court.

1324. Sub-section (2) — Admissibility of evidence taken on commission:—This section has been enacted on the basis of the judgment in 19 Bom. 749. Under the 1892 Code, evidence taken under a commission issued by the Chief Presidency Magistrate during the course of an inquiry before him was held inadmissible at the trial of the same case at the High Court Sessions—*Q E v Jacob*, 19 Cal 113. This difficulty has been removed by this sub-section.

Evidence taken on commission is admissible in a trial of a seaman for an offence committed on the High Seas—*Barton*, 16 Cal 238.

508. In every case in which a commission is issued under Sec. 503 or Sec. 506, the inquiry, trial or other proceeding may be adjourned for a specified time reasonably sufficient for the execution and return of the commission.

Adjournment of inquiry or trial. When a commission has been issued, the trial should be postponed till the return of the commission. The trial and commission cannot go together. The discretion given by this section to adjourn proceedings ought to be exercised in a reasonable manner. The accused person should not be detained for an unnecessarily long time—See *Jacob*, 19 Cal. 113.

CHAPTER XLI.

SPECIAL RULES OF EVIDENCE.

509. (1) The deposition of a Civil Surgeon or other medical witness taken and attested by a Magistrate in the presence of the accused, or taken on commission under Chapter XL, may be given in evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, although the deponent is not called as a witness.

Deposition of medical witness.

Power to summon medical witness.

(2) The Court may, if it thinks fit, summon and examine deponent as to the subject of his deposition.

1325. Deposition :—It is only the *deposition* of a Civil Surgeon that can be taken in evidence; the only opinion of the Civil Surgeon which can be considered in judicially dealing with the case is an opinion expressed by him when examined as a witness under the usual tests to which witnesses are subjected. The Civil Surgeon's *letter* addressed to the Sessions Judge expressing an opinion as to the nature of the wound inflicted upon the deceased, is extra-judicial matter and cannot be received in evidence—*Samiruddin*, 5 Cal. 211. So also, the *certificate* of a medical officer as to the cause of the death of a person and of the fatal character of the wounds is no evidence—2 Weir 659. The *report* of a Medical man on his *post mortem* examination cannot be treated as evidence, though it may be used by him to refresh his memory when giving evidence—*Roghuni*, 11 Cal. 455. A paper which purports to be the substance of a report from a subordinate medical officer with an expression of concurrence by the Civil Surgeon cannot be used as evidence, although the examination of a medical witness written in proper form may be so used—*Chintamonee*, 11 W.R. 2. A certificate granted by the Professor of a Medical College as regards the bones submitted to him for examination is not admissible in evidence. He must be examined as a witness—*Ahilya Manaji*, 24 Bom.L.R. 803.

1326. 'Taken and attested' .—Before the deposition of a medical witness given before the committing Magistrate can be admitted in the Sessions Court, it must either appear in the Magistrate's record or must be proved by the evidence of witnesses to have been taken and attested in the prisoner's presence. It should not be merely presumed under sec. 114 Illustration (e) of the Evidence Act to have been so taken and attested—*Riding*, 9 All 720.

'By a Magistrate' .—The deposition may be attested by a Magistrate, *i.e.*, any Magistrate, not necessarily by the committing Magistrate while holding the preliminary inquiry—1893 A.W.N. 180.

'In the presence of the accused' :—To render it admissible in evidence, the deposition of a witness in a criminal case should be taken and attested by the Magistrate in the presence of the accused—*Kachali Hari*, 18 Cal. 129; *Jhubboo Mahton*, 11 Cal. 739. The evidence of a Medical officer given before a committing Magistrate is not admissible in the Sessions Court where the committing Magistrate does not certify that the evidence was given in the presence of the accused—4 C.W.N. 49. In the absence of proof that the deposition was taken and attested by the Magistrate in the presence of the accused, it cannot be presumed, under sec. 80 or sec. 114 Illustration (e) of the Evidence Act, that the deposition was so taken and attested—*Kachali Hari*, 18 Cal 129; *Pohp Singh*, 10 All. 174. The examination of a medical witness taken in the absence of the accused is inadmissible in evidence. When, however, there is sufficient *prima facie* evidence to warrant a commitment to the Sessions Court, and the evidence of the medical witness is likely to be only of a formal character, and great inconvenience would result from his being summoned to a Magistrate's Court, the examination need

not be taken before a Magistrate, but his attendance before the Sessions Court must be secured. Under all other circumstances the Magistrate should invariably record the evidence of the medical witness before himself—Ratanlal 81.

In order to secure compliance with the provisions of this section, Magistrates are hereby directed to sign at the foot of the deposition of medical witnesses a *certificate* in the following form.—“The foregoing deposition was taken in the presence of the accused (name) who had an opportunity of cross-examining the witness. The deposition was explained to the accused, and was attested by me in his presence”—*Cal G. R. & C. O.* page 14, *C. P. Cr. Cir.*, Part II, No 55; *N. W. P. H. C. Cr. Cir.*, Para. 38, p. 17.

Deposition should be carefully recorded—“The statement of a medical witness, if taken and attested by the Magistrate in the presence of the accused, is admissible as evidence in the Sessions Court, although the medical witness is not himself called. It ought therefore to be recorded with the utmost care and accuracy—*Bharat*, 20 O C 61, 18 Cr.L.J. 380

1327. Value of medical evidence :—Mere theories of medical witnesses should not be accepted as against proved facts. It would be improper for a Judge to reject facts which were proved by the evidence of certain witnesses, merely because a medical officer gave his opinion that what the witnesses deposed to could not be true—11 W.R. 25 Medical experts and others such as Judges who have to form opinions and exercise their judgment should have regard primarily to the facts and not draw upon their imagination; otherwise the administration of justice would depend upon their individual idiosyncrasies and become unstable and unworkable—*Emp. v Yunus Ali*, 32 C.W.N 783 (787). A Judge is not entitled to discard the direct evidence of credible and unimpeachable witnesses who depose that with their own eyes they saw certain things done, merely upon the strength of the opinion of a medical witness that those things could not have been done—1889 A.W.N 74. On the other hand, in a case of murder, the medical evidence as to the cause of death should never as a matter of precaution be dispensed with, although the accused admits having killed the deceased and pleads extenuating circumstances—*Agra M A* 2nd January 1862, ¶ 1.

1328. Sub-section (2) .—*Summoning of medical witness* — In a case of murder or man-slaughter, where the medical report is inconsistent with the prosecution evidence, it is the duty of the prosecution to call the medical officer himself or to give other medical evidence in the hearing of the jury, and not to stand merely on the deposition given by the medical officer before the committing Magistrate in its recorded form. It is unreasonable to expect the jury to convict if a proper exposition and explanation of the medical evidence is not given *viva voce* by a doctor who can deal with the matter and satisfy the jury—*Debendra Narayan*, 56 Cal 566, 33 C.W.N. 632, 30 Cr L.J. 1031 (1033). The recorded deposition of a medical witness should be carefully scrutinized by the Sessions Judge, and if it appears that the deposition is essential

deficient or requires further explanation or elucidation, the Judge should summon and examine the witness—*Bharat*, 20 O.C. 61, 18 Cr L J 380.

In all cases of murder, the committing Magistrate should bind over the medical witnesses to attend at the Sessions, unless grave inconvenience will be caused thereby—Rule 204 of *Mad. Rules of Practice*

"If Magistrates carefully and fully record the medical evidence, there will be no necessity for summoning the medical witness to attend before the Sessions Court,, except for special reason in particular cases. The accused persons or their pleaders should be asked at the time of commitment whether they wish to have the medical witness summoned before the Sessions Court or whether they consider that the evidence recorded by the Magistrate, which should be carefully attested in their presence, is sufficient. If they desire the personal attendance of the medical witness, this should be regarded as a sufficient reason for summoning him"—*Cal G. R. & C. O.*, p 14

510. Any document purporting to be a report under the hand of any Chemical Examiner or Assistant Chemical Examiner to Government, upon any matter or thing duly submitted to him for examination or analysis and report in the course of any proceeding under this Code, may be used as evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code.

1329. Report —The report must be the original report of the Chemical Examiner, bearing his signature, and not a copy of the report; and it must be signed by the Chemical Examiner—15 W.R. 49

Where a matter containing poison was submitted to the Chemical Examiner, his report in order to be admissible in evidence must purport to be signed by the officer who detected the poison in the matter and who from personal knowledge could certify to the correctness of the result embodied in the report—2 Weir 681.

'Any Chemical Examiner':—The word 'any' includes an Additional Chemical Examiner. The word 'any' did not occur in the earlier Code, and it was therefore held in *Q. E. v. Autal Muchi*, 10 Cal 1026 that the report of an Additional Chemical Examiner could not be received in evidence.

Identity of articles examined:—When committing cases, a Magistrate must take care to send up evidence to prove that a body sent to the hospital for *post mortem* examination is really the body of the person referred to in the case under trial, or that an article analysed by the Chemical Examiner was actually the article sent to him for analysis in the case under trial. A Sessions Judge must insist upon being furnished with such evidence, and must not record either the chemical analysis report or the evidence of the medical officer until the connecting links requisite

render them admissible have been established—*Nga Pya*, 1 Bur. L.R. 634; *Q. E. v. Autal Muchi*, 10 Cal. 1026; *Chukkarpalli Ramayya v. Emp.*, 20 M.L.J. 657, 1 Cr.L.J. 222; *Md. Din v. Emp.*, 26 P.L.R. 748, 26 Cr.L.J. 1420. A Sessions Judge is bound to warn the jury, that before using the Chemical Examiner's report, they must be satisfied on the evidence that the substances examined were in fact what they were said to be—*Ojel Molla v. Emp.*, 18 C.W.N. 180, 15 Cr.L.J. 147.

511. In any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, a previous conviction or acquittal may be proved, in addition to any other mode provided by any law for the time being in force—

Previous conviction or acquittal how proved.

(a) by an extract certified, under the hand of the officer having the custody of the records of the Court in which such conviction or acquittal was had, to be a copy of the sentence or order; or,

(b) in case of a conviction, either by a certificate signed by the officer in charge of the jail, in which the punishment or any part thereof was inflicted, or by production of the warrant of commitment under which the punishment was suffered;

together with, in each of such cases, evidence as to the identity of the accused person with the person so convicted or acquitted.

1330. Proof of previous convictions—Before passing sentences, it is desirable and necessary that if there are previous convictions they should properly be proved—*Turimella*, 17 Cr.L.J. 179. Magistrates are not absolved from the ordinary rules of evidence in taking proof of previous convictions. Whenever it is required to prove a previous conviction against a man, whether it be for the purpose of enhancement of punishment under section 75 I. P. C., or in proceedings under Chap. VIII of the Cr. P. C., such previous conviction must be proved strictly and in accordance with law. Unless it is so proved, no Court can properly take such previous conviction into consideration—43 Cal. 1128. Previous convictions should, regard being had to the provisions of this section, be proved by copies of judgments or extracts from judgments or by any other documentary evidence of the fact of such previous convictions, and the examination of the accused in respect of those convictions is, having regard to sec. 342, without legal warrant or jurisdiction—*Yasin*, 28 Cal. 689; *Alloomiya*, 28 Bom. 129. Previous conviction should be proved by one of the modes laid down in this

section The Court should not be satisfied only with the admission of the accused—*Dayaram*, 30 P.L.R. 530, 30 Cr.L.J. 1082.

When the previous conviction has been put to the accused and he denies it, the certified extract from the records of the Court in which he was convicted should be put in evidence; proof should be given that he and the person named therein are one and the same person, and the Court should record a specified finding upon that point—1881 A.W.N. 144; *Tuki Mahomed v. Kishto*, 15 W.R. 53. But a mere *Kaifiat* from the record office is not sufficient to prove a previous conviction—*Tuki Mahomed v. Kisto*, 15 W.R. 53.

Finger-impressions.—The manner in which a previous conviction may be proved is not limited to the method laid down by this section. Any relevant evidence upon which the Court can properly base a finding that the accused was on a previous occasion convicted of an offence will do as well as the method indicated by this section. Thus, a previous conviction may be proved by *finger-impressions*. See *Emp. v. Sahadeo*, 3 N.L.R. 1, 5 Cr.L.J. 220; *Murti Roy*, 6 C.P.L.R. 3; *Abdul Hamid*, 32 Cal. 759, *Fakir Mahomed*, 1 C.W.N. 33; 1906 P.L.R. 3. If the identity of the accused is to be proved by a comparison of finger-prints, the one taken in Court being compared with certain finger-prints contained in the record of previous convictions, there ought to be evidence to prove the similarity between the two, and the identification of the last-mentioned finger-prints as those of the person who has been previously convicted—*Ramdas v. K. E.*, 21 C.W.N. 469, 16 Cr.L.J. 462. The papillary ridges on the bulbs of the fingers and thumbs, by means of which finger-impressions are made, while proved to be almost beyond change from birth to death, are never wholly repeated in the case of the fingers of any other person, and they therefore furnish a surer test of identity than any other comparable bodily feature. Where two prints made on different occasions resemble one another in the *minutiae*, and contain no points of disagreement, an irresistible conclusion arises that they were made by the same finger—*Emp. v. Sahadeo*, 3 N.L.R. 1, 5 Cr.L.J. 220.

512. (1) If it is proved that an accused person has absconded, and that there is no

Record of evidence in
absence of accused.

immediate prospect of arresting him, the Court competent to try or commit for trial such person for the offence complained of may, in his absence, examine the witnesses (if any) produced on behalf of the prosecution, and record their depositions. Any such deposition may, on the arrest of such person, be given in evidence against him on the inquiry into, or trial for, the offence with which he is charged, if the deponent is dead or incapable of giving

evidence or his attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay, expense or inconvenience which, under the circumstances of the case, would be unreasonable.

(2) If it appears that an offence punishable with death or transportation has been committed by some person or persons unknown, the High Court may direct that any Magistrate of the first class shall hold an inquiry and examine any witnesses who can give evidence concerning the offence. Any depositions so taken may be given in evidence against any person who is subsequently accused of the offence, if the deponent is dead or incapable of giving evidence or beyond the limits of British India.

1331. Scope of section.—This section has been specially enacted for enabling the Magistrate to record evidence in the absence of an absconding accused, and therefore a Magistrate cannot reject an application of the complainant to summon witnesses or to call on them to produce documents, because the accused has absconded—2 Bom L.R. 707.

The Magistrates can only record the evidence, and cannot convict or sentence the accused in his absence—1917 P R 36

A pardon can be tendered to an approver under sec. 337 even though the principal accused has absconded; in such a case, the approver's evidence will be recorded under this section—46 Bom 120.

Proof of absconding.—In order to give jurisdiction to the Court to examine witnesses in the absence of the accused, it must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the accused has absconded and that there is no immediate prospect of arresting him—1890 A W N 100, 1896 A W. N. 182. So, where evidence was recorded by the Magistrate while there was no proof that the accused had absconded, there was no judicial proceeding, and any witness giving false evidence therein could not be prosecuted for an offence under sec 193 I. P. C.—*Emp. v Makhni*, 1890 A. W. N. 100.

According to the Lahore High Court, to satisfy the requirements of this section, all that is necessary is that it should be proved that the accused has absconded, and it is not necessary that a finding should be given by the Court to that effect—*Daya Ram v Emp.*, 11 Lah 489, 27 Cr L J 247, 26 P.L.R. 845. But in an earlier case the Punjab Chief Court held that where the accused had absconded, the Court should take evidence as if the accused person having absconded, and should record a finding to that effect. In the absence of such proof and finding, the recording of the deposition of witnesses in the absence of the accused was illegal—*Wahid v Emp.*, 1883 P.R. 21. The Allahabad High Court also holds that the

finding that the accused has absconded *should be recorded as a condition precedent* by the Magistrate who takes the evidence under sec 512—*Sheoraj v. Emp.*, 48 All 375, 27 Cr.L.J. 874. The Court which records the deposition under sec. 512 must first of all *record an order* that in its opinion it has been proved that the accused has absconded—*Emp v Rustam*, 38 All. 29, 13 A.L.J. 1043, 10 Cr.L.J. 801. It is sufficient if the Magistrate records a finding that the accused has absconded; it is not necessary to *record further that there is no immediate prospect of arresting him*. And so, where the Magistrate recorded a clear finding that the accused had absconded, the mere fact that he did not recite in his order a finding that there was no immediate prospect of arresting the accused, would not render the evidence taken in the absence of the accused inadmissible against them when arrested—*Bhagwati v. Emp.*, 41 All. 60, 16 A.L.J. 902, 20 Cr.L.J. 8. In *Gharbin v. Q. E.*, 10 Cal 1097, the Calcutta High Court has laid down that evidence can be recorded against the accused in his absence, only if the fact of his absconding is alleged, tried and established before the deposition is recorded; but nothing is said in this case as to whether the Court should record a *finding* as to the absconding of the accused, as in fact the evidence in this case was not recorded under sec. 512.

Value of the deposition given in absence of accused—The latter part of sub-section (1) seems clearly to indicate that the witnesses who were examined during the absence of the absconding accused should be examined in the presence of the accused, when he is found, unless it is impracticable to obtain their attendance. The statements recorded by a Magistrate under sec. 512 in the absence of the accused cannot be treated as evidence in the Sessions Court, if the witness is living and can be procured—*Rakhia v. Emp*, 1911 P.L.R 157, 12 Cr.L.J. 214. Where it was not impracticable to obtain the attendance of the witnesses when the accused was found, and the accused was committed to the Sessions merely on the strength of the recorded deposition of those witnesses, the commitment was held to be illegal—22 W.R 33. But if the accused pleads to the charge, the commitment cannot be quashed—*Sagambar*, 12 C.L.R. 120. If, however, upon such commitment, the Sessions Judge in the course of the trial is of opinion that the prosecution has not laid a basis for the reception of the deposition taken before the Magistrate in the absence of the accused, he should adjourn the trial and, under sec 540, summon such witnesses as he may deem material—*Sagambar*, 12 C.L.R. 120.

When two witnesses who had given evidence at a previous trial against four persons then on trial, happened to have referred in the course of their deposition at that trial to a person S who was then absconding, and that person S is subsequently tried, the statements of those two witnesses cannot be read in the subsequent trial of S merely because they happen to be absent and cannot give evidence. The two witnesses gave their evidence at a trial in which S was not an accused person; they merely mentioned the name of S, but the attention of the Court was not

then directed against S, nor was the evidence given in any sense as evidence against S—*Shcoraj v. Emp.*, 48 All. 375, 27 Cr.L.J. 874.

'Incapable of giving evidence':—Where a witness who had been examined under section 512 appeared in Court at the trial but could not remember the details of the occurrence, *held* that he could not be considered as 'incapable of giving evidence' within the meaning of this section. What the Court should do in such a case is to refresh the memory of the witness by reading out his deposition and then ask him if he remembers the details of the occurrence—*Bhika v Emp.*, 25 Cr L J 88 (Lah.)

CHAPTER XLII.

PROVISIONS AS TO BONDS.

513. When any person is required by any Court or officer to execute a bond, with or

Deposit instead of recognizance.

without sureties, such Court or officer may, except in the case of a

bond for good behaviour, permit him to deposit a sum of money or Government promissory notes to such amount as the Court or officer may fix, in lieu of executing such bond.

'Except in case of bond for good behaviour':—The object of law in making this exception in good behaviour cases, is to secure the good conduct of the person bound over, not by means of money but by a bond and sureties, and by making the sureties responsible for the good behaviour of the person bound down See 2 N W P. 295

1332. Deposit of money:—The deposit of money in lieu of executing a bond Where a person was ordered to execute a bond for good behaviour, and also to deposit a certain sum in addition thereof, the order as to deposit was illegal, because it was not in lieu of, but in addition, to, execution of bond, and also because it was a good behaviour case—*Ratanlal* 671

Where money has been deposited in Court as bail, the Magistrate is bound to return the amount, on the appearance of the accused, to the person who made the deposit It has no jurisdiction to attach this money in order to realise out of it the fine imposed on the accused—*Raghuandan v Emp*, 11 O L J. 296, *Girdhari Lal v Emp*, 19 A L J 887.

514. (1) Whenever it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court by which a bond

Procedure on forfeiture of bond.

under this Code has been taken, or

of the Court of a Presidency Magistrate, or Magistrate of the first class,

or when the bond is for appearance before a Court, to the satisfaction of such Court,

that such bond has been forfeited, the Court shall record the grounds of such proof, and may call upon any person bound by such bond to pay the penalty thereof, or to show cause why it should not be paid.

(2) If sufficient cause is not shown and the penalty is not paid, the Court may proceed to recover the same by issuing a warrant for the attachment and sale of the moveable property belonging to such person or his estate if he be dead.

(3) Such warrant may be executed within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court which issued it; and it shall authorize the *attachment* and sale of any moveable property belonging to such person without such limits, when endorsed by the District Magistrate or Chief Presidency Magistrate within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such property is found.

(4) If such penalty is not paid and cannot be recovered by such attachment and sale, the person so bound shall be liable, by order of the Court which issued the warrant, to imprisonment in the civil jail for a term which may extend to six months.

(5) The Court may, at its discretion, remit any portion of the penalty mentioned and enforce payment in part only.

(6) Where a surety to a bond dies before the bond is forfeited, his estate shall be discharged from all liability in respect of the bond. * * *

(7) *When any person who has furnished security under section 106 or section 118 or section 562 is convicted of an offence the commission of which constitutes a breach of the conditions of his bond or of a bond executed in lieu of his bond under section 514-B, a certified copy of the judgment of the Court by which he was convicted of such offence may be used as evidence in proceedings under this section against his surety or sureties, and, if such certified copy is so used, the Court*

shall presume that such offence was committed by him unless the contrary is proved.

Change :—This section has been amended by section 139 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act XVIII of 1923. In sub-section (3) the word 'attachment' has been substituted for the word 'distress' as the former word is more appropriate. In sub-section (6) the words "but the party who gave the bond may be required to find a new surety" have been omitted, but a separate provision to the same effect is made in the new section 514-A. Sub-section (7) has been newly added, the reason is stated in Note 1339 below.

1333. What amounts to forfeiture :—Bonds for appearance should be strictly construed. If the bond requires the accused to appear on a day fixed, and if he appears on that day, the bond is complied with, and the failure of the accused to appear on any other day on which the case is called does not entail a forfeiture of the bond—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 663; *Anonymous*, 4 M.H.C.R. App 44; *Behari Lal*, 36 Cal. 749 Where bonds were taken from the accused and his sureties to appear on Sunday when the Court was closed, and when on the next Monday the case was called on and the accused not being present the bonds were forfeited, it was held that as the bond required the attendance of the accused on the day fixed, i.e., on Sunday and not on the next day, the failure of the accused to appear on Monday did not cause a forfeiture of the bond—*Asanulla*, 2 C.W.N. 519 If, however, the bond requires the accused to appear from day to day until the close of the trial, the bond is not illegal—6 M.H.C.R. App. 38, and the accused will forfeit his bond if he fails to appear on any adjourned hearing. Where a bond required the accused to appear 'on the first hearing or at other times required' and the accused appeared on the first day as mentioned in the bond, and was verbally directed to appear on a subsequent date on which he failed to appear, it was held that the failure to comply with the verbal direction would entail a forfeiture of the bond—*Haslavaram Subba Reddi*, 2 Weir 658. Where on a person being arrested under sec. 55 of this Code, the usual security bond was taken for his appearance, held that the bond was only with respect to the offence for which the person was arrested under sec. 55, and the failure of the surety to produce the person in connection with any other offence which he might be suspected of having committed subsequently did not entail a forfeiture of the bond—*Mana v Emp*, 25 Cr.L.J. 131 (Lah.) A bail bond should not be forfeited for failure of the surety to produce the accused person, where the failure to produce is due to an act of law, e.g., on account of the accused being arrested for another offence—*Alauddin v Emp*, 4 Pat. 259, 6 P.L.T. 397, 26 Cr.L.J. 833.

Where a bond requires the accused to appear before a particular Court, the failure of the accused to appear before another Court to which the case has been transferred, does not work a forfeiture of the bond, if no obligation to appear in the latter Court has been specified in the bond—*Shamsuddin v. Emp*, 30 Cal. 107, *Behari Lal*, 36 Cal. 749;

or when the bond is for appearance before a Court, to the satisfaction of such Court,

that such bond has been forfeited, the Court shall record the grounds of such proof, and may call upon any person bound by such bond to pay the penalty thereof, or to show cause why it should not be paid.

(2) If sufficient cause is not shown and the penalty is not paid, the Court may proceed to recover the same by issuing a warrant for the attachment and sale of the moveable property belonging to such person or his estate if he be dead.

(3) Such warrant may be executed within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court which issued it; and it shall authorize the *attachment* and sale of any moveable property belonging to such person without such limits, when endorsed by the District Magistrate or Chief Presidency Magistrate within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such property is found.

(4) If such penalty is not paid and cannot be recovered by such attachment and sale, the person so bound shall be liable, by order of the Court which issued the warrant, to imprisonment in the civil jail for a term which may extend to six months.

(5) The Court may, at its discretion, remit any portion of the penalty mentioned and enforce payment in part only.

(6) Where a surety to a bond dies before the bond is forfeited, his estate shall be discharged from all liability in respect of the bond. * * *

(7) *When any person who has furnished security under section 106 or section 118 or section 562 is convicted of an offence the commission of which constitutes a breach of the conditions of his bond or of a bond executed in lieu of his bond under section 514-B, a certified copy of the judgment of the Court by which he was convicted of such offence may be used as evidence in proceedings under this section against his surety or sureties, and, if such certified copy is so used, the Court*

is wholly illegal, and the bond given by the surety for the woman's appearance has no legal force and cannot be forfeited if the woman does not appear—*Bela Singh*, 1918 P.L.R. 50, 19 Cr.L.J. 443, 44 I.C. 971; 1907 P.W.R. 22.

Death of accused :—The death of the accused discharges the sureties from all liabilities. "The object of the surety bonds is to ensure that the accused person shall not evade justice by flying from the jurisdiction of the Court. But if the accused elects to die sooner than face his trial, that can hardly be a sufficient reason for forfeiting the bonds of sureties; it cannot impose upon them any moral obligation or responsibility to the Court"—*Rama Bapu*, 18 Bom L.R. 683, 17 Cr.L.J. 393; *Vijayaraghavulu*, 37 Mad. 156

1334. What Court can proceed under this section :—

So far as bonds generally are concerned, action may be taken under this section by the Court by which the bond was taken or by the Court of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class. But in the case of a bond for appearance before a Court, the tribunal indicated is the Court and there is no other tribunal. Where the bond is for appearance before a Sessions Court, a Deputy Magistrate cannot take action for the forfeiture of the bond. The Sessions Judge cannot delegate that function to the Deputy Magistrate under sec. 516 which deals with the levy of the amount only—14 C.W.N. 259, 10 Cr.L.J. 248. Where a bail-bond was executed for due appearance of the accused before a certain Court, and no provision was made therein for his appearance before any other Court to which the case might thereafter be transferred, held that after such transfer, the former Court had no jurisdiction to forfeit the bond on the ground of the non-appearance of the accused either before the Court to which the case was transferred or before itself—*Maung Nge v. K E*, 2 Rang. 581 (586). A personal recognizance to appear was taken from the accused by the Magistrate of Karjat. The accused having failed to appear on the day fixed, the Magistrate at Karjat issued a notice to the accused under this section. In the meanwhile, the accused was transferred to the Court of the Magistrate at Khalapur, who forfeited the bond and directed the accused to pay the penalty. It was held that the Magistrate at Khalapur had no jurisdiction to make the order under this section, as he was not the Magistrate who had taken the bond or before whom the accused had to appear on the date of default—*In re Mir Husen*, 16 Bom L.R. 84, 15 Cr.L.J. 295. The Presidency Magistrate of Bombay has no jurisdiction under this section to order the forfeiture of a bond for appearance before the Police taken by the Police under sec. 106 of the City of Bombay Police Act (Bom Act IV of 1902)—*Crawford*, 42 Bom 400, 19 Cr.L.J. 607.

1335. Notice to show cause :—If an order of forfeiture is passed without any notice to the person whose bond is forfeited, it amounts to a failure of justice, and the defect cannot be cured by sec. 537—*Sarju v. Jai Raj*, 25 Cr.L.J. 445, A.I.R. 1925 Oudh 51. Before a warrant can be issued for the attachment of his property, the surety should be called upon to show cause why he should not pay the penalty mentioned in

bond, and it should be clear on the face of the record that he was so called upon. A mere verbal and unrecorded order to show cause is not sufficient—15 W.R. 82. A summary order for recovering the amount due on the security bond from a surety without serving upon him any notice to pay the same or to show cause why it should not be paid, is invalid—9 W.R. 4. Where a Magistrate, in a proceeding to forfeit the surety bond for good behaviour, issued notice to the surety and upon his non-appearance did not proceed to hold any inquiry as to whether the principal offender had committed any offence, but relying on the evidence he had recorded before giving notice, passed an order forfeiting the surety bond, held that the procedure was illegal in as much as the only evidence recorded was not recorded upon notice to the surety, and that the order must be set aside—*Moslem Mandal*, 54 Cal. 134, 44 C.L.J. 170, 27 Cr.L.J. 1293.

Procedure, if party appears to show cause :—If the party appears to show cause, he should be allowed an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses upon whose evidence the rule to show cause was issued—4 Cal 865; *Har Chandra*, 25 Cal. 440. If the accused appears and shows cause, and the Magistrate still considers that the recognizance should be forfeited, it is his duty to record the evidence upon which it is proved that the accused has acted in such a way that it becomes necessary to forfeit the recognizance. There must be a regular judicial trial and legal inquiry before punishment can be inflicted—12 W.R. 54. Before it can be declared that a bond executed by a surety is forfeited, there must be a formal finding arrived at after taking evidence in the presence of such surety, which evidence must prove that the principal person has so acted as to necessitate or render it advisable that the surety should, by reason of the act of the principal, forfeit his bond—*Har Chandra*, 25 Cal. 440.

1336. Order when to be passed :—If the accused's bond is forfeited, the Court may at once proceed to pass an order of forfeiture. If the accused fails to appear on the day fixed, the order of forfeiture of the bond of appearance is not illegal if it is passed on the very next day—*Nihal Chand*, 2 Bom L.R. 589. Indeed, a Magistrate ought to take action immediately, otherwise it will be deemed that the Magistrate has decided not to take action under this section. Thus, where a person who is already bound over under Chapter VIII is charged with an offence before a Magistrate, and the Magistrate at the time of passing his sentence in the second offence knows that there is an outstanding recognizance, he should decide once for all whether he will proceed on it or not. If he does not make any order for the forfeiture of the recognizance, it must be taken that he has decided not to forfeit the recognizance, and he cannot afterwards, in a subsequent and separate proceeding, reconsider his decision and direct forfeiture of the recognizance—*Manshi v. Emp.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 4 (Lah); *Mawaz*, 1913 P.R. 13, 14 Cr.L.J. 67; 1904 P.R. 26, *Ramchandra*, 1 C.L.R. 134; *Parbatti Churn*, 3 C.L.R. 406. But is it sufficient if the Magistrate passes an order of forfeiture in substantially the same proceeding in which he convicts the accused, though he does not pass such order immediately on conviction. Thus, where the Magistrate did not pass an order of forfeiture of security at the time of convic-

tion of the principals, but while convicting them he plainly wrote in his judgment that "in as much as the sureties would forfeit Rs. 4,000 presently, I refrain from passing a heavy sentence on the accused;" and then the Magistrate issued process to the sureties and confiscated the security in full: it was held that the Magistrate having plainly showed in his judgment his intention to confiscate, the order of forfeiture of security though passed subsequently after conviction was legal—*Hussain Khan v. Crown*, 1917 P.R. 15, 18 Cr.L.J. 566. But the Allahabad High Court holds that the mere fact that no immediate action is taken against a person under this section is no bar to his taking such action at a subsequent time, there is nothing in the language of this section which lays down any such limitation; the Magistrate can wait till the time of appealing has expired or till the appeal has been dismissed, and then he can proceed under this section—*Emp v Raja Ram*, 26 All. 202. This case has been followed by the Sind Court in *Jeomal*, 19 S.L.R. 95, 27 Cr.L.J. 326 (327). Even the Judges who decided the case of 1913 P.R. 13 (cited above) have also admitted that there is nothing in sec. 514 to debar a Magistrate who has convicted a person of an offence, which involves the forfeiture of the bond, from subsequently taking action against that person by forfeiting the bond in question.

If a person is bound down to keep the peace, say for one year, and the bond is forfeited, proceedings for forfeiture of the bond must be initiated within the term of the bond, i.e., within one year from the date of the bond; and if the proceedings are started within that period, the termination of the period of the bond before the proceedings are finished will not invalidate the subsequent order of forfeiture—20 A.L.J. 692, 44 All. 657.

Moveable property.—During the surety's lifetime, only moveable property can be attached and sold for recovery of the penalty—16 A.L.J. 503 (see this case cited under sec. 118). But a surety can offer house property as security under sec. 118, though his moveable property alone can be attached and sold—*Ibid*.

'His estate if he be dead'.—These words were introduced into the Code of 1898 to meet 1894 P.R. 22, where it was held that the legal representative of a deceased surety could not be proceeded against under the provisions of this section.

1337. Liability of sureties.—It is the duty of the surety to see that the accused does not run away, but where a surety has failed to produce the accused by reason of an illegal order passed by a Magistrate which the surety was not bound to carry out, and where there is no connivance and no negligence, it cannot be said that the surety has acted irresponsibly so as to be penalised—*Parbhu Dayal*, 49 All. 825, 28 Cr.L.J. 586 (587), 25 A.L.J. 537. A surety executed a bond whereby he undertook to produce the accused before the Magistrate of Agra during an inquiry into an offence. The Magistrate ordered the surety later to produce the accused at Purnea. The surety sent the accused Purnea, but the latter absconded on his way to Purnea. Nine

later the surety was ordered to produce the accused before the Magistrate at Agra in connection with a case at Purnea, and on his failing to do so his security was forfeited. *Held* that as the bond directed the surety to produce the accused at Agra, the first order directing the surety to produce the accused at Purnea was illegal. The second order was legal, but as the accused had absconded during an honest attempt of the surety to carry out the illegal order of the Magistrate (by sending the accused over to Purnea), the surety should not be penalised to the full extent; and the High Court directed that the order forfeiting the sum of Rs 1,000 be reduced to a sum of Rs 250—*Parbhu Dayal, supra*.

If the absence of the accused is due to an arrangement between the accused and the complainant, and the surety has knowledge of the arrangement, he is not relieved of his liability, but in such a case he should not be ordered to pay the full amount—*Ali Muhammad, 27 P.L.R. 646, 27 Cr.L.J. 1152*

The bond executed by the principal and the bond executed by the surety are to be considered as *one bond for one amount*, and is discharged on forfeiture by the payment of the amount due by either the principal or the surety—*Kaku v. Q. E., 1894 P.R. 26*. In no case can an amount in excess of the amount secured by the bond be demanded or recovered from the person bound or his sureties, individually or collectively—*Ali Mahomed v. Emp., 1911 P.L.R. 226, 12 Cr.L.J. 404, 11 I.C. 591*. Where the principal accused was bound over (under sec. 107) in the sum of Rs 500, and his surety in the same amount, and on forfeiture of the bond the Magistrate ordered that the principal should forfeit the whole amount of his bond, *viz.*, Rs 500, and the surety should forfeit Rs. 250, *held* that the order was illegal, the Magistrate could not demand a sum in excess of Rs. 500, whether from the principal or from the surety or from both. The High Court modified the order of the Magistrate by directing the principal to pay Rs 250 and the surety to pay Rs. 250—*Harnam v. Crown, 5 Lah 448 (449)*. When the amount of the bond has been recovered from the principal, the sureties are not liable to any further amount. The liability of the surety is only a joint and several liability with the principal and there is no warrant to collect the amount twice over—*K. E. v. Nga Kaung, 2 Cr.L.J. 463, U.B.R. (1905) 31; K E v Nga Kaung, 2 L.B.R. 235, 1894 P.R. 26, Abdul Aziz, 4 Lah 462*. But the Calcutta High Court holds that on the breach of the bond both the surety and principal are liable to pay the penalty of their respective bonds; and the surety is liable quite irrespective of the question whether the amount of the bond of the principal has been realised or not. The liability of the surety is not co-extensive with that of the principal as in the ordinary case of a surety for a debtor for the payment of his debt, where the surety is discharged as soon as the principal debtor pays the money due from him. Here the surety is an additional safeguard against a breach of the peace. Therefore where the principal accused was bound down in the sum of Rs 100, to keep the peace under sec 107, and the surety bond himself in the sum of Rs 50, and upon the bond of the accused being declared forfeited, both he and his surety were ordered to pay the

amounts of their respective bonds (*viz.* Rs. 100 and 50), held that the order was not illegal—*Saligram v. Emp.*, 36 Cal. 562.

As regards the liability of sureties *per se*, if three sureties sign a bond, they are jointly and severally liable to pay the amount of the bond, but every one of them cannot be called on to pay the whole amount; the sum named can be recovered only once—*Mahomed Ibrahim v. Crown*, 8 S L R. 173, 16 Cr.L.J. 100

Since sureties on a bond are required in order that the failure of the principal to appear may be at their peril, it follows that the object of this provision is defeated if the principal and surety are allowed to relieve the latter of the peril and confine it to the former by an arrangement among themselves. Therefore, an agreement by an accused with his surety that he will indemnify the surety if the bail is forfeited on account of the accused's non-appearance, is void—*Jodhraj v. Bishanlal*, 20 N L R 166.

Sub-section (4):—Imprisonment—When default is made in payment, the Magistrate cannot forthwith direct imprisonment. He should order the attachment and sale of the defaulter's moveable property, and if the penalty cannot be recovered from such attachment and sale, *then and then only* can he direct imprisonment—10 C L R 571, *Maung Po v. Maung Shwe*, 30 Cr.L.J. 346 (348)

1338. Sub-section (5):—Remission of penalty—This sub-section gives the Court power to remit the penalty or to reduce its amount. Under the Codes of 1872 and 1861, neither the Magistrate nor even the High Court in revision had power to reduce the amount of the penalty under a recognizance bond which had been forfeited. See 8 C L R. 72, *Nurul Huqq*, 3 Cal 757; 19 W R. 1. If the Magistrate thought that the amount of recognizance was excessive, he was to refer the matter to Government—*Ibid.*

1339. Sub-section (7):—Admissibility of judgment of convictions:—This sub-section has been newly enacted. Under the old law there was a conflict of opinion among the High Courts. The Allahabad and Punjab Courts laid down that where a person who had given a security bond with a surety for good behaviour, was convicted of an offence, the production of the judgment of conviction and the proof, if necessary, of the identity of the principal was sufficient evidence upon which a Magistrate was competent to issue notice to the surety. It was not incumbent on the Magistrate to prove that the principal was properly convicted, by re-summoning the witnesses on whose evidence the principal was convicted—*Man Mohan*, 21 All 86, *Wadhawa*, 1903 P R. 32, 1911 P W R. 35. But in *Har Chandra*, 25 Cal 440 and *Chandra Sekhar*, 11 Cal. 77, it was held that the mere production of the original record or a certified copy of the trial in which the principal was convicted would not be conclusive evidence to show that the accused had really committed an offence; such fact must be proved by evidence taken in the presence of the surety, unless it was admitted by him. The present sub-section adopts the view of the Allahabad and Punjab decisions. "There has been a conflict of opinion whether a judgment convicting the principal in a bond

taken under the Code and ordering the forfeiture of the bond is sufficient *prima facie* proof in proceedings under this section against the sureties. The amendment permits the use of such a judgment as evidence in such proceedings and directs that the Court shall presume that such offence was committed unless the contrary is proved"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons (1914)*.

The judgment of conviction is undoubted evidence against the principal himself. Thus, where the bond is given by the person bound down to keep the peace, the judgment convicting him of a breach of the peace is admissible in evidence against him, and may form a sufficient basis for an order under this section, he having had an opportunity of cross-examining the witness on whose evidence the forfeiture is held to be established—*Hara Chandra*, 25 Cal. 440; 4 Cal. 865.

Revision —The High Court can revise all orders made under this section. See notes under section 515.

1340. Nature of proceedings under this section :
—The proceeding to realise a penalty is of the nature of a civil proceeding (3 P.L.T. 381) and the person against whom it is taken is competent to give evidence on oath in his own behalf—15 W.R. 87. It is not a criminal proceeding, and no charge need be drawn up. After the Magistrate has satisfied himself that the bond has been forfeited, he can at once call upon the person concerned to pay the penalty. The proceeding therefore cannot be held to be a "trial" in the sense of the Code—2 Mad 169

514A. When any surety to a bond under this Code becomes insolvent or dies, or when any bond is forfeited under the provisions of section 514, the Court, by whose order such bond was taken, or a Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class, may order the person from whom such security was demanded to furnish fresh security in accordance with the directions of the original order, and if such security is not furnished, such Court or Magistrate may proceed as if there had been a default in complying with such original order.

This section has been newly added by sec 140 of the Cr P.C Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923, to make up the deletion of certain words in sub-section (6) of section 514. It also covers the case of a surety who becomes insolvent.

514B. When the person required by any Court or officer to execute a bond is a minor, such Court or officer may accept, in lieu thereof, a bond executed by a surety or sureties only.

Bond required from a minor.

"We have added a new section 514B to provide for the case of a bond being required from a minor"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*

Under the old law, where a person released on probation under sec. 562 and ordered to execute a bond for good conduct was a minor, the bond could not be executed by his sureties, see *K. E. v. Mi Pyu*, 4 L.R.R. 12, 11 Cr.L.J. 123. This is no longer good law, having regard to the provision of this section.

515. All orders passed under Section 514 by any Magistrate other than a Presidency Magistrate or District Magistrate, shall be appealable to the District Magistrate, or, if not so appealed, may be revised by him.

Appeal from and revision of orders under Section 514.

1341. Appeal and revision—Under the old Codes of 1861 and 1872 there was no provision for appeal or revision of orders forfeiting a security bond under sec. 514, see *Ananthachari v. Ananthachari*, 2 Mad. 169. This section makes provision for such appeal or revision

Under this section, all orders passed by the subordinate Magistrates shall be appealable to the District Magistrate, but not to any first Class Magistrate—*Ratanlal* 384.

A bond for keeping the peace or for good behaviour is not given to any particular person but to the Court, and no private party is entitled to appeal against an order of a Magistrate refusing to forfeit the bond, but it is open to the District Magistrate to take action in revision—*Sarju v. Jal Raj Kumar*, A I R. 1925 Oudh 51, 25 Cr L.J. 445.

Orders passed by a District Magistrate under this section may be subject to revision by the High Court—*Masta v. K E*, 1905 P R. 15, 2 Cr.L.J. 131

516. The High Court or Court of Session may direct any Magistrate to levy the amount due on a bond to appear and attend at such High Court or Court of Session.

Power to direct levy of amount due on certain recognizance.

This section empowers the Court of Session to delegate his power of levying fine to a Magistrate, but he cannot delegate his power of initiating proceedings for forfeiture of the bond—14 C W N 259, 10 Cr.L.J. 248 (cited in Note 1334 under sec. 514).

CHAPTER XLIII.

OF THE DISPOSAL OF PROPERTY.

516A. *When any property regarding which any offence appears to have been committed, or which appears to have been used for the commission of any offence, is produced before any Criminal Court during any inquiry or trial, the Court may make such order as it thinks fit for the proper custody of such property pending the conclusion of the inquiry or trial, and, if the property is subject to speedy or natural decay, may, after recording such evidence as it thinks necessary, order it to be sold or otherwise disposed of.*

This section has been newly added by section 141 of the Cr P.C. Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. "It is proposed to add to the chapter a new section to enable the Court to pass orders for the custody or disposal of property during an inquiry"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914). Under the old law, an order for disposal of property could be made only when the inquiry or trial was concluded (sec. 517), but no order could be made while the offence committed in connection with such property was still under inquiry, and the trial was not yet ended—*Ratanlal* 957, 5 C L J. 229, 24 M.L.J. 1. This section enables a Court to make an order for disposal of property during the inquiry or trial.

517. (1) *When an inquiry or a trial in any Criminal Court is concluded, the Court may make such order as it thinks fit for the disposal, by destruction, confiscation, or delivery to any person claiming to be entitled to possession thereof or otherwise, of any property or document produced before it or in its custody or regarding which any offence appears to have been committed or which has been used for the commission of any offence.*

(2) *When a High Court or a Court of Session makes such order and cannot through its own officers conveniently deliver the property to the person entitled thereto, such Court may direct that the order be carried into effect by the District Magistrate.*

(3) *When an order is made under this section in* (3) *When an order is made under this section, ***

a case in which an appeal lies, such order shall not (except when the property is live-stock or is subject to speedy and natural decay) be carried out until the period allowed for presenting such appeal has passed, or, when such appeal is presented within such period, until such appeal has been disposed of.

such order shall not, except where the property is live-stock or subject to speedy and natural decay, and *save as provided by sub-section (4), be carried out for one month*, or when an appeal is presented, until such appeal has been disposed of.

(4) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prohibit any Court from delivering any property under the provisions of sub-section (1) to any person claiming to be entitled to the possession thereof, on his executing a bond with or without surties to the satisfaction of the Court, engaging to restore such property to the Court if the order made under this section is modified or set aside on appeal.

Explanation.—In this section the term “property” includes, in the case of property regarding which an offence appears to have been committed, not only such property as has been originally in the possession or under the control of any party, but also any property into or for which the same may have been converted or exchanged, and anything acquired by such conversion or exchange, whether immediately or otherwise.

Change .—This section has been amended by section 142 of the Cr.P.C. Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923, as follows.—

(a) The italicised words have been added in sub-section (1) ; “These words are added to elucidate the order for disposal of property produced before a Court by explaining that this means disposal by destruction, confiscation or restoration to the person claiming to be entitled to the possession thereof”—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914).

(b) Sub-section (3) has been changed as shown in parallel columns. “It allows one month for the presentation of an appeal or an application for revision where this is allowed”—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*

(c) Sub-section (4) has been added “By this clause, the Court is enabled, if it sees fit, to restore the property to the possession of any

person claiming to be entitled to it, who is willing to execute a bond for its return if need be"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914).

1342. Scope of section :—Under the Code of 1882, the operation of this section was much restricted, and the Court could make an order under this section only with reference to property in respect of which any offence had been committed or which had been used for the commission of any offence otherwise not—*Fattah Chand*, 24 Cal 499, *Basudeb v. Naziruddin*, 14 Cal. 834 : 1 C.W.N. 561; ■ *Weir* 665, 666, 668, 669; 1 Bom. 630, *Anant Ramchandra*, 10 Bom. 197; 17 Bom 748; *Devidin*, 22 Bom 844, and the order could be made only when that offence was actually under investigation or trial by the Court—*Ratanlal* 500; *Abdul Khalik*, 1888 P.R. 46.

Under the 1898 Code, the scope of the section has been enlarged, and an order can be made with regard to any property produced before the Court, or in its custody, even though it has not been used for the commission of any offence or though no offence in regard to it has been committed—*Russul v Ahmed*, 34 Cal 347, *In re Pyde Ramanna*, 42 Mad. 9, *Maung Ma v. Ma Kra*, 6 Rang' 259, 29 Cr.L.J. 958; 21 Cr.L.J. 414 (Nag); (e.g., when the accused is acquitted of the offence—*Maung Mira*, supra); or though the offence actually under investigation ■ not in connection with the property or is not proved—2 *Weir* 666. The ruling in 2 *Weir* 665 is no longer good law. The decision in 30 Cal. 690 is erroneous as it did not notice the change in the law in the 1898 Code

1343. Property :—Property produced in Court :—When a portion of a property (e.g. a portion of salt or other articles in bulk) is produced in Court and received in evidence as a sample, the whole bulk is taken to have been produced before the Court, and the Magistrate can make an order with respect to the entire bulk—2 *Weir* 670.

Property in respect of which an offence has been committed :—These words mean property which has been the subject of offences like theft or criminal misappropriation—*Abinash v. K. E.*, 34 Cal. 986 Where the accused gave false information that his jewels were stolen, and afterwards these jewels were found in his possession, and the Magistrate after convicting him of an offence under sec 182 I P. C. confiscated those jewels under this section, it was held that the order under this section was illegal, because the jewels were neither produced before the Court, nor was there any offence committed with regard to them—*Lakshmi Narayan*, 9 C.W.N. 597

Cash is not, strictly speaking, property, except in so far as it is capable of being possessed and identified in specie. If, however, it is certain that the coins found on the person of thieves are the actual coins which have been the subject of theft, then it is permissible to treat such coins as stolen property and the Magistrate can pass an order as to their disposal (e.g., an order to pay them to the complainant as compensation). But coins which have been put into circulation and passed on to other

persons cannot be treated in the same way as stolen coins actually remaining in the possession of thieves—*Parsu v. Emp.*, 18 S.L.R. 218, 26 Cr.L.J. 1315. But in an Allahabad case, where the accused embezzled some money from a Bank and sent part of the embezzled money to one of his creditors in notes under insured cover which was traced and seized by the police, and the Magistrate after convicting the accused ordered the money to be handed over to the Bank, held that the order was strictly justified under the provisions of this section, as the money was "property in respect of which an offence was committed" and it was property to which the Bank was entitled—*Bankey Lal v. Allahabad Bank*, 23 A.L.J. 889, 26 Cr.L.J. 1232.

The Magistrate can dispose of property stolen in British territory, though the Police might have seized it in foreign territory—1878 P R 20.

Property used for the commission of an offence.—This means property which has been instrumental in committing an offence e.g. guns or swords—*Abinash v. K E.*, 34 Cal 986 Thus, where the accused stole two bullocks and killed them, it was ordered that the axe and the knives with which he slaughtered the animals and which were found with the accused when he was arrested, should be confiscated and sold—*Bhura v Emp.*, 26 Cr L J 1495 (1496) (Nag) But any instrument or thing which is too remotely connected with the commission of an offence cannot be confiscated under this section. Thus, it is illegal to confiscate a press in which a seditious matter has been published, because the press is a too remote instrument and cannot be said to be property which has been used for the commission of the offence—*Abinash*, 34 Cal. 986; 1907 P.W.R. 37. A Magistrate convicting a person for gambling under sections 6 and 7 of the Madras Towns Nuisances Act cannot confiscate the money found in his waistcoat pocket, when there was no evidence to show that the money was actually staked—*Appaji Aiyar*, 41 Mad. 644 So also, a boat which has been used by the accused in going to commit a theft or in escaping from pursuit cannot be said to be property used for the commission of an offence—*Jarip Gazi*, 8 C.W N 887, see also *Ratanlal* 688 Similarly, where the accused has been guilty of rash driving, it is illegal to pass an order that the cart and pony of the accused should be sold and the sale proceeds paid over to the complainant as compensation—*Ilahi Baksh*, 1904 P.L N 4, 1 Cr.L.J. 38

Property must be moveable—This section has no application to immovable property. Where the accused dispossessed the complainant of his garden by breaking the pad-lock of its gate and were convicted of the offence of criminal trespass, the Court had no power to order the restoration of the garden to the complainant under this section as this section did not apply to immovable property—*Sheonandan v. Bholanath*, 18 C.W.N 1146, 15 Cr.L J 222 See also 36 Cal 44; 1900 A.W N 81, and *Adepu v Ramayya*, 12 L.W 227, 22 Cr L.J 110, 59 I.C. 414 *Contra*—*Tun Hla v. Shwe Ngo*, 4 L B R. 229, 7 Cr L.J. 490, where the word 'property' was held to include immovable property.

Property must have been in existence:—No order can be made

under this section with respect to property which was not in existence at the time of the offence. Thus an innocent purchaser of a stolen cow cannot be ordered to deliver up the calf which was not even in embryonic existence when the theft took place, but which was given birth to by the cow while she was in his possession—10 Mad 25

1344. Order, when can be made :—According to the words of this section an order for disposal of the property can be made only upon the conclusion of the trial, and not long after the conclusion of the trial—*Naini Mal*, 24 Cr.L.J. 804 (All). An order for disposal of property passed 14 days after the date of the passing of the judgment in the trial is not invalid—*Kishan Chand v. Nanak Chand*, 7 Lah L.J. 625, 26 Cr.L.J. 1453. But in another Lahore case it has been held that the order under sec. 517 and the judgment in the trial must be contemporaneous. And so, if no order is passed by a Court in respect of the disposal of the property on the conclusion of the trial of the accused, the Court has no jurisdiction to pass order at any subsequent time directing delivery of the property to the complainant—*Abdul v. Ghulam Muhammad*, 4 Lah. 460 (461). This case has been dissented from in 7 Lah.L.J. 625 cited above.

No order as to the disposal of property can be made under this section if the trial is barred under sec. 403. The words 'when an inquiry or trial is concluded' cannot apply to a case in which the Court is prohibited from conducting a trial at all—*Tun Hla v. Shwe Ngo*, 4 L.B.R. 229, 7 Cr.L.J. 490. Similarly, an order directing delivery of property cannot be made by a Magistrate without any criminal proceeding before him or any other Magistrate, but merely on the application of the person in whose favour the order is made—6 C.L.J. 707.

Where a person charged with criminal breach of trust in respect of certain jewels died before the day fixed for his trial, and there was no trial, no order could be made by the Magistrate under this section. The jewels were ordered to be returned to the person from whom the Police recovered them—*Kuppammal*, 29 Mad. 375

Order discretionary :—Orders under this section are discretionary. This section invests the Magistrate with a discretionary power and it is a rule of law that such power must be exercised judicially, i.e., according to the sound principles of law and not in an arbitrary manner—*Sadashiv*, 11 Bom.L.R. 16, 9 Cr.L.J. 162. This discretion is open to correction by the High Court where it has been exercised in violation of judicial principles—*Pandharinath*, 40 Bom 186, 16 Cr.L.J. 783

1345. Nature of order under this section :—The old section stated that the Magistrate could make such order as he thought fit for the 'disposal' of the property. This was a general term and the nature of the order to be passed for disposal was not specified. It depended upon the discretion of the Magistrate to say what order was to be passed having regard to all the facts of the case—*Sadashiv*, 11 Bom.L.R. 16, 9 Cr.L.J. 162. Under the amended section the word 'disposal' has been elucidated by certain explanatory words

Order in a bribe case :—When the accused was convicted of taking bribe and the money paid as bribe was deposited in Court by the complainant, the Magistrate could order a portion of the bribe to be confiscated and the rest to be paid to the complainant—1873 P.R. 9.

Order in respect of currency note —Where the accused stole a currency note from the complainant and changed it at the Government Treasury, then on conviction of the accused for theft, the currency notes should be delivered to the Treasury and not to the complainant. Currency note is money and the ownership passes by mere delivery, and the original owner cannot claim the amount as against the Treasury—*Nizam v Jacob*, 19 Cal. 52. The accused purchased some gold ornaments and handed to the jeweller a currency note which he had stolen. The jeweller not having had adequate cash took the note to a neighbouring shopkeeper who cashed it in good faith. Afterwards, during the prosecution of the accused, the note was attached from the shopkeeper, and on conviction of the accused the Magistrate ordered it to be returned to the Crown whose property it was found to have been. Held that the currency note should be returned to the shopkeeper, for property in it had passed to him by mere delivery—*In re Pandharinath*, 40 Bom 186, 31 I.C. 383, 16 Cr L.J. 783. Title to a currency note passes by mere delivery, and therefore where a stolen currency note is recovered from an innocent third person, it should be returned to that person, and not to the person who lost it by theft—*Srinivasamoorthi v. Narasimhalu*, 50 Mad. 916, 28 Cr L.J. 879 (880). See also *In re Collector of Salem*, 2 Weir 664, 7 M.H.C.R. 233, 3 Cal. 379, 1 N.W.P. 298.

So is the rule in respect of current coins. But *Babashahi* coin is not current coin in British India, and it is to be delivered to the complainant from whom it is stolen, like any other common article or property—*In re Mathur*, 25 Bom 702.

Order of confiscation —An order of disposal under this section includes an order of forfeiture or confiscation—*Ratanlal* 492. This is now expressly provided for in the present section. In 5 N.L.R. 59 it was held that the 'disposal' of property could not be held to include confiscation or forfeiture, as the penalty of confiscation or forfeiture having been expressly provided for in secs 62, 121 etc of the Indian Penal Code and in numerous other sections of other Acts, it could not be included in the general word 'disposal' used in this section. The same view was taken in *Secretary of State v Lown Karan*, 5 P.L.J. 321, *Abinash v K E*, 34 Cal 986, 1907 P.W.R. 37. These rulings are no longer correct in view of the express words of the present section.

An order for the confiscation of property which is the subject matter of an offence cannot be made without first giving notice to and hearing the person to whose prejudice the order would be. Want of notice would be a good ground for setting aside the order—*Ambica Tewari*, 11 Bur.L.T. 193, 17 Cr.L.J. 207.

Order of destruction of counterfeit coin:—If the accused is convicted of an offence under sec. 241 I. P. C., and counterfeit coin is found in his possession, the Magistrate can order the destruction of the coin—2 Weir 669.

Order of restoration of property:—If no offence is proved to have been committed in respect of any property produced before the Court, and the accused is acquitted, the Magistrate should restore the property to the person from whom it was last taken (i.e., to the accused)—1897 A.W.N. 26; 2 Weir 669, *Sattar Ali v. Afzal*, 54 Cal 283, 28 Cr.L.J. 546, *Hagu v. Manmatha*, 18 C.W.N. 959; *In re Davidin*, 22 Bom 844; 1 C.W.N. 561, 2 Weir 668; 1 Bom. 630; *Anant Ramchandra*, 10 Bom. 197; 17 Bom. 748, *Ahmed*, 9 Mad. 448; 14 Cal. 834; 5 W.R. 55. In such a case, an order of confiscation is not proper—16 Cr.L.J. 811 (Mad.). See also 17 Bom L.R. 79; 42 Mad 9. The property should be restored especially when there is no finding in the case that it belongs to some one else—*Gaparaju*, 3 M.L.T. 334. Thus, where an accused person has been acquitted of the offence of cheating, it is not competent to the Court to restore the goods found in the possession of the accused to the complainant. The proper order in such a case would be to let the goods remain in the possession of the person in whose custody they were found—*Ram Dan v. Hari Das*, 27 Cr L.J. 853 (854) (Cal)

But if a case of theft fails, because the dishonest intention of the accused is not proved, the property can be restored to the complainant, and need not be given back to the accused—16 M.L.J. (Sh. N.) 4. So also, where the Magistrate, though he discharges the accused, believes that the property in his custody is the subject of some offence, he is not bound to restore the property to the person from whom it was taken, but can make an order of disposal under this section—*Q. E. v. Ahmed*, 9 Mad. 448

A Magistrate cannot, on dismissal of a complaint, restore the property to the accused, if he disclaims the property. In such a case the Court should retain the property until one or other of the parties has established his right in the Civil Court—1913 P.W.R. 37

If a complaint of theft of a certain property is dismissed on the ground of there being a *bona fide* dispute about the ownership of the property, the Magistrate should take custody of the property, sell it (if it is perishable) and retain the sale proceeds until they are shown to be payable to one or other of the parties, either by virtue of a decree of Court, or of an agreement between themselves—*Visa Samra*, 16 Bom L.R. 951, 16 Cr.L.J. 111, 27 I.C. 159, *Cheng Reddi v. Ramasami*, 1 L.W. 1032, 27 I.C. 152, 16 Cr.L.J. 104. In 2 Weir 667, it has been held that in such a case, the Magistrate may deliver the property to the person from whose possession it was last taken, with a condition that the property, or its value, must be forthcoming in case the rival claimant establishes a title. But if it is found that the property belongs partly to the accused and partly to another person, it is not illegal to deliver the property to both of them on their joint receipt—34 Mad. 94

1346. Order, when rights of third parties are concerned :—A property with regard to which an offence has been committed should not be delivered to the owner of the property when it has been pledged to another person (see 10 Cr.L.J. 788) without allowing the pledgee an opportunity of being heard. But when the evidence disclosed that the property was obtained by fraud from the owner and subsequently pledged, the property should be delivered to the owner and the remedy of the pledge was to bring a suit in the Civil Court to enforce his lien on the property—*Kong Lone v. Ma Kay*, 4 L.B.R. 13, 11 Cr.L.J. 125; *Palaniappa v. Ko Saye*, 3 Bur L.T. 111, 12 Cr.L.J. 88, 8 I.C. 1204. But where certain jewels were given to the accused to sell, but the accused instead of selling them gave them to another person who pledged them to a third person, it was held that the jewels should be restored to the pledgee and not to the owner; because the owner, having parted with the jewels to be disposed of for money, was not entitled to the assistance of a Criminal Court in recovering them from a pawnee to whom they were so disposed of—*Stephen Aviet v. K. E.*, 4 L.B.R. 25, 6 Cr.L.J. 135, *Annamalai v. Mrs. Basch*, 11 L.B.R. 217, 23 Cr.L.J. 216. But if in such a case the pledgee was not a *bona fide* pledgee and knew that the pledgor had no authority to pledge the articles, held that the articles should be delivered to the owner and not to the pledgee—*Emp. v. Nga Po Chit*, 1 Rang 199, A.I.R. 1923 Rang 227, 24 Cr.L.J. 858. Where a pledged property was stolen from the possession of the pledgee by the pledgor who was thereupon convicted of theft, the Court should pass an order restoring the property to the pledgee and not to the person to whom the pledgor had sold it for value after the theft—*Gour Mohan v. Bansidhar*, 24 Cr.L.J. 238 (Cal.). A goldsmith was entrusted with a certain quantity of gold and diamonds for making a comb for the complainant. When the article was nearly completed, the goldsmith pledged it to a diamond merchant who had no knowledge that the property was the property of the complainant. The Court ordered the jewel to be returned to the complainant. Held that the order was justifiable—*Changanlal v. Maung Po Kauk*, 2 Bur L.J. 152. Where certain jewels were given to a broker for sale and the broker sold the jewels and misappropriated the sale proceeds, and was convicted of criminal breach of trust, the jewels ought to be restored to the purchaser and not to the owner, because the offence was committed not with respect to the jewels but with respect to the sale proceeds, and therefore the Magistrate was not competent to make any order with respect to the jewels which validly belonged to the purchaser—*Nanatal v. Maung Tun*, 4 Bur L.T. 170, 12 Cr.L.J. 467, 11 I.C. 1003.

Notice :—In a case in which the question of the right to possession is not one between the complainant and the accused, but one between the complainant and a third person, an order for the restoration of the property should not be made without giving the opposite party an opportunity of being heard. Thus, where the complainant entrusted certain jewels to the accused who committed criminal breach of trust in respect of them and pledged them to another person, the Court should not order

the jewels to be restored to the complainant without giving any notice to the pledgee—*Shwe Wa v. C I. Mehta*, 5 Rang. 553, 28 Cr.L.J. 932

1347. Question of title.—An order under this section does not decide the question of ownership of the property. It merely decides the question of the right to possession, till a Civil Court decides the question of ownership—1 Bur.L.T. 267. Where a question of *bona fides* and of title by purchase or otherwise clearly arises, the duty of the Criminal Court is not to pass any order under this section, but to leave the complainant to his remedy in the Civil Court if he thinks he has one—*Naini Mall v. Emp.*, 24 Cr.L.J. 804 (All.). Where the title to the seized property is doubtful, it should be returned to the person from whom it was seized, unless there are special circumstances which would render such a course unjustifiable—*Srinivasamoorthi v. Narasimhalu*, 50 Mad 916, 28 Cr.L.J. 879 (880). If conflicting claims are put forward to the property by different parties, the Magistrate cannot give a decision as to the ownership of the property; the proper procedure would be to keep the property in Court, pending any order which may be made by a competent Civil Court—*Ram Khelawan v. Talsi*, 28 C.W.N. 1094. Where the property in dispute was a certain quantity of wood, the proper order would be to sell the property and retain the sale proceeds in Court until they were shown to be payable to one or other of the parties either in virtue of a decree or in virtue of an agreement among themselves—*Visa Samta*, 16 Bom.L.R. 951, 16 Cr.L.J. 111, 27 I.C. 159.

1348. Improper orders :—(1) *Disposal in charity* :—The section does not place the property at the disposal of the Magistrate in the sense of enabling him to bestow it in charity. He is to make such legal disposition thereof as seems right, i.e., to direct its restoration to some one to whom it seems to belong or permit it to continue in the possession in which it is found or otherwise—2 Weir 666.

(2) *Order regarding custody of children* —Orders regarding custody of children cannot be passed under this section—1 Weir 348

(3) *Order for removal of building* —Where the accused built a new wall abutting on the road in contravention of the rules of the Municipality and the Magistrate after convicting and fining the accused ordered the wall to be pulled down, it was held that the order as to the removal of the wall was illegal—1900 A.W.N. 81.

(4) *Order demanding security* :—The Magistrate cannot take a bond from the accused to produce the property (with respect to which an offence is alleged to have been committed) in Court whenever required. There is no provision of the law which enables a Magistrate to make an order demanding security. He can proceed under sec. 94 in order to secure the production of the property, and on failure of the accused to produce it, he can proceed under sec. 96—*Purna Chandra v. Sashi*, 7 C.W.N. 522. Sub-section (4) does not apply to the case, because under that sub-section a Magistrate can take a bond from a person at the time of delivering the property to him.

(5) *Detention of property* :—If no offence is proved in respect of the property produced in Court, the proper order that the Court may pass is to restore the property to the person from whom it was originally taken. It cannot detain the property until the title of the rightful owner is declared by a Civil Court—2 Bom 844

Sub-section (4) :—If no offence is proved to have been committed, the Magistrate may restore the property to the accused, and at the same time demand security from him for its production whenever required—2 Weir 668

1349. Explanation .—The words 'conversion' and 'exchange' used in the Explanation to the section must be taken in their ordinary sense. They apply to such acts as melting down of gold and silver into ornaments or the exchange of notes for cash. When, therefore, a person fraudulently obtained a decree upon a forged promissory note and in execution of that decree purchased a garden and was subsequently convicted of cheating, it was held that the convicting Court could not direct restoration of the garden to its owner, because it could not be said that the garden was acquired by the conversion of the forged promissory note into a decree—*Nga Ke Moung*, 4 Bur L T. 211, 12 Cr L J 473, 12 I.C. 81. A gold ornament was stolen from the complainant and sold by the thief for Rs 184 to the applicant who converted it into gold and sold it in pieces to different persons. In the course of the trial of the theft case, the applicant was made to produce Rs 184, and at the end of the trial the Magistrate ordered the sum to be paid over to the complainant. It was held that the money could not be paid over to the complainant, since it merely represented the sum which the applicant paid to the accused as the price of the gold bangles, and it could not be treated under the Explanation to this section as the exchanged property with reference to which an offence had been committed—*Anant*, 20 Bom L R 604, 19 Cr L J 721, 46 I C. 401

In view of this Explanation, the objection that the coins directed to be returned are not the identical coins stolen cannot be sustained—4 S.L R 255

Appeal —See section 520

1350. Revision .—The High Court has jurisdiction to interfere with an order of the Magistrate passed under this section—2 Weir 669, 40 Bom 186. An order made under this section may be revised by the High Court either under sec 520 or by virtue of the powers conferred on it by sec 439 read with secs. 435 and 423 (d) of the Code—*Hagu v. Manmatha*, 18 C W.N 959, 15 Cr L J 184. But where the case is one in which an appeal lies, any party aggrieved by an order as to the disposal of property must go to the Court of appeal. In such a case, a Court of revision has no jurisdiction to interfere with an order as to the disposal of property. It is only when there is neither an appeal nor a confirmation that a Court of revision or reference can interfere—35 Bom 253. The High Court will not exercise its revisional power.

the jewels to be restored to the complainant without giving any notice to the pledgee—*Shwe Wa v. C. I. Mehta*, 5 Rang. 553, 28 Cr.L.J. 932.

1347. Question of title :—An order under this section does not decide the question of ownership of the property. It merely decides the question of the right to possession, till a Civil Court decides the question of ownership—1 Bur.L.T. 267. Where a question of *bona fides* and of title by purchase or otherwise clearly arises, the duty of the Criminal Court is not to pass any order under this section, but to leave the complainant to his remedy in the Civil Court if he thinks he has one—*Naini Mall v. Emp.*, 24 Cr.L.J. 804 (All). Where the title to the seized property is doubtful, it should be returned to the person from whom it was seized, unless there are special circumstances which would render such a course unjustifiable—*Srinivasamoorthi v. Narasimhalu*, 50 Mad 916, 28 Cr L.J. 879 (880). If conflicting claims are put forward to the property by different parties, the Magistrate cannot give a decision as to the ownership of the property; the proper procedure would be to keep the property in Court, pending any order which may be made by a competent Civil Court—*Ram Khelawan v. Tulsí*, 28 C.W.N. 1094. Where the property in dispute was a certain quantity of wood, the proper order would be to sell the property and retain the sale proceeds in Court until they were shown to be payable to one or other of the parties either in virtue of a decree or in virtue of an agreement among themselves—*Visa Samta*, 16 Bom.L.R. 951, 16 Cr.L.J. 111, 27 I.C. 159.

1348. Improper orders —(1) *Disposal in charity* :—The section does not place the property at the disposal of the Magistrate in the sense of enabling him to bestow it in charity. He is to make such legal disposition thereof as seems right, *i.e.*, to direct its restoration to some one to whom it seems to belong or permit it to continue in the possession in which it is found or otherwise—2 Weir 666

(2) *Order regarding custody of children* :—Orders regarding custody of children cannot be passed under this section—1 Weir 348

(3) *Order for removal of building* :—Where the accused built a new wall abutting on the road in contravention of the rules of the Municipality and the Magistrate after convicting and fining the accused ordered the wall to be pulled down, it was held that the order as to the removal of the wall was illegal—1900 A.W.N. 81.

(4) *Order demanding security* :—The Magistrate cannot take a bond from the accused to produce the property (with respect to which an offence is alleged to have been committed) in Court whenever required. There is no provision of the law which enables a Magistrate to make an order demanding security. He can proceed under sec 94 in order to secure the production of the property, and on failure of the accused to produce it, he can proceed under sec 96—*Purna Chandra v. Sashi*, 7 C.W.N. 522. Sub-section (4) does not apply to the case, because under that sub-section a Magistrate can take a bond from a person at the time of delivering the property to him.

money found on the person of the accused; when no money was found in the possession of the person convicted, the Magistrate cannot grant compensation to the innocent purchaser out of the fine imposed on the accused—2 Weir 671; *K. E. v. Abdul*, 3 Bom.L.R. 449; *K. E. v. Dhondu*, 3 Bom.L.R. 764. See also *Ratanlal* 631.

The Magistrate cannot call upon the owner to pay the purchase-money of the stolen property to the *bona fide purchaser*; and an order delivering the property to the purchaser from the thief because the original owner would not pay him the purchase money, is illegal—1896 A.W.N. 91.

520. Any Court of appeal, confirmation, reference or revision may direct any order under section 517, section 518 or section 519 passed by a Court subordinate thereto, to be stayed pending consideration by the former Court, and may modify, alter or annul such order and make any further orders that may be just.

1352. "Any Court of appeal or revision" —The words "any Court of appeal" are not necessarily limited to a Court before which an appeal in the main case is pending. The orders under secs 517-519 are appealable quite independent of the fact whether an appeal has been preferred or not from the main order of conviction or acquittal—*Joggeshur*, 3 Cal 379, *Q. E. v. Ahmed*, 9 Mad 448, *U Po Hla*, 7 Rang. 345 (F.B.), 30 Cr.L.J. 540 (542). Therefore where a second class Magistrate restored certain property to the complainant when no offence was found to have been committed, the District Magistrate was competent to annul the order and restore the property to the person from whose possession it was taken, although there was no appeal pending before the District Magistrate—2 Weir 673. So also, even where no appeal has been preferred from a conviction by a subordinate Court, the District Magistrate has got jurisdiction to interfere as a Court of revision under sec. 520 with an order passed by the trial Court under sec 517—*Emp. v. Nga Po Chit*, 1 Rang 199, 24 Cr.L.J. 858, A I R 1923 Rang 227, *U Po Hla*, supra.

But the Sessions Judge is not a Court of appeal or revision in respect of an order passed by a second class Magistrate. So also, a Sessions Judge is not a Court of appeal from the decision of a second class Magistrate, because there can be no second appeal to the Sessions Judge. Moreover, the Sessions Judge has no revisional powers over the order of a sub-divisional Magistrate passed on appeal—*Soma Pillai v Krishna Pillai*, 47 M L J. 481, 25 Cr.L.J. 1247, 20 L.W. 521. But see *Explanation* to Sec 435.

Moreover, the words 'Court of Appeal' imply the Court to which an appeal lies in the particular case and not the Court to which appeals would ordinarily lie from the Court deciding the particular case. And therefore where a 1st class Magistrate, in acquitting the accused person

with theft of cattle, ordered the cattle to be restored to him, but the complainant appealed to the Sessions Judge as regards the order relating to the disposal of property, whereupon the Sessions Judge revised the order and held that the complainant was entitled to the cattle, *held* that the Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to act under sec. 520 since he was not a Court of appeal in this particular case, because no appeal could lie to him against a judgment of acquittal; the appeal ought to have been preferred to the High Court—*In re Khema*, 42 Bom. 664, 20 Bom L.R. 395, 19 Cr.L.J. 597. The trying Magistrate acquitted the accused who was charged with theft of a drum, and under sec. 517 directed the drum to be returned to the accused. On appeal the District Magistrate set aside the order under sec. 517 and directed the drum to be delivered to the complainant. *Held* that the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to do so, because he was not a Court of appeal within the meaning of sec. 520, since no appeal could lie to him against an order of acquittal. The District Magistrate was also not a Court of confirmation, reference or revision, the only Court which could pass orders on a reference or revision being the High Court—*Emp. v. Devi Ram*, 46 All 623 (624), 22 A.L.J. 505, 25 Cr.L.J. 1168. The Rangoon High Court, however, holds that even in case of an acquittal by the trial Court, the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate, as a Court of revision, has power under sec. 520 to interfere with the order of the trial Court with regard to the disposal of property—*U Po Hla v Ko Po*, 7 Rang 345 (F B), 30 Cr.L.J. 540 (542), overruling *Moung Awa v Ma Kra*, 6 Rang. 259, 29 Cr.L.J. 958. The same view was taken in an earlier Madras case—*Emp. v. Ahmed*, 9 Mad 448. The Punjab Chief Court also held that the 'Court of appeal' merely implied the Court to which appeals would ordinarily lie, and did not mean that an appeal must lie in the particular case in which the order was passed as to disposal of property—*Bhagat Ram*, 96 P.L.R. 1911, 12 Cr.L.J. 400, 11 I.C. 584.

An appeal from an order of a second class Magistrate ordinarily lies to the District Magistrate, but if the District Magistrate has directed an appeal or a certain class of appeals to be heard by a Sub-divisional Magistrate, the Court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, and not that of the District Magistrate is the 'Court of Appeal' under this section. Therefore where an appeal in the main case lies to the Sub-divisional Magistrate, that Magistrate has jurisdiction to pass an order as to the disposal of property under this section—*In re Arunachala Thevan*, 46 Mad 162.

But when no appeal is preferred against the main order in the case (i.e., against the acquittal or conviction), but the appeal is confined entirely to the question of disposal of property, the appeal would lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies, (e.g., to the District Magistrate from an order of a second class Magistrate, and not to the Sub-divisional Magistrate)—*In re Arunachala*, 46 Mad. 162 (165); *Jogi Venkiah v. Station House officer*, 42 M.L.J. 534. But see *In re Khema*, 42 Bom. 664 (cited above) where the appeal was not against the main order of acquittal, but against the order as to disposal of property, but still the

High Court held that the Court of appeal was not the Sessions Judge to whom the appeal would ordinarily lie, but the High Court to which the appeal would lie against the main order in the particular case (i.e., against acquittal)

But when an appeal has been preferred to a particular Court from the main order of conviction or acquittal, no appeal or revision against an order as to the disposal of property can be preferred to any other Court. The jurisdiction of the other Courts as to the revision of the order is suspended owing to the seizure of the whole case by the Court of Appeal—*Hussain Shah*, 17 C.P.L.R. 107. But where the Appellate Court in dealing with an appeal has left untouched the order passed by the Original Court under Secs. 517–519, there exists no bar to an application for revision of that order being made in any other Court having jurisdiction to revise that order—*Hussain Shah*, 17 C.P.L.R. 107

Where a Magistrate disposing of a criminal appeal fails to pass an order under section 520, it will be open to his successor to do so—*In re Subba Naidu*, 43 M.L.J. 87. See sec. 559.

Notice—An order under this section should not be passed without giving notice to the opposite party—35 Bom 253, *Kanshi Ram*, 4 Lah. 49 (51). Although there is no rule of law which requires that such a notice is absolutely necessary, still if there is some interval between the date of the main order in the appeal and the order as to disposal of property, it is desirable that notice should be given to the opposite party before passing the second order—*In re Arunachala*, 46 Mad. 162.

1353. "And make any further orders that may be just".—These words did not occur in the old Codes and were for the first time introduced into the Code of 1898. Under the old Codes it was doubted whether the Appellate or Revisional Court could direct restitution of property when setting aside the order of the Lower Court. But now the addition of the words "and make any further order that may be just" in this section gives such power to the Superior Court beyond any doubt. See 46 Mad 162 (at p 167), 18 C.W. 959, and 19 Cr.L.J. 995 (Pat). Owing to this change in the section, the following rulings are no longer good law.—9 W.R. 57, 14 Cal 834, 1 Bom 630, 1 Bom. 575; 22 Bom. 434.

Where the trial Court has not made any order as to the disposal of property, the Sessions Judge on appeal can pass any order that may be just with regard to the disposal of property—*Thiraj*, 10 Lah 187. The fact that an order for delivery of property under sec 517 has been carried out, does not deprive the High Court of its power to order restoration of the property to the rightful owner—*Shwe Wa v C. I Mehta*, 5 Rang 553, 28 Cr.L.J. 932. It is clearly just that when a subordinate Court has made over property to a person who is not entitled to its possession, the High Court should remedy the error by restoring the property to the person properly entitled to its possession—*Ibid*. It is not necessary that an order as regards the property should be passed under this section by the Appellate Court simultaneously with the disposal of the appeal. Thus,

where a conviction for theft of bulls was set aside by the Appellate Magistrate but at that time he forgot to pass any order as to the bulls, and some time after the disposal of the appeal he passed an order for restoration of the bulls to the accused, held that the second order was not illegal as it could be treated as part of the proceedings of the main appeal (the interval being a short one)—*In re Arunachala*, 46 Mad. 162

When an application is made to the Superior Court "to make any further order as may be just," such application should not always be deemed as an appeal and need not be presented within the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal from the order of a Magistrate—*Srinivasamoorthi v. Narasimhalu*, 50 Mad. 916, 28 Cr.L.J. 879 (880). Thus, a person was convicted in June 1920 for dishonestly receiving stolen currency notes, and was ordered by the Magistrate to make over the money to the complainant. On appeal, the Sessions Judge in July 1921 reversed the conviction and acquitted the accused, but passed no order as regards the notes. Subsequently, in January 1922, the accused made an application to the Sessions Judge for the restoration of the money, which the Judge rejected as barred by limitation. Held, that this application was in no sense an appeal against the order of the trying Magistrate, but an independent application to the Sessions Judge with a view to his taking action under sec 520 and 'passing any order that may be just.' No period of limitation is prescribed for such an application, and it can be made within a reasonable time from the date on which an accused person is acquitted of the crime with which he was charged—*Kanshi Ram v. Crown*, 4 Lah. 49 (51), 24 Cr.L.J. 713

1354. Revision :—When an order of the Lower Court has been set aside by the Sessions Court under this Section, the order of the Sessions Court is not appealable, the remedy is by way of revision to the High Court—1898 A.W.N. 40. The words 'any proceeding' in sec. 435 are wide enough to empower the High Court to revise an order passed under this section—2 Weir 669.

521. (1) On a conviction under the Indian Penal Code section 292, section 293, section 501 or section 502, the Court may order the destruction of all the copies of the thing in respect of which the conviction was had and which are in the custody of the Court or remain in the possession or power of the person convicted.

(2) The Court may, in like manner, on a conviction under the Indian Penal Code, section 272, section 273, section 274 or section 275, order the food, drink, drug or medical preparation in respect of which the conviction was had, to be destroyed.

522. (1) Whenever a person is convicted of an offence attended by criminal force or show of force or by criminal intimidation, and it appears to the

Power to restore possession of immoveable property.

Court that by such force or show of force or criminal intimidation any person has been dispossessed of any immoveable property, the Court may, if it thinks fit, when convicting such person or at any time within one month from the date of the conviction, order the person dispossessed to be restored to the possession of the same.

(2) No such order shall prejudice any right or interest to or in such immoveable property which any person may be able to establish in a civil suit.

(3) An order under this section may be made by any Court of appeal, confirmation, reference or revision.

Change—The italicised words and sub-section (3) have been added by section 143 of the Cr P C Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. "This amendment provides for the order of restoration being passed within one month from the date of conviction, secondly, it extends the scope of the section to ouster from possession by show of criminal force or criminal intimidation; and thirdly, it gives power to an Appellate Court or to the High Court in revision to pass such an order"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914).

1355. Scope of section:—Sec. 522 which enables a Magistrate to deprive a wrong-doer of possession, is limited only to cases in which possession has been obtained by criminal force attending an offence and the wrong-doer has been convicted of such offence—2 Weir §§

An order under this section should not be made where the accused person has not been convicted of an offence attended by criminal force—*Sorta v. Dochhi*, 12 C.W.N. 269, 37 All 654. Thus, no order can be passed under this section, where the trespass which the accused was alleged to have committed was not a criminal trespass but merely a civil one—*Sorta v. Dochhi*, 12 C.W.N. 269. If the conviction is set aside in appeal or revision, the order under Sec 522 resulting from the conviction must also be set aside—*Lal Chand v. Dasondhi*, 24 Cr L.J. 493, A.I.R. 1923 Lah. 15.

1356. Criminal force.—To justify an order under this section, the Court must find that the offence of which the accused is convicted was attended with criminal force as defined in Sec 350 of the I P. Code; and therefore where a person was convicted of criminal trespass, in which no criminal force was used, the Magistrate could not make an order under this section—*Churaman v. Ramlal*, 25 All 341; *Chunni v. Baldeo*, 21 A. L.J. 593, *Ishan v. Dino Nath*, 27 Cal 174, 3 L.B.R. 20, *Balram v. Chamru*, 2 P.L.T. 120; *Hari Chand*, 20 Cr L.J. 488, 1919 P.R. 1

51 I.C. 472; 1906 P.R. 12; *Shera*, 28 P.L.R. 238, 28 Cr.L.J. 320, 24 O.C. 352; 1922 M.W.N. 356. If the accused armed with sticks and lathis rushed at the complainant and used threats, whereupon the complainant was obliged to run away from his field, held that there was criminal force as defined in secs. 349 and 350 I. P. C. although actual physical force was not used, and an order under this section was justified—*Emp. v. Ashiq Hussain*, 45 All 25 (26).

But the words 'attended by criminal force' do not mean an offence of which criminal force is an ingredient; to hold such view is to put a narrow construction on the general words. Therefore, an offence under sec. 447 I.P.C. or under sec. 341 I.P.C. would fall under the present section, if criminal force was in fact used in committing the offence, although the use of criminal force is not a necessary ingredient of an offence under sec. 447 or 341 I. P. Code—*Batakala Pottiyavadu*, 26 Mad. 49 (50), *Mohini v. Narendra*, 31 Cal. 691 (696) (F.B.). *Contra*—*Ram Chandra v. Jityandria*, 25 Cal. 434 (439), *Lachmidas*, 23 W.R. 54, 12 L.W. 227 and 4 P.L.W. 329 where the words were interpreted to mean an offence in which criminal force formed an ingredient.

There must be a clear finding by the Magistrate that criminal force was in fact used by the accused, and that the complainant was dispossessed by such force. In the absence of such finding, an order under this section cannot be made—*Batakala*, 26 Mad. 49 (50); *Ramchandra v. Jityandria*, 25 Cal. 434 (438); *Bhagbat v. Siddique*, 39 Cal. 1050; *Teja Singh*, 28 Cr.L.J. 819 (Lah.). In *Usmanmiya v. Amirmiya*, 28 Cr.L.J. 191 (192) it has been held that there need not be an express finding that criminal force was used, if the evidence on record leaves no doubt as to the matter.

The word 'force' means force to a person as defined in section 349 I. P. C. and not force to property. Thus, where the accused dispossessed the complainant of his garden by breaking open the padlock of the gate but used no force or violence to any person, it was held that the case did not fall under this section—*Sheonandan v. Bholanath*, 15 Cr.L.J. 222, 18 C.W.N. 1146. [But see *Usman v. Amirmiya*, 28 Cr.L.J. 191 (192)] Where the accused committed rioting and used violence to the complainant's fencing but not to any person, it was held that this section did not apply—*Sadasib Mandal*, 18 C.W.N. 1150, 15 Cr.L.J. 720. This section does not apply to a case of criminal trespass and dispossession of the complainant unless it is found that the trespass was attended with use of criminal force on the person of the complainant—*Balram v. Chamru*, 2 P.L.T. 120, 22 Cr.L.J. 329, 61 I.C. 57. Where trespass was committed in the absence of the complainant, an order for restoration cannot be passed—*Mangi Ram v. Emp.*, 26 P.L.R. 500.

1357. Show of force:—An order may now be passed under this section even if the offence is attended with mere show of force. On this point there was a conflict of opinion prior to the present amendment. In some cases it was held that there must be actual criminal force and not mere show of criminal force. Thus, it was held that the offence of being

members of an unlawful assembly was one in the composition of which the use of criminal force did not enter, though the show of criminal force might exist; and therefore an order under this section could not be passed on conviction for being members of an unlawful assembly—*Ramchandra v. Jityandria*, 25 Cal 434 (439); 5 C.W.N. 250; *Ishan v. Deno Nath*, 27 Cal. 174; *Narayan v. Visaji*, 23 Bom. 494; *Bundhi Singh*, 19 Cr.L.J. 516, 45 I.C. 276, 4 P.L.W. 329, *Mahesh*, 50 I.C. 30, 20 Cr.L.J. 270 (Pat). But these cases were dissented from in *Chhako Mandal*, 11 C.W.N. 467; 1918 U.B.R. 3rd Qr. 11; and 20 Cr.L.J. 115 (Bur.), where it was held that an order as to possession of property could be passed by a Magistrate even where a person was dispossessed by mere show of criminal force. The Legislature has now given effect to the ruling in the latter set of cases by inserting the words "show of force or criminal intimidation" in this section, and the former set of cases must be deemed as overruled. And thus it has been held under the amended Code that where the accused succeeded in taking possession of the complainant's house by means of criminal trespass, threatening to use force to the complainant and his men, the accused's act clearly came within this section and an order for restoration of the house to the complainant was just and proper—*Rameshar v K E.*, 4 Pat. 438, 27 Cr.L.J. 137.

1358. Dispossession:—To justify an order under this section it must be shown that a party has been dispossessed by criminal force. Where there is no evidence of such dispossession, an order under this section cannot be sustained—2 Weir 674, *Kaon*, 1917 P.L.R. 62, 18 Cr.L.J. 898. There should be an express finding that the person in whose favour the order was made had been dispossessed by the use of criminal force—*Lachmidas v Pallat*, 23 W.R. 54. Where the accused was convicted of rioting and an order was passed under this section to the effect that one of the witnesses be put in possession of certain land until ousted by a Court of competent jurisdiction, held that as there was no evidence that the witness had been dispossessed by criminal force, the order of the Magistrate was bad—2 Weir 674. If the Magistrate purported to act under sec. 145, he should have instituted separate proceedings.

Where it is found that neither party is in actual possession, an order under this section cannot be made—2 Weir 675.

Order affecting possession of third person:—The object of the provisions of this section is to enable the criminal Court, by a summary order, to restore the state of things which existed at the time of the dispossession by the convicted person or persons. It cannot go behind the state of affairs existing at the time of forcible dispossession leading to the criminal prosecution. Where an auction-purchaser of a mortgaged property was put in possession of the property by ejecting the tenant, and the auction-purchaser was forcibly dispossessed by the accused, it was held that upon the conviction of the accused, the auction-purchaser was entitled to be restored to actual possession which he held of the house at the time of his dispossession, that the tenant had no right to any possession, and that

should seek his remedy in the Civil Court—*Rameshwar v. Bisna Nath*, 5 C.W.N. 374.

An order under this section can only be binding between the parties to the order and can have no finality in favour of one who was not a party to the order and does not claim under any party—*Adinarayana v. Surama*, 48 M.L.J. 372.

1359. Order under this section.—The order to be passed under this section is an order to the effect that the person dispossessed be restored to the possession of the property. Where the accused obstructed the complainant's right of way over a path by the erection of a hut, and used criminal force to the complainant when the latter objected to the obstruction, held that the Magistrate could order the hut to be removed, because that was the only way in which the complainant could be restored to the possession of his right of way of which he had been dispossessed by reason of the obstruction—*Mohini v. Harendra*, 3 Cal. 691 (695) (F.B.).

Order when can be made.—An order under this section, although it can be made only on the conviction of an offence, is an independent order and need not be made simultaneously with the conviction—*Narayan v. Visafi*, 23 Bom. 494. It is not essential in law that an order restoring possession should find a place in the actual judgment. But it must be immediate, that is, directly arising out of the judgment of the Court convicting in the case, and without any fresh materials having in the meantime been produced—*Jatindra*, 14 Cr.L.J. 172 (Cal.); see also *Khubi v. Bakhtayal*, 16 A.L.J. 489, 19 Cr.L.J. 734, 46 I.C. 414. It is proper if it is made within a reasonable time from the date of conviction—U.B.R. (1918) 3rd Qr 111, 20 Cr.L.J. 115 (Bur.). It is not necessary for the Magistrate to pass an order under this section simultaneously with the conviction and there is no illegality if he passes the order at any time after the conviction, if the cause of delay in applying for the order is fully explained to his satisfaction and the complainant moves the Court promptly after the cause of delay has ceased—*Ghulam Muhammad v. Karam Singh*, 1914 P.R. 15, 15 Cr.L.J. 275. In this case, there was 20 months' delay owing to the filing of a civil suit by the accused, and the Court excused the delay, since the complainant applied for restoration immediately after this civil suit had terminated in his favour. It should be noted that the present section as now amended gives only one month's time.

In *Mohan v. Rai Chand*, 4 C.W.N. 308, however, it has been held that an order under this section must be made simultaneously with the order of conviction of the accused, and cannot be made subsequently. But this ruling is no longer good law in view of the words "or at any time within one month" newly added in this section. "We do not think that an order of restoration need be made simultaneously with the conviction, but we think that any application for such an order should be made promptly, and that one month is sufficient time to allow for this purpose"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*.

1360. Notice to party :—Since an order under this section is to be immediate, that, is directly arising out of the judgment of the Court convicting the accused, and without any fresh materials having in the meantime been produced, it is not necessary that any notice should go to the accused before the order is passed—*Jalindra Nath*, 14 Cr.L.J. 172 (Cal) But the Magistrate should give the party an opportunity to show cause as a matter of due exercise of judicial discretion—*Pan Nyun v. Maung Nyo*, 3 L.B.R. 20, 2 Cr.L.J. 377 Where an order under this section was made in respect of a house on a conviction of rioting and hurt, and the Sessions Judge on appeal set aside the conviction but directed the order under sec 522 to be in abeyance pending a reference to the High Court, and subsequently in the absence of the complainant declared the order to be void, it was held that the Sessions Judge's order should not have been made behind the back of the party affected by it—*Majid Ali v. Ali Asrab*, 23 C.W.N. 862, 20 Cr.L.J. 846

Sub-section (2) :—*Limitation for civil suit* —See Art. 47 of the Indian Limitation Act, which provides a period of three years from the date of the order.

1361. Sub-section (3) .—This subsection has been newly added. Prior to this amendment it was held that an Appellate Court had no power to pass an order under this section where the convicting Magistrate had not passed any order hereunder—*Bhagabat v. Siddiq Ostagar*, 39 Cal. 1050, *Mahammad Din v. Crown*, 1919 P II 14; *Aziz Ahmad v. Budhu*, 45 All. 553 (554) These rulings are no longer correct Under the present amendment, the High Court acting in reference or revision has power to pass the order even though no such order might have been made by the trial or appellate Court—*Lachman v. Emp*, 21 A.L.J. 871

An order under this section may be passed by the Court of appeal or revision at any time howsoever long after the conviction by the Magistrate, and not necessarily within one month from the date of conviction—*Rameshwar v. K E*, 4 Pat 438, A I R 1925 Pat 689

1362. Appeal or Revision :—Since an Appellate Court can pass an incidental or consequential order under section 423 (d), an order under this section (which is in the nature of an incidental or consequential order) is also subject to appeal and is similarly subject to the revisional powers of the High Court under sec 423—*Gourhari v. Allaz*, 29 Cal 724 The ruling in 25 Cal. 630 is not correct in view of section 423 (d) An Appellate Court may set aside an order under this section, while affirming the conviction—10 C.W.N. 900 The High Court has full power to interfere with an order passed by a Magistrate under this section, although this section is not mentioned in sec. 520—*Ahmed Ali v. Keenoo* 36 Cal. 44. Where the Magistrate ordered that a property which the accused had taken possession by force should be restored to the complainant, but on the application of the accused the High Court set aside the order of restoration, held that the order of the High Court amounted to an order of restoration of the property to the accused—*Sheonandan v. Bholi Nath*, 18 C.W.N. 1147, 15 Cr.L.J. 222.

523. (1) The seizure by any police officer of pro-

Procedure by Police upon seizure of property taken under Section 51 or stolen.

perty taken under section 51 or alleged or suspected to have been stolen, or found under circumstances which create suspicion of the com-

mission of any offence, shall be forthwith reported to a Magistrate, who shall make such order as he thinks fit respecting the disposal of such property or the delivery of such property to the person entitled to the possession thereof, or, if such person cannot be ascertained, respecting the custody and production of such property.

(2) If the person so entitled is known, the Magistrate

Procedure where owner of property seized unknown.

may order the property to be delivered to him on such conditions (if any) as the Magistrate thinks fit.

If such person is unknown, the Magistrate may detain it and shall, in such case, issue a proclamation specifying the articles of which such property consists, and requiring any person who may have a claim thereto to appear before him and establish his claim within six months from the date of such proclamation.

Sections 517 and 523 :—Section 517 applies only when an inquiry or trial in a Criminal Court is concluded. But sec 523 applies even though there has been no inquiry or trial, as in a case where a complaint has been dismissed under sec. 203—*Ramasami v. Venkateswara*, 24 M.L.J. 1, 14 Cr.L.J. 27.

1363. Scope of section :—This section does not apply where the property was not taken possession of by the Police under sec 51 or 54 i.e., where it was not seized by the police under the suspicion of its being stolen property nor had the petitioner committed any offence in respect to the property. Thus, it does not apply where the police obtained possession of the property in question in the course of an investigation into an offence which is in no way related to the property—*Chuni Lal v. Ishar Das*, 4 Lah 38 (42, 43), 24 Cr L.J. 670. This section applies only to property seized by the Police of their own motion in the exercise of the powers conferred on them, i.e., under secs. 51, 54, 165 and 166. Such property should be disposed of by the Magistrate under this section. But property seized by the Police under a search warrant issued by the Magistrate during the course of an inquiry or trial comes under sec. 517 and not under this section—*Ratanlal Rangildas*, 17 Bom. 748. So also, this section does not apply where the property is seized by the Police on the complaint of certain persons claiming as owners thereof—*Kupparammal*, 29 Mad 375 (377). *Contra*—*Lakshman Govind*, 26 Bom. 552, where it has been held that the words 'seized by the Police

apply equally whether the seizure was under a warrant of the Magistrate, or without such warrant, and the Magistrate has power under this section to dispose of the property seized under a search warrant.

Property.—Standing crops do not come under the provisions of this section—*Narayan v. Visaji*, 23 Bom. 494.

1364. Order under this section.—Under this section the Magistrate may make 'such order as he thinks fit.' The discretion given by these words should be properly exercised. If there is no evidence as to the ownership of the property, it should be delivered to the person from whose possession it was taken—5 Bom.L.R. 25, 17 Bom.L.R. 79; *Kyin Tou v. E. Cho*, 4 L.B.R. 14, 6 Cr.L.J. 126; 8 S.L.R. 141. A Magistrate is also competent to order the property seized by the Police to be made over to the complainant if the Magistrate finds on the materials before him that the complainant is entitled to the property—*Husansha v. Mashaksha*, 12 Bom.L.R. 232. But if the property is alleged or suspected to have been stolen or found under circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence, the Magistrate can pass order that the property should be at the disposal of the Government even though the complainant may be entitled thereto—*Ramasami v. Venkateswara*, 24 M.L.J. 1, 14 Cr.L.J. 27. So also, if neither party succeeds in establishing his title to possession, the property would be at the disposal of the Government—*Ibid*.

Conditional order regarding property.—The Magistrate cannot demand security, either under this section or under sec. 517, from the person in whose possession the articles are, for their production if required—7 C.W.N. 522 (see the case cited under sec 517). But if before the inquiry or trial, it becomes necessary to pass an immediate order to save the property from possible loss or decay, the Magistrate can order the property to be delivered to one of the parties on certain terms—*Nasib Ali v. Rukhmini*, 8 C.W.N. 415.

1365. Inquiry.—It has been pointed out in a Bombay case that the provisions of this section are wider than those of the corresponding section of the Code of 1872, and the Magistrate, instead of delivering the property to the person from whom it was taken, may now hold an inquiry and then deliver it to the person legally entitled—8 Bom. 338. In another case it has been held that the Magistrate is bound to make a proper inquiry before making an order concerning the right of possession of property under this section—*In re Ratanlal*, 17 Bom. 748. See also 26 Bom. 552. But the Madras High Court holds that from a study of the section it appears that there is no obligation on the Magistrate to hold an inquiry for the purpose of determining as to which of the contending parties is entitled to the property. 'It does not appear that it is authorised to usurp the functions of a Civil-Court and convert the trial of an accused person into an inquiry in regard to property'—*Kupfammal*, 29 Mad. 375 (378). In another Bombay case also it has been laid down that the Magistrate need not hold an inquiry but may proceed on such evidence as is available and pass an order under this section. He can base his

order on a mere statement made by the accused to the Police that the property was stolen by him from the adjudged owner—*Q. E. v. Tribhovan*, 11 Bom. 131. The same view has been taken by the Sind Court—*Asi*, 5 S.L.R. 3, 12 Cr.L.J. 108, 9 I.C. 634 (dissenting from 17 Bom. 748). The Magistrate is not bound to make a judicial inquiry by examination of witnesses on oath before making an order under this section. All that the law requires is that he should have materials before him to satisfy himself as to who is entitled to possession—*Ma Thein v. Ma The*, 12 Bur.L.T. 266, 57 I.C. 81, 21 Cr.L.J. 561; *Chuni Lal v. Ishar Das*, 4 Lah. 38 (42), 24 Cr.L.J. 670. An order under this section can be passed on police reports and papers alone without any independent inquiry on oath with regard to the question of ownership—*Chuni Lal v. Ishar Das*, supra. If there is no question that the property was taken out of the complainant's possession, the Magistrate can return the property to the complainant without making any inquiry—*Ratanlal* 385.

When the Magistrate has issued a proclamation under sub-section (2), he is not bound to make any inquiry till after the expiry of the six months from the date of the proclamation—*Mahalabuddin*, 22 Cal. 781.

Question of title—The Magistrate deciding a case under this section should not decide any question of title but must be confined only to the question of possession—*Husansha v. Mashaksha*, 12 Bom.L.R. 232. The order under this section does not conclude the right of any person. The real owner may proceed in the Civil Court against the holder of the articles for damages—*Q. E. v. Tribhovan*, 9 Bom. 131.

1366. Proclamation—When the person legally entitled to the property is known, the Magistrate need not make a proclamation nor wait for six months before delivering the property to him. He may deliver the property to the person entitled, whether he has issued a proclamation or not. If he has issued a proclamation, that fact will not invalidate an order for immediate delivery of the property to such a known person—*Po Lwin*, 3 L.B.R. 197, 4 Cr.L.J. 203.

1367. Revision—On a proper case being made out, the High Court in revision has jurisdiction to examine an order passed under this section—*Chuni Lal v. Ishar Das*, 4 Lah. 38 (42). The High Court has power in revision not only to set aside a Magistrate's order for the disposal of property passed under this section, but also to order restitution of the property to the person entitled thereto—*Ma Thein v. Ma The*, 12 Bur.L.T. 266, 21 Cr.L.J. 561, 57 I.C. 81.

Review—Orders under this section cannot be reviewed. When once a Magistrate has passed an order restoring possession of the property, he cannot reconsider it and pass another order subsequently—4 Bom.L.R. 12.

524. If no person within such period establishes his claim to such property, and if the person in whose possession such property was found is unable to

Procedure where no claimant appears within six months.

show that it was legally acquired by him, such property shall be at the disposal of Government, and may be sold under the orders of the Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-divisional Magistrate, or a Magistrate of the first class empowered by the Local Government in this behalf.

(2) In the case of every order passed under this section, an appeal shall lie to the Court to which appeals against sentences of the Court passing such order would lie.

1367A. "*Unable to show that.... . . him*" —When the proclamation has been issued under sec. 523, and the six months have expired, then the provisions of sec 524 come in, and the person in whose possession the property was found can come up and prove his title to the property—*Mahalabuddin*, 22 Cal 761 If he is unable to show that the property is his own, it may be forfeited to Government. But the words "unable to show that it was legally acquired by him" do not reverse the presumption laid down in sec 110 of the Evidence Act, i.e., it should be presumed that the accused is the owner of the property, in the absence of any proof to the contrary. Where the police seized certain property from the accused and no claimant came forward to claim the same though a proclamation was issued, and several items of the property bore the name of the accused, but the Magistrate said that the evidence produced by the accused was suspicious, though no evidence was elicited to show clearly that the accused's claim was false, it was held that under the circumstances the proper and safest course is to follow the presumption laid down in sec. 110 of the Evidence Act—*Aslum v Crown*, 8 S L R. 141, 16 Cr L J 138, 27 I C 202. Where no offence is found to have been committed, the property should be returned to the accused and should not be confiscated to the Government—*In re Kareppa*, 17 Bom L R 79, 16 Cr. L J 207, 27 I C 767.

Property shall be at the disposal of Government —The Criminal Court can make arrangements for the custody and protection of the property while in the possession of Government, and can make a transfer of the property to such person as it thinks proper—*Secretary of State v Lown Karan*, 5 P L J. 321 (324), 21 Cr L J. 475

The words "at the disposal of the Government" may reasonably be interpreted as meaning that the Government shall be free to sell the property or to hold it as a trustee for the true owner, who will be entitled to bring a suit for possession of the property—*Ibid* (at p. 327).

1368. Appeal:—The appeal allowed by sub-section (2) is an appeal in the full sense of Chapter XXXI, and the provisions of that chapter must be fully complied with. Where an appeal to the Court of Session from an order of the District Magistrate was treated as a sort of miscellaneous application and decided *ex parte* without a notice

to the other party, and none of the procedure of Chapter XXXI was followed, the order of the Sessions Judge was set aside—1881 A.W.N. 150.

Civil suit :—In one case the Bombay High Court has expressed the opinion that as this section allows an appeal from an order under this section, it is doubtful whether the law contemplates a remedy by suit—*Secretary of State v. Wakhul*, 10 Bom. 668. But in another case the Bombay High Court has laid down that the Magistrate's order under this section is not conclusive as to title, and the owner is entitled to bring a civil suit for possession—*Q. E. v. Tribhuvan*, 11 Bom. 131. See also *Wasappa v. Secretary of State*, 40 Bom. 200. These two cases have been followed in *Secretary of State v. Lown Karan*, 5 P.L.J. 321 (326), 21 Cr.L.J. 475.

525. If the person entitled to the possession of such

Power to sell perish-
able property.

property is unknown or absent and the property is subject to speedy and natural decay, or if the Magistrate to whom its seizure is reported is of opinion that its sale would be for the benefit of the owner or that the value of such property is less than ten rupees, the Magistrate may at any time direct it to be sold; and the provisions of sections 523 and 524 shall, as nearly as may be practicable, apply to the nett proceeds of such sale.

The italicised words have been added by section 144 of the Cr.P.C. Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923

CHAPTER XLIV.

OF THE TRANSFER OF CRIMINAL CASES.

High Court may
transfer case or itself
try it.

526. (1) Whenever it is made to appeal to the High Court—

- (a) that a fair and impartial inquiry or trial cannot be had in any Criminal Court subordinate thereto, or
- (b) that some question of law of unusual difficulty is likely to arise, or
- (c) that a view of the place in or near which any offence has been committed, may be

required for the satisfactory inquiry into or trial of the same, or

- (d) that an order under this section will tend to the general convenience of the parties or witnesses, or
- (e) that such an order is expedient for the ends of justice, or is required by any provision of this Code;

it may order—

- (i) that any offence be inquired into or tried by any Court not empowered under sections 177 to 184 (*both inclusive*) but in other respects competent to inquire into or try such offence;
- (ii) that any particular * * * case or appeal, or class of * * * cases or appeals, be transferred from a Criminal Court subordinate to its authority to any other such Criminal Court of equal or superior jurisdiction;
- (iii) that any particular * * * case or appeal be transferred to and tried before itself; or
- (iv) that an accused person be committed for trial to itself or to a Court of Session.

(2) When the High Court withdraws for trial before itself any case from any Court other than the Court of a Presidency Magistrate, it shall, except as provided in section 267, observe in such trial the same procedure which that Court would have observed if the case had not been so withdrawn.

(3) The High Court may act either on the report of the lower Court, or on the application of a party interested, or on its own initiative.

(4) Every application for the exercise of the power conferred by this section shall be made by motion, which shall, except when the applicant is the Advocate General, be supported by affidavit or affirmation.

(5) When an accused person makes an application under this section, the High Court may direct him to

execute a bond, with or without sureties, conditioned that he will, if so ordered, pay *any amount which the High Court has power under this section to award by way of costs to the person opposing the application.*

(6) Every accused person making any such application shall give to the Public Prosecutor notice in writing of the application, together with a copy of the grounds on which it is made; and no order shall be made on the merits of the application unless at least twenty-four hours have elapsed between the giving of such notice and the hearing of the application.

(6A) *Where any application for the exercise of the power conferred by this section is dismissed, the High Court may, if it is of opinion that the application was frivolous or vexatious, order the applicant to pay by way of costs to any person who has opposed the application any expenses reasonably incurred by such person in consequence of the application.*

(7) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect any order made under section 197.

(8) If, in any criminal case or appeal, before the commencement of the hearing, the Public Prosecutor, the complainant or the accused notifies, to the Court before which the case or appeal is pending, his intention to make an application under this section in respect of the case, the Court shall exercise the powers of postponement or adjournment given by Section 344 in such a manner as will afford a reasonable time for the

(8) *If, in the course of any inquiry or trial or before the commencement of the hearing of any appeal, the Public Prosecutor, the complainant or the accused notifies to the Court before which the case or appeal is pending his intention to make an application under this section in respect of such case or appeal, the Court shall adjourn the case or postpone the appeal for such a period as will afford a reasonable time for the*

application being made and an order being obtained thereon, before the accused is called on for his defence, or, in the case of an appeal, before the hearing of the appeal.

(9) *Notwithstanding anything hercinbefore contained, a Judge presiding in a Court of Session shall not be required to adjourn a trial under sub-section (8) if he is of opinion that the person notifying his intention of making an application under this section has had a reasonable opportunity of making such an application and has failed without sufficient cause to take advantage of it.*

Change.—This section has been amended by sec 145 of the Cr.P.C. Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. In clauses (ii) and (iii) the word 'criminal' has been omitted, in sub-section (5) the words "any amount . . . application" have been substituted for the words "the costs of the prosecutor", sub-sections (6A) and (9) have been newly added, and sub-section (8) has been materially altered as shown in parallel columns. The reasons are stated below in their proper places.

Secs. 526 and 269:—Sec. 269 in no way limits the powers of transfer conferred on the High Court by this Section. The High Court has power to transfer a case from a jury-district to a non-jury district—10 S.L.R. 154 (cited under sec. 269).

1369. Conditions precedent.—Before an application is made to the High Court for transfer, the *District Magistrate* must be moved first. The High Court will not ordinarily entertain an application for transfer when the applicant can under the law move the District Magistrate for the same relief but has not done so. The High Court will interfere only in the last resort—*Ravi Chandra v. Sandar*, 26 Cr.L.J. 960 (All.); *In re Fonseca*, 1 Cr.L.J. 589, 11 Bom.L.R. 480; *Ghulam Nabi v. Jawala*, 24 Cr.L.J. 466 (Lah.). (Contra—*Nathoomal*, 20 S.L.R. 54, 27 Cr.L.J. 40 (41), where it is held that the application for transfer lies to the High Court direct, and a trial will be unnecessarily delayed if the District Magistrate has to be moved in the first instance before applying to the High Court). The case to be transferred must be a case pending before a competent Court. The High Court cannot under this section transfer a case which is not properly before a Subordinate Court of competent jurisdiction to receive and try it—*Mangal Tekchand*, 10 Bom. 274; *Ledgard v Bull*, 9 All. 191 (P.C.); *Scott v. Rickets*, 9 Mad 356; *In re Sikka*, 17 L.W. 69, 6 Cal 30; 7 Bom.L.R. 104, *Girdharlal v. Motilal*, 3 Bom.L.R. 121. If the complaint has been made to a Magistrate who is not competent to take cognizance of the case, he shall

return the complaint for presentation to the proper Court with an endorsement to that effect (see sec. 201). The application for transfer must be made *before* the disposal of the case. A case cannot be transferred after acquittal. This section contemplates interference by the High Court by way of transfer, when a person is aggrieved or injured by any order of the Magistrate *before* the disposal of the case. It is not intended to give power to interfere in order to set aside an acquittal or discharge—*Corporation of Calcutta v. Bheechunram*, 2 Cal. 290; 1 Bom.L.R. 782.

1370. Cases which can be transferred :—In clauses (i) and (ii) of the old section, the Legislature used the words '*criminal case*' and so the word *criminal* led to a divergence of views in several cases. Thus, as regards cases under Chapter VIII, it was held in 28 Cal. 709, 41 Cal 719, *Wahid Ali*, 32 All. 642, 12 A.L.J. 262, 1913 P.R. 1 and 1 S.L.R. 98 that such cases were criminal cases and were therefore covered by this section; but in 1914 P.R. 5 and 1916 P.L.R. 78 it was held that those cases not being *criminal* cases could not be transferred from one Court to another. So also, as regards cases under Chapter XII, in 2 C.L.J. 614, 26 Mad 188, 34 All. 533 and 11 O.C. 61, it was held that proceedings under section 145, being *criminal* proceedings, could be transferred from one Court to another, whereas the contrary view was taken in 25 Bom. 179 and 8 S.L.R. 215. The Legislature has now wisely omitted the word '*criminal*,' so that all cases inquired into and tried in any criminal Court can now be transferred under this section. "The word *criminal* has been omitted to make it clear that the powers of a High Court to transfer criminal cases extend to the transfer of miscellaneous proceedings under the Code."—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914). A proceeding under sec. 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act is neither civil nor criminal, but is a 'case' within the meaning of sec. 526, and as it is held in a Criminal Court, it can be transferred from one Court to another under this section—*Lakshmi Narain v. Ratni*, 27 P.L.R. 225, 27 Cr.L.J. 476 (477). The contrary view held in 1888 P.R. 41 is no longer correct.

Future cases cannot be transferred.—The High Court can transfer actual cases only, i.e., cases actually pending before a Court; it cannot direct that cases that may be filed in future should, when filed, not be heard by the authority to which they are presented but should be transferred to some other Courts—*Q. E. v. Lagma*, Ratanlal 973.

Inquiry :—A inquiry under the Workmen's Breach of Contract Act is an inquiry contemplated by this section and can be transferred from one Court to another—*Bansi v. Lakshmi*, 45 All 700 (701).

1371. Clause (a).—Reasonable apprehension of not having a fair trial :—The basis of all applications for transfer of criminal cases must be that the accused must have a reasonable apprehension that he will not receive a fair trial—1 P.L.J. 309. When there are circumstances existing to create a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the accused that he will not receive a fair and unprejudiced

trial, a transfer should be directed, though there is really no bias in the mind of the Court from which the transfer is sought and though the circumstances may be capable of explanation—2 Weir 678; *Baktu v. Kali Prasad*, 28 Cal. 297; *Dupeyon v. Driver*, 23 Cal. 495; *Kali Churn v. Emp.*, 33 Cal. 1183, 18 Cal. 247; *Ram Kishen*, 35 All. 5; *Farzand v. Hanuman*, 19 All 64; 25 Bom. 179, *Sardari Lal*, 3 Lah. 443; 1 P.L.T. 522; *Rang Bahadur v. Kareman*, 3 P.L.T. 297; *Benode Behari v. Emp.*, 5 P.L.T. 63, 25 Cr.L.J. 590; 20 Cr.L.J. 566 (Pat.), 25 Cr.L.J. 603 (Lah.). Confidence in the administration of justice is an essential element of good government, and reasonable apprehension of failure of justice in the mind of the accused person should therefore be taken into serious consideration on an application for transfer—*Kali Churn v. Emp.*, 33 Cal 1183, 10 C.W.N. 793, *Sardari Lal v. Emp.*, 3 Lah 443, 24 Cr.L.J. 286.

When a transfer is asked for, it is not sufficient merely to allege that the applicant would not get an impartial trial, but he must place before the Court the facts which give rise to this belief in his mind—*Amar Singh v. Sadhu Singh*, 6 Lah 396, 26 Cr.L.J. 853

When sufficient grounds are made out for a transfer, the High Court is bound to act under this section. It is precluded from considering the possible effect which the transfer may have on the reputation or authority of the Magistrate concerned—*Narain v. Howrah Municipality*, 10 C.W.N. 441. One of the most important duties of the High Court is to create and maintain confidence in the administration of justice, and this can be done by giving to every citizen an assurance that so far as practicable he will never be forced to undergo a trial by a Judge or Magistrate, when he has reasonable apprehension that a fair and impartial trial cannot be obtained from that Judge or Magistrate—1 S.L.R. 8. In transferring a case from one Magistrate to another, the High Court ought not to be guided by the impressions produced in its own mind as to the impartiality of the Magistrate, but must look to the effect likely to be produced in the minds of the parties and their witnesses by the selection of a Magistrate whose personal antecedents or circumstances have however unavoidably connected him with either one party or the other—*In re Pandurang*, 25 Bom. 179

It is the duty of the Magistrate not only to conduct the case impartially, but also to conduct himself in such a manner that the parties may have absolute confidence in him that only full justice will be dealt out to them. If the Magistrate, though not actually biased, still conducts himself in such a manner and utters such words as to impair the confidence of any of the parties, then there is good ground for the transfer of the case from his file to that of some other Magistrate—*Bhairab Chandra*, 25 Cal. 727; *Lolit Mohan v. Surya Kanta*, 28 Cal 709; *Ma Akbar v. Emp.*, 47 All. 288, 23 A.L.J. 133; *Sikandar Lal*, 10 Lah 778, 30 Cr.L.J. 129. Judicial officers should be careful to avoid the opportunity of having imputations made. Where a Magistrate offers a seat on the dais to a gentleman not necessarily having any connection with

the case, while he is hearing it, receives visits from the complainant and the defendant during the hearing of the proceedings, thereby laying himself open to an imputation, and accepts a lift in the complainant's car and sits in it with the complainant's brother, it is advisable to transfer the hearing of the case—*Ganpat v. Koshalendra*, 3 O.W.N. 245, 13 O.L.J. 644, 27 Cr.L.J. 498. Magistrates should not fail to remember that it is their duty no less to preserve an outward appearance of impartiality than to maintain the internal freedom from bias, which is incumbent on all judicial officers, and that if they allow their executive zeal to appear to outturn their judicial discretion, their action is certain to induce the party to make an application to the High Court for transfer—1 S.L.R. ■

What is a reasonable apprehension should be decided according to the incidents of the case and in reference to the special circumstances. It is difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule under which a transfer should be made, for the circumstances in one case might differ from those of the other—*Kali Churn*, 33 Cal. 1183; 5 P.L.T. 63; *Rajani Kanta*, 36 Cal. 904; *Rekha Ahir*, 1 P.L.T. 494, 56 I.C. 664. It is not sufficient if the accused merely alleges that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had. He should also place before the Court the facts and circumstances from which he is led to entertain such belief, and if these will reasonably give rise to that belief, a transfer will be made—10 O.C. 165; 1917 F.W.R. 13. The allegation by the accused that he distrusts the tribunal and that he believes that he will not get a fair trial, must be examined and found true before it can be accepted; otherwise the accused person has only to say that he distrusts the Magistrate in order to get the case transferred, and he will go on doing so indefinitely—*Abdulla v. Emp.*, 22 N.L.R. 99, 27 Cr.L.J. 835. It is not every kind of apprehension that will entitle an accused person to get a transfer of the case; the apprehension of the accused must be shown to be reasonable—*Rekha Ahir*, supra; *Pulin v. Asutosh*, 39 C.L.J. 330. The High Court will not order a transfer merely in defence to the susceptibilities of the accused when there is no reasonable ground for the apprehension—*Narain Chandra v. Howrah Municipality*, 10 C.W.N. 441. What is a reasonable apprehension must of course depend on the degree of intelligence of the accused—*Ahmad Din v. Emp.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 638; *Sardari v. Emp.*, 3 Lah. 443; *Machal v. Matru*, 10 N.L.R. 15, 15 Cr.L.J. 196 (1917). The possibility of probability of his entertaining a reasonable apprehension must also be determined from the circumstances which might give rise to such apprehension and from the conduct of the accused, after taking into consideration the accused's position in life, his conduct and behaviour, his character, social status and mental development—*Fastuddin*, 30 Cr.L.J. 728 (731) (Nag.). In determining whether an application is reasonable, it is the duty of the High Court to place itself in the position of the accused and to consider the facts and circumstances attending his position. Abstract reasonableness ought not to be the standard—*Kali Churn*, 33 Cal. 1183; 15 Cal. 455; *Kishori Gir v. Ram Narayan*, 8 C.W.N. 77; 29 Cal. 211; *Pulin v. Asutosh*, 39 C.L.J. 330. The Nagpur Court

however goes further and holds that if an accused person does in fact believe that he will not have a fair and impartial trial in a certain tribunal, it is inexpedient that he should be tried by it, however high the certainty of impartiality of that tribunal may be in the minds of all right-thinking men. That the belief is entirely wrong and does not do him any credit is immaterial. The question is not whether the belief is reasonable or unreasonable, but whether it exists or not, though the only way of deciding whether it exists or not is to see whether it might reasonably be expected to exist in a person of the standard of intelligence and honesty common in the class to which the accused belongs—*Abdulla v. Emp.*, 22 N.L.R. 89, 27 Cr.L.J. 835, *Machal v. Matru*, supra. In a Sind case it is laid down that the apprehension to be established must be an apprehension reasonable in the opinion of the Court, and not such apprehension as would appear reasonable in the mind of the accused. The Court itself should be satisfied on that point, and the real test is not what the accused may reasonably have been led to think about it—*Wali Mahomed*, 18 Cr.L.J. 644, 10 S.L.R. 183. But this would be putting a wrong construction on the section. For, it is not so much the mind of the Magistrate that determines the question, but it is the impression that is reasonably created in the mind of the accused by the conduct of the Magistrate—*Sikandar Lal*, 10 Lah 778, 30 Cr.L.J. 129 (131). It has been observed in an oft quoted English case, that the law of transfer of cases is based not so much upon the motives which might be supposed to bias the Judge as upon the susceptibilities of the litigant parties. One important object at all events is to clear away everything which might engender suspicion and distrust of the tribunal and so to promote the feeling of confidence in the administration of justice which is so essential to social order and security—*Sergeant v. Dale*, 2 Q.B.D. 558 (567); *Satindra Nath Sen*, 1929 Cr.C. 597 (600) (Cal.), *Awadh Singh v. Puran*, 2 P.L.T. 198, *Anant v. Emp.*, 7 N.L.J. 155, *Machal v. Matru*, 10 N.L.R. 15, 15 Cr.L.J. 196. Where good grounds are made out for a transfer, the application ought not to be refused merely because the case has reached an advanced stage or that the transfer might entail expenses and trouble—*Sikander Lal*, 10 Lah 778, 30 Cr.L.J. 129.

1372. Instances of reasonable apprehension.—When the District Magistrate and the Sessions Judge expressed an opinion that an impartial jury could not be obtained if the case was tried in the district, it was held that the expression of such belief was sufficient to shake the confidence of the public and of the parties in the fairness and impartiality of the jury, and to create in their minds a reasonable apprehension that a fair and impartial trial could not be had if the case was tried there, and therefore an order for transfer was expedient for the ends of justice under this section—*Bhairab Chandra*, 25 Cal 727. When in a case of petty theft, the Magistrate issued non-bailable warrants against the accused in the first instance, and then exacted very heavy bail from them, there was a sufficient ground for apprehension that a fair trial could not be had from him, and therefore a transfer should be directed—8 C.W.N. 589. Where in a summons case the Magistrate had issued a warrant without

any apparent reason, and there was reason to believe that in other proceedings connected with the case the Magistrate had formed an opinion unfavourable to the accused, there ought to be a transfer of the case—*Wilson*, 18 Cal. 247. The issue of a warrant for the arrest of a complainant who has not appeared is not justifiable, and this action on the part of the Magistrate is a sufficient ground for transfer of the case from his file—*Fazal Ahmad v. Abdulla*, 26 P.L.R. 701, 7 Lah. L.J. 571. Where it appeared that during the course of an inquiry preliminary to commitment some entries in the order-sheet were not made by the Magistrate daily as required by the rules of the High Court, and certain orders were not recorded either on the particular day or possibly even on the following day, and in one instance the Magistrate did not record the order with reference to the order of proceedings before him, and it further appeared that the Magistrate, even after the receipt of the order of the High Court staying all further proceedings in the case, proceeded to record the evidence of a medical officer, *held* that the Magistrate had acted with impropriety and the case should be transferred to another Magistrate—*Anant Ram v. Mansool*, 2 C.W.N. 639. Where a Magistrate acquitted the accused on a consideration of the complainant's statement alone, and without examining his witnesses, it showed that the Magistrate had formed a decided opinion before hearing the evidence for the prosecution; the High Court set aside the order of acquittal and directed the transfer of the case to another Magistrate—*Sinnai Gowndan*, 20 Mad. 388. Where the Magistrate makes inordinate delay in examining the complainant, or disregards the preliminaries prescribed by this Code for dealing with complaints, or awaits the consideration of the evidence in another case with which the accused has no concern, in order to decide whether any action should be taken upon the complaint, these may give rise to a reasonable apprehension that a fair trial cannot be had, and the case should be transferred—*Rekha Ahir*, 1 P.L.T. 494, 21 Cr.L.J. 504, 56 I.C. 664. Where the complainant made a verbal statement in chambers before the District Magistrate who at once arrested the accused before making any inquiry, and there was a likelihood of the Magistrates of the district figuring as witnesses in the case, *held* that the case should be transferred to a different district altogether—*Din Dayal*, 1 P.L.T. 522, 21 Cr.L.J. 795, 58 I.C. 523. Where after the application of the accused for adjournment of the case to enable them to move the High Court for transfer, the Magistrate raised the amount of bail of some of the accused from Rs. 100 to Rs. 250, and cancelled the bail-bonds of others, it was held that the action of the Magistrate might be absolutely *bona fide*, but it was sufficient to create a reasonable apprehension in the minds of the accused that they would not have a fair trial before him—*Tittu Sahu*, 1 P.L.T. 652, 21 Cr.L.J. 530, 57 I.C. 454. Where the Magistrate exhibits haste in recording the statement of an accused person before all the evidence for the prosecution is concluded, this fact may create an apprehension in the mind of the accused that he will not get a fair trial, and entitles him to a transfer of the case—18 A.L.J. 1145. Where in a proceeding under sec. 107, the persons against whom the

proceeding was taken were appointed special constables, it might raise a reasonable apprehension that they would not have a fair and impartial trial, and a transfer ought to be allowed—11 C.W.N. 121; 10 C.W.N. 82. Where it was alleged by the accused that the District Magistrate had cancelled his license for arms and refused to see him when he called to pay his respects, it was held that these incidents were likely to lead the accused to believe that the District Magistrate was displeased with him and there was a reasonable apprehension of his not having a fair trial from the Magistrate—*Ram Krishna*, 35 All 5, 13 Cr L.J. 823. Where the trying Magistrate stopped the cross-examination of the complainant in a case because in his view the complainant had been fully cross-examined for one hour, it was held that the act of the Magistrate was indiscreet and might reasonably lead the accused to believe that they would not get a fair trial at his hands, and the case should therefore be transferred to another Magistrate—20 Cr L.J. 559 (Pat.). Where there was an order of the Superintendent of Police that the accused was to be allowed facilities for instructing legal advisers only on application to him, it was held that there might be a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the accused that his movements were unduly restricted by that order, and the High Court therefore allowed a transfer of the case to another place—23 C.W.N. 481, see also *Harthar Roy*, 23 C.W.N. 479. Where a Magistrate, during the course of the trial, received a letter from the witness for the defence, which was calculated to create an apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that the witness was a friend of the Magistrate; where the witnesses for the petitioner were treated in a manner different from that in which the witnesses of the opposite party were treated; and where the Magistrate while complying with the prayer for postponement as the petitioner wanted to move for transfer to another Court, passed an illegal order imposing condition when he had no discretion but to postpone; held that a strong ground was made out for transfer—*Dayawanti v. Bilanand*, 30 P.L.R. 657, 30 Cr L.J. 1048. Where the Magistrate refused to dispense with the personal appearance of pardanashin ladies belonging to respectable families, and repeatedly insisted on their appearance in Court, the High Court transferred the case from that Magistrate—17 C.W.N. 1248. Where a complaint of murder had been preferred against the accused before the Sub-divisional Magistrate, and during the pendency of the complaint, the Deputy Commissioner of the District made a speech in the presence of all the Magistrates including the Sub-divisional Magistrate, that the accused was innocent and that baseless charges had been imputed from malicious motives, held, that under the circumstances, the apprehension on the part of the complainant that he would not get justice at the hands of the Magistrate was reasonable, and that there was a sufficient ground for transferring the case from the file of the Subdivisional Magistrate—*Rup Narain v. Abdul Hamid*, 11 O.L.J. 657, 25 Cr L.J. 1374. Where the Magistrate refused to give facilities to the accused to prosecute his civil suit connected with the same facts on which the prosecution was based, and the record of the civil suit was unnecessarily sent for and

detained by the Magistrate so as to delay the decision in the civil suit, held that this was a good ground for apprehension that the accused would not get fair trial from the Magistrate—*Faqir Singh*, 10 Lah. 223, 29 Cr.L.J. 769 (770). An examination of the accused under sec. 342 amounting practically to a lengthy cross-examination by a series of searching questions may raise an apprehension in the mind of the accused about the fairness of the trial and is a valid ground for transfer—*Faqir Singh*, *supra*.

The applicant who wants the transfer of the case on the ground of bias in the mind of the Magistrate must show the very clearest grounds for believing that the Magistrate is likely to be prejudiced or influenced by an improper motive in the decision of the case. In the absence of such ground, it is highly improper to transfer a case from his Court and thus to throw a gratuitous slight upon the Magistrate—6 B.H.C.R. 69; *Ratanlal* 323, 1887 A.W.N. 139. The transfer of a criminal case should not be necessarily ordered simply because an accused person thinks that he would not get an impartial trial, but the real question to be considered is whether on the facts disclosed in the application for transfer, there arises a reasonable inference that the Magistrate who is seized of the case may be prejudiced willingly or unwillingly against the accused—12 A.L.J. 33. Moreover, to justify a transfer, it must be shown that the Magistrate possessed such a substantial interest in the result of the case as would justify a conclusion that he had a real bias in the matter—*Hyderally*, *Ratanlal* 685.

For a transfer of a case on the ground of bias on the part of the Magistrate, it is not necessary for an accused person to prove actual bias, it is sufficient to show circumstances which may raise a reasonable apprehension in the mind of an accused person that he will not have a fair and impartial trial, although the circumstances may be susceptible of explanation and may have happened without any real bias in the mind of the Magistrate—2 Weir 678; *Wilson*, 18 Cal. 247; *Dupeyon v. Driver*, 23 Cal. 493; *Bhairab Chandra*, 25 Cal. 727; 28 Cal. 709; *Baktu v. Kali*, 28 Cal. 297; *Kali Churn* 33 Cal. 1183; 19 All. 96; 25 Bom. 179; *Rang Bahadur v. Karimant*, 2 P.L.T. 297, 63 I.C. 868; 1 P.L.T. 522, 20 Cr.L.J. 566 (Pat.); *Amar Singh v. Sadhu Singh*, 6 Lah. 396, 26 Cr.L.J. 853; *Faqir Singh*, 10 Lah. 223, 29 Cr.L.J. 719 (771); *Sikandar*, 10 Lah. 778, 30 Cr.L.J. 129; 15 C.P.L.R. 192. The grounds of transfer need not show actual bias, but it is sufficient if there are grounds alleged for suspecting bias. But if false charges of bribery and corruption are trumped up against the Magistrate, no transfer will be ordered, even when there are sufficient grounds for suspecting bias—2 L.B.R. 220.

Although each of the circumstances alleged may not be by itself sufficient to show that there was a bias on the part of the Magistrate, a transfer would nevertheless be justified, where having regard to all the circumstances taken together, the accused might reasonably apprehend that he would not have a fair trial—9 C.W.N. 619; *Titu Saha*, 1 P.L.T. 652; *Din Dayal*, 1 P.L.T. 522, 58 I.C. 523.

1373. Expression of opinion or remarks :—A Magistrate who has already formed a decided opinion about the case before him and has expressed a strong opinion as to the guilt of the accused, is precluded from trying the case and a transfer ought to be directed—*Harischandra*, 10 Bom L.R. 201; *Wahid Ali*, 32 All. 642, 7 A.L.J. 813; 22 A.L.J. 430, *Grish Chunder*, 20 Cal. 857; *Wilson*, 18 Cal. 247; *Sidanath*, 8 C.W.N. 641; 3 C.W.N. 278; *Rang Bahadur v Kariman*, 2 P.L.T. 297, 63 I.C. 868; 20 Cr.L.J. 566 (Pat); 23 Cr.L.J. 168; *In re Virji*, 11 Bom.L.R. 856; *Motunial v Md. Rarizan*, 111 S.L.R. 117, 27 Cr.L.J. 802 Where a case was sent to a Magistrate for disposal with a remark by the District Magistrate that it was quite a clear case and the defence was ridiculous, it was a good ground for transfer of the case to another district—*Md. Yakub v. Emp.*, 2 O.W.N. 688, 26 Cr.L.J. 1525. Where the Magistrate started proceedings under sec 476 against a witness of the accused for perjury, immediately after his statement had been recorded, and before the case against the accused had been concluded, held that the action of the Magistrate was likely to create an apprehension in the mind of the accused that he had prejudged the case against him, as the action under sec 476 amounted to an expression of opinion that the witness had given false evidence—*Gopal Singh*, 29 Cr.L.J. 40 (Lah) A transfer was ordered where in the course of the examination of the prosecution witness, the Magistrate made certain observations which went to show that he was not favourable to the prosecution—*Shcodhari v Jhingur*, 7 P.L.T. 49, 26 Cr.L.J. 1249. Where a Magistrate made certain premature and ill-advised remarks regarding the evidence of certain defence witnesses, and held out threats to the accused regarding the sentence and the effect of his transfer-application, held that the case was a fit one for transfer—*Sikandar Lal*, 10 Lah. 778, 30 Cr.L.J. 129 (131) Where a Magistrate had already formed a very strong opinion and passed strong remarks on the conduct of the Sub-Inspector, the case should be transferred from his Court—*Sartaj Singh*, 22 A.L.J. 430, 26 Cr.L.J. 139 (140) A Magistrate in recording the evidence of a witness made a note regarding the demeanour of the witness (sec 363) to the effect that the witness faltered and that from his demeanour it appeared that he had not told the truth, held that as the witness was altogether disbelieved by the Magistrate, this was a sufficient ground for transfer of the case to some other Magistrate—*Golam Bari v Yar Ali*, 29 C.W.N. 316, 26 Cr.L.J. 852 Where a Magistrate, in recording the examination of the accused under sec 364, added a note which amounted to an expression of opinion that he had already made up his mind as to the value of the defence, held that this was a good ground for transfer—*Faqir Singh*, 10 Lah. 233, 29 Cr.L.J. 769 (771)

Expression of opinion in a connected or counter case —A Judge is not disqualified from trying a case of rioting merely because he has decided a counter case of rioting and expressed an opinion. But the Judge should be careful to confine himself in the trial to the evidence before him and should not let his mind be influenced by the evidence given in the former case—*Asimaddi v Govinda*, 1 C.W.N. 426;

also, *Rajani Kanta v. Emp.*, 36 Cal. 904. Judges are presumed to be upright men who will approach each case from the point of view of that case alone and not permit their minds to be affected in any way by anything that has gone before that case. The mere fact that the Judge, in a former proceeding arising out of a counter case to the one now coming before him, expressed certain views upon the evidence in the former case as to which of the two versions is correct, is not a reasonable ground of apprehension that the accused will not have a fair trial—*Amrit Mandal*, 1 P.L.J. 399, 18 Cr.L.J. 95; *Emp. v. Hargobind*, 33 All. 583. Interest or bias on the part of the Magistrate is not to be inferred from opinions formed on evidence judicially recorded; otherwise a Magistrate would, after disposing of one of two counter cases, be disqualified from trying the other—*Crown v. Kamil*, 1 S.L.R. 37; *In re Vadlal*, 6 Bom.L.R. 1092. But when in a case and a counter case, the Magistrate in discharging the accused in one case expressed a strong opinion on the guilt of the accused in the other case, a transfer of the case pending will be directed—*Rangasami v. Emp.*, 30 Mad. 233. Where in a proceeding it appeared that the Magistrate had expressed his opinion in a very strong language against the petitioner in a connected case, a transfer should be directed—*Rehmani*, 1916 P.L.R. 78; *Viswanath v. Emp.*, 27 Cr.L.J. 210 (Nag); 11 O.L.J. 556.

1374. Inspection by Magistrate :—The inspection of a locality by the Magistrate acting fairly and judiciously during the inspection is not only not illegal, but under certain circumstances proper for the right understanding of the evidence. The Magistrate does not constitute himself a witness by a mere local inspection, and such inspection is no ground for transferring the case—*Harsa Singh*, 1901 P.L.R. 89, 1901 P.R. 13. But if the Magistrate goes to inspect the locality accompanied with one party (e.g., a partisan of the complainant) the action of the Magistrate is improper and is a sufficient ground for transferring the case—*Bhai Gopal*, 1901 P.L.R. 165; *Karban Ullah v. Azmat*, 12 C.W.N. 748. It is not only not objectionable but in many cases highly advisable that a Magistrate trying a criminal case should himself inspect the scene of occurrence in order to understand fully the bearing of the evidence given in Court. But if he does so, he should be careful not to allow any person on either side to say anything to him which might prejudice his mind one way or another. If the Magistrate goes out of his way in making a local inspection and makes the inspection with the complainant without notice to several of the accused and in their absence, the accused may very rightly apply for a transfer under this section—*Faqirzy Lal*, 21 Cr.L.J. 160, 11 O.L.J. 689, 54 I.C. 774, *In re Lalji*, 19 All 302; *Atiar Rai v. Emp.*, 39 Cal 476. Sec. 539B clearly lays down that if a Magistrate visits the scene of occurrence, he should do so after due notice to the parties. Where the Magistrate visited the place without notice to the parties, made inquiries, and as a result of his inquiry he summoned several persons as witnesses, held that the Magistrate by his action placed himself in the position of a witness to corroborate or contradict the other evidence, and was therefore disqualified from con-

pleting the trial of the case—*Pakir Muhammad v. Emp.*, 4 Rang. 106, 27 Cr.L.J. 1084. See also notes under sec 336, under heading "Local Inspection."

Magistrate being a witness in the case :—The fact that the Magistrate may be a witness in the case for the defence is a ground of transfer, but in applying to the High Court for a transfer on that ground, it must be shown that the Magistrate will be a necessary and essential witness for the defence—*Srilal Chamarra*, 19 Cr L J 632 (Cal), 45 I.C 680. When in a criminal case the evidence of the Magistrate is found necessary by the defence, it is proper that the case should be transferred to another Magistrate—*Abdul Lali*, 26 All. 536. In 1897 A W M 17, it has been held that the mere fact that a Magistrate in whose Court a case is pending may be summoned as a witness for the defence, is not of itself a ground for the transfer of the case from the Court of such Magistrate; but it may be a ground for such Magistrate committing the case to the Court of Session, instead of passing sentence himself, in the event of a conviction.

1375. Magistrate having personal knowledge of the case :—If a Magistrate has knowledge in respect of matters which form the subject matter of the proceedings, and he derives such knowledge from outside the Court and not from evidence on the record, the case should be transferred from him—*Satindra Nath Sen*, 1929 Cr C. 597 (600) (Cal) When a Magistrate initiates proceedings under sec 110 on information within his own knowledge, he is not the proper person to conduct the inquiry under sec 117; the case must be transferred to some other Magistrate—6 C.W.N. 595; 28 Cal 709. But in an Allahabad case it has been held that there is nothing to limit the source or the nature of the information on which a Magistrate can act under sec 110; and therefore the mere fact that the Magistrate has initiated proceedings on information based upon his own personal knowledge is not a ground for transfer—*Mithu Khan*, 27 All 172 (173) Where a Magistrate became aware of some of the facts in connection with a case by his taking part, or at any rate by his being present, at a search made by the Police during the investigation, it was expedient that the case should be transferred to the file of some other Magistrate—*Gya Singh v. Mahomed*, 5 C.W.N. 864 Where a Magistrate had dealt with the dispute in an informal manner as a private arbitrator, it is desirable that the case should be transferred to another Court, as his previous informal knowledge would necessarily hamper him at every turn—18 C.L.J. 150

1376. Magistrate being friend or relation of complainant :—The mere fact that the Magistrate is the master of the complainant does not deprive him of his jurisdiction, but in such a case it would generally be expedient for him to refer the complainant to another Magistrate—*Basappa*, 9 Bom 172

The fact that the Magistrate is a friend or remote relation of complainant is no ground for transfer—*Sitaram v Govind*, 1912 P.L.R. 16, 13 Cr L.J. 474 So also the fact that the accused was a class

fellow of the Magistrate some 15 years previously is not a sufficient ground for transfer. If a case had to be transferred on every occasion in which the Magistrate fifteen years before had rubbed shoulders with somebody who was a complainant or respondent or advocate in the case, then the whole of judicial work would come to an end—*Gokul Prasad*, 27 A.L.J. 616, 30 Cr.L.J. 522. The fact that both the complainant and the accused are acquainted with the Magistrate who sometimes gets medical help from each, is not a ground of transfer—*Aliquallah*, 1917 P.W.R. 13, 18 Cr.L.J. 719. So also, the fact that the Magistrate is a relation of the Sub-Inspector of Police or that he is in private life a guardian of a person who has a claim to the estate whose manager or servant instituted the proceeding, is not a valid ground of transfer—28 Cal. 297. But in 13 C.W.N. 50 (note), the fact that the prosecution witness was a relation of the Magistrate was held to be a sufficient ground for transfer. Where the Magistrate is a great friend of a prosecution witness, who is himself a friend of the complainant, the complaint should be transferred from the file of that Magistrate—*Trilok Singh v. Crown*, 8 Lah.L.J. 257, 27 Cr.L.J. 782. In a recent Calcutta case the fact that the complainant's mukhtar was a near relation of the Magistrate was held to be a ground for transfer—*Nityaranyan v. K. E.*, 29 C.W.N. 648, 25 Cr.L.J. 1183.

1377. Magistrate being interested in the case :—Where the District Magistrate's letter showed that he had taken a keen personal interest in the matter which had led up to the proceedings being taken against the accused and that he had even taken part in the inquiry and had himself instituted the proceedings (under sec. 107) and was more or less convinced of the accused's guilt, held that the proceedings ought to be transferred to another district—*Wahid Ali*, 7 A.L.J. 813, 32 All. 642. Where the accused was connected with a Raj estate which was under the management of the District Magistrate as Collector and Agent to the Court of Wards, the High Court granted the application for transfer of the case from the file of the District Magistrate, lest there might be some bias in the mind of the Magistrate inducing him to look with favour upon the interests of any party—*Kishori Gir v. Ram Narayan*, 8 C.W.N. 77. Where a Magistrate has interested himself in a case pending before him in the way of obtaining a settlement by the parties, it is to the interest of both the parties and it is but fair to the Magistrate himself that he should not hear the case—*Muzaffar Husain v. Md. Yakub*, 47 All. 411, 23 A.L.J. 191, 26 Cr.L.J. 869; *Gobinda Chandra v. Gopal Chandra*, 18 C.L.J. 150, 14 Cr.L.J. 602. But the mere fact that the District Magistrate in his capacity as Collector is concerned in the management of an estate under the Court of Wards is no ground for transfer of a case instituted by a servant of the estate against a tenant of the estate and pending before a Subordinate Magistrate in the district, especially where there was not even a suggestion that the Collector or Manager knew of the institution of the case—*Baktu v. Kall Prasad*, 23 Cal. 297. See also notes under sec. 556.

*Magistrate proceeding with the case after issue of rule for transfer :—*See Note 1388 under sub-section (8).

1378. Other cases :—Where from the number of witnesses on both sides the case could not be finished in one day but the Judge insisted on finishing the case in one day and was unwilling to grant an adjournment to another date, *held* that this constituted a sufficient ground for the transfer of the case from that Magistrate—*Ram Sarup*, 17 A L J. 48, 20 Cr. L. J. 127, 49 I C 111 Where the trying Magistrate ordered that he would examine only one witness a day during the trial and would devote no more time each day, and thus prolonged the trial of the case, *held* that this was a sufficient ground for transfer of the case—*Narain Das v. Emp.*, 26 Cr L J 1363 (Lah) Where during a trial a prosecution witness made certain statements which showed his complicity in the offence and the Magistrate ordered him to be put on trial along with the accused, *held* that the action taken by the Magistrate was quite legal, but inasmuch as the witness had been examined on oath before the Magistrate who might to a certain extent have been prejudiced, the case against him should be tried by a different Magistrate—*Radharaman v. Kamakshya*, 20 Cr L J 385 (Cal), 50 I C 993 Where in a case of rioting and murder committed to the Sessions Court, which had apparently aroused considerable local interest, it appeared that the Civil Surgeon had been discussing the case at the local club with the officers of the station including the Sessions Judge, *held* that this fact by itself was sufficient to justify an order of transfer of the case from the Sessions Judge—*Md. Daraz Khan*, 19 A L J 946, 23 Cr L J 126 Where the Magistrate had asked the pleader for the defence not to defend the accused, *held* that under such circumstances the accused could not have confidence in the impartiality of the Magistrate and the case should be transferred—3 Lah L J. 528 Where no practitioner in a District ordinarily employed in criminal cases is willing to act for the accused, it is a ground for transfer of the case to another district—*Lalla v Zahoor Ahmed*, 2 O W N 682, 26 Cr. L J 1272 Where at the request of the complainant, his case is sent to a particular Magistrate for trial, the accused will be justified in asking for a transfer from that Court—25 Cr L J 989 (Lah)

1379. What are not grounds of transfer :—Want of temper and discretion on the part of the Magistrate in dealing with the petitioner's written statement and failure to give satisfactory explanation to the High Court are not, by themselves, sufficient grounds for granting an application for transfer—2 W R. 58 The mere fact that the complainant is a man of importance in the place where the trial is held is not sufficient to justify a transfer to another place—*In re Ratanji*, Ratanlal 474

A *bona fide* mistake of law is not a ground of transfer Thus, in a case under sec. 380 I P C the Magistrate should at once give the accused an opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses if he so desires, even though the charge may not be framed, but a refusal

fellow of the Magistrate some 15 years previously is not a sufficient ground for transfer. If a case had to be transferred on every occasion in which the Magistrate fifteen years before had rubbed shoulders with somebody who was a complainant or respondent or advocate in the case, then the whole of judicial work would come to an end—*Gokul Prasad*, 27 A.L.J. 616, 30 Cr.L.J. 522. The fact that both the complainant and the accused are acquainted with the Magistrate who sometimes gets medical help from each, is not a ground of transfer—*Aliqullah*, 1917 P.W.R. 13, 18 Cr.L.J. 719. So also, the fact that the Magistrate is a relation of the Sub-Inspector of Police or that he is in private life a guardian of a person who has a claim to the estate whose manager or servant instituted the proceeding, is not a valid ground of transfer—28 Cal. 297. But in 13 C.W.N. 50 (note), the fact that the prosecution witness was a relation of the Magistrate was held to be a sufficient ground for transfer. Where the Magistrate is a great friend of a prosecution witness, who is himself a friend of the complainant, the complaint should be transferred from the file of that Magistrate—*Trilok Singh v. Crown*, 8 Lah.L.J. 257, 27 Cr.L.J. 782. In a recent Calcutta case the fact that the complainant's mukhtar was a near relation of the Magistrate was held to be a ground for transfer—*Nityaranjan v. K. E.*, 29 C.W.N. 648, 26 Cr.L.J. 1183.

1377. Magistrate being interested in the case :—Where the District Magistrate's letter showed that he had taken a keen personal interest in the matter which had led up to the proceedings being taken against the accused and that he had even taken part in the inquiry and had himself instituted the proceedings (under sec. 107) and was more or less convinced of the accused's guilt, held that the proceedings ought to be transferred to another district—*Wahid Ali*, 7 A.L.J. 813, 32 All. 642. Where the accused was connected with a Raj estate which was under the management of the District Magistrate as Collector and Agent to the Court of Wards, the High Court granted the application for transfer of the case from the file of the District Magistrate, lest there might be some bias in the mind of the Magistrate inducing him to look with favour upon the interests of any party—*Kishori Gir v. Ram Narayan*, 8 C.W.N. 77. Where a Magistrate has interested himself in a case pending before him in the way of obtaining a settlement by the parties, it is to the interest of both the parties and it is but fair to the Magistrate himself that he should not hear the case—*Muzaffar Husain v. Md. Yakub*, 47 All. 411, 23 A.L.J. 191, 26 Cr.L.J. 869; *Gobinda Chandra v. Gopal Chandra*, 18 C.L.J. 150, 14 Cr.L.J. 602. But the mere fact that the District Magistrate in his capacity as Collector is concerned in the management of an estate under the Court of Wards is no ground for transfer of a case instituted by a servant of the estate against a tenant of the estate and pending before a Subordinate Magistrate in the district, especially where there was not even a suggestion that the Collector or Manager knew of the institution of the case—*Bakla v. Kall Prasad*, 29 Cal. 297. See also notes under sec. 586.

Magistrate proceeding with the case after issue of rule for transfer.
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1378. Other cases.—Where from the number of witnesses on both sides the case could not be finished in one day but the Judge insisted on finishing the case in one day and was unwilling to grant an adjournment to another date, *held* that this constituted a sufficient ground for the transfer of the case from that Magistrate—*Ram Sarup*, 17 A L.J. 48, 20 Cr L.J. 127, 49 I.C. 111. Where the trying Magistrate ordered that he would examine only one witness a day during the trial and would devote no more time each day, and thus prolonged the trial of the case, *held* that this was a sufficient ground for transfer of the case—*Narain Das v. Emp.*, 26 Cr.L.J. 1363 (Lah). Where during a trial a prosecution witness made certain statements which showed his complicity in the offence and the Magistrate ordered him to be put on trial along with the accused, *held* that the action taken by the Magistrate was quite legal, but inasmuch as the witness had been examined on oath before the Magistrate who might to a certain extent have been prejudiced, the case against him should be tried by a different Magistrate—*Radharaman v. Kamakshya*, 20 Cr L.J. 385 (Cal), 50 I.C. 993. Where in a case of rioting and murder committed to the Sessions Court, which had apparently aroused considerable local interest, it appeared that the Civil Surgeon had been discussing the case at the local club with the officers of the station including the Sessions Judge, *held* that this fact by itself was sufficient to justify an order of transfer of the case from the Sessions Judge—*Md. Daraz Khan*, 19 A L.J. 946, 23 Cr L.J. 126. Where the Magistrate had asked the pleader for the defence not to defend the accused, *held* that under such circumstances the accused could not have confidence in the impartiality of the Magistrate and the case should be transferred—3 Lah L.J. 528. Where no practitioner in a District ordinarily employed in criminal cases is willing to act for the accused, it is a ground for transfer of the case to another district—*Laita v Zahoor Ahmed*, 2 O W N 682, 26 Cr.L.J. 1272. Where at the request of the complainant, his case is sent to a particular Magistrate for trial, the accused will be justified in asking for a transfer from that Court—25 Cr L.J. 989 (Lah).

1379. What are not grounds of transfer.—Want of temper and discretion on the part of the Magistrate in dealing with the petitioner's written statement and failure to give satisfactory explanation to the High Court are not, by themselves, sufficient grounds for granting an application for transfer—2 W R 58. The mere fact that the complainant is a man of importance in the place where the trial is held is not sufficient to justify a transfer to another place—*In re Ratanji*, Ratanlal 474.

A *bona fide* mistake of law is not a ground of transfer. Thus, in a case under sec. 380 I P C the Magistrate should at once give the accused an opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses if he so desires, even though the charge may not be framed.

Lakshmi, 45 All. 700 (701). Where a case has given rise to communal feeling to such an extent that one of the parties finds it difficult to persuade his witnesses to appear in Court, owing to the fear that they might render themselves liable to injury at the hands of the members of the opposite community, it is desirable that the case should be transferred to some other locality—*Halim v. Emp.*, ■ P.L.T. 153, 27 Cr.L.J. 1391.

1382. Clause (e) :—"*Expedient for the ends of justice*":—When a Magistrate who had seizin of the case did not know English and there was a large amount of evidence oral and documentary 'n English in the case, a transfer was necessary in the interests of justice—*Mohammad v. Ali Raza*, 16 Cr.L.J. 73 (All.), 26 I.C. 665. But the fact that the Magistrate was not well versed in Telegu and Sanskrit in which a book produced in evidence was written is not a ground of transfer, because it is a difficulty which is of common occurrence—(1911) 2 M.W.N. 50.

Where the case was relating to a dispute between Hindus and Mahomedans in respect of a mosque or graveyard, it is desirable that the case should be tried by the District Magistrate or some other European Magistrate—*Kader Baksh v. Sundar Lal*, 1915 P.L.R. 127, 16 Cr.L.J. 213; *Mangat v. Crown*, 26 P.L.R. 267, 26 Cr.L.J. 1056; *Harikishen v. Allah Baksh*, 28 Cr.L.J. 588 (Lah.).

Unnecessary delay in the disposal of a petty case is a good ground for transfer—*Mangalam v. Abdul*, 2 Weir 679; 12 A.L.J. 262; 8 M.L.T. 222

The fact that the accused is an acquaintance of the Magistrate, and that it would be in the interests of justice if the trial were held by a stranger Magistrate who knew nothing about either party, is not a ground of transfer—*Mewa Ram v. Narain*, 16 A.L.J. 490, 19 Cr.L.J. 702, 46 I.C. 158.

1383. Clause (ii) :—"*From a Criminal Court subordinate to its authority*":—The High Court has no jurisdiction to direct the transfer of a case from a Court not subordinate to its jurisdiction: Sec. 183 does not empower such a transfer. Thus, the High Court at Madras has no power to transfer a case from the Court of the Presidency Magistrate of Bombay to the Court of the Presidency Magistrate ■ Madras—40 Mad 835.

The Courts of the District Magistrate and Sessions Judge of Bangalore are subordinate to the High Court of Madras, and the High Court can transfer the cases pending before those Courts—*Scott v. Rickells*, 9 Mad 356. The Perim Sessions Court and the Court of the Cantonment Magistrate ■ Secunderabad are subject to the Bombay High Court, and that High Court can transfer any case pending before those Courts to any other Court of equal or superior jurisdiction—*Mangal Tekchand*, 10 Bom 274; *Q. E. v. Edwards*, 9 Bom. 333.

In an Allahabad case it has been held that *Panchayat* Courts established under the U. P. Act VI of 1920 are not subordinate to the High

Court, and the power under this section cannot be exercised to transfer a proceeding pending in one Panchayet Court to another—*Sat Narain v. Sarju*, 46 All. 167 (168, 169). In this case, Kanhaiya Lal J. is of opinion that the High Court cannot transfer a case from one village Panchayet to another under the provisions of this section, but it can do so under sec. 22 of the Letters Patent—*Ibid* (p. 170). In a later case of the same High Court, however, it has been laid down that as Panchayet Courts are Criminal Courts, the High Court has jurisdiction to transfer cases pending before a Panchayet Court—*Basdeo v. Badal*, 49 All. 188, 29 Cr L J 94. In this case the learned Judges did not enter into the question whether the Panchayet Courts were subordinate to the High Court.

As to whether the High Court has power to transfer a case which has been committed to a Court of Session having no jurisdiction to the Court of Session having jurisdiction, see 18 All. 350, 8 Bom 312, 36 Mad. 397 and other cases cited in Note 549 under sec. 177, headed "commitment to wrong sessions."

1384. To what Court case may be transferred :—The transfer must be from one Court to another Court. Therefore the High Court cannot transfer a case from the file of one Presidency Magistrate to another, both being Magistrates presiding over the same Court—*Murugesu Mudaliar*, 13 M L J. 69. In 35 Mad 739 however the High Court transferred a case from the file of the Chief Presidency Magistrate to the file of another Presidency Magistrate.

The transfer must be to a Court of competent authority and of equal or superior jurisdiction. Where the High Court directed the District Magistrate to transfer a case (under sec. 107) to another Magistrate, and the District Magistrate transferred the case to a 2nd Class Magistrate, the transfer was illegal because the 2nd Class Magistrate was not competent to hear the case under sec. 107, and also because he was of inferior jurisdiction to the District Magistrate—37 All. 20. The transfer should have been made to a First Class Magistrate as in *K E v. Munna*, 24 All 151.

In selecting a Court to which the case is to be transferred regard must be had to the gravity of the offence. Where a case under sec. 211 I. P. C. was transferred from the Court of a Joint Magistrate to that of an Honorary Magistrate with first class powers, where the case remained pending for four months, it was held that the case, being of a serious nature, ought to have been transferred to the Court of Session or to the Court of a more experienced Magistrate—*Atagan Lal v. Ganesh*, 16 A L J 294, 45 I C 515, 19 Cr L J 611.

Power of the Court to which case is transferred—Sec. 19 All. 249 and 1917 P.R. 30 cited in Note 606 under sec. 192.

1385. Sub-section (3) —'A party interested'—Ordinarily, the only persons who are recognised by the Code as parties to a criminal case are the persons who have the right to control the proceedings, i.

portion of the Code—*Muhammad Sharif v. Hari Prasad*, 5 Pat. 229, 27 Cr.L.J. 1214.

This clause does not apply to proceedings under sec. 145. As this clause directs that the application to the trial Court is to be made by the Public Prosecutor or the complainant or the accused, and as in a proceeding under sec. 145, there is no complainant or accused or Public Prosecutor, the parties in a proceeding under sec. 145 cannot take advantage of this clause. Probably the Legislature thought that proceedings which are quasi civil in their nature, such as inquiries into the possession of land, do not require the exercise of the very summary powers which clause (8) confers—*Loka Mahton v. Kali Singh*, 11 Pat 553, 28 Cr.L.J. 1035, *Jamir v. Murari*, 34 C.W.N. 59 (60), 50 C.L.J. 331, 1929 Cr. C. 522.

Court, whether bound to adjourn:—Under the old section there was a difference of opinion as to whether the Court was bound to adjourn the trial on an application for adjournment. In *Q. E. v. Gayatri Prosunno*, 15 Cal. 455, *Kishori v. Ram Narain*, 8 C.W.N. 77, 2 Weir 685, *Kali Churn*, 33 Cal. 1183, and 1 S.L.R. 35 it was held that the words of this section were obligatory and the Court was bound to adjourn. But in 19 Mad. 375, *Dhone Kristo*, 6 C.W.N. 717, 18 A.L.J. 1145 and *Joharuddin v. Emp*, 31 Cal. 715 it was held that the Court was not bound to grant an adjournment if there was sufficient time, between the date of the application for adjournment and the date fixed for the hearing of the case, to have moved the High Court for transfer and to have obtained its order thereon.

The words of the present sub-section have been made more imperative. The Joint Committee remarks: "Our amendment provides for a compulsory adjournment at any stage of the case, except that a Sessions Court may refuse to adjourn (sub-section 9) when it is of opinion that the application has been unreasonably delayed." Under the present sub-section, the Magistrate is bound to adjourn the case—*Sartaj Singh*, 22 A.L.J. 430, 26 Cr.L.J. 139 (140), and the Magistrate while granting the adjournment has no power to impose any condition—*Dayawanti v. Bitanand*, 30 P.L.R. 657, 30 Cr.L.J. 1048. After an application is made under this clause, the Magistrate is bound to adjourn the case at once, and cannot proceed with the case and record any evidence at all—*Sartaj Singh*, supra; *Churanji Lal*, 9 Lah. 537, 29 Cr.L.J. 815.

But an application for adjournment cannot be granted if no ground is stated therein and the application is made at a very late stage, e.g. after the evidence on behalf of the opposite party has been closed—*Jamir v. Murari*, 34 C.W.N. 59 (61), 1929 Cr. C. 522; or if it is made after the arguments have been heard, and when nothing remains to be done by the Court except to deliver judgment—*Chockalingam*, 52 Mad. 355, 30 Cr.L.J. 908.

When an application is made under this clause, it is not for the Magistrate to decide whether the applicant has an apprehension that he would not receive a fair trial at his hands. That is the function of the

High Court. The Magistrate is bound to adjourn the case, unless in his judgment he is *bona fide* satisfied that the applicant has no intention of making an application for transfer—*Jatoi v. Emp.*, 20 S.L.R. 122, 27 Cr.L.J. 935 (1937). When a party applies for adjournment and notifies his intention to apply for a transfer, the Magistrate should satisfy himself that the party has a *bona fide* intention of moving the High Court and that the notification is not a mere pretext to obtain an adjournment. If it is found that the party has no such *bona fide* intention, the adjournment should be refused. But the Magistrate should not refuse applications for adjournments on conjectural grounds. It is only when it is quite clear to him that there is no *bona fide* intention of applying for a transfer that he can refuse to adjourn—*Nathoomal*, 20 S.L.R. 54, 27 Cr.L.J. 40 (42, 43).

A refusal to adjourn the case without just cause is by itself a sufficient ground for transfer of the case—*Jatoi v. Emp.*, *supra*; *Shenai Uka*, 3 S.L.R. 155, 10 Cr.L.J. 570, 4 I.C. 379, *Olandas*, 8 S.L.R. 341, 16 Cr.L.J. 476, 29 I.C. 108.

If the accused applies to the High Court and obtains an order of transfer, all proceedings held by the Magistrate after the accused had notified his intention of making an application for transfer would be void—*Nathoomal*, *supra*.

The postponement should be for a reasonable time to allow the party to move the High Court for transfer. A postponement for too short a time is useless—19 Mad 375. An adjournment for six days is not a reasonable time within which to move the High Court—2 Weir 686.

1388. Magistrate proceeding with the case after issue of rule for transfer—When an application was made under subsection (8), and the Magistrate without passing any orders thereon proceeded with the case, and even though a telegram to the effect that a rule nisi by the High Court staying proceedings had been issued was shown to the Magistrate, he examined some more witnesses for the prosecution and committed the accused, it was held that the action on the part of the Magistrate was enough to show a bias, and consequently a transfer was necessary—11 C.W.N. 507, 5 C.W.N. 110, 2 C.W.N. 498, 16 C.W.N. 1031. If the Court entertains any doubt about the truth of the telegram, it should have satisfied itself by telegraphing to the Registrar of the High Court—5 C.W.N. 110, 2 C.W.N. 498. Where, upon the High Court having issued a rule staying further proceedings, the petitioner sent a telegram which was laid before the trying Magistrate, but the petitioner having failed to appear on the date previously fixed, the Magistrate issued a warrant upon the petitioner, it was held that the sending of the telegram did not in any way absolve the petitioner from the obligation to appear before the Court on the date fixed, and the issue of the warrant upon the petitioner was no ground for transfer of the case—*Chandi Prasad*, 17 C.W.N. 536, 14 Cr.L.J. 823. But where further proceedings having been stayed by the High Court's order, one of the complainants appeared before the Magistrate on the date fixed for hearing and apprised him of

that order, but the Magistrate instead of staying further proceedings issued a warrant for the arrest of the complainant who had not appeared, held that the Magistrate's action was unjust and hostile to the complainants and the case must be transferred—*Fazal Ahmad v. Abdulla*, 7 Lah.L.J. 571, 26 P.L.R. 701, 27 Cr.L.J. 104.

Where the High Court granted a transfer on the 26th, and on the 27th a telegram to that effect was shown to the Magistrate, and the Magistrate adjourned proceedings till the 30th so that the order of the High Court might reach him; and on the 30th the Magistrate proceeded with the case and convicted the accused, and on the 31st the order of the High Court reached the Magistrate, it was held that the Magistrate's action though not illegal was indiscreet, in as much as he did not wait sufficiently for the order of the High Court to reach him—*Ratanlal* 46

Sub-section (9) :—Under this sub-section the Sessions Court may refuse to adjourn when it is of opinion that the application has been unreasonably delayed. The reason is that "the calendars of Sessions Courts involving the convenience of jurors, assessors and parties are peculiarly liable to be upset by the postponement of cases"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914).

526A. (1) Where any person subject to the Naval Discipline Act or to the Army Act or to the Air Force Act is accused

High Court to transfer for trial to itself in certain cases.

of any offence such as is referred to

in proviso (a) to section 41 of the Army Act, the Advocate General shall, if so instructed by the competent authority, apply to the High Court, for the committal or transfer of the case to that High Court, and thereupon the High Court shall order that the case be committed for trial to or be transferred to itself and shall thereafter proceed to try the case by jury.

(2) The Governor-General in Council may, by notification in the Gazette of India, declare any officer to be the competent authority for the purpose of issuing instructions under sub-section (1) in regard to any class of cases specified in the notification.

This section has been added by sec. 32 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, XII of 1923

527. (1) The Governor-General in Council may, by notification in the Gazette of India, direct the transfer of any particular * * case or appeal from one High Court to another High Court, or from any Criminal Court subordinate to one

Power of Governor General in Council to transfer criminal cases and appeals.

High Court, to any other Criminal Court of equal or superior jurisdiction subordinate to another High Court, whenever it appears to him that such transfer will promote the ends of justice, or tend to the general convenience of parties or witnesses.

(2) The Court to which such case or appeal is transferred shall deal with the same as if it had been originally instituted in, or presented to, such Court.

The word "criminal" has now been omitted from this section by sec 146 of the Cr. P. C Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923

528. (1) *Any Sessions Judge may withdraw any case from, or recall any case which he has made over to, any Assistant Sessions Judge subordinate to him.*

Sessions Judge may withdraw cases from Assistant Sessions Judge.
(2) *Any Chief Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-divisional Magistrate may withdraw any case from, or recall any case which he has made over to, any Magistrate subordinate to him, and may inquire into or try such case himself, or refer it for inquiry or trial to any other such Magistrate competent to inquire into or try the same.*

District or Sub-divisional Magistrate may withdraw or refer cases.
(3) *The Local Government may authorize the District Magistrate to withdraw classes of cases*
Magistrate to withdraw from any Magistrate subordinate to him either such classes of cases as he thinks proper, or particular classes of cases.

(4) *Any Magistrate may recall any case made over by him under Section 192, sub-section (2) to any other Magistrate and may inquire into or try such case himself.*

(5) A Magistrate making an order under this section shall record in writing his reasons for making the same.

(6) The head of a Village under the *Madras Village-Police Regulation, 1816*, or the *Madras Village-Police Regulation 1821*, is a Magistrate for the purposes of this section.

Change —Sub-sections (1) and (4) have been newly added, and sub-section (6) has been slightly amended, by sec 147 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923.

Sub-section (1) :—"In order to facilitate arrangements for the disposal of sessions business, it is proposed to empower Sessions Judges to withdraw or recall cases from the file of Assistant Sessions Judges. This question does not arise in the case of appeals as they are heard by Sessions or Additional Sessions Judges"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1921).

1389. Sub-section (2) :—*District Magistrate and Sub-divisional Magistrate :—*Under this section, the District Magistrate and the Sub-divisional Magistrate within his sub-division have co-ordinate jurisdiction. The District Magistrate cannot set aside a transfer made by the Sub-divisional Magistrate, on the ground that the reason which induced the Sub-divisional Magistrate to transfer the case are in his opinion insufficient. If the District Magistrate interferes on such ground, his action would be virtually entertaining an appeal against an order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate passed under this section. If the District Magistrate is of opinion that the order of the S. D. Magistrate is not legal or proper, he can take action under sec. 435 or 439. He can interfere with the transfer made by the Sub-divisional Magistrate only on the ground of *expediency*, i.e., he can withdraw the case from the Magistrate to whom it was transferred by the S. D. Magistrate, on the ground that it is inexpedient that that Magistrate should try the case; and the District Magistrate may then try the case himself or refer it to some other Magistrate—*Raghunatha Pandaram*, 26 Mad. 130; *Kishori Lal*, 30 Cr L.J. 654 (All). Magistrates of co-ordinate jurisdiction should not interfere with each other's jurisdiction. Where a District Magistrate acts on his own initiative in transferring a criminal case, his order is not vitiated by the fact that another Magistrate of co-ordinate authority (e.g. the Sub-divisional Magistrate) has refused to make the transfer. But if the District Magistrate examines the reasons given by the S. D. Magistrate and finds them to be wrong, that amounts to interfering by way of appeal, and the order of transfer passed by him is not sustainable in law—*Narayanasamy v Kuppasamy*, 5 L.W. 372, 18 Cr.L.J. 57 (58). But in *Thaman v. Alagiri*, 14 Mad 399 it has been held that a Magistrate subordinate to the Sub-divisional Magistrate is also subordinate to the District Magistrate within the meaning of this section, and the District Magistrate can set aside an order of transfer made by the Sub-divisional Magistrate, if he is of opinion that there were no sufficient grounds for the transfer, and can retransfer the case to the file of the original Magistrate from whom it was transferred by the S. D. Magistrate.

But this section cannot be so read as to imply that after a District Magistrate has transferred some cases from one file to the file of another Magistrate, a sub-divisional Magistrate who is subordinate to the District Magistrate has jurisdiction to nullify that order by ordering a fresh transfer of the cases to his own file—*Id. Akbar v. Emp.*, 47 All. 288, 23 A. L.J. 133, 26 Cr L.J. 538.

Chief Presidency Magistrate :—The Chief Presidency Magistrate has under this section power to withdraw any case from one of the Presidency Magistrates and refer it for inquiry or trial to any other Presidency

Magistrate—*In re Nageswar*, 1 Bom.L.R. 397. The Chief Presidency Magistrate has power to transfer to his own file a case which had been transferred to the Fourth Presidency Magistrate for disposal by the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate who took cognizance of the offence—*Mohim Mohan v. Punam Chand*, 51 Cal 820, 28 C.W.N 903, 26 Cr. L.J. 101.

1390. Transfer :—Cases which can be transferred :—This section is applicable to—(1) proceedings under Chapter VIII—*Dinendra*, 8 Cal. 851; (2) proceedings under Chapter XII—*Satish v. Rajendra*, 22 Cal 898; 2 C.L.J. 614, *Raj Mohan v. Prosunno*, 5 C.W.N 696, 2 P.L.T 186, and (3) proceedings under sec 488—*Ghulam*, 1905 P.R 5.

The term "case" includes a proceeding upon a complaint as soon as the complaint has been received by the Magistrate who takes cognizance of the offence complained of. A case can be transferred even before the Magistrate decides to issue process against the accused—*Asaram v. Bhagirath*, 11 I.C. 621, 12 Cr.L.J 437, 7 N.L.R 97.

Case when can be transferred—(1) A case may be transferred as soon as the complaint is filed and the Magistrate takes cognizance of the case and before he issues process. A person who apprehends that a complaint made against him will not be impartially tried by the Magistrate is entitled to have the case transferred even before issue of any process against him—*Asaram v. Bhagirath*, supra. But when a complaint has been dismissed by a Magistrate under sec 203 and the Sessions Judge has directed further inquiry into the case, the District Magistrate cannot transfer the case from the file of that Magistrate to any other Magistrate—11 C.W.N. 316. (2) A case cannot be transferred at a very late stage of the trial, when the prosecution evidence has been taken and all that remains to be done is to pass an order of commitment or discharge—*Pakira*, 2 Weir 691. (3) A District Magistrate ought not to transfer a case pending before a subordinate Magistrate after the whole of the prosecution evidence has been taken and the Magistrate has expressed an opinion that the evidence for the prosecution is not sufficient to support the charge—*Nobo*, 14 W.R. 12, *Gobind Swain*, 2 Pat 333. (4) A case which has been disposed of by a competent authority cannot be withdrawn by the District Magistrate to his file under this section—17 C.W.N 451. But where several persons were charged before the police with rioting and only one of them was sent up by the police for trial and convicted, whereupon the complainant asked the Magistrate to issue process against the other persons, but the Magistrate refused, and the District Magistrate thereupon withdrew the case to his own file, it was held that the District Magistrate had ample jurisdiction to do so, the refusal of the subordinate Magistrate to issue process against the other accused did not do the case finally, but the case was still pending before the subordinate Magistrate—5 C.W.N 488. (5) Where the records of a case are sent to a Head Assistant Magistrate under sec 349 for punishment, the case can be validly transferred at the District Magistrate to a Joint Magistrate—*Chandra Sekar*.

*To whom cases may be transferred :—*The District Magistrate, after withdrawing a case, can refer it to any subordinate Magistrate. An Additional District Magistrate is now subordinate to the District Magistrate under the express provision of Section 10 (3) and the latter can transfer cases to the former. The contrary ruling in 34 Cal 918 is no longer good law. When a Magistrate is gazetted to the office of the Chairman of the Municipal Board and takes charge of that office, he is thereby divested of his office as Magistrate. He ceases to be subordinate to the District Magistrate and the latter cannot transfer any criminal case to him for trial—36 All 513. Moreover, the case must be transferred to a Magistrate competent to try the case. A District Magistrate cannot transfer a case under sec. 107 to a second class Magistrate—Govind, 37 All. 20, or to a Magistrate who has no local jurisdiction over the matter—Konda Reddy v. K. E., 41 Mad. 246

A District Magistrate, after he has transferred a case from a Sub-divisional Magistrate, can retransfer the case to the same Sub-divisional Magistrate; such retransfer does not amount to revision of his own original order of transfer, as an order of transfer is not a final order—Ramalinga, 51 Mad. 610, 29 Cr.L.J. 734, 55 M.L.J. 217

1391. Grounds of transfer :—The District Magistrate's powers under this section are very wide and undefined, and he should exercise the powers with due discretion and for really good reasons—1899 P.R. 13; Ghulam Mohiuddin, 20 Cr.L.J. 402; Jagashar, 1929 Cr C. 660 (All).

When personal allegations are made against a Magistrate as grounds of transfer, the District Magistrate must require strict proof of the allegations—*In re Mahadhu*, Ratanlal 590. To move a case from one Magistrate to another on grounds personal to such Magistrate is tantamount to a severe censure on such officer, and the very clearest grounds must exist before a transfer can be allowed—6 B.H.C.R. 69; and moreover the Magistrate must be given an opportunity of answering the allegations made against him by the applicant—*Vedu Bapu v Bhagwandas*, 5 Bom L.R. 28.

Where a Magistrate in the course of an investigation held a prolonged inquiry during which he made a number of notes, and collected a large amount of information which by reason of the way in which it was acquired he could not properly or legally consider in arriving at a judicial determination, and the notes made by the Magistrate were of such a nature that he ought to be examined as a witness in respect thereto, it was held that in such a case, the Magistrate ought not to try the case, but that it must be transferred to some other Magistrate—21 Cal. 920, 20 W.R. 76. The fact that a Magistrate before whom a case is pending is also the Treasury Officer and has very little time at his disposal by virtue of his duties as a Treasury Officer is not a sufficient ground for directing a transfer of a case from his Court—*Ghulam Mohiuddin*, 20 Cr L.J. 402 (Pat), 51 I.C. 162. Where a Magistrate tried and convicted an accused in a case and expressed an opinion that the evidence of the accused was

not believable, it was held that the expressed opinion in itself was no ground for a transfer of another case against the same accused by a different complainant under a different set of facts—*Hayat Khan*, 4 P.L.W. 21, 19 Cr.L.J. 121. The fact that the trial of a case before a Magistrate extended for a long time (e.g., 3 months) is not a vital ground for withdrawing the case from the file of the Magistrate—*Jewraj v. Dullabji*, 19 Cr.L.J. 119 (Pat.), 43 I.C. 407

1392. Recording reasons.—See sub-section (5). The reasons for transfer of a case from one Magistrate to another must be recorded—*Ratanlal* 590, 5 Lah L.J. 230; *Venkatachalam v. Chairman*, 16 Cr.L.J. 626 (Mad.), 30 I.C. 450, and an omission to record reasons renders the order of transfer liable to be set aside—*In re Venkata Reddi*, 1924 M.W.N. 673, 26 Cr.L.J. 221. But the Calcutta and Patna High Courts are of opinion that a failure to record the reasons will not vitiate the proceedings unless it has prejudiced the accused—34 Cal. 918, *Mahomed Sharif v. Hari Prasad*, 5 Pat. 229, 27 Cr.L.J. 1214. Where by virtue of a Government order the District Magistrate had been directed to withdraw all cases in which complaints had been made against a police officer, the omission to record reasons therefor was a mere irregularity and did not vitiate the subsequent proceedings—*Dukhi Kewat*, 28 All. 421

1393. Notice.—Although the section does not provide for the giving of a notice to the opposite party, still on general principles notice should be given to the party affected, so as to give him an opportunity of showing cause against an order of transfer—*Ajodhya v. Paryag*, 7 C.W.N. 114; *Kamatchi Ammal*, 30 L.W. 401, 30 Cr.L.J. 1043; *Sardara v. Emp.*, 5 Lah L.J. 230, *Daud Hussan*, *Ratanlal* 460, *In re Ratanji*, *Ratanlal* 474, *Mulubhai*, *Ratanlal* 655, *Krishna Anant*, *Ratanlal* 877, *Umrao v. Fakir*, 3 All. 749, *Teacotta v. Ameer Majee*, 8 Cal. 393, *In re Nageshwar*, 1 Bom.L.R. 347, *Vedu v. Bhagwandas*, 5 Bom.L.R. 28, *Imp. v. Sadashiv*, 22 Bom. 549, *Baksha v. Tahir*, 1902 P.R. 28; 14 C.P.L.R. 190; U.B.R. (1897—1901) 392, *Ramalinga*, 51 Mad. 610, 29 Cr.L.J. 734. Where a transfer is made at a late stage of the trial, e.g., when all the prosecution witnesses have been examined, the Magistrate does not exercise a sound discretion in not giving notice to the accused—6 M.L.T. 14, 1887 A.W.N. 53, *Mahadhu*, *Ratanlal* 590. Where at the instance of the complainant a Sub-divisional Magistrate after hearing the parties has transferred a case from the file of one Sub-Magistrate to that of another, it is incumbent upon the District Magistrate when re-transferring the case at the instance of the accused, to give notice to the complainant—*In re Maniklam*, 39 M.L.J. 714, 60 I.C. 55, 22 Cr.L.J. 199

But in several other cases it has been held that the issue of a notice is not mandatory, and the want of notice does not amount to illegality but to mere impropriety. The question of propriety is one to be decided on the facts of each case—*In re Hawaji*, 21 Bom.L.R. 276, 50 I.C. 496, 20 Cr.L.J. 320, *In re Virji*, 6 Bom.L.R. 856. The question is general in its terms, and although as a rule of practice it is desirable that a notice should be issued, still it cannot be said that the omission to issue

is in itself a reason for setting aside the order of transfer—*Gobinda v King Emp*, 2 Pat. 333, A.I.R. 1923 Pat 228; *Bagh Ali v. Md. Din*, 6 Lah. 541, 27 Cr.L.J. 411. If the opposite party acquiesces in the transfer, he cannot complain on the ground of absence of notice—*Asaram v. Bhagirath*, 7 N.L.R. 97, 11 I.C. 621, 12 Cr.L.J. 437. When the District Magistrate transferred a case *suo motu* on administrative grounds, no notice was held to be necessary—1910 P.R. 3. When the order of transfer was made at the request of the trying Magistrate, no notice need be given to either party—*Kuppumuthu*, 24 Mad 317. Where there was great delay in disposing of a petty case, an order of transfer could be made without notice to the accused to shew cause against the order—2 Weir 692. When by virtue of a Government order the District Magistrate was directed to withdraw all cases in which complaints had been made against a police officer, no notice to the complainant was necessary before making a transfer—*In re Dukhi*, 28 All. 421.

1394. Power of District Magistrate after transfer :—The District Magistrate after he has transferred the case to a subordinate Magistrate has no jurisdiction relating to the case, so long as the transfer subsists. But he can again withdraw the case to his own file if he thinks fit—*Mrs. Belugas*, 12 W.R. 53. When a District Magistrate makes an order of transfer, the case is out of his hands, and the District Magistrate has no jurisdiction to make any order in the case when it is properly seized of by a subordinate Magistrate—*Ajab Lal*, 32 Cal. 783. He cannot dismiss the complaint, much less prosecute the complainant—*Sh. Kutab Ali*, 3 C.W.N. 490; nor can he issue process for the apprehension of the absconding accused—27 Cal 979. He can make no order in the case except such order as may be made by him by way of revision—*Radhabullabh v. Benode*, 30 Cal 449.

Powers and duties of Magistrate to whom case is transferred.—When a case has been transferred after process has been issued to the accused, the Magistrate to whom the case has been transferred should proceed from the stage in which the proceedings were left. He cannot go back and dismiss the complainant under sec. 203—19 W.R. 28.

The Magistrate to whom a case is transferred can act upon the evidence already recorded by the Magistrate from whom the case is withdrawn. See notes under sub-section (3) of sec. 350.

The Magistrate to whom a case is transferred cannot further transfer the case to some other Magistrate subordinate to him—*Bashir Hussain v. Ali Hussain*, 36 All. 166; *Darra v. Mukat*, 12 A.L.J. 277, 15 Cr.L.J. 357.

1394A. Sub-sec. (6) :—This sub-section supersedes 15 Mad. 81 (decided under the 1882 Code) in which it was held that the village Headman not being a Magistrate, no case from his file could be transferred to the file of another Magistrate.

Prior to its present amendment, this sub-section applied only to village Headmen appointed under Madras Regulation IV of 1821; and therefore

a District Magistrate was not competent to transfer a case from a village Headman appointed under any other Regulation (e.g., Reg. I of 1816)—26 Mad. 394. This case is now overruled as the present sub-section expressly mentions the Regulation of 1816

1395. Revision :—The High Court will not interfere in revision with an order of the District Magistrate dismissing an application under sec. 528 for the transfer of a case. The High Court's powers of revision are in express terms limited to those conferred by certain sections mentioned in section 439; section 526 is not one of those. The Letters Patent does not confer any power of transfer over and above that conferred by section 526. The remedy of the applicant is to make an independent petition for transfer under section 526 supported by affidavit or affirmation—*Ashu v. Maung Po Kha*, 1 Rang 632

CHAPTER XLIVA.

SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS RELATING TO EUROPEAN AND INDIAN BRITISH SUBJECTS AND OTHERS.

This Chapter has been added by section 33 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, XII of 1923

528A. (1) *Where, in any case to which the provisions of Chapter XXXIII do not apply, any person claims to be dealt with as an European or Indian British subject, or where any person claims to be dealt with as an European (other than an European British subject) or an American, he shall state the grounds of such claim to the Magistrate before whom he is brought for the purpose of the inquiry or trial; and such Magistrate shall inquire into the truth of such statement and allow the person making it a reasonable time within which to prove that it is true, and shall then decide whether he is or is not an European British Subject or an Indian British subject, or an European or an American, as the case may be, and shall deal with him accordingly.*

(2) *When any such claim is rejected by the Magistrate and the person by whom it was made is committed by the Magistrate for trial before the Court of Session, and such person repeats the claim before such Court, such Court shall, after such further inquiry, if any, as it thinks fit, decide the claim, and shall deal with such person accordingly.*

(3) *When any Court before which any person is tried rejects any such claim as aforesaid, the decision shall form a ground of appeal from the sentence or order passed in such trial.*

This is the old section 453 with certain alterations.

1396. Analysis of section :—(a) An Indian British subject claiming to be dealt with as such must put in his claim before the Magistrate before whom he is brought for the purpose of inquiry or trial, according to the provisions of sub-section (1). This sub-section applies to Presidency Magistrates as well as Magistrates in the mufassal. (b) If the Magistrate rejects the claim and tries him, the decision shall form a ground of appeal from the sentence or order passed in such appeal. See sub-section (3). This sub-section applies to Presidency Magistrates as well as to Magistrates in the mufassal. (c) If the Magistrate rejects the claim and commits the accused to the Court of Session, he may repeat the claim before the latter Court. See sub-section (2). It should be noted that under sub-section (2) such repetition may only be made before a Court of Session (in the mufassal) and not before the High Court Sessions. (d) If the Court of Session rejects the claim and tries the accused, the decision shall form a ground of appeal from the sentence or order passed in such trial. (e) If a claim is made before a Presidency Magistrate and rejected by him, and the accused is committed to the High Court, there is no provision for repetition of the claim before the High Court, and the accused will not be entitled to put in, under sec 275 of the Code, before the High Court a further claim for being tried by a jury the majority of whom should be Indians. But the decision of the Presidency Magistrate rejecting the claim is not final, and is subject to revision by the High Court—*Emp. v. Harendra Chandra*, 51 Cal. 969 (1889, 1900), 29 C.W.N. 384, 26 Cr.L.J. 385.

1397. Claim as to status :—Evidence :—The plea that the accused is an European British subject must be substantiated by ample evidence. Where the prisoner pleaded that he was an European British subject, but the evidence as to his nationality was incomplete, it was held that the plea was not made out—*Turnbull*, 2 Weir 11, 6 M.H.C.R. 7. So also, a mere statement by the prisoner that he is an European British Subject cannot be acted upon—*Clarke v. Beane*, 5 W.R. 53. The Judge may be satisfied by the appearance of the prisoner and the circumstances brought forward at the time that the plea is true, but if he is not so satis-

Red, and the plea is persisted in, it must be substantiated by sufficient evidence—*Turnbull*, 6 M.H.C.R. 7. A statement in an affidavit by the accused's wife that she heard from their grandparents while they were all living together that the accused's grandfather was born in England of English parents, though not controverted by the Crown by a counter-affidavit, is hearsay evidence, and is not sufficient to establish the status of the accused as an European British Subject—*Thomas v. Emp.*, 53 Cal. 746, 27 Cr.L.J. 1304 (1306)

Opportunity to plead must be given.—The Magistrate trying the prisoner ought to give him an opportunity of pleading that he is an European British subject—*Clarke v. Beane*, 5 W.R. 53

Time for making claim.—A claim on the ground of status may be put forward before a committing Magistrate at any time up till the time when the commitment is made—*Emp v. Harendra*, 51 Cal 980 (991).

528B. If in any such case an European or Indian

Failure to plead status
a waiver. British subject or an European (other than an European British subject) or an American does not claim to be dealt with as such by the Magistrate before whom he is tried or by whom he is committed, or if, when such claim has been made before and rejected by the committing Magistrate, it is not repeated before the Court to which such person is committed, he shall be held to have relinquished his right to be dealt with as an European British subject or an Indian British subject, or an European or an American, as the case may be, and shall not assert it in any subsequent stage of the case.

This is the old section 454 with certain alterations

1398. Waiver.—An European British subject can relinquish his rights. The provisions of this Code give certain rights and privileges to the European British Subjects, which rights they are at liberty to give up—6 Cal. 83. Failure to make a claim amounts to a relinquishment of rights—*Alexander Ruffe*, 1912 P.R. 6, 13 Cr.L.J. 197 Where the Magistrate explained to the accused his rights under this Code and then asked him if he claimed to be dealt with as such, and the accused stated that he did not claim the rights, it was held that he had relinquished the rights—*Barindra Kumar Ghosh*, 37 Cal. 467 If no claim is put forward before the committing Presidency Magistrate, the accused will not be allowed to assert before the High Court any claim to be tried by a jury the majority of whom should belong to his own nationality—*Emp. v. Harendra*, 51 Cal 980 (991), 29 C.W.N. 384 But the omission of the accused to avail himself of his right to claim the benefit of section 454 does not conclude the matter and he is not debarred from trying

the conditions mentioned in clause (a) or (b) of sec 443 exist—*Martindale v. Emp.*, 52 Cal. 347, 29 C.W.N. 447, 26 Cr.L.J. 401.

The expression "any subsequent stage of the case" includes the stages of appeal and revision—*Jeremiah v. Johnson*, 45 M.L.J. 800, 25 Cr.L.J. 231.

Magistrate whether bound to inform accused of his rights.—The Calcutta High Court holds that before an European British subject can be considered to have waived the privileges conferred upon him by this Code it must appear that his rights were distinctly made known to him to enable him to exercise his choice and judgment whether he would or would not claim those rights—*Quiros*, 6 Cal. 83. Where this was not done, the conviction was set aside—*Baladev v. Charke*, 18 C.W.N. 385, and the records were returned to the Magistrate with a direction that he should explain to the accused all the privileges he was entitled to as an European British subject and definitely ascertain from him whether he waived his claims—*Nuty*, 7 N.L.R. 93, 11 I.C. 620, 12 Cr.L.J. 436. But the Punjab Chief Court holds that it is not the duty of the Magistrate to ask categorically whether the accused claims his right as an European British subject, much less his duty to explain his right to him as such subject. The Legislature appears to presume that a person entitled to a privilege knows of its existence, and that if he desires to assert it he will assert it—*Tobin*, 1885 P.R. 5.

Revocation of waiver.—The waiver is not irrevocable. If the withdrawal of the waiver is made promptly and shortly after the waiver had been made, and if substantially nothing had been done in the interval on the waiver, the withdrawal should be allowed—*Sterling*, 1908 P.R. 1, 7 Cr.L.J. 274; *Keough*, 1878 P.R. 17.

528C. Where a person, not being an European

Trial of person as belonging to class to which he does not belong.

British subject, is dealt with as an European British subject or not being an Indian British subject is dealt with as an Indian British subject or, not being an European (other than an European British subject) or American, is dealt with as an European or American, and such person does not object, the inquiry, commitment, trial or sentence, as the case may be, shall not, by reason of such dealing, be invalid.

This is the old section 453 with certain alterations

528D. (1) Unless there is something repugnant in

Application of Acts conferring jurisdiction on Magistrates or Courts of Session

the context, all enactments made by the Governor-General in Council or the Indian Legislature which confer on Magistrates or on the

Court of Session jurisdiction over offences shall be deemed to apply to European British subjects, although such persons are not expressly referred to therein.

(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorise any Court to exceed the limits prescribed by this Code as to the amount of punishment which it may inflict on an European British subject or to confer jurisdiction on any Magistrate of the second or third class for the trial of such subjects.

This is the old section 459 with certain alterations

CHAPTER XLV.

OF IRREGULAR PROCEEDINGS.

Irregularities which do not vitiate proceedings. 529. If any Magistrate not empowered by law to do any of the following things, namely:—

- (a) to issue a search-warrant under section 98;
- (b) to order, under section 155, the police to investigate an offence;
- (c) to hold an inquest under section 176;
- (d) to issue process, under section 186, for the apprehension of a person within the local limits of his jurisdiction who has committed an offence outside such limits;
- (e) to take cognizance of an offence under section 190, sub-section (1) clause (a) or clause (b);
- (f) to transfer a case under section 192;
- (g) to tender a pardon under section 337 or section 338;
- (h) to sell property under section 524 or section 525; or
- (i) to withdraw a case and try it himself under section 528;

erroneously in good faith does that thing, his proceedings shall not be set aside merely on the ground of his not being so empowered.

1399. Scope of Section :—*Clause (f) :—*'A case' includes cases under Chapter VIII or XII. See notes under Sec. 192. The irregularity of transfer under Sec. 192 by a Magistrate not empowered is cured by this section—*Dasarath*, 36 Cal. 869; *Kishori v. Srinath*, 36 Cal. 370

*Clause (g) :—*See 20 Ail. 40 cited under Sec 337.

*Prejudice to accused :—*Having regard to the provisions of this section read with Sec. 531, it must be shown that the proceedings wrongly held in a case have in fact occasioned a failure of justice before they can be set aside—39 Cal. 119.

530. If any Magistrate, not being empowered by law in this behalf, does any of the following things, namely :—

- (a) attaches and sells property under section 88;
- (b) issues a search-warrant for a letter, parcel or other thing in the Post Office, or a telegram in the Telegraph Department;
- (c) demands security to keep the peace;
- (d) demands security for good behaviour;
- (e) discharges a person lawfully bound to be of good behaviour;
- (f) cancels a bond to keep the peace;
- (g) makes an order under section 133 as to a local nuisance;
- (h) prohibits, under section 143, the repetition or continuance of a public nuisance;
- (i) issues an order under section 144;
- (j) makes an order under Chapter XII;
- (k) takes cognizance, under section 190, sub-section (1) clause (c), of an offence;
- (l) passes a sentence under section 349, on proceedings recorded by another Magistrate;
- (m) calls, under section 435, for proceedings;
- (n) makes an order for maintenance;

(o) revises, under section 515, an order passed under section 514;

(p) tries an offender;

(q) tries an offender summarily; or

(r) decides an appeal;

his proceedings shall be void.

1400. Clause (j).—This clause refers only to a case where a Magistrate is not competent, by virtue of the position he holds or the powers vested in him, to try a case of the character mentioned in sec. 145. But where a Magistrate is competent to try a case under sec. 145, the fact that he has no local jurisdiction over the matter will not make the trial void—5 C.W.N 586

Clause (n).—If an order under sec 488 is passed by a Magistrate who is *duly empowered* to try maintenance-cases, the order is not vitiated by the fact that the proceedings were taken in a wrong Court. To such a case sec 530 (n) does not apply, but sec 531—*Sitram v Sukia*, 49 C.L.J 205, 30 Cr.L.J 525.

Clause (p).—If a Third Class Magistrate, not being specially empowered by the Local Government, tries an offender under sec 2 of the Bombay Public Conveyances Act (IV of 1863), the trial is void—*Q E v. Rama, Ratanlal* 921 If a Second Class Magistrate tries an accused, who has actually committed an offence under sec 409 I P C., as though for an offence under sec 406 I. P. C., the trial and conviction are void—*Sitaram*, 1 Bom.L.R. 27 But where the offence consists of circumstances of aggravation which make it triable by a higher Court, and a 2nd Class Magistrate tries it, ignoring those aggravating circumstances, the proceedings are not void *ab initio* under this section—*Q E v Gundy*, 13 Bom 502, A distinction should be drawn between proceedings which are *improper* and proceedings which are *void*. If a Magistrate tries an offender for an offence which is beyond his jurisdiction, his proceedings shall be *void*. But where the facts disclose an offence within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, it is a complete fallacy to say that he is not empowered to try the person charged for the offence which is within his jurisdiction merely because the same facts disclose a more serious offence which is beyond his jurisdiction. No doubt it would be *improper* for a Magistrate to intentionally ignore the circumstances of aggravation which show that an offence beyond his jurisdiction has been committed, and to try the accused for a lesser offence within his jurisdiction, but his proceedings would not be *void* on that ground—*K E v Ayyan*, 24 Mad 675; *Kuttuva Rowther v Suppan*, 25 L.W 86. 28 Cr L.J 164 (165) See also 4 Bom L.R. 267, and *Dawson v K E*, 2 Rang. 455, 26 Cr L.J. 1108

Where a trial is void under this section, sec 403 does not bar a retrial—*Hussain Gaibu*, 11 Bom 307, 1910 P.R 7, 29 Cal 412

Clause (g) :—Where a Magistrate deliberately disregards the offence actually complained of, viz., an offence not triable summarily, and tries it summarily, his proceedings are absolutely void—*Kailash v Joynuddi* 5 C.W.N. 252; 29 Cal. 409; 1907 P.L.R. 21; 4 Cal. 18; *Emp. v. Rari Narain*, 46 All. 446

Clause (r) :—The word 'Magistrate' in this section includes a Sessions Judge; therefore if a Sessions Judge hears an appeal which ought to have been presented to the High Court, the proceedings before the Sessions Judge are absolutely void—*In re Abdulla*, 2 Rang 386 (387), 26 Cr.L.J. 293, A.L.R. 1925 Rang. 39.

531. No finding, sentence or order of any Criminal Court shall be set aside merely on the ground that the inquiry, trial or other proceeding in the course of which it was arrived at or passed, took place in a wrong sessions division, district, sub-division or other local area, unless it appears that such error has in fact occasioned a failure of justice.

1401. Object and scope of section.—The policy of this Code as shown by secs. 531-538 is to uphold in most cases orders passed by a Criminal Court which was lacking in local jurisdiction or which has committed illegalities or irregularities, unless failure of justice has been occasioned or is likely to be occasioned through such want of jurisdiction or such illegalities or irregularities—*Ganapathi*, 42 Mad. 791.

This section only refers to districts, subdivisions and local areas governed by this Code, and not to tributary Mahals like Keonjhar or Mourbhanj to which the Code does not extend—16 Cal 667; 8 Cal. 985

The 'order' under this section includes an order of committal—*Bhagwantia v K E.*, 3 Pat 417 (421), 26 Cr.L.J. 49

Offence in one place, trial or commitment in another :—See Note 549 under section 177. See also 17 Mad. 402, cited under sec 332.

Commitment to wrong Sessions :—See Note 549 under sec 177

Trial at a place outside jurisdiction :—Where a criminal appeal was heard and disposed of at a place which was outside the local limits of his criminal jurisdiction, but where he had civil jurisdiction, it was held that the procedure was an irregularity, but no failure of justice being occasioned thereby, the trial was not a nullity—*Q. E. v. Fazl Azim*, 17 All 36

Jurisdiction of Court to order forfeiture :—This section applies only to proceedings in a wrong place and cures defects as to local jurisdiction. But it cannot cure a defect where a bond of appearance taken from the accused by one Magistrate is forfeited by another Magistrate, for it is a defect not of local jurisdiction but of personal jurisdiction—*Mir Husein*, 16 Bom.L.R. 84, 15 Cr.L.J. 295 (cited under sec 514)

Failure of justice:—Where no objection was taken in the Lower Court, and the petitioner failed to show in the High Court that he had been prejudiced, the High Court declined to interfere—21 W.R. 88. Even the fact that the objection to jurisdiction was taken at a comparatively early stage of the proceedings was not a conclusive proof that the accused was prejudiced by the irregularity—*Kali Charan*, 34 C.L.J. 200, 22 Cr.L.J. 666, 63 I.C. 458.

532. (1) If any Magistrate or other authority purporting to exercise powers duly conferred, which were not so conferred, commits an accused person for trial before a Court of Session or High Court, the Court to which the commitment is made may, after perusal of the proceedings, accept the commitment if it considers that the accused has not been injured thereby, unless during the inquiry and before the order of commitment, objection was made on behalf either of the accused or of the prosecution to the jurisdiction of such Magistrate or other authority.

(2) If such Court considers that the accused was injured, or if such objection was so made, it shall quash the commitment and direct a fresh inquiry by a competent Magistrate.

1402. Scope of Section:—Sec. 531 must be read as complete in itself and not as in any way cut down or limited by the proviso contained in the latter part of sec. 532. Sec. 531 applies only to cases in which there is no jurisdiction by reason of the inquiry, trial or other proceeding being held in a wrong local area. Sec. 532 seems to refer to cases in which the Magistrate is competent to deal with the offence as having taken place within the local limits of his jurisdiction, but has no power to commit to the Sessions either because he is a Second-Class Magistrate or for some reasons other than that of want of local jurisdiction—*James Ingle*, 16 Bom. 200.

This section applies only to cases where the Magistrate or other authority who has assumed to commit has not been duly invested with the powers under which he has assumed to make the commitment, i.e., when the defect is one personal to the committing authority and there is no defect in his proceeding—*Shamal Khan*, 1890 P.H. 16. This section does not deal with cases in which the defect in the committal order arises from want of territorial jurisdiction—*James Ingle*, 16 Bom. 200; *Rathiram*, 20 Cr.L.J. 416 (Mad), 51 I.C. 176. It does not apply where the commitment is bad owing to a disqualification of the Magistrate under sec. 556—2 L.B.R. 209. It has no application to commitments made by Magistrates acting under sec. 346—12 C.W.N. 136. But this section

applies where the commitment is irregular by reason of want of sanction under sec. 196 or 197—*Q E v. B. G. Tulak*, 22 Bom. 112; *Q. E. v. Morton*, 9 Bom. 288. It also applies where the commitment of the approver (who has broken the conditions of pardon) is irregular by reason of want of the certificate of Public Prosecutor required under sec. 339—*Nga Wa v. Emp.*, 3 Rang. 55, 4 Bur.L.J. 23.

Objection to commitment:—If a Magistrate, being empowered to commit to the Sessions but having no territorial jurisdiction over the place of offence, commits a case to the Sessions, the commitment is valid under sec. 531, and it cannot be set aside under section 532, although the objection to such commitment was taken before the commitment—*Q E v. Reddy*, 17 Mad. 402.

Where objection to the want of jurisdiction of the Magistrate to commit is not taken before the Magistrate, the High Court can accept the commitment under this section, if it considers that the accused has not been prejudiced thereby—*Bal Gangadhar Tilak*, 22 Bom. 112.

533. (1) If any Court, before which a confession

Non-compliance with provisions of S. 164 or 364. or other statement of an accused person recorded or purporting to be recorded under Section 164 or Section 364 is tendered or has been received in evidence, finds that any of the provisions of either of such sections have not been complied with by the Magistrate recording the statement, it shall take evidence that such person duly made the statement recorded; and, notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, S. 91, such statement shall be admitted if the error has not injured the accused as to his defence on the merits.

(2) The provisions of this section apply to Courts of Appeal, Reference and Revision.

1403. Scope of Section:—What this section means is this, that where a confession or other statement of an accused person is duly made, but in recording it the provisions of the law have not been complied with, oral evidence is admissible to prove that the confession or the statement was duly made. The defect which this section intends to cure is one not of substance, but of form only, as for instance when the Magistrate has omitted to sign the certificate, or has omitted to state in the certificate that the statement was taken in his hearing—2 C.W.N. 702; 1915 P.R. 17; or where the Magistrate has omitted to record that the required warning was given to the accused under sec. 164—*Part-4 Singh v. Emp.*, 6 Lah. 415, 7 Lah.L.J. 482; *Ramai v. Emp.*, 3 Pat. 872; *Khemton v. Emp.*, 6 Lah. 58, 26 Cr.L.J. 1074; *Bawa Singh v. Emp.*, 7 Lah.L.J. 230, 26 Cr.L.J. 1458; or where the Magistrate has recorded that the confession was voluntarily made but omitted to record the ques-

tions and answers which would show that the confession was voluntary—*Rama Kariyappa*, 31 Bom.L.R. 565, A.I.R. 1929 Bom. 327 (328). But this section will not render a confession admissible when the provisions of the law have been *totally disregarded*, as for instance where a statement has been neither signed by the accused nor certified by the Magistrate—9 Mad. 224, 17 Cal 862, or where no warning was given at all under sec. 164—*Partap v Emp*, 6 Lah 415, A.I.R. 1925 Lah. 605. This section has no application where no record whatsoever has been made of a confession—*Gulabu*, 35 All 260. But the Bombay High Court lays down that neither the language nor the object of sec. 533 would justify a distinction between an omission to comply with the law and an *infraction or direct violation* of the law. The test is that as long as the irregularity does not injure the accused as to his defence on the merits, it can be cured under sec. 533—*Visram Babaji*, 21 Bom. 495 (501), *Q. E. v. Raghu*, 23 Bom 221, *Rama Kariyappa*, supra. In these cases it has been held that this section applies to omissions to comply with the law as well as to infractions of the law, i.e., to defects not only of form but of substance also.

Irregularity in record of confession —See Notes 1037, 1038, and 1042 under sec. 364

Omission to sign the record —See Note 1040 under sec. 364

Want of memorandum or certificate —See Note 519 under sec. 164 and Note 1041 under sec. 364.

Irregularity in recording confession.—See note 516 under sec. 164.

534. *An omission to inform under S. 447 any person of his rights under Chapter XXXIII shall not affect the validity of any proceeding.*

Omission to give information under section 447.

This section has been amended by section 34 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, XII of 1923

535. (1) No finding or sentence pronounced or passed shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no charge was framed, unless, in the

Effect of omission to prepare charge.

opinion of the Court of appeal or revision, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.

(2) If the Court of appeal or revision thinks that a failure of justice has been occasioned by an omission to frame a charge, it shall order that a charge be framed, and that the trial be recommenced from the point immediately after the framing of the charge.

1404. *Omission to frame charge* :—An omission to frame a charge does not invalidate an order of acquittal and render it equivalent

to an order of discharge; such order is a bar to a retrial for the same offence—3 All. 129. Mere omission to frame a charge will not justify a reversal of the order of the lower Court, unless a failure of justice has been occasioned, especially where at the close of the prosecution evidence-in-chief, the Magistrate laid down the charge—*Madhab v. Emp.*, 53 Cal. 738, 27 Cr.L.J. 1295.

Where a charge was framed under sec. 147, I. P. C., but the accused was convicted of an offence under sec. 323, I. P. C., it was held that the conviction was illegal on account of the absence of a charge under sec. 323 I. P. C., and sec. 535 of this Code did not cure the defect. The words "merely on the ground that no charge was framed" in this section must mean a case where the offence being a petty one, and the evidence being fairly taken, the Court framed no charge at all. But where a charge has been framed (in this case a charge under sec. 147 I. P. C., was framed), this section does not apply and it cannot be said that the conviction 'shall not be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no charge was framed;' and the persons charged under sec. 147 I. P. C., for rioting with the common object of causing hurt to the complainant cannot be convicted under sec. 323 I. P. C., of causing hurt to another person—40 Cal. 168. But in a recent case the same High Court has laid down that this section is not confined to cases where no charge at all has been framed, but also applies to cases in which no charge was framed of the particular offence of which the accused has been convicted (though a charge of another offence was framed)—*Abdul Rahim v. K. E.*, 41 C.L.J. 474, 26 Cr.L.J. 1279.

Where a Magistrate framed a charge under section 19 (e) and (f) of the Arms Act, and then submitted the record to the District Magistrate for his sanction and the District Magistrate sanctioned the institution of proceedings, whereupon the trial proceeded and the accused was convicted, it was held that the omission to frame a charge afresh after sanction was cured by this section—*Kaka v. K. E.*, 4 L.B.R. 247, 8 Cr.L.J. 85.

536. (1) If an offence triable with the aid of assessors is tried by a jury, the trial shall not on that ground only be invalid.

(2) If an offence triable by a jury is tried with the aid of assessors, the trial shall not on that ground only be invalid, unless the objection is taken before the Court records its finding.

1405. Sub-section (1):—The difference between a trial by jury and a trial with the aid of assessors lies in the summing up of the case, and the manner in which the verdict of the jury and the opinions of the assessors are taken. It is at this latter point that there is a departure of

ways, and if the accused does not put any objection at the crucial point, he cannot afterwards be heard to complain. Where no objection was taken at the trial, it was too late to take objection on appeal—33 Bom 423.

Sub-section (2):—Where a case was triable by jury but was tried with the aid of assessors and no objection was taken at the trial, it was held that the trial was not invalid, even though the accused was materially injured, by reason of the fact that the Judge differed from the opinions of the assessors and convicted the accused—*Ganapathi*, 23 Mad 632. The objection must be taken at the trial and cannot be taken in appeal—*Ibid*.

537. Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered under Chapter XXVII or on appeal or revision on account—

Finding or sentence when reversible by reason of error or omission in charge or proceedings.

(a) of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, charge, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in any inquiry or other proceedings under this Code, or

(b) (Omitted).

(c) of the omission to revise any list of jurors or assessors in accordance with Section 324, or

(d) of any misdirection in any charge to a jury, unless such error, omission, irregularity or misdirection has in fact occasioned a failure of justice.

Explanation.—In determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in any proceedings under this Code has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings.

Change:—Clause (b) and the illustration have been omitted by sec 148 of the Cr P. C. Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. Clause (b) ran as follows:—“(b) of the want of, or any irregularity in, any sanction required by sec. 195 or any irregularity in proceedings taken under sec. 476.” By reason of the omission of this clause, any irregularity

in a proceeding under sec. 476 can no more be condoned under sec. 537. Thus, if the Court takes action under sec. 476 in respect of an offence referred to in clause (a) of sec. 195, the proceeding is without jurisdiction, and sec. 537 cannot cure the irregularity—*Dore Sah*, 2 Luck. 646. 28 Cr.L.J. 681 (682).

The Illustration ran as follows.—“A Magistrate being required by law to sign a document signs it in initials only. This is purely an irregularity and does not affect the validity of the proceeding.” This illustration was given to show the class of irregularity contemplated by this section, as distinguished from substantial departures from law—*Allu v Crown*, 4 Lah 376 (380). But as this Code nowhere lays down that the Magistrate must sign his name in full and not in initials, the illustration was thought to be “inappropriate” and has been omitted by the *Select Committee of 1916*.

1406. Scope of Section :—This section applies to mere errors of procedure arising out of mere inadvertence and not to substantive errors of law—*Appa Subhana*, 8 Bom 200; 11 B H C R. 237; 12 W.R. (P.C.) 32. It does not apply to cases of disregard or disobedience of the whole of some mandatory provisions of the Code, but applies only to cases of failure to comply with some part of such provisions in the course of a general compliance with the whole—*Gangadhar v Bhangí*, 25 Cr.L.J. 1152 (Nag.). When a trial is contrary to law, it is no trial at all, and a disobedience to an express provision of law as to the mode of the trial is not an irregularity which can be cured by this section, but is an illegality which vitiates the whole trial. This section has not the effect of curing material irregularities and absolute illegalities. The errors which can be cured by this section are formal defects of procedure and not substantive errors of law—*Subramanya Ayyar v. Emp.*, 25 Mad. 61 (P.C.); *Harnarain v Kariman*, 5 P.L.J. 61, 21 Cr.L.J. 621. This section does not apply to an infringement of statutory requirements. It only applies to errors, omissions and irregularities of a technical nature which may occur by accident or oversight in the course of proceedings conducted in the mode prescribed by statute. If in conducting a trial the Judge adopts a procedure which is a departure from the authorised procedure, it would amount to a violation of the law, which cannot be cured by section 537—*Allu v. Crown*, 4 Lah 376; *Lyme v. Crown*, 4 Lah. 392 (396). Thus, where two cross-cases were at first tried by the Judge separately but were afterwards tried jointly, the evidence for the prosecution in one case was treated at the request of the accused as the defence evidence in the cross-case, only one set of findings was recorded in respect of both cases, and finally one composite judgment was delivered, held that the procedure adopted by the Judge was a serious departure from the usual and proper course, and was not only irregular but grossly illegal. Section 537 could not apply to the case—*Allu v Crown*, 4 Lah. 376. The test to be applied in considering whether a particular infringement of the provisions of the Code does or does not fall within the purview of section 537 appears to be this. Does the error go to the whole root of the trial? Does it in effect vitiate the proceedings? Has the Court

assumed an authority which it does not possess? Has it broken the vital rules of procedure? If the error is of such a nature, then the proceedings are vitiated in their very inception and section 537 has no application, but the mere fact that a certain provision of the Code is imperative does not in itself indicate that a breach of the provision vitiates the whole proceedings—*Emp v. Bechu Chaube*, 45 All. 124 (127), 20 A.L.J. 874, 24 Cr L.J. 67. A distinction should be made between a positive enactment by the Code that a certain trial shall not take place and a positive enactment that in the course of such a trial certain detailed procedure should be followed. Both are imperative provisions. But still the one is a different thing from the other. In the former case an infringement of the enactment amounts to an assumption of jurisdiction and vitiates the trial from the very beginning. In the latter case, an infringement merely amounts to an error, omission or irregularity in the procedure adopted in the course of the trial. This section aims at curing infringements of the latter type—*Nga Hla U v K E.*, 3 Rang 139, 26 Cr L.J. 1336, A.L.R. 1925 Rang. 258.

'Subject to provisions hereinbefore contained'—These words do not refer to the provisions of the entire Code preceding this section but only to the provisions of this chapter (i.e., secs 529 to 536)—*Ram Subheg*, 19 C W N 972, 16 Cr L.J. 641 (per Sharfuddin and Beachcroft JJ.); *Contra*—22 Cal 176, 23 Cal 983, *Ram Subheg*, 19 C W N. 972 (per Fletcher J.).

'Court of competent jurisdiction'.—This means a Court of competent jurisdiction in respect of the particular offence charged—*Krishnabhat*, 10 Bom 319. If a Magistrate in consequence of a personal disqualification (e.g., under section 556) is forbidden by law to try a particular case, though he may be authorised generally to try cases of the same class, he cannot be said to be a Court of competent jurisdiction with respect to that particular case—*Sudhama*, 23 Cal 328. Thus, a Magistrate who takes cognizance of a case under sec. 190 (1) (c) is not competent to try the case, if the accused objects to it, and if in spite of such objection he proceeds to try the same himself, he cannot be said to be a Court of competent jurisdiction in respect of that case—13 All. 345. If a District Magistrate transfers to a subordinate Magistrate a case which the latter is not competent to try, a trial by the latter of that case is a defect which cannot be cured by this section, as the trial is not held by a Court of competent jurisdiction—*Raghu v. Abdul*, 23 Cal. 442.

1407. Failure of justice.—The test in case of errors, omissions or irregularities and other matters of like nature referred to in this section is not whether the Court had acted illegally, (for in one sense every error or irregularity in so far as it contravenes the provisions of the Code is illegal) but whether there had been a failure of justice—*Abdur Rahman*, 27 Cal 839. Moreover, the test (viz., whether the error or irregularity has occasioned a failure of justice) is one which can be properly applied only after the final result of the case is known. Where an objection is taken on the ground of there being a material error, before a case is finally disposed of, and while there is time to correct the same, it would be unreasonable to hold that this section intends

error to be allowed to remain uncorrected. To hold that would be to give this section the effect not only of curing mere formal defects of procedure when discovered too late, but of practically subverting all procedure—*Nilratan v Jogesh*, 23 Cal. 983. If, however, the inquiry has proceeded far enough to enable the test required by this section to be applied, this section may be called in to cure the error or irregularity—12 Cr.L.J. 320 (Sind).

'In fact':—The words 'in fact' have been introduced into the Code of 1898 apparently in order to emphasize the duty of the Court to go into the merits before interfering in consequence of misdirection or other error—*Smither*, 25 Mad. 1 (16).

1408. Error, omission or irregularity:—Error or irregularity in summons or warrant.—See 8 All. 293 in Note 143 under sec. 68; 38 Mad. 1088, and 18 A.L.J. 1149 in Note 162 under sec. 90; and Note 285 under sec. 115. The error of a Magistrate in proceeding by warrant instead of by summons, furnishes no ground for quashing the proceedings—1 W R. 16

A search warrant issued illegally under section 96 (1) cannot, by the operation of this section, be taken to have been validly issued under sec 98. This section cannot give legal effect to a defective warrant—*Rash Behary*, 35 Cal 1076

Issue of fresh summons —Where on an information a summons was issued to the accused, and owing to its disclosing no offence a fresh summons was issued without any fresh or supplemental information, the error, omission or irregularity in the fresh summons was not sufficient to upset the finding and sentence unless it had occasioned a failure of justice—*Jeevanji*, 31 Bom. 611

Irregularity in arrest.—Where certain arrests were made without the substance of the warrants being notified to the persons arrested, the omission was cured by this section—18 Cr L J 666 (All.)

Absence of complaint —The absence of a complaint of Court required by sec. 195 of this Code goes to the root of the case and vitiates the whole trial—*Girdhari Lal v. Emp.*, 29 O.C 1, 12 O.L.J. 104, 26 Cr.L.J. 929; *Ameraj v Emp.*, 23 A.L.J. 35, 26 Cr L J 751. See Note 614A under sec. 195

Error or omission in the charge —An omission to set out the guilty intention of the accused in a charge will be cured by this section unless it is shown that the omission has occasioned a failure of justice—22 Cal. 391. Where the law and section of the law were mentioned in the charge, the omission of the words "unlawfully and maliciously" in the charge was not so material as to prejudice the accused—42 Cal 957. The omission of the word 'dishonestly' in a charge under sec. 411 I. P. C. is not a ground of reversing the conviction and sentence, where the accused person fully understood the nature of the offence with which he was charged and has not been prejudiced by the omission—10 B H C.R. 373. Where there is ample evidence to show the common object of an assembly, the omission to mention the common object can be cured by this section—

2 P.L.J. 541; 18 Cr.L.J. 328 (Pat.); *Basiraddi*, 21 Cal. 827. But where the charge is defective and the common object of the unlawful assembly is not very precisely set out therein, and moreover the charge does not specify the property the taking possession of which is supposed to be the common object of the assembly, the defect in the charge cannot be cured by this section—*Poresh Nath*, 33 Cal. 295.

Errors in frame and contents of charge:—See Note 730 under sec. 225.

Irregularity in proclamation:—See 1917 P.R. 39 in Note 165 under sec. 87.

Error or omission in judgment:—See Note 1051 under sec. 367, under sub-heading "Defective Appellate judgments."

Misdirection to jury.—See Note 916 under sec. 297.

Explanation.—In considering whether the irregularity in a charge has occasioned a failure of justice, regard must be had to the time when the objection was taken to the irregularity. Where the accused, who was represented by pleader, did not raise any objection to the defect in the form of the charge when it was read out to him at the preliminary inquiry, nor at the time when he was called upon to plead to the charge at the sessions trial, but raised the objection after he had examined all his witnesses, and it appeared that he examined not less than 25 witnesses to meet the case for the prosecution, held that the accused could not be prejudiced by the defect in the charge, and that no failure of justice had been occasioned—*Chidambaram v. Emp.*, 32 Mad. 3 (13).

538. No *attachment* made under this Code shall

Attachment not illegal
nor distrainer a trespasser
for defect or want of
form in proceedings.

be deemed unlawful nor shall any person making the same be deemed a trespasser, on account of any defect or want of form in the sum-

mons, conviction, writ of attachment or other proceedings relating thereto.

The word 'attachment' has been substituted for the word 'distress' by sec. 149 of the Cr.P.C. Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. A similar amendment has been made in sections 386 and 387.

CHAPTER XLVI.

MISCELLANEOUS.

539. Affidavits and affirmations to be used before

Courts and persons
before whom affidavits
may be sworn.

any High Court or any officer of such Court may be sworn and affirmed before such Court or the

Clerk of the Crown, or any Commissioner or other person appointed by such Court for that purpose, or any Judge, or any Commissioner for taking affidavits in any Court of Record in British India, or any Commissioner to administer oaths in England or Ireland, or any Magistrate authorized to take affidavits or affirmations in Scotland.

1409. Affidavits sworn before the Presidency Magistrate of Calcutta cannot be used before the Patna High Court—*B. N. Ry. Co v. Sh. Makbul*, 7 P.L.T. 343, 27 Cr.L.J. 313. An affidavit made before a Magistrate who has no seisin of the case or who is not competent to try the case (but is competent only to commit, it being a sessions case) is not valid and cannot be used before a High Court—*Ram Chandra v. K. E.*, 3 Pat. 110, 7 P.L.T. 304, 27 Cr.L.J. 499. A Deputy Magistrate has no power to administer oath to a person making an affidavit to be used in High Court; and such person cannot be prosecuted for perjury if he makes any false statement in such affidavit—*In re Iswarchandra*, 14 Cal. 653. But an affidavit to be used in a Civil Court may be sworn to before any Magistrate by virtue of sec 139 of the Civil Procedure Code—*Dinobandhu v. Hurrymutty*, 8 C.W.N. x1

An affidavit must contain nothing but bare facts known to the person who makes the affidavit either personally or upon information from a source which he believes to be a correct source and one on which reliance can be placed. As human beings are liable to make mistakes in reciting facts, the law requires that the contents of affidavits should be carefully read over to the deponents in a language which they understand and should be vouched by them to be correct—*Mangal Prasad*, 36 All 13, 11 A.L.J. 986, 15 Cr.L.J. 164

539A. (1) *When any application is made to any Court in the course of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, and allegations are made therein respecting any public servant, the applicant may give evidence of the facts alleged in the application by affidavit, and the Court may, if it thinks fit, order that evidence relating to such facts be so given.*

An affidavit to be used before any Court other than a High Court under this section may be sworn or affirmed in the manner prescribed in Section 539, or before any Magistrate.

Affidavits under this section shall be confined to, and shall state separately, such facts as the deponent

able to prove from his own knowledge and such facts as he has reasonable grounds to believe to be true, and, in the latter case, the deponent shall clearly state the grounds of such belief.

(2) *The Court may order any scandalous and irrelevant matter in an affidavit to be struck out or amended.*

This section and the next have been added by section 150 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. "This new section is intended to discourage the making of false and scandalous statements in petitions filed before the Courts, if such petition seeks to impugn the action of subordinate authorities"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914) "We think that the provisions of this section should apply to all criminal proceedings, including appeals. We would allow the applicant to give evidence by affidavit, and would leave the Court a discretion to require this to be done in any case"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*

1409A. Under this section, an affidavit to be used before a Court other than a High Court, e.g., before a District Magistrate, must be sworn in the manner prescribed in sec 539 or before a Magistrate; but neither of these sections authorises the swearing of an affidavit before the Nazir of a subordinate Court, who has no authority to administer oath, and the person making a false statement in the affidavit cannot be convicted of an offence under sec 193 I P Code—*Ganpat Devaji*, 31 Bom.L.R. 144, 30 Cr L.J. 593 (594)

539B. (1) *Any Judge or Magistrate may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding, after due notice to the parties, visit and inspect any place in which an offence is alleged to have been committed, or any other place which it is in his opinion necessary to view for the purpose of properly appreciating the evidence given at such inquiry or trial, and shall without unnecessary delay record a memorandum of any relevant facts observed at such inspection.*

Local inspection.

(2) *Such memorandum shall form part of the record of the case. If the Public Prosecutor, complainant or accused so desires, a copy of the memorandum shall be furnished to him free of cost:*

Provided that in the case of a trial by jury or with the aid of assessors, the Judge shall not act under this section unless such jury or assessors are also allowed a view under Section 293.

"This section is inserted definitely prescribing that any Judge or Magistrate may, at any stage of any inquiry or trial, visit and inspect any place connected with the occurrence, subject to his recording a note of his inspection"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914) "We are of opinion that the Judge or Magistrate shall view the *locus in quo* only for the purpose of properly appreciating the evidence given at the trial, and that in the case of trial by jury or with assessors, the Judge should only view if the jury or assessors do the same under sec. 293. We also think that notice should be given to the parties of the intention of the Judge or Magistrate to visit the *locus*. We would also provide that the memorandum to be made by the Judge or Magistrate shall form part of the record of the case, and that a copy of it may be furnished to both sides"—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916*.

1410. Local inspection :—A trying Magistrate may visit the scene of an alleged offence to test the evidence he has heard in Court, and act on the opinion he has formed from what he has seen in adjudicating between the parties. The Court ought, in every case in which it has made a local inspection, to acquaint the parties with the opinion it has formed. An immediate report of what is seen should be placed on the record and laid open to the scrutiny of the parties—*Babbon Sheikh v. K. E.*, 37 Cal 340 (349, 357); *Parameshwar v. K. E.*, 3 P.L.T. 347, 23 Cr.L.J. 440, A.L.R. 1922 Pat. 296. A Magistrate, when making an inspection of the scene of offence, should invariably be accompanied by both the parties or their pleaders, who should draw his attention to facts if they choose and thus prevent him from drawing wrong inferences—*Q. E. v. Chanbasappa Ratanlal* 854, *Q. E. v. Manikam*, 19 Mad 263 (266), *Krishnappa v. Sengoda*, 2 Weir 727. A Magistrate may make a local inspection not only for the purpose of understanding the evidence adduced in Court, but also for the purpose of testing it by the light of his own observations. If the Magistrate has seen a certain state of things in making a local inspection, he can use the testimony of his own senses for testing the veracity of the witnesses deposing before him as regards the features of the locality—*Babbon Sheikh v. Emp.*, 37 Cal. 340 (355, 356). But where a Magistrate made a local inspection and used it not for the purpose of understanding the evidence given at the trial, but for the purpose of obtaining information which did not appear from the evidence of the witnesses, the procedure was quite illegal, and the Magistrate went beyond the powers granted to him by this section and made himself a witness in the case. The trial was vitiated and must be set aside—*Fakira*, 29 Cr.L.J. 656 (Pat.); *Hari Mohan*, 30 Cr.L.J. 491 (492) (Pat.).

If the Sessions Judge thinks it necessary or desirable to visit the place of occurrence, he should give due notice to the parties, and proceed thither with the assessors and the parties, before the close of the trial, and before the opinions of the assessors are recorded—*In re Oudh Behari*, 1 C.L.R. 143; *Deja v. K. E.*, 11 L.B.R. 88, 9 Bur.L.T. 133, 17 Cr.L.J. 500. If no notice is given to the parties, it is not competent to the Judge to take into account any observations of the locality made by

him. And where the Judge made an inspection of the locality *after* the assessors had given their opinions, the Appellate Court eliminated that portion of the judgment which related to the visit to the spot and the Judge's conclusion therefrom, and decided the case on the other materials—*Dey v. K. E.*, *supra*

During the trial of the accused persons, one of whom had made a confession, the Sessions Judge went himself to the scene of the crime accompanied by the assessors and the confessing accused, who showed him the ground and made certain additional statements by way of comment or illustration of his confession, and the Judge made note of them. *Held* that the law does not recognize a procedure of this kind and that the Judge was clearly wrong in allowing the accused to make the additional statements and in recording them—*Kesho Singh v K E.*, 20 O C. 136, 18 Cr L.J. 742.

When a Magistrate makes a local inspection, he should without unnecessary delay record a memorandum of the inspection and supply the petitioner with a copy thereof. The Magistrate's refusal to make a memorandum is an illegality vitiating the proceedings, or in any case, an irregularity by which the defence is prejudiced—*Jowala Singh*, 10 Lah. 138, 29 Cr L.J. 719 (720). A Judicial Officer conducting a local inspection shall record the result of his inspection *at once* so that the parties may have an opportunity of seeing what the facts are which the Judicial Officer considered to be established by the local inspection—*Jowala*, *supra*. A Magistrate should not, after making a local inspection, deliver his judgment relying upon that inspection without giving the parties an opportunity to rebut his opinion. His report should be open to the scrutiny of the parties—*Babbon Sheikh*, 37 Cal 340. If the Magistrate holds a local inquiry but makes no memorandum of the facts observed, and then convicts the accused upon the knowledge of those facts, the procedure is illegal. The object of the local inspection is to allow the Magistrate properly to appreciate the evidence given at the trial, and not to allow the Magistrate to become the principal witness in the case on a question of fact. It is illegal for a Magistrate to keep the knowledge of the facts he had observed to himself and then to convict the accused upon such knowledge—*Jowala Singh*, *supra*. See also *Parmeshwar*, 3 P.L.T. 347, 23 Cr L.J. 440, A I R. 1922 Pat 296. Where after the Magistrate had made a local inspection, he gave judgment convicting the accused and then after delivering judgment he made a note of the result of such inspection in the order sheet, *held* that the procedure was irregular, but as the Magistrate's judgment in this case was mainly based on the documents on the record and on the oral evidence before him, and he used the local inspection only to confirm the evidence which he had already before him, the judgment of the Magistrate should not be set aside as the accused was not prejudiced by such irregularity—*Bhola Nath v. Kedar*, 25 Cr L.J. 705, A I R. 1925 Cal 353. But in another Calcutta case it has been held that the provisions of sub-section (2) are mandatory, and therefore where the Magistrate made a local inspection and drew up a diagram and made an

inspection-note thereon but the note did not form part of the record of the case, the procedure was illegal and not merely irregular, and the defect could not be cured even though there was no prejudice to the accused—*Hriday Gobinda v. K. E.*, 52 Cal. 148, 40 C.L.J. 149, 25 Cr.L.J. 1375. In a very recent case, however, where the local inquiry was made in the presence of both parties, and the Magistrate made no memorandum of the inspection, but the petitioners' pleader who was present at the time did not ask the Magistrate to record a memorandum or to attach a memorandum to the record or to give him a copy, and was content to go on to judgment without seeing the memorandum or even ascertaining whether one was made, it was held that the petitioners could not be allowed to say that for this formal defect the proceedings should be set aside, unless they could show that the Magistrate's omission had caused them prejudice—*Forbes v. Md. Ali Haidar*, 53 Cal. 46, 42 C.L.J. 131, 26 Cr.L.J. 1524 (dissenting from *Hriday Gobind v. K. E.*, supra.). According to the Bombay High Court, the failure to make a memorandum of the facts observed at the inspection is not an illegality vitiating the trial but is only an irregularity covered by sec. 537, where no prejudice has been caused—*Khushal Jeram v Emp.*, 50 Bom. 680, 27 Cr.L.J. 1151 (following 53 Cal. 46).

As to the circumstances under which a Magistrate making a local inspection is incompetent to try the case, see Note 1374 under section 526, and Note 1432 under sec. 556

540. Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined; and the Court shall summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to it essential to the just decision of the case.

1411. Examination of Court witnesses :—This section confers very wide powers upon a Court in the matter of summoning witnesses, but the wider the powers, the greater is the exercise of discretion required of the Magistrate. It was not intended by this section that the Magistrate should exercise his powers at the bidding of any person, but the powers are given to prevent any danger or miscarriage of justice owing to some particular witness not having been called—*Sitab Singh v. Dalganjan*, 12 A.L.J. 15, 14 Cr.L.J. 692. This section is a supplementary provision enabling the Court to examine, and in certain circumstances imposing on it the duty of examining, a material witness who would not otherwise be brought before the Court. But a Magistrate misuses this power if he uses it to anticipate the defence of an accused

to his prejudice, or if he uses it, after satisfying himself that the accused has a good defence, to discharge the accused instead of acquitting him. A Magistrate cannot resort to this section in order to avoid the responsibility of making up his mind as to the value of the prosecution evidence—*Chetu*, 1886 P.R. 11.

The first part of this section is an enabling provision whereby a Court in the exercise of its discretion is empowered, at any time before it actually pronounces judgment, to take further evidence either for the prosecution or for the defence, and for that purpose it may adjourn the hearing of a case in order to procure the attendance of the proper persons. In many instances it happens that a new light is thrown on the case by witnesses for the defence and it then becomes desirable, sometimes in the interests of the accused himself, that fresh evidence should be called for. The second part of this section is imperative. If the new evidence appears to the Court essential to the just decision of the case, the Court has no choice but to take such evidence. The new witnesses should be examined, cross-examined and re-examined. Where the defence case could not have been anticipated by the prosecution, and it is said that witnesses are available to prove the falsity of the defence case, the Court should allow such witnesses to be examined. The accused should be given liberty to examine any further witnesses whom he wishes to examine to meet the evidence of the fresh witnesses for the prosecution—*Maung Po Hmyin v K E*, 1 Rang 308, 25 Cr L J 217, A.I.R. 1923 Rang. 216.

Where the Magistrate visited the scene of occurrence without notice to the parties, in contravention of the provisions of sec. 539B, and made certain inquiries in the course of inspection, and then as a result of the inquiry, summoned several persons as witnesses, purporting to do so under sec. 540, held that the action of the Magistrate could not be justified under section 540. This section merely provides that a Magistrate may summon any witness whose evidence appears to be necessary, and the most common way of knowing whether the evidence of such a witness is necessary is through the evidence of other witnesses in the case. But this section does not contemplate that the Magistrate should acquire such knowledge by going into the highways and by-ways and searching for further evidence; and the power to summon a witness does not by any means imply a power to discover such witness by personal inquiry out of Court—*Pakir Muhammad v Emp*, 4 Rang 106, 27 Cr.L.J. 1084.

When an accused person has been examined under sec. 342 after the close of the prosecution, and then a witness is examined under sec. 540, it is not necessary to examine the accused again. See 3 Pat. 1015 and other cases cited in Note 977 under sec. 342.

A Magistrate may summon any person as a Court witness at any stage of the proceedings, but in fairness to the parties and to afford them an opportunity of proper cross-examination he should (save under exceptional circumstances) inform them beforehand of the names of those witnesses—*Udho Ram*, 10 Lah. 790, A.I.R. 1929 Lah 120 (121).

Who can summon witnesses:—No Magistrate other than the one who is seized of the case can summon witnesses under this section—36 All 13.

'May summon':—It is entirely in the discretion of the Court to call and examine witnesses; and the Public Prosecutor cannot demand as a matter of right to call and examine any witness not examined before the committing Magistrate—*Hayfield*, 14 All 212.

'At any stage'.—Although it is true that proper discretion has to be exercised under sec 540, still the terms of this section are extremely wide, and any Court may at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding summon any person as a witness, if his evidence appears to it essential to the just decision of the case. This power can be exercised even after the close of the case for the prosecution and the defence—*In re Chellaperumal*, 46 M.L.J. 325, 25 Cr.L.J. 354. A Magistrate can, under this section, receive fresh evidence after the evidence on both sides has been taken and the case adjourned for judgment, in as much as the case is still pending when such evidence is being taken—*In re Ananda Chunder*, 24 Cal. 167. Where in a criminal trial, after the evidence for the defence was closed, the Magistrate examined certain witnesses for the prosecution giving at the same time full liberty to the accused to cross-examine them, the High Court declined to interfere in revision—*Gur Baksh*, 21 O.C. 95, 19 Cr.L.J. 630, 45 I.C. 678. But although a Magistrate has discretion to admit evidence on behalf of either side at any stage of the inquiry or trial, still he ought not to admit further evidence for the prosecution after the prosecution has closed its case and the accused has entered upon his defence, unless there be valid reasons which must be recorded—*Ganga v. K E.*, 10 A.L.J. 383, 13 Cr.L.J. 772. Magistrates should exercise their discretion under this section very cautiously. Where arguments were heard and the case posted for judgment for a certain day, the examination of any further prosecution witnesses under this section cannot be justified—*Natabar v. Adyanath*, 27 C.W.N. 675. When the trial has been concluded so far that no witnesses remain to be examined on either side and the assessors have given their opinions, it is not open to the Sessions Judge to fish for witnesses under this section or to order for further inquiry to be made by the committing Magistrate—*Alwal Khan*, 1892 P.R. 4.

1412. Who may be examined:—Under this section the Court is bound to summon and examine any witnesses whose evidence seems to be essential to the just decision of the case—6 C.W.N. 98. The Court would not be bound to issue summons to witnesses, under this section, unless it is satisfied that their evidence will be very material—*Shakir Ali*, 19 All. 502. When the committing Magistrate refuses to examine any witnesses mentioned in the list submitted to him under sec 211, the Sessions Judge can under this section direct those witnesses to be summoned and examined—*Raja of Kanti*, 8 All 668; *Hayfield*, 14 All. 212.

Magistrates are at liberty to summon witnesses who are resident outside the limits of their own districts—3 M.H.C.R. App 5

The Magistrate may summon and examine any person as a witness. The power to summon a witness is not limited to the witnesses cited for the prosecution or the defence—*Chetu*, 1886 P.R. 11. A person who had been suspected and charged with an offence but was afterwards discharged by the Magistrate for want of evidence, may be examined afterwards as a witness for the prosecution—7 W.R. 44. Where the prosecution declines to examine any witnesses, the Court may on its own initiative cause them to be produced and examine them under this section—*Emp v Satyendra*, 37 C.L.J. 173, 24 Cr.L.J. 193, A.I.R. 1923 Cal 463. Where the defence is based on section 84 I. P. C., the Sessions Judge may under this section ascertain the behaviour of the prisoner during the years previous to the homicide, and if he has been kept in a lunatic asylum, record medical evidence of the facts observed there—*Dongar*, Ratanlal 279.

But this section does not enable the Court to examine the accused as a witness, even in appeal, for an appeal is but the continuation of the original case—*Subbayya*, 12 Mad. 451.

1413. Right of parties to cross-examine —When a Judge thinks it necessary to examine a witness under this section, and does so, the accused as well as the complainant ought to be allowed an opportunity of cross-examining the witness—*Grish Chunder*, 5 Cal 614, *Gopal Lal v Manik Lal*, 24 Cal 288, *Pita v K E*, 47 All 147. When a witness is called by the Court under this section, both the prosecution and the accused are entitled to cross-examine him on matters relevant to the inquiry, and they are not restricted to the points on which the witness has been examined by the Court—*Chintamon*, 35 Cal 243. Where a witness was at first called for the defence, but afterwards the accused declined to examine him, whereupon he was examined as a witness by the Court, it was held that the accused would not be deprived of his right to cross-examine the witness—*Mohendra*, 29 Cal. 387. It is not a proper cross-examination if the defence counsel is merely allowed to suggest certain questions to the Magistrate, and the Magistrate puts those questions to the witness—*Pita v K E*, 47 All 147, 26 Cr L.J. 575.

540-A. (1) At any stage of an inquiry or trial under this Code, where two or more accused are before the Court, if the Judge or Magistrate is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded, that any one or more of such accused is or

Provision for inquiries and trials being held in the absence of accused in certain cases .

are incapable of remaining before the Court, he may, if such accused is represented by a pleader, dispense with his attendance and proceed with any inquiry or trial in his absence, and may, at any subsequent stage of the proceedings, direct the personal attendance of such accused.

(2) If the accused in any such case is not represented

by a pleader, or if the Judge or Magistrate considers his personal attendance necessary, he may, if he thinks fit, and for reasons to be recorded by him, either adjourn such inquiry or trial, or order that the case of such accused be taken up or tried separately.

This section has been added by section 151 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. "This section is designed to meet a practical difficulty which is occasionally experienced in trials involving a large number of accused persons when one or more of them is incapable of remaining at the bar"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914). "Sub-section (1) provides for the case of an accused who is represented by a pleader, and whose personal attendance can be dispensed with. Sub-section (2) provides for the case of an accused who is not so represented, or whose continued personal attendance may be necessary, and allows the Court in such a case either to adjourn the trial of the accused, or to order the particular accused to be tried separately."—*Report of the Select Committee of 1916.*

541. (1) Unless when otherwise provided by any

Power to appoint place of imprisonment.

law for the time being in force, the Local Government may direct in what place any person liable to be imprisoned or committed to custody under this Code shall be confined.

(2) If any person liable to be imprisoned or committed to custody under this Code

Removal to criminal jail of accused or convicted persons who are in confinement in civil jail, and their return to the civil jail.

is in confinement in a civil jail, the Court or Magistrate ordering the imprisonment or committal may direct that the person be removed to a criminal jail.

(3) When a person is removed to a criminal jail under sub-section (2), he shall, on being released therefrom, be sent back to the civil jail, unless either—

(a) three years have elapsed since he was removed to the criminal jail, in which case he shall be deemed to have been discharged from the civil jail under Section 342 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882 or

(b) the Court which ordered his imprisonment in the civil jail has certified to the officer in charge of the criminal jail that he is entitled

to be discharged under Section 341 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1882.

In sub-section (3), the words "sub-section (2)" have been substituted for "sub-section (1)" by the Repealing and Amending Act, VII of 1924, to correct a clerical error

1414. 'Jail':—The term 'prison' and 'jail' do not include a police lock-up. A Magistrate has no power to sentence an accused to suffer imprisonment in a police lock-up—7 L B R 62

Dividing imprisonment in different jails:—A Criminal Court passing a sentence of imprisonment cannot divide the imprisonment in different jails. From this section and sec. 63 (t) of Act IX of 1894, and the Prisoners Act of 1871, it is clear that the power of directing imprisonment to be undergone in different jails belongs to the Local Government and the Inspector-General of Prisoners, and not to the Court passing the sentence—Q. E. v. Radha, Ratanlal 827

542. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Prisoner's Testimony Act, 1869,

Power of Presidency Magistrate to order prisoner in jail to be brought up for examination.

any Presidency Magistrate desirous of examining, as a witness or an accused person, in any case pending before him, any person confined in any jail within the local limits of his jurisdiction,

may issue an order to the officer in charge of the said jail requiring him to bring such prisoner in proper custody, at a time to be therein named, to the Magistrate for examination.

(2) The officer so in charge, on receipt of such order, shall act in accordance therewith and shall provide for the safe custody of the prisoner during his absence from the jail for the purpose aforesaid.

543. When the services of an interpreter are re-

Interpreter to be bound to interpret truthfully.

quired by any Criminal Court for the interpretation of any evidence

or statement, he shall be bound to

state the true interpretation of such evidence or statement.

1415. It is not necessary to administer oath to an interpreter—16 W.R. 61. The omission to administer oath to an interpreter under section 5 (b) of the Oaths Act (X of 1873) renders it necessary for the prosecution to prove that the interpretation of the deposition was made accurately, but omission to do so does not make the deposition inadmissible in evidence—36 Cal. 808.

544. Subject to any rules made by the Local Government, * * * any Criminal Court may, if it thinks fit, order payment, on the part of Government, of the reasonable expenses of any complainant or witness attending for the purposes of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding before such Court under this Code.

Expenses of complainants and witnesses. Sec. 544, and the Rules framed by the Local Government under this section, give a discretion to the Magistrate in the matter of expenses of complainants and witnesses, but such discretion should be exercised not arbitrarily but on sound judicial principles—*Emp. v Ganesh*, ■ Bom.L.R. 353, 5 Cr L J. 329.

This section empowers the Court to order that the expenses of the complainant and his witness should be paid by the Government under proper circumstances. But it does not empower the Court trying a complaint to order that the diet money of a witness produced before it should be paid by the complainant. That power is vested in the Court under the general rules of the High Court. If the Court orders such payment, in accordance with such rules, the amount cannot be recovered under the provision of sec. 547 as if it were a fine, but can be recovered by a suit in the Civil Court—*Kamal v Paramasukh*, 29 C.W.N. 1033.

Bengal Rules:—1. The Criminal Courts are authorised to pay by these rates the expenses (a) of complainants or witnesses whether for the prosecution or for the defence (i) in cases in which the prosecution is instituted or carried on by or under the orders or with the sanction of the Government, or of any Judge, Magistrate or other public officer, or in which it shall appear to the presiding officer to be directly in furtherance of the interests of the public service, and (ii) in all cases entered in column 5 of the Schedule II appended to the Criminal Procedure Code as not bailable; and (b) of witnesses in all cases in which they are compelled by the Magistrate of his own motion to attend under the provisions of section 540 of the Code.

2. If a witness is summoned in the instance of the complainant or accused under section 244 of the Code, his expenses shall not be withheld from him except on the ground of failure to do his duty as a witness when summoned.

3. (1) For the purpose of computing the expenses which the Criminal Courts are authorised to pay under these rules, complainants and witnesses shall be divided into two classes, namely—

(a) labourers and ordinary cultivators and other persons of similar class, and

(b) persons of better position,

and the allowances shall ordinarily be a diet allowance, which may be paid to persons coming under class (b) on demand by them, and to persons in class (a) as a general rule.

(2) Such allowance shall be calculated for each class at daily rates within, and never exceeding, the maximum limit specified below opposite the territorial description of the Court in which the complainant or witness appears :—

	Class (a) per diem	Class (b) per diem
I. Courts in the districts of Nadia, Murshidabad, Jessore, Khulna, and Midnapore	7 annas	Rs. 5
II. Courts in the rest of the districts in the Presidency	8 annas	Rs 5

Explanation.—The rates fixed in this rule are maxima, and are intended to meet the cost of meals for one day. In every case, therefore, the Court should consider the circumstances of the individual and local conditions and grant a reduced allowance in circumstances and localities where the actual expenses fall short of the maximum rate. In cases where no meal is taken away from home, or where only one meal is taken, no allowance or a reduced allowance, as the case may be, should be granted.

4 (1) Complainants and witnesses performing the journey or part of the journey by rail, steamer or train may be allowed their actual fares each way according to the class by which persons of their rank and station in life would ordinarily travel. In determining the class by which a person would ordinarily travel, regard should be had to the standard laid down in section V of the Travelling Allowance Rules published in the *Calcutta Gazette Extraordinary*, December 23, 1921.

(2) Charges for toll at ferries will be allowed at the authorized rates to the extent to which they have been actually incurred.

(3) Other travelling expenses will be given only when the journey could not have been performed on foot, or in the case of persons whose age, position and habits of life render it impossible for them to walk. In such cases, in addition to the allowance permitted by the preceding rules, travelling allowance shall be given at the following rates :—

(a) When the journey is by any kind of conveyance by road, the actual reasonable conveyance charge up to a maximum limit of 4 annas a mile.

(b) In the Districts where the usual mode of travelling is by water, the actual expenses incurred for boat-hire up to a maximum of Rs 2 per diem.

(4) In hill districts, where it is customary for respectable persons to be accompanied by a man carrying their baggage, when such a person is summoned for a distance of more than five miles, he may be allowed the actual cost incurred for the hire of one coolie.

5. If the Court is of opinion that any person following any trade or profession or engaged in any commercial undertaking has suffered substantial loss by reason of his attendance as a witness or complainant, he may be allowed, in addition to the diet money and travelling expenses:

permissible under the preceding rules, compensation according to circumstances.

6. Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, Government servants when summoned to give evidence in their *public* capacity shall receive no payment from the Court on account of travelling or halting allowance, but shall be entitled to draw such allowance under the Civil Service Regulations, on producing a certificate of attendance granted by the Court. Provided that—

(i) when a Government servant is required to give evidence in his private capacity at a Court situated not more than five miles from his headquarters, the Court shall be authorised, where it considers it necessary, and notwithstanding anything contained in this rule, to pay the actual travelling expenses incurred;

(ii) when the salary of the Government servant as summoned does not exceed Rs. 10 per mensem, he shall be paid his expenses by the Court.

7. Notwithstanding anything contained in rules 3 and 4, whenever the Court requires the expenses of a Government officer, summoned as witness in his official capacity, to be deposited in advance, the term "expenses" shall be interpreted to mean the travelling and halting allowance admissible under the Civil Service Regulations.

8. Government servants when summoned to give evidence in their *private* capacity shall be paid by the Court such travelling allowance as is paid to persons of similar status under rules 3 and 4, but they shall not be entitled to any diet allowance, nor shall they receive any travelling allowance under the Civil Service Regulations.

9. Officers will be held responsible that parties of witnesses are brought to Court together as far as possible, so as to save expense. The hire of more than one boat shall not be allowed in one case unless the presiding officer is satisfied that the witnesses could not have arranged to come together.

10. The number of days for which diet allowance should be granted will be determined by the officer ordering payment in each case.

11. For this purpose and for regulating the reimbursement of tolls paid, a table shall be prepared and kept in each Court, showing the distance of each thana from the sudder station and subordinate stations, the number of intermediate ferries to be crossed, and authorised rates of charges for tolls at each of these ferries, the existence or absence of roads or waterways being also noted in the table—*Calcutta Gazette*, 1922, Part I, August 9, pp. 1522-1524

545. (1) Whenever under any law in force for the

time being a Criminal Court imposes a fine or confirms in appeal, revision or otherwise a

Power of Court to pay expenses or compensation out of fine.

sentence of fine, or a sentence of which fine forms a part, the Court may, when passing judgment, order the whole or any part of the fine recovered to be applied—

(a) in defraying expenses properly incurred in the prosecution;

(b) in the payment to any person of compensation for any loss or injury caused by the offence, when substantial compensation is, in the opinion of the Court, recoverable by such person in a civil Court; and

(c) when any person is convicted of any offence which includes theft, criminal misappropriation, criminal breach of trust, or cheating, or of having dishonestly received, or retained, or of having voluntarily assisted in disposing of, stolen property knowing or having reason to believe the same to be stolen, in compensating any bona fide purchaser of such property for the loss of the same if such property is restored to the possession of the person entitled thereto.

(2) If the fine is imposed in a case which is subject to appeal, no such payment shall be made before the period allowed for presenting the appeal has elapsed, or, if an appeal be presented, before the decision of the appeal.

Change —Clause (b) has been slightly amended and clause (c) newly added, by section 152 of the Cr P C Amendment Act XVIII of 1923. "Clause (b) makes it clear that compensation under section 545 may be paid to any person by whom it would be recoverable in a Civil Court. The payment of compensation to an innocent purchaser of stolen property is provided for in clause (c) when the property is restored to the possession of the person entitled thereto"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914)

1416. Order when can be made.—An order of compensation can be made under this section when the Court imposes a fine. If the accused is discharged or acquitted and no fine is imposed, no order under this section can be passed—*In re Bastoo*, 22 Bom 717, *Govind Narayan*, Ratanlal 407. If the accused is convicted of theft and sentenced to imprisonment but no fine is imposed on him, the Court cannot order payment of compensation to the person whose property was stolen—*Bhura v. Emp.* 26 Cr L J 1495 (Nag). Where a person is dealt with under sec 562 and no fine is imposed on him, the Court has no power to direct him to pay compensation to the other party—*Munney Mirza v. K. E.* 25 Cr L J 1116 (Oudh). In a proceeding under sec 107, an

order directing the accused to pay the costs of the complainant is *ultra vires*—*Sheo Prasad v. Mahangoo*, 25 Cr.L.J. 76, A.I.R. 1924 All 694. Where the Magistrate does not impose any fine but orders the sale of the boat of the accused and directs the compensation to be paid out of the sale proceeds, the order is illegal—*Beera*, Ratanlal 688. Similarly, a compensation cannot be ordered to be paid out of the rents and profits of the property forfeited—*Q. E. v. Nana Patlu*, Ratanlal 146. A Magistrate cannot, without imposing a substantive sentence of fine, order payment of compensation to the complainant—2 Weir 715. The proper course is to impose a fine, and out of the fine realised direct payment to the complainant of such amount as the Court thinks fit, having regard to the provisions of this section—*Mohesh v. Bholanath*, 3 C.L.R. 404.

What Court can award compensation:—Compensation may be awarded not only by the trying Court, but also by the High Court in revision, see *Bishen v. Ismail*, 11 Bur L.J. 81, 28 Cr.L.J. 757 (758).

A Police Patel's Court is not a "criminal Court" and he cannot make an order of compensation under this section—*Q. E. v. Ramia*, Ratanlal 317.

Order cannot be made after judgment:—The award of compensation should be a part of the sentence and order made upon a conviction of an offence, and should be founded upon a statement of the loss, damage or expenses ascertained at the trial—*Q. v. Muttan*, 11 W.R. 53. The order should be made when passing judgment, after the judgment is passed, the Court becomes *functus officio* and has no further power to make any order under this section—U.B.R. (1892-96) 80.

1417. Clause (a)—Expenses of the prosecution:—The award of costs should not exceed the actual costs of the complainant out of pocket—*Mohesh v. Bholanath*, 3 C.L.R. 405.

Expenses under this section do not include such expenses as are incurred in bringing the person of the offender before the Magistrate—*Ramaswamy*, Ratanlal 608. Where fine is imposed on a person for destroying land-marks, a portion of the fine so imposed cannot be ordered to be paid to the Amin for the purpose of paying the expenses of his deputation to restore the land-marks destroyed—6 W.R. 93; such expenses are not expenses incurred in the prosecution. Subsistence allowances and car hire for prosecution witness cannot be ordered to be paid by the accused—U.B.R. (1892-96) 7. Court-fees and process fees are now provided for in Sec. 546A.

Expenses under this section should be directed to be paid out of the amount of the fine imposed, and a separate order for such expenses is improper—*Q. E. v. Saolairam*, Ratanlal 341; *Takaram*, 4 Bom L.J. 877. An order for expenses to be paid in addition to the fine is illegal—24 Mad. 305; *Rajubhai*, 5 Bom L.R. 126; *Q. E. v. Dhanji*, Ratanlal 196. But the expenses mentioned in sec. 546A may be awarded in addition to fine.

1418. Clause (b)—Compensation :—*Amount of compensation :—*When compensation is awarded under this section, the distinction between clauses (a) and (b) of the section should be borne in mind, and the order should show, whether it is made to defray the expenses of the prosecution or as compensation for injury caused by the offence committed—U.B.R. (1892-96) 290. In awarding compensation, no sum in excess of the loss actually suffered by the complainant should be ordered to be paid. Where the accused was convicted of illegally demanding money, and was fined three times the amount of the illegal receipt, and the whole of the fine was ordered to be paid to the complainant, the order was held to be improper—5 L.B.R. 50. In a theft case, it is illegal to award compensation to the complainant in excess of the price of the property stolen from him—*Shib Das*, 1913 P.L.R. 335, 14 Cr.L.J. 659.

Where a complainant cannot recover substantial compensation in a Civil Court, compensation cannot be awarded to him under clause (b), but a sum may be awarded to him under clause (a) to defray the expenses of the prosecution—15 Cr.L.J. 555 (Bur). Therefore a Magistrate convicting a person under sec. 193 I.P.C. can only order the expenses properly incurred in the prosecution to be defrayed out of the fine, but has no power to award compensation, because substantial compensation is not recoverable by a civil suit for perjury—*Mangulchand v. Mohan*, 14 N.L.R. 131, 19 Cr.L.J. 927, 47 I.C. 443.

*Compensations which are improper :—*Where in a petty case no pecuniary loss has been sustained by the complainant, it is improper for the Court to award compensation—1 Bur.S.R. 538, but see 2 Weir 717, where it has been held that compensation should be awarded where there is substantial cause for it, even though the case be frivolous.

Where the accused was convicted and fined for being drunk on a public road, no compensation could be awarded to the constable who in arresting the accused had to struggle with him and in so doing lost his whistle and Rs. 5, because such compensation is not for injury caused by the offence committed—U.B.R. (1892-96) 79. A Court cannot award compensation for alleged offences other than those which form the subject of the inquiry in the case in which the order is made—*Q. E. v. Govind Narayan*, Ratanlal 407. Where the accused took his sister who was suffering from plague into a town without informing the authorities and was thereupon convicted for an offence under sec. 188 I.P.C., no compensation could be awarded to the Municipality on account of the expenses incurred by it in disinfecting the house into which the accused brought the case of plague—*Q. E. v. Rahimatkha*, Ratanlal 958. Where the offence is under the I.P.C., no compensation can be awarded under any other special law. Thus, where the accused was fined under sec. 379 I.P.C. for cutting trees in a field, and out of the fine recovered a reward of Rs. 5 was ordered to be paid to the complainant (under the Forest Act) for detecting the offence, it was held that the order of reward was illegal, since the offence was under the I.P.C., and not under the Forest Act—*Vithu*, Ratanlal 873. See also *Bhikari*, Ratanlal 241.

1419. Who is entitled to compensation:—*Heirs of the deceased*—Under the Code of 1861, compensation could be awarded to the 'person injured,' and therefore it could not be paid to the heirs of the person who had been killed—10 W.R. 39. Under the Code of 1872 also the law was practically the same, but in the 1882 Code the language of the section has been changed, and no mention is specifically made of the person who is entitled to compensation. Still in *Lutchmak*, 12 Mad. 352 and *Yalla Sanguli Mamidi*, 21 Mad. 74 the Judges clung to the old view, and held that compensation awarded to the widow of the deceased was illegal. In 36 Cal 302 and *Saif Ali*, 1898 P.R. 17, it has been held that the heirs of the deceased are entitled to compensation. The present amendment now makes it clear that compensation can be awarded to any person by whom it can be recovered in a Civil Court.

In awarding compensation to the heirs of the person killed, the names of the heirs should be mentioned. An order of compensation to the 'nearest heirs,' without specifying who those heirs may be, is bad in law—*Chuha*, 1913 P.R. 18, 14 Cr L.J. 522.

Husband of woman enticed away—Where a person is convicted of enticing away a married woman, compensation may be awarded to the husband for injury done to his honour—1878 P.R. 14.

Compensation for injury caused to another—Where the accused was charged with causing hurt to two persons, but was fined for causing injuries to one of them only, compensation out of the fine cannot be awarded to the other person—*Vobanna*, 2 Weir 718.

Refund of compensation—Where a conviction is set aside on appeal and a refund of the fine levied is ordered, and the party who has received a portion of the money as compensation refuses to refund it, the only remedy lies in a Civil Court—*Anonymous*, 2 Weir 717. But in *Mutsuddi v. Mani Ram*, 19 All 112, and other cases it has been held that the amount may be recovered by a process under sec. 547 and not necessarily by a suit in a Civil Court. See Note 1422 under Sec 547.

1420. Clause (c)—Bona fide purchaser of stolen property—This clause has been newly added. Under the old law, it was held that when a person was convicted of theft, an order awarding compensation, out of the fine imposed, to the innocent purchaser of the stolen property was not authorised by this section—6 Mad. 286; because the injury to the purchaser was not the consequence of the theft but of the invalid sale—*Mariyappa*, 2 Weir 716. On a conviction of theft, the stolen property should be returned to the owner, but it was illegal to impose a condition that a portion of the fine imposed on the accused should be paid to the innocent purchaser. No such condition could be imposed on the return of the property to the owner—*K. E. v. Abdul*, 3 Bom L.R. 449. When theft was proved, the stolen property was ordered to be restored to the rightful owner and not to the bona fide purchaser. The rule of English law protecting bona fide purchasers for value in market overt does not apply in India, and on conviction of the accused the property with respect to which the theft was committed should be delivered to the original

owner—*Nobo Kristo v. Lall Chand*, 20 W R 38; *Faiz Muhammad*, 1908 P.R. 2. See also 1893 A.W.N. 61. In 1878 P.R. 21, it was held however that when stolen property was in the hands of a *bona fide* purchaser, the proper order to be made was to leave it in his hands, and the remedy of the complainant was to secure possession of the property in a Civil Court.

Under the present law, as provided by this clause, compensation will be awarded to the innocent purchaser.

The clause applies only to a purchaser and not to a mortgagee or pledgee, an innocent mortgagee or pledgee who has advanced money on the security of the stolen property will not be entitled to any compensation—*Ratanlal* 631; *Ramchandra*, 46 Bom. 893, 23 Cr.L.J. 341.

546. At the time of awarding compensation in any subsequent civil suit relating to the same matter, the Court shall take into account any sum paid or recovered as compensation under section 545.

Payments to be taken into account in subsequent suit.

'Take into account'—This expression does not mean that in a subsequent civil suit, at the time of awarding damages, the amount of compensation recovered under sec 545 is to be deducted from the damages awarded in the suit—22 W R 336 (Civil).

546A. (1) Whenever any complaint of a non-cognizable offence is made to a Court, the Court, if it convicts the accused, may, in addition to the penalty imposed upon him, order him to pay to the complainant—

Order of payment of certain fees paid by complainant in non-cognizable cases.

(a) the fee (if any) paid on the petition of complaint, or for the examination of the complainant, and

(b) any fees paid by the complainant for serving process on his witnesses or on the accused, and may further order that, in default of payment, the accused shall suffer simple imprisonment for a period not exceeding thirty days.

(2) An order under this section may also be made by an Appellate Court, or by the High Court when exercising its powers of revision.

This section has been added by section 153 of the Cr.P.C. Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. "It embodies the provisions of section 31 of the Court Fees Act in order that greater prominence may be given to

them"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914). The provision as to imprisonment in default of payment, and sub-section (2) did not occur in the Court Fees Act. Section 31 of the Court Fees Act has now been repealed by section 163 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923.

1421. Scope of the section.—This section does not apply, and the costs of the complainant cannot be awarded, where the offence is not a non-cognizable one—*Nuruddin v Emp*, 25 Cr.L.J. 1161 (Oudh).

If the complaint is not required by law to be stamped, the fact that the Court-fee has been illegally levied by the Court will not be a ground for ordering the accused to pay the fee on conviction—8 B.H.C.R. 22. Thus, no fee is leviable on a complaint by Municipal Officers, and the accused on conviction should not be ordered to pay the same—*Q E v. Khajabhog*, 16 Mad 423.

A proceeding under the Workmen's Breach of Contract Act is not a proceeding for an offence, and if in such a proceeding the workman admits the advance and repays the same, it is not open to the Magistrate to make him pay the complainant the Court-fee paid on the complaint—*Dhondu*, 6 Bom L.R. 255.

If there are several persons convicted, the order of payment of the value of the Court-fee and process-fee should be joint and not several—*Reg v. Sankara*, Bom H.C. Cr. Rule, 1872.

The provisions of this section are not to be controlled by section 545, unlike section 545 the expenses awarded under this section are directed to be paid in addition to fine and not out of the fine imposed—*Yamuna*, 24 Mad. 305.

According to the Calcutta High Court, the order of payment of Court-fee is no part of the principal sentence in the case and is not to be treated as a fine added to a sentence of imprisonment so as to make the sentence appealable—20 Cal 687. But the Madras High Court holds that it is an integral part of the sentence—22 Mad 153, 3 M.H.C.R. App 28. See these cases cited in Note 1113 under section 413.

"May".—"We think the Court should not be bound to exercise the power conferred by this section in trivial cases and we have accordingly used the word may"—*Report of the Joint Committee* (1922).

547. Any money (other than a fine) payable by virtue of any order made under this Code, and the method of recovery of which is not otherwise expressly provided for, shall be recoverable as if it were a fine.

Moneys ordered to be paid recoverable as fines.

The italicised words have been added by section 154 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. These words provide for the recovery of compensation under sec. 250, of costs under sec. 143 (3), and of the Court-fees and process-fees mentioned in sec. 546A.

1422. This section only provides a summary method of realising 'money payable' and these words cannot be stretched so as to include live stock or other goods—*Phumman*, 23 Cr.L.J. 157 (Lah)

An order of refund of compensation paid to the complainant under sec. 543 may be enforced by process under this section. It is not necessary that the accused should bring a civil suit for recovery of the money—*Mutsaddi v. Mani Ram*, 19 All 112, *Ishri v. Bakshi*, 6 All. 96, *Pola Varapu*, 7 Mad. 563; *Ali Ahmad v Nathu*, 1884 P R 14, *Ratanlal* 213 *Contra*—2 Weir 717

An order by the High Court setting aside an award of compensation (sec. 250) to the accused must be deemed to be an order directing refund of the money, and such order is enforceable under this section—*Howarna v. Jassu*, 1885 P.R. 12. See also 1903 P R 29

An order directing the complainant to pay the diet money of his witness cannot be enforced under this section, the remedy of the witness to recover the money is by a civil suit—*Kamal v. Paramsukh*, 29 C W N 1033 (see this case cited under sec 544).

548. If any person affected by a judgment or order passed by a Criminal Court desires Copies of proceedings. to have a copy of the Judge's charge to the jury or of any order or deposition or other part of the record, he shall, on applying for such copy, be furnished therewith:

. Provided that he pays for the same, unless the Court, for some special reason, thinks fit to furnish it free of cost.

1423. 'Affected by judgment, order' etc.—A complainant whose complaint is dismissed is a person affected by the order of dismissal, and therefore he is entitled to ask for a copy of the Magistrate's order of discharge—*In re Abdul*, *Ratanlal* 305, 8 Cal 166. But a 'charge' is not an order of a Criminal Court by which an accused person can be said to be affected within the meaning of this section, so as to entitle him to copies of deposition where the trial has not proceeded beyond the frame of charge and the examination of the prosecution witnesses—1892 A W N 140

Accused entitled to copies—A prisoner is entitled to copies of all documents for which he applies and which he thinks necessary for his defence, and a Magistrate will be acting contrary to law in determining whether such copies are necessary or not—14 W R 77

549. (1) The Governor General in Council may make rules, consistent with this Code and the Army Act and the Air Force Act or any similar law for the time being in force, as to Delivery to military authorities of persons liable to be tried by Court-martial.

the cases in which persons subject to military or air force law shall be tried by a Court to which this Code applies, or by Court martial, and when any person is brought before a Magistrate and charged with an offence for which he is liable, under the Army Act, section 41, or under the Air Force Act, section 41, to be tried by a Court-martial, such Magistrate shall have regard to such rules, and shall in proper cases deliver him, together with a statement of the offence of which he is accused, to the commanding officer of the regiment, corps or detachment to which he belongs, or to the commanding officer of the nearest military or air force station, as the case may be, for the purpose of being tried by Court-martial.

(2) Every Magistrate shall, on receiving a written application for that purpose by the commanding officer of any body of troops stationed or employed at any such place, use his utmost endeavours to apprehend and secure any person accused of such offence.

The italicised words have been added by the Repealing and Amending Act, X of 1927.

550. Any police-officer may seize any property which may be alleged or suspected to have been stolen, or which may be found under circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence. Such police-officer, if subordinate to the officer in charge of a police-station, shall forthwith report the seizure to that officer.

1424. If a Police officer has reason to suspect certain property to be stolen he must himself seize the property. He cannot order any other person to detain the same—*Bithal*, 16 O.C. 371, 15 Cr.L.J. 177.

This section gives the Police officer power to seize only the property suspected to be stolen; but it does not empower him to seize any other property which is mixed with the stolen one—1909 P.W.R. 14.

551. Police-officers superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police-station may exercise the same powers, throughout the local areas to which they

Powers of superior officers of Police.

are appointed, as may be exercised by such officer within the limits of his station.

552. Upon complaint made to a Presidency Magistrate or District Magistrate on oath of the abduction or unlawful detention of a woman, or of a female child under the age of sixteen years, for any unlawful purpose, he may make an order for the immediate restoration of such woman to her liberty, or of such female child to her husband, parent, guardian or other person having the lawful charge of such child, and may compel compliance with such order, using such force as may be necessary.

Change :—The word "sixteen" has been substituted for "fourteen" by the Criminal Law Amendment Act XVIII of 1924, for the purpose of affording greater protection to girls. By the same Act, the age limit has been raised from sixteen to eighteen in sections 372 and 373 of the Indian Penal Code.

1425. Unlawful detention.—The detention of a child in a missionary school, against the will of her parent or guardian with a view that she should be brought up in a religion which such parent or child disapproved of and the adoption of which would not only involve a total change in the child's mode of life, but would also deprive the parent or guardian of any control in the education or bringing up of the child, would amount to unlawful detention—*Abraham v. Mahtabo*, 16 Cal 487

The detention of a girl by the father in his house against the will of her husband does not amount to unlawful detention, unless it is shown that the detention was contrary to the wish of the girl—*Nathu v. Nari Lal*, 15 Cr L J 712 (Cal.) If a woman is residing with her relative who are aiding her in endeavouring to procure a divorce, such detention is not unlawful—*Syed Umar v. Syed Davood*, 2 Weir 724

Unlawful purpose.—A Magistrate can act under this section when both the detention and the purpose are unlawful. In 16 Cal 487 cited above the detention was held to be unlawful, but the purpose was not. Unlawful purpose means immoral purpose. This section applies to female children only, and not to children generally, this shows that the purpose has some special reference to the sex of the person against whom it is entertained. In other words, the section has reference to adultery, concubinage, prostitution, deflowering or other similar purposes. But it certainly does not include the detention of a Hindu girl in a Christian Institution in order that she may be a Christian, or the detention of a Christian child in a Mahomedan Institution in order that she may be a Mahomedan—*Abraham v. Mahtabo*, 16 Cal. 487; see also 4 Bom L.R. 609

1426. Procedure :—It is the District Magistrate who alone has jurisdiction to entertain a complaint and make an order under this section. He has no power to transfer such a case to a Sub-Magistrate, and that Magistrate would have no jurisdiction therein—Ratanlal 963

An application under this section does not necessarily allege the commission of an offence, and is not a complaint; consequently the provisions of secs 200 and 203 do not apply to proceedings under this section—4 Bom L.R. 609. A person proceeded against under this section is not in the position of an accused person, and may offer himself as a witness in the proceeding, see sec. 340

Where a Magistrate has reason to believe that a woman is unlawfully detained but cannot find who so detains her, the proper course is for the Magistrate to issue an order to have the woman brought before him and to examine her; it would be illegal for the Magistrate in such a case to order the restoration of the woman to liberty without any finding that she was unlawfully detained by any one and without ordering any one to restore her to liberty—Syed Umar v Syed Davood, 2 Weir 724.

An application to get back a girl from her father's custody on the allegation that she is the wife of the applicant must be made to a Civil Court and not to the Magistrate under this section—10 C.W.N. 1xxv.

553. (1) Whenever any person causes a police-

Compensation to persons groundlessly given in charge in Presidency-town.

officer to arrest another person in a presidency-town, if it appears to the Magistrate by whom the case is heard that there was no sufficient

ground for causing such arrest, the Magistrate may award such compensation, not exceeding fifty rupees, to be paid by the person so causing the arrest to the person so arrested, for his loss of time and expenses in the matter, as the Magistrate thinks fit.

(2) In such cases, if more persons than one are arrested, the Magistrate may, in like manner, award to each of them such compensation, not exceeding fifty rupees, as such Magistrate thinks fit.

(3) All compensation awarded under this section may be recovered as if it were a fine, and if it cannot be so recovered, the person by whom it is payable shall be sentenced to simple imprisonment for such term not exceeding thirty days as the Magistrate directs, unless such sum is sooner paid.

554. (1) With the previous sanction of the Governor General in Council, the High Court at Fort William, and with the previous sanction of the Local Government, any other High Court established by Royal Charter may, from time to time, make rules for the inspection of the records of subordinate Courts.

Power of chartered High Courts to make rules for inspection of records of subordinate Courts.

(2) Every High Court not established by Royal Charter may, from time to time, and with the previous sanction of the Local Government,—

Power of other High Courts to make rules for other purposes.

(a) makes rules for keeping all books, entries and accounts to be kept in all Criminal Courts subordinate to it, and for the preparation and transmission of any returns or statements to be prepared and submitted by such Courts;

(b) frame forms for every proceeding in the said Courts for which it thinks that a form should be provided;

(c) makes rules for regulating its own practice and proceedings and the practice and proceedings of all Criminal Courts subordinate to it; and

(d) make rules for regulating the execution of warrants issued under this Code for the levy of fines:

Provided that the rules and forms made and framed under this section shall not be inconsistent with this Code or any other law in force for the time being.

(3) All rules made under this section shall be published in the local official Gazette.

555. Subject to the power conferred by S. 554, and by S. 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915, the forms set

Forms.

forth in the fifth schedule, with such variation as the circumstances of each case require, may be used for the

respective purposes therein mentioned, and if used shall be sufficient.

1427. "*With such variation*":—There being no prescribed form of warrant under section 100, a Magistrate who had to issue one under that section adapted a form under sec. 96 to the provision of sec. 100 by altering the figures and by drawing up the warrant in terms required by sec. 100. It was held that the warrant was perfectly legal—45 Cal. 905. See also Note 205 under sec. 100.

556. No Judge or Magistrate shall, except with the permission of the Court to which an appeal lies from his Court, try or commit for trial any case to or in which he is a party or personally interested, and no Judge or Magistrate shall hear an appeal from any judgment or order passed or made by himself.

Explanation.—A Judge or Magistrate shall not be deemed a party, or personally interested, within the meaning of this section, to or in any case by reason only that he is a Municipal Commissioner or otherwise concerned therein in a public capacity, or by reason only that he has viewed the place in which an offence is alleged to have been committed or any other place in which any other transaction material to the case is alleged to have occurred, and made an inquiry in connection with the case.

Illustration.

A, as Collector, upon consideration of information furnished to him, directs the prosecution of B for a breach of the Excise Laws. A is disqualified from trying this case as a Magistrate.

1428. *Principle and scope of section* :—It is one of the oldest and plainest rules of justice and common sense that no man shall sit as a Judge in a case in which he has any interest—*Bholanath*, 2 Cal. 23. It is an unshaken doctrine of human jurisprudence that no man can be judge in his own cause (*Nemo debet esse iudex in propria sua causa*). This maxim rests not upon any suspicion as to the honesty of the Judge or his capacity for the purposes of adjudication, but it rests upon a thing higher than the technicalities of law. It rests upon the philosophy that says that human beings are after all human beings, and with all honour due to the honesty and integrity of the Judges, they are not to hear cases in which they are themselves concerned—(*Q. E. v. Pohpi*, 13 All 171 (174).

"The law in laying down this strict rule had regard not so much to the motives which might be supposed to bias the Judge ■ to the susceptibilities of the litigant parties. One important object, at all events, is to clear away everything which might engender suspicion and distrust in the tribunal and to promote the feelings of confidence in the administration of justice which is so essential to social order and security"—*Serjeant v. Dale*, 2 Q.B.D. 558 (567).

A Magistrate who is disqualified under this section to try a case is not a Court of 'competent jurisdiction' in respect to that case, and if he tries that case, the defect is not cured by sec 537—*Sudhama v. Q. E.*, 23 Cal. 328. Nor will the disqualification be cured by any consent or waiver on the part of the accused—*Shamdasani*, 53 Bom. 716, 1929 Cr.C. 433 (434); *Bholanath*, 2 Cal. 23, *Bisheshar*, 32 All. 635; *Faiz Muhammad*, 9 N.L.R. 81, 14 Cr.L.J. 385 (387); 7 A.L.J. 749, 1 S.L.R. 98; 4 Lah.L.J. 452. Even the absence of *bona fides* on the part of the objector does not affect the question of the disqualification of the Magistrate in trying the case—*Shamdasani*, *supra*.

'Try or commit any case'—The expression 'try any case' is wide enough to include any stage of a judicial proceeding in which the guilt or innocence of the accused is finally adjudicated upon—*Bhojraj*, 5 S.L.R. 137, 13 Cr.L.J. 30. Thus, he cannot hear an appeal in the case. The word 'try' is comprehensive enough to include the hearing of an appeal—*Nistarini v. A. C. Ghosh*, 23 Cal. 44, 17 C.W.N. xii, *Inayat Hussain*, 1899 A.W.N. 74, 4 Lah.L.J. 452, *Faiz Muhammad*, ■ N.L.R. 81, 14 Cr.L.J. 385 (386); 1 S.L.R. 98. He is also debarred from interfering in revision in the case—1905 U.B.R. (Cr.P.C.) 37. He cannot direct further inquiry under sec. 436—*Bhojraj*, 5 S.L. ■ 137, 13 Cr.L.J. 30. (*Contra*—27 All. 25).

But a Magistrate can *initiate* proceedings even though he is personally interested in the case—*Bholanath Sen*, 2 Cal. 23. Though a Magistrate is disqualified under this section from trying a case, on account of personal interest, he ■ not, on that account, debarred from granting a permission to another Magistrate to proceed with the case—*Fateh Bahadur*, 20 All. 181. The Magistrate is not debarred from *taking cognizance* of the case even though he has taken some part in the initiation of the proceedings—*Oziullah v. Beni Madhab*, 50 Cal. 135.

■ a Magistrate considers that he is disqualified from trying ■ case, and the case is of a petty nature, he ought not to commit it to the Sessions, but should move the District Magistrate to transfer it to some other Magistrate—*Emp. v. Ram Jatan*, 21 A.L.J. 420, 25 Cr.L.J. 665, A.I.R. 1924 All. 185.

Permission of Appellate Court—Under this section, a Magistrate who is personally interested can try a case with the permission of the Appellate Court. And the Appellate Court can grant the permission if the Magistrate requests permission at the initial stage of the case and before the proceedings are begun—*In re Shamdasani*, 53 Bom. 716, 1929 Cr.C. 433 (435).

'In which he is a party':—Where a Magistrate while travelling in a railway carriage requested the accused who were his fellow-passengers to desist from smoking, and, on their contemptuously refusing to do so, arrested and subsequently tried and convicted them, it was held that the Magistrate was legally and morally disqualified from exercising his judicial functions in relation to the offences imputed—*Venkana, Ratanlal* 339. So also, a Magistrate, who was one of the persons obstructed by the accused driving on the wrong side of the road, could not himself try the accused for offences under secs. 28 and 29 of the Bombay Act VII of 1867—*Lahana, Ratanlal* 321.

1429. Personally interested:—The words 'personally interested' do not imply mere intellectual interest but something of the nature of an expectation of advantage to be gained, or of a loss or some disadvantage to be avoided, by the person who is said to be interested in the case—*Cholappa, 8 Bom L.R. 947*. Thus, a public officer whose duty it is to see that the law is obeyed cannot, merely by reason of that duty, be said to be personally interested in the prosecution and trial of an offender—*In re Ganeshi, 15 All. 192*. The words 'personally interested' cannot refer to any remote interest in the matter, but must refer to some particular and immediate personal interest in the case and its result—*In re Ganeshi, 15 All. 192*. The law does not measure the amount of interest which a Judge possesses. If he has any legal interest in the decision of the question one way, he is disqualified, no matter how small the interest may be—*Sergeant v Dale, 2 Q.B.D. 558*.

Instances —(1) *Taking part in arrest of accused and Police proceedings*—Where the Magistrate took an active part in dispersing the unlawful assembly and pursuing the members and arresting them, and subsequently he initiated proceedings against the accused and himself tried and convicted them, it was held that the Magistrate should not have tried the case himself as he had initiated and directed the whole proceedings and could be said to have been personally interested in them—20 Cal. 857. Where the investigation of the Police at the preliminary inquiry was directed by a Magistrate to a considerable degree and where the Magistrate himself traced some of the accused and ordered their arrest, he was disqualified from trying the case—*Sudhama v. Q.E., 33 Cal. 328*. A Magistrate who takes more than a formal part in a police investigation should not try the case—*Nga Po v Emp., 4 Bur L.J. 65, 26 Cr.L.J. 1317; 2 L.B.R. 209*.

(2) *Magistrate being a witness:*—A Magistrate cannot, in a case in which he is the sole Judge of law and fact, be a competent witness. The trial and conviction by a Magistrate of an accused in a case wherein he (the Magistrate) is himself a witness, is illegal—*Donnelly, 22 Cal. 405; Mangni Lal, 20 Cr.L.J. 45 (Pat.), 48 I.C. 685; 1904 P.L.R. 21*. A Magistrate cannot import matters (e.g., personal knowledge) into his judgment not stated on oath before the Court in the presence of the accused. If he does so, he makes himself a witness in the case, and renders himself incompetent to try it—*Mangni Lal, 20 Cr.L.J. 45 (Pat.); Grish Chander, 20 Cal. 857*. A Magistrate who becomes aware of some of the facts in

connection with a case by his taking some part, or at any rate by being present, at a search made by the police during the investigation, should not try the case but transfer it to some other Magistrate—5 C.W.N. 864. An officer should not try an offence under sec. 174 I. P. C., in his capacity as a Magistrate, when the offence has been committed before him in his capacity as a Settlement Officer—*Sukhari*, 2 All. 405. But if during the course of the trial, the Magistrate himself made a statement on oath which he recorded, and permitted himself to be cross-examined and re-examined, it was held that he was not incompetent to try the case—*Emp. v. Nanhe*, 27 All. 33.

(3) *Pecuniary interest*:—If a Judge has any pecuniary interest, however small, in the result of the proceedings, it is against public policy that he should take part in the proceedings; he is disqualified from trying the case and the Court will not inquire whether he was really biased or likely to be biased—*Allison v. General Council of Medical Education*, [1894] 1 Q.B. 750; 70 L.T. 471; *In re Shamdasani*, 53 Bom. 716, 1929 Cr. C. 433 (434); *Rodrigues*, 20 Bom. 502. Thus, a Magistrate who is a shareholder of the Company against whose auditors a prosecution is started under sec. 282 Companies Act, must be deemed to be personally interested, and cannot try the case—*In re Shamdasani*, supra. A Magistrate who is a shareholder of the company which is the complainant in the case is disqualified from trying the case. In such cases, it is not necessary to inquire whether there was any real or substantial ground for suspecting bias on his part—*In re Rodrigues*, 20 Bom. 502. See also *Bholanath*, 2 Cal. 23. A Magistrate should not entertain a criminal case in which persons indebted to him are concerned either as complainants or as accused—C. P. Cr. Cir., Part II, No. 59.

(4) *Judge or Magistrate being complainant*—It is impossible to allow the same Judge or the Magistrate to be the complainant and the Court. If a Sessions Judge makes a complaint under sec. 476A, he cannot hear an appeal in the case. The accused is entitled to a decision from a Judge who approaches the case with an absolutely open mind—*Saf v. Emp.*, 8 Lah. 496, 29 Cr L J 6 (7).

(5) *Magistrate being servant of complainant*:—A Magistrate who is a servant of the corporation is deemed to have such an interest in the result of a prosecution by the corporation as to disqualify him from trying the case—*Wood v. Corporation of Calcutta*, 7 Cal. 322; *Nobin v. Chairman*, 10 Cal. 194.

(6) *Magistrate being master of complainant*—The mere fact that the Magistrate is the master of the complainant who is complaining on his own account merely, does not deprive the Magistrate of his jurisdiction, though in such a case it should generally be expedient for him to refer the complainant to some other Magistrate—*Basappa*, 11 Bom. 172. But where the complainant was the servant of the Magistrate, and it appeared that the Magistrate's wife was driving in the dog-cart for passing which

the accused was charged with rash and negligent driving, the Magistrate was held to be personally interested and ought not to try the case—*Q. E. v. Sahadev*, 14 Bom. 572.

(7) *Magistrate being Agent of Court of Wards* :—The mere fact that the District Magistrate is, in his capacity as Collector, concerned in the management of an estate under the Court of Wards, does not disqualify him from trying a case of theft arising out of a dispute between the landlord and tenant in an estate under the management of the Court of Wards—*Amrit Majhi*, 46 Cal 854, *Baktu v. Kali Prosad*, 28 Cal 297. But where the manager of an estate under the Court of Wards, who was also the Sub-divisional Officer, drew up proceedings as Magistrate under sec 145 against one who disputed the possession of a piece of land, in which the estate claimed an interest, and the Magistrate refused an application for transfer of the case, it was held that the Magistrate showed a lack of appreciation of ordinary principles which should guide judicial officers in matters of this kind—9 C.W.N. cccxvi.

(8) *Magistrate being friend of a party* :—If a Magistrate is in close business or friendly relationship with a party, it is on the whole undesirable that he should take part in hearing a case in which the interests of that person are gravely affected. Thus, a Magistrate is disqualified from trying a case, if the complainant during the pendency of the case has paid several visits to him and supplied him with servants and eatables. But the fact that on only one occasion the person at whose instance the complaint was made visited the Magistrate, and the visit was of a wholly innocent nature paid in the regular course of the Magistrate's social duties, would not disqualify the Magistrate—*In re S. Mukhtar*, 8 Pat 575 (F B), A I R 1929 Pat 151 (153).

1430. Sanctioning or directing the prosecution :—See the illustration. A Magistrate who takes a mere formal part in the prosecution cannot be said to direct the prosecution and is not therefore deprived of his jurisdiction in the case. Thus, a Magistrate who simply issued process as officer-in-charge of the Sudder sub-division is not precluded from hearing an appeal in the case—*Dasarath Rai*, 36 Cal 869. Where a Magistrate under the Excise Act lays before the Inspector of Police certain information regarding the conduct of the accused in his dealings in opium and directs the said Inspector to make an inquiry on the basis of that information, and a prosecution is subsequently instituted in the ordinary course by the investigating Police Officer, held that the Magistrate cannot be said to have such connection with the proceedings antecedent to the prosecution as would debar him from trying the accused—*Babu Ram*, 15 Cr.L.J. 17, 11 A.L.J. 852. Whether a given case falls within the provisions of this section is a question of fact to be determined by the circumstances of each case. Where a Deputy Tahsildar made a report to the Tahsildar about certain offences and the Tahsildar in his turn reported the matter to the Deputy Magistrate, who authorised the Tahsildar to prosecute the accused, and the Tahsildar then lodged a

complaint before the Deputy Magistrate who tried the case, *held* that the Deputy Magistrate was not disqualified, since he merely *authorised* the prosecution and not *directed* it. A distinction should be drawn between authorisation and direction of prosecution—*Chenchu Reddi*, 24 Mad. 238. If a District Magistrate or other executive head of a district or department orders a prosecution because the matter before him demands elucidation by judicial inquiry, this section would not be applicable, but where the officer ordering the prosecution has satisfied his own mind that the accused is guilty, then clearly he should not try the accused. Thus, where a Forest Officer asked the Deputy Commissioner to give a warning to the accused for having made a false report to that officer, but the Deputy Commissioner directed prosecution of the accused under sec. 182 I. P. C. on the ground that he was satisfied that there was a clear case of a false report deliberately made, *held* that the Deputy Commissioner was disqualified from hearing the case as Magistrate—*Faiz Muhammed*, D N. L. R. 81, 14 Cr L J 385 (386, 387). Where the prosecution is by a Town Committee, the mere fact that the Magistrate had as the President of the Town Committee sanctioned the prosecution cannot be said to give the Magistrate any personal interest in the proceedings, and the Magistrate is competent to try the case himself. But nevertheless it is not desirable that he should try the case when other Magistrates are available—*Gopi Chand v K E*, 1 Rang 517, 22 Cr L J 273, A I R 1924 Rang. 87. A Sessions Judge is not prohibited in law from hearing an appeal from a conviction in a case in which, as an Insolvency Judge, on the application of a creditor, he had allowed the prosecution to proceed—*Srikrishna v Emp*, 21 A L J. 90. But where a District Magistrate who as Inspector of Factories ordered an inquiry to be made in the same capacity *directed* the prosecution of the accused for an offence under the Factories Act, he was disqualified from trying the case—*Lorinda*, 1 Lah 35, 21 Cr L J 389. Where a Cantonment Magistrate in his capacity as secretary of the Cantonment Committee ordered the prosecution of the accused in respect of an alleged building in contravention of the cantonment rules, and proceeded to try the case, *held* that the case ought to be transferred to another Magistrate—*Hira Lal v Emp*, 20 A L J 911. A Magistrate, who upon information furnished to him directs the issue of a warrant under sec. 6 of the Gambling Act, is disqualified from trying the case—*Chin Pin*, 13 Bur L T 154, 61 I C 835, 22 Cr L J 451. Where after the close of a trial, the trying Magistrate orders the Police to send up a charge-sheet in respect of a witness for the prosecution, and upon the Police doing so, tries that person and convicts him, *held* that the Magistrate having directed the prosecution is not competent to hold the trial—*Gundoo*, 23 Bom L R 842, 22 Cr L J. 603, 62 I C 875.

1431. Explanation—Under the Explanation, a Magistrate is not deemed to be a party or personally interested in any case by reason of the fact that he is a Municipal Commissioner or otherwise concerned therein in a public capacity. But if in addition to a connection of that sort, he *directs the prosecution* of a person for an offence, he is dis-

qualified from trying the case, not by reason of the fact that he is a Municipal Commissioner or publicly connected with the case, but by reason of the further fact that he has constituted himself the prosecutor—*Bhojraj*, 5 S.L.R. 137, 13 Cr.L.J. 30; 1899 A.W.N. 74; *Gundoo*, 23 Bom.L.R. 842, 22 Cr.L.J. 603, 62 I.C. 875. Thus, the mere fact that the Magistrate might happen to be a Municipal Commissioner does not necessarily disqualify him from holding a trial in which some Municipal matter was involved. But it is a very different matter when it is found that the Magistrate is practically one of the prosecutors and the Judge—*Kharak Chand v. Tarack*, 10 Cal 1030. A Municipal Commissioner in his capacity as such Commissioner had invited the attention of the Executive Officer of the Municipality to the manner in which a certain Bye-law of the Municipality was being disregarded by the accused. The Executive Officer called the attention of the Health Officer to the matter and the Health officer instituted the prosecution after satisfying himself that there were good *prima facie* grounds for believing that the Bye-law was being broken and that the interests of the public health required its enforcement. The case was tried by a Bench of Honorary Magistrates of which the Municipal Commissioner was a member, and ended in a conviction. Held, that the trial and conviction were not illegal, because the Municipal Commissioner was not a party to the prosecution nor did he cause it to be instituted—*Nanoo v. Emp.*, 24 Cr.L.J. 135 (All). The mere fact that the Magistrate is the Vice-President of the Municipality and Chairman of the Managing Committee does not disqualify him from trying an offence against the Municipality. But if he has taken any part in promoting the prosecution, as for instance, by concurring in sanctioning it at a meeting of the Managing Committee or otherwise, he would be disqualified—*Q. E v Pherozsha*, 18 Bom 422, *Mahammad Baksh*, 10 Lah 718, 30 Cr.L.J. 698 (699), *Fazl Ilahi v. Municipal Committee*, 1896 P.R. 5. So also, if the Magistrate is the Vice-President of a Municipal Committee and was present at the meeting in which the resolution was passed, for the disobedience of which the accused is prosecuted, the Magistrate is debarred from trying the case—*Nurkishan*, 23 Cr.L.J. 704, A.I.R. 1922 Lah 72. A Magistrate does not, by reason of his being a member of a sub-committee of a Municipal Board, become personally interested so as to be disentitled to try the accused for an offence against the Municipal Board—*Mohan Lal*, 27 All. 25. But if he presides at a meeting of the Municipal Board which directs the prosecution of the accused, he becomes disqualified—*Deendayal*, 14 N.L.R. 14; *Bhojraj*, 5 S.L.R. 137, 13 Cr.L.J. 30; *Rama Rao*, 20 Cr.L.J. 244, 49 I.C. 916. It may be that he did not speak or vote at the meeting but the fact remains that he attended the meeting where the question was debated and the prosecution ordered, and he has therefore placed himself personally to some extent in the position of a prosecutor—*Bhojraj*, 5 S.L.R. 137. Where the Municipal Committee resolved to institute criminal proceedings against the accused and directed the Secretary to take necessary steps, and the Secretary forwarded a copy of the resolution to the Joint Magistrate (who was no other than the Secretary himself) who took proceedings and

tried the accused, it was held that the trial was not only illegal but a mere show—*Basant*, 1883 A.W.N. 181. The District Magistrate is not disqualified from hearing the appeal merely because he happens to be the Chairman of the Municipal Board—*Inayat Hussain*, 1899 A.W.N. 74. *Contra*—23 Cal. 44 and *Eragada*, 15 Mad. 83, where it was held that the very fact that the Chairman of the Municipality was the Magistrate, disqualified him from trying the offence, and the Explanation did not apply to his case.

In *Nobin v. Chairman*, 10 Cal. 194, a distinction has been drawn between a salaried officer of a Corporation and an Honorary Officer, and it has been held that the Explanation does not apply to a salaried officer. A salaried officer of the Corporation is, by reason of the very fact that he is a servant of the Corporation, precluded from trying any Municipal case as a Magistrate. But a gentleman who without remuneration is merely discharging a public and honorary office, and who has no personal interest in the proceedings of the Municipality, may well be supposed to be free from that bias which the jealousy of the law presumes in other persons more immediately interested.

'Concerned therein in a public capacity'—A Magistrate in charge of opium and excise administration of a district is not personally interested in the observation of the provisions of the Opium Act, merely because it is his duty to see the law relating to sale of opium enforced and maintained in his district; he is therefore not precluded from exercising jurisdiction in respect of offences against the said Act—*In re Ganesht*, 15 All 192; 5 A.L.J. 357. A District Magistrate is not precluded under this section from trying an offence under the Police Act, merely because he is the head of the Police—*Narain Singh*, 22 All. 340. The fact that the District Magistrate is also the District Superintendent of Police does not of itself disqualify him from trying or inquiring into cases investigated by the Police of his district—2 L.B.R. 209. But if the Magistrate in his public capacity directs the prosecution, he is disqualified. Thus, where the Magistrate as president of the octroi sub-committee directed the prosecution of an accused for evading the payment of octroi, the Magistrate was debarred from trying the case, even though the accused had consented to be so tried—*Bisheshwar*, 32 All 635.

1432. Local inspection.—Under the Code of 1882, it was held that a Magistrate making a personal inspection of the *locus in quo* where the offence was committed, made himself a witness in the case and thereby rendered himself incompetent to try the case—*Q. E. v. Manikam*, 19 Mad 263, *Grish Chunder v. Q. E.*, 20 Cal 857; *Haru Kishore v. Abdul*, 21 Cal, 920. But now the law has been changed by the addition of the latter part of the Explanation.

A Magistrate is competent to inspect personally a locality in order to test the connection of the evidence and the plans of the locality submitted in the case. Such an inspection would not disqualify him from trying the case—*Hansa Singh*, 1901 P.R. 13, *Babbon v. K. E.*, 37 Cal 34 (355). Where the Magistrate inspected the *locus in quo* and stated i

in Council, or on the Local Government, may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires."

But this section was unnecessary, because its provisions are covered by section 14 of the General Clauses Act. The old section has therefore been omitted and an entirely different section has been framed in its place. "A new section is intended to be inserted, providing for the powers of Judge and Magistrates being exercised by their successors-in-office, and the determination by the Chief Presidency or District Magistrate of the person to be deemed the successor-in-office of a Subordinate Magistrate in cases of doubt"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914).

A complaint under sec. 476 relating to an offence committed in relation to a proceeding in a Magistrate's Court can be made by the successor-in-office of the Magistrate—*Behram v. Crown*, 7 Lah 108, 27 Cr.L.J. 776 See Note 1239 under sec 476.

560. A public servant having any duty to perform

Officers concerned in sales not to purchase or bid for property. in connection with the sale of any property under the Code shall not purchase or bid for the property.

561. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Code,

Special provisions with respect to offence of rape by a husband. no Magistrate except a Chief Presidency Magistrate or District Magistrate shall—

(a) take cognizance of the offence of rape where the sexual intercourse was by a man with his wife, or

(b) commit the man for trial for the offence.

(2) And, notwithstanding anything in this Code, if a Chief Presidency Magistrate or District Magistrate deems it necessary to direct an investigation by a police-officer, with respect to such an offence as is referred to in sub-section (1), no police-officer of a rank below that of police-inspector shall be employed either to make, or to take part in, the investigation

Clause (a):—Where the offence referred to in this clause was taken cognizance of by the District Magistrate, the fact that the investigation into the offence had been conducted by a subordinate Police-officer was not a material irregularity which would vitiate the proceedings—*Mehri*, 1895 A.W.N. 9.

561A. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to

Saving of inherent power of High Court limit or affect the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the

process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

1433A. This section has been added by section 156 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. "By this section it is proposed to give statutory recognition to the inherent powers of the High Court—a principle which is already well-recognized"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914).

"Or otherwise to secure the ends of justice".—"We have slightly elaborated the provisions of this clause. We understand that a High Court has recently held [44 All 401] that it had no power to direct the expunging of objectionable matter from a record. We think it desirable that it should be made clear that this clause is intended to meet such a case"—*Report of the Joint Committee* (1922). See Note 1214 under sec. 439. Thus, by virtue of the inherent powers conferred on it by this section, the High Court can expunge any objectionable remark from the judgment of a lower Court—*Amar Nath v. Crown*, 5 Lah 476 (481), 26 Cr.L.J. 463; *Abdul Aziz v. Emp.*, 25 Cr.L.J. 1245 (Lah.), *Benarsi Das v. Crown*, 6 Lah. 166, 26 Cr.L.J. 1326, *Daly*, 9 Lah 269, 29 Cr.L.J. 620, *Panchanan v. Upendra*, 49 All 254, 27 Cr.L.J. 1407 (1408); *Md. Qasam v. Anwar Khan*, 27 Cr.L.J. 510 (511), *Mahomed Husain*, 23 S.L.R. 432, 30 Cr.L.J. 970. But such power can be exercised only where there is no foundation whatever for the remarks objected to, and not where it is a matter of inference from evidence—*Panchanan v. Upendra*, *supra*. The powers under this section should be sparingly used and only in exceptional cases. It is not desirable that the High Court should on the motion of a subordinate Magistrate, expunge remarks made by a lower Appellate Court relating to the conduct of judicial proceedings taken by the said Magistrate—*Md. Qasam*, *supra*.

In the exercise of its inherent powers under this section, the High Court cannot pass any order which would conflict with the provisions of the Code. Thus, the High Court has no jurisdiction to make an order for the restoration of attached property, where the application is made beyond the period prescribed in sec. 89—*In re Gurunath*, 26 Bom L.R. 719, 25 Cr.L.J. 1293.

The powers conferred on the High Court under this section are powers which must be found within the Crim Pro Code. This section confers no new powers on the High Court, because the Court cannot, by invoking its inherent powers, extend the powers given to it by statute—*Sukh Dev*, 1929 Cr. C. 351 (Lah.); *Marudayya v. Shanmuga*, 49 M.L.J. 593. Thus, the High Court has no power to appoint a receiver pending the disposal of a revision petition against an order passed under section 145—*Marudayya v. Shanmuga Sundara*, 49 M.L.J. 593. See this case cited in Note 421 under sec. 145.

It has been held in some cases that the words "save as otherwise provided by this Code" in sec. 369, and the words "Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit" in sec. 561A, show that sec. 369 must be read as subject to sec. 561A, and that the latter section is in no way limited or governed by sec. 369. Therefore, the High Court is com-

Magistrate, who shall dispose of the case in manner provided by section 380.

(1A) *In any case in which a person is convicted of theft, theft in a building, dishonest misappropriation, cheating, or any other offence under the Indian Penal Code, punishable with not more than two years' imprisonment, and no previous conviction is proved against him, the Court before whom he is so convicted may, if it thinks fit, having regard to the age, character, antecedents or physical or mental condition of the offender and to the trivial nature of the offence or to any extenuating circumstances under which the offence was committed, instead of sentencing him to any punishment, release him after due admonition.*

(2) *An order under this section may be made by any Appellate Court or by the High Court when exercising its power of revision.*

(3) *When an order has been made under this section in respect of any offender, the High Court may, on appeal when there is a right of appeal to such Court, or when exercising its powers of revision, set aside such order, and in lieu thereof pass sentence on such offender according to law:*

Provided that the High Court shall not under this sub-section inflict a greater punishment than might have been inflicted by the Court by which the offender was convicted.

(4) *The provisions of sections 122, 126A and 406A shall, so far as may be, apply in the case of sureties offered in pursuance of the provisions of this section.*

Change:—Sub-section (1) has been substantially amended, and sub-sections (2) to (4) have been newly added, by section 157 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act, XVIII of 1923. The main changes are the following:—“First, this section extends the list of offences on conviction for which a person may be released upon probation; secondly, it is made clear that section 562 does not apply merely to the case of youthful offenders but applies to a wider class of persons; thirdly, the word ‘trivial’ has been omitted; fourthly, the period for which an offender may be released under this section has been extended from one to three years; fifthly, power has been conferred on an Appellate Court or upon a High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction to make an

order under section 562; and finally, the High Court has been empowered, either on appeal or in revision, to inflict a sentence of imprisonment in lieu of an order under this section"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1014). Sub-section (1A) has been added by the Cr. P. C. Second Amendment Act XXXVII of 1923. This amendment has been made on the recommendation of the Jail Committee.

1434. Scope and application of section :—Under this section the first offender need not necessarily be a youth; its operations are not limited to *juvenile offenders*. It applies to persons of advanced age—*Tularam*, 2 Bom L.R. 817, *Salim*, 1916 P.R. 11, 17 Cr.L.J. 254; *Pullabholia*, 18 Cr.L.J. 469 (Mad.); *K E v Po Thein*, 2 L.B.R. 314. The intention of the law is not to make it essential that the offender must be young or that the offence must be trivial in its nature etc., but merely to indicate the lines on which the discretion of the Court should be exercised—*K. E. v. Ba Han*, 2 L.B.R. 65, 5 C.W.N. ccli.

To enable a Magistrate to apply this section the first essential is that the accused is a first offender, and if he is one, the extenuating circumstances which entitle him to the indulgence of the Court are his age, character and antecedents—*Tularam*, 2 Bom L.R. 817. In order to give a Court jurisdiction to release an offender under this section, there must co-exist two conditions, viz., there should be no previous convictions proved and the offence must be one of those specified in the section. If the two conditions are fulfilled, the Court has jurisdiction in the exercise of its discretion to act under the section. But in exercising the discretion the Court must have regard to the points specified in the section, namely the age, character and antecedents of the offender, and to the circumstances under which the offence was committed—*K E v. Ba Han*, 2 L.B.R. 65. This section is intended to apply to offenders (especially youthful offenders) who without being persons of depraved character may on occasions succumb to *sudden temptation*, and the legislature very humanely and very properly allows the Magistrate in such cases to give the young man a chance and to deal with him leniently under this section. But where an offence implies a good deal of preparation (e.g., the offence of illicit manufacture of liquor) it cannot be said that it is done in consequence of succumbing to a sudden temptation, and the section should not be applied to such a case—*Crown v Sujan Singh*, 1916 P.R. 19, 17 Cr.L.J. 310, *Emp v Piara Singh*, 7 Lah 32, 27 P.L.R. 221. Where a youth of 18 years enticed away a girl, and no attempt was made by him to seduce or ill-treat her, but on the other hand he wished honourably to marry her, *held* that it was precisely for this sort of case that sec 562 was enacted—*Mukham*, 1929 Cr.C. 658 (All).

This section may be a very valuable section if properly applied, and it may very often happen that a juvenile offender who is sentenced to jail for a short period of imprisonment for a trivial offence may be practically ruined for life, whereas he would be saved by the due application of sec 562. But in passing an order under this section, at least two things are necessary to guard against, viz., danger to the public, and danger to the accused himself. The public must not be led to suppose

that all juvenile offenders may commit any crimes that they like without any fear of punishment, because that would be an incentive to criminal parents to initiate their children into a life of crime. And even children themselves being immune from the fear of punishment might be tempted to go astray into the paths of crime. It is obvious therefore that before applying this section one must consider whether there is a good cause for its application or not. If the offence is by no means a simple crime such as is committed by children out of mere thoughtlessness rather than of criminality, but it shows a singular combination of design and ingratitude and a general character of craft and deceit, it would call for a severe punishment indeed, and resort should not be had to the provisions of this section—*Daryalal v. Emp.*, 18 S.L.R. 61, 25 Cr.L.J. 1234. Magistrates should be very careful in applying this section and should not allow themselves to be misled into the use of this section by misplaced leniency and sympathy—*Emp. v. Matho*, 27 Cr.L.J. 209 (Sind). Thus, the fact that an offender is a lad of 17 years of age is no ground for taking action under this section, if the offence be a hideous and reprehensible one calling for condign and deterrent punishment (e.g. rape upon an infant girl of 5 years)—*Sardha Ram*, 29 Cr.L.J. 1096 (1097) (Lah.).

Petty squabbles of young persons should be dealt with under this section—*Ma Kywe*, 4 Bur.L.T. 68, 10 I.C. 772, 12 Cr.L.J. 242. Where the offender is a person of good position in life, he should rather be dealt with under this section than sentenced to whipping—1907 P.W.R. 9. Where the accused was a widow of over 45, and it appeared that in committing the offence (forgery, false personation) she was a puppet in the hands of the other accused, held that this was a case in which the Court instead of sentencing her to imprisonment should release her on her entering into a bond—*K. E. v. Kiran Bala*, 43 C.L.J. 79, 30 C.W.N. 373, 27 Cr.L.J. 409.

This section applies when no previous conviction is proved against the offender. A previous conviction is a technical bar to an order under this section; but if no such conviction is proved at the trial and an order under this section is passed, a subsequent discovery of a previous conviction is no ground for interference in revision—*Emp. v. Partab Narain*, 11 O.W.N. 593, 26 Cr.L.J. 1278.

The words in this section are "instead of sentencing him." Therefore where the Magistrate convicted the accused and passed a sentence of imprisonment and fine, and then added: "As the accused is a young man of respectable family, I do not think jail life would be suitable to him. Therefore, under sec. 562 I order him to execute a bond for Rs. 200 etc.," held that the order under sec. 562 was illegal. This section cannot be applied where the Magistrate has not only convicted the accused but has also sentenced him. The order under sec. 562 must be set aside—*Misri Lal*, 17 A.L.J. 426, 50 I.C. 1000 (1001), 20 Cr.L.J. 392. In another case, where the Magistrate fined the accused as well as passed an order under sec. 562, the High Court set aside the order as to fine—*Karim Bakhsh*, 10 Lah. 722, 30 Cr.L.J. 46 (47).

1435. Sub-section (1):—Under the old law this sub-section applied only where the offender was convicted of one of certain offences under the *Penal Code*, and not of an offence under any other law e.g. an offence under the Indian Railways Act—1 N.L.R. 139; or an offence under the Excise Act—*Sujan Singh*, 1916 P.R. 19, 17 Cr.L.J. 310 This restriction has now been removed.

The old sub-sec (1) could not apply where the offender was punishable with more than 2 years' imprisonment. Thus, it could not apply where the accused was convicted of criminal breach of trust—7 Bur.L.R. 14; or of receiving stolen property—*Atmaram*, 2 Bom.L.R. 343; or of lurking house trespass—*Maruti*, 15 C.P.L.R. 11, or of using as genuine a forged document—17 Bom.L.R. 921, or of house breaking—*Pullabholla*, 18 Cr.L.J. 469 (Mad.); or of voluntarily causing grievous hurt—*Abdul Lal*, 4 L.B.R. 150; or of aggravated form of cheating under sec. 420 I. P. C.—*Nga Pyi*, 3 L.B.R. 95, *Rab Natwar*, 1 Lah. 612; 41 Mad 533; or to an offence under sec. 381 I. P. C.—*Bapu Rao*, 4 N.L.R. 18. All these cases will now fall under the present sub-section (1)

No order can be made under this section where the accused has been convicted in the trial of an offence not falling under this section as well as of an offence falling under this section—2 Weir 731.

Who can pass order—An order under this section can be passed not only by the Court which convicted the accused but also by the Appellate Court, as well as by the High Court in revision—24 All 306; 29 Mad. 567; *Abdul Kadar v. Monmohan*, 25 C.W.N. 720, 23 Cr.L.J. 235 This is now expressly provided in the new sub-section (2)

1436. Bond.—The bond to be taken should be not only to keep the peace and to be of good behaviour, but to appear and receive sentence when called upon, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour—*Q. E v. Yessu*, 2 Bom.L.R. 112. But it is not competent to a Magistrate to direct the accused to appear in Court on a fixed day to receive sentence; all he can do is to release the accused on probation of good conduct for a certain period and to direct him to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, if he does not observe the conditions of the bond—*Q. E v. Rama*, 2 Bom.L.R. 702

Bond by minor:—It was held that the third proviso to section 118, providing for bond of minors to be executed by their sureties, applied only to bonds under that section, and did not apply to bonds of first offenders released under this section. A bond under this section had to be executed by the minor himself and not by his sureties (Cf. the words 'on his entering into a bond')—4 L.B.R. 12 (overruling 2 L.B.R. 137). But this is no longer good law in view of the new section 514B.

Inability to furnish security.—If an accused person is ordered to give security under this section and he fails to do so, he should not be detained in prison till the expiration of the period for which security is to be furnished, but the proper course is for the Magistrate, before passing an order under this section, to ascertain whether the accused is likely to be able to give security immediately or within a reasonable time. If he fails to give security within a reasonable time, the Magistrate

should pass a sentence which should be only nominal—*Tun Gaung*, 3 L.B.R. 2, 2 Cr.L.J. 374; *Nasu Mea v. K. E.*, 2 Rang. 360 (361), 26 Cr.L.J. 285. The Magistrate should not imprison the accused under sec. 123, on failure to give security under sec. 562. Sec. 123 specifically applies only to sections 106 and 118 and not to sec. 562—*Nasu Meah v. K. E.*, 2 Rang. 360 (361).

1437. Proviso:—Power of 2nd or 3rd Class Magistrate.—It is not open to a Second Class Magistrate, who has not been specially empowered to exercise jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of the section, to take proceedings under that sub-section, although he was invested by a notification issued under the 1882 Code with all the powers specified in the fourth schedule of that Code—2 Weir 731. If a Second Class Magistrate not empowered under this section is of opinion that the case is a fit one for the exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of section 562, he should record his opinion to that effect and submit the case to a First Class Magistrate or Sub-divisional Magistrate for orders—*Crown v. Jawah*, 5 Lah 36 (37), 25 Cr.L.J. 1124. The same remarks apply to third class Magistrates.

Power of the Magistrate to whom proceedings are submitted.—See notes under sec. 380.

Joint trial of young and aged offenders:—Where the first accused aged nearly 50 and the second accused a boy of 11, were charged of theft before a Second Class Magistrate, and the Magistrate sent the case of both the accused to a First Class Magistrate so that the second accused might be dealt with under sec. 562, it was held that the Second Class Magistrate should have disposed of the case of the first accused according to law without submitting the case to the First Class Magistrate, and that he should have submitted the case of the second accused only—*Q. E. v. Yessu*, 2 Bom.L.R. 112. Under the present law, the case of the aged offender also falls under this section.

1438. Sub-section (1A):—The offences enumerated in this sub-section are the same as those mentioned in the old section. It is restricted to offences under the Indian Penal Code, and does not apply to an offence under any other law, e.g. an offence under the Indian Railways Act—*John Scott*, 1 N.L.R. 139; or an offence under the Excise Act—1916 P.R. 19.

Again, the benefit of this sub-section is not extended to the aggravated forms of the offences mentioned herein. Thus, when this sub-section speaks of theft, dishonest misappropriation or cheating, it must be construed to mean theft etc. in its simple form, punishable respectively under secs. 379, 403 and 417 I. P. C., and does not include the aggravated forms of those offences. The offence of cheating means simple cheating not the aggravated form of it under sec. 420 I. P. C.—*Nga Pyi*, 3 Cr.L.J. 21, 3 L.B.R. 95 (F.B.); 41 Mad. 533; *Rab Nawaz*, 1 Lah 612; *Deva Kantha*, 5 P.L.J. 267, 21 Cr.L.J. 468. The word 'theft' can only mean simple theft; otherwise it would not have been followed by the words 'theft in a building' as well. A servant found

guilty of theft and convicted under sec. 381 I. P. C. is not entitled to the benefit of this clause, as theft by servant is not one of the offences specified herein. It is an evasion of law to treat an aggravated form of offence as an ordinary offence and thus introduce a different jurisdiction or a lower scale of punishment—*Bapu Rao*, 4 N.L.R. 18, 7 Cr.L.J. 319. But the Allahabad High Court holds that the words 'dishonest misappropriation' and 'cheating' apply to and cover those offences in all their forms; thus 'cheating' covers secs 418, 419 and 420 I. P. C., and 'criminal misappropriation' includes offences under sections 404 and 405 I. P. C.; otherwise the words are a mere surplusage, because these offences are not punishable with more than two years' imprisonment. The words of a Statute should be given an extended meaning of which they are reasonably susceptible, when a restricted meaning would reduce those words to a mere surplusage—*Har Narain v Ramji*, 12 A.L.J. 465, 15 Cr.L.J. 375. The Nagpur Court holds the same view in *Emp. v Jal Lal*, 24 Cr.L.J. 251, A I R 1923 Nag. 158

This sub-section also speaks of any other offence punishable with not more than two years' imprisonment. In applying this sub-section to those offences, the term of imprisonment and not the nature of the offences is the test. If the offence is punishable with not more than two years' imprisonment, the clause may be applied, even though the offence be a serious one. Thus a boy of 18 years who attempted to cause hurt with a dangerous weapon may be dealt with under this sub-section, because the attempt to cause hurt is punishable with 18 months, though the offence of causing hurt itself is punishable with 3 years—*Kra Pru Aung*, 3 L.B.R. 30

The words "the Court before whom he is so convicted" occurring in sub-section (1A) should not be read as controlled by the proviso to sub-section (1), so that it is not necessary that the Magistrate passing an order under sub-section (1A) should be a first class Magistrate or a second class Magistrate specially empowered. Therefore an ordinary Magistrate of the second class who has convicted an accused under section 279 I P Code can order his release after due admonition—*Murlidhar v Mahboob Khan*, 47 All 353, 26 Cr.L.J. 624. But the Bombay High Court holds that the proviso to sub-section (1) governs the whole section, and is therefore applicable to sub-section (1A), so that a 3rd class Magistrate is not competent to release an offender after due admonition under sub-section (1A)—*Emp v. Ranchhod*, 27 Bom L.R. 1019, 26 Cr.L.J. 1461, A I R 1925 Bom 479

Distinct conviction must be recorded —Where the charge is in the alternative either of theft or of retaining stolen property, and the Magistrate while convicting the accused does not say of which of those offences he convicts the accused, held that in the absence of a conviction for theft, the Magistrate is not competent to pass an order under this sub-section—*Bhagwant Gansh*, 1 Bom L.R. 857

Sub-section (2) —Under sub-section (2), an appellate Court pass an order releasing the accused on probation of good conduct.

Where the High Court, on an appeal from a conviction and sentence by the Presidency Magistrate, ordered that the accused be released on entering into a bond, but the accused failed to execute the bond, the punishment originally awarded by the Presidency Magistrate would not stand, (because that sentence had been already cancelled by the High Court) but the Presidency Magistrate should treat the accused as a person who was convicted but not sentenced to punishment and is again produced before his Court for the purpose of a suitable punishment being awarded—*In re Badsha*, 21 L.W. 40, 26 Cr.L.J. 683, A.J.R. 1925 Mad 496.

1439. Appeal and revision—An appeal lies from an order under this section releasing a convict on his entering into a bond—*Emp. v. Manohar*, 1904 P.R. 24; *Bahadur v. Ismail*, 29 C.W.N 151, 52 Cal. 463, 26 Cr.L.J. 455. And the appeal may be preferred even after the expiry of the period of the bond—*Hayata v Emp.*, 1917 P.R. 20, 18 Cr.L.J. 401. An appeal will lie to the Sessions judge from an order of a Magistrate of the first class passed under this section in a summary trial—*Emp. v. Hira Lal*, 46 All 828 (see this case cited under sec. 414).

So also, the High Court in revision can set aside the conviction and the order demanding security, even though the convicts have not moved the High Court to exercise that power—*Radha Kishen*, 67 P.L.W. 1912, 13 Cr.L.J. 476, *Chhaju Mal*, 1914 P.L.R. 21. But unless the order passed by the Magistrate under this section is clearly mistaken or injudicious or amounts to a failure of justice, the High Court will not interfere in revision—*Murlidhar v. Mahboob*, 47 All 353, 26 Cr.L.J. 624. Where the Magistrate has passed an order of release after taking into consideration all the relevant circumstances of the case, the High Court will not interfere in revision, unless a strong case has been made out justifying such interference—*Kesho Ram*, 28 Cr.L.J. 255 (256) (Lah.). The High Court is reluctant to interfere with an order of a Magistrate passed under this section in the exercise of his discretionary jurisdiction—*Parlab Narain*, 2 O.W.N 593, 26 Cr.L.J. 1278; *Abdul v Crown*, 1910 P.W.R. 19, 11 Cr.L.J. 389, 6-I.C. 639. In the latter case the High Court refused to interfere, even though the order had been passed in a case to which this section was wholly inapplicable.

It was held under the old law that in setting aside in revision the order under this section the High Court could not substitute in its place a sentence of imprisonment, because no 'sentence' had been passed by the Lower Court (the order under sec. 562 not being a 'sentence'), and the provisions of sec. 439 as to enhancement of sentence did not apply—*Emp. v. Bhasite*, 37 All. 31, 12 A.L.J. 1244, 16 Cr.L.J. 43. If the Appellate or Revisional Court considered that any sentence should be passed upon the accused, it could order a retrial—1911 P.R. 16; 37 All. 31. But the new sub-section (3) now empowers the High Court, in appeal or in revision, to pass sentence on the accused after setting aside the order as to security—*Emp. v. Kesar*, 24 A.L.J. 228, 27 Cr.L.J. 373.

563. (1) If the Court which convicted the offender, or a Court which could have dealt with the offender in respect of his original offence, is satisfied that the offender has failed to observe any of the conditions of his recognizance, it may issue a warrant for his apprehension.

Provision in case of offender failing to observe conditions of his recognizance.

(2) An offender, when apprehended on any such warrant, shall be brought forthwith before the Court issuing the warrant, and such Court may either remand him in custody until the case is heard or admit him to bail with a sufficient surety conditioned on his appearing for sentence. Such Court may, after hearing the case, pass sentence.

564. (1) The Court, before directing the release of an offender under section 562, sub-section (1), shall be satisfied that the offender or his surety (if any) has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place for which the Court acts or in which the offender is likely to live during the period named for the observance of the conditions.

Conditions as to abode of offender.

(2) Nothing in this section or in sections 562 and 563 shall affect the provisions of section 31 of the Reformatory Schools Act, 1897.

The words "sub-section (1)" have been added by the Repealing and Amending Act, VII of 1924 "This is intended to make it clear that section 564 (1) does not relate to the release of an offender under sub-section (1A) of section 562"—*Gazette of India*, 1924, Part V, page 59

Previously convicted offenders.

Order for notifying address of previously convicted offender

565. (1) When any person having been convicted—

(a) by a Court in British India of an offence punishable under section 215, section 489A, section 489B, section 489C, or section 489D, of the Indian Penal Code, or of any offence punishable under Chapter XII or Chapter XVII of that Code,

with imprisonment of either description for a term of three years or upwards, or

- (b) *by a Court or Tribunal in the territories of any Prince or State in India acting under the general or special authority of the Governor General in Council or of any Local Government, of any offence which would, if committed in British India, have been punishable under any of the aforesaid sections or Chapters of the Indian Penal Code with like imprisonment for a like term,*

is again convicted of any offence punishable under any of those sections or Chapters with imprisonment for a term of three years or upwards by a High Court, Court of Session, Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate, Sub-divisional Magistrate, or Magistrate of the first class, * * * such Court or Magistrate may, if it or he thinks fit, at the time of passing sentence of transportation or imprisonment on such person, also order that his residence and any change of or absence from such residence after release be notified as hereinafter provided for a term not exceeding five years from the date of the expiration of such sentence.

(2) If such conviction is set aside on appeal or otherwise, such order shall become void.

(3) The Local Government may make rules to carry out the provisions of this section relating to the notification of residence or change of or absence from residence by released convicts.

(4) An order under this section may also be made by an Appellate Court or by the High Court when exercising its powers of revision.

(5) Any person against whom an order has been made under this section and who refuses or neglects to comply with any rule so made shall be deemed within the meaning of section 176 of the Indian Penal Code to have omitted to give a notice required for the purpose of preventing the commission of an offence.

(6) *Any person charged with a breach of any such rule may be tried by a Magistrate of competent jurisdiction in the district in which the place last notified by him as his place of residence is situated.*

Change:—This section has been almost redrafted by section 158 of the Cr. P. C. Amendment Act XVIII of 1923. The main changes introduced are the following:—"Firstly, it extends the list of offences after a conviction for which a person may be required to notify his residence and subsequent changes of residence; secondly, on the analogy of section 75 of the Penal Code, as amended in 1910, provision has been made for previous conviction before tribunals of Native States which exercise their jurisdiction under the general or special authority of the Government of India or the Local Government, thirdly, all first class Magistrates, in place of those specially empowered, have been authorised to pass orders under this section; fourthly, the rule-making power has been extended to cover the provision of this section relating to the notification of residence, or change of residence, or absence from residence of released convicts, fifthly, the punishment of a breach of the rules made under this section has been enhanced, and lastly, Courts of Appeal or revision have been empowered to pass orders under this section"—*Statement of Objects and Reasons* (1914)

1440. Application of section.—This section applies when the accused has been previously convicted, the passing of an order under this section on a first offender is illegal—8 M.L.T. 352

This section does not apply where either the previous or the subsequent conviction is for an attempt to commit the offence under Chap. XII or XVII of the I. P. C.—*Harnam*, 1907 P.R. 17, 6 Cr.L.J. 378

This section does not apply where the accused, upon the subsequent conviction, is sentenced to whipping—35 Bom. 137. An order under this section can be passed only when the accused is sentenced to transportation or imprisonment

This section does not apply where the subsequent conviction is a technical one. Where a person is found only technically guilty of theft, it is absurd to make his conviction for such a trifling offence the occasion for a long period of Police supervision under this section—*Jawahir*, 4 P.L.R. 1914, 15 Cr.L.J. 183

Where the previous conviction of the accused is set aside on appeal, though on technical grounds, the accused cannot be called an old offender and an order of restriction cannot be passed under this section on a subsequent conviction—*Nga Po v. K. E.*, 3 Rang. 156, 26 Cr.L.J. 1344

Under the old law, this section did not apply where the previous conviction had been in a Native State, even though the law of that State was identical in terms with the Indian Penal Code—*Ghasia Tel.*, 1 N.L.R. 137. But now this section does apply to such a case. See clause (b) which has been newly added

Under the old law, a first class Magistrate could not pass orders under this section unless he was specially authorised by the Local Government to do so—*Crown v. Dino*, 8 S.L.R. 340, 16 Cr.L.J. 469, 29 I.C. 101. Under the present law, all first class Magistrates can pass orders under this section.

Previous conviction need not be specified in charge :—An order under this section is not such punishment as is meant by the words of sec. 221. Therefore the provisions of sec. 221 (7) do not apply to an order under this section, and such an order can be legally passed without the previous conviction on which it is based having been mentioned in the charge. The omission is a mere irregularity cured by sec. 537—*Jhagroo*, ■ N.L.R. 88, 14 Cr.L.J. 390.

1441. Notification of residence :—*Change of residence* :—As long as a man retains his residence in the same place, his temporary absence from home for a day or two does not require notification. Whether he retains his residence must always be a question of fact, but provided a man leaves his family and household effects in the house in which he was residing, he would ordinarily be considered to retain his residence there. Where all that was proved was that the accused was absent from the notified residence for a single night, held that there was nothing to indicate that the residence itself was changed, and it was not necessary that he should notify such temporary absence for a single night—*Naddi Chengadu*, 40 Mad. 789. But under the present law, absence from residence must also be notified.

1442. Power of appellate Court :—Under the old law, it was held that an Appellate Court could not pass an order under this section, where the original Court did not or could not do so—*Crown v. Dino*, ■ S.L.R. 340. But now sub-section (4) gives such power to the Appellate Court and to the High Court in revision.

1443. Punishment :—Under the old law it was held that any person refusing or neglecting to comply with the rules made under sub-section (3) was punishable as if he had committed an offence under the first part (and not second part) of section 176 I. P. C.—*Bhola*, 1 N.L.R. 133; *Husein Beg*, 31 Mad. 548. Under the present sub-section (5) the use of the words "notice required for the prevention of commission of an offence" show that the punishment will henceforth be under the second part of sec. 176 I. P. C. In other words, the present section has enhanced the punishment.

Rules :—For Bengal Rules, see *Cal G. R. & C. O.*, pp. 58–60. For Madras Rules, see *Madras G. O. No. 910*, dated 15th June, 1904; for Bombay Rules, see *Bombay Govt. Gazette*, 1900, Part I, p. 374; for Punjab Rules, see *Punjab Gazette*, 1901 Part I, p. 182; for Burma Rules, see *Burma Gazette*, 1902, Part I, p. 63; for C. P. Rules, see *Central Provinces Gazette*, 1901, Part III, p. 87; for Assam Rules, see *Assam Gazette*, 1902, Part II, pp. 80, 81.

ORDINANCE No. I of 1930.

[19th April, 1930.]

An Ordinance to supplement the ordinary criminal law in Bengal.

Whereas an emergency has arisen which makes it necessary to supplement the ordinary criminal law in Bengal

NOW *THEFORE*, in exercise of the power conferred by section 72 of the Government of India Act, the Governor-General is pleased to make and promulgate the following Ordinance :—

1. (1) This Ordinance may be called the Bengal Criminal Law Short title and extent Amendment Ordinance, 1930

(2) It extends to the whole of Bengal

2 (1) Where, in the opinion of the Local Government, there are reasonable grounds for believing that any person—
Power of Local Government to deal with certain suspects,

(i) has acted, is acting or is about to act in contravention of the provisions of the Indian Arms Act, 1878, or of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, or

(ii) has committed, is committing or is about to commit any offence specified in the First Schedule, or

(iii) has acted, is acting or is about to act with a view to interfere by violence or by threat of violence with the administration of justice;

the Local Government, if it is satisfied that such person is a member, or is being controlled or instigated by a member, of any association of which the objects or methods include the doing of any of such acts or the commission of any of such offences, may, by order in writing, give all or any of the following directions, namely, that such person—

(a) shall notify his residence and any change of residence to such authority as may be specified in the order,

(b) shall report himself to the police in such manner and at such periods as may be so specified;

(c) shall conduct himself in such manner or abstain from such acts as may be so specified,

(d) shall reside or remain in any area so specified,

(e) shall not enter, reside in, or remain in any area so specified,

(f) shall be committed to custody in jail

and may at any time add to, amend, vary or rescind any order made under this section

(2) The Local Government in its order under sub-section (1) may direct—

(a) the arrest without warrant of the person in respect of whom the order is made at any place where he may be found by any police officer or by any officer of Government to whom the order may be directed or endorsed by or under the general or special authority of the Local Government,

(b) the search of any place specified in the order which in the opinion of the Local Government has been, is being, or is

about to be used by such person, for the purpose of doing any act, or committing any offence, of the nature described in sub-section (1).

3. An order made under sub-section (1) of section 2 shall be served on the person in respect of whom it is made in the manner provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, for service of a summons, and upon such service such person shall be deemed to have had due notice thereof.

4. (1) Any officer of Government authorised in this behalf by general or special order of the Local Government may arrest without warrant any person against whom a reasonable suspicion exists that he is a person in respect of whom

an order might lawfully be made under sub-section (1) of section 2

(2) Any officer exercising the power conferred by sub-section (1) may, at the time of making the arrest, search any place and seize any property which is, or is reasonably suspected of being, used by such person for the purpose of doing any act, or committing any offence, of the nature described in sub-section (1) of section 2

(3) Any officer making an arrest under sub-section (1) shall forthwith report the fact to the Local Government, and may, by order in writing, commit any person so arrested to custody pending receipt of the orders of the Local Government, and the Local Government may by general or special order specify the custody to which such person shall be committed

Provided that no person shall be detained in custody under this section for a period exceeding fifteen days save under a special order of the Local Government, and no person shall in any case be detained in custody under this section for a period exceeding one month.

5. (1) The Local Government and every officer of Government to whom any copy of any order made under section 2 has been directed or endorsed by or under the general or special authority of the Local Government may use any and every means necessary to enforce compliance with such order

(2) Any officer exercising any of the powers conferred by section 4 may use any and every means necessary to the full exercise of such powers

6. Whoever, being a person in respect of whom an order has been made under sub-section (1) of section 2, knowingly disobeys any direction in such order, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine

7. (1) Every person in respect of whom an order has been made under sub-section (1) of section 2 shall, if so directed by any officer authorised in this behalf by general or special order of the Local Government,—

(a) permit himself to be photographed,

(b) allow his finger impressions to be taken;

(c) furnish such officer with specimens of his handwriting and signature;

(d) attend at such times and places as such officer may direct for all or any of the foregoing purposes.

(2) If any person fails to comply with or attempts to avoid any direction given in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1), he

shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.

8. The power to issue search warrants conferred by section 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, shall be deemed to include a power to issue warrants authorising the search of any place in which any Magistrate mentioned in that section has reason to believe that any offence specified in the Second Schedule has been, is being, or is about to be committed, and the seizure of anything found therein or thereon which the officer executing the warrant has reason to believe has been, is being, or is intended to be, used for the commission of any such offence; and the provisions of the said Code, so far as they can be made applicable, shall apply to searches made under the authority of any warrant issued under this section, and to the disposal of any property seized in any such search; and an order for search issued by the Local Government under sub-section (2) of section 2 shall be deemed to be a search warrant issued by a Presidency Magistrate or the District Magistrate having jurisdiction in the place specified therein, and may be executed by the person to whom the order is addressed in the manner provided in this section

9. (1) Within one month from the date of an order by the Local Government under sub-section (1) of section 2, the Local Government shall place before two persons, who shall be either Sessions Judges or Additional Sessions Judges having, in either case, exercised for at least five years the powers of a Sessions Judge, or Additional Sessions Judge, the material facts and circumstances in its possession on which the order has been based or which are relevant to the inquiry, together with any such facts and circumstances relating to the case which may have subsequently come into its possession, and a statement of the allegations against the person in respect of whom the order has been made and his answers to them, if furnished by him. The said Judges shall consider the said material facts and circumstances and the allegations and answers and shall report to the Local Government whether or not in their opinion there is lawful and sufficient cause for the order.

(2) On receipt of the said report, the Local Government shall consider the same and shall pass such order thereon as appears to the Government to be just or proper.

(3) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person against whom an order has been made under sub-section (1) of section 2 to attend in person or to appear by pleader in any matter connected with the reference to the said Judges, and the proceedings and report of the said Judges shall be confidential

10. (1) When an order under sub-section (1) of section 2 has been made against a person, the Local Government may at any time, without conditions or upon any conditions which such person accepts, direct the suspension or cancellation of such order

(2) If any condition on which an order has been suspended or cancelled is in the opinion of the Local Government not fulfilled, the Local Government may revoke the suspension or cancellation, and thereupon the person in whose favour such suspension or cancellation was made may, if at large, be arrested by any police officer without warrant, and the order under sub-section (1) of section 2 shall be deemed to be in full force.

about to be used by such person, for the purpose of doing any act, or committing any offence, of the nature described in sub-section (1)

3. An order made under sub-section (1) of section 2 shall be served on the person in respect of whom it is made in the manner provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, for service of a summons, and upon such service such person shall be deemed to have had due notice thereof.

4. (1) Any officer of Government authorised in this behalf by general or special order of the Local Government may arrest without warrant any person against whom a reasonable suspicion exists that he is a person in respect of whom an order might lawfully be made under sub-section (1) of section 2.

(2) Any officer exercising the power conferred by sub-section (1) may, at the time of making the arrest, search any place and seize any property which is, or is reasonably suspected of being, used by such person for the purpose of doing any act, or committing any offence, of the nature described in sub-section (1) of section 2.

(3) Any officer making an arrest under sub-section (1) shall forthwith report the fact to the Local Government, and may, by order in writing, commit any person so arrested to custody pending receipt of the orders of the Local Government, and the Local Government may by general or special order specify the custody to which such person shall be committed.

Provided that no person shall be detained in custody under this section for a period exceeding fifteen days save under a special order of the Local Government, and no person shall in any case be detained in custody under this section for a period exceeding one month.

5. (1) The Local Government and every officer of Government to whom any copy of any order made under section 2 has been directed or endorsed by or under the general or special authority of the Local Government may use any and every means necessary to enforce compliance with such order.

(2) Any officer exercising any of the powers conferred by section 4 may use any and every means necessary to the full exercise of such powers.

6. Whoever, being a person in respect of whom an order has been made under sub-section (1) of section 2, knowingly disobeys any direction in such order, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.

7. (1) Every person in respect of whom an order has been made under sub-section (1) of section 2 shall, if so directed by any officer authorised in this behalf by general or special order of the Local Government,—

(a) permit himself to be photographed,

(b) allow his finger impressions to be taken,

(c) furnish such officer with specimens of his handwriting and signature,

(d) attend at such times and places as such officer may direct for all or any of the foregoing purposes.

(2) If any person fails to comply with or attempts to avoid any direction given in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1), he

shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.

8. The power to issue search warrants conferred by section 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, shall be deemed to include a power to issue warrants authorising the search of any place

Power of Search. which any Magistrate mentioned in that section has reason to believe at any offence specified in the Second Schedule has been, is being, or is about to be committed, and the seizure of anything found therein thereon which the officer executing the warrant has reason to believe as been, is being, or is intended to be, used for the commission of any such offence; and the provisions of the said Code, so far as they can be made applicable, shall apply to searches made under the authority of any warrant issued under this section, and to the disposal of any property seized in any such search, and an order for search issued by the Local Government under sub-section (2) of section 2 shall be deemed to be a search warrant issued by a Presidency Magistrate or the District Magistrate having jurisdiction in the place specified therein, and may be executed by the person to whom the order is addressed in the manner provided in this section

9. (1) Within one month from the date of an order by the Local Government under sub-section (2) of section 2, the Local Government shall place before two persons, who shall be either Sessions Judges or Additional Sessions Judges having, in either case, exercised for at least five years the powers of a Sessions Judge, or Additional Sessions Judge, the material facts and circumstances in its possession on which the order has been based or which are relevant to the inquiry, together with any such facts and circumstances relating to the case which may have subsequently come into its possession, and a statement of the allegations against the person in respect of whom the order has been made and his answers to them, if furnished by him. The said Judges shall consider the said material facts and circumstances and the allegations and answers and shall report to the Local Government whether or not in their opinion there is lawful and sufficient cause for the order

(2) On receipt of the said report, the Local Government shall consider the same and shall pass such order thereon as appears to the Government to be just or proper

(3) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person against whom an order has been made under sub-section (1) of section 2 to attend in person or to appear by pleader in any matter connected with the reference to the said Judges, and the proceedings and report of the said Judges shall be confidential.

10. (1) When an order under sub-section (2) of section 2 has been made against a person, the Local Government may at any time, without conditions or upon any conditions which such person accepts, direct the suspension or cancellation of such order

Power to suspend operation of orders under section 2.

(2) If any condition on which an order has been suspended or cancelled is in the opinion of the Local Government not fulfilled, the Local Government may revoke the suspension or cancellation, and thereupon the person in whose favour such suspension or cancellation was made may, if at large, be arrested by any police officer without warrant, and the order under sub-section (1) of section 2 shall be deemed to be in full force

(3) If the conditions on which such suspension or cancellation has been made include the execution of a bond with or without sureties, the Local Government may at once proceed to recover the penalty of such bond.

(4) A Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class shall in default of payment of such penalty issue, on application made in this behalf by an officer of the Local Government specially empowered, a warrant for the attachment and sale of the moveable property belonging to the defaulter or his estate if he be dead. On the issue of such warrant the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 514 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, shall apply to such recovery.

11. (1) The Local Government shall, by order in writing, appoint such persons as it thinks fit to constitute Visiting Committees. Visiting Committees for the purposes of this Ordinance, and shall by rules prescribe the functions which these Committees shall exercise.

(2) Such rules shall provide for periodical visits to persons under restraint by reason of an order made under sub-section (1) of section 2.

(3) No person in respect of whom any such order has been made requiring him to notify his residence or change of residence or to report himself to the police or to abstain from any specified act, shall be deemed to be under restraint for the purpose of sub-section (2)

12. The Local Government shall make to every person, who is placed under restraint by reason of an order made under sub-section (1) of section 2, a monthly allowance for his support of such amount as is, in the opinion of the Local Government, adequate for the supply of his wants, and shall also make to his family, if any, and to such of his near relatives, if any, as are in the opinion of the Local Government dependent on him for support, an allowance for the supply of their wants suitable in the opinion of the Local Government to their rank in life.

Explanation.—In this section the expression “under restraint” has the same meaning as in section 11.

13. (1) The Local Government may make rules providing for the procedure to be followed regarding the notification of residence and report to the police by persons in respect of whom orders have been made under section 2, and for the place and manner of custody of all persons arrested or committed to or detained in custody under this Ordinance

(2) Such rules shall be published in the *Calcutta Gazette*, and on such publication shall have effect as if enacted in this Ordinance

14. No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under this Ordinance

THE FIRST SCHEDULE.

(See section 2)

(1) Any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code, namely, sections 148, 302, 304, 325, 327, 329, 332,

333, 392, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 431, 435, 436, 437, 438, 440, 457 and 506.

(2) Any attempt or conspiracy to commit, or any abetment of, any of the above offences.

THE SECOND SCHEDULE

(See section 8)

(a) Any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code, namely sections 148, 302, 304, 326, 327, 329, 332, 333, 385, 386, 387, 392, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 431, 435, 436, 437, 438, 440, 454, 455, 457, 458, 459, 506 and 506

(b) Any offence under the Explosive Substances Act, 1908

(c) Any offence under the Indian Arms Act, 1878.

(d) Any attempt or conspiracy to commit, or any abetment of, any of the above offences.

ORDINANCE No. II of 1930.

[27th April, 1930]

An Ordinance to provide for the better control of the Press.

WHEREAS an emergency has arisen which makes it necessary to provide for the better control of the Press;

Now therefore, in exercise of the power conferred by section 72 of the Government of India Act, the Governor General is pleased to make and promulgate the following Ordinance —

1. (1) This Ordinance may be called the Indian Press Ordinance, Short title and extent. 1930.

(2) It extends to the whole of British India, inclusive of British Baluchistan, the Sonthal Parganas and the Pargana of Spiti

2. In this Ordinance, unless there is anything repugnant in the Definitions. subject or context,—

(a) "book" includes every volume, part or division of a volume, pamphlet and leaflet, in any language, and every sheet of music, map, chart or plan separately printed or lithographed

(b) "document" includes also any printing, drawing or photograph or other visible representation

(c) "High Court" means the highest Civil Court of Appeal for any local area except in the case of the province of Coorg where it means the High Court of Judicature at Madras;

(d) "Magistrate" means a District Magistrate or Chief Presidency Magistrate

(e) "newspaper" means any periodical work containing public news or comments on public news and

(f) "printing-press" includes all engines, machinery, types, lithographic stones, implements, utensils and other plant or materials used for the purpose of printing

3. (1) Every person keeping a printing-press who is required to make a declaration under section 4 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, shall, at the time of making the same, deposit with the Magistrate before whom the declaration is made, security to such an amount, not being less than five hundred or more than two thousand rupees, as the Magistrate may in each case think fit to require, in money or the equivalent thereof in securities of the Government of India.

Provided that the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, for special reasons to be recorded by him, dispense with the deposit of any security.

(2) The Magistrate may, at any time, cancel an order dispensing with security and require security to be deposited, and he may, at any time, vary any order fixing the amount of security under this sub-section or under sub-section (1).

(3) Whenever it appears to the Local Government that any printing-press kept in any place in the territories under its administration, in respect of which a declaration was made prior to the commencement of this Ordinance under section 4 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, is used for any of the purposes described in section 4, sub-section (1), the Local Government may, by notice in writing, require the keeper of such press to deposit with the Magistrate within whose jurisdiction the press is situated security to such an amount, not being less than five hundred or more than five thousand rupees, as the Local Government may think fit to require, in money or the equivalent thereof in securities of the Government of India.

4. (1) Whenever it appears to the Local Government that any printing-press in respect of which any security has been deposited as required by section 3 is used for the purpose of printing or publishing any newspaper, book or other document containing any words, signs or visible representations which are likely or may have a tendency, directly or indirectly, whether by inference, suggestion, allusion, metaphor, implication or otherwise—

(a) to incite to murder or to any offence under the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, or to any act of violence, or

(b) to seduce any officer, soldier, sailor or airman in the Army, Navy or Air Force of His Majesty or any police officer from his allegiance or his duty, or

(c) to bring into hatred or contempt His Majesty or the Government established by law in British India or the administration of justice in British India or any Indian Prince or Chief under the suzerainty of His Majesty, or any class or section of His Majesty's subjects in British India, or to excite disaffection towards His Majesty or the said Government or any such Prince or Chief, or

(d) to put any person in fear or to cause annoyance to him and thereby induce him to deliver to any person any property or valuable security, or to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which he is legally entitled to do, or

(e) to encourage or incite any person to interfere with the administration of the law or with the maintenance of law and order, or to commit any offence, or to refuse or defer payment of any land-revenue, tax, rate, cess or other due

or amount payable to Government or to any local authority, or any rent of agricultural land or anything recoverable as arrears of or along with such rent, or

(f) to induce a public servant or a servant of a local authority to do any act or to forbear or delay to do any act connected with the exercise of his public functions or to resign his office, or

(g) to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of His Majesty's subjects, or

(h) to prejudice the recruiting of persons to serve in any of His Majesty's forces, or in any police force, or to prejudice the training, discipline or administration of any such force,

the Local Government may, by notice in writing to the keeper of such printing-press, stating or describing the words, signs or visible representations which in its opinion are of the nature described above, declare the security deposited in respect of such press and all copies of such newspaper, book or other document wherever found in British India to be forfeited to His Majesty

Explanation I—In clause (c) the expression "disaffection" includes disloyalty and all feelings of enmity.

Explanation II.—Comments expressing disapproval of the measures of the Government or of any such Indian Prince or Chief as aforesaid with a view to obtain their alteration by lawful means, or of the administrative or other action of the Government or of any such Indian Prince or Chief or of the administration of justice in British India without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection do not come within the scope of clause (c)

(2) After the expiry of ten days from the date of the issue of a notice under sub-section (1), the declaration made in respect of such press under section 4 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, shall be deemed to be annulled

5. Where the security given in respect of any press has been declared forfeited under section 4, every

Deposit of further security. person making a fresh declaration in respect of such press under section 4 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, shall deposit with the Magistrate before whom such declaration is made security to such amount, not being less than one thousand or more than ten thousand rupees, as the Magistrate may think fit to require, in money or the equivalent thereof in securities of the Government of India.

6. If after such further security has been deposited the printing-

Power to declare further security, printing-press and publications forfeited press is again used for the purpose of printing or publishing any newspaper, book or other document containing any words, signs or visible representations which, in the opinion of the Local Government, are of the nature described in section 4, sub-section (1), the Local Government may, by notice in writing to the keeper of such printing-press, stating or describing such words, signs or visible representations, declare—

(a) the further security so deposited,

(b) the printing-press used for the purpose of printing or publishing such newspaper, book or other document or found in or upon the premises where such newspaper, book or other document is, or at the time of printing the matter complained of was, printed, and

(c) all copies of such newspaper, book or other document wherever found in British India to be forfeited to His Majesty.

7. (i) Where any printing-press is, or any copies of any newspaper, book or other document are, declared forfeited to His Majesty under this Ordinance, the Local Government may direct a Magistrate to issue a warrant empowering any police-officer, not below the rank of a Sub-Inspector, to seize and detain any property ordered to be forfeited and to enter upon and search for such property in any premises—

(i) where any such property may be or may be reasonably suspected to be, or

(ii) where any copy of such newspaper, book or other document is kept for sale, distribution, publication or public exhibition or reasonably suspected to be so kept.

(2) Every warrant issued under this section shall, so far as relates to a search, be executed in manner provided for the execution of search-warrants under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.

8. (1) Every publisher of a newspaper who is required to make a declaration under section 5 of the Press

and Registration of Books Act, 1867, shall, at the time of making the same, deposit with the Magistrate before whom the declaration is made security to such an amount, not being less than five hundred or more than two thousand rupees, as the Magistrate may in each case think fit to require, in money or the equivalent thereof in securities of the Government of India :

Provided that the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, for special reasons to be recorded by him, dispense with the deposit of any security

(2) The Magistrate may, at any time, cancel an order dispensing with security and require security to be deposited, and he may, at any time vary any order fixing the amount of security under this sub-section or under sub-section (1).

(3) Whenever it appears to the Local Government that a newspaper published within its territories, in respect of which a declaration was made by the publisher thereof prior to the commencement of this Ordinance under section 5 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, contains any words, signs or visible representations of the nature described in section 4, sub-section (1), the Local Government may, by notice in writing, require the publisher to deposit with the Magistrate, within whose jurisdiction the newspaper is published, security to such an amount, not being less than five hundred or more than five thousand rupees, as the Local Government may think fit to require, in money or the equivalent thereof in securities of the Government of India

9. (1) If any newspaper in respect of which any security has been deposited as required by section 8 contains

any words, signs or visible representations, which in the opinion of the Local Government, are of the nature described in section 4, sub-section (1), the Local Government may, by notice in writing to the publisher of such newspaper, stating or describing such words, signs or visible representations, declare such security and all copies of such newspaper, wherever found in British India, to be forfeited to His Majesty.

(2) After the expiry of ten days from the date of the issue of a notice under sub-section (1), the declaration made by the publisher of such newspaper under section 5 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, shall be deemed to be annulled.

10. Where the security given in respect of any newspaper is declared forfeited, any person making a fresh declaration under section 5 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, as publisher of such newspaper, or any other newspaper which is the same in substance as the said newspaper, shall deposit with the Magistrate before whom the declaration is made, security to such amount, not being less than one thousand or more than ten thousand rupees, as the Magistrate may think fit to require, in money or the equivalent thereof in securities of the Government of India.

11. If, after such further security has been deposited, the newspaper again contains any words, signs or visible representations which, in the opinion of the Local Government, are of the nature described in section 4, sub-section (1), the Local Government may, by notice in writing to the publisher of such newspaper, stating or describing such words, signs or visible representations, declare—

(a) the further security so deposited, and

(b) all copies of such newspaper wherever found in British India, to be forfeited to His Majesty

12. (1) Where any newspaper, book or other document wherever printed appears to the Local Government to contain any words, signs or visible representations of the nature described in section 4, sub-section (1), the Local Government may, by notification in the local official Gazette, stating the grounds of its opinion, declare every copy of the issue of the newspaper, and every copy of such book or other document to be forfeited to His Majesty, and thereupon any police-officer may seize the same wherever found in British India, and any Magistrate may by warrant authorise any police-officer not below the rank of Sub-Inspector to enter upon and search for the same in any premises where any copy of such issue or any such book or other document may be or may be reasonably suspected to be.

(2) Every warrant issued under this section shall, so far as relates to a search, be executed in manner provided for the execution of search-warrants under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898

13. The Chief Customs-officer or other officer authorized by the Local Government in this behalf may detain any package brought, whether by land, sea or air, into British India which he suspects to contain any newspapers, books or other documents of the nature described in section 4, sub-section (1), and shall forthwith forward copies of any newspapers, books or other documents found therein to such officer as the Local Government may appoint in this behalf to be disposed of in such manner as the Local Government may direct.

14. No newspaper printed and published in British India shall be transmitted by post unless the printer and publisher have made a declaration under section 5 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, and the publisher has deposited security when so required under this Ordinance.

Power to detain articles being transmitted by post.

15. Any officer in charge of a post-office or authorized by the Post-Master General in this behalf may detain any article other than a letter or parcel in course of transmission by post, which he suspects to contain—

(a) any newspaper, book or other document containing words, signs or visible representations of the nature described in section 4, sub-section (1), or

(b) any newspaper in respect of which the declaration required by section 5 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, has not been made, or the security required by this Ordinance has not been deposited by the publisher thereof, and shall deliver all such articles to such officer as the Local Government may appoint in this behalf to be disposed of in such manner as the Local Government may direct.

Application to High Court to set aside order of forfeiture.

16. Any person having an interest in any property in respect of which an order of forfeiture has been made under section 4, 6, 9, 11 or 12 may, within two months from the date of such order, apply to the High Court for the local area in which such order was made, to set aside

such order on the ground that the newspaper, book or other document in respect of which the order was made did not contain any words, signs or visible representations of the nature described in section 4, sub-section (1).

Hearing by Special Bench.

17. Every such application shall be heard and determined by a Special Bench of the High Court composed of three Judges, or, where the High Court consists of less than three Judges, of all the Judges.

Order of Special Bench setting aside forfeiture.

18. (1) If it appears to the Special Bench that the words, signs or visible representations contained in the newspaper, book or other document in respect of which the order in question was made were not of the nature described in section 4, sub-section (1), the Special Bench shall set aside the order of forfeiture

(2) Where there is a difference of opinion among the Judges forming the Special Bench, the decision shall be in accordance with the opinion of the majority (if any) of those Judges.

(3) Where there is no such majority which concurs in setting aside the order in question, such order shall stand.

Evidence to prove nature of tendency of newspapers.

19. On the hearing of any such application with reference to any newspaper, any copy of such newspaper published after the commencement of this Ordinance may be given in evidence in aid of the proof of the nature or tendency of the words, signs or visible representations contained in such newspaper, in respect of which the order of forfeiture was made.

Procedure in High Court.

20. Every High Court shall, as soon as may be, frame rules for the conduct of business in the case of appeals and orders passed thereon, and until such rules are framed the practice of such Court in proceedings other than suits and appeals shall apply, so far as may be practicable, to such applications.

21. Every declaration of forfeiture purporting to be made under this Ordinance shall, as against all persons, be conclusive evidence that the forfeiture therein referred to has taken place, and no proceeding purporting to be taken under this Ordinance shall be called in question by any Court, except the High Court on such application as aforesaid, and no civil or criminal proceeding, except as provided by this Ordinance, shall be instituted against any person for anything done or in good faith intended to be done under this Ordinance.

22. (1) Whoever keeps in his possession a press for the printing of books or papers without making a deposit under section 3 or section 5, when required so to do, shall on conviction by a Magistrate be liable to the penalty to which he would be liable if he had failed to make the declaration prescribed by section 4 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867.

Penalty for keeping press or publishing newspaper without making deposit

(2) Whoever publishes any newspaper without making a deposit under section 8 or section 10, when required so to do, or publishes such newspaper knowing that such security has not been deposited, shall, on conviction by a Magistrate, be liable to the penalty to which he would be liable if he had failed to make the declaration prescribed by section 5 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867.

23. (1) Where a deposit is required from the keeper of a printing-press under sub-section (1) or sub-section (3) of section 3 or under section 5, such press shall not be used for the printing or publishing of any newspaper, book or other document until the deposit has been made.

Power to declare printing-press forfeited if used before deposit is made

(2) Where any printing-press is used in contravention of sub-section (1), the Local Government may, by notice in writing to the keeper thereof, declare the press so used and any other printing-press found in or upon the premises where such press was so used, to be forfeited to His Majesty; and the provisions of section 7 shall apply.

24. Where any person has deposited any security under this Ordinance and ceases to keep the press in respect of which such security was deposited, or, being a publisher, makes a declaration under section 8 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, he may apply to the Magistrate within whose jurisdiction such press is situate for the return of the said security, and thereupon such security shall, upon proof to the satisfaction of the Magistrate and subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, be returned to such person.

Return of deposited security in certain cases

25. Every notice under this Ordinance shall be sent to a Magistrate, who shall cause it to be served in the manner provided for the service of summonses under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.

Service of notices

26. Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to prevent any person from being prosecuted under any other law for any act or omission which constitutes an offence against this Ordinance.

Operation of other laws not barred.

27. So long as this Ordinance remains in force, all declarations required to be made under section 4, section 5, section 8 and section 8A of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, shall be made, in a Presidency town before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, and elsewhere before the District Magistrate.

Power to detain articles being transmitted by post.

15. Any officer in charge of a post-office or authorized by the Post-Master General in this behalf may detain any article other than a letter or parcel in course of transmission by post, which he suspects to contain—

(a) any newspaper, book or other document containing words, signs or visible representations of the nature described in section 4, sub-section (1), or

(b) any newspaper in respect of which the declaration required by section 5 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, has not been made, or the security required by this Ordinance has not been deposited by the publisher thereof,

and shall deliver all such articles to such officer as the Local Government may appoint in this behalf to be disposed of in such manner as the Local Government may direct.

16. Any person having an interest in any property in respect of

Application to High Court to set aside order of forfeiture,

which an order of forfeiture has been made under section 4, 6, 9, 11 or 12 may, within two months from the date of such order, apply to the High Court for the local area in which such order was made, to set aside

such order on the ground that the newspaper, book or other document in respect of which the order was made did not contain any words, signs or visible representations of the nature described in section 4, sub-section (1)

17. Every such application shall be heard and determined by a

Hearing by Special Bench

Special Bench of the High Court composed of three Judges, or, where the High Court consists of less than three Judges, of all the Judges

18. (1) If it appears to the Special Bench that the words, signs

Order of Special Bench setting aside forfeiture

or visible representations contained in the newspaper, book or other document in respect of which the order in question was made were not of the nature described in section 4, sub-section (1), the Special Bench shall set aside the order of forfeiture

(2) Where there is a difference of opinion among the Judges forming the Special Bench, the decision shall be in accordance with the opinion of the majority (if any) of those Judges.

(3) Where there is no such majority which concurs in setting aside the order in question, such order shall stand.

19. On the hearing of any such application with reference to any

Evidence to prove nature of tendency of newspapers

newspaper, any copy of such newspaper published after the commencement of this Ordinance may be given in evidence in aid of the proof of the nature or tendency of the words, signs or visible representations contained in such newspaper, in respect of which the order of forfeiture was made

20. Every High Court shall, as soon as conveniently may be, frame

Procedure in High Court.

rules to regulate the procedure in the case of such applications, the amount of the costs thereof and the execution of orders passed

thereon, and until such rules are framed the practice of such Court in proceedings other than suits and appeals shall apply, so far as may be practicable, to such applications.

ORDINANCE No. V of 1930.

[30th May, 1930.]

An Ordinance to provide against certain forms of intimidation.

WHEREAS an emergency has arisen which makes it necessary to provide against certain forms of intimidation,

Now therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 72 of the Government of India Act, the Governor General is pleased to make and promulgate the following Ordinance —

- Short title and extent 1. (1) This Ordinance may be called the Prevention of Intimidation Ordinance, 1930.
(2) It shall extend only to such provinces as the Governor General in Council may, by notification in the Gazette of India, specify.

CHAPTER I

Molestation

2. This Chapter shall have effect in specified areas in any province, or throughout a province, as the Local Government may, by notification in the local official Gazette, direct
- Application of Chapter I

3. For the purposes of this Chapter, a person is said to molest another person who, with a view to cause such other person to abstain from doing or to do any act which such other person has a right to do or to abstain from doing, obstructs or uses violence to or intimidates such other person or anyone in whom such person is interested, or loiters at or near a house where such person or anyone in whom such person is interested resides or works or carries on business or happens to be, or persistently follows him from place to place, or interferes with any property owned or used by him or deprives him of or hinders him in the use thereof
- Definition of "molestation."

4. Whoever molests or abets the molestation of any person shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.
- Punishment for molestation

5. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, an offence punishable under section 4 shall be cognisable and non-bailable, and no Magistrate shall take cognisance of any such offence except upon a report in writing of facts which constitute such offence made by a police-officer
- Special rules of procedure

CHAPTER II

Boycotting

6. This Chapter shall have effect in specified areas in a province, or throughout a province, as the Local Government may, by notification in the local official Gazette, direct
- Application of Chapter II

7. For the purposes of this Chapter,—

(a) a person is said to "boycott" another person who refuses to deal or do business with, or to supply goods to, or to let a house or land to, or to render any customary service to such person or any person in whom such person is interested,

Definition of "boycotting."

or refuses to do so on the terms on which such things would be done in the ordinary course, or abstains from such professional or business relations as he would ordinarily maintain with such person, and

(b) a "public servant" includes a public servant as defined in section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, and a servant of a local authority, and a person belonging to any class of persons which the

Definition of "public servant"

Local Government may, by notification in the local official Gazette, declare to be public servants for the purposes of this Chapter.

Punishment for boycotting of a public servant.

8. Whoever boycotts or abets the boycotting of a public servant, or threatens a public servant with boycotting, shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both;

Provided that no person shall be convicted under this section if the Court is satisfied that his acts were not intended to prejudice the public servant boycotted, or proposed or threatened to be boycotted, in the discharge of the duties of his office, or to cause such public servant to terminate or withhold his services in the discharge of such duties, or to commit a breach of discipline

9. (1) An offence punishable under section 8 shall be non-cognisable, and, notwithstanding anything contained in the Second Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, a case relating to such an offence shall, for the purposes of

Special rules of procedure.

section 204 of the said Code, be deemed to be one in which a warrant should issue in the first instance

(2) Where information is given to the officer in charge of a police-station of the commission within the limits of such station of an offence punishable under section 8, he shall deal with it in the manner provided in section 154 of the said Code, and, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of section 155 of the said Code, he shall investigate the case as if he had received an order from a competent Magistrate under sub-section (2) of that section.

CHAPTER III.

Supplemental.

10. No Magistrate other than a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class shall take cognisance of or try any offence under this Ordinance.

Jurisdiction

11. The Local Government may, by notification in the local official Gazette, declare that any offence punishable under section 183 of the Indian Penal Code, or any offence of criminal intimidation, when committed in any area specified in the notification, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, be cognisable and non-bailable, and

Power to declare certain non-cognisable and bailable offences to be cognisable and non-bailable

thereupon the said Code shall, while such notification remains in force, be deemed to be amended accordingly.

VICEROY'S STATEMENT

From the beginning of the civil disobedience movement it has been part of the programme of the Congress to use for various purposes the methods of picketing in order to make their will prevail. At the recent meeting of the Working Committee of the All-India Congress Committee held at Allahabad, resolutions were passed which urged the adoption of such methods on more intensive lines. The information received by my Government makes it plain that activities of this kind are now being pursued in various places in such a manner as gravely to interfere with the liberty of individuals in many directions.

2 The most common object with which picketing and other kinds of molestation and intimidation are being employed is for the purpose of preventing the sale of foreign goods or of liquor. It is no part of the duty of my Government, and certainly it is not their desire, to take steps against any legitimate movements directed to these ends. They are anxious to see the promotion of indigenous Indian Industries, and it is perfectly legitimate for any person, in advocacy of this object, to urge the use of Indian goods to the utmost extent of which Indian industry is capable. Nor have I anything but respect for those who preach the cause of temperance.

But what is not legitimate is for those who desire these ends, proper as they are in themselves, to pursue them by means amounting in effect to intimidation of individuals, and to endeavour to force their views on others, not by argument but by the coercive effect of fear. When resort is had to such methods, it becomes necessary for Government to protect the natural freedom of action of those who may wish to sell and those who may wish to buy.

3. Unscrupulous efforts are also being made by the organisers of the civil disobedience movement to bring pressure to bear on Government servants to resign their posts or fail in their duty. The methods employed include, not only various forms of molestation and intimidation, but also definite attempts to use the weapon of boycott against Government servants. Thus it is found that in different parts of the country, not only are the residences of Government servants picketed and they themselves and their relatives subjected to threats of injury to life or property, but organised attempts are made to refuse them necessary supplies, the use of transport and the tenancy of houses. These methods have reached their maximum intensity in Gujerat, but they are also being practised in other parts of the country.

4 In normal circumstances when intimidation is a comparatively rare offence the ordinary law suffices. But when, as now, intimidation in its various forms is carefully organised and constitutes an important part of the programme of a movement designed to paralyse the Government and to coerce the public, it is necessary to see that powers should be adequate to deal rapidly and effectively with a menace to the public liberty. I have accordingly thought it essential to promulgate an Ordinance which is designed to protect the public in general against molestation and intimidation and to check the boycott of Government servants. These powers will not be used to impede or interfere with the legitimate promotion of any economic movement which has for its object the furtherance of indigenous enterprise, nor will they be exercised in regard to any genuine labour dispute. The Ordinance is directed only to those movements which are being organised by the Government servants' movement. It will be withdrawn as soon as the Government servants' Ordinance, moreover, has been so drafted as to be applied only where the powers are

actually required. It will not be applied to any province in which the local Government has not satisfied my Government that the activities of the civil disobedience movement has rendered its application necessary. Further, within a province, the powers to deal with molestation or with the boycott of Government servants will come into force only in those areas in which the local Government considers that the situation necessitates their application. But where the situation so demands, I have no doubt that it is my duty to empower local Governments to give protection to those who merely desire to carry on their lawful business and pursuits without let or hindrance, and to safeguard public servants, as far as may be, against the attempt to deprive them by means of boycott of the ordinary requirements of daily life.

(Gazette of India, Extraordinary, May 30, 1930)

ORDINANCE No. VI of 1930.

[30th May, 1930]

An Ordinance to provide against instigation to the refusal of the payment of certain liabilities.

WHEREAS an emergency has arisen which makes it necessary to provide against instigation to the illegal refusal of the payment of certain liabilities;

Now therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 72 of the Government of India Act, the Governor General is pleased to make and promulgate the following Ordinance:—

1. (1) This Ordinance may be called the Short title and extent. Unlawful Instigation Ordinance, 1930.
(2) It extends to the whole of British India, including British Baluchistan and the Sonthal Parganas.

2. (1) The Governor General in Council may, by notification in the Gazette of India, empower any Local Government to make declarations under sub-sections (2) and (3).
(2) A Local Government empowered in this behalf may, by notification in the local official Gazette, declare that any part of the province or the whole province shall be a notified area for the purposes of this Ordinance.

(3) Such Local Government may further, by the same or by subsequent notification, declare that in such notified area, land-revenue or any sum recoverable as arrears of land-revenue, or any tax, rate, cess or other due or amount payable to Government or to any local authority, or rent of agricultural land, or anything recoverable as arrears of or along with such rent, shall be a notified liability.

3. Whoever, by words either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations, or otherwise, instigates, expressly or impliedly, any class of persons to the refusal of any payment of any

and whoever that any words,

t to be likely such instiga-

tion shall thereby be communicated directly or indirectly to any person or class of persons in a notified area, in any manner whatsoever, shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.

Special rules of procedure. 4. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, an offence punishable under this Ordinance shall be cognisable and non-bailable.

(2) No Magistrate shall take cognisance of any offence punishable under this Ordinance except upon a report in writing of facts which constitute such offence made by a police-officer not below the rank of sub-inspector.

5. (1) Where—

Power to declare certain publications forfeited and to issue search warrants for the same

(a) any newspaper or book as defined in the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, or

(b) any document,

wherever made, appears to the Local Government to contain any matter the publication of which is punishable under section 3, the Local Government; the grounds newspaper con- er document e-officer may

seize the same, wherever found in British India, and any Magistrate may by warrant authorise any police-officer not below the rank of sub-inspector to enter upon and search for the same in any premises where any copy of such issue or any such book or other document may be or may be reasonably suspected to be

(2) In sub-section (1) "document" includes also any painting, drawing or photograph, or other visible representation.

(3) An order of forfeiture under sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be an order of forfeiture under section 99A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and sections 99B, 99C, 99D, 99E, 99F and 99G shall apply thereto, with such modifications as may be required to adapt them to the provisions of this Ordinance.

VICEROY'S STATEMENT

At the meeting of the Working Committee of the All-India Congress Committee held recently at Allahabad a resolution was passed to the effect that the time had arrived for the inauguration of a no-tax campaign by non-payment of specified taxes in certain provinces. Previous to the passing of this resolution a movement for the refusal of the payment of land revenue had been started in certain districts of Gujerat in the Bombay Presidency, and attempts had been made in several other provinces to persuade revenue and tax payers to withhold the payment of their liabilities. The decision above referred to clearly contemplates a wide extension of the civil disobedience movement in the shape of an appeal to the masses which must if successful involve grave reactions upon the administration and the stability of the State.

2 The taxes against which the movement is at present aimed are sources of provincial revenue, and their non-payment would deprive Local Governments of a considerable part of the resources on which they depend for the efficient conduct of the reserved and transferred departments. Were the programme of the Congress to meet with any appreciable measure of success, its first result would be to deprive the people of the advantage of the beneficent activities in which Local Governments are

engaged. It is clear, however, that no Government can tolerate the non-payment of its dues and that the Local Governments confronted with a challenge of this nature, must exercise to the full the powers of realisation with which they are by law invested. The consequences will inevitably be suffering and distress to those who respond to the incitements of the Congress. Thus, both in the interests of the State and of the persons whom it is the design of the Congress to lead astray it is necessary to stop in its initial stages a movement so fraught with dangerous consequences.

3 While the law gives powers to proceed against persons who refuse to discharge their public liabilities, it does not include provisions by which effective action can be taken against those who for political purposes, mislead and instigate others to their undoing. Having regard to these considerations and to the necessity of firm and prompt action against a movement, the object of which is to bring the administration to a standstill, I have deemed it necessary to promulgate an Ordinance, by which Local Governments may, as the necessity is established, be invested with powers to deal effectively with persons who instigate others to withhold the payment of certain lawful dues. I have thought it proper to include within the purview of the Ordinance certain liabilities (for instance, the rent of agricultural land) which although not included in the dues which form the present announced object of attack by the Congress, have been mentioned by them from time to time as coming within the scope of the civil disobedience movement and would indeed in many parts of the country form the inevitable object of attack if any movement were initiated to withhold payment of revenue to Government.

4 The powers taken under the Ordinance will not be used by Local Governments to modify their revenue policy or to attenuate in any way the concessions by way of suspensions remissions or otherwise which it is their practice to grant. Nor will the Ordinance be used indirectly to give assistance to landlords in the normal process of realization of rent or to facilitate enhancement of rent. It will be confined strictly to its declared purpose, namely, to prevent instigation in pursuance of a political movement to refuse payments lawfully due. I trust that in taking measures to check at the outset a movement which is intended to disorganise the administration and which must, if successful, damage the whole economic structure of society, I shall have the support of all those who desire to resist a plain threat to orderly progress and stable government.

(Gazette of India, Extraordinary, May 30, 1930)

ORDINANCE No. VII of 1930.

[2nd July, 1930.]

An Ordinance to provide for the control of unauthorised news-sheets and newspapers.

WHEREAS an emergency has arisen which makes it necessary to provide for the control of unauthorised news-sheets and newspapers,

Now therefore, in exercise of the power conferred by section 72 of the Government of India Act, the Governor General is pleased to make and promulgate the following Ordinance :—

Short title, extent and duration. 1. (1) This Ordinance may be called the Unauthorised News-sheets and Newspapers Ordinance, 1930

(2) It extends to the whole of British India, inclusive of British Baluchistan, the Southal Parganas and the Pargana of Spiti.

(3) It shall remain in force so long as the Indian Press Ordinance, II of 1930, remains in force

Definitions.

2. In this Ordinance, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,—

(a) "newspaper" means any periodical work containing public news or comments on public news;

(b) "news-sheet" means any non-periodical document containing public news or comments on public news or any matter described in sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Indian Press Ordinance, II of 1930,

(c) "press" includes a printing-press and all machines, implements and plant and parts thereof and all materials used for multiplying documents;

(d) "unauthorised newspaper" means—

(i) any newspaper in respect of which there are not for the time being valid declarations under section 5 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, and

(ii) any newspaper in respect of which security has been required under the Indian Press Ordinance, II of 1930, but has not been furnished,

(e) "unauthorised news-sheet" means any news-sheet other than a news-sheet published by a person authorised under section 3 to publish it,

(f) "undeclared press" means any press other than a press in respect of which there is for the time being a valid declaration under section 4 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, and

(g) "document" and "printing-press" have the meanings assigned to them in the Indian Press Ordinance, 1930

3. (1) The Chief Presidency Magistrate or the District Magistrate may, by order in writing, authorise any person by name to publish a news-sheet, or to publish news-sheets from time to time

(2) A copy of an order under sub-section (1) shall be furnished to the person thereby authorised

(3) The Chief Presidency Magistrate or District Magistrate may at any time revoke an order made by him under sub-section (1)

Power to seize and destroy unauthorised news sheets and newspapers. 4. (1) Any police-officer may seize any unauthorised news-sheet or unauthorised newspaper, wherever found

(2) Any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate, Sub-divisional Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class may by warrant authorise any police-officer not below the rank of Sub-Inspector to enter upon and search any place where any stock of unauthorised news-sheets or unauthorised newspapers may be or may be reasonably suspected to be, and such police-officer may seize any documents found in such place which, in his opinion, are unauthorised news-sheets or unauthorised newspapers

(3) All documents seized under sub-section (1) shall be produced as soon as may be before a Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate, Sub-divisional Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class, and all documents seized under sub-section (2) shall be produced as soon as may be before the Court of the Magistrate who issued the warrant

(4) If, in the opinion of such Magistrate or Court, any of such documents are unauthorised news-sheets or unauthorised newspapers, the Magistrate or Court may cause them to be destroyed. If, in the opinion of such Magistrate or Court, any of such documents are not unauthorised news-sheets or unauthorised newspapers, such Magistrate or Court shall dispose of them in the manner provided in sections 523, 524 and 525 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.

5. (1) Where a Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-divisional Magistrate has reason to believe that an unauthorised news-sheet or unauthorised newspaper is being produced from an undeclared press within the limits of his jurisdiction, he may by warrant authorise any police-officer not below the rank of Sub-Inspector to enter upon and search any place wherein such undeclared press may be or may be reasonably suspected to be, and if, in the opinion of such police-officer, any press found in such place is an undeclared press and is used to produce an unauthorised news-sheet or unauthorised newspaper, he may seize such press and any documents found in the place which in his opinion are unauthorised news-sheets or unauthorised newspapers.

(2) The police-officer shall make a report of the search to the Court which issued the warrant and shall produce before such Court, as soon as may be, all property seized:

Provided that where any press which has been seized cannot be readily removed, the police-officer may produce before the Court only such parts thereof as he may think fit.

(3) If such Court, after such inquiry as it may deem requisite, is of opinion that a press seized under this section is an undeclared press which is used to produce an unauthorised news-sheet or unauthorised newspaper, it may, by order in writing, declare the press to be forfeited to His Majesty. If, after such inquiry, the Court is not of such opinion, it shall dispose of the press in the manner provided in sections 523, 524 and 525 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.

(4) The Court shall deal with documents produced before it under this section in the manner provided in sub-section (4) of section 4

6. Every warrant issued under this Ordinance shall, so far as it relates to a search, be executed in the manner provided for the execution of search-warrants under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.

7. Every declaration of forfe-

Jurisdiction barred.

to be taken under this Ordinance Court, and no civil or criminal any person for anything done or this Ordinance.

SCHEDULES.

SCHEDULE I

ENACTMENTS REPEALED.

(Repealed by the Amending and Repealing Act X of 1914)

Offences under the following Secs of the I P C. may be tried by any Magistrate —140, 143, 144, 145, 147, 151, 153, 160, 170, 171, 172, 174, 277, 278, 279, 285, 286, 289, 290, 291-A, 323, 334, 336, 341, 352, 356, 357, 358, 374, 379, 380, 403, 426, 447, 448, 451, 504, 510

Offences under the following Secs I P C. may be tried by First or Seco

155, 156, 157, 158, 1
185, 186, 187, 188, 1
260, 261, 262, 264, 2
282, 283, 284, 287, 2
339, 342, 343, 353, 3
418, 419, 421, 422, 423, 424, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 434, 451, 452, 453, 454, 456, 457, 461, 462, 482, 483, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 508.

Offences under the following Secs of the I P C. to be tried by First class Magistrates only —124-A, 129, 133, 148, 152, 153-A, 161, 162, 163, 164, 167, 168, 169, 171-A, 171-B, 171-C, 171-D, 171-E, 171-F, 171-G

181, 193,
213 A, 21
240, 242,
318, 320,
392, 393,
485, 494, *

Offences under the following sections of the I P C. exclusively triable by
128, 130, 131, 132, 134, 1
226, 231, 232, 234, 235, (if
302 to 304, 305 to 308,
370, 376, 386 to 391, 395 to
400, 406, 467, 471 (partl.
511 (partly)

Offences under the following Secs of the I P C. to be tried as warrant cases —115—116, 144—148, 152, 153, 153 A, 159, 161—170, 177, 181, 189—201, 203—227, 229—267, 270, 281, 293—333, 373, 378, 342—348, 353—357, 363—424, 427—440, 448—489, 493—509, 511

Offences under the following Secs I P C. to be tried as summons cases:—137—143, 151, 153—158, 160, 171—180, 182—188, 202, 225-B, 228, 263 A, 269, 271—280, 282—294 A, 334, 336, 347, 341, 352, 358, 426, 447, 490—492, 510

Offences under the following Secs. I P C. are to be tried as warrant cases, sometimes as summons cases —153, 177, 225

Offences under the following Secs I P C. are punishable with fine only —137, 151, 153, 156, 171-G, 171 H, 171 I, 263 A, 278, 282, 290, 294 A partly

SCHEDULE II.

TABULAR STATEMENT OF OFFENCES.

EXPLANATORY NOTE.—The entries in the second and seventh columns of the schedule, headed respectively "Offences" and "Punishment under the Indian Penal Code," are not intended as definitions of the offences and punishments described in the several corresponding sections of the Indian Penal Code, or even as abstracts of those sections, but merely as references to the subject of the section, the number of which is given in the first column.

The third column of this schedule applies also to the Police in the towns of Calcutta and Bombay.

ABBREVIATIONS.—Cog = cognizable (may arrest without warrant) ; Not Cog. = not cognizable (shall not arrest without warrant) ; Not B = not bailable ; Com. = compoundable ; Not Com = not compoundable ; Imp = imprisonment ; C. I. = of either description ; S. I. = simple imprisonment ; Ses = session ; P. Mag. = Presidency Magistrate ; Mag. = Magistrate ; Ct. = Court ; Dt. M. = Dist Magistrate ; C. P. M. = Chief Presidency Magistrate.]

CHAPTER V.—ABETMENT.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Section.	Offence.	Cog. or not.	Warrant or summons.	Bailable or not.	Com. or not.	Punishment under the I.P.C.	By what Ct. triable.
109	Abetment of any offence, if the act abetted is committed in consequence, and where no express provision is made for its punishment.	Cog if the offence is cog.	As in the offence abetted.	As in the offence abetted.	As in the offence abetted.	Same punishment as for the offence abetted.	The Ct. by which the offence abetted is triable.

110 Abetment of any offence, if the person abetted does the act with a different intention from that of the abettor.	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do
111 Abetment of any offence when one act is abetted and a different act is done; subject to the proviso	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do
112 Abetment of any offence, when an effect is caused by the act abetted different from that intended by the abettor.	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do
114 Abetment of any offence, if abettor is present when offence is committed.	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do
115 Abetment of an offence punishable with death or transportation for life, if the offence be not committed in consequence of the abetment	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do
If an act which causes him to be alone in consequence of the abetment.	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do
116 Abetment of an offence, punishable with imprisonment, if the offence be not committed in consequence of the abetment.	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do

Section.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
		Offence	Cog or not.	Warrant or summons.	Bailable or not.	Com. or not.	Punishment under the I. P. C.	By what Ct. triable.
		If the abettor or the person abetted be a public servant whose duty it is to prevent the offence.	Cog. if the offence abetted is cog	As in the offence abetted	As in the offence abetted.	As in the offence abetted.	$\frac{1}{2}$ Imp of the longest term provided for the offence, or fine, or both.	The Ct. by which the offence abetted is triable.
117		Abetting the commission of an offence by the public, or by more than ten persons.	Do. ...	Do. .	Do.	Do. .	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, or fine, or both.	Do.
118		Concealing a design to commit an offence punishable with death or transportation for life, if the offence be committed.	Do. .	Do. .	Not B. ..	Do. ..	Imp. e. d. for 7 years and fine	Do.
		If the offence be not committed.	Do. ..	Do. ..	Bailable	Do. ..	Imp. e. d. for 3 years and fine	Do.
119		A public servant concealing a design to commit an offence which it is his duty to prevent, if the offence be committed.	Do. ..	Do. ..	As in the offence abetted.	Do	$\frac{1}{2}$ Imp. of the longest term provided for the offence, or fine, or both.	Do.
		If the offence be punishable with death or transportation for life.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Not B. ..	Do. .	Imp e. d. for 10 years.	Do.

If the offence be not committed. Do ... Do. Do.

Imp. of the longest term provided for the offence, or fine, or both.

Do

Imp. of the longest term provided for the offence, or fine, or both.

As in the offence concealed. As in the offence concealed.

126 Concealing a design to commit an offence punishable with imprisonment, if the offence be committed. Cog. if the offence concealed is cog.

Do

Imp. of the longest term provided for the offence or fine, or both.

Do

Bailable

Do

If the offence be not committed. Do

CHAPTER V.A—OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY

Ct. of Ses., when the offence which is the object of the conspiracy is triable exclusively by such Ct. ; in all other cases, Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class

Same punishment as for the abetment of the offence which is the object of the conspiracy.

Not. com.

As in the offence which is the object of the conspiracy. As in the offence which is the object of the conspiracy.

Cog. if the offence which is the object of the conspiracy is cog.

127 Criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, transportation, or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards

P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.

Imp e d. for six months, or fine, or both.

Do

Bailable

Not Cog.

Any other criminal conspiracy.

CHAPTER VI.—OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE

4

7

Section.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Offence.	Cog or not.	Warrant or summons	Bailable or not.	Com or not.	Punishment under the I. P. C.	By what Ct. triable.	
121	Waging or attempting to wage war, or abetting the waging of war against the Queen.	Not Cog	Warrant	Not B.	Not Com.	Death, or transportation for life, and <i>fine</i> .	Ct of Ses.	
121-A	Conspiring to commit certain offences against the State.	Do	Do	Do	Do	Trans for life or any shorter term, or Imp e. d. for 10 years, and <i>fine</i> .	Do	
122	Collecting arms, etc., with the intention of waging war against the Queen.	Do	Do	Do	Do	Trans for life, or imp e. d. for 10 years, and <i>fine</i> .	Do.	
123	Concealing with intent to facilitate a design to wage war.	Do	Do	Do	Do	Imp. e. d. for 10 years and <i>fine</i>	Do	
124	Assaulting Governor-General, Governor, etc., with intent to compel or restrain the exercise of any lawful power.	Do	Do	Do	Do	Imp. e. d. for 7 years and <i>fine</i> .	Do.	
124-A	Sedition	Do	Do	Do	Do	Trans. for life or for any term and <i>fine</i> , or Imp. e. d. for 3 years and <i>fine</i> , or <i>fine</i>	Ct. of Ses., C. P. M., or Dt. M., or Mag. 1st class specially empowered.	

Section	Offence.	3	4	5	6	7	8
		Cog. or not	warrant or summons	Bailable or not.	Com. or not.	Punishment under the I. P. C.	By what Ct. triable
132	Abetment of mutiny, if mutiny is committed in consequence thereof	Cog.	Warrant	Not B...	Not Com.	Death, or term for life, or imp. e. d. for 10 years, and fine.	Ct. of Sess.
133	Abetment of an assault by an officer, soldier, sailor or airman on his superior officer, when in the execution of his office.	Do ...	Do ..	Do ...	Do ..	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, and fine.	Ct. of Sess., 1 st Mag., or Mag. 1st class
134	Abetment of such assault, if the assault is committed.	Do ..	Do ..	Do ..	Do, ...	Imp. e. d. for 7 years, and fine.	Ct. of Sess.
135	Abetment of the desertion of an officer, soldier, sailor or airman.	Do ..	Do ..	Bailable	Do, ..	Imp. e. d. for 2 years, or fine, or both.	Ct. of Sess., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class
136	Harbouring such an officer, soldier, sailor or airman who has deserted.	Do, ..	Do, ..	Do ..	Do ...	Do, do	Do
137	Deserter concealed on board merchant-vessel, through negligence of master or person in charge thereof	Not Cog	Summons	Do, ...	Do, ...	Fine of 500 rupees.	Do.

138	Abetment of act of insult or indignation by an officer, soldier, sailor or airman if the offence be committed in consequence.	Cog.	Warrant	Do.	Do.	Imp. e d. for 6 months, or fine, or both.	Do.
140	Wearing the dress or carrying any token used by a soldier, sailor or airman, with intent that it may be believed that he is such a soldier, sailor or airman.	Do.	Summons	Do.	Do.	Imp. e d. for 3 months, or fine of 500 rupees, or both.	Any Mag
CHAPTER VIII—OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILITY							
143	Being member of an unlawful assembly.	Cog.	Summons	Bailable	Not Com	Imp e d. for 6 months, or fine or both.	Any Mag.
144	Joining an unlawful assembly armed with any deadly weapon	Do.	Warrant	Do	Do	Imp. e d. for 2 years, or fine, or both.	Do.
145	Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly, knowing that it has been commanded to disperse	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do	Do.	Do.
147	Rioting	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
148	Rioting armed with a deadly weapon	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Imp. e d. for 3 years, or fine, or both.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag. or Mag. 1st class.
149	If an offence be committed by any member of an unlawful assembly, every other member of such assembly shall be guilty of the offence	Cog. if the offence is	As in the offence.	As in the offence.	Do.	Same as for the offence	Ct. by which the offence is triable.

Section.

	Offence	Cog. or not.	Warrant or summons.	Bailable or not	Com. or not.	Punishment under the I. P. C.	By what Ct triable.
150	Hiring, engaging or employing persons to take part in an unlawful assembly.	Cog.	According to the offence committed by the persons hired, etc	As in the offence.	Not Com.	The same as for being a member of such assembly, and for any offence committed by any member of such assembly.	Ct. by which the offence is triable.
151	Knowingly joining or continuing in any assembly of five or more persons after it has been commanded to disperse.	Do.	Summons	Bailable	Do.	Imp. e. d. for 6 months, or fine, or both	Any Mag
152	Assaulting or obstructing public servant when suppressing riot, etc	Do.	Warrant	Do.	Do.	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, or fine, or both.	Ct. of Sess., P. Mag. or Mag. Ist class
153	Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot, if rioting be committed. If not committed	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Imp. e. d. for 1 year, or fine, or both.	Any Mag
153A	Promoting enmity between classes.	Not Cog.	Warrant	Not B.	Do.	Imp. e. d. for 6 months, or fine, or both	Do.
					Do.	Imp. e. d. for 2 years, or fine, or both.	P. Mag. or Mag Ist class

	Do	Summons	Bailable	Do	Fine of 1,000 rupees	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
154 Owner or occupier of land not giving information of riot, etc	Do	Do	Bailable	Do	—	Do
155 Person for whose benefit or on whose behalf a riot takes place not using all lawful means to prevent it	Do	Do	Do	Do	Fine	Do
156 Agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed not using all lawful means to prevent it.	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do
157 Harbours persons hired for an unlawful assembly	Cog	Do	Do	Do	Imp. e. d. for 6 months, or fine, or both.	Do
158 Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly or riot	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do
Or to go armed	Do	Warrant	Do	Do	Imp e. d. for 2 years, or fine, or both.	Do
159 Committing affray	Not Cog	Summons	Do	Do	Imp e. d. for 1 month, or fine of 100 rupees, or both.	Any Mag.

CHAPTER IX.—OFFENCES BY OR RELATING TO PUBLIC SERVANTS

	Not Cog	Summons	Bailable	Not Com.	Imp. e. d. for 2 years, or fine, or both	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.
161 Being or expecting to be a public servant, and taking a gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act.						

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Offence	Cog. or not.	Warrant or summons.	Bailable or not	Com. or not.	Punishment under the L. P. C.	By what Ct. triable.
162	Taking a gratification in order by corrupt or illegal means to influence a public servant.	Not. Cog.	Summons.	Bailable	Not. Com.	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, or fine, or both.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.
163	Taking a gratification for the exercise of personal influence with a public servant.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Simple imp. for 1 year, or fine, or both.	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.
164	Abetment by public servant of the offences defined in the last two preceding clauses with reference to himself	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, or fine, or both.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.
165	Public servant obtaining any valuable thing, without consideration, from a person concerned in any proceeding or business transacted by such public servant.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Simple imp. for 2 years, or fine, or both	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
166	Public servant disobeying a direction of the law with intent to cause injury to any person.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Simple imp. for 1 year, or fine, or both.	Do.
167	Public servant framing an incorrect document with intent to cause injury.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, or fine, or both.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.

168 Public servant unlawfully engaging in trade.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Simple imp. for 1 year, or fine, or both	P. Mag. or Mag. 1st class.
169 Public servant unlawfully buying or bidding for property.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Simple imp. for 2 years, or fine, or both, and confiscation of property purchased.	Do.
170 Personating a public servant.	Cog.	Warrant	Do.	Do.	Imp. e. d. for 2 years, or fine, or both.	Any Mag.
171 Wearing garb or carrying token used by public servant with fraudulent intent.	Do.	Summons	Do.	Do.	Imp. e. d. for 3 months, or fine of 200 rupees, or both.	Do.

CHAPTER IX A.—OFFENCES RELATING TO ELECTIONS.

171 E Bribery	Not Cog.	Summons	Bailable	Not Com.	Imp. e. d. for one year, or fine, or both.	P. Mag. or Mag. of the 1st class
171 F Undue influence and persuasion at an election.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
171 G False statement in connection with an election.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Fine	Do.
171 H Illegal payments in connection with elections.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Fine of 500 rupees	Do.
171 J Failure to keep election accounts.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do	Do.

CHAPTER X.—CONTEMPTS OF THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC SERVANTS.

172 Abusing to avoid service of summons or other proceedings from a public servant.	Not Cog.	Summons	Bailable	Not Com.	S. I. for 1 month, or fine of 300 rupees, or both.	Any Mag
173 Summons or notice require attendance in person, etc., in a Court of Justice	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	S. I. for 6 months, or fine of 1,000 rupees, or both	Do.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Offence.	Cog. or not.	Warrant or summons	Bailable or not.	Com. or not.	Punishment under the I. P. C.	By what Ct. triable.
173	Preventing the service or the affixing of any summons or notice, or the removal of it when it has been affixed, or preventing a proclamation. If summons, etc., require attendance in person, etc., in a Ct. of Justice.	Not Cog	Summons	Bailable	Not Com	S. I. for 1 month, or fine of 500 rupees, or both.	In Mag. or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
		Do. "	Do.	Do.	Do.	S. I. for 6 months, or fine of 1,000 rupees, or both.	Do.
174	Not obeying a legal order to attend at a certain place in person or by agent, or departing therefrom without authority. If the order require personal attendance, etc., in a Ct. of Justice.	Do	Do	Do	Do.	S. I. for 1 month, or fine of 500 rupees, or both.	Any Mag.
		Do	Do.	Do	Do.	S. I. for 6 months, or fine of 1,000 rupees, or both.	Do.
175	Intentionally omitting to produce a document to a public servant by a person legally bound to produce or deliver such document.	Do	Do	Do.	Do.	S. I. for 1 month, or fine of 500 rupees, or both.	The Ct. in which the offence is committed, subject to the provisions of Ch. XXV; or, if not committed in a Ct., a P. Mag., or Mag. of the 1st or 2nd class.

If the document is required to be produced in all delated to, a Ct. of Justice.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	S. I. for 6 months, or fine of 1,000 rupees, or both	Do.
	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	S. I. for 1 month, or fine of 500 rupees, or both.	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
176 Intentionally omitting to give notice or information to a public servant by person legally bound to give such notice or information.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	S. I. for 6 months, or fine of 1,000 rupees, or both.	Do.
If the notice or information required respects the commission of an offence, etc.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
177 Knowingly furnishing false information to a public servant	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Imp. ed for 2 years, or fine, or both	Do.
If the information required respects the commission of an offence, etc	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	S. I. for 6 months, or fine of 1,000 rupees, or both.	The Ct in which the offence is committed, subject to the provisions of Ch. XXV; or if not committed in a Ct., a P. Mag. or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
178 Refusing oath when duly required to take oath by a public servant	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
179 Being legally bound to state truth, and refusing to answer questions.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
180 Refusing to sign a statement made to a public servant when legally required to do so.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	S. I. for 3 months, or fine of 500 rupees, or both.	Do.

Offences.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Offences.	Cog. or not.	Warrant or summons.	Returnable or not.	Com or not.	Punishment under the I. P. C.	By what Ct. triable.
181	Knowingly stating to a public servant on oath a true fact which is false.	Not Cog.	Warrant	Returnable	Not Com.	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, and fine	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.
182	Giving false information to a public servant in order to cause him to use his lawful power to the injury or annoyance of any person.	Do.	Summons	Do.	Do.	Imp. e. d. for 6 months, or fine of 1,000 rupees, or both.	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
183	Resistance to the taking of property by the lawful authority of a public servant.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
184	Obstructing sale of property offered for sale by authority of a public servant.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Imp. e. d. for 1 month, or fine of 500 rupees, or both	Do.
185	Bidding, by a person under a legal incapacity to purchase it, for property at a lawfully authorized sale, or bidding without intending to perform the obligations incurred thereby.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Imp. e. d. for 1 month, or fine of 200 rupees, or both.	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.

156 Obstructing public servant in the discharge of his public functions	Do	..	Do.	..	Do.	...	Do.	..	Imp. e. d. for 3 months, or fine of 500 rupees, or both.	Do.
157 Omission to assist public servant when bound by law to give such assistance.	Do	Do	Do	..	Do.	..	Do.	...	S. I. for 1 month, or fine of 200 rupees, or both.	Do.
Willfully neglecting to aid a public servant who demands aid in the execution of process, the prevention of offences, &c	Do	Do	Do	..	Do	..	Do.	...	S. I. for 6 months, or fine of 500 rupees, or both.	Do.
158 Disobedience to an order lawfully promulgated by a public servant, if such disobedience causes obstruction, annoyance or injury to persons lawfully employed.	Do	Do	Do	...	Do	...	Do.	..	S. I. for 1 month, or fine of 200 rupees, or both.	Do
If such disobedience causes danger to human life, health or safety, &c.	Do	Do	Do	...	Do.	..	Do.	...	Imp. e. d. for 6 months, or fine of 1,000 rupees, or both.	Do
159 Threatening a public servant with injury to him or one in whom he is interested, to induce him to do or forbear to do any official act.	Do	Do	Do	...	Do	...	Do	..	Imp. e. d. for 2 years, or fine, or both.	Do
160 Threatening any person to induce him to refrain from making a legal application for protection from injury.	Do	Do	Do	...	Do.	...	Do.	...	Imp. e. d. for 1 year, or fine, or both.	Do

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Section	Offence	Cog. or not.	Warrant or summons	Bailable or not.	Com. or not.	Punishment under the L. P. C.	By what Ct. triable.
CHAPTER XI.—FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE.							
103	Giving or fabricating false evidence in a judicial proceeding.	Not Cog	Warrant.	Bailable	Not Com.	Imp. r. d for 7 years and fine	Ct. of Ses. P. Mag. or Mag. 1st class
	Giving or fabricating false evidence in any other case.	Do. ...	Do. ..	Do.	Do. ..	Imp. e. d for 3 years and fine	Do.
104	Giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to cause any person to be convicted of a capital offence. If innocent person be thereby convicted and executed.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Not B	Do. ..	Transportation for life or rigorous imp. for 10 years and fine.	Ct. of Ses.
		Do. ...	Do. ..	Do. .	Do. ..	Death or as above ...	Do.
105	Giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure conviction of an offence punishable with transportation for life or with imprisonment for seven years or upwards.	Do. ..	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do.	The same as for the offence.	Do.
106	Using in a judicial proceeding evidence known to be false or fabricated.	Do. ...	Do. ...	As in the offence of giving each evidence.	Do. ...	Same as for giving or fabricating false evidence.	Ct. of Ses. P. Mag. or Mag. 1st class.

197	Knowingly issuing* or signing a false certificate relating to any fact of which such certificate is by law admissible in evidence.	Do	Do	Bailable	Do	...	Same as for giving false evidence.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.
198	Using as a true certificate one known to be false in a material point.	Do.	Do.	Do	Do	...	Do	Do.
199	False statement made in any declaration which is by law receivable in evidence.	Do	Do.	Do.	Do	...	Do.	Do.
200	Using as true any such declaration known to be false.	Do	...	Do	Do	...	Do.	Do.
201	Causing disappearance of evidence of an offence committed, or giving false information touching it to screen the offender, if a capital offence. If punishable with transportation for life or imprisonment for 10 years. If punishable with less than 10 years, imprisonment.	Do	...	Do	Do	...	Imp e d for 7 years, and fine.	Ct of Ses.
		Do	Do	Do	Do	...	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, and fine.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.
		Do	Do	Do	Do	...	Imp. of the longest term, provided for the offence, or fine or both	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st Class, or Ct. by which the offence is triable
202	Intentional omission to give information of an offence by a person legally bound to inform.	Do	...	Summons	Do	...	Imp. = d. for 6 months or fine, or both	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Section.	Offence.	Cog. or not.	Warrant or summons.	Bailable or not.	Com or not.	Punishment under the I. P. C.	By what Ct. triable.
203	Giving false information respecting an offence committed.	Not. Cog.	Warrant	Pailable	Not. Com.	Imp. e. d. for 2 years, or fine, or both.	P. Mag. or Mag. 1st or 2nd Class.
204	Secrecing or destroying any document to prevent its production as evidence.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. do	P. Mag. or Mag. 1st class.
205	False personation for the purpose of any act or proceeding in a suit or criminal prosecution, or for becoming bail or security.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, or fine, or both.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag. or Mag. 1st class.
206	Fraudulent removal or concealment, etc., of property to prevent its seizure as a forfeiture, or in satisfaction of a fine under sentence, or in execution of a decree.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Imp. e. d. for 2 years, or fine, or both.	P. Mag. or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
207	Claiming property without right, or practising deception touching any right to it, to prevent its being taken as a forfeiture, or in satisfaction of a fine under sentence, or in execution of a decree.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. do	Do.

208 Fraudulently suffering a decree to pass for sum not due or suffering decrees to be executed after it has been satisfied.	Do .	Do .	Do .	Do .	Do .	Do .	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.
209 False claim in a Court of Justice.	Do	Do .	Do .	Do .	Do .	Imp. e. d. for 2 years, and fine.	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st Class.
210 Fraudulently obtaining a decree for a sum not due, or causing a decree to be executed after it has been satisfied.	Do	Do .	Do .	Do .	Do .	Imp. e. d. for 2 years, or fine or both.	Do.
211 False charge of offence made with intent to injure	Do	Do .	Do .	Do .	Do .	Do .	Do.
If offence charged be punishable with imprisonment for 7 years or upwards.	Do .	Do .	Do .	Do .	Do .	Imp. e. d. for 7 years, and fine	Ct. of Ses. P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.
If offence charged be capital or punishable with transportation for life,	Do	Do .	Do .	Do .	Do .	Do .	Ct. of Ses.
212 Harbours an offender, if the offence be capital.	Cog .	Do .	Do .	Do .	Do .	Imp. e. d. for 5 years, and fine.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag. or Mag. 1st class.
If punishable with transportation for life, or with imprisonment for 10 years.	Do.	Do .	Do .	Do .	Do .	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, and fine.	Do.
If punishable with imprisonment for 1 year and not for 10 years	Do.	Do .	Do .	Do .	Do .	1 Imp of the longest term provided for the offence, or fine, or both.	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class, or Ct. by which the offence is triable.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Section.	Offence.	Cog. or not.	Warrant or summons.	Ballable or not.	Com or not.	Punishment under the I P. C.	By what Ct. triable.
213	Taking gift, &c, to screen an offender from punishment, if the offence be capital.	Cog.	Warrant	Ballable	Not Com.	Imp e. d. for 7 years, and fine.	Ct. of Ses
	If punishable with transportation for life, or with imprisonment for 10 years.	Do	Do	Do	Do	Imp e. d. for 3 years, and fine.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.
	If with imprisonment for less than 10 years	Do	Do	Do	Do	½ Imp. of the longest term provided for the offence, or fine or both.	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class, or Ct. by which the offence is triable
214	Offering gift or restoration of property in consideration of screening offender if the offence be capital.	Not Cog	Do	Do	Do	Imp e. d. for 7 years, and fine.	Ct. of Ses.
	If punishable with transportation for life, or with imprisonment for 10 years.	Do	Do	Do	Do	Imp e. d. for 3 years, and fine.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.
	If with imprisonment for less than 10 years.	Do	Do	Do	Do	½ Imp. of the longest term, provided for the offence, or fine or both	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class, or Ct. by which the offence is triable.

215	Taking gift to help to ro- cover moveable property of which a person has been deprived by an offence, without causing apprehension of offender	Cog	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Imp. e. d. for 2 years, or fine, or both.	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.
216	Harboursing an offender who has escaped from custody, or whose appre- hension has been ordered, if the offence be capital	Cog	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Imp. e. d. for 7 years, and fine	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.
217	If punishable with trans- portation for life, or with imprisonment for 10 years.	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, with or without fine.	Do.
218A	If with imprisonment for 1 year, and not for 10 years	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Imp. of the longest term provided for the offence, or fine, or both.	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class, or Ct. by which the of- fence is triable.
218A	Harbouring robbers or dacoits.	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	R. L. for 7 years and fine.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class
217	Public servant disobeying a direction of law with intent to save person from punishment, or pro- perty from forfeiture.	Not Cog	Summons	Do	Do	Do	Do	Imp. e. d. for 2 years, or fine, or both.	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
218	Public servant framing an incorrect record or writing with intent to save person from punishment, or pro- perty from forfeiture.	Do	Warrant	Do	Do	Do	Do	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, or fine, or both.	Ct. of Ses.

Section.	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Offence.	Cog or not.	Warrant or summons.	Bailable or not.	Com. or not.	Punishment under the I. P. C.	By what Ct. triable.
219 Public servant in a judicial proceeding corruptly making and pronouncing an order, report, verdict or decision which he knows to be contrary to law.		Not Cog.	Warrant	Bailable	Not Com.	Imp. e. d. for 7 years, or fine, or both.	Ct. of Ses.
220 Commitment for trial or confinement by a person having authority, who knows that he is acting contrary to law.		Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do.
221 Intentional omission to apprehend on the part of a public servant bound by law to apprehend an offender, if the offence be capital		Do	Do	Do	Do	Imp e. d. for 7 years, with or without fine.	Do
If punishable with transportation for life, or imprisonment for 10 years		Do	Do	Do	Do	Imp. e. d. for 11 years, with or without fine.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.
If with imprisonment for less than 10 years.		Do	Do	Do	Do	Imp. e. d. for 2 years, with or without fine.	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.

222	Intentional omission to apprehend on the part of a public servant bound by law to apprehend a person under sentence of a Court of Justice, if under sentence of death	Do	Do	Not B. . .	Do.	Trans. for life, or imp. e d. for 14 years with or without fine.	Ct. of Ses.
	If under sentence of transportation or penal servitude for life, or transportation, imprisonment or penal servitude for 10 years or upwards.	Do.	Do	Do	Do.	Imp. e d. for 7 years, with or without fine.	Do
	If under sentence of imprisonment for less than 10 years or lawfully committed to custody	Do	Do	Detainable	Do	Imp. e d. for 3 years, or fine, or both	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.
223	Escape from confinement negligently suffered by a public servant	Do.	Summons	Do	Do.	S 1 for 2 years or fine, or both.	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
224	Resistance or obstruction by a person to his lawful apprehension.	Cog	Warrant	Do	Do.	Imp. e d. for 3 years, or fine, or both	Do
225	Resistance or obstruction to the lawful apprehension of another person, or rescuing him from lawful custody.	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do	Do
	If charged with an offence punishable with transportation for life or imprisonment for 10 years.	Do	Do	Not B. . .	Do.	Imp. e d. for 11 years, and fine.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.
	If charged with a capital offence	Do	Do	Do	Do.	Imp. e d. for 7 years, and fine.	Ct. of Ses.

277 Violation of condition of remission of a punishment	Not Cog.	Summons	Do. ...	Do. ..	Punishment of original sentence, or if part of the punishment has been undergone, the residue.	The Ct. by which the original offence was triable.
278 Intentional insult or interruption to a public servant sitting in any stage of judicial proceeding	Do. "	Do. ...	Bailable	Do	S. I. for 6 months, or fine of 1,000 rupees, or both.	Ct. in which offence is committed, subject to provisions of Ch. XXXV.
279 Imprisonment of a juror or assessor.	Do	Do. .	Do	Do. ..	Imp. e d for 2 years, or fine, or both.	P. Mag. or Mag. 1st class.

CHAPTER XII.—OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT STAMPS.

280 Counterfeiting, or performing any part of the process of counterfeiting coin	Cog	Warrant	Not B.	Not Com.	Imp. e d for 7 years, and fine	Ct. of Ses.
281 Counterfeiting or performing any part of the process of counterfeiting the Queen's coin.	Do	Do	Do .	Do ..	Trans for life, or imp e. d. for 10 years, and fine.	Do
282 Making, buying or selling instrument for the purpose of counterfeiting coin	Do	Do.	Do ...	Do ...	Imp e d. for 3 years, and fine.	Ct of Ses, P. Mag. or Mag. 1st class.
283 Making, buying or selling instrument for the purpose of counterfeiting Queen's coin.	Do	Do .	Do.	Do. ...	Imp. e d. for 7 years, and fine.	Ct of Ses.
284 Possession of instrument or material for the purpose of using the same for counterfeiting coin.	Do	Do .	Do.	Do. ...	Imp. e d for 3 years, and fine	Ct. of Ses, P. Mag. or Mag. 1st class.
If Queen's coin.	Do .	Do. ..	Do.	Do. ...	Imp e d for 10 years, and fine.	Ct of Ses

3

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2

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Section.

Offence.

Cog. or not

Warrant or summons.

Bailable or not.

Com. or not.

Punishment under the I. P. C.

By what Ct. triable.

236 Abetting in British India the counterfeiting out of British India of coin

Ct. of Ses.

The punishment provided for abetting the counterfeiting of such coin within British India.

Ct. of Ses, P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.

237 Import or export of counterfeit coin, knowing the same to be counterfeit.

Ct. of Ses.

Trans. for life, or Imp. e d. for 10 years, and fine.

238 Import or export of counterfeit of the Queen's coin, knowing the same to be counterfeit.

Ct. of Ses, P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.

239 Having any counterfeit coin known to be such when it came into possession and delivering, etc., the same to any person.

Do.

Imp e d. for 10 years, and fine.

240 The same with respect to the Queen's coin

P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class

Imp e d. for 2 years, or fine of 10 times the value of the coin counterfeited, or both.

241 Knowingly delivering to another any counterfeit coin as genuine which when first possessed, the deliverer did not know to be counterfeit.

242	Possession of counterfeit coin by a person who knew it to be counterfeit when he became possessed thereof.	Do	..	Do.	..	Do	..	Imp. e. d. for 3 years and fine.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag. or Mag. 1st class.
243	Possession of Queen's coin by a person who knew it to be counterfeit when he became possessed thereof.	Do	..	Do.	..	Do	..	Imp e. d. for 7 years, and fine.	Do.
244	Person employed in a Mint causing coin to be of a different weight or composition from that fixed by law.	Do	..	Do.	..	Do	..	Do.	Ct or Ses.
245	Unlawfully taking from a Mint any coining instrument.	Do.	..	Do.	..	Do	..	Do.	Do.
246	Fraudulently diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin.	Do.	..	Do.	..	Do	..	Imp e. d. for 3 years, and fine.	Ct of Ses., P. Mag. or Mag. 1st class.
247	Fraudulently diminishing the weight or altering the composition of the Queen's coin.	Do.	..	Do.	..	Do	..	Imp. e. d for 7 years, and fine.	Do
248	Altering appearance of any coin with intent that it shall pass as a coin of a different description.	Do.	..	Do.	..	Do.	..	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, and fine.	Do.
249	Altering appearance of the Queen's coin with intent that it shall pass as a coin of a different description.	Do.	..	Do.	..	Do	..	Imp. e. d. for 7 years, and fine.	Do.

Section.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
		Offence.	Cog. or not.	Warrant or summons.	Bailable or not.	Com. or not.	Punishment under the I. P. C.	By what Ct. triable.
250		Delivery to another of coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered.	Cog. ..	Warrant	Not B. ..	Not Com.	Imp. e. d. for 5 years, and fine.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag., 1st class.
251		Delivery of Queen's coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered.	Do ..	Do ...	Do ..	Do ..	Imp. e. d. for 10 years, and fine.	Do.
252		Possession of altered coin by a person who knew it to be altered when he became possessed thereof.	Do .	Do.	Do ..	Do ..	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, and fine.	Do.
253		Possession of Queen's coin by a person who knew it to be altered when he became possessed thereof.	Do	Do	Do ..	Do ..	Imp. e. d. for 5 years, and fine.	Do.
254		Delivery to another of coin as genuine which, when first possessed, the deliverer did not know to be altered	Do. .	Do ...	Do .	Do. ...	Imp. e. d. for 2 years, or fine of ten times the value of the coin.	P. Mag., or Mag., 1st or 2nd class.
255		Counterfeiting a Government stamp	Do. ..	Do.	Do .	Do. ...	Trans. for life, or imp. e. d. for 10 years, and fine.	Ct. of Ses.
256		Having possession of an instrument or material for the purpose of counterfeiting a Government stamp.	Do ..	Do. ...	Do ...	Do. ...	Imp. e. d. for 7 years, and fine.	Do.

257 Making, buying or selling instrument for the purpose of counterfeiting a Government stamp.	Do.	...	Do.	...	Do.	...	Do.	...	Do.
258 Sale of counterfeit Government stamp.	Do.	...	Do.	...	Do.	...	Do.	...	Do.
259 Having possession of a counterfeit Government stamp.	Do.	.	Do.	...	Do.	.	Do.	.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag. or Mag. 1st class.
260 Using as genuine a Government stamp known to be counterfeit.	Do.	.	Do.	.	Do.	.	Imp. e. d. for 7 years, or fine, or both.	.	Do.
261 Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a Government stamp, or removing from a document a stamp used for it with intent to cause loss to Government.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	...	Do.	...	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, or fine or both.	Do.
262 Using a Government stamp known to have been before used.	Do.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	...	Imp. e. d. for 2 years, or fine, or both.	.	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
263 Signature of mark denoting that stamp has been used.	Do.	...	Do.	.	Do.	...	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, or fine, or both.	.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag. or Mag. 1st class.
263A Fictitious stamps.	Do.	...	Do.	...	Do.	...	Fine of 200 rupees.	.	P. Mag. or Mag. 1st class.

CHAPTER XIII.—OFFENCES RELATING TO WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

264 Fraudulent use of false instrument for weighing.	Not Cog.	Summons	Bailable	Not com.	Imp. e. d. for 1 for year, or fine, or both.	.	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or second class.
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205	Fraudulent use of false weights or measures.	Not Cog.	Summons	Bailable	Not Com.	Imp. e. d. for one year, or fine, or both.	P. Mag. or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
206	Being in possession of false weights or measures for fraudulent use.	Do ...	Do.	Do.	Do. ...	Do.	Do.
207	Making or selling false weights or measures for fraudulent use.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do. ...	Do.	Do.

CHAPTER XIV—OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY, CONVENIENCE, DECENTY AND MORALS.

260	Negligently doing any act known to be likely to spread infection of any disease dangerous to life.	Cog.	Summons	Bailable	Not Com.	Imp. e. d. for 6 months, or fine, or both.	P. Mag. or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
270	Malignantly doing any act known to be likely to spread infection of any disease dangerous to life.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Imp. e. d. for 2 years, or fine, or both.	Do.
271	Knowingly disobeying any quarantine rule.	Not Cog.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Imp. e. d. for 6 months, or fine, or both.	Do.
272	Adulterating food or drink intended for sale, so as to make the same noxious.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Imp. e. d. for 6 months, or fine of 1000 rupees, or both.	P. Mag. or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.

273	Selling any food or drink as food or drink, knowing the same to be noxious.	Do	..	Do	...	Do	do	...	Do
274	Adulterating any drug or medical preparation intended for sale so as to lessen its efficacy, or to change its operation, or to make it noxious.	Do	.	Do.	.	Do.	Do
275	Offering for sale or issuing from a dispensary any drug or medical preparation known to have been adulterated.	Do	.	Do	..	Do.	...	do	Do.
276	Knowingly selling or issuing from dispensary any drug as medical preparation as a different drug or medical preparation.	Do	Do	..	Do	.	Do.	do	Do.
277	Defiling the water of a public spring or reservoir.	Cog	..	Do.	.	Do.	...	Imp. e. d. for 3 months, or fine of 500 rupees, or both.	Any Mag.
278	Making atmosphere noxious to health.	Not Cog.	Do.	Do.	...	Do.	...	Fine of 500 rupees,	Do.
279	Driving or riding on a public way so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life or his own life etc.	Cog.	Do	.	Do	...	Do.	Imp. e. d. for 6 months, or fine of 1,000 rupees, or both.	Do.
280	Navigating any vessel so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life etc.	Do	Do	...	Do.	...	Do.	do	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
281	Exhibition of a false light, mark or buoy.	Do.	Warrant	Do	Do	...	Do	Imp. e. d. for 7 years, or fine, or both.	Ct. of Ses.

Section.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
		Offence.	Cog. or not.	Warrant or summons.	Bailable or not.	Com. or not.	Punishment under the I. P. C.	By what Ct. triable.
282	Conveying for hire any person by water, in a vessel in such a state, or so loaded, as to endanger his life.		Cog. ...	Summons	Bailable	Not Com.	Imp. s. d for 6 months, or fine of 1,000 rupees, or both	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
283	Causing danger, obstruction or injury in any public way or line of navigation		Do. ..	Do	Do. .	Do .	Fine of 200 rupees	Do.
284	Dealing with any poisonous substance so as to endanger human life etc		Not Cog	Do	Do.	Do.	Imp. s. d for 6 months, or fine of 1,000 rupees or both.	Do.
285	Dealing with fire or any combustible matter so as to endanger human life, etc.		Cog .	Do	Do. .	Do	Do do .	Any Mag
286	So dealing with any explosive substance.		Do.	Do	Do.	Do. ..	Do. do.	Do.
287	So dealing with any machinery.		Not Cog.	Do .	Do ..	Do ..	Do. do.	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
288	A person omitting to guard against probable danger to human life by the fall of any building over which he has a right entitling him to pull it down or repair it.		Do .	Do. ...	Do. ..	Do. ..	Do. do.	Do.

229	A person omitting to take order with any animal in his possession, so as to guard against danger to human life, or of grievous hurt, from such animal.	Cog. ...	Do.	Do.	Do.	Imp. e. d. for 6 months, or fine of 1,000 rupees, or both	Any Mag.
230	Committing a public nuisance	Not Cog	Do	...	Do	Fine of 200 rupees	Do.
231	Continuance of nuisance after injunction to discontinue.	Cog	Do	Do	Do	8 I for 6 months, or fine, or both	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
232	Sale, etc., of obscene books	Do	Warrant	Do.	Do.	Imp. e. d. for 3 months or fine, or both.	P. Mag. or Mag. 1st Class.
233	Sale, etc., of obscene objects to young persons	Do	Do	Do.	Do	Imp. e. d. for 6 months or fine or both.	Do
234	Obscene Songs.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do	Any Mag.
234A	Keeping a lottery office.	Not Cog	Summons	Do	Do	Imp. e. d. for 6 months or fine, or both.	Do.
	Publishing proposals relating to lotteries	Do.	Do	Do.	Do.	Fine of 1,000 rupees	Do
CHAPTER XV.—OFFENCES RELATING TO RELIGION							
235	Destroying, damaging or defiling a place of worship or sacred object with intent to insult the religion of any class of persons.	Cog	...	Summons	Bailable	Not Com.	Imp. e. d. for 2 years, or fine, or both.
235A	Malignantly insulting the religion or the religious belief of any class	Not Cog	Warrant	Not B.	Do.	...	Imp. e. d. for 2 years, or fine or both.
236	Causing a disturbance to an assembly engaged in religious worship.	Cog.	...	Summons	Bailable	Do	Imp. e. d. for 1 year, or fine, or both
							P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class

By what Ct.
triable

Punishment under the
I. P. C

Com.
or not

Bailable
or not

Warrant
or
summons.

Cog. or
not.

Offence.

Section.

*Of the Causing of Miscarriage ; of Injuries to Unborn Children ; of the Exposure of Infants ;
and of the Concealment of Birth.*

Section.	Offence.	Cog. or not.	Warrant or summons.	Bailable or not	Com. or not	Punishment under the I. P. C	By what Ct. triable
312	Causing miscarriage. If the woman be quick with child.	Do. .	Do. .	Do. .	Do. .	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, or fine, or both Imp e. d for 7 years, and fine	Do.
313	Causing miscarriage without woman's consent.	Do. ...	Do. .	Not B.	Do. .	Trans. for life, or imp. e. d. for 10 years, and fine.	Do.
314	Death caused by an act done with intent to cause miscarriage. If act done without woman's consent.	Do. .	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Imp. e. d. for 10 years, and fine.	Do.
315	Act done with intent to prevent a child being born alive, or to cause it to die after its birth.	Do. ...	Do.	Do. ...	Do. .	Trans for life, or as above.	Do.
316	Causing death of a quick unborn child by an act amounting to culpable homicide.	Do. .	Do. ...	Do. .	Do. .	Imp. e. d. for 10 years, or fine or both.	Do.

1 Section.	2 Offence	3 Cog. or not.	4 Warrant or summons.	5 Bailable or not	6 Com or not	7 Punishment under the I P C	8 By what Ct triable
345	Keeping any person in wrongful confinement, knowing that a writ has been issued for his liberation.	Not.	Cog. Summons	Bailable	Not. Com.	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, in addition to imp. under any other section	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag. or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
346	Wrongful confinement in secret.	Cog. ...	Do. .	Do .	Com with Court's permission.	Do do	Do.
347	Wrongful confinement for the purpose of extorting property, or constraining to do an illegal act, etc	Do. ...	Do ...	Do ...	Not Com.	Imp e. d. for 4 years, and fine.	Do
348	Wrongful confinement for the purpose of extorting confession or information or of compelling restoration of property, etc	Do ...	Do.	Do	Do .	Do do	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag or Mag. 1st class.
<i>Of Criminal Force and Assault.</i>							
352	Assault or use of criminal force otherwise than on grave provocation.	Not Cog.	Summons	Bailable	Com ...	imp. e. d. for 3 months, or fine, or both.	Any Mag
353	Assault or use of criminal force to deter a public servant from discharge of his duty.	Do. ...	Warrant	Do ...	Not Com.	Imp. e. d. for 2 years, or fine, or both.	P. Mag., or Mag 1st or 2nd Class.

354 Assault or use of criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty.	Do ...	Do .	Do ..	Do ..	do.	...	Do.
355 Assault or criminal force with intent to dishonour a person, otherwise than on grave and sudden provocation.	Not Cog.	Summons	Do, ..	Com. I ..	Do	...	Do
356 Assault or criminal force in attempt to commit theft of property worn or carried by a person.	Cog. ...	Warrant	Not B. ...	Not Com	Do.	.	Any Mag
357 Assault or use of criminal force in attempt wrongfully to confine a person	Do, ...	Do. .	Bailable	Com. with Imp. e d. for 1 year, Court's per mission, or fine, or both.	Do.		Do.
358 Assault or use of criminal force on grave and sudden provocation.	Not Cog.	Summons	Do. ...	Com. ...	S. L. for 1 month, or fine or 200 rupees, or both.		Do.

Of Kidnapping, Abduction, Slavery and Forced Labour.

363 Kidnapping.	Cog ...	Warrant	Bailable	Not Com.	Imp. e. d. for 7 years, and fine, ' Ct. of Ser, P. Mag, or Mag. 1st class		
364 Kidnapping or abducting in order to murder.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Not B ...	Do. ...	Transportation for life, or rigorous imp. for 10 years and fine		Ct of Ses
365 Kidnapping or abducting with intent secretly and wrongfully to confine a person.	Do. ...	Do. ..	Do. ...	Do. ...	Imp. e. d. for 7 years, and fine		Ct of Ses, P. Mag., or Mag 1st class.

Section	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
		Offence	Cog. or not.	Warrant or summons	Bailable or not.	Com. or not.	Punishment under the I. P. C.	By what Ct. triable.
382	Theft, preparation having been made for causing death, or hurt, or restraint or fear of death, or of hurt, or of restraint, in order to the committing of such theft or to returing after committing it, or to retaining property taken by it.		Cog. ...	Warrant	Not B...	Not Com.	R. I. for 10 years, and fine	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.
<i>Of Extortion.</i>								
384	Extortion		Not Cog.	Warrant	Bailable	Not Com.	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, or fine, or both.	Ct. of Ses, P. Mag. or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
385	Putting or attempting to put in fear of injury, in order to commit extortion.		Do. .	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. .	Imp. e. d. for 2 years, or fine, or both	Do.
386	Extortion by putting a person in fear of death or grievous hurt.		Do. .	Do. ..	Not B	Do. ...	Imp. e. d. for 10 years and fine.	Ct. of Ses.
387	Putting or attempting to put a person in fear of death or grievous hurt, in order to commit extortion.		Do. .	Do. ..	Do. ...	Do. ...	Imp. e. d. for 7 years, and fine.	Do.
388	Extortion by threat of accusation of an offence punishable with death, transportation for life, or imprisonment for 10 years.		Do. .	Do. ...	Bailable	Do. ...	Imp. e. d. for 10 years, and fine.	Do.

389	If the offence threatened be an unnatural offence. Putting a person in fear of accusation of offence punishable with death, trans. for life, or with imp. for 10 years, in order to commit extortion. If the offence be an unnatural offence	Do. ...	Do. ..	Do. ..	Do. ..	Trans. for life. Imp. e. d. for 10 years, and fine.	Do. Ct. or Ses.
390	Robbery ...	Do. ...	Do. ..	Do. ...	Do. ..	Trans. for life.	Do.
<i>Of Robbery and Dacoity.</i>							
392	Robbery ...	Cog. ...	Warrant	Not B.	Not com.	R. I. for 10 years and fine.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag. or Mag. 1st class.
	If committed on the highway between sunset and sunrise.	Do. ...	Do. ..	Do	Do. ..	R. I. for 14 years, and fine	Do.
393	Attempt to commit robbery	Do. ...	Do. ..	Do. ..	Do. ...	R. I. for 7 years and fine	Do.
394	Person voluntarily causing hurt in committing or attempting to commit robbery, or any other person jointly concerned in such robbery.	Do. ..	Do. ..	Do. ...	Do. ...	Trans. for life, or R. I. for 10 years and fine.	Do.
395	Dacoity ...	Do. ...	Do. ..	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. do	Ct. of Ses.
396	Murder in dacoity ...	Do. ...	Do. ..	Do. ...	Do. ...	Death, trans. for life, or R. I. for 10 years, and fine.	Do.
397	Robbery or dacoity with attempt to cause death or grievous hurt.	Do. ...	Do. ..	Do. ...	Do. ...	R. I. for not less than 7 years.	Do
398	Attempt to commit robbery or dacoity when armed with deadly weapon.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. do.	Do

Section	Offence	Cog. or not.	Warrant or summons.	Bailable or not.	Com. or not.	Punishment under the I. P. C.	By what Ct. triable.
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Of Cheating.

417	Cheating	Not Cog.	Warrant	Bailable.	Com. with Ct.'s permission	Imp. e. d. for 1 year, or fine, or both.	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
418	Cheating a person whose interest the offender was bound, either by law or by legal contract, to protect.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, or fine, or both.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
419	Cheating by personation.	Cog.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.
420	Cheating and thereby dishonestly inducing delivery of property, or the making, alteration or destruction, of a valuable security.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Imp. e. d. for 7 years, and fine.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.

Of Fraudulent Deeds and Disposition of Property.

421	Fraudulent removal or concealment of property, &c., to prevent distribution among creditors.	Not Cog.	Warrant.	Bailable.	Not Com.	Imp. e. d. for 2 years, or fine, or both.	P. Mag. or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
422	Fraudulently preventing from being made available for his creditor a debt or demand due to the offender.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Imp. e. d. for 2 years, or fine, or both.	Do.

Of Mischief.

423	Fraudulent execution of deed of transfer containing a false statement of consideration.	Do	...	Do	...	Do	...	Do	...	Do.	...	Do.
424	Fraudulent removal or concealment of property, of himself or any other person, or assisting in the doing thereof, or dishonestly releasing any demand or claim to which he is entitled.	Do	...	Do	..	Do	...	Do	...	Do.	...	Do.
425	Mischief	Not Cog.	Summons	Bailable	Com. when private person is injured.	Imp. e. d. for 3 months, or fine, or both.	Any Mag.			
427	Mischief, and thereby causing damage to the amount of 50 rupees or upwards.	Do	...	Warrant	Do	...	Do	...	Imp. e. d. for 2 years, or fine, or both.	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.		
428	Mischief by killing, poisoning, maiming or rendering useless any animal of value of Rs. 10 or upwards.	Cog.	...	Do	...	Do	...	Do	...	Do.		Do.
429	Mischief by killing, poisoning, maiming or rendering useless any elephant, camel, horse, &c., whatever may be its value, or other animal of value of 50 rupees or upwards.	Do	...	Do	...	Do	...	Do	...	Imp. e. d. for 5 years, or fine, or both.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.	

Section.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
		Offence,	Cog. or not.	Warrant or summons.	Bailable or not.	Com. or not.	Punishment under the I P. C.	By what Ct. triable,
430	Mischief by causing diminution of supply of water for agricultural purposes, &c.		Cog. ..	Warrant	Bailable	Com. with Ct.'s permission.	Imp. e. d. for 5 years, or fine, or both.	Ct. of Ses, P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
431	Mischief by injury to public road, bridge, navigable river, or navigable channel and rendering it impassable or less safe for travelling or conveying property.		Do. ..	Do. .	Do.	Not Com.	Do. do.	Do.
432	Mischief by causing inundation or obstruction to public drainage, attended with damage.		Do. .	Do. .	Do. ..	Do. ..	Do. do.	Do.
433	Mischief by destroying, or moving, or rendering less useful a lighthouse, sea mark, or by exhibiting false lights.		Do. ..	Do. ...	Do	Do.	Imp. e. d. for 7 years, or fine, or both.	Ct. of Ses.
434	Mischief by destroying or moving, etc., a land mark fixed by public authority.		Not Cog.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Imp. e. d. for 1 year, or fine, or both.	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.

	Cog. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Imp. e. d. for 7 years, and fine.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag. or Mag. 1st class.
435 Mischief by fire in explosive substance with intent to cause damage to amount of 100 rupees or upwards, or in case of agricultural produce, in rupees or upwards.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Trans. for life, or imp. e. d. for 10 years, and fine.	Ct. of Ses.
436 Mischief by fire or explosive substance, with intent to destroy a house, etc.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Not B.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do.	Do.
437 Mischief with intent to destroy or make unsafe a decked vessel, in a vessel of 20 tons burden.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Imp. e. d. for 10 years and fine.	Do.
438 The mischief described in the last section when committed by fire or any explosive substance.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Trans. for life, or imp. e. d. for 10 years, and fine.	Do.
439 Blundering vessel ashore with intent to commit theft, etc.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Imp. e. d. for 10 years, and fine.	Do.
440 Mischief committed after preparation made for causing death, or hurt, etc.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Imp. e. d. for 5 years, and fine.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag. or Mag. 1st class.

Of Criminal Trespass.

	Cog. ...	Summons	Bailable	Com. ...	Imp. e. d. for 3 months, or fine or both.	Any Mag.
447 Criminal trespass
448 House trespass	...	Warrant	Do. ...	Do. ...	Imp. e. d. for 1 year, or fine, or both.	Do.
449 House-trespass in order to the commission of an offence punishable with death.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Not B....	Not Com.	Trans. for life, or imp. e. d. for 10 years, and fine.	Ct. of Ses.

Section.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
		Offence.	Cog. or not	Warrant or summons.	Bailable or not	Com. or not.	Punishment under the I.P.C.	By what Ct. triable.
450		House-trespass in order to the commission of an offence punishable with transportation for life	Cog. ...	Warrant	Not B.	Not Com.	Imp. e. d. for 10 years, and fine	Ct. of Ses.
451		House-trespass in order to the commission of an offence punishable with imp. If the offence is theft.	Do. ..	Do	Bailable	Com. with Ct's permission	Imp. e. d. for 2 years, and fine.	Any Mag.
452		House trespass having made preparation for causing hurt, assault, etc.	Do. ...	Do	Not B.	Not Com.	Imp. e. d. for 7 years, and fine.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
453		Lurking house trespass or house-breaking.	Do. ...	Do	Do	Do. ...	Do.	Do.
454		Lurking house-trespass or house-breaking in order to the commission of an offence punishable with imp. If the offence is theft.	Do. ...	Do	Do	Do.	Imp. e. d. for 2 years, and fine.	P. Mag. or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
455		Lurking house-trespass or house-breaking after preparation made for causing hurt, assault, etc.	Do. ...	Do	Do	Do.	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, and fine.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
			Do. ...	Do	Do	Do.	Imp. e. d. for 10 years, and fine.	Do
			Do. ...	Do	Do	Do	Do.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.

456	Lurking house-trespass or house-breaking by night.	Do	...	Do.	...	Do.	...	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, and fine.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
457	Lurking house trespass or house breaking by night in order to the commission of an offence punishable with imp.	Do	...	Do.	...	Do.	...	Imp. e. d. for 5 years, and fine.	Do.
	If the offence is theft	Do	..	Do.	...	Do.	...	Imp. e. d. for 14 years, and fine.	Do.
458	Lurking house trespass or house-breaking by night, after preparation made for causing hurt, etc.	Do.	...	Do.	...	Do.	...	Do.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.
459	Grievous hurt caused whilst committing lurking house trespass or house breaking.	Do	.	Do.	...	Do.	..	Transportation for life, or imp. e. d. for 10 years, and fine	Ct. of Ses.
460	Death or grievous hurt caused by one of several persons jointly concerned in house breaking by night etc	Do		Do.	...	Do.	.	Do.	Do.
461	Dishonestly breaking open or unfastening any closed receptacle containing or supposed to contain property.	Do		Do.		Do.		Imp. e. d. for 2 years, or fine, or both.	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd Class.
462	Being entrusted with any closed receptacle containing or supposed to contain any property, and fraudulently opening the same.	Do	...	Do	...	Do.	...	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, or fine, or both.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.

Section.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
		Offence.	Cog. or not.	Warrant or summons.	Bailable or not.	Com. or not.	Punishment under the I. P. C.	By what Ct. triable.
CHAPTER XVIII.—OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO TRADE OR PROPERTY MARKS.								
465	Forgery	"	Not Cog	Warrant	Bailable	Not Com	Imp. e. d. for 11 years, or fine, or both.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.
466	Forgery of a record of a Ct. of Justice or of a Register of Births, etc., kept by a public servant		Do	Do.	Not B	Do. ...	Imp. e. d. for 7 years, and fine.	Ct. of Ses.
467	Forgery of a valuable security, will, or authority to make or transfer any valuable security, or to receive any money, etc., When the valuable security is a promissory note of the Govt. of India.		Do. ...	Do ..	Do ..	Do .	Trans. for life, or imp e. d. for 10 years, and fine.	Do.
468	Forgery for the purpose of cheating.		Cog	Do.	Do. ..	Do. .	Do. ...	Do.
468	Forgery for the purpose of cheating.		Not Cog.	Do.	Do. ..	Do. ..	Imp. e. d. for 7 years, and fine.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.
469	Forgery for the purpose of harming the reputation of any person, or knowing that it is likely to be used for that purpose.		Do. ..	Do. ...	Bailable	Do. ...	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, and fine.	Do.

471 Using as genuine a forged document which is known to be forged. When the forged document is a promissory note of the Govt. of India	Do ...	Do.	Do ...	Do.	..	Punishment for forgery of such document.	Same Ct. as that by which the forgery is triable. Ct. of Ses
472 Making or counterfeiting a seal, plate, etc, with intent to commit a forgery punishable under Sec 467 of the Indian Penal Code, or possessing with like intent any such seal, plate, etc, knowing the same to be counterfeit.	Cog ...	Do.	Do.	Do.	..	Do.	Do.
473 Making or counterfeiting a seal, plate, etc, with intent to commit a forgery punishable otherwise than under Section 467 of the Indian Penal Code, or possessing with like intent any such seal, plate, etc, knowing the same to be counterfeit.	Not Cog	Do	Do	Do.	..	Trans. for life, for imp. e. d. for 7 years, and fine.	Do.
474 Having possession of a document, knowing it to be forged, with intent to use it as genuine; if the document is one of the description mentioned in Section 466 of the Indian Penal Code.	Do	Do.	Do	Do	..	Imp. e. d. for 7 years, and fine.	Do.
	Do ...	Do.	Do ...	Do	..	Do.	Do

If the document is one of the description mentioned in Section 467 of the Indian Penal Code.

Ct. of Sess.

475 Counterfeiting a device or mark used for authenticating documents described in Section 467 of the Indian Penal Code, or possessing counterfeit marked material.

Trans. for life or imp. e. d. for 7 years, and fine

Do. do. do.

Do.

476 Counterfeiting a device or mark used for authenticating documents other than those described in Section 467 of the Indian Penal Code, or possessing counterfeit marked material.

Imp. e. d. for 7 years, and fine.

Do. do. do.

Do.

477 Fraudulently destroying, or defacing, or attempting to destroy or deface, or secreting a will, etc.

Trans. for life, or imp. e. d. for 7 years, and fine.

Do. do. do.

Do.

477-A Falsification of accounts ...

Imp. e. d. for 7 years, or fine, or both.

Do. do. do.

Ct. of Sess, P. Mag. or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.

Of Trade and Property Marks.

442 Using a false trade or property-mark with intent to deceive or injure any person	Not Cog.	Warrant	Bailable	Com. with Ct's permission	Imp. e. d. for 1 year, or fine, or both.	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
443 Counterfeiting a trade or property mark used by another, with intent to cause damage or injury.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, or fine or both.	Do.
444 Counterfeiting a property-mark used by a public servant, or any mark used by him to denote the manufacture, quality, etc., of any property.	Do.	Summons	Do	Not Com.	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, and fine.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.
445 Fraudulently making or having possession of any die, plate, or other instrument for counterfeiting any public or private property or trade mark.	Do.	Do	Do.	Do.	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, or fine, or both.	Do.
446 Knowingly selling goods marked with a counterfeit property or trade-mark.	Do	Do.	Do.	Com. with Ct's permission	Imp. e. d. for 1 year, or fine, or both.	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
447 Fraudulently making a false mark upon any package or receptacle containing goods, with intent to cause it to be believed that it contains goods which it does not contain, etc.	Do.	Do.	Do.	Not Com.	Imp. e. d. for 3 years, or fine, or both.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
448 Making use of any such false mark.	Do.	Do	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.

Section.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
		Offence.	Cog. or not.	Warrant or summons.	Bailable or not.	Com. or not.	Punishment under the I. P. C.	By what Ct. triable.
489		Removing, or destroying, or defacing any property-mark with intent to cause injury.	Not Cog.	Summons	Bailable	Not com.	Imp. e. d. for 1 year, or fine, or both.	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
<i>Of Currency Notes and Bank Notes.</i>								
489-A		Counterfeiting currency or Bank notes.	Cog.	Warrant	Not B.	Not com.	Trans. for life, or imp. e. d. for 10 years, and fine.	Ct. of Ses
489 B		Using genuine forged or counterfeit currency notes or bank notes	Do.	Do	Do	Do	do.	Do.
489 C		Possession of forged or counterfeit currency notes or bank notes.	Do.	Do	Bailable	Do.	Imp. e. d. for 7 years, or fine, or both.	Do.
489 D		Making or possessing instruments or materials for forging or counterfeiting currency notes or bank notes.	Do	Do.	Not B	Do.	Trans. for life, or imp. e. d. for 10 years, and fine.	Do.
CHAPTER XIX.—CRIMINAL BREACH OF CONTRACTS OF SERVICE.								
490		Being bound by contract to render personal service during a voyage or journey or to convey or guard any property or person and voluntarily omitting to do so.	Not Cog.	Summons	Bailable	Com	Imp. e. d. for 1 month, or fine of 100 rupees, or both.	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.

491 Being bound to attend on, or supply the wants of, a person who is helpless from youth, unsoundness of mind or disease, and voluntarily omitting to do so.	Do. ...	Do.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Imp. = d. for 3 months, or fine, or both.	Do.
492 Being bound by contract to render personal service for a certain period at a distant place to which the employee = conveyed at the expense of the employer and voluntarily deserting the service or refusing to perform the duty.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Imp. e. d. for 1 month, or fine of double the expense incurred, = both.	Do.
493 A man by deceit causing a woman not lawfully married to him to believe that she is lawfully married to him and to cohabit with him in that belief.	Not Cog.	Warrant	Not B.	Not Com.	Imp. e. d. for 10 years, and fine.	Ct. of Sea.
494 Marrying again during the lifetime of a husband or wife.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Bailable	Cons. with Ct's permission.	Imp. e. d. for 7 years, and fine.	Ct. of Sea., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.
495 Same offence with concealment of the former marriage from the person with whom subsequent marriage is contracted.	Do. ..	Do. .	Do. ...	Not Com.	Imp. e. d. for 10 years, and fine.	Ct. of Sea.

CHAPTER XX.—OFFENCES RELATING TO MARRIAGE.

Section.	Offence.	3	4	5	6	7	8
		Cog. or not.	Warrant or summons.	Bailable or not.	Com. or not.	Punishment under the I. P. C.	By what Ct. triable.
496	A person with fraudulent intention going through ceremony of being married knowing that he is not thereby lawfully married.	Not Cog.	Warrant	Not B.	{Not Com.	Imp. e. d. for 7 years, and fine.	Ct. of Ses.
497	Adultery	Do. ..	Do. ...	Bailable	Com. ...	Imp. e. d. for 5 years, or fine, or both.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.
498	Enticing or taking away or detaining with a criminal intent a married woman.	Do. ..	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Imp. e. d. for 2 years, or fine, or both.	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
CHAPTER XXI.—DEFAMATION.							
500	Defamation ...	Not Cog.	Warrant.	Bailable	Com. ...	S. I. for 2 years, or fine, or both.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st Class.
501	Printing or engraving matter knowing it to be defamatory.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. do. ...	Do.
502	Sale of printed or engraved substance containing defamatory matter, knowing it to contain such matter.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. do. ...	Do.

CHAPTER XXII.—CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION, INSULT AND ANNOYANCE.

201	Insult intended to provoke a breach of the peace.	Not Cog.	Warrant	Bailable	Com. ...	Imp. e. d. for 2 years, or fine, or both.	Any Mag.
205	False statement, rumour, &c circulated with intent to cause mutiny or offence against the public peace.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Not B. ...	Not Com.	Do. do	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.
206	Criminal intimidation.	Do. .	Do. .	Bailable	Com. .	Do. do.	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
	If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, &c.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Not Com.	Imp. e. d. for 7 years, or fine, or both.	%, of Ses., P. Mag. or Mag. 1st class.
207	Criminal intimidation by anonymous communication or having taken precaution to conceal whence the threat comes.	Do.	Do. .	Do. ...	Do. ...	Imp. e. d. for 2 years, in addition to the punishment under above section.	Do.
208	Act caused by including a person to believe that he will be rendered an object of Divine displeasure.	Do. .	Do. ...	Do. ...	Com. .	Imp. e. d. for 1 year, or fine, or both.	P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd Class.
209	Uttering any word or making any gesture intended to insult the modesty of a woman, &c.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Com. with C's permission	S. I. for 1 year, or fine or both.	P. Mag. or Mag. 1st class.
210	Appearing in a public place &c., in a state of intoxication, and causing annoyance to any person.	Do. ...	Do. ...	Do. ...	Not Com.	S. I for 24 hours, or fine of 10 rupees, or both.	Any Mag.

Section.	Offence.	3	4	5	6	7	8
		Cog. or not.	Warrant or summons.	Bailable or not.	Com. or not.	Punishment under the I. P. C.	By what Ct. triable.

CHAPTER XXIII.—ATTEMPTS TO COMMIT OFFENCES.

511	Attempting to commit offences punishable with trans. or imp. and in such attempt doing any act towards the commission of the offence.	As in the offence attempted.	As in the offence attempted.	As in the offence attempted.	As in the offence attempted.	Trans. or Imp. not exceeding half of the longest term provided for the offence, or fine, or both.	The Ct. by which the offence attempted is triable.
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OFFENCES AGAINST OTHER LAWS.

	If punishable with death, trans or imp. for 7 years or upwards.	Cog. ...	Warrant	Not B....	Not Com.	...	Ct. of Ses.
	If punishable with imprisonment for 3 years and upwards, but less than 7 years.	Do. . .	Do. . .	Ditto, except in cases under the Indian Arms Act, Sec. 19, which shall be bailable.	Do.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st class.
	If punishable with imp. for one year and upwards, but less than 3 years.	Not. Cog.	Summons	Bailable	Do.	Ct. of Ses., P. Mag., or Mag. 1st or 2nd class.
	If punishable with imprisonment for less than one year, or with fine only.	Do. . .	Do. . .	Do. . .	Do.	Any Mag.

SCHEDULE III.

(See section 36).

ORDINARY POWERS OF PROVINCIAL MAGISTRATES.

I.—*Ordinary Powers of a Magistrate of the Third Class.*

- (1) Power to arrest or direct the arrest of, and to commit to custody, a person committing an offence in his presence, S 64.
- (2) Power to arrest, or direct the arrest in his presence of, an offender, S. 65
- (3) Power to endorse a warrant, or to order the removal of an accused person arrested under a warrant, Ss. 83, 84 and 86
- (4) Power to issue proclamation in cases judicially before him, S 87.
- (5) Power to attach and sell property *and to dispose of claims to attached property* in cases judicially before him, S 88
- (6) Power to restore attached property, S. 89
- (7) Power to require search to be made for letters and telegrams, S 95
- (8) Power to issue search warrant, S. 96
- (9) Power to endorse a search warrant and order delivery of thing found, S. 99.
- (10) Power to command unlawful assembly to disperse, S 127.
- (11) Power to use civil force to disperse unlawful assembly, S. 128
- (12) Power to require military force to be used to disperse unlawful assembly, S 130
- (13) * * * *
- (14) Power to authorise detention, *not being detention in the custody of the Police*, of a person during a police investigation, S 167.
- (14A) *Power to postpone issue of process and inquire into case himself*, S. 202.
- (15) Power to detain an offender found in Court, S 351
- (16) * * * *
- (17) Power to apply to District Magistrate to issue commission for examination of witness, S 506 (2)
- (18) Power to recover forfeited bond for appearance before Magistrate's Court, S 514 ; *and to require fresh security*, S 514A.
- (18A) *Power to make orders as to custody and disposal of property pending inquiry or trial*, S 516A
- (19) Power to make order as to disposal of property, S. 517
- (20) Power to sell * * * property of a suspected character, S 525
- (21) *Power to require affidavit in support of application*, S 539A
- (22) *Power to make local inspection*, S 539B.

II — *Ordinary Powers of a Magistrate of the Second Class.*

- (1) The ordinary powers of a Magistrate of a third class.
- (2) Power to order the police to investigate an offence in cases in which the Magistrate has jurisdiction to try or commit for trial, S. 155.
- (3) Power to postpone issue of process and to inquire into a case or direct investigation, S. 202.
- (4) * * * * *

III.—*Ordinary Powers of a Magistrate of the First Class*

- (1) The ordinary powers of a Magistrate of the second class
- (2) Power to issue search-warrant otherwise than in course of an inquiry, S. 98.
- (3) Power to issue search-warrant for discovery of persons wrongfully confined, S. 100.
- (4) Power to require security to keep the peace, S. 107.
- (5) Power to require security for good behaviour, S. 109.
- (6) Power to discharge sureties, S. 126A
- (6A) Power to make orders as to local nuisances, S. 133
- (7) Power to make orders, etc., in possession cases, Ss. 145, 146 and 147.
- (7A) Power to record statements and confessions during a police investigation, S. 163
- (7A) Power to authorise detention of a person in the custody of the Police during a police investigation, S. 167.
- (7B) Power to hold inquests, S. 174.
- (8) Power to commit for trial, S. 206.
- (9) Power to stop proceedings when no complaint, S. 249.
- (9A) Power to tender pardon to accomplice during inquiry into case by himself, S. 337
- (10) Power to make orders of maintenance, Ss. 488 and 489.
- (11) Power to take evidence on commission, S. 503
- (12) Power to recover penalty on forfeited bond, S. 514
- (12A) Power to require fresh security, S. 514A.
- (12B) Power to recall case made over by him to another Magistrate, S. 528 (4).
- (13) Power to make order as to first offenders, S. 562
- (14) Power to order released convicts to notify residence, S. 565.

IV.—*Ordinary Powers of a Sub-divisional Magistrate appointed under S. 13.*

- (1) The ordinary powers of a Magistrate of the first class.
- (2) Power to direct warrants to landholders, S. 78
- (3) Power to require security for good behaviour, S. 110
- (4) * * * * *
- (5) Power to make orders prohibiting repetitions of nuisances, S. 143.
- (6) Power to make orders under S. 144.
- (7) Power to depute Subordinate Magistrate to make local inquiry, S. 148.

- (8) Power to order police investigation into cognisable cases, S. 156
- (9) Power to receive report of police-officer and pass order, S. 173
- (10) * * * *
- (11) Power to issue process for person within local jurisdiction who has committed an offence outside the local jurisdiction, S. 186.
- (12) Power to entertain complaints, S. 190
- (13) Power to receive police-reports, S. 190.
- (14) Power to entertain cases without complaint, S. 190
- (15) Power to transfer cases to a Subordinate Magistrate, S. 192.
- (16) Power to pass sentence on proceedings recorded by a subordinate Magistrate, S. 349.
- (17) Power to forward record of inferior Court to District Magistrate, S. 435 (2).
- (18) Power to sell property alleged or suspected to have been stolen, etc, S. 524.
- (19) Power to withdraw cases other than appeals and to try or refer them for trial, § 528.
- (20) * * * *

V.—*Ordinary Powers of a District Magistrate*

- (1) The ordinary powers of a Sub-Divisional Magistrate.
- (1A) *Power to try juvenile offenders, S. 29A.*
- (2) Power to require delivery of letters, telegrams, etc, S. 95.
- (3) Power to issue search-warrants for documents in custody of postal or telegraph authority, S. 96
- (4) Power to require security for good behaviour in case of sedition, S. 108.
- (5) Power to discharge persons bound to keep the peace or to be of good behaviour, S. 124
- (6) Power to cancel bond for keeping the peace, S. 125
- (6A) *Power to order preliminary investigation by police-officer not below the rank of Inspector in certain cases, S. 195B*
- (7) Power to try summarily, S. 260
- (7A) *Power to tender pardon to accomplice at any stage of a case, S. 337.*
- (8) Power to quash convictions in certain cases, § 350
- (9) Power to hear appeals from order requiring security for *keeping the peace* or good behaviour, S. 406.
- (9A) *Power to hear appeals from order of Magistrates refusing to accept or rejecting sureties, S. 406A*
- (10) Power to hear or refer appeals from convictions by Magistrates of the second and third classes, S. 407
- (11) Power to call for records, S. 435.
- (12) Power to order inquiry into complaint dismissed or cases of accused discharged, S. 436
- (13) Power to order commitment, S. 437.
- (14) Power to report case to High Court, S. 438
- (15) * * * *
- (16) * * * *

- (17) Power to appoint person to be public prosecutor in particular case, S. 492 (2).
- (18) Power to issue commission for examination of witness, Ss. 503, 506.
- (19) Power to hear appeals from or revise orders passed under Ss. 514, 515.
- (20) Power to compel restoration of abducted female, S. 552.

SCHEDULE IV.

(See sections 37 and 38)

ADDITIONAL POWERS WITH WHICH PROVINCIAL MAGISTRATES MAY BE INVESTED.

POWERS
WITH
WHICH A
MAGISTRATE
OF THE
FIRST CLASS
MAY BE
INVESTED.

By THE
LOCAL
GOVERN-
MENT

By THE DIS-
TRICT
MAGISTRATE.

- (1) Power to require security for good behaviour in case of sedition, S. 108.
- (2) Power to require security for good behaviour, S. 110
- (3) * * *
- (4) Power to make orders prohibiting repetitions of nuisances, S. 143.
- (5) Power to make orders under S. 144.
- (6) * * *
- (7) Power to issue process for person within local jurisdiction who has committed an offence outside the local jurisdiction, S. 186.
- (8) Power to take cognizance of offences upon complaints, S. 190.
- (9) Power to take cognizance of offences upon Police reports, S. 190.
- (10) Power to take cognizance of offences without complaint, S. 190
- (11) Power to try summarily, S. 260.
- (12) Power to hear appeals from convictions by Magistrates of the second and third classes, S. 407.
- (13) Power to sell property alleged or suspected to have been stolen, etc., S. 524.
- (14) * * *
- (15) Power to try cases under S. 124A of the Indian Penal Code.
- (1) Power to make orders prohibiting repetitions of nuisances, S. 143
- (2) Power to make orders under S. 144.

POWERS
WITH WHICH
A MAGIS-
TRATE OF
THE FIRST
CLASS MAY
BE IN-
VESTED

BY THE DIS-
TRICT MA-
GISTRATE.

- (3) * * *
- (4) Power to take cognizance of offences upon complaint, S. 190
- (5) Power to take cognizance of offences upon police-reports, S. 190
- (6) Power to transfer cases, S. 192.

(1) * * *

BY THE LO-
CAL GOVERN-
MENT

POWERS
WITH WHICH
A MAGIS-
TRATE OF
THE SECOND
CLASS MAY
BE IN-
VESTED.

a person in the custody of the police during a police investigation, S. 167.

- (4) Power to hold inquests, S. 174.
- (5) Power to take cognizance of offences upon complaint, S. 190.
- (6) Power to take cognizance of offences upon police-reports, S. 190
- (7) Power to take cognizance of offences without complaint, S. 190.
- (8) Power to commit for trial, S. 206
- (9) Power to make orders as to first offenders, S. 562.
- (1) Power to make orders prohibiting repetitions of nuisances, S. 143.
- (2) Power to make orders under S. 144

BY THE DIS-
TRICT MA-
GISTRATE

- (3) Power to hold inquests, S. 174.
- (4) Power to take cognizance of offences upon complaint, S. 190.
- (5) Power to take cognizance of offences upon police-reports, S. 190.

BY THE LO-
CAL GOV-
ERNMENT

POWERS
WITH WHICH
A MAGIS-
TRATE OF
THE THIRD
CLASS MAY
BE INVESTED

- (1) Power to make orders prohibiting repetitions of nuisances, S. 143
- (2) * * *
- (3) Power to hold inquests, S. 174.
- (4) Power to take cognizance of offences upon complaint, S. 190
- (5) Power to take cognizance of offences upon police-reports, S. 190.

(6)

POWERS WITH WHICH A SUB-DIVISIONAL MAGISTRATE MAY BE IN- VESTED.	BY THE DIS- TRICT MAGIS- TRATE	(1) Power to make orders prohibiting repetitions of nuisances, S. 143.
		(2) * * *
		(3) Power to hold inquests, S. 174
		(4) Power to take cognizance of offences upon complaint, S. 190.
		(5) Power to take cognizance of offences upon police-reports, S. 190
	BY THE LO- CAL GOVER- NMENT	
		Power to call for records, S. 435

SCHEDULE V.

(See section 555.)

FORMS

I.—SUMMONS TO AN ACCUSED PERSON.

(See section 68.)

To _____ of _____
 WHEREAS your attendance is necessary to answer to a charge of
(state shortly the offence charged) you are hereby required to appear
 in person (or by pleader *as the case may be*) before the *(Magistrate)*
 of _____, on
 the _____ day of _____ . Herein fail not
 Dated this _____ day of _____ 19____
(Seal.) _____ *(Signature)*

II.—WARRANT OF ARREST

(See section 75.)

To *(name and designation of the person or persons who is or are to execute the warrant)*
 WHEREAS _____ of _____ stands charged
 with the offence of *(state the offence)*, you are hereby directed to arrest
 the said _____ and to produce him before me Herein fail not.
 Dated this _____ day of _____ 19____
(Seal.) _____ *(Signature)*

(See section 76.)

This warrant may be endorsed as follows:—
 If the said _____ shall give bail himself in the sum
 of _____ with one surety in the sum of _____
 for two sureties each in the sum of _____) to attend
 before me on the _____ day of _____ and to

continue so to attend until otherwise directed by me, he may be released.

Dated this _____ day of _____ 19 . (Signature)

III.—BOND AND BAIL-BOND AFTER ARREST UNDER A WARRANT.

(See section 86)

I (name), of _____ being brought before the District Magistrate of _____ (or as the case may be) under a warrant issued to compel my appearance to answer to the charge of _____ do hereby bind myself to attend in the Court of _____ on the _____ day of _____ next, to answer to the said charge and to continue so to attend until otherwise directed by the Court; and, in case of my making default herein, I bind myself to forfeit, to Her Majesty the Queen, Empress of India, the sum of rupees _____

Dated this _____ day of _____ 19 . (Signature)

I do hereby declare myself surety for the above-named _____ of _____ that he shall attend before _____ on the _____ day of _____ next to answer to the charge on which he has been arrested, and shall continue so to attend until otherwise directed by the Court; and in case of his making default therein, I bind myself to forfeit to Her Majesty the Queen, Empress of India, the sum of rupees _____

Dated this _____ day of _____ 19 . (Signature)

IV.—PROCLAMATION REQUIRING THE APPEARANCE OF A PERSON ACCUSED.

(See section 87.)

WHEREAS complaint has been made before me that (name, description and address) has committed (or is suspected to have committed) the offence of _____ punishable under section _____ of the Indian Penal Code, and it has been returned in a warrant of arrest thereupon issued that the said (name) cannot be found, and whereas it has been shown to my satisfaction that the said (name) has absconded (or is concealing himself to avoid the service of the said warrant)

Proclamation is hereby made that the said _____ of _____ is required to appear at (place) before this Court (or before me) to answer the said complaint on the _____ day of _____

Dated this _____ day of _____ 19 . (Seal) (Signature.)

V.—PROCLAMATION REQUIRING THE ATTENDANCE OF A WITNESS.

(See section 87)

WHEREAS complaint has been made before me that (name, description and address) has committed (or is suspected to have committed)

ted) the offence of (*mention the offence concisely*) and a warrant has been issued to compel the attendance of (*name, description and address of the witness*) before this Court to be examined touching the matter of the said complaint; and whereas it has been returned to the said warrant that the said (*name of witness*) cannot be served, and it has been shown to my satisfaction that he has absconded (*or is concealing* *arrant*).

the said (*name*) is required to
 on the _____ day of _____ next
 at _____ o'clock to be examined touching the offence complained of
 Dated this _____ day of _____ 19 ____
 (Seal) (Signature)

VI—ORDER OF ATTACHMENT TO COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE OF A WITNESS.

(See section 88)

To the Police officer in charge of the Police-station at _____
 WHEREAS a warrant has been duly issued to compel the attendance of (*name, description and address*) to testify concerning a complaint pending before this Court, and it has been returned to the said warrant that it cannot be served; and whereas it has been shown to my satisfaction that he has absconded (*or is concealing* himself to avoid the service of the *has been or is being* *mentioned therein*).

This is to authorize and require you to attach by seizure the moveable property belonging to the said _____ to the value of _____ rupees of _____ pending the further order of _____ an endorsement certifying the manner of its execution.
 Dated this _____ day of _____ 19 ____
 (Seal) (Signature)

ORDER OF ATTACHMENT TO COMPEL THE APPEARANCE OF A PERSON ACCUSED.

(See section 88)

To (*name and designation of the person or persons who is or are to execute the warrant*)

WHEREAS complaint has been made before me that (*name, description and address*) has committed (*or is suspected to have committed*) the offence of _____ punishable under section _____ of the Indian Penal Code, and it has been returned to a warrant of arrest thereupon issued that the said (*name*) cannot be found; and whereas it has been shown to my satisfaction that the said (*name*) has absconded (*or is concealing* himself to avoid the service of the said warrant) and thereupon a Proclamation has been *or is being* duly issued and published requiring the said _____ to appear to answer

the said charge within _____ days ; and whereas the said _____ is possessed of the following property other than land paying revenue to Government in the village (or town) of _____ in the District of _____ viz, _____ and an order has been made for the attachment thereof :

You are hereby required to attach the said property by seizure, and to hold the same under attachment pending the further order of this Court, and to return this warrant with an endorsement certifying the manner of its execution.

Dated this _____
(Seal.)

day of _____

19 .

(Signature.)

ORDER AUTHORIZING AN ATTACHMENT BY THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AS COLLECTOR.

(See section 88.)

To the Deputy Commissioner of the District of _____

WHEREAS complaint has been made before me that (name, description and address) has committed (or is suspected to have committed) the offence of _____ punishable under section _____ of the Indian Penal Code, and it has been returned to a warrant of arrest thereupon issued that the said (name) cannot be found ; and whereas it has been shown to my satisfaction that the said (name) has absconded (or is concealing himself to avoid the service of the said warrant) and thereupon a Proclamation has been or is being duly issued and published requiring the said _____ to appear to answer the said charge within _____ days, [* * *] and whereas the said _____ is possessed of certain land paying revenue to Government in the village (or town) of _____ in the district of _____ :
I hereby authorize and request you to cause the said land to be _____ further order of _____ ay have done in _____

Dated this _____
(Seal.)

day of _____

19 .

(Signature)

VII.—WARRANT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE TO BRING UP A WITNESS.

(See section 90.)

To (name and designation of the Police officer or other person or persons who is or are to execute the warrant)

WHEREAS complaint has been made before me that _____ has (or is suspected to have) committed the offence of _____ (mention the offence concisely), and it appears likely that (description of witness) can give evidence concerning the said _____ and whereas I have good and sufficient reason to believe _____ attend as a witness on the hearing of the said complaint and to do so :

This is to authorize and require you to arrest the said (name) and on the _____ day of _____ to bring him before this Court, to be examined touching the offence complained of.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this _____ day of _____ 19 ____.

(Seal)

(Signature)

VIII.—WARRANT TO SEARCH AFTER INFORMATION OF A PARTICULAR OFFENCE.

(See section 96.)

To (name and designation of the Police-officer or other person or persons who is or are to execute the warrant)

WHEREAS information has been laid (or complaint has been made) before me of the commission (or suspected commission) of the offence of (mention the offence concisely), and it has been made to appear to me that the production of (specify the thing clearly) is essential to the inquiry now being made or about to be made into the said offence or suspected offence;

This is to authorize and require you to search for the said (the thing specified) in the (describe the house or place or part thereof to which the search is to be confined) and, if found, to produce the same forthwith before this Court, returning this warrant with an endorsement certifying what you have done under it, immediately upon its execution.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this _____ day of _____ 19 ____.

(Seal)

(Signature)

IX.—WARRANT TO SEARCH SUSPECTED PLACE OF DEPOSIT.

(See section 98.)

To (name and designation of a Police-officer above the rank of a constable.)

WHEREAS information has been laid before me, and on due inquiry thereupon had I have been led to believe that the (describe the house or other place) is used as a place for the deposit (or sale) of stolen property (or if for either of the other purposes expressed in the section, state the purpose in the words of the section);

This is to authorize and require you to enter the said house (or other place) with such assistance as shall be required and to use, if necessary, reasonable force for that purpose, and to search every part of the said house (or other place, or if the search is to be confined to a part, specify the part clearly) and to seize and take possession of any property (or documents, or stamps, or seals, or coins or obscene objects, as the case may be)—[Add (when the case requires it) and also of any instruments and materials which you may reasonably believe to be kept for the purpose of facilitating the commission of the offence]—and to bring the same forthwith to bring before this Court, returning this warrant with an endorsement certifying what you have done under it.

immediately upon its execution.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this
day of 19 .
(Seal.)

(Signature.)

X.—BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE.

(See section 107.)

WHEREAS I (name), inhabitant of (place), have been called upon to enter into a bond to be of good behaviour to Her Majesty the Queen, Empress of India, and to all Her subjects for the term of (state the period) or until the completion of the inquiry in the matter of (state the inquiry) now pending in the Court of (state the Court) I hereby bind myself to be of good behaviour during the said term or until the completion of the said inquiry; and in case of my making default therein, I hereby bind myself to forfeit to Her Majesty the Queen, Empress of India, the sum of rupees (state the sum).
Dated this day of 19 .

(Signature)

XI.—BOND FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR

(See sections 108, 109 and 110)

WHEREAS I (name), inhabitant of (place), have been called upon to enter into a bond to be of good behaviour to Her Majesty the Queen, Empress of India, and to all Her subjects for the term of (state the period) or until the completion of the inquiry in the matter of (state the inquiry) now pending in the Court of (state the Court) I hereby bind myself to be of good behaviour during the said term or until the completion of the said inquiry; and in case of my making default therein, I hereby bind myself to forfeit to Her Majesty the Queen, Empress of India, the sum of rupees (state the sum).
Dated this day of 19 .

(Signature.)

(Where a bond with sureties is to be executed, add).—We do hereby declare ourselves sureties for the above named (name) that he will be of good behaviour to Her Majesty the Queen, Empress of India and to all Her subjects during the said term or until the completion of the said inquiry, and in case of his making default therein, we bind ourselves jointly and severally, to forfeit to Her Majesty the sum of rupees (state the sum).
Dated this day of 19 .

(Signature.)

XII.—SUMMONS ON INFORMATION OF A PROBABLE BREACH OF THE PEACE

(See section 114)

To (name) of (place)
WHEREAS it has been made to appear to me by credible information that (state the substance of the information), and that you are likely to commit a breach of the peace (or by which act a breach of the peace probably be occasioned), you are hereby required to attend in person

by a duly authorized agent) at the Office of the Magistrate of _____ on
the _____ day of _____ 19____, at ten o'clock in the
forenoon to show cause why you should not be required to enter into a
bond for rupees _____ [when sureties are required, add—and also to
give security by the bond of one (or two, *as the case may be*) surety (or
sureties) in the sum of rupees (each *if more than one*)] that you will keep
the peace for the term of _____

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this
day of 19

(Seal)

(Signature.)

XIII — WARRANT OF COMMITMENT ON FAILURE TO FIND SECURITY TO KEEP THE PEACE.

(See section 123)

To the Superintendent (or Keeper) of the Jail at

WHEREAS (name and address) appeared before me in person (or by his authorised agent) on the _____ day of _____ in obedience to a summons calling upon him to show cause why he should not enter into a bond for rupees _____ with one surety (or a bond with two sureties each in rupees _____) that he, the said (name) would keep the peace for the period of _____ months; and whereas an order was then made requiring the said (name) to enter into and find such security (state the security ordered when it differs from that mentioned in the summons), and he has failed to comply with the said order;

This is to authorize and require you, the said Superintendent (or Keeper), to receive the said (name) into your custody, together with this warrant and him safely to keep in the said Jail for the said period of (term of imprisonment) unless he shall in the meantime be lawfully ordered to be released, and to return this warrant with an endorsement certifying the manner of its execution.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this _____ day of _____, 19____.

(Seal)

(Signature.)

XIV.—WARRANT OF COMMITMENT ON FAILURE TO FIND SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR

(See section 123)

$$x_{i+1} = x_i + \Delta x_i \quad \text{for } i = 1, 2, \dots, n-1$$

is that (name and description) having
unable to give any

or

WHEREAS evidence of the general character of (name and description) has been adduced before me and recorded, from which it appears that he is an habitual robber (or housebreaker, etc., as the case may be);

And whereas an order has been recorded stating the same and requiring the said (*name*) to furnish security for his good behaviour for the term of (*state the period*) by entering into a bond with one surety (*or* two or more sureties, *at the case may be*) himself for rupees

, and the said surety (*or* each of the said sureties) for rupees

, and the said (*name*) has failed to comply with the said order and for such default has been adjudged imprisonment for (*state the term*) unless the said security be sooner furnished ;

This is to authorize and require you, the said Superintendent (*or* Keeper) to receive the said (*name*) into your custody, together with this warrant and him safely to keep in the said Jail for the said period of (*term of imprisonment*) unless he shall in the meantime be lawfully ordered to be released, and to return this warrant with an endorsement certifying the manner of its execution.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this
day of 19 .

(Seal)

(Signature)

XV.—WARRANT TO DISCHARGE A PERSON IMPRISONED ON FAILURE TO GIVE SECURITY

(See sections 123 and 124)

To the Superintendent (*or* Keeper) of the Jail at
(*or other officer in whose custody the prisoner is*)

WHEREAS (*name and description of prisoner*) was committed to your custody under warrant of the Court, dated the day of and has since duly given security under section of the Code of Criminal Procedure ;

or

and there has appeared to me sufficient ground for the opinion that he can be released without hazard to the community ;

This is to authorize and require you forthwith to discharge the said (*name*) from your custody unless he is liable to be detained for some other cause

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this
day of 19 .

(Seal.)

(Signature)

XVI.—ORDER FOR THE REMOVAL OF NUISANCES

(See section 133)

To (*name, description and address*)

WHEREAS it has been made to appear to me that you have caused an
using the public roadway (*or other*
road or public place), by etc., (*state*
nuisance) and that such obstruction

or

WHEREAS it has been made to appear to me that you are
as owner, or manager, the trade or occupation of (*state the*
trade or occupation and the place where it is carried on) and

same is injurious to the public health (or comfort) by reason (*state briefly in what manner the injurious effects are caused*), and should be suppressed or removed to a different place ;

or

WHEREAS it has been made to appear to me that you are owner (*or are in possession of or have the control over*) a certain tank (*or well or excavation*) adjacent to the public way (*describe the thoroughfare*), and that the safety of the public is endangered by reason of the said tank (*or well or excavation*) being without a fence (*or insecurely fenced*) ;

or

WHEREAS etc. etc (*as the case may be*) ;

I do hereby direct and require you within (*state the time allowed*) to (*state what is required to be done to abate the nuisance*) or to appear at _____ in the _____ Court of _____ on the _____ day of _____ next, and to show cause why this order should not be enforced ;

or

I do hereby direct and require you within (*state the time allowed*) to cease carrying on the said trade or occupation at the said place, and not again to carry on the same, or to remove the said trade from the place where it is now carried on, or to appear, etc ;

or

I do hereby direct and require you within (*state the time allowed*) to put up a sufficient fence (*state the kind of fence and the part to be fenced*), or to appear, etc. ,

or

I do hereby direct and require you, etc. , (*as the case may be*)

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this _____ day of _____ 19____
(Seal) (Signature)

XVII —MAGISTRATE'S ORDER CONSTITUTING A JURY

(See section 138.)

WHEREAS on the _____ day of _____ 19____, an order was issued to (*name*) requiring him (*state the effect of the order*), and whereas the said (*name*) has applied to me, by a petition bearing date the _____ day of _____ for an order appointing a jury to try whether the said recited order is reasonable and proper ; I do hereby appoint (*the names, etc. of the five or more Jurors*) to be the jury _____ the said Jury to report _____ on the date of this order.

_____ day of _____ 19____, this _____
(Seal) (Signature.)

XVIII — MAGISTRATE'S NOTICE AND PEREMPTORY ORDER AFTER THE FINDING BY JURY.

(See section 140.)

To *(name, description and address)*

I HEREBY give you notice that the Jury duly appointed on the petition presented by you on the _____ day of _____ have found that the order issued on the _____ day of _____ requiring you *(state substantially the requisition in the order)* is reasonable and proper. Such order has been made absolute, and I hereby direct and require you to obey the said order within *(state the time allowed)*, on peril of the penalty provided by the Indian Penal Code for disobedience thereto.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this

day of _____ 19 .

(Seal)

(Signature)

XIX — INJUNCTION TO PROVIDE AGAINST IMMINENT DANGER PENDING INQUIRY BY JURY.

(See section 142.)

To *(name, description and address)*

WHEREAS the inquiry by Jury appointed to try whether my order _____, is reasonable and proper _____, it to me that the nuisance _____ so imminent serious danger _____ measures to prevent such danger, I do hereby under the provisions of S 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, direct and enjoin you forthwith to *(state plainly what is required to be done as a temporary safeguard)*, pending the result of the local inquiry by the Jury.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this _____ day of 19 .

(Seal)

(Signature)

XX — MAGISTRATE'S ORDER PROHIBITING THE REPETITION, ETC., OF A NUISANCE

(See section 143.)

To *(name, description and address)*

WHEREAS it has been made to appear to me that, etc., *(state the proper recital, guided by Form No XVI or Form No XXI, as the case may be)*;

I do hereby strictly order and enjoin you not to repeat the said nuisance by again placing or causing or permitting to be placed, etc., *(as the case may be)*.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this

day of _____ 19

(Seal)

(Signature)

XXI — MAGISTRATE'S ORDER TO PREVENT OBSTRUCTION, RIOT, ETC

(See section 144.)

... are in possession
 ...), and that, in
 throw or place a
 portion of the earth and stones dug up upon the adjoining public road, so
 as to occasion risk of obstruction to persons using the road ;

or

WHEREAS it has been made to appear to me that you and a number
 of other persons (*mention the class of persons*) are about to meet and
 proceed in a religious procession along the public street, etc., (*as the
 case may be*), and that such procession is likely to lead to a riot or an
 affray ;

or

WHEREAS etc., etc., (*as the case may be*) ;

I do hereby order you not to place or permit to be placed any of the
 earth or stones dug from land on any part of the said road ;

or

I do hereby prohibit the procession passing along the said street, and
 strictly warn and enjoin you not to take any part in such procession (*or
 as the case recited may require*)

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this
 day of 19

(Seal.)

(Signature.)

XXII.—MAGISTRATE'S ORDER DECLARING PARTY ENTITLED TO
RETAIN POSSESSION OF LAND, ETC., IN DISPUTE

(See section 145.)

It appearing to me, on the ground duly recorded, that a dispute,
 ... existed between (*describe the parties
 only if the dispute be between bodies
 the concisely the subject of dispute*)
 jurisdiction, all the said parties were
 ... turns as to
 ... and being
 ... he merits of
 ... session, that
 ... description)

is true ;

I do decide and declare that he is (*or they are*) in possession of the
 ... and entitled to retain such possession until
 ... rbid any disturbance of his

day of 19 Court, this

(Seal.)

(Signature)

XXIII.—WARRANT OF ATTACHMENT IN THE CASE OF A DISPUTE AS TO POSSESSION OF LAND, ETC.

(See Section 146.)

To the Police-officer in charge of the Police-station at
[or, To the Collector of]

WHEREAS it has been made to appear to me that a dispute likely to induce a breach of the peace existed between (*describe the parties concerned by name and residence, or residence only if the dispute be between bodies of villagers*) concerning certain (*state concisely the subject of dispute*) situate within the limits of my jurisdiction, and the said parties were thereupon duly called upon to state in writing their respective claims as to the fact of actual possession of the said (*the subject of dispute*) and whereas, upon due inquiry into the said claims, I have decided that neither of the said parties was in possession of the said (*the subject of dispute*) [or, I am unable to satisfy myself as to which of the said parties was in possession as aforesaid] ;

This is to authorise and require you to attach the said (*the subject of dispute*) by taking and keeping possession thereof and to hold the same under attachment until the decree or order of a competent Court determining the rights of the parties or the claim to possession shall have been obtained, and to return this warrant with an endorsement certifying the manner of its execution.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this
day of 19 .

(Seal)

(Signature.)

XXIV.—MAGISTRATE'S ORDER PROHIBITING THE DOING OF ANYTHING ON LAND OR WATER

(See Section 147)

A DISPUTE having arisen concerning the right of use of (*state concisely the subject of dispute*) situate within the limits of my jurisdiction, the possession of which land (*or water*) is claimed exclusively by (*describe the person or persons*), and it appearing to me, on due inquiry into the same, that the said land (*or water*) has been open to the enjoyment of such use by the public (*or if by an individual or a class of persons, describe him or them*) and (*if the use can be enjoyed throughout the year*), that the said use has been enjoyed within three months of the institution of the said inquiry (*or if the use is enjoyable only at particular seasons, say "during the last of the seasons at which the same is capable of being enjoyed"*) ;

I do order that the said (*the claimant or claimants of possession*), or anyone in their interest, shall not take (*or retain*) possession of the said land (*or water*) to the exclusion of the enjoyment of the right of use aforesaid, until he (*or they*) shall obtain the decree or order of a competent Court adjudging him (*or them*) to be entitled to exclusive possession

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this
day of 19 .

(Seal)

(Signature)

XXV.—BOND AND BAIL-BOND ON A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY BEFORE A POLICE OFFICER.

(See Section 169)

I (name) of , being charged with the offence of ,
and after inquiry required to appear before the Magistrate of

or
and after inquiry called upon to enter into my own recognizance to
appear when required, do hereby bind myself to appear at
in the Court of , on the day of
next (or on such day as I may hereafter be required to attend) to answer
further in the said charge, and, in case of my making default herein,
I bind myself to forfeit to Her Majesty the Queen, Empress of India,
the sum of rupees .

Dated this day of 19 .
(Signature)

I hereby declare myself (or we jointly and severally declare our-
selves and each of us) surety (or sureties) for the abovesaid
that he shall attend at , in the Court of , on the
day of next (or on such day as he may here-
after be required to attend), further to answer to the charge pending
against him, and in case of his making default therein, I hereby
bind myself (or we hereby bind ourselves) to forfeit to Her Majesty the
Queen, Empress of India, the sum of rupees .

Dated this day of 19 .
(Signature.)

XXVI.—BOND TO PROSECUTE OR GIVE EVIDENCE.

(See Section 170)

I (name), of (place), do hereby bind myself to attend at
in the Court of at o'clock on the day of
next and then and there to prosecute (or to prosecute and
give evidence) (or to give evidence) in the matter of a charge of
against one A. B., and, in case of making default herein,
I bind myself to forfeit to Her Majesty the Queen, Empress of India
the sum of rupees .

Dated this day of 19 .
(Signature)

XXVII.—NOTICE OF COMMITMENT BY MAGISTRATE TO GOVERNMENT PLEADER.

(See Section 218.)

The Magistrate of hereby gives notice that he has com-
mitted one for trial at the next Sessions; and the Magistrate
hereby instructs the Government Pleader to conduct the prosecution
of the said case.

The charge against the accused is that, etc., (state the offence as in
the charge).

Dated this day of 19 .
(Signature)

XXVIII.—CHARGES.

(See secs. 221, 222, 223.)

(I) CHARGES WITH ONE HEAD.

(a) I [name and office of Magistrate, etc] hereby charge you [name of accused person] as follows :—

(b) That you, on or about the _____ day of _____, at _____, waged war against Her Majesty the Queen, Empress of India, and thereby committed an offence punishable under S 121 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of the Court of Session [when the charge is framed by a Presidency Magistrate, for Court of Session substitute High Court]

(c) And I hereby direct that you be tried by the said Court on the said charge.

[Signature and seal of the Magistrate.]

[To be substituted for (b)] .—

(2) That you, on or about the _____ day of _____, at _____, with the intention of inducing the Hon'ble A. B., Member of the Council of the Governor General of India, to refrain from exercising a lawful power as such Member, assaulted such Member, and thereby committed an offence punishable under S 124 of the Indian Penal Code and within the cognizance of the Court of Session [or High Court]

(3) That you, being a public servant in the _____ Department, directly accepted from [state the name], for another party [state the name] a gratification other than legal remuneration, as a motive for forbearing to do an official act, and thereby committed an offence punishable under S 161 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of the Court of Session [or High Court].

(4) That you, on or about the _____ day of _____, at _____, did [or omitted to do, as the case may be] such conduct being contrary to the provisions of Act _____, section _____, and known by you to be prejudicial to _____, and thereby committed an offence punishable under S 166 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of the Court of Session [or High Court]

(5) That you, on or about the _____ day of _____, at _____, in the course of the trial of _____ before _____, stated in evidence that " _____ " which statement you either knew or believed to be false, or did not believe to be true, and thereby committed an offence, punishable under S 193 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of the Court of Session [or High Court].

(6) That you, on or about the _____ day of _____, committed culpable homicide not amounting to murder, causing the death of _____, and thereby committed an offence punishable under S 301 of the Indian Penal Code and within the cognizance of the Court of Session [or High Court].

(7) That you, on or about the _____ day of _____, at _____, abetted the commission of suicide by *A. B.*, a person in a state of intoxication, and thereby committed an offence punishable under S 306 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of the Court of Session [or High Court]

(8) That you, on or about the _____ day of _____, at _____, voluntarily caused grievous hurt to _____, and thereby committed an offence punishable under S. 325 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of the Court of Session [or High Court]

(9) That you, on or about the _____ day of _____, at _____, robbed [*state the name*], and thereby committed an offence punishable under S 392 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of the Court of Session [or High Court]

(10) That you, on or about the _____ day of _____, at _____, committed dacoity, an offence punishable under S. 395 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of the Court of Session [or High Court].

[In cases tried by Magistrates, substitute "within my cognizance" for "within the cognizance of the Court of Session", and in (c) omit "by the said Court"]

(II) CHARGES WITH TWO OR MORE HEADS.

(a) I [*name and office of Magistrate, etc*] hereby charge you [*name of accused person*] as follows :—

(b) *First*.—That you, on or about the _____ day of _____, at _____, knowing a coin to be counterfeit, delivered the same to another person, by name *A. B.*, as genuine, and thereby committed an offence punishable under S 241 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of the Court of Session [or High Court].

Secondly.—That you, on or about the _____ day of _____, at _____, knowing a coin to be counterfeit attempted to induce another person, by name *A. B.*, to receive it as genuine, and thereby committed an offence punishable under S 241 of the Indian Penal Code and within the cognizance of the Court of Session [or High Court].

(c) And I hereby direct that you be tried by the said Court on the said charge

[*Signature and seal of the Magistrate.*]

[*To be substituted for (b)*] :—

(2) *First*.—That you, on or about the _____ day of _____, at _____, committed murder by causing the death of _____, and thereby committed an offence punishable under S 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of the Court of Session [or High Court]

Secondly.—That you, on or about the _____ day of _____, at _____, causing the death of _____, committed culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and thereby committed an offence punishable under § 304 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of the Court of Session [or High Court]

(3) *First.*—That you, on or about the _____ day of _____, at _____, committed theft, and thereby committed an offence punishable under S. 379 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of the Court of Session [or High Court]

Secondly.—That you, on or about the _____ day of _____, at _____ committed theft, having made preparation for causing death to a person in order to the committing of such theft, and thereby committed an offence punishable under S. 382 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of the Court of Session [or High Court]

Thirdly.—That you, on or about the _____ day of _____, at _____ committed theft, having made preparation for causing restraint to a person in order to the effecting of your escape after the committing of such theft, and thereby committed an offence punishable under S. 382 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of the Court of Session [or High Court]

Fourthly.—That you, on or about the _____ day of _____, at _____ committed theft, having made preparation for causing fear of hurt to a person in order to the retaining of property taken by such theft, and thereby committed an offence punishable under S. 382 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of the Court of Session [or High Court].

(4) That you, on or about the _____ day of _____, *Alternative charges on section 193* _____, in the course of the inquiry into _____ before _____, stated in evidence that "_____ and that you, on or about the _____ day of _____, at _____, in the course of the trial of _____, before _____, stated in the evidence that "_____ one of which statements you either knew or believed to be false, or did not believe to be true, and thereby committed an offence punishable under S. 193 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of the Court of Session [or High Court].

[In cases tried by Magistrates, substitute "within my cognizance" for "within the cognizance of the Court of Session" and in (c) omit "by the said Court"].

CHARGE FOR THEFT AFTER PREVIOUS CONVICTION.

I (name and office of Magistrate etc), hereby charge you (name of accused person) as follows —

That you, on or about the _____ day of _____, at _____ committed theft, and thereby committed an offence punishable under S. 379 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of the Court of Session [or High Court or Magistrate, as the case may be].

And you, the said (*name of accused*), stand further charged that you, before the committing of the said offence, that is to say, on the _____ day of _____, had been convicted by the *State Court by which conviction was had*) at _____ of an offence punishable under Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code with imprisonment for a term of three years, that is to say, the offence of house-breaking by night (*describe the offence in the words used in the section under which the accused was convicted*), which conviction is still in full force and effect, and that you are thereby liable to enhanced punishment under S 75 of the Indian Penal Code.

And I hereby direct that you be tried, etc.

XXIX.—WARRANT OF COMMITMENT ON A SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT OR FINE IF PASSED BY A MAGISTRATE.

(See Sections 245 and 258)

To the Superintendent (*or Keeper*) of the Jail at _____
 WHEREAS on the _____ day of _____ 19____, (*name of prisoner*), the (1st, 2nd, 3rd, *as the case may be*) _____ prisoner in case No. _____ of the Calendar for 19____, was convicted before me (*name and official designation*) of the offence (*mention the offence or offences concisely*) under section (*or sections*) of the Indian Penal Code (*or of Act* _____), and was sentenced to (*state the punishment fully and distinctly*):

This is to authorize and require you, the said Superintendent (*or Keeper*), to receive the said (*prisoner's name*) into your custody in the said jail, together with this warrant, and there carry the aforesaid sentence into execution according to law.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this _____ day of _____ 19____.
 (Seal.)

(Signature)

XXX.—WARRANT OF IMPRISONMENT ON FAILURE TO RECOVER AMENDS BY Attachment and sale.

(See Section 250.)

To the Superintendent (*or Keeper*) of the Jail at _____
 WHEREAS (*name and description*) has brought against (*name and description of the accused person*) the complaint that (*mention it concisely*) and the same has been dismissed as *false and frivolous* (*or vexatious*) and the order of dismissal awards payment by the said (*name of the complainant*) _____; and whereas _____ order has been _____

This is to authorize and require you, the said Superintendent (*or Keeper*), to receive the said (*name*) into your custody, together with this warrant, and him safely to keep in the said jail for the said period of (*term of imprisonment*), subject to the provisions of S 69 of the Indian Penal Code, unless the said sum be sooner paid, and on the receipt thereof, forthwith to set him at liberty, returning this warrant with an endorsement certifying the manner of its execution.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this
day of 19 .

(Seal)

(Signature.)

XXXI.—SUMMONS TO WITNESS.

(See Sections 68 and 252.)

To of

WHEREAS complaint has been made before me that
has (or is suspected to have) committed the offence of (*state the offence
concisely with time and place*), and it appears to me that you are likely
to give material evidence for the prosecution ;

You are hereby summoned to appear before this Court on the
day of next at ten o'clock in the
forenoon, to testify what you know concerning the matter of the said
complaint, and not to depart thence without leave of the Court ; and you
are hereby warned that, if you shall without just excuse neglect or refuse
to appear on the said date, a warrant will be issued to compel your
attendance.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this
day of 19 .

(Seal)

(Signature.)

XXXII —PRECEPT TO DISTRICT MAGISTRATE TO SUMMON JURORS AND ASSESSORS

(See Section 326)

To the District Magistrate of

WHEREAS a Criminal Session is appointed to be held in the Court
house at on the day of next,
and the names of the persons herein named, have been
furnished to this Court ; you are here
persons to attend at the said Court of Ses
and, within such date, to certify that you have done so in pursuance of
this precept.

(Here enter the names of Jurors and Assessors)

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this
day of 19 .

(Seal)

(Signature.)

XXXIII —SUMMONS TO ASSESSOR OR JUROR.

(See Section 328)

To (name) of (place)

PURSUANT to a precept directed to me by the Court of Session
of requiring your attendance as an Assessor (or a Juror) at the
next Criminal Session, you are hereby summoned to attend at
said Court of Session at (place), at ten o'clock in the
the day of next.

Given under my hand and the seal of office, this
day of 19 .
(Seal)

(Signature).

XXXIV.—WARRANT OF COMMITMENT UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH.

(See Section 374)

To the Superintendent (or Keeper) of the Jail at .
WHEREAS at the Session held before me on the . day
of 19 . (name of prisoner), the (1st, 2nd, 3rd, as the case may
be) prisoner in case No . of the Calendar at the said Session, was
duly convicted of the offence of culpable homicide amounting to murder
under section . of the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to
suffer death, subject to the confirmation of the said sentence by the
Court of .

This is to authorise and require you, the said Superintendent (or
Keeper), to receive the said (prisoner's name) into your custody in the
said jail, together with this warrant, and him there safely to keep until
you shall receive the further warrant or order of this Court, carrying into
effect the order of the said Court.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this
day of 19 .
(Seal)

(Signature.)

XXXV.—WARRANT OF EXECUTION ON A SENTENCE OF DEATH.

(See Section 381.)

To the Superintendent (or Keeper) of the Jail at .
WHEREAS (name of prisoner) the (1st, 2nd, 3rd, as the case may be)
prisoner in case No . of the Calendar at the Session held
before me on the . day of 19 ., has been by
warrant of this Court, dated the . day of ., com-
mitted to your custody under sentence of death, and whereas the order
of the . Court of . confirming the said sentence has been
received by this Court;

This is to authorise and require you, the said Superintendent (or
Keeper) to carry the said sentence into execution by causing the said
at (time and place)
an endorsement

day of 19 .
(Seal.)

(Signature)

XXXVI.—WARRANT AFTER A COMMUTATION OF A SENTENCE.

(See Sections 381 and 382)

To the Superintendent (or Keeper) of the Jail at .
WHEREAS at a Session held on the . day of 19 .
(name of prisoner), the (1st, 2nd, 3rd, as the case may be) prisoner in case
No . of the Calendar at the said Session, was convicted of the
offence of . punishable under section .

of the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to and was thereupon committed to your custody ; and whereas by the order of the Court of (a duplicate of which is hereunto annexed) the punishment adjudged by the said sentence has been commuted to the punishment of transportation for life (or as the case may be) ;

This is to authorize and require you, the said Superintendent (or Keeper), safely to keep the said (prisoner's name) in your custody in the said jail as by law is required, until he shall be delivered over by you to the proper authority and custody for the purpose of his undergoing the punishment of transportation under the said order.

or
if the mitigated sentence is one of imprisonment, say, after the words "custody in the said jail," "and there to carry into execution the punishment of imprisonment under the said order according to law."

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this
day of 19 .

(Seal)

(Signature.)

XXXVII—WARRANT TO LEVY A FINE BY Attachment AND SALE.

[See Section 386 (1) (a)]

To (name and designation of the Police-officer or other person or persons who is or are to execute the warrant)

WHEREAS (name and description of the offender) was on the day of 19 , convicted before me of the offence of (mention the offence concisely), and sentenced to pay a fine of rupees ; and whereas the said (name), although required to pay the said fine, has not paid the same or any part thereof ;

This is to authorize and require you to attach any moveable property belonging to the said (name) which may be found within the district of ; and if within (state the number of days or hours allowed) next after such attachment the said sum shall not be paid (or forthwith), to sell the moveable property attached or so much thereof as shall be sufficient to satisfy the said fine, returning this warrant with an endorsement certifying what you have done under it, immediately upon its execution.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this
day of 19 .

(Seal)

(Signature)

XXXVII-A.—BOND FOR APPEARANCE OF OFFENDER RELEASED PENDING REALISATION OF FINE.

(See Section 388)

Whereas I, (name), inhabitant of (place), have been sentenced to pay a fine of rupees and in default of payment thereof to undergo imprisonment for ; and whereas the Court has been pleased to order my release on condition of my executing a bond for my appearance on the following date or dates, namely :—

I hereby bind myself to appear before the Court of
at _____ *o'clock on the following date or dates, namely,*
and in case of making default herein, I bind myself to forfeit
to His Majesty the King, Emperor of India the sum of Rupees
Dated this _____ *day of* 19 _____ *(Signature)*
Where a bond with sureties is to be executed, add—We do hereby
declare ourselves sureties for the above-named _____ *that*
he will appear before the Court of _____
or dates, namely, _____
therein we bind ourselves jointly and severally _____
the King, Emperor of India the sum of rupees _____
(Signature).

XXXVIII.—WARRANT OF COMMITMENT IN CERTAIN CASES OF CONTEMPT WHEN A FINE IS IMPOSED

(See Section 480.)

To the Superintendent (or Keeper) of the Jail at _____
 WHEREAS at a Court holden before me on this day (*name and description of the offender*) in the presence (or view) of the Court committed wilful contempt;

And whereas for such contempt the said (*name of offender*) has been adjudged by the Court to pay a fine of rupees _____, or in default to suffer simple imprisonment for the space of (*state the number of months or days*);

This is to authorize and require you, the Superintendent (or Keeper) of the said jail to receive the said (*name of offender*) into your custody, together with this warrant, and him safely to keep in the said jail for the said period of (*term of imprisonment*) unless the fine be sooner paid, and on the receipt thereof, forthwith to set him at liberty, returning this warrant with an endorsement certifying the manner of its execution

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this
 day of _____ 19 _____

(Seal.)

(Signature)

XXXIX.—MAGISTRATE'S OR JUDGE'S WARRANT OF COMMITMENT OF WITNESS REFUSING TO ANSWER

(See section 485.)

To (*name and description of officer of Court*)

WHEREAS (*name and description*) being summoned (or brought before this Court) as a witness and this day required to give evidence on an inquiry into an alleged offence, refused to answer a certain question (or certain questions) put to him touching the said alleged offence, and duly recorded, without alleging any just excuse for such refusal, and for his contempt has been adjudged detention in custody for (*term of detention adjudged*);

This is to authorize and require you to take the said (*name*) into custody and him safely to keep in your custody for the space of _____ days unless in the meantime he shall consent to be examined and to answer the question asked of him, and on the last

of the said days, or forthwith on such consent being known, to bring him before this Court to be dealt with according to law, returning this warrant with an endorsement certifying the manner of its execution,

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this

day of 19 .

(Seal.)

(Signature.)

XL.—WARRANT OF IMPRISONMENT ON FAILURE TO PAY MAINTENANCE.

(See Section 488).

To the Superintendent (or Keeper) of the Jail at

WHEREAS (*name, description and address*) has been proved before me to be possessed of sufficient means to maintain his wife (*name*) [or his child (*name*), who is by reason of (*state the reason*) unable to maintain herself (or himself)] and to have neglected (or refused) to do so, and an order has been duly made requiring the said (*name*) to allow to his said wife (or child) for maintenance the monthly sum of rupees ; and whereas it has been further proved that

the said (*name*) in wilful disregard of the said order has failed to pay rupees , being the amount of the allowance for

the month (or months) of . And thereupon an order was made adjudging him to undergo simple (or rigorous) imprisonment in the said jail for the period of

This is to authorize and require you, the said Superintendent (or Keeper), to receive the said (*name*) into your custody in the said jail, together with this warrant, and there carry the said order into execution according to law, returning this warrant with an endorsement certifying the manner of its execution.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this

day of 19 .

(Seal.)

(Signature.)

XLI.—WARRANT TO ENFORCE THE PAYMENT OF MAINTENANCE BY Attachment and Sale

(See Section 488.)

To (*name and designation of the Police-officer or other person to execute the warrant*).

WHEREAS an order has been duly made requiring (*name*) to allow his said wife (or child) for maintenance the monthly sum of rupees , and whereas the said (*name*) in wilful disregard of the said order has failed to pay rupees , being

the amount of the allowance for the month (or months) of ;

This is to authorize and require you to attach any moveable property belonging to the said (*name*) which may be found within the district of , and if within (*state the number of days or hours allowed*) next after such attachment the said sum shall not be paid (or forthwith), to sell the moveable property attached, or so much thereof as shall be sufficient to satisfy the said sum, to

this warrant with an endorsement certifying what you have done under it, immediately upon its execution.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this

day of _____ 19 .

(Seal)

(Signature.)

XLII — BOND AND BAIL-BOND ON A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY BEFORE A MAGISTRATE.

(See Sections 496 and 499.)

I (name) of (place), being brought before the Magistrate of _____ (as the case may be) charged with the offence of _____, and required to give security for my attendance in his Court and at the Court of Session, if required, do bind myself to attend at the Court of the said Magistrate on every day of the preliminary inquiry into the said charge and, should the case be sent for trial by the Court of Session, to be, and appear, before the said Court when called upon to answer the charge against me; and, in case of my making default herein, I bind myself to forfeit to Her Majesty the Queen, Empress of India, the sum of rupees _____.

Dated this _____ day of _____ 19 .

(Signature.)

I hereby declare myself (or we jointly and severally declare ourselves and each of us) surety (or sureties) for the said (name) that he shall attend at the Court of _____ on every day of the preliminary inquiry into the offence charged against him, and, should the case be sent for trial by the Court of Session, that he shall be, and appear, before the said Court to answer the charge against him, and in case of his making default therein, I bind myself (or we bind ourselves) to forfeit to Her Majesty the Queen, Empress of India, the sum of rupees _____.

Dated this _____ day of _____ 19 .

(Signature.)

XLIII.—WARRANT TO DISCHARGE A PERSON IMPRISONED ON FAILURE TO GIVE SECURITY.

(See section 500.)

I, _____ (Magistrate for _____) of the District of _____

do hereby warrant that _____ (name) shall be discharged to your custody, unless he is liable to be detained for some offence under the Criminal Procedure Code; and I require you to discharge the said (name) from your custody, unless he is liable to be detained for some other matter.

This is to authorise and require you forthwith to discharge the said (name) from your custody, unless he is liable to be detained for some other matter.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this

day of _____ 19 .

(Seal.)

(Signature.)

XLIV.—WARRANT OF ATTACHMENT TO ENFORCE A BOND.

(See Section 514)

To the Police-officer in charge of the Police-station at . . .

WHEREAS (*name, description and address of person*) has failed to appear on (*mention the occasion*) pursuant to his recognizance, and has by such default forfeited to Her Majesty the Queen, Empress of India, the sum of rupees (*the penalty in the bond*); and whereas the said (*name of person*) has, on due notice to him, failed to pay the said sum or show any sufficient cause why payment should not be enforced against him ;

This is to authorize and require you to attach any moveable property of the said (*name*) that you may find within the district of . . . , by seizure and detention, and if the said amount be not paid within three days, to sell the property so attached or so much of it as may be sufficient to realise the amount aforesaid, and to make return of what you have done under this warrant immediately upon its execution.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this

day of . . . 19 . . .

(*Seal.*)

(*Signature.*)

XLV —NOTICE TO SURETY ON BREACH OF A BOND.

(See Section 514.)

To . . . of . . . day of . . . 19 . . .
WHEREAS on the . . . day of . . . 19 . . .
you became surety for (*name*) of (*place*) that he should appear before this Court on the . . . day of . . . and bound yourself to Her Majesty the Queen, Empress of India, and whereas the said (*name*) by reason of such default you

You are hereby required to pay the said penalty or show cause, within . . . days from this date, why payment of the said sum should not be enforced against you.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this

day of . . . 19 . . .

(*Seal*)

(*Signature*)

XLVI. —NOTICE TO SURETY OF FORFEITURE OF BOND FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.

(See Section 514)

To . . . of . . . day of . . . 19 . . .
WHEREAS on the . . . day of . . . 19 . . .
surety by a bond for (*name*) of (*place*) that he would be of good behaviour for the period of . . . and bound yourself in default thereof to forfeit the sum of rupees . . . to Her Majesty the Queen, Empress of India : and whereas the said (*name*) has been convicted of the offence of (*mention the offence concisely*) committed since you became such surety, whereby your security bond has become forfeited ;

You are hereby required to pay the said penalty of rupees . . . or to show cause within . . . days why it should not be forfeited . . .

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this
day of 19 .
(Seal.) _____ (Signature)

XLVII.—WARRANT OF ATTACHMENT AGAINST A SURETY.

(See Section 514)

To _____ of _____
WHEREAS (*name, description and address*) has bound himself as surety for the appearance of (*mention the condition of the bond*), and the said (*name*) has made default, and thereby forfeited to Her Majesty the Queen, Empress of India, the sum of rupees _____ (*the penalty in the bond*),

This is to authorize and require you to attach any moveable property of the said (*name*) which you may find within the district of _____, by seizure and detention; and, if the said amount be not paid within three days, to sell the property so attached, or as much of it as may be sufficient to realise the amount aforesaid, and make return of what you have done under this warrant immediately upon its execution

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this
day of 19 _____
(Seal.) _____ (Signature)

XLVIII.—WARRANT OF COMMITMENT OF THE SURETY OF AN ACCUSED PERSON ADMITTED TO BAIL.

(See Section 514)

To the Superintendent (or Keeper) of the Civil Jail at _____

WHEREAS (*name and description of surety*) has bound himself as a surety for the appearance of (*state the condition of the bond*) and the said (*name*) has therein made default, whereby the penalty mentioned in the said bond has been forfeited to Her Majesty the Queen, Empress of India: and whereas the said (*name of surety*) has, on due notice to him, failed to pay the said sum or show any sufficient cause why payment should not be enforced against him, and the same cannot be recovered by attachment and sale of moveable property of his, and an order has been made for his imprisonment in the Civil jail for (*specify the period*);

This is to authorize and require you, the said Superintendent (or Keeper), to receive the said (*name*) into your custody with this warrant and him safely to keep in the said jail for the said (*term of imprisonment*) and to return this warrant with an endorsement certifying the manner of its execution.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this
day of 19 _____
(Seal.) _____ (Signature.)

XLIX.—NOTICE TO THE PRINCIPAL OF FORFEITURE OF A BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE.

(See Section 514.)

To (*name, description and address*).

WHEREAS on the _____ day of _____ 19 , you entered into a bond not to commit, etc., (*as in the bond*), and proof of the forfeiture of the same has been given before me and duly recorded;

You are hereby called upon to pay the said penalty of rupees _____
 or to show cause before me within _____ days why payment
 of the same should not be enforced against you.

Dated this _____

day of _____

19 .

(Seal.)

(Signature).

**L.—WARRANT TO ATTACH THE PROPERTY OF THE PRINCIPAL
 ON BREACH OF A BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE.**

(See Section 514.)

To (name and designation of Police officer) at the Police-station of _____

WHEREAS (name and description) did on the _____ day of
 19 , enter into a bond for the sum of rupees _____ binding himself
 not to commit a breach of the peace, etc., (as in the bond) and proof
 of the forfeiture of the said bond has been given before me and duly
 recorded; and whereas notice has been given to the said (name) calling
 upon him to show cause why the said sum should not be paid, and he
 has failed to do so or to pay the said sum;

This is to authorize and require you to attach by seizure moveable
 property belonging to the said (name) to the value of rupees _____
 which you may find within the district of _____ and, if the said
 sum be not paid within _____, to sell the property so attached or
 so much of it as may be sufficient to realise the same, and to make
 return of what you have done under this warrant immediately upon
 its execution.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this
 day of _____ 19 .

(Seal)

(Signature)

**LI —WARRANT OF IMPRISONMENT ON BREACH OF A BOND TO KEEP
 THE PEACE**

(See Section 514)

To the Superintendent (or Keeper) of the Civil Jail at _____

WHEREAS proof has been given before me and duly recorded that
 (name and description) has committed a breach of the bond entered into
 by him to keep the peace, whereby he has forfeited to Her Majesty the
 Queen, Empress of India, the sum of rupees _____, and
 whereas the said (name) has failed to pay the said sum or to show
 cause why the said sum should not be paid although duly called upon to
 do so, and payment thereof cannot be enforced by a attachment of his
 moveable property, and an order has been made for the imprisonment of
 the said (name) in the Civil jail for the period of _____ term of imprisonment;

This is to authorize and require you, the said Superintendent (or
 Keeper) of the said Civil jail, to receive the said (name) into your custody
 together with this warrant and him safely to keep in the said jail for
 the said period of _____ term of imprisonment and to return this warrant with
 an endorsement certifying the manner of its execution.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this
 day of _____ 19 .

(Seal)

(Signature)

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- Apprehended danger*, temporary orders in case of—, (sec. 144)
- Approver*, tender of pardon to an—, 951,
 examination of—as a witness, 954,
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 prosecution of—for perjury, 964,
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- Arrest*, persons bound to aid police-officers and Magistrates making
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 Magistrate taking part in—of accused should not try the case, 1429;
 —of accused in appeal from acquittal, sec. 427.
- Assessors*, trial by jury of offence triable with—, 874, 1405;
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